LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION
G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991
LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge of
Branch 16 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and REGINALDO Y. LIM,
respondents.
Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
Madamba, Lim & Tan for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue of whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for
forcible entry and detainer or one for specific performance is the center of this litigation.
The facts are not disputed as related by the respondent Court of Appeals in its questioned
decision dated December 7, 1988 —
The record reveals that on October 23, 1987, the appellee, Reginaldo Y. Lim, had filed a
complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, in part, alleging, as follows:
3. Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building
adverted to in the next preceding paragraph, until they transferred to their present
residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City;
4. The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he
keeps some of his important belongings, such as his law books, important
documents, appliances, etc.;
5. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which all
the occupants of the various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in
and out therefrom;
6. Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the building
including plaintiff has been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock by Rafael
Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of defendant corporation;
7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of
September 30, 1987 to fetch three (3) of his law books, which he needed to read in
connection with a case he is handling, he was surprised to find out that the key
given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already changed;
1| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred
expenses in the sum of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases;
9. Plaintiff was only able to contact defendant through its Officer-in-Charge, Mr.
Rafael Lim, the following day, October 1, 1987, but his request for him to be
provided with the appropriate key produced negative result, hence, this suit where
plaintiff incurred expenses in the form of attorney's fees and costs of suit.
ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING ORDER
10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form part
of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;
11. The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key,
above-cited, constitutes a violation of the substantial rights of plaintiff, who has a
clear and unmistakable right to the use and enjoyment of Room 301 of the building
owned by defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order
commanding defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key in order to prevent
great and and/or irreparable damages and injury upon plaintiff.
In conclusion, the said appellee prayed, as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction/restraining order commanding
defendant to provide plaintiff the appropriate key or a duplicate key to the lock of
the main door of the building be immediately issued, and, after hearing the case on
its merits, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
ordering:
l. the injunction prayed for in the complaint;
2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory damages;
3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. the cost of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and/or remedies which the Honorable Court
may deem just and proper in the premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.)
The opening paragraphs of the questioned decision relate what had happened in the courts
below:
 LAW ON PROPERTY
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, grounded on pure
questions of law.
The case is simplicity itself.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation and is the owner of a building
located at 1231 Piedad Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila;
Public respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
16;
For sometime prior to the filing of this petition, Lim Eng Piao, father of private
respondent, occupied said premises as a dwelling unit at the above given address
together with all the members of his family. Lim Eng Piao subsequently died. Said
occupancy was continued by private respondent. Later, the latter was able to
acquire a house and lot at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon (sic). In spite of having
transferred residence, private respondent did not vacate Room 301 of the building
in question. Instead, he utilized the same as a place where he keeps some of his
important belongings, papers, books, documents and appliances . . .
On or about September 1987, petitioner changed the lock of the common main
door of the building.
On the morning of September 30, 1987, private respondent tried to go to Room
301 but found that the key given him could not fit and open the main door. As one
of the occupants of the building in question, private respondent demanded from
petitioner's officer-in-charge the delivery to him of the appropriate keys to the said
common main door so that he could enter the premises and be restored to
possession of said Room No. 301 of the building, but his efforts proved futile as the
officer in charge did not heed his demand . . .
On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster of private respondent
from said premises, he instituted Civil Case No. 122546 entitled Reginaldo Y. Lim
vs. Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial Court
which was raffled to Branch 25. Said complaint was denominated as an action for
damages with injunction despite the allegations contained therein . . .. The
aforesaid case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction . . .
On October 23, 1987, private respondent again instituted another action at the
Metropolitan Trial Court docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 which was raffled to
Branch 16. The complaint reiterated the same allegations . . .
2| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by respondent
judge pending trial on the merits, commanding petitioner to deliver the
appropriate keys to private respondent and allow him to enter the premises and
occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building . . .
On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted the instant petition;
On the same date after an ex-parte hearing, the Executive Judge of this Court, in
order to obviate any possible injustice pending the determination of the issuance
of the injunctive writ, issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the
enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by respondent
judge and from further taking cognizance of said Civil Case No. 122775; . . .
In ruling in favor of the private appellee, the appellee judge, in part, stated:
In this case force was used by petitioner to deprive private respondent of the
physical possession of Room 301 when the lock of the main door was changed
without his knowledge and consent.
The issued (sic) involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership (Mercado vs. Go Bio, 78
Phil. 279; Masallo, vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134).
The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title
to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by
strong hand, violence or terror . . . In affording this remedy, breaches of the peace
and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out of possession must respect
and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. (Supia and Batioco vs.
Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312).
Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Summary
Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied. A motion to dismiss being
one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Hence, the petition must fail on this score alone.
Anent the second issue, petitioner contended that when the amount of damages
claimed is not specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over the case would
fall under the Regional Trial Courts, as the failure to so allege would characterize
the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Petitioner's contentions is (sic) not well-taken.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
In Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514, the Supreme Court held that exemplary
damages must be specified and if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it,
if together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not
exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000.00).
As to moral damages, the aforesaid ruling can likewise be made to apply.
What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer
cases is NOT the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the
nature of the action because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main
action (Vichanco vs. Laurilla, L-13935, June 30, 1960).1
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit.2 A
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated May 9,
1990.3
Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of which is that the action being one for
specific performance the jurisdiction thereof is vested in the Regional Trial Court.
– POSSESSION
the possession of Room 301 of petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to
use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the
right of egress and ingress through the main door of the building. Through stealth,
petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving private respondent of the
possession of his rented room.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action
for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully
depriving or withholding possession from him4
This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant
or any other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof,
is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The petition must fail.

A reading of the allegations of the complaint show that private respondent and his family
resided in Room 301 of the building of petitioner until they transferred to their present
residence at No. 3 Igdalig St., Quezon City. However, private respondent retained possession
of said room to keep his important belongings, such as his law books, important documents,
appliances, etc. The building has only one common main door through which all the
occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and out.1âwphi1 Accordingly, all
occupants including private respondent were given a key to the main doorlock by
petitioner.

However, when private respondent wanted to go inside his room on September 30, 1987 to
get three (3) of his lawbooks which he needed to read in connection with a case he was then
handling, he found that the key he possessed was no longer compatible with the lock, i.e.,
the same was changed. Private respondent had to buy three (3) new lawbooks for Pl,253.00
to prepare for his cases. He requested private respondent to provide him the appropriate
key but his request was denied. Petitioner also alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable
right to the use of said room entitling him to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
to command petitioner to provide him the appropriate key to the lock of the main building;
and to pay damages in the amount of Pl,253.000, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the
suit.

From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one for
forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private respondent retained

3| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 116192 November 16, 1995
EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R
SP No. 322631 reversing the decision of the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of
June 29, 1994 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this
petition for review on certiorari.
This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by herein private
respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as
defendant, in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case
No. 899, which complaint alleges these material facts:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A of the
subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT No. T-147219, located
at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan, containing as area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of
the title is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is
declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached
as Annex "B" of this complaint;
3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid
but the same is being used and occupied by the defendant where a house was
constructed thereon;
4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it was found
out by the Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71
square meters, copy of the relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached as
Annex "C" hereof;
5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to remove the old
fence so that she could construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her
property, the defendant vehemently refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence
and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the said fence to construct a new one,
she would take action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;
4| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the fence
encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;
7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco for
settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced
by a certification to file action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the Lupon
Chairman, copy of the certification to file action is hereto attached as Annex "D" hereof;
8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is poor
but nevertheless she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent
to the defendant for conference and/or settlement but the defendant stood pat that she
will not allow the removal of the fence, thus depriving the plaintiff of the use and
possession of the said portion of her lot (71 square meters) which is being occupied by
the defendant for several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as
Annex "E" of this complaint;
9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to have the
fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of the possession and
she was forced to hire the services of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum
of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination of this case before this
Honorable Court. 2
xx xxx xxx
On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the defendant to file
her answer to the complaint.3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that
Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of motion for
extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers.4 Nonetheless, defendant
filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with Motion to Dismiss."5 Plaintiff filed and ex-parte
motion reiterating her contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with
motion was barred for reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to file an
answer is a prohibited pleading.6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding merit in
plaintiff's ex-parte motion, ordered that defendant's answer be stricken from the records
for having been filed out of time.7 The case was then submitted for decision.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the following decretal
portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the latter:
1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing the
plaintiff to remove the old fence permanently and (to) make the necessary
 LAW ON PROPERTY
enclosure of the area pertaining to the herein plaintiff containing an area of 280
square meters, more or less;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees.
No pronouncement as to damages;
3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit.8 (Corrections in parentheses supplied.)
Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the same was denied
by the trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993.9
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No DH-
121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower
appellate court rendered judgment, stating in part as follows:
A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries
led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide the instant appealed case based on (the) reason that the said case should be
one of question of ownership or accion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry
as the(re) was no allegation of prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as
required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff in
forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be said that
defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the plaintiff is
not the proper one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria,
as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial Court.
This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the defendant/appellant
considering that the resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot and academic.10
(Corrections in parentheses ours.)
Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration having been denied in said lower court's order
dated August 12, 1993, 11 she elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for
review on certiorari, purportedly on pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition
as a special civil action for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for
proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
12
On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13
reversing the decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of the municipal circuit
trial court, hence the present petition.
The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over
the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the
nature of the action, are determined by the averments in the complaint. 14 Accordingly, the
5| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
issue in the instant case can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of
the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent
reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but
essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria
on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right
to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entity, the possession
is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession
de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by
the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession
is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause
of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession. 15
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the
entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within
one year from the date of the last demand. 16
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry into
the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner
entered upon the land and constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on
whether petitioner's possession became legal before private respondent made a demand on
her to remove the fence. The complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by
petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed
by a fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the adjacent lot
belonging to her.
Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said fence was already
in existence on that lot at the time private respondent bought her own lot and it was only
after a relocation survey was made that it was found out that petitioner is allegedly
encroaching on the lot of the former. Consequently, there is here no contract, express or
implied, between petitioner and private respondent as would qualify it as a case of unlawful
detainer. Neither was it alleged that the possession of the disputed portion of said lot was
acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a
case of forcible entry.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's possession of the
controverted portion was by mere tolerance since that fact was never alleged in the former's
basic complaint, and this argument was raised in her later pleadings more as an
afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue that private respondent tolerated a state of
affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one
constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. 17
Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave rise to the
ejectment suit, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, for two reasons:
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the lawful possessor,
the violation of which right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for
in the Rules. If a period of one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is
filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the
inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be
that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is
in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court
— upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription from setting in — and summarily throw
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable, especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. 18
– POSSESSION
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action
for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through
the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary
ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case
of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo
until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership. 22
On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary to pass upon the
other issues raised in the petition at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is REINSTATED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the
land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. 19 The complaint must show enough on its face to give
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper
regional trial
court. 21

If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was
unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should
present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the
possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or
6| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
PEDRO P. PECSON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID and ERLINDA NUGUID, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 affirming in part the order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-41470.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case as gathered from the record are as follows:
Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon
City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty
taxes amounting to twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the
city Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983
to the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred
three thousand pesos (P103,000.00).
The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case No. Q-41470 before the RTC
of Quezon City. In its decision of 8 February 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to the
private respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the issue
concerning it was "not a subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the private respondents' motion
to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention that
the apartment building was included in the sale.3
Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 2931. In its decision of 30 April 1992,4 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
assailed decision. It also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included
in the auction sale of the commercial lot. Thus:
Indeed, examining the record we are fully convinced that it was only the land — without the
apartment building — which was sold at the auction sale, for plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes
due thereon. Thus, in the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property To Purchaser (Exh. K, p.
352, Record) the property subject of the auction sale at which Mamerto Nepomuceno was the
purchaser is referred to as Lot No. 21-A, Block No. K-34, at Kamias, Barangay Piñahan, with
an area of 256.3 sq. m., with no mention whatsoever, of the building thereon. The same
description of the subject property appears in the Final Notice To Exercise The Right of
Redemption (over subject property) dated September 14, 1981 (Exh. L, p. 353, Record) and
in the Final Bill of Sale over the same property dated April 19, 1982 (Exh. P, p. 357, Record).
Needless to say, as it was only the land without any building which Nepomuceno had acquired
at the auction sale, it was also only that land without any building which he could have legally
sold to the Nuguids. Verily, in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land executed by Mamerto
7| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
Nepomuceno in favor of the Nuguids on October 25, 1983 (Exh. U, p. 366, Record) it clearly
appears that the property subject of the sale for P103,000.00 was only the parcel of land, Lot
21-A, Blk. K-34 containing an area of 256.3 sq. meters, without any mention of any improvement,
much less any building thereon. (emphases supplied)
The petition to review the said decision was subsequently denied by this Court.5 Entry of
judgment was made on 23 June 1993.6
On November 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of
possession of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code.7 Acting
thereon, the trial court issued on 15 November 1993 the challenged order8 which reads as
follows:
Submitted for resolution before this Court is an uncontroverted [sic] for the Delivery of
Possession filed by defendants Erlinda Tan, Juan Nuguid, et al. considering that despite
personal service of the Order for plaintiff to file within five (5) days his opposition to said
motion, he did not file any.
In support of defendant's motion, movant cites the law in point as Article 546 of the Civil Code
...
Movant agrees to comply with the provisions of the law considering that plaintiff is a builder
in good faith and he has in fact, opted to pay the cost of the construction spent by plaintiff.
From the complaint itself the plaintiff stated that the construction cost of the apartment is
much more than the lot, which apartment he constructed at a cost of P53,000.00 in 1965 (par.
8 complaint). This amount of P53,000.00 is what the movant is supposed to pay under the
law before a writ of possession placing him in possession of both the lot and apartment would
be issued.
However, the complaint alleges in paragraph 9 that three doors of the apartment are being
leased. This is further confirmed by the affidavit of the movant presented in support of the
motion that said three doors are being leased at a rental of P7,000.00 a month each. The
movant further alleges in his said affidavit that the present commercial value of the lot is
P10,000.00 per square meter or P2,500,000.00 and the reasonable rental value of said lot is
no less than P21,000.00 per month.
The decision having become final as per Entry of Judgment dated June 23, 1993 and from this
date on, being the uncontested owner of the property, the rents should be paid to him instead
of the plaintiff collecting them. From June 23, 1993, the rents collected by plaintiff amounting
to more than P53,000.00 from tenants should be offset from the rents due to the lot which
according to movant's affidavit is more than P21,000.00 a month.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion, the Court hereby grants the following prayer that:
1. The movant shall reimburse plaintiff the construction cost of P53,000.00.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
2. The payment of P53,000.00 as reimbursement for the construction cost, movant Juan
Nuguid is hereby entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the Lot
and improvements thereon.
3. The movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the Lot in question as
per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should
pay rent to the movant of no less than P21,000.00 per month from said date as this is
the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.
4. The amount of P53,000.00 due from the movant is hereby offset against the amount
of rents collected by the plaintiff from June 23, 1993, to September 23, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial
court. Instead, on 18 November 1993, it issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff
"to place said movant Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property located at No. 79 Kamias
Road, Quezon City, with all the improvements thereon and to eject therefrom all occupants
therein, their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives."9
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the order of 15 November 1993, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
32679. 10 In its decision of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the
trial court citing Article 448 of the Civil Code. In disposing of the issues, it stated:
As earlier pointed out, private respondent opted to appropriate the improvement introduced
by petitioner on the subject lot, giving rise to the right of petitioner to be reimbursed of the
cost of constructing said apartment building, in accordance with Article 546 of the . . . Civil
Code, and of the right to retain the improvements until he is reimbursed of the cost of the
improvements, because, basically, the right to retain the improvement while the
corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on
which they are built . . . [2 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1992) p. 112].
With the facts extant and the settled principle as guides, we agree with petitioner that
respondent judge erred in ordering that "the movant having been declared as the
uncontested owner of the lot in question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated
June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no less than P21,000 per month
from said date as this is the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.
We, however, agree with the finding of respondent judge that the amount of P53,000.00
earlier admitted as the cost of constructing the apartment building can be offset from the
amount of rents collected by petitioner from June 23, 1993 up to September 23, 1993
which was fixed at P7,000.00 per month for each of the three doors. Our underlying
reason is that during the period of retention, petitioner as such possessor and receiving
the fruits from the property, is obliged to account for such fruits, so that the amount
thereof may be deducted from the amount of indemnity to be paid to him by the owner of
the land, in line with Mendoza vs. De Guzman, 52 Phil. 164 . . . .
8| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
The Court of Appeals then ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents have not yet indemnified
petitioner with the cost of the improvements, since Annex I shows that the Deputy Sheriff
has enforced the Writ of Possession and the premises have been turned over to the
possession of private respondents, the quest of petitioner that he be restored in
possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic, although it is but fair and just
that private respondents pay petitioner the construction cost of P53,000.00; and that
petitioner be ordered to account for any and all fruits of the improvements received by
him starting on June 23, 1993, with the amount of P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building on the
theory that he constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot, and that the key
issue in this case is the application of Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the parties, concerned themselves with the
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These articles read as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor
in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right
of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing
or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter
had acted in good faith. 12
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco
vs. Regalado: 13
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed
the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only
in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad
faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building
on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the part of
the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe
that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary
intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the
two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and
indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
– POSSESSION
unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be
allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which
the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the
landowner.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate
rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted
to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and
enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the
portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain
the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not having
been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income
therefrom.
It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's
determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to account for the rentals of
the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order of 15
November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470
are hereby SET ASIDE.

Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the
determined. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost apartment building on the lot. For this purpose, the parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence
of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient on the current market value of the apartment building. The value so determined shall be
reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, forthwith paid by the private respondents to the petitioner otherwise the petitioner shall be
however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.
Concepcion, Jr., 14 this Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various
fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material based on the market value of the No costs.
said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, 15 despite the finding that the useful improvement,
a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to SO ORDERED.
ten thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the
amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In
the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a useful
improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, 16 cited by the petitioner.

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved.
In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
17 that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such
a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him.
Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private
respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-

9| Elixir C. Langanlangan
Law on Property – Atty. Soraya laut
XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009
PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners,
vs.
FE S. FACTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution2 dated
April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397, which had affirmed the
Decision3 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch
198 in Civil Case No. LP-04-0160.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in
Almanza, Las Piñas City. The ownership of the land originated from respondent’s paternal
grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who had been in actual,
continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the land
even before 1906.4
On December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor filed a
Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title to the said parcel of
land, or Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Psu-253567, before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 71.5 On
December 8, 1994, the trial court granted the petition in LRC Case No. N-9049 and declared
the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor as co-owners of the property.
6 The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor thereafter sold seven (7)
hectares of the Factor family property during the same year. The siblings, except Enrique
Factor, respondent’s father, shared and divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves,
with the agreement that Enrique would have as his share the portion of the property located
in Antioch Street, Pilar Executive Village, Almanza I, Las Piñas City, known as the Factor
compound.
Following his acquisition thereof, Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the
compound including the subject property, a rest house, where members of the Factor family
stayed during get-togethers and visits.7 Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi,
were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound, particularly in No. 8 Antioch St.,
Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Piñas City since 1999.8
10 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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– POSSESSION
When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound
including the subject rest house and other residential houses for lease was transferred and
entrusted to Enrique’s eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao.
Gloria Factor-Labao, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao,
lived in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest house
because Gloria collected the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the Factor
compound. When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the administration and management of
the Factor compound including the subject rest house, passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor
as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that Ruben
Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent allowed him to stay at the rest
house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor family.
On May 31, 2002, Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On November 10, 2002,
Ruben Labao died.
At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the
rest house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then
audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully
deprived her and the Factor family of the subject property’s lawful use and possession.
Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an
unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to occupy the
premises, barred, threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on September 12,
2003, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint9 for forcible entry against herein petitioners
Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi.
Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of ownership of the subject property and
the alleged prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject
property was owned by Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved
into the subject property, while petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of Precy, remained in No. 8
Antioch St.
On July 13, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79 ruled in
favor of Fe S. Factor. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to:
1. To immediately vacate the subject premises and surrender possession thereof to
the plaintiff.
2. To pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time
they finally vacate the premises.
3. To pay attorney’s fee of Php 10,000.00.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
The counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 198, which, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC and later denied their motion for
reconsideration.11 Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals but it was denied also. Hence, the instant petition before us.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
I. [WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT THAT FORCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION AND STEALTH HAD BEEN
COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN OCCUPYING THE SUBJECT RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE;
II. [WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF
PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;
III. [WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL [TRIAL] COURT HOLDING
PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY THE MONTHLY RENTAL OF ₱2,000.00 FROM
DECEMBER 1, 2002 UP TO THE TIME THEY FINALLY VACATE PREMISES.12
The resolution of the first issue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the
sufficiency of the evidence presented below, a course of action which this Court will not do,
consistent with our repeated holding that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 13 The
resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to
certain exceptions, none of which is present in the instant petition. 14 Noteworthy, in this
case, the cited findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
As to the second issue, the resolution thereof boils down to a determination of who, between
petitioners and respondent, would be entitled to the physical possession of the subject
property.
Both parties anchor their right of material possession of the disputed property on their
respective claims of ownership. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a better right of
possession over the subject property since she inherited the subject property as the
surviving spouse and sole heir of Ruben Labao, who owned the property before his death.
Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of possession on the fact that her
predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property as early as 1975.
After careful consideration, we find in favor of the respondent.
11 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any
of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself.15 Possession de facto is the physical possession of
real property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible
entry case.16 This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party’s possession,
provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.17
Petitioners argue that respondent was never in possession of the subject property since the
latter never occupied the same. They claim that they have been in actual possession of the
disputed property from the time petitioner Precy married Ruben Labao in 2002.
In this instance, however, petitioners’ contention is unconvincing.
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of
every square inch of the property at all times.18 Possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or
by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.19 Possession
can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of
public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles.20
While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject property,
they failed to prove that they had prior possession of the subject property. On record,
petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses,
resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the subject property whenever they visit
the same.21 Likewise, as pointed out by the MeTC and the RTC, Ruben and petitioner Precy’s
marriage certificate revealed that at the time of their marriage, Ruben was residing at 123
A. Lake St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Even Ruben’s death certificate showed that his place of
death and residence was at #4 Labao St., Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. Considering that her
husband was never a resident of the subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain
convincingly how she was able to move in with Ruben Labao in the subject property during
their marriage.
On the other hand, it was established that respondent’s grandparents, Constantino Factor
and Maura Mayuga-Factor, had been the occupants and in possession of various agricultural
parcel of lands situated in Almanza, Las Piñas City, in the concept of owners, for more than
thirty years prior to 1975. In fact, the RTC in its Decision dated December 8, 1994 in LRC
Case No. N-9049 has confirmed the rights of respondent’s predecessors over the subject
property and ordered the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in their favor.22
 LAW ON PROPERTY
The right of respondent’s predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to
uphold respondent’s right to possession over the same. Respondent’s right to the property
was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their father’s death. 23 As heir,
respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from encroachments made or attempted
before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary rights even before
judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.24
After the death of Enrique Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao who took over
the administration of the subject property. And as a consequence of co-ownership,25 soon
after the death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the surviving co-owners, may be subrogated
to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the right to the administration and
management of the subject property.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ unsupported claim of possession must yield
to that of the respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her
predecessors-in-interest who have always been in possession of the subject property. Even
assuming that respondent was never a resident of the subject property, she could legally
continue possessing the property. Visiting the property on weekends and holidays is
evidence of actual or physical possession.26 The fact of her residence somewhere else, by
itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The law does not require
one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his possession. 27 For, again,
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession. 28 There is no cogent reason
to deviate from this doctrine.
All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved the
extent and character of her possession over the disputed property. As a consequence of her
ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession, considering petitioners’ failure
to prove prior possession. The Court stresses, however, that its determination of ownership
in the instant case is not final. It is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. It would not bar or prejudice a separate action between
the same parties involving the quieting of title to the subject property. 29
As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that the
respondent must demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation threat,
strategy or stealth. The Supreme Court, in Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines,30
explained:
In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not
have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all
12 | E l i x i r C . L a n g a n l a n g a n
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XU-College of Law, 2019-2020
– POSSESSION
that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.31
As expressly stated in David v. Cordova:32
The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open
daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but
without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor
from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be
maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily
implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other
party.33
Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the subject property even if she does not stay
in it. So when petitioners entered said property without the consent and permission of the
respondent and the other co-owners, the latter were deprived of its possession. Moreover,
the presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject
property constitutes force contemplated by Section 1, 34 Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.1avvphi1
As to the last issue, we have previously ruled that while the courts may fix the reasonable
amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property, they could not simply rely
on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. The reasonable
amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial notice but by supporting
evidence.35 In the instant case, we find no evidence on record to support the MeTC’s award
of rent.
On the matter of attorney’s fees awarded to the respondent, we are in agreement to delete
it. It is a well-settled rule that where attorney’s fees are granted, the court must explicitly
state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal
reason for the award.36 Again, nothing in the body of both decisions of RTC and MeTC
explicitly stated the reasons for the award of attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision dated January 16,
2006 and Resolution dated April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of rentals and attorney’s fees are
DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 150666 August 3, 2010
LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision1
dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48109 which
affirmed the September 29, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 135, ordering petitioners Luciano and Nelly Briones to remove the improvements
they have made on the disputed property or to pay respondent-spouses Jose and Fe
Macabagdal the prevailing price of the land as compensation.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent-spouses purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot
No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter land located in Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Piñas City,
Metro Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of Deeds
of Pasay City. On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent
to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of
Vergon, petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S.
After being informed of the mix up by Vergon’s manager, respondent-spouses immediately
demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners, however,
refused to heed their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an action to recover
ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati City.3
Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which
was consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergon’s agents over the seven (7)-year
period they were paying for the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good
faith and impleaded Vergon as third-party defendant claiming that because of the warranty
against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is decided
against them.4
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses and found that petitioners’ house was
undoubtedly built on Lot No. 2-R. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads
as follows:
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– POSSESSION
PREMISES CONSIDERED, let judgment be rendered declaring, to wit:
1. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2-R of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-147392
at Vergonville Subdivision, No. 10, Las Piñas, Metro Manila covered by TCT No.
62181 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City on which defendants have constructed
their house;
2. Defendants, jointly and severally, are ordered to demolish their house and vacate the
premises and return the possession of the portion of Lot No. 2-R as above-described
to plaintiffs within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, or in the alternative,
plaintiffs should be compensated by defendants, jointly and severally, by the
payment of the prevailing price of the lot involved as Lot No. 2-R with an area of 325
square meters which should not be less than ₱1,500.00 per square meter, in
consideration of the fact that prices of real estate properties in the area concerned
have increased rapidly;
3. Defendants, jointly and severally, pay to plaintiffs for moral damages with plaintiffs’
plans and dreams of building their own house on their own lot being severely
shattered and frustrated due to defendants’ incursion as interlopers of Lot No. 2-R in
the sum of ₱50,000.00;
4. Defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs in the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and,
5. to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Defendants’ counterclaim against plaintiffs is dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause
of action.
Defendants’ third-party complaint against third-party defendant Vergonville Realty and
Investments Corporation is likewise ordered dismissed for lack of cause of action and
evidently without merit.
On the other hand, defendants, jointly and severally, are liable for the litigation expenses
incurred by Vergonville Realty by way of counterclaim, which is also proven by the latter
with a mere preponderance of evidence, and are hereby ordered to pay the sum of
₱20,000.00 as compensatory damage; and attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱10,000.00
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding that the lot upon which petitioners built their
house was not the one (1) which Vergon sold to them. Based on the documentary evidence,
such as the titles of the two (2) lots, the contracts to sell, and the survey report made by the
geodetic engineer, petitioners’ house was built on the lot of the respondent-spouses.6 There
was no basis to presume that the error was Vergon’s fault. Also the warranty against
eviction under Article 1548 of the Civil Code was not applicable as there was no deprivation
of property: the lot on which petitioners built their house was not the lot sold to them by
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Vergon, which remained vacant and ready for occupation.7The CA further ruled that
petitioners cannot use the defense of allegedly being a purchaser in good faith for wrongful
occupation of land.8
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate
court.9 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING PETITIONERS TO DEMOLISH THEIR
ONLY HOUSE AND VACATE THE LOT AND TO PAY MORAL AND COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEE IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF PS[₱]
110,000; AND
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF THE LOWER COURT
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO
CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.10
In the main, it is petitioners’ position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners
insist that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon’s agents
when they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon, Felix
Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house when he signed the building permit.11
Also, petitioners are builders in good faith.12
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, we note that petitioners raise factual issues, which are beyond the scope of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. Well settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to the review of errors of law. The Court is not bound to
weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties, particularly where the findings of
both the trial court and the appellate court coincide. The resolution of factual issues is a
function of the trial court whose findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on
this Court, more so where these have been affirmed by the CA. 13 We note that the CA and
RTC did not overlook or fail to appreciate any material circumstance which, when properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case. Indeed, it is beyond cavil that
petitioners mistakenly constructed their house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot
No. 2-S.
However, the conclusiveness of the factual findings notwithstanding, we find that the trial
court nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or
to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 52714 of
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the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was
done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in
good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code
governs. Said article provides,
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.15 The builder
in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building
to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value
is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the
improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.17
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful
expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor
in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor
in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the
principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not
prefer to refund the amount expended.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the
subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value
of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,18 this case must be remanded to the RTC which shall
conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement
and of the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of
the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.
As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show
negligence on Vergon’s part. Petitioners’ claim is obviously one (1) for tort, governed by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis ours.)
Under this provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1)
the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.19 This the petitioners failed to
do. The President of Vergon signed the building permit as a precondition for its approval by
the local government, but it did not guarantee that petitioners were constructing the
structure within the metes and bounds of petitioners’ lot. The signature of the President of
Vergon on the building permit merely proved that petitioners were authorized to make
constructions within the subdivision project of Vergon. And while petitioners acted in good
faith in building their house on Lot No. 2-R, petitioners did not show by what authority the
agents or employees of Vergon were acting when they pointed to the lot where the
construction was made nor was petitioners’ claim on this matter corroborated by sufficient
evidence.
One (1) last note on the award of damages. Considering that petitioners acted in good faith
in building their house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis
for the award of moral damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the
award to Vergon of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees for the litigation expenses
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Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its Answer to
petitioners’ third-party complaint. Under Article 220820 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as
moral damages nor judicial costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed for—as was not
done in this case—and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for "such
other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable." 21 It must also be noted
that aside from the following, the body of the trial court’s decision was devoid of any
statement regarding attorney’s fees. In Scott Consultants & Resource Development
Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,22 we reiterated that attorney’s fees are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its
basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly
state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal
reason for the award of attorney’s fees.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 48109 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages in favor of
respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal and the award of compensatory damages and
attorney’s fees to respondent Vergon Realty Investments Corporation are DELETED. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, for further
proceedings consistent with the proper application of Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code, as follows:
1. The trial court shall determine:
a. the present fair price of the respondent-spouses’ lot;
b. the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of their house;
c. the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by
reason thereof; and
d. whether the value of said land is considerably more than that of the house built
thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional
Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a. The trial court shall grant the respondent-spouses a period of fifteen (15) days
within which to exercise their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code,
whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying to petitioners either
the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of the house,
or the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by
reason thereof, or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of said land. The
amounts to be respectively paid by the respondent-spouses and petitioners, in
accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party
and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such
notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party
entitled to receive it;
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION
b. The trial court shall further order that if the respondent-spouses exercises the
option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects
such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the house, petitioners shall give written notice
of such rejection to the respondent-spouses and to the Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the respondent-spouses’ option to sell the land. In that
event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice
of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the
Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement
is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after
the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms
of the lease, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The
period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from
the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since
petitioners have occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be
increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease.
Petitioners shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the
house. Upon expiration of the two (2)-year period, or upon default by
petitioners in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, the
respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover
their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or at the latter’s
expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by petitioners to the
Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such tender shall constitute
evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the
Court.
c. In any event, petitioners shall pay the respondent-spouses reasonable
compensation for the occupancy of the respondent-spouses’ land for the period
counted from the year petitioners occupied the subject area, up to the
commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;
d. The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its Decision shall be inextendible,
and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due
to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order
of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for
compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the
obligee.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

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 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 174191 January 30, 2013
NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA GALABO, and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 of petitioner Nenita Quality Foods
Corporation (NQFC) to nullity the February 22, 2006 Decision2 and the July 13, 2006
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006. The CA reversed the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which affirmed in toto
the decision5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, Branch 5, in Civil
Case No. 10,958-E-01. The MTCC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry and damages,
which respondents Crisostomo Galabo, Adelaida Galabo, and Zenaida Galabo-Almachar filed
against NQFC.
The Factual Antecedents
The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 102,
PSD-40060, the former Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City with an area of
six thousand seventy-four square meters (6,074 sq. m.).
As the CA summarized in the assailed decision, the respondents are the heirs of Donato
Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation
in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation.
Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original
survey of 1916 to 1920.
When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation
in the 1950s, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No.
102; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-214966 for Lot No. 722
on April 26, 1953, Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents, however, continue to
posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.
When NQFC opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the late 1950s, it
allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined and to ward off further offers, put up
"Not For Sale" and "No Trespassing" signs on the property. In the 1970s, Crisostomo fenced
off the entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it.
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On August 19, 1994, the respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that
they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of
Rights (Deed of Transfer)7 dated July 10, 1972, which the respondents and their mother
allegedly executed in Santos’ favor. The respondents denied this claim and maintained that
they had been occupying Lot No. 102, which the BOL itself recognized per its letters 8 and
the Certification9 dated April 12, 2000 confirming Donato as the long-time occupant and
awardee of the property. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for free patent over
Lot No. 102 on September 6, 2000.
On January 3, 2001 and again on a later date, NQFC’s workers, with armed policemen of
Toril, Davao City, entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the
entry to the authorities. On April 16, 2001, Crisostomo received a letter from NQFC’s counsel
demanding that he remove his house from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the
existing fence and cut down various trees that the respondents had planted on the property.
NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102
after he purchased it from the respondents in 1972 and declared it under his name for
taxation purposes. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau of
Lands, and obtained Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-403510 on June 18, 1974. On
December 29, 2000, the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102 to NQFC via the Deed of
Absolute Sale11 of even date. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation of the respondents’
patent application over Lot No. 102, which the BOL-Manila granted on April 19, 2001, on
the ground that Donato failed to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has long been titled
in Santos’ name.
When conciliation failed, the respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a complaint 12 for
forcible entry with damages before the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been
in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession
through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth.
The Ruling of the MTCC
Relying on the ruling of the BOL-Manila, the MTCC dismissed the respondents’ complaint,13
explaining that the questions raised before it required technical determination by the
administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters, which the BOL-Manila
did in this case.14
The MTCC held that the pieces of evidence NQFC presented – the Deed of Transfer the
respondents executed in Santos’ favor, Santos’ OCT P-4035 over Lot No. 102, the Deed of
Absolute Sale in NQFC’s favor, and the findings of the BOL-Manila – established NQFC’s
rightful possession over the property. It further held that: (1) the respondents relinquished
their rights over Lot No. 102 when they executed the Deed of Transfer in Santos’ favor; (2)
the certificate of title over Lot No. 102 in Santos’ name shows that he was in actual physical
 LAW ON PROPERTY
possession since actual occupation is required before an application for free patent can be
approved; and (3) NQFC validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 102 when it purchased it
from Santos, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess the property as ancillary to
such ownership.
The Ruling of the RTC
The respondents appealed the MTCC decision to the RTC but the latter court denied the
appeal.15 As the MTCC did, the RTC relied on the findings of the BOL-Manila. It held that: (1)
the respondents failed to perfect whatever right they might have had over Lot No. 102; and
(2) they are estopped from asserting any right over Lot No. 102 since they have long
transferred the property and their right thereto, to Santos in 1972.
In resolving the issue of possession of Lot No. 102, the RTC also resolved the question of
ownership, as justified under the Rules, explaining that the NQFC’s possession of Lot No.
102 was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the respondents was based
merely on the allegation of possession and occupation by Donato, and not on any title.16
Thus, the question of concurrent possession of Lot No. 102 between NQFC and the
respondents should tilt in NQFC’s favor.
When the RTC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration in an order17 dated
March 5, 2003, the respondents elevated their case to the CA via a petition for review. 18
The Ruling of the CA
The respondents claimed before the CA that the RTC erred when it held that NQFC had prior
possession of Lot No. 102, based solely on its Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued, among
others, that: (1) Santos should have taken the necessary steps to oust the respondents had
he been in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972; (2) Santos could not have validly
obtained title over Lot No. 102 since it was still in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) as of 1980;19 and (3) NQFC no longer had to forcibly evict the respondents in
January 2001 if it had been in possession of Lot No. 102 after it bought this land from Santos
in 2000.
The CA found reversible error in the RTC’s decision; thus, it granted the respondents’
petition and ordered NQFC to vacate Lot No. 102. The CA explained that a plaintiff, in a
forcible entry case, only has to prove prior material and physical possession of the property
in litigation and undue deprivation of it by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. These, the respondents averred in the complaint and sufficiently proved, thus
entitling them to recover possession of Lot No. 102. Relying on the doctrine of presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, the CA especially took note of the letters
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– POSSESSION
and the Certification which the BOL sent to the respondents acknowledging Donato as the
awardee of Lot No. 102 and the respondents as the actual occupants and possessors.
In brushing aside the RTC’s findings, the CA ruled that: (1) Donato’s failure to perfect his
title over Lot No. 102 should not weigh against the respondents as the issue in a forcible
entry case is one of possession de facto and not of possession de jure; and (2) NQFC’s
ownership of Lot No. 102 is beside the point as ownership is beyond the purview of an
ejectment case. The title or right of possession, it stressed, is never an issue in a forcible
entry suit. The CA, however, denied the respondents’ prayer for moral damages and
attorney’s fees, and rejected the other issues raised for being irrelevant.
In its July 13, 2006 resolution,20 the CA denied NQFC’s motion for reconsideration,
prompting the NQFC’s present recourse.
The Petition
NQFC argues that the CA erred in holding that the respondents had prior physical
possession of Lot No. 102.21 It claims that, first, in reversing the RTC findings, the CA relied
solely on the letters and the Certification of the BOL,22 which has been controverted by the
following pieces of evidence, among others: (1) the Deed of Transfer that the respondents
executed in favor of Santos; (2) the order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ patent
application; (3) Santos’ OCT P-4035; and (4) the Deed of Absolute Sale that Santos executed
in favor of NQFC.
NQFC maintains that the Bureau of Lands would not have granted Santos’ free patent
application had he not been in possession of Lot No. 102 because continued occupation and
cultivation, either by himself or by his predecessor-in-interest, of the property is a
requirement for such grant under the Public Land Act. By the very definition of "occupy,"
Santos is therefore deemed to have possessed Lot No. 102 prior to 1974, the year his free
patent application was granted,23 and under the principle of tacking of possession, he is
deemed to have had possession of Lot No. 102 not only from 1972, when the respondents
transferred it to him, but also from the time Donato acquired the lot in 1948. Thus, Santos
had no reason to oust the respondents since he had been in possession of Lot No. 102
beginning 1972, by virtue of the transfer.24
Second, the respondents had no documents to prove that they were in actual occupation
and cultivation of Lot No. 102 – the reason they did not heed the BOL’s request to perfect
their title over it. Finally, citing jurisprudence,25 NQFC argues that the RTC rightly ruled on
the issue of its ownership over Lot No. 102 in deciding the issue of prior physical possession
as the Rules allow this, by way of exception.26
The Case for Respondents
 LAW ON PROPERTY
The respondents’ arguments closely adhere to the CA’s ruling. They argue that NQFC, rather
than meeting the issues, focused on its alleged ownership of Lot No. 102 and the possession
flowing out of its ownership. They deny ever meeting Santos and they maintain that their
continued possession and occupation of Lot No. 102 belie this supposed sale. Even granting
that this sale occurred, Santos could still not have acquired any right over Lot No. 102 for as
of 1980, it was still in the name of the Republic. 27 Thus, they could not have transferred
ownership of Lot No. 102 to Santos, and he cannot claim ownership of Lot No. 102 by reason
of this sale.28
On the other hand, the respondents’ open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse
possession of Lot No. 102 for three decades, coupled by a claim of ownership, gave them
vested right or interest over the property.29 This vested right is equivalent to an actually
issued certificate of title so that the execution and delivery of the title is a mere formality.
To say the least, NQFC did not have to send them a formal demand to vacate30 and violently
oust them from the premises had it been in actual possession of the property as claimed. 31
Lastly, the respondents invoked the settled rule that the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45
petition is limited only to reviewing errors of law. NQFC failed to show misapprehension of
facts in the CA’s findings to justify a departure from this rule.32
The Court’s Ruling
We first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily
requires us to delve into factual issues, a course not proper in a petition for review on
certiorari, for a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. 33 This
rule is read with the equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally
conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable by this Court. 34 By way of
exception, we resolve factual issues when, as here, conflict attended the findings of the
MTCC and of the RTC, on one hand, and of the CA, on the other. Of minor note, but which we
deem important to point, the petition needlessly impleaded the CA, in breach of Section 4,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.35
Substantively, the key issue this case presents is prior physical possession – whether NQFC
had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102.
We rule in the negative.
First, on the reliance on the BOL letters and Certification and the CA’s alleged disregard of
NQFC’s evidence. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the
Deed of Transfer, Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the
Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ free patent application. In presenting these pieces of
evidence, NQFC is apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that is at issue as
an attribute of ownership to actual possession. The latter type of possession is, however,
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– POSSESSION
different from and has different legal implications than the former. While these documents
may bear weight and are material in contests over ownership of Lot No. 102, they do not
per se show NQFC’s actual possession of this property.
We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated
by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible
entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or
material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal
concepts36 for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. 37 As
we explained in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,38 and again in the more recent cases of Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals,39 De Grano v. Lacaba,40 and Lagazo v. Soriano,41 the word "possession"
in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession
de facto, not possession de jure42 or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.43
Title is not the issue,44 and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief
from the parties in an ejectment case."45
Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him." 46 He
cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by its owners.47 For these reasons,
an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only at providing an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession.48 Ejectment suits are intended to "prevent breach of
x x x peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and
resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his."49 Thus, lest the purpose of these
summary proceedings be defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided unless
it is necessary to resolve the issue of de facto possession.
We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely addressing the issue of possession
and presenting evidence showing that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot
No. 102, the former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of Lot No. 102 and
presented documents to this effect. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972
is uncorroborated. Even the tax declarations under Santos’ name are hardly of weight; "tax
declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession. They are
merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner"50 but not necessarily of the actual
possession required in forcible entry cases.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry, and
unlawful detainer, is proper:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
 LAW ON PROPERTY
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express
or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
– POSSESSION
As a final reiterative note, this Decision deals only with de facto possession and is without
prejudice to an appropriate action for recovery of possession based on ownership.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition; the decision
dated February 22, 2006 and the resolution dated July 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77006 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove:
(1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the
defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. 51 As in any civil case, the
burden of proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must
establish their case by preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents
sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements.

To support its position, NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it
bought Lot No. 102 from Santos on December 29, 2000, its possession is, by operation of
law, tacked to that of Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato acquired Lot No. 102 in
1948.

NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law52 allows a present possessor to
tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the
property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to
possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required
for acquiring or losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate – possession in
forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.

The CA brushed aside NQFC’s argument on the respondents’ failure to perfect their title over
Lot No. 102. It held that the issue in this case is not of possession de jure, let alone ownership
or title, but of possession de facto.1âwphi1 We agree with the CA; the discussions above are
clear on this point.

We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be
material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow
this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court53 provides that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with
the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this
limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.54 Save for this instance,
evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case.55

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 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 147951 December 14, 2009
ARSENIO OLEGARIO and Heirs of ARISTOTELES F. OLEGARIO, represented by
CARMELITA GUZMAN-OLEGARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO C. MARI, represented by LILIA C. MARI-CAMBA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be possession
under a claim of title or must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one
who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not in the concept of an
owner and such possessory acts, no matter how long continued, do not start the running of
the period of prescription.
In the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioners assail the April 18, 2001
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52124, reversing the October 13,
1995 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan, Branch 39. The CA declared
the respondent herein as the owner of Lot Nos. 17553, 17526 and 14356 of the Mangatarem
cadastral survey.
Factual antecedents
As early as 1916,4 Juan Mari, the father of respondent, declared his ownership over a parcel
of land in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same by
delineating the limits with a bamboo fence,5 planting various fruit bearing trees and
bamboos6 and constructing a house thereon.7 After a survey made in 1950, Tax Declaration
No. 80488 for the year 1951 specified the subject realty as a residential land with an area of
897 square meters and as having the following boundaries: North - Magdalena Fernandez;
South - Catalina Cacayorin; East - Camino Vecinal; and West - Norberto Bugarin. In 1974,
the subject realty was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari, by virtue of a deed of sale.
Meanwhile, in 1947, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father
of petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a new tax declaration 9 for a certain 50-square meter
parcel of land, indicating the following boundaries: North - Cesario and Antonio Fernandez;
South - Juan Mari; East - Barrio Road; and West - Norberto Bugarin. Then on May 14, 1961,
Wenceslao Olegario executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of Unregistered Property"10 in favor of
Arsenio Olegario transferring to the latter inter alia the aforementioned 50-square meter
property.
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– POSSESSION
In the cadastral survey conducted from 1961 to 1962, the subject realty was identified as
Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356 of the Mangatarem Cadastre. At this time, Wenceslao
Olegario disputed Juan Mari’s claim over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17553. Hence, on the two
corresponding survey notification cards dated September 28, 1968,11 the claimant appeared
as "Juan Mari v. Wenceslao Olegario". With regard to Lot No. 14356, the survey notification
card named Juan Mari as the claimant.
Sometime around 1988, respondent filed with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners because of their
encroachment into the disputed realty. After investigation, said office decided in favor of the
respondent and found the latter to be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356.
Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision became final and executory.
In 1989, Arsenio Olegario caused the amendment of his tax declaration 12 for the 50-square
meter property to reflect 1) an increased area of 341 square meters; 2) the Cadastral Lot
No. as 17526, Pls-768-D;13 and 3) the boundaries as: North-NE Lot 16385 & Road; South-
NW-Lots 14363 & 6385, Pls-768-D; East-SE-Lot 17552, Pls-768-D and West-SW-Lot 14358,
Pls-768-D.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
In 1990, after discovering the amended entries in Arsenio Olegario's Tax Declaration No.
4107-R, respondent filed a complaint14 with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Recovery
of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration No. 4107-R. Respondent alleged, inter alia,
that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor, was deprived by the Olegarios of the
possession of portions of subject realty which respondent owned. Trial thereafter ensued.
On October 13, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, viz:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the defendants-Olegario the owners of Lots 17553 and 17526 of the
Mangatarem cadastral survey.
2. Dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint on the ground of prescription of action and on
the further ground that [he] failed to prove [his] ownership of any portion of the two
lots mentioned in the next preceding paragraph (assuming arguendo that [his] action
has not prescribed);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of this suit. No damages are awarded by the
Court. SO ORDERED.15
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court's findings. The CA found
respondent to have adduced stronger evidence of prior possession and ownership of the
disputed realty. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated October 13, 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is hereby entered declaring appellant Pedro C. Mari represented by Lilia C.
Mari-Camba the lawful owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356 of the Mangatarem
Cadastre, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.16
Petitioners, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, thereafter filed
the present petition for review.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not there was failure on [the part of] the Court of Appeals to appreciate
and give weight to the evidence presented by the petitioners;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision in adjudicating ownership
of the said lots in favor of the respondent and [in] giving great weight to the
respondent’s evidence;
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to declare the action as barred
by laches;
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to find an[d] declare the petitioners as
having acquired ownership of the disputed lots by acquisitive prescription;
5. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in adjudicating the lot in favor of
respondent and also [in] denying award of damages to petitioners.17
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners contend that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or
thereabouts, or for more than 30 years already. Hence, they acquired ownership thereover
by virtue of prescription. They also impute negligence or failure on the part of respondent
to assert his alleged rights within a reasonable time.
Respondent's Arguments
On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners claim ownership over only a certain
50-square meter parcel of land, as evidenced by their tax declaration which consistently
declared only such area. It was only in September 1989 that petitioners sought to expand
the area of their claim to 341 square meters by virtue of a letter to the Provincial Assessor
of Pangasinan. Hence, respondent asserts that prescription has not set in. Respondent also
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– POSSESSION
contends that petitioners' occupancy has been illegal from the point of inception and thus,
such possession can never ripen into a legal status.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners' Evidence is Weak
Considering the conflicting findings of the RTC and the CA, a circumstance that constitutes
an exception18 to the general rule that only questions of law are proper subjects of a petition
under Rule 45, we shall assess and weigh the evidence adduced by the parties and shall
resolve the questions of fact raised by petitioners.
A study of the evidence presented by petitioners shows that the CA did not err in finding
such evidence weaker than that of respondent. Arsenio Olegario testified that as early as
1937 their family had built a nipa house on the land where they lived. Yet he also testified
that the former owner of the land was his mother, Magdalena Fernandez. 19 Significantly,
Magdalena Fernandez has never claimed and was never in possession or ownership of Lot
Nos. 17553, 17526 and 14356. Petitioners’ evidence thus supports the conclusion that in
1937 they were in possession, not of Lot No. 17526, but of their mother’s land, possibly 50
square meters of it, which is the approximate floor area of the house. Conversely,
petitioners' evidence fails to clearly prove that in 1937 they were already occupying the
disputed lots. The records, in fact, do not show exactly when the Olegarios entered and
started occupying the disputed lots.
The evidence shows that a hollow block fence, an improvement introduced by the Olegarios
in 1965, now exists somewhere along the disputed lots. Petitioners' claim that they were in
possession of the disputed lots even prior to 1965 based on the existence of the bamboo
fence on the boundary of their land preceding the existence of the hollow block fence,
however, holds no water. The testimony of Marcelino Gutierrez shows that formerly there
was a bamboo fence demarcating between the land of the Olegarios and the Maris and that
in 1964 or 1965 a hollow block fence was constructed. He did not say, however, that the
place where the hollow block fence was constructed was the exact same place where the
bamboo boundary fence once stood. Even the testimony of Arsenio Olegario was ambiguous
on this matter, viz:
Q When was the [concrete] hollow block [fence] separating your property [from] the
property of Juan Mari constructed?
A It was constructed in 1965.
Q Before the construction of that concrete hollow block fence between your land and the
land of Juan Mari [in] 1965, what was the visible boundary between your land and the
land of Juan Mari?
 LAW ON PROPERTY
A Bamboo fence, sir.20
Arsenio merely testified that a bamboo fence was formerly the visible boundary between
his land and the land of Juan Mari; and that a concrete hollow block fence was constructed
in 1965. His testimony failed to show that the concrete hollow block fence was constructed
in the same position where the bamboo boundary fence once stood.
On the other hand, there is ample evidence on record, embodied in Tax Declaration No. 9404
for the year 1947; the survey sketch plan of 1961; and the survey plan of 1992, that the
boundary claimed by the Olegarios kept moving in such a way that the portion they occupied
expanded from 50 square meters (in the land of his mother) to 377 square meters.21 Viewed
in relation to the entire body of evidence presented by the parties in this case, these
documents cannot plausibly all be mistaken in the areas specified therein. As against the
bare claim of Arsenio22 that his predecessor merely made an inaccurate estimate in
providing 50 square meters as the area claimed by the latter in 1947 in the tax declaration,23
we find it more plausible to believe that each of the documents on record stated the true
area measurements of the parties' claims at the particular time each document was
executed.1avvphi1
As correctly found by the CA, the earliest that petitioners can be considered to have
occupied the disputed property was in 1965 when the concrete hollow block fence was
constructed on the disputed lots.
Ownership and Prescription
As previously mentioned, respondent's predecessor, Juan Mari, had declared the disputed
realty24 for tax purposes as early as 1916. The tax declarations show that he had a two storey
house on the realty. He also planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos thereon. The records 25
also show that the 897-square meter property had a bamboo fence along its perimeter. All
these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in possession of subject realty in the
concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 or long before petitioners entered the
disputed realty sometime in 1965.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code,26 the respondent is the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he has been in
possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners acquired joint
possession only sometime in 1965.
Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, petitioners did not acquire
ownership. Firstly, they had no just title. Petitioners did not present any document to show
how the titles over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17533 were transferred to them, whether from
respondent, his predecessor, or any other person.27 Petitioners, therefore, could not acquire
the disputed real property by ordinary prescription through possession for 10 years.
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– POSSESSION
Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, occupation and use, however
long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. 28 In other words,
possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under
claim of title, that is, it must be adverse.29lawphil
Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely tolerated by
the owner - did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession is
continued, it does not start the running of the prescriptive period. 30 Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest
title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There
should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstance as to
manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.31
Petitioners have failed to prove that their possession was adverse or under claim of title or
right. Unlike respondent, petitioners did not have either the courage or forthrightness to
publicly declare the disputed lots as owned by them for tax purposes. Tax declarations
"prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere
desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and
other interested parties".32 Petitioners' omission, when viewed in conjunction with
respondent's continued unequivocal declaration of ownership over, payment of taxes on
and possession of the subject realty, shows a lack of sufficient adverseness of the formers’
possession to qualify as being one in the concept of owner.
The only instance petitioners assumed a legal position sufficiently adverse to respondent's
ownership of the disputed properties was when they declared Lot No. 17526 for tax
purposes in their name in 1989.33 Since then and until the filing of the complaint for
recovery of possession in 1990, only one year had elapsed. Hence, petitioners never
acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription of the subject realty.
On the other hand, being the sole transferree of his father, respondent showed through his
tax declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he, through his predecessor,
had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916. "Open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period - ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property."34 Ownership of immovable property is acquired by extraordinary prescription
through possession for 30 years.35 For purposes of deciding the instant case, therefore, the
possession by respondent and his predecessor had already ripened into ownership of the
subject realty by virtue of prescription as early as 1946.
Laches
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION
Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or SO ORDERED.
delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it had earlier abandoned or declined to assert it.

The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting
complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will
assert the right on which he bases his suit and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.36

In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice and
knew all along the position of the respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they were
standing pat on his ownership over the subject realty. This stand of respondent and his
predecessor was recorded and clearly visible from the notification survey cards. 37 From
1968, the date of the cards, until 1989 there was nothing to indicate any change in the
position of any of the parties. Moreover, that respondent had not conceded ownership and
possession of the land to petitioners is clear also from the fact that Pedro Mari continued to
declare the entire 897-square meter property in his name and pay taxes for the entire area
after his father transferred the property to him.

On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by
changing the area of the property declared in their name from 50 square meters to 341
square meters and specifying the details to make it appear that the tax declaration for the
50-square meter property pertained to Lot No. 17526. As previously discussed, it was only
at this point, in 1989, that it can be clearly stated that petitioners were making their claim
of ownership public and unequivocal and converting their possession over Lot No. 17526
into one in the concept of owner.

Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners’ position over
the disputed land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for
recovery of possession and nullification of tax declaration. Hence, we find no laches in the
instant case.

In conclusion, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in recognizing the ownership
and right of possession of respondent over Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356. There is, thus,
also no basis for an award of damages and attorney’s fees in favor of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 18, 2001 is AFFIRMED.

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 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 169956 January 19, 2009
SPOUSES JONEL PADILLA and SARAH PADILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
ISAURO A. VELASCO, TEODORA A. VELASCO, DELIA A. VELASCO, VALERIANO A.
VELASCO, JR., IDA A. VELASCO, AMELITA C. VELASCO, ERIBERTO C. VELASCO, JR., and
CELIA C. VELASCO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 dated February 11, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated October 4, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69997 entitled “Isauro A. Velasco, Teodora A.
Velasco, Delia A. Velasco, Valeriano A. Velasco, Jr., Ida A. Velasco, Amelita C. Velasco, Eriberto
C. Velasco, Jr. and Celia C. Velasco v. Spouses Jonel Padilla and Sarah Padilla.”
The facts
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondents are the heirs of Dr. Artemio A. Velasco (Artemio), who died single and without
any issue on January 22, 1949. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No. 2161 consisting
of 7,791 square meters situated at Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, covered by
Tax Declaration No. 4739. Artemio acquired the lot from spouses Brigido Sacluti and
Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale dated February 14, 1944.
In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and
Teresita Padilla (Solomon spouses).
Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused. The
matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of trees in the area, fenced
it and built a house thereon. They harvested the crops and performed other acts of dominion
over the property.
On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting and
damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna.
They asked the court to order petitioners to vacate the property and to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
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– POSSESSION
Isauro A. Velasco (Isauro), the brother of the deceased Artemio, as administrator of the
property, was presented as a witness. He testified that Artemio owned the property. As
evidence thereof, he presented the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan executed by spouses
Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial in favor of Artemio, and declared that he (Isauro) was
present during the signing of the instrument. He offered in evidence tax declarations and
tax receipts covering Lot No. 2161 which were all in the name of Artemio. A certification
from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) was likewise presented by Isauro which states
that based on the records of the LRA, Decree No. 403348 was issued on October 10, 1930
covering Lot No. 2161.3
Rolando R. Flores, a geodetic engineer, also testified that on January 16, 1993, upon prior
notice to petitioners, he conducted a survey of the land based on the technical description
of the property and the map from the Bureau of Lands. The purpose of the survey was to
verify if the area occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161. Upon his examination and based
on his survey, he concluded that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161.4
On the other hand, petitioners averred that the Solomon spouses owned the property; that
the said spouses bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by a deed of sale
dated September 4, 1987; that the land was identified as Lot No. 76-pt, consisting of 10,000
square meters, located at Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna; and that the spouses authorized
petitioners to occupy the land and introduce improvements thereon.
Petitioners further claimed that subsequent to the sale of the property to the Solomon
spouses, Lot No. 76-pt. was levied on in Civil Case No. 320 under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Pagsanjan, Laguna. The case was entitled “Rural Bank of Pagsanjan,
Inc. v. Spouses Hector and Emma Velasco, Valeriano Velasco and Virginia Miso.” Petitioners
alleged that Valeriano Velasco obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, with
Hector Velasco as co-maker, and the land was mortgaged by Valeriano as collateral.
Valeriano’s failure to pay the loan caused the foreclosure of the land, and on September 17,
1980, Lot No. 76-pt was sold at a public auction by the Provincial Sheriff. The Rural Bank of
Pagsanjan was the highest bidder.
Pedro Zalameda Trinidad, Jr. (Pedro), as a witness for the petitioners, testified that he was
born in Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, and had been residing there since birth.
He said that based on his knowledge, the land belonged to Nonong (Valeriano) Velasco
because he used to buy coconuts harvested from the said land and it was Nonong Velasco
who caused the gathering of coconuts thereon.5
Petitioner Jonel Padilla also took the witness stand. He testified that Pedro was occupying
the land when he initially visited it. A representative of the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan
disclosed to him that the land previously belonged to Valeriano. He verified from the
Municipal Assessor the technical description of the land, but no longer verified from the
Bureau of Lands because he trusted the bank. Upon his recommendation, his sister and his
 LAW ON PROPERTY
brother-in-law purchased the property after verifying the supporting documents. It was his
brother-in-law who went to the Bureau of Lands and found that it was Lot No. 2161.6
On July 27, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[respondents] ordering the [petitioners] to vacate the land presently occupied by them and
restore possession thereof to the [respondents], to render an accounting of the proceeds
from the crop harvested therefrom starting September 1987 up to the time the property is
returned to the [respondents], and to remove at their expense all the structures they
constructed thereon.8
Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, but on February 11, 2005, the CA issued the
assailed decision affirming the decision of the RTC. They consequently filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the same was denied in the assailed resolution dated October 4,
2005. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioners anchor their petition on the following grounds:
I. The alleged sale executed between Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial as seller and
Dr. Artemio [Velasco] as buyer was never established, respondents having failed to
present the original copy thereof during the trial despite their clear and categorical
commitment to do so. Furthermore, the purported Original Certificate of Title issued
in the name of Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial was never presented in evidence,
thus, creating the presumption that had it been presented, the same would have been
adverse to respondents.9
II. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property from its lawful owner in good
faith and for value.10
III. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property at the public auction sale
conducted by the provincial sheriff of Laguna based on the judgment and writ of
execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Laguna against respondent
Valeriano Velasco for non-payment of a loan considering that (1) the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 4624 in the name of respondent Valeriano Velasco is entitled to the
presumption of regularity especially since respondents have not explained how and
why it was wrongly issued in the name of their own brother, respondent Valeriano
Velasco and without any of them taking any action to correct the alleged mistake;
and (2) by their failure to assert their alleged ownership of the property and their
inaction [by not] questioning the legal action taken by the bank against their co-
respondent Valeriano Velasco and the subject property despite their full awareness
since 1980, respondents are barred by estoppel from denying the title of the bank
and the Solomon spouses.11
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IV. The action a quo was barred by prescription considering that respondents filed their
legal action against the petitioners only on October 14, 1991, more than ten (10)
years after the bank had acquired the subject property on September 17, 1980 at the
public auction conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna.12
V. At the very least, respondents are guilty of laches, they having slept on their rights
for an unreasonable length of time such that to dispossess petitioners of the property
after they had introduced substantial improvements thereon in good faith would
result in undue damage and injury to them all due to the silence and inaction of
respondents in asserting their alleged ownership over the property.13
VI. The evidence proves that Lot no. 2161 and Lot no. 76-pt are one and the same.14
VII. The failure of Atty. Asinas to present other witnesses, additional documents and to
respond to certain pleadings brought about by his serious illnesses constitutes
excusable negligence or incompetency to warrant a new trial considering that the
Supreme Court itself had recognized “negligence or incompetency of counsel as a
ground for new trial” especially if it has resulted in serious injustice or to an uneven
playing field.15
VIII. The overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence, if presented, would have
altered the result and the decision now appealed from.16
IX. The petitioners should be awarded their counterclaim for exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.17
The arguments submitted by petitioners may be summed up in the following issues:
I. Who, as between the parties, have a better right of possession of Lot No. 2161;
II. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed; and
III. Whether the negligence of respondent’s counsel entitles them to a new trial.
The Ruling of the Court
We deny the instant petition.
First. The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for recovery of the right to possess. This
was a plenary action filed in the regional trial court to determine the better right to
possession of realty independently of the title.18 Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an
ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no
longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of the plaintiffs in
accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.19
Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, respondents were
able to establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitioners occupied the
property. Lot No. 2161 was the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision dated
October 10, 1930 in Cadastre (Cad.) Case No. 11, LRC Record No. 208. The Original
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Certificate of Title to the land was issued to Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial. On February
14, 1944, the original owners of the land sold the same to Artemio. From the date of sale,
until Artemio’s death on January 22, 1949, he was in continuous possession of the land.
When Artemio died, Isauro acted as administrator of the land with Tomas Vivero as
caretaker. In 1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a deed of sale between the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and the Solomon spouses. The land bought by the Solomon spouses
from the Bank is denominated as Lot No. 76-pt and previously owned by Valeriano.
However, it was proved during trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161
in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to the petitioners was Lot No. 76-
pt.
Given this factual milieu, it can readily be deduced that respondents are legally entitled to
the possession of Lot No. 2161.
It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were
adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is
not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there
are substantial reasons for doing so.20 In the instant case, we find no exceptional reason to
depart from this policy.
Second. The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action
was filed with the RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents of the
property in October 1987. At the time of the filing of the complaint, only four (4) years had
elapsed from the time of dispossession.
Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the real right of possession is not
lost till after the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion publiciana
prescribes after the lapse of ten years.21 Thus, the instant case was filed within the allowable
period.
Third. Petitioners put in issue that Lot No. 2161 and Lot 76-pt are one and the same, and
that the land was owned by Valeriano when it was foreclosed by the bank. This, in effect, is
a collateral attack on the title over the property which is registered in the name of Artemio.
We cannot countenance this stance of the petitioners, and perforce, must strike it down.
Title to a registered land cannot be collaterally attacked.22 A separate action is necessary to
raise the issue of ownership.
In accion publiciana, the principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary
thereto. Only in cases where the possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue
of ownership may the trial court delve into the claim of ownership. This rule is enunciated
in Refugia v. CA,23 where the Court declared, viz.:
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Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real
owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and
make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same
vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the
validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim
of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is
because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not
bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Fourth. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to a new trial due to the failure of their counsel
in the proceedings before the RTC to present testimonial and documentary evidence
necessary for them to obtain a favorable judgment. They maintain that the failure of their
counsel to present these other evidence was due to counsel’s lingering illness at that time,
and therefore, constitutes excusable negligence.
It may be reiterated that mistakes of counsel as to the competency of witnesses, the
sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, as well as
his failure to introduce certain evidence or to summon witnesses and to argue the case, are
not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of counsel be so great that his
client is prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his case.24
In this case, the illness of petitioners’ counsel and his alleged failure to present additional
evidence during the trial of the case do not constitute sufficient ground for a new trial. The
Order25 issued by the trial court in its denial of the motion for new trial filed by petitioners
aptly explains the reason why a new trial is unnecessary, viz.:
Assuming that Atty. Asinas failed to perform the imputed acts by reason of his ailments, still,
the same is insufficient ground to grant a new trial. The evidence on record established the
fact that [respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject realty for a long time. Their possession was interrupted by [petitioners] who
entered the property in [1987] pursuant to a deed of sale between the Rural Bank of
Pagsanjan and spouses Bartolome C. Solomon and Teresita Padilla. Considering that this is
an accion publiciana and [respondents’] earlier rightful possession of the subject parcel of
land has been adequately established, the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to
be adduced in a new trial would not adversely affect the findings of the Court. The
ownership and possession of the property purchased by the Solomon spouses from the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan could be the subject of an appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION
G.R. No. 187944 March 12, 2014 subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her
own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11
VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner,
vs. In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente,
MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, Respondents. to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of
way. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-
DECISION 2.12

REYES, J.:
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3
issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the
Petition for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar
(Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on
February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-
49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez
(Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2
(subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on
February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in
the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres
(Asuncion):9
Lot No. TCT No. Heirs
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja
(Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot.
They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject
lot from the former’s relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they
examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged
signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No.
1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification
of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot
No. 1907-A.14
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint
for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition.1âwphi1 She alleged that she bought the
subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and
the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their
successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right
to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The
respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the
improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay
Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17

1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling.18
1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena Padilla, The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review19 filed
married to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios), before the CA.
married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica);10 and
(4) Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married to Teresita Curso The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners
(Teresita) for several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased
the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her
1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’
1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v.
CA,20 the respondents emphasized that "even if one is the owner of the property, the possession
1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia) thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment."21 The
respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of
and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit

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 LAW ON PROPERTY
involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where the
issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the
question of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to
the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s
demand letter sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004.
Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s,
was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also
signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in
the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following year after its supposed
execution.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to
Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for
Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of
the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in
an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an
"Agreement,"23 dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had
waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a
loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The loan was paid
by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s
siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over
the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action. The
certification to file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James
Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot.
Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed
on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date. The
absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service should
be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.
In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their
loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification
of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant,
would be rendered useless in the event that the latter’s complaint for unlawful detainer would
be granted and the former’s ancestral house demolished.
The Ruling of the CA
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of
the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
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Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in Sarmiento
vs. Court of Appeals,:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful
detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination
of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry
is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom
is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became
illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date
of the last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of
forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must
be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry
into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents]
entered the land and constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the
respondents’] possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the
land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot [the
respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner,
demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the
respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the land for several decades already.
There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the
respondents’] possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether
 LAW ON PROPERTY
express or implied, between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her
predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case
of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In any
event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the respondents’] possession of the land was by
mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the
property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-
in-interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia].
Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession which he
later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in
the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in
the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before
the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial
court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had
been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for
ejectment. Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior
actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned
out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case of
Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves
a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the
MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at
bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an
unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is not necessary.27 Instead,
what is required is a better right of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of
jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
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In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
I. Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged
and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
II. Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition
of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s
ejectment suit.
Carmencita’s Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs
of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents
Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf,
demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand
turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from
Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack28
and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit
involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment
complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different
reliefs.29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the
registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also
explained that the occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on
the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon
demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper.32
The Respondents’Arguments
In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s complaint
for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment
as to when and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint,
Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents possessed "the property by mere
tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and remove
their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners’."34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court
ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership
are inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely
on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of
partition of Lot No. 1907-A.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.
Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are
present in the case at bar.
"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However,
the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper."37
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property, viz:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession
of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each
other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and
that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession
of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case
of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.39
(Citations omitted)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and
sufficiently established:
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1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.40
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to
clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed
a house upon it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who
specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came
about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual
substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue
of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully
withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered
owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence
of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that
for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant
or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does
not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of
Lot No. 1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does
not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling
were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession,
and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay
disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as
easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One
such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:
 LAW ON PROPERTY
"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible
entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance
of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in
which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,
should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in
the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor
of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to
have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover
possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts."
xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the
house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require
the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s
suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of
petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the
"confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the
whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim
to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of
the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by
proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is
permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a
violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the
proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional
circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned
by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case
sprang:
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the
theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However,
in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having
any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we
are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely
physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.["]
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"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case
No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is
squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of
who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.["]
"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the
removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.["]
"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners’
house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands."46
(Citation omitted)
We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for
reasons discussed hereunder.
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the
respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The
respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the
pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-
A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should
Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which has been standing in the
subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify
the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's complaint
for unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere
tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist
which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her
ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need
not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished pending the resolution of their
petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot
is likewise presented as an issue.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.
The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,
vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and
style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson for petitioner.
Cendana Santos, Delmundo & Cendana for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the
particular question of when a person may be deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of
movable property in the hands of another. The article runs in full as follows:
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived
has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from the petitioner
by an impostor who sold it to the private respondents. Ownership of the books was
recognized in the private respondents by the Municipal Trial Court, 1 which was sustained
by the Regional Trial Court, 2 which was in turn sustained by the Court of Appeals. 3 The
petitioner asks us to declare that all these courts have erred and should be reversed.
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz
placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on
delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered,
for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On
October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after
verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed
to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further
verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah
Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which
set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as
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Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private
respondents. 8
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the
UN Avenue, which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened
Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books
without warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over
to the petitioner. 9
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books
after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was
issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private
respondents. 10 As previously stated, the petitioner was successively rebuffed in the three
courts below and now hopes to secure relief from us.
To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner
in taking the law into its own hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the
private respondents. The circumstance that it did so with the assistance of the police, which
should have been the first to uphold legal and peaceful processes, has compounded the
wrong even more deplorably. Questions like the one at bar are decided not by policemen
but by judges and with the use not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Now to the merits
It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove
they had bought the stock. This is unacceptable. Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559
provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title," thus dispensing with further proof.
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good faith has been
dismissed by the lower courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership
of the books from the EDCA invoice showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he
was selling them for a discount because he was in financial need. Private respondents are in
the business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently
have to part with their books at reduced prices. To Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only
one of the many such sellers she was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for
any one in the business of buying and selling books to buy them at a discount and resell
them for a profit.
But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
 LAW ON PROPERTY
In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has
been unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled to its recovery except only where
the property was purchased at a public sale, in which event its return is subject to
reimbursement of the purchase price. The petitioner is begging the question. It is putting
the cart before the horse. Unlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case
at bar that EDCA has been unlawfully deprived of the books.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that
he could have validly transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the
payment check bounced for lack of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified
the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the
parties on the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the
thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the
vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the
purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to
criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted,
delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn
transfer it to another.
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang,11 the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco
Ang, who in turn sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been paid by Ang, it sued for
the recovery of the articles from Tan, who claimed he had validly bought them from Ang,
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paying for the same in cash. Finding that there was no conspiracy between Tan and Ang to
deceive Asiatic the Court of Appeals declared:
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 12 of the Civil Code providing, among other things
that "one who has been unlawfully deprived of personal property may recover it from
any person possessing it." We do not believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully
deprived of the cartons of Gloco Tonic within the scope of this legal provision. It has
voluntarily parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and sale. The
circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did not render illegal a
transaction which was valid and legal at the beginning.
In Tagatac v. Jimenez,13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold
it to Jimenez. When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the
plaintiff sued to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on the ground that she had been
unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Feist's deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the Court of
Appeals held:
The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has been
unlawfully deprived of her car. At first blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully
deprived thereof, considering that she was induced to part with it by reason of the
chicanery practiced on her by Warner L. Feist. Certainly, swindling, like robbery, is an
illegal method of deprivation of property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant
was "illegally deprived" of her car, for the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to
part with it is illegal and is punished by law. But does this "unlawful deprivation" come
within the scope of Article 559 of the New Civil Code?
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale as a voidable
contract (Article 1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it is susceptible of either
ratification or annulment. If the contract is ratified, the action to annul it is extinguished
(Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the contract is cleansed from all its defects (Article 1396,
N.C.C.); if the contract is annulled, the contracting parties are restored to their respective
situations before the contract and mutual restitution follows as a consequence (Article
1398, N.C.C.).
However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of annulment or
of ratification, the contract of sale remains valid and binding. When plaintiff-appellant
Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the car to Feist by virtue of said voidable contract of sale,
the title to the car passed to Feist. Of course, the title that Feist acquired was defective
and voidable. Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his title thereto
had not been avoided and he therefore conferred a good title on the latter, provided he
bought the car in good faith, for value and without notice of the defect in Feist's title
 LAW ON PROPERTY – POSSESSION
(Article 1506, N.C.C.). There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad all this trouble. The private respondents have themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and
faith, it is safe to assume that he acted in good faith. for merely transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind of business. It is
they and not EDCA who have a right to complain.
The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as
applied to the case before us. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books
which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet
paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title
acquired by the private respondents to the books.

One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were
to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's
title who buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person
claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor.
The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be
compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to
reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.

It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that
the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz
showed her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA
was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had
never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by
telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his
identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this
unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms
thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the
buyer.

Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that
the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of
Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being
movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to
buy them.

It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice
sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence.1âwphi1 We cannot see the justice in
transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper care,
when they bought the books from Cruz.

While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not
against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused

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