G.R. No.

143276             July 20, 2004 the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of
the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, valuation.
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special
Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank.
Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both
DECISION
coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the
following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions
of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
(3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of made by the DAR.5
19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the
Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land
hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600
planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just
(DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known as compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents' valuation
of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Series of 1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of
1994,3 the Land Bank of the Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
valuation of the property:
1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente
Acquired property Area in hectares Value Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum
of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS
(P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of
riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
in the proportion provided by law; and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE

P173,918.55
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded
interest in cash.
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A.
6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before IT IS SO ORDERED."7

1
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez
vs. DAR, et al."), using the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net
Income (NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula
under Republic Act No. 38448 )
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the
formula under Executive Order No. 2289 )
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR
AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision10 affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no
trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is
charged "primarily" with "the determination of the land valuation and
compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary
Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement…" For its part, the DAR relies
on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank.12
Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.13 If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the
purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator15 conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land
by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the DAR are
in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as
amended, which provides:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the
matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 "for final determination
of just compensation."18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court19 and,
on its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute,
including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x."20 In
determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation."
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11,
Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the
object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21
2
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows: 5. the assessment made by government assessors;

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) 6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
LV = Land Value
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
CNI = Capitalized Net Income institution on the said land, if any.
CS = Comparable Sales Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence.
In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint
applicable. commissioners for such purpose.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2"
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it
dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of
just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property
is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in
the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties,
thus:
"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares,
defendants determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos
only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided
by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands
and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the
above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per
annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the
instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95
kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low considering that
farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance
in average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut
lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more
fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In
the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at
3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly
palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
xxx   xxx   xxx

3
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut
land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross
production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as
compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in
both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court
then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the coconut
land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the
value that Landbank fixed for this case.
"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the
net income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19
divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare.
Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has
an area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average
gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600
hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this
case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13,
granted interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The
compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00
per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis
added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge.24 They may only do so "in the
absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"25 which are
not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case." (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO)
No. 22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of the
property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and
the person who personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to
coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial
court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but
to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No.
228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is
covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial
discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the
law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the
valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the
RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective
evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall
consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended,
mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,
shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or
4
at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No.
6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the
merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures
specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.

5
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS
FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @
Commander Kamlon, MAJID SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI
DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y  MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD,
IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @
Ajid and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another
case, also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and
overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this
occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not
synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos.
10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping
(Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were
filed1 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos,
Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de
Kamming,2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam3 Taruk Alah,
Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for
kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of
the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX
ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060]4 and for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario,5 a male public
officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron
vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the herein accused at
the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix
Rosario6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del
Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February
2, 1989, the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom was made
to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present
an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the
aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the
victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all
private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain
the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065]7 a male
public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being
present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed
with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin
Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.8cräläwvirtualibräry
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
Joint trial on the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered
the assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court
renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the
eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not
having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
6
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all
these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall
be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art.
267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin
Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y
Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and
pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza
and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their
kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised
Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused -
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul
Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years
of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of
[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066
and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)
imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
10064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as
Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for
[k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in
the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors, they are entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty
imposable on them by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve
five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum
to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders convicted
of an offense punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and
Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an
offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming
are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced
further to return the following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the
day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being solidary.
To Jessica Calunod:
One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00
One Bracelet P 2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Cash P 200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
One Necklace P 300.00
One Calculator P 295.00
Eyeglasses P 500.00
7
One Steel Tape P 250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
One Wrist Watch P 1,800.00
Cash P 300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-Gara
One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00
The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon a.k.a.
Commander Kamlon Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and Jane Does are
ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Costs against the accused convicted.
SO ORDERED.9cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.10 In a letter dated
February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal
because of their application for amnesty. In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we
granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the
consideration of this Court.11
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head
of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del
Rosario, representing the non-government; Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and
Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22,
1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the
Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their way,
they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them (p. 4,
TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the
leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5,
TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup
themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN,
ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their
captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all times
armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like
cooking. (pp.9-10. TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which
demanded a ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20)
sets of uniform. (p.15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were informed
that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o clock in the
evening of that day. At around 12:00 o clock midnight, the victims were released
after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN,
ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several
negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x.12cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San
Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
8
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:13cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while weeding their farm
in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked
up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion was stationed.
Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained. In
the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma
Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On
May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga
City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the
captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought
her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two
wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives
and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for
everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she
had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos other wives one of whom was armed.
After about two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives
were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her chance
and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was
thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to
the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a month
sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for
Kamming and his men. She made good her escape during an encounter between
the group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at
Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in going back to her mothers house at
Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o clock in
the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army
battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused
for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a day in
May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The
soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they shown
any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were
no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion
and placed them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among
the civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That
night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali;
and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days
and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail,
Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was
arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He
has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in
the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-
4).
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom
and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it
imposed upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two
counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this
pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their
testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil
or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this
Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only
because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis.
The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what
happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused
explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3,
9
1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused
were keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of
the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2)
Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador
Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and Imam
Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable
doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of
kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established
communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in
order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with
their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral support.
These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them
or comforting them.
xxx
II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin.
The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping.
Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were armed. They actively
participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in
transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap
hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among
the nine armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12,
1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished and
from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
charged. (People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People v. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in question.
(U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone.
(People v. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).)14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the
government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an
encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-examine
him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken judicial
notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being
highly improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and
moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom
cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
10
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the Second Issue:
offense.15cräläwvirtualibräry
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had
withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:
pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues CP CAJAYON D MS:
pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other
pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed
by the trial court. A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

The Courts Ruling Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with
the group?
The appeal is bereft of merit.
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four
First Issue: days.

Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took
judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades
Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him
and his purported cohorts.16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-
examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that
the latters testimony should not be used against him.17cräläwvirtualibräry
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we
came to know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some
food.
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of
you?

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence A Yes.
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the Q And to whom were you assigned?
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge.18 This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the A To lla Abdurasa.
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to,
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial who else did you come to know?
notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in
deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by Falcasantos - Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon,
some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
xxx
conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of
Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really
the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais. came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see
the[m] again?

11
A Yes, maam. A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to]
g[i]ve food to us.
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you
mentioned are here? Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A Yes, they are here. A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

Q Some of them are here? xxx

A Some of them are here. Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember
how he looks like?
xxx
A Yes.
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine his wife are here?
armed men who took us from the highway.
A Yes, maam.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his
name as JAILON KULAIS. A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified
[himself] as Jailon Kulais.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you
alight, what else was he doing while you were in their captivity? A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana. xxx

COURT: ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q Who? Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

A Tangkong. A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.

x x x 19cräläwvirtualibräry Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr.
Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant as not mention Tangkong?
one of the culprits:
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx
xxx

Q And what happened then?

12
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell A Yes.
you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
A Yes.
COURT:
Q Will you please identify?
Q Who?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified
A Tangkong, your Honor. himself as Jailon Kulais.)

x x x 20cräläwvirtualibräry xxx

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration: CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN

FISCAL CAJAYON: Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?

xxx FISCAL CAJAYON:

Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified
himself as Jailon Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way
from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga
Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word
Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours
another will be on duty guarding us.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
x x x 21cräläwvirtualibräry
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that
kidnapping or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will,
for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident
that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the
kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the
entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of
the trial court that he was a conspirator.
Kidnapping

13
for Ransom Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the
ones you were asked to write.
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
is also apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in A (Witness going over [letters])
identifying the accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of
the ransom letters. This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.

CP CAJAYON D MS: Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what
else will make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these
meetings for possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by A The signature is there.
this? What were you supposed to negotiate? Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the A And over it is a signature.
terms.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Q That is your signature?
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A Yes, maam.
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander
Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter. Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write A Yes, there is the other signature.
for your ransom?
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro,
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them. Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you
come up to know who signed this one?
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship? signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A Yes. A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable xxx
City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten.
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the portion here
COURT: which says the terms? ...
Original? A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad
CP CAJAYON D MS: nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3,
1989).23cräläwvirtualibräry
Original, your Honor.
xxx

14
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00
in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxx
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21,
1988.24 Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21 1988 and the
other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes
xxx
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to
inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was
asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that
all of us are alive.26 [sic]
Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro27 and
Edilberto Perez.28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and
deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money
were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan29 and Teddy
Mejia.30cräläwvirtualibräry
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code,31 having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private
individual, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus
affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of kidnapping for
ransom.

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this. Kidnapping of

Public Officers
A (Going over the letter)

Yes, maam. Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were
members of the government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The
Q Could you please read it aloud to us? three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify
the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently
A (Witness reading) established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco when the abduction occurred.
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7
colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours32 does not
size.25cräläwvirtualibräry matter. In People vs. Domasian,33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and
was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused
xxx
therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was
INTERPRETER: involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all.34 Convicting
appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors, Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was
marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large. deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court justified
the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in
xxx
an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed liberty.35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos,36 the Court held that since the appellant
by your companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the
know only.

15
duration  of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a
few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers37 --
Gara was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City
Engineers Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the
kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article
267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court
held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,38 which held that the crime
committed was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave
coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going
with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled, when a group
of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that
the victims testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the
appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably
established that the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof
beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was
a member  of the armed group which abducted the victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives
greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the
negative testimonies of the defense.39 Between positive and categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the
former generally prevails.40 Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez
testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were
compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap
victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the
charges against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the
day he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain
where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3,
1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him
as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life
imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal
Code, is reclusion perpetua  to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the
capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that
could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and
has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code.41cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of
kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED,  but the
penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five
terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for
ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of
Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal
effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is
ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to
the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
16
G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R.
No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as
follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then
Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment
with defendant company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in
Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to
plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an
original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted
the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-
month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21,
1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract
to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms
and conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted
(Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command
of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which
plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of
the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a
few days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was
reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion
training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having
successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on
April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently
appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over
Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them
to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to
terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however,
immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible
promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve
were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective
November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three
months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family
on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to
exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave
only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said
motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the
instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before
the court a quo  (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia:
(1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2)
that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant
contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim
arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor
Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his
employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant
17
postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items
demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of
an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the
case involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters;
and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal  per se but on
the manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-
84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied
upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches,
waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of
action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano
and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the amounts of —
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as
consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the
issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court,
thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed
by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's
action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were
denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES
ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN
FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY
HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO
REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING
LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly
ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal
under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific
laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws
of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to
18
this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the
Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or
on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment
effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which is under
Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said
article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where
prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that
the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29,
1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial
Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
xxx     xxx     xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been
decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive
period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not  be invoked by petitioners, for
the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in
Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to
claims arising from employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was
based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to
"money claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money
claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law
applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it
necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing
Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus
non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's
conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination  filed
again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's
action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the
prescription period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he
filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National
Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it
has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we
held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the
statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been
commenced at all."12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment
was valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner
allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals
when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From
the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus,
when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual
19
termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months
salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room
for interpretation.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted
that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for
membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory
to the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from
questioning the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's
decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including
the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline
industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the
regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice
but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of
frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300
fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off
A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which
he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company.
No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to
respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

20
G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division
dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February
2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost
his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On
the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I
am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights
and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May
2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that
Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again
departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
21
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the
available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days
from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting
the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is
a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his
barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned
to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as
Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979
to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it
as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the
United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the
Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit
of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no
real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the
glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times
and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as
an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to
travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US
citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US
nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
22
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on
the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the
said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American
citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did
not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction
over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention
and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling,
claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered,
and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus
does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the
petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within
the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later
than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following
premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another
country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.
23
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the
use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in
the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict
conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport.
Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June
18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so
that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he
was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same
in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s
submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20,
2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the
use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was
not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken,
the respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that
the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is
more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a
citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to
be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his
use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent
proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned
his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport
and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation
of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to
retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his
citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither
does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having
received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been
held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a
candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the
people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
24
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued
use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC
En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the
First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the
applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice
mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification
case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a
foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to
run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent
Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before
the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case
filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one
for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the
COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as
one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court
said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the
requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of
25
the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc,
cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this
instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10
July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
26
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does
not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is
fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was
a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective
position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his
American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from
running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he
was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a
result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese
national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that
27
violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as
he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November
2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the
fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate
of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his
Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May
2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a
second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of
Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and
the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the
office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required
by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory
prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and
contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the
candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus
to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or
illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast
ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the
manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and
generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the
board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the
other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
28
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots;
in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances
of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In
the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court
of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election,
its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been
duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one
had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was
elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election;
and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void
and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to
the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional
issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even
have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court
comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter
established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding
the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot
cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be
met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications
of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very
law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might
as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
29
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty
and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where
the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted
without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune
our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for
the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified
reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make
an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section
39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets
out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as
mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC
can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To
state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they
know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have.
Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid
COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate
and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an
30
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that
voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When
there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters
are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and
still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere
obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed
second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the
qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule
because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which
is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already
been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates
in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any
other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply.
31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

32
G.R. No. 188314               January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI
a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other
JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter
Decision convicted the three accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a.
Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie
or Zaky – of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA
modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346
(Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its
Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move
out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two
men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor
obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of
the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from
each other – one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of
the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed
that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person
near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter
looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for
two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at
the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more
certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on
asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed
that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in
front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering
with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at
him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters
to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA,
the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver
initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards
a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus
passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he
made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an
exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally,
accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified
the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who
had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan,
Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu
33
Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does" – were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and
Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476),
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477),
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat
pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated
the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG
bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in
front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he
claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty
persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-
24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their
participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes,
because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus
that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive
devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in
the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members
of the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained
to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder.2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two
other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were
told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that
their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and
other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf
leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a
soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he
knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in
November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT – that
is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of
them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad and
Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February,
he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go
to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been
exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the
warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused
Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission.3 According to
Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
34
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the
crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct
a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty."
The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment
before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that
were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not
guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad
and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty to the
multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated
multiple murder charges remain… [I]s that not inconsistent considering the
stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you
will recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death
of at least four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under the
circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this matter with your clients?
………
Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven’t
conferred with them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
………
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from
your lips.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and
Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence
of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of
not guilty to the frustrated multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their
pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the
murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty
to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
………
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in
Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the
charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address
at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and accommodate…
5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges
… must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty."7 According to the Court:
35
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a
case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave
no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People
v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even
if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel;
that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or
a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment
was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the
accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same act relied upon in
the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the
change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial
admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem
it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance.
Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of
guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is
made … loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the
offense charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving
his commission of the offense charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence
for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of
facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales,
and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified
accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while
inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati
ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb
exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and
Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations)
and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both
stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the
Valentine’s Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt
made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutor’s direct examination of
state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he
train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
36
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two
weeks.
………
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at
Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that
mission?
………
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro
Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and
Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the
2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November
2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
………
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to
you by Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
………
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date,
December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
………
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
detonate a bomb
………
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring
to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.
………
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the
bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from
me until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed
me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not
explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
………
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
………
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?
A : No, sir.
37
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives,
which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
………
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me
not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo
Trinidad exploded.
………
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
………
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that
he took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded
at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with
the bombing in General Santos.
………
A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was
sometime in February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing
exploded in Makati, any other call?
………
A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.
………
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
………
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu
Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you
for the success of the mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is
the relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the
mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr.
witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf
should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was
determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger
towards the Christians."18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani
and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine’s Day bombing incident,
months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs
and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was
to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get
two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first
mission."19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but
to no avail. The day before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad got another two
kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that
they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third
try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf
Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then
received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo."20
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against
Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
38
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the
provision on "principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given
Asali on how to make bombs – coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat’s confirmation that
Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission – prove the
finding that Rohmat’s co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission
of the crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the
crime would not have materialized."22lawphi1
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al.,
the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or
the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and
co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor
was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied
to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused
Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the
"collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission
of the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major
points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two
other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched
between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu
Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing
and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive
explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly
admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with
respect to the latter’s participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it
has been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established
the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused
Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators’ criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused,
which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado,
353 SCRA 643).25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in
concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments."26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a
conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 27 Thus,
in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the
latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given
on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the
39
testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against
the latter.28

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

40
G.R. No. 152375               December 16, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs),
MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA
R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) to set aside the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the
Sandiganbayan3 denying the petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).
THE ANTECEDENTS
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed
as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner
alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the
major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel
Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa
(Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a
party to Civil Case No. 0009.5
6
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,  among them, Civil Case
No. 0130.7 The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No.
0130.
I. Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-
controlled board of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders
convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors
was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer
for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan
(docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August
9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from
exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’
meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director,
officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in
the management of ETPI.9
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion
with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been
"illegally ‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10 especially in the election
of the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order
for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under
the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for
1992 be held on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the
ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati,
Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the
supervision and control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr.
[O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies
may vote their corresponding shares.
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained
until final judicial resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered
shares of stock (or in a proper case the underlying assets of the corporation
concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition
for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 10778913 (PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse
41
of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered
stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution,
we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with
the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.15
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this
Court a "Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting
for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent
Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution.16 The
Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V.
Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s
instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on
October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in
London, England.
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the
petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the
defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the
deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his
affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or
establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A
stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the
petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case
No. 0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he
cross-examined Bane.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by
granting authority to the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders’
meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock"
and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock."22 Thus, a special
stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and
the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."23 From
this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R.
No. 147214  (Africa’s petition).
We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:
This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to
elect a board of directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a
stockholders meeting (to amend the articles of incorporation to increase the
authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered test. On such
determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders
meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with
no other choice but to remand these questions to it for proper determination.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima
facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and
there is an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend the ETPI
Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital
stock of ETPI.
The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Resolution and in conformity herewith.
II. Civil Case No. 0009
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November
29, 1996 and March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and
concluded.25
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the
following witnesses:
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES
(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the
time ETPI was organized.
xxxx
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x
42
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x 1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies
on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in
(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x [petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the
[respondents]. (emphasis added)
(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case,
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O.
Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130
stating that – xxx, subject to the following conditions :
1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 1. xxx
0050, 0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:
2. xxx
a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-
b. Maurice Bane examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the
c. Evelyn Singson respondents].

IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

d. Leonorio Martinez

e. Ricardo Castro; and
f. Rolando Gapud
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and
the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies
and the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the
[petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to
cross-examine them.
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the
petitioner filed a Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.
On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution)
denying the petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made
its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane
deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission,
the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice 34 (2nd
motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that:
1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same
for trial any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional
evidence and limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition]
which already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts
established by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended
thereto. [emphasis ours]
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000
resolution) denying the petitioner’s 2nd motion:
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved."
Apparently, this provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made

43
by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in
resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases
where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the
Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something
which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the
ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity
to raise objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic)
129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately
filed their respective demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the
Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).
IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the
admission of the Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the
respondents’ demurrers to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the
assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan
ruled:
But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has
already rested its case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not
even a question of whether the non-appearing defendants are deemed to have
waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of the
deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell
on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which
already denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has
become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution
stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in
effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on
its rights for almost two years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to
rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to
introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative
for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how
can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the
deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration
within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained finality and its effect
cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though
purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this
court’s 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]
The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.
II.
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS ALREADY
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) – AS PART
OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).
III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS
TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an
interlocutory order; thus, the petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution
could not have given it a character of "finality" so long as the main case remains
pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayan’s denial
of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take
judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the
petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was
originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a "child" of the
"parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and
admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the
"parent" case.
44
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane
deposition, the Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy
grounds," considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that
it would be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly
served on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to
have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to
its allegation that the respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly
belongs to the government.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of
evidence was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the
time the case was filed and the voluminous records that the present case has
generated.43
THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS
and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY
In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April
10, 200245 ), they claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond
the 60-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.46 This assertion proceeds from the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion,
being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise
simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit
that the petitioner’s 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on
the assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the
petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari  within the proper
period gave the 1998 resolution a character of "finality."
The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission
of a supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the
discretion of the trial court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound
discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the evidence sought to be admitted
was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before [it] rested
its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of the petitioner’s 3rd
motion – i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not
waived their right to cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized
this right in its 1998 resolution and the petitioner never questioned this
recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be
a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The
respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence
because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by
arguing that a party may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts
before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses
that it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000
resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done
through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously
erred in considering the petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial
justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a
formal offer of evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of
the pieces of evidence he formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity
to present further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case should the court
reject any piece of the offered evidence.50
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition
considering that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be easily
summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his
advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Section
47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly
stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet
to file their respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed
since we required their comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these
comments and to consider this petition submitted for decision.
THE ISSUES
45
On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution,
as follows:
1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for
reconsideration;
iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane
deposition to the petitioner’s cause; and
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior consolidation
of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -
i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court; and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by
a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the
order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must
preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution is "final" or "interlocutory" in
nature.
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order
and an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or
order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the
remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution,
however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the
aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence
pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a
judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no
further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves
substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does
not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is
basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is
interlocutory. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st motion through
the 1998 Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded
the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve
the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court
until the case is finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or
rescind the order upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution – which merely
denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No.
0009 – could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order
resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioner’s failure to move for
its reconsideration or to appeal.56
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a
proscribed third (actually second) motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides, the proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed
against "a judgment or final  order." Although a second motion for reconsideration
46
of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of
the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be
rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited
motion.57
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from
a judgment or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that
the Rules of Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an
appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to
question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents
insist that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned
from the petitioner’s notice of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue
that since this ruling had long been rendered by the court, the petitioner’s
subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to resuscitate
the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution
is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly
conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been
immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a
petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed
interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the
aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue
notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is
inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of
the order complained of.59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had
not yet concluded the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal
offer of evidence. At this stage of the case, the prematurity of using the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the admission of the Bane
deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available
to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its
position on the admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could
introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal
offer61 – as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for
certiorari, and the denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point
for the period of filing such a petition.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally
erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan
undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not
necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing
that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its
exercise of jurisdiction.62 Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous
legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of
discretion but not a grave one.  For this reason alone, the petition should be
dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in
light of the unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner
cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the remedy at the opportune time,
and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and
has become a matter of public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the
petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence
in the course of completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court
procedure has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule
30 (which capsulizes the order of presentation of a
party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct
evidence in the course of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to
have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence
only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his
manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that
"due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it
47
"had terminated the presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In
the face of these categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly
make an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual
order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case could not have
been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally offered. To begin
with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this
present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer
of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition
for certiorari that the petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before
then, the petitioner never found it appropriate to question on certiorari the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for
the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.
Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an
immediate recourse to the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd
motion dictated a different course of action. The petitioner’s non-observance of the
proper procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while seemingly
innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first
attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without
seeking reconsideration of the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of
evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the
Bane deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of
evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane
deposition into its case. In resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane
deposition has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009. This
pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence
(considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s
attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the
deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the
Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen the case.
Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should have already
questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its
attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the
consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner
allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying
having rested its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition.
Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention
to the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By
pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized
that they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner
should have realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the
case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane deposition.
Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been
prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived
ambiguity in the resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the
petitioner’s motion to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of
evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to
allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such
opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional
evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the
prism of the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen
the case (for the purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional
evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it
had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to
reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the
Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5,
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless
the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the
issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:
xxxx
48
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce
evidence upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first
instance, all the evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given
piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises
to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.76
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence
prevents him from introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence
is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the
burden of evidence from one party to the other;78 or where the evidence sought to
be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the party’s right to
introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved
party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f),
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the
evidence would qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of
justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise
of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court’s action was attended
by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or,
the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in
contemplation of the law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and
unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond
allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment82 or mere abuse of
discretion.83
In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to
offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in
the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly
discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or
where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The
omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been
deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted;
emphases ours)
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences.
Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the
court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an
eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded because
offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal,
unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the
defendant and affecting his case injuriously."
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is
rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special
reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance
of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." These
exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration
proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is
taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be
expected. Even at the risk of violating legal  formulæ, an opportunity should be
given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their
claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the
parties to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is
allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was withheld
deliberately and without justification.86
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the
petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the
Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioner’s concern
in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion "redundant." This is tantamount to
49
a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is
equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its
case, the respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The
respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the
petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted
"through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is
another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily
applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to
reopen the case for the submission of the Bane deposition.
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of
course. The state of the parties’ submissions and the delay that has already
attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious
course of action. At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued for or
against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old
sequestration case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility,
too, is an issue that would have again been raised on remand and would surely
stare us in the face after remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve
the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not
dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be
admitted in evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.91 The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of
Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others,92 the "former case or
proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos.
0009 and 0130 were consolidated – provided that:
Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how
cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.
To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several
cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases.95
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations.
First, Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases
consolidated; on the parties and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence
presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the
discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions
consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used
generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In
fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of
consolidation, as discussed below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation
is basically a function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to
determine for itself (given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues
involved, the parties affected, and the court’s capability and resources vis-à-vis all
the official business pending before it, among other things) what "consolidation"
will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple
and convenient premise that the deposition-taking took place after the
Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the
silence of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law on the
effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to determine the kind of
"consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this
case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different
senses:97
50
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which
case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and
become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by
a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual
consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to
one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases
does not at all provide a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion
as to the effects of the consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this
procedural device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official
business – we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous records of the
proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would even
suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action,
parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need for a motion to
adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had
a merger actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the
Sandiganbayan can already take judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely
a consolidation for trial.103 Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the
petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the
petitioner’s 1st Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the
incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not available for cross-examination in"
the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so
that the respondents can cross-examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order
of consolidation had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases
with the main case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in
these consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been aware of and had
allowed actual consolidation without objection.104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one
another and the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case
No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not
parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder
involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan
in fact intended an actual consolidation and, together with the parties
affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused and
unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action
is also appreciated in another action – must find support in the proceedings held
below. This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the
present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual
consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court,
jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and
despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of
the petitioner’s right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the
evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the
several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction
and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation in 1993 (that is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the
Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009
contain any reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly,
in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a
representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under
Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original,
albeit incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being
measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court –
the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different
proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of
the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies
taken in the incident cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the
petitioner represented to the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the
51
provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again
presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-face two years thereafter
even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to treat the
Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action"
(deposition de bene esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be
used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under
the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the
witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness
is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment;
or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis
ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.  – The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s
position that the Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing
the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action,
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility,
compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the
petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a
deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under
Section 47, Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition,
therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the
other; both  provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case
where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’
testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and
Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation
for trial.114 Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a
means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant
as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally,
the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or
hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented
in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation.
Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the
actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the
adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party
had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-
examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial
52
evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a
case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid
down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.117
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While
a former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,
the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not
universally conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the
adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of
a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-
examination119 afforded an adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in
the direct examination or connected therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a
mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in
the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony
or deposition is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least,
be substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former
statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by
an opportunity to do so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean
that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same.121 Although some
issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former
testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122 )
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on
evidence and therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on
deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the
petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions,
the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be
avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case
No. 0130, for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner
established and what the Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane
deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use
of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the
deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section
47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites
for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the
petitioner complied with the latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for
the  admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to
testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial
or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its
trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or deposition can be
introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of
the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue
that we must now examine and resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be
"deceased or unable to testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that was
taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony of
the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the
deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as follows:
53
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a
testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the
Philippines," which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, absence from jurisdiction128 -  the petitioner’s excuse for the non-
presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify under
the same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance
of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for
discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should
be rejected in evidence.129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former
proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a
ground for its admission in evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be
produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the
former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is
also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other  case
(Civil Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the
witness. For purposes of the present  case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the
Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can or should we, that
the previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains
and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or
proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same court. Since the
basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the
burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of
the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the
previous condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-
presentation of the deponent in court.132
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine;
identity of parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a
witness made on direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has
been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a
testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a
mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called.134 This right is
available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of
witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay
statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported
testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of
cross-examination is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-
examine has been satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of
parties as the present opponent to the admission of the Bane deposition to whom
the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be the
same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties
to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding.
Physical identity, however, is not required; substantial identity136 or identity of
interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent proceeding is between persons who
represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in estate.
The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights of
property.138
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity
of interest or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present
opponents, the respondents. While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose
Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI
stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130 (and,
unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While
Africa and the respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not
establish at all any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the
acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent.
The sequestration of their shares does not result in the integration of their rights
and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-
vis other stockholders.139
IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient
evidence of waiver
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to
cross-examine the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking
despite individual notices previously sent to them.140
54
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30,
1996,141 the petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26
1996. Because it failed to specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s
deposition, the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr.
Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise moved the scheduled
deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the
intended deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the
respondents, only respondent Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition143 to the
petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of the
petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s
motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down
on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition
upon oral examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the
individual sought to be bound thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled
that -
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition
shall not be taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter.
However, the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not
arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the
spirit of he law. The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by
Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient
protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his
unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into
another person's affairs — prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid
to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this reason, courts
are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to
litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the
adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent
Enrile’s Opposition (which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed
to provide even the bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so)
non-parties,147 and to ensure that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead,
the Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioner’s assertion (that the taking of Bane
deposition is a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns – e.g.,
reasonability of the notice; and the non-party status of the respondents in Civil
Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane
deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior
notice on the respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot
override the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect
of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by
proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by the taking of the
Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-
examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its
presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony
or deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of
parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition
in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africa’s status as a party
in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through
its Section 5 which provides:
Effect of substitution of parties.  — Substitution of parties does not affect the right
to use depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and
another action involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same
parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully
taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally
taken therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the
respondents waived their right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the
taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on
their right to cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that they never intended
any waiver of this right.
Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to
take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give
reasonable notice in writing to every other party  to the action. The notice shall
55
state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of
each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he
belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for
cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect
that the individual notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind
them to the conduct of the then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to
begin with, they were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we observe that
in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent was any indication
sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear
at the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-
examination, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their
objections at the appropriate time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds
indeed were we to hold that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity
nor in substantial identity of interest with any of the parties in the same action,
can be bound by the action or omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a
notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the respondents’
mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken
earlier in Civil Case No. 0009 – the principal action where it was sought to be
introduced – while Bane was still here in the Philippines. We note in this regard
that the Philippines was no longer under the Marcos administration and had
returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was filed. In
fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for
Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit,"
which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a
deposition could then have been taken - without compromising the respondents’
right to cross-examine a witness against them - considering that the principal
purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are
avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of the present
matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil
Case No. 0009.
After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to
move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition
immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the
respondents would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a
resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the
deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be
stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130,
they likewise have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an
ETPI stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court
can only express dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines
before taking his deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of
what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a
"vital cog" in the petitioner’s case against the respondents, the Court is left to
wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead
of the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to
do so.
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been
previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan
should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and
act on without proof because these facts are already known to them.152 Put
differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law
maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial
notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation
of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it
would not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of
"the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines,"155 or gives the
court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters "ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions."156 On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask
the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties
56
to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In
the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their corresponding
oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.158 This rule
though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any
part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a
case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the
archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties,
and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where
sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal
of the latter case.160
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory
taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary
taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the
concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever
evidence offered in any of the "children" cases – Civil Case 0130 – as evidence in
the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161 To the
petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial
notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are
inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an
exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is
obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits
that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve
issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we
would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of
evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in
another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of
the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it
relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on
the court. We invite the petitioner’s attention to our prefatory pronouncement
in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and
the law, the Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know
nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced
judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty
as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish
by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument
that we should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd
motion – the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of
Maurice Bane) – was a legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion;
(2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) notwithstanding the grave abuse of
discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible
under the rules of evidence.165
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane
deposition. His covering note states:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the
Court and the public will understand what the Bane deposition is all about.
(underlining added)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified
what is at issue in this case – i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition.
Admissibility is concerned with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence,
whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the Bane deposition,
57
it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to
adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness")
is not an issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a
competent evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine
Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and
the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J.
Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in
response to the dissent’s position, which we will restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco
wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different
actions consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the different
causes of actions involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the
order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon
all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After the
consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which
are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action,
which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all
subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties
adjudicated in a single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus
Juris Secundum, the following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several
actions are combined into one and lose their separate identity and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of
several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one
is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions are ordered to be tried
together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a
separate judgment. The failure to distinguish between these methods of
procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being
consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion
and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that
the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1
Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s
statement out of context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on
evidence is at most an unsettled matter that requires the approach we did in the
majority’s discussion on consolidation.167
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to
the purpose of consolidation – to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues
involved in the consolidated cases" and "the simplification of the proceedings." It
argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the same evidence is
dispensed with.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since
consolidation is primarily addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching
its official business, it would be in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the
court should have a say on what consolidation would actually bring168 (especially
where several cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the
present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the
Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had
in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court – which
is not a trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the
consolidation only resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still
bound by the Bane deposition considering that they were given notice of the
deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to one of due process – the
fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-
examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence – especially
when read in light of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute
for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking
(questioning the reasonableness thereof – an issue applicable to the rest of the
respondents) which the Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the
Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the
petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus,
failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the
apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane
58
deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are WE CONCUR:
the parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due process.

Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly

misstates that the Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking.
For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner
staunchly asserted that the deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can
deny the complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have reached.
Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness
demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and for
the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by
respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning
omission and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court
without itself being guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.

Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions,

contrary to the petitioner’s claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly,
rules of procedure involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that
technical rules deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or
mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They involve issues of due
process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile,
who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so
that these shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They involved,
too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which we
cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights
and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course
of their evolution.

In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive
at a conclusive decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part).
The same vote resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the
ponencia is deemed sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

59
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya
sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya
ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong
magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa
rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta
kung wala na akong saka?"
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha
na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.
- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat
The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond
reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have
taken their own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the
Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision5 of
the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of theft.6
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.7 The Information provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan,
Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain,
entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once inside
the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested
1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without
the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in the
aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00), Philippine
currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero),
Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto
Pacate.10
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca
plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On
June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men, including
Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions.
At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men.
Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in
harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the
police.11
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a
survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca,
valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.12
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod
Police Station.13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was
the plantation owner.14
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his
neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of
Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate
installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal
case.17
60
Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her
share to the harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact amount
anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around
15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21
Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca
from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca
since he was the rightful tenant of the land.22
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He
claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio
Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting
happened.23
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the
Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.26
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as
evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any
objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of
tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim
of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by
prosecution witnesses."32
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as
maximum;cralawlawlibrary
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca
stole[n];cralawlawlibrary
b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary
c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's
fees;cralawlawlibrary
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the
burden to prove the existence of the tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He
was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement.36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision
"declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at bar":37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a
given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken
conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed
Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court,
a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation.39
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership.
"He claims that the parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the
subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based merely on the testimony of
61
the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify parcels of land."40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by
harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive
possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's consent.42 "The subject
of the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order
to consummate the crime of theft."43
Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal
property under the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was
erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was
"capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about 1,000
kilos of abaca were already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by the
prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from
criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi
is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability
should be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to show
that the case was initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to
ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land.50
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision
finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision
dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte,
Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico Ligtas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on
February 2, 2012.54
II
On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution.55 This court required People of the Philippines to file its Comment
on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;cralawlawlibrary
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of
the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak,
Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial
notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the
conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Petition is meritorious.
III
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of
Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the
claim of petitioner [as] tenant."57
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the
Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and
binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.60 This court has
differentiated between a question of law and question of
fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
62
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are
beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress from.62 However, there are
exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition
for review under Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7)
when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified
"when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial
court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they
would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused
to acquittal."64
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is
generally a question of fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy
relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
statutory elements of tenancy.66
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it
held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the
prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the
land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus,
proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
IV
Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was
motivated by ill will and revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove petitioner
from the land he has legitimately occupied as tenant.69 Telling is the fact that
petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the
Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private
complainant's tenant.71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as
the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency vested with
primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy
relationship.72
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To
require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship through evidence other than the
DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond
the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private
complainant did not file an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy
relationship constitutes as res judicata.75
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the DARAB Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial
notice of the DARAB Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
63
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge.77 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that
there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between him and private complainant
and that he did not take the abaca hemp.78 Nevertheless, respondent maintains
that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship
between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any
sharing of harvest between the parties.81
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is
conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal
proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases
are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or
vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal
liability for the same act.
....
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding
on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.82 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the
same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act
results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-
2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the
tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft
were proven by the prosecution.
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB
found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in
the above-quoted Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence
submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any evidence
submitted by the respondent.
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as
such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of
his holdings by the landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and
only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by
the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of the land subject in this case and well described
in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to
maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession of the land in
dispute;cralawlawlibrary
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster
Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call the parties and assist them in
the execution of a leasehold contract covering the land in dispute, and for
the parties to respect and obey such call of the said MARO in compliance
with the legal mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in
vindicating his right and other actual expenses incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.
No cost.
64

SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence.85 This court is
not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."86
V attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to
determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.87 This
court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's
primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship
between landowners and tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding
on courts when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that
administrative res judicata exists in that case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of
the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained
finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of
respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in
accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the
rule of administrative  res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is
examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was
already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata  cannot be said to apply exclusively
to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable
judicial powers have been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to
decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
purely administrative proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of
quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.95 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior
judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal
Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and
differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in
Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
65
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated
or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is
the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases,
then res judicata  in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as
between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment"
applies.97 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive
on the parties.99 As in this case, the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano attained finality
when the landowner did not appeal the Decision.101 This court ruled that the
doctrine of res judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
empowered, through its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication
boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to
the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides that the
decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no
appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89,
there being no appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the
matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the
CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer open to
doubt and controversy.
....
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT
and Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB
Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively
the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB
Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul
'94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues
raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved
with finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include
Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the adjudication board and the
DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the
applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the
issues which have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment
precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the
same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as
it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was
66
predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding
effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since
said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle
of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment also applies in criminal cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged with
the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-remittance
of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the findings of the
National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the
absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained finality.106 This
court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are
founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment
to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion
is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the
premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once
determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been
rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same
parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section
47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based on
the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like the splitting
of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a
Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of
issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates
uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be
devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court
ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists
is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship.109 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential
elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there
was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as tenant of the land.111 In
rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both
petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner's evidence,
which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was
installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres
Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.114 However, Andres
Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's
share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed
in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant
failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled
hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private
complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as
counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already
shown her intention not to participate the proceedings of the case for reasons
known only to her;cralawlawlibrary
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her
decision not to participate in the proceedings of the case;cralawlawlibrary
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to
withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-
entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of
other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings
on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant are
immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et
al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121
In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac
67
that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their
predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial
Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the
registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents,
respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and
Josefina Roxas Omaña.122
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the
renunciation of their tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. However, they failed to comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the
DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator.124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy
relationship [that] existed between the parties."125 He found that petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy
cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package.126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found
that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were deemed
tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were entitled to security of
tenure.127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial
Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that
all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of
tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be upheld.128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed
to overcome the burden of proving the existence of a tenancy
relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants.
While it appears that there was personal cultivation by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what was established was that
petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing
scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner thereof.
Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced. Such
claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests
on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy,
which burden they failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie
must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of
harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect
that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the
claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the
purported sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The
sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value.
Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be
adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship.
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court
of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in
Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome
substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may
be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the
precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon
the courts. This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact
that petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the
indispensable elements of tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
68
Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were
merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a
preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the Department of
Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further,
the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide
tenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the
DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into
finality.131 It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial
stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a
tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review
the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy
exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
VI
According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code were not established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The
DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that
he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's
land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without
the consent of the owner—petitioner argues that this, too, was negated by his
status as private complainant's tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by
the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to
stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding because
as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled him to
continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or
until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and
executory.135 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." In
acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven
snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence
failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law."136 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its owner;cralawlawlibrary
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its
owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or
other forest or farm products.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4)
there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of the person or force upon things.137
Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancy system.138
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she
cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the
landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the
taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that
petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution,
therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt and should be acquitted."148
In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary
to discuss further the other errors raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March
16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless
he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is
ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and

banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove
lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It failed to clearly identify "the person
who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to
whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private
complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent to
it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged
to private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and
bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had
a criminal intent."144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the
produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant.
Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent
of the crime until proven guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than
to convict one innocent person."146 Thus, courts must consider "[e]very
circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that
"[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent

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