“War is merely an idea” (Mueller).

Discuss, drawing on international relations theory

and module readings.

War has been a feature of international politics since the earliest days of human existence,
and in all that time a myriad of possible explanations and theories for the outbreak and
engagement of war have been presented Some scholars, such as E. H. Carr, argue the realist
point of view, that states are the principal actors in international politics and that in their aim
to achieve a greater share of the global balance of power, the military is of “supreme
importance”. War is an essential and worthwhile pursuit for the realist state acting in self-
interest. Others, namely John Mueller, claim the constructivist view that “war is merely an
idea”, and so is subject to all transformations an idea may experience over time. The realist
theory of war strongly contrasts with Mueller’s constructivist claim that war as an idea and
institution has been and is becoming increasingly obsolete, and within this essay these
theories of war will be discussed and compared.
The essence of constructivism is recognition of the impact of developing ideas on
state behaviour. Unlike realist theory, state behaviour is not solely governed by self-interest
and thirst for power - as ideas change over time they shape and reshape, international politics
and redefine the interests of states. According to Mueller, war is not some innate and
inevitably recurring phenomenon, but an institution that can cease to exist. Attitudes and
norms of state behaviour regarding war have changed quite drastically over the past few
centuries as there have been significant shifts away from the glamorisation of war, and from
its consideration as a standard or necessary reaction. In The Obsolescence of Major War
Mueller utilises constructivist theory to maintain that the “idea” of war has lost its perceived
benefit, due to the rise of the peace movement over the past century and especially due to the
impact of WW1 and WW2 on society. The horrors and major losses incurred during these
wars have redefined the public perception and experience of war, from what was once
considered honourable and necessary to now a to-be-avoided tragedy. Processes of de-
escalation and conflict resolution (such as the League of Nations or the United Nations) serve
to illustrate the increased importance of war-avoidance by major states on the global stage, as
evidenced by the lack of a major global conflict since 1945. Even though the Cold War was a
conflict between two major superpowers, it was markedly different to previous wars of
similar ilk. Mueller further supports his argument with two solid examples of similar
institutions that experienced a shift in perception and lost perceived value in society: slavery
and duelling.
At the time of their peak position in society both duelling, and slavery were seen as
essential institutions, duelling providing a method of dispute settlement and slavery being
extremely profitable, however today both are viewed as archaic, unnecessary and unthinkable
practices. The public perception of these institutions underwent a shift, and these institutions
lost their place and worth. In the same way the public perception of war has changed, it is no
longer deemed a moral way to settle disputes, nor is any potential profit garnered by war
considered worthwhile. Mueller argues that just as happened with slavery and duelling, war
will become and has been becoming, obsolete as its practice is no longer deemed valuable as
an idea.
Also worth noting is the position of liberalism, as explained in Doyle’s Liberalism in
World Politics, in liberalism, which places value on economic power and the promotion of
peace, cooperation and liberal values (political freedoms, human rights etc), it is generally
considered that as states become increasingly liberal in the freedoms granted to its citizens (in
a democracy) the international community is less inclined to go to war as the common
aspiration is world peace and cooperation.
Mueller’s theory regarding war stands in direct contrast to that of realists like E. H.
Carr who outlines in The Twenty Years Crisis that in realism, states exist in complete anarchy
(on a global scale), such that states are able to act entirely independently and out of self-
interest. States act to further their share of the global balance of power, to ensure their own
survival and success. For realists, war is an inevitable outcome of international relations, as
international relations is founded on struggle for power. War is intrinsically linked to the
human condition, as states act out of natural human self-interest and desire for power. This
explanation for war certainly fits many historical cases, for example the Second World War
quite simply can represent Nazi desire for security (breaking the Treaty of Versailles,
consolidation of military force and territory) and for increased power and land. Unlike
constructivism, realism maintains that incentives for war are constant and fundamental to
human nature and behaviour, and so war is a recurring and inevitable phenomenon in
international relations. Realism holds no weight to the impact of changing ideas, and so
cannot account for long periods of peace that we have experienced or the impact of new
behavioural norms. For example, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 did not simply rearrange
the balance of power in Europe, instead it introduced new norms of inter-state relations
united under common identities and respective sovereignty of one’s own states, meaning that
when conflicts arose the issues of identity and sovereignty were no longer a focus. Realism
fails to account for the possibility of newly established ideas and methods of dispute, whereas
constructivism allows a broader scope of understanding that can include the realist claim of
action in self-interest (though this may change).
As such, Mueller is able to support his claim that “war is merely an idea”, as it is this
broader and less regimented understanding of war that can answer some of the failings of the
realist understanding of war. He rejects the claim that war is inevitable, and illustrates well its
changes as an idea, and its possible future as a forgotten and unwelcome institution.

(word count: 992 words)

Ruairi Vickery 19335152

 Do democracies and non-democracies behave similarly in international politics? Answer drawing
on international relations theory and module readings.

The question of similarities between the behaviour of democracies and non-democracies has
been a subject of debate in international relations discourse for a very long time, and as
always there is a variety of answers, each depending on the lens of analysis adopted. Firstly,
the objective differences between a democracy and a non-democracy must be outlined.
Democracy means “rule of the people” and describes a system of popular participation in
public interest, ie. voting and majority rule. The positions of power are not held forever, and
those in those positions are placed there by election. A non-democracy, however, implies the
opposite, the total rule by one (or a few) for whom there are no barriers of behaviour. While
democracy has become convention, there still exist many non-democratic states today. The
ethical question of non-democracy notwithstanding, many scholars of international relations
seek to identify similarities and differences in the behaviour of these two types of state, with
which to form other assumptions or new theories of international relations. The potential
similarities of these two systems of government, al always rely on the lens of understanding
applied. 
In realism, states are the principal actors in an anarchic international system, and
therefore have no incentives but to act out of self-interest. As Carr outlines in his Twenty
Years Crisis, states act to increase their share of the global balance of power, and to
consolidate their own assets whether through war or just the shoring up of defences.
Decisions of policy are made in the pursuit of wealth and power, and so the ideals of peace,
freedom and representation typically seen in democratic states are not of importance to state
leaders. Decisions are made with careful consideration of the benefits incurred solely to the
state and its people. As states are the only principal actors, and all act out of self-interest
without exception, the realist sees similarities between the behaviour of democracies and
non-democracies - both seek power and security regardless of regime type or ideology. This
is why historically we can see many instances of both democracies and non-democracies
deliberately engaging in war for material gain, such as the (democratic) US invasion of Iraq
to gain control of oil supply and (non-democratic) Hitler’s invasion of Europe in seeking
‘lebensraum’ for the German people.  However, as realist states are rational egoists, it follows
that a head of state in democracy may act differently than in a non-democracy in order to
protect their position of power, as in a democracy there is the possibility of deposition and
election of a different leader/party, and their perception by the public is of utmost
importance. 
  Similarly, in institutionalism, which maintains the importance of international
organizations and institutions in inter-state relations and cooperation, states act out of self-
interest, the incentives to cooperation are marked by benefit for the state without incurring
risk. As states are rational egoists in institutionalism, regardless of their democracy or not,
their behaviour will remain uniquely self-interested and so democracies and non-democracies
will act similarly. 
On the contrary, liberalism presents a fundamentally different point of view on the
behaviours of democracies and non-democracies. Liberalism redefines the parameters of state
power, disregarding the outdated military power and instead examining power through
relative economic growth, potential peace and cooperation and liberal ideals such as human
rights and political freedom. These fundamental liberal values mean that liberalism and
democracy must go hand in hand, as the freedoms allowing democracy to succeed are liberal
in nature. As such, democracies and non-democracies do not act similarly in international
relations under the lens of liberalism, as elected policymakers are not acting solely out of
self-interest but out of liberal ideals, namely peace and cooperation on the international scale.
Non democratic states, according to Doyle in Liberalism and World Politics, are aggressive
in nature due to their dictatorial control and limitation of the freedoms granted under
liberalism, and thus non democracies continue to act in the self-interest of the chosen few
with power. Doyle describes three facets of liberalism, outlining the pacification between
states brought about by liberal democracy and the tendency of authoritarian non democracies
to engage in warfare in order to maintain security or power. Under the lens of liberalism,
democracies and non-democracies do not work similarly, as there state preferences differ at
their very foundation, one liberal democracy desiring peace and cooperation (or occasionally
territorial expansion but less so within the past few decades), and the other authoritarian
acting out of self-interest and desire for consolidated power. 
In a similar vein, social constructivism argues that the ideas of a state shape the
structure of said state and dictate state behaviour. Just as democratic and liberal ideals go
hand in hand, these ideals in society shape the expected social and political norms. In
democracies state behaviour is expected to be fair and ethical, citizens are to be treated with
respect and state behaviour is with the interests of those citizens in mind. Democracy is
founded on the context of freedoms and fairness, as well as the preference of peace and
cooperation over conflict and war (as illustrated by Mueller). State behaviour is governed by
and reflects these societal norms, however in an authoritarian state, social norms are
drastically different, as the society is not founded on personal and political freedoms and
fairness. State behaviour is not governed by norms of fairness or equality, and so only caters
to those whose ideas are deemed relevant, those ideas being absolute power and control of the
citizenry. Non democracies act entirely differently in international relations than
democracies, as the ideas behind state behaviour are in direct contrast with each other. 
State behaviour of democracies and non-democracies can simultaneously be similar
and different depending on the lens of understanding applied, as ultimately when considered
egoist, state behaviour remains constant across regime type, whereas when the impact of
changing social norms and ideas is considered, differences in behaviour are evident. 

(word count: 985) 

Ruairi Vickery 19335152