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Why did Tito’s Yugoslavia Collapse?

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (more commonly referred to as former

Yugoslavia), was a country founded in the wake of World War II, governed by Josip Broz
Tito until his death in 1980, whereafter the underlying structural and economic problems
were exacerbated, contributing to a rise in ethnonationalism. These issues, coupled with the
collapse of communism, resulted in the breakout of civil war and ultimately, the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. At its founding, the new Yugoslav federation consisted of the six socialist
republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and
Slovenia, all united and governed by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.1 Under the
guidance of Tito, the legacy of ethnic divisions was hushed up, historical conflicts and
prejudices pushed aside in favour of the new, national Yugoslav identity2, and the fear of a
return to these conflicts, along with a common faith in communism, helped to foster unity.
However Tito’s death and the weakening of communism after the end of the Cold War meant
that Yugoslavia lost these two unifying factors, allowing those ethnic tensions to boil over
once more.
The 1973 oil crisis and subsequent drastic increase in oil prices had a profound
impact the world over, not least in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav economy was extremely
dependent on world trade and so industry suffered a huge blow due to the global decrease
in demand3. Exports plummeted and by 1982 Yugoslavia had a $2100m balance of trade
deficit with the EEC, and one of $400m with the US. What made this recession so
destructive to the Yugoslavian economy was an issue unique to its system of government.
Despite its centralized ideology and political structure of leadership by the League of
Communists, the federal constitution of 1974 allowed the six republics and two autonomous
regions of Yugoslavia to pursue decentralized economic policies, resulting in policies
favouring economic autarchy4. The lack of a centralized economic strategy in response to
the serious downturn in trade and economic growth exacerbated the economic divisions
within Yugoslavia itself, especially the North/South divide5.
Since the 1960s the gap in incomes between the wealthier regions and the poorer
was steadily increasing6 and by the late 1970s, Kosovo, the poorest region of the country,
had an income per capita of $1000, only one third of the national average. Illiteracy was at a
high of twice the national average also7. The tendency for the migration of skilled workers
due to lack of opportunities also widened the gap between the poorer regions of Kosovo and
Macedonia in comparison to the wealthier regions of Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina8.
In the late 1980s despite the same sized populations of Slovenia, Kosovo and Macedonia,
Slovenia represented 29% of Yugoslav exports, while Macedonia only provided 4% and

1 Cyril D'Souza. “The Breakup of Yugoslavia.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 29, no. 48, 1994, pp. 3027–3031.
2 Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. p. 668
3 Singleton, F. B. “Yugoslavia: Economic Grievances and Cultural Nationalism.” The World Today, vol. 39, no. 7/8, 1983, pp.
284–290.
4 Ibid.
5 Lang, Nicholas R. “The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia.” World
Politics, vol. 27, no. 3, 1975, pp. 309–335. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2010123. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021. pp.330-335
6 Ibid.
7 Singleton, F. B. “Yugoslavia: Economic Grievances and Cultural Nationalism.” The World Today, vol. 39, no. 7/8, 1983, pp.
284–290.
8 Lang, Nicholas R. “The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia.” World
Politics, vol. 27, no. 3, 1975, pp. 309–335.
Kosovo only 1%9. The vast economic disparity between the wealthy regions of the North and
the poorer regions of the South fostered economic tensions for both sides, spurred on by a
history of ethnic divisions. The North resented the burden placed upon them in supporting
the Southern regions, and the South resented the economic disparity perpetuated by the
wealth of the North. These originally economic disputes and tensions, such as the protests in
Zagreb, Croatia calling for to “Stop the plunder of Croatia”, unearthed the barely-buried
ethnic and cultural tensions of Yugoslavia as the representatives for the richer regions
lamented that their wealth was being squandered and exploited by the “lazy southerners”
and those southerners despaired at the low prices offered on their food and products sold in
the North.10 The residents of the richer regions became convinced that they would be better
off without the burden of the poorer. Similarly, the mismanagement of urban-rural migration
as the poorer rural populations spread North in search of jobs contributed to tensions
between them and the urban populations. Subsidisation by the government went to heavy
industry leaving smaller scale production in need of funds, and much of the influxing rural
workers were left without the jobs they had arrived in search of.11 Also, as the militias that
had carried out so much of the violence in these larger cities in the past had been largely
built up of rural populations, the return of this demographic to cities contributed to growth in
ethnic tensions.12
The economy deteriorated even further after the death of Tito, as unlike the many
other Communist countries indebted to the West, the Yugoslavian government resorted to
printing more money inducing hyper-inflation through the 1980s, resulting in an inflation rate
of 1240% in 1989.13 Yugoslavia had a long history of ethnic divisions as it consisted of an
extremely ethnically diverse population, with a huge variety of languages, cultures and even
alphabets.14 These “once-forgotten” divides resurfaced with the economic difficulties facing
Yugoslavia in the 1970s and onwards after Tito’s death and the loss of his unifying
leadership under a strong communist identity.
In the melting pot of Yugoslavia the long history and legacy of violence and deep
rooted cultural and ethnic divisions, the emergence of ethnonationalist tensions was almost
to be expected. Yugoslavia was a country consisting largely of “ethnic slavs”, varying groups
of Serbs, Albanians, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians and religious groups too, especially a large
Moslem population.15 These groups, while distinct in culture and nationality, were so
interspersed among the republics of Yugoslavia that almost every dispute, issue or conflict
could be used to spur on nationalistic fervour and rhetoric.16 Throughout the long history of
the Balkans there have been religious, linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences, various
“age-old conflicts” and recent hangups from the violence of WWII17 and despite the best
efforts of Tito to create a (relatively successful) unified Yugoslav identity supported by the
might of communism, after his death this identity crumbled in the face of the resurfacing of

9 Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. p.670
10 Singleton, F. B. “Yugoslavia: Economic Grievances and Cultural Nationalism.” The World Today, vol. 39, no. 7/8, 1983, pp.
284–290.
11Cyril D'Souza. “The Break up of Yugoslavia.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 29, no. 48, 1994, pp. 3027–3031. JSTOR,
12Ibid.
13Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. pp.670-671
14Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. p. 665
15 Hodson, Randy, et al. “National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia.” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 99, no. 6, 1994,
pp. 1540-1544
16Ibid. pp. 1542-1544
17Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. pp.665-699
these ethnic and cultural tensions.18 The failures of the Yugoslavian economy at this time
polarised the rich and the wealthy, and the age-old ethnic divisions bubbled up as the Croats
and Slovenes deeply resented the economic decisions being made in Belgrade. In the power
vacuum after Tito’s death Croatia and Slovenia desired for economic and political
independence. Their fears regarding the mismanagement of the country were exacerbated
further by the issues of growing ethnic tensions and especially by the rise of Serbian
nationalism under Slobodan Milosevic.19
The autonomous province of Kosovo served as a breeding ground for emerging
Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia. The legacy of the violent history of the Balkans was
especially remembered by the large Moslem and Albanian populations in Bosnia, Kosovo
and Macedonia.20 In Kosovo, the poorest region, the cultural contrast between the Serbs and
the greater population of Albanians was of constant significance, especially as the economic
divisions within Yugoslavia as a whole worsened. Despite their being only one third of the
population, the government of Kosovo was Serbian, high ranking professions and positions
were for Serbs only, and access to higher education was barred from Albanians. Since 1966
the Albanians had called for a more equal share of power and representation in the
government of Kosovo and in Belgrade.21 After the 1974 Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Kosovo province became autonomous and Albanians began to find
themselves more properly represented in government, and this combined with their
emergence as the primary demographic in Kosovo - the Albanians had a birth rate that was
twice the national average, and there was a steady stream of migrating Serbians throughout
the 1970s and 1980s22 - meant that there was a push by Albanians to obtain independence
of Kosovo from Serbia in the 1980s.23 Protests and demonstrations took place to demand
this independence and the granting of republic status to Kosovo, however these
demonstrations were met by Serbian authorities with violence and mass arrest, seeing over
1,750 Albanians imprisoned for up to 15 years between 1981 and 1988.24
Nationalist tensions continued to worsen in Kosovo and, and a new Serbian leader,
Slobodan Milosevic utilised these nationalist tensions in Kosovo to consolidate Serbian
authority there and he attempted to fill the power vacuum left behind in the wake of Tito’s
death. Under his leadership in 1987 the League of Communists of Serbian undertook the
goal of regaining control of Kosovo by limiting the autonomy granted to it under Tito’s 1974
constitution.25 By 1989 Milosevic had secured his position over Serbia, elected to president
of the Serbian Republic and began his aim of maintaining and spreading Serbian control and
influence over Yugoslavia. Milosevic began to dismantle the delicate balance of power
between the republics of Yugoslavia that Tito had maintained through his own charm and
through the systems of government and revolving presidency.26 Milosevic was able to
“absorb” the previously independent Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia through an

18ibid.
19Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. pp. 670-671
20 Singleton, F. B. “Yugoslavia: Economic Grievances and Cultural Nationalism.” The World Today, vol. 39, no. 7/8, 1983, pp.
284–290.
21Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23“Yugoslavia - Police Violence in Kosovo Province - the Victims.” Amnesty.Org, Amnesty International,
www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/180000/eur700161994en.pdf. Accessed 18 Jan. 2021. pp.2-13
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. p. 671
amendment to the constitution whereby these provinces kept their seats in the federal
presidency but, along with Montenegro, would support Serbia in any dispute or federal
conflict, giving Serbia a guaranteed four out of eight votes. 27 Milosevic knew that in order to
achieve the Serb-led unification of Yugoslavia he would be in direct opposition to the other
republics and so this effective stagnation in the federal government allowed him more
freedom to consolidate Serbian power. This seizure of power in the federal government
presented the other states with very few options and it was Slovenia and Croatia particularly
that began to seriously consider their leaving Tito’s Yugoslavia and declaring
independence.28
As politics became increasingly nationalistic and citizens of each republic more
concerned for their respective security Slovenian took on a nationalist political platform,
looking to limit the possible Serbian authority over Yugoslavia. In 1989 Slovenia published a
doctrine of “Republican supremacy”, stating that in cases of a conflict between the
republican constitution and the federal, the former would take precedence.29 This doctrine
effectively ruled out the previous mechanisms for conflict resolution set out by Tito in his
leadership of Yugoslavia, as the previous federal constitutional mechanisms of conflict
resolution were now eclipsed by unilateral mechanisms relying on use of force.30 The ease
with which the Slovenian doctrine built off of the original constitution suggests that the
original constitution itself was a rushed and weakly written document, contributing ultimately
to the collapse of Tito’s Yugoslavia. This failure of the constitution is suggestive of the failure
of the political system also, and with the collapse of European Communism in 1989,
Yugoslavia suffered a blow to its strongest political unifying factor.31
In elections held in 1990 the multi-party system was extremely ineffective,
political parties by this point had become very nationalistic and prioritised the ethnic majority
of their state. The potential policies and reforms necessary to unify Yugoslavia were too
widespread and divided to succeed, and ultimately the political stalemate and lack of
direction under a unified communist government, combined with the increased nationalist
divisions and the undercurrent of economic issues and resentment were too much to bear. 32
By June 1991 any chance for a ‘democratic and unified Yugoslavia’ was gone33, and in that
same month Croatia and Slovenia both declared formal independence from Yugoslavia.
Their secession proved to be the final catalyst needed for the outbreak of war, specifically
the Croat-Serb war, as in the case of Slovenia, the large Slovenian proportion of the
population (90%) meant that there was little internal opposition and war could be avoided. 34
This was not the case in Croatia however.
There the Serb minority rebelled against the newly formed Croatian government who
in turn vowed to crush the rebellion. In Bosnia there was no majority population and so after
the elections of 1990 a brief cooperative government between the Muslim nationalist party,
the Serbian nationalist party and the Croatian democratic party held power. However as
Yugoslavia ultimately fell apart, the Croats and Bosnian Muslims formed an alliance and

27 Ibid.
28 ibid .
29Hayden, Robert M. “Yugoslavia's Collapse: National Suicide with Foreign Assistance.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.
27, no. 27, 1992, pp. 1377–1382.
30 Ibid
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006. p. 674
34 Ibid
were engaged in war by the Serbs in 1992.35 However, even this Bosnian-Croat alliance
devolved into war in 1993, and Yugoslavia as a whole was engulfed in civil wars well until
the late 1990s. These wars served to be the final nails in the coffin for Tito’s Yugoslavia as
by the end of these brutal and bloody wars, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia and Macedonia had all become independent, with Montenegro becoming
independent from Serbia in 2006. 36
Another important factor in the collapse of Tito’s Yugoslavia that must be mentioned
is the role of the international community and the failure of said community to aid in the
deescalation of violence and war. An important factor in the development of the Croat-Serb
war in 1992 for example was the all-too early German recognition of the independence of
Croatia and Slovenia from the Yugoslavian Federation. This international and public
recognition antagonised the Serbs and heightened the fears of Serbs in the now foreign
(independent) states, especially in Croatia, further incentivising the breakout of war.37 Similar
was the early American recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely due to the American
fear of the Yugoslav army, and an army which upon the collapse of the country would be
severely weakened. This US recognition of B and H independence had the same impact as
the German recognition of Croatia, also leading to open warfare. 38 The European
Community and US both were aware of the escalating issues in Yugoslavia but seemed all
too ready to accept the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and their initial response was lacking
and inadequate. 39
Tito’s Yugoslavia certainly had promise, its foundation and early leadership was
originally successful as Tito created a unified Yugoslav identity under Communism, however
the underlying issues of nationalist tension and ethnic divisions never really went away, and
the deep rooted economic issues spiralled into chaos following the Oil Crisis in the 1970s.
Tensions sparked among the kindling that was the undercurrent of economic and cultural
divides and nationalist politicians, largely Slobodan Milosevic, were able to take advantage
of these tensions in attempting to fill the power vacuum left in Tito’s wake. The tumultuous
years of nationalist tension and the failure of the political system to adequately represent and
manage the interests of each national group and republic crumbled the foundations of
Yugoslavia and the secession of the states from the Federation combined with the
inadequacy of international intervention and the recognition of independent states made war
inevitable, and due to these factors Tito’s Yugoslavia had entirely collapse by the late 1990s.

35 Hayden, Robert M. “Yugoslavia's Collapse: National Suicide with Foreign Assistance.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.
27, no. 27, 1992, pp. 1377–1382.
36 Fawn, Rick. “The Kosovo: And Montenegro: Effect.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol.
84, no. 2, 2008, pp. 269–294. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25144765. Accessed 25 Jan. 2021. p269
37 Judt. 674-675
38 Hayden, Robert M. “Yugoslavia's Collapse: National Suicide with Foreign Assistance.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.
27, no. 27, 1992, pp. 1377–1382. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4398583. Accessed 25 Jan. 2021.
39 Ibid.
Bibliography

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Singleton, F. B. “Yugoslavia: Economic Grievances and Cultural Nationalism.” The World

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Hodson, Randy, et al. “National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia.” American Journal of
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Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Illustrated, Penguin Books, 2006.
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Accessed 18 Jan. 2021.