PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

GABBY CONCEPCION
(G.R. NO. 212206 JULY 4, 2016)

PONENTE: PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
An Information was filed charging appellant Gabby Concepcion, Leopoldo Caguring,
Algel Negapatan, Marting Esgaba, and two John Does with the crime of murder.
On June 23, 2004. Reggie was cleaning Danny Ang’s banca when he heard his
friend Jessie shouts for help. Reggie hid on top of a tolda which is about two to three
arms length from the crime scene. He then saw Jessie being chased by martin, Toto, and
Elloy. Jessie was running towards the banca where Leopoldo, Algel, and Gabby with
other companions were waiting for him. Upon seeing Jessie, Leopoldo and Algel held his
arms while Toto stabbed him. Thereafter, Jessie was pushed into the water. Thereat,
Gabby tried to shoot Jessie but he missed. The other accused roamed around the banca
and served as Gabby’s lookout. As a result, Jessie died to hemorrhagic shock secondary
to two stab wounds. The police recovered a homemade shotgun and two butcher’s
knives.
The Regional Trial Court render the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court found
that the killing was attended by treachery and that the appellants conspired to kill Jessie.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of eyewitness Reggie who had no motive
to falsely testify against appellants. The trial court considered the flights of the accused
Elloy as indicia of guilt. The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the RTC and
dismissed the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Reggie as “more apparenbt
than real, if not totally trivial”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused were guilty of murder for the death of Jessie Asis.

RULING:
YES. The accused were guilty of murder for the death of Jessie Asis.Reggie was
found to be at the crime scene when the crime of murder took place. The appellate court
found Reggie's testimony "clear, straightforward and credible." While Reggie may be a
member of Siete Pares a rival group of Otso Makulit, we agree with the appellate
court's ratio decidendi that this fact alone does not make Reggie a biased witness.
With respect to appellants' allegation that it was impossible for Reggie to have
witnessed the whole incident, Reggie categorically stated in his direct examination that
he was about two to three meters from the situs criminis. He was also familiar with
appellants, they being his former friends.hanrobleslaw
The attending circumstance of treachery was likewise properly appreciated.
Treacheiy is present when the following conditions are present: (1) the employment of
such means of execution that gave the one attacked no opportunity to defend oneself or
to retaliate and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with treachery. As correctly imposed by the
trial court and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, appellant must suffer the prison term
of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence
of an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. Appellants are
not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.

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 ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. 192330 NOVERMBER 14, 2012)

PONENTE: ABAD, J.

FACTS:
This case is about a Municipal Mayor charged with illegal diversion of food
intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsioderation
projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in
its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers,
what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries. Garcia and Polinio went ot
petitioner Mayor Ysidoro to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him,
Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice
and two boxes of sardines worth Php 3, 396.00 to CSAP.
The Sandiganbayan held that Mayor Ysidoro applied public property to a public
purpose other than that of which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Ysidoro is guilty of technical malversation.

RULING:
YES. The technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code has three elements: (a) thatt the offender is an accountable public
officer; (b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some
public use; © that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance.
The creation of two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate
separate funds for SFP and CSAP in the annual budget. Mayor Ysidoro could not
legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food
intended for the to CSAP beneficiaries.

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 JORGE NAVARRA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. 224943 MARCH 20, 2017)

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information 6 dated January 18, 2001 filed before
the RTC charging, inter alia, petitioner of violation of Section 22 (a), in relation to Section
28 (h) and (f), of RA 8282. The prosecution alleged that from 1995 to 2000, petitioner
served as the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of FENICS, an employer
registered with the SSS. Sometime in the years 1999 to 2002, a total of eleven (11)
employees of FENICS filed separate complaints before the SSS against FENICS for the
latter's non-remittance of their SSS contributions. Upon verification, Argamosa
discovered that FENICS indeed failed to remit the SSS contributions of its employees
from July 1997 to June 2000 and, thus, determined that FENICS's total unpaid
obligations, excluding the 3% monthly penalty mandated by law.Despite numerous
demands, FENICS failed to pay its delinquencies, thus, constraining SSS to file an
Affidavit-Complaint against petitioner and his co-accused for the aforesaid crime before
the Office of the City Prosecutor .
In his defense, petitioner averred that while he is indeed the President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of FENICS, he never had custody of the employees'
SSS contributions, as it was the Human Resources Department that was tasked to
handle such matters. Further, he asserted that during the period when the alleged
delinquencies were incurred, FENICS had already shut down. In this relation, petitioner
narrated that: (a) from 1995-1996, FENICS diligently remitted the employees' SSS
contributions; (b) beginning 1997, its business started to decline due to the pull-out of
one of its biggest customers eventually leading to its shut down; and (c) since FENICS
was already non-operational, its employees were unable to work, and naturally, there
could have been no wages/salaries from which the SSS contributions could be sourced.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The accused appealed. Accordingly, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for violation of Section
22 (a), in relation to Section 28 (h) and (f), of RA 8282.

RULING:
NO. Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioner assails the validity or regularity of
the Information filed against him on the ground that it allegedly did not charge a criminal
offense. However, as pointed out by the CA, petitioner never raised such issue prior to
his arraignment. In fact, a reading of the records shows that petitioner only raised the
same after he was convicted by the RTC and the case was already on appeal before the
CA. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that his failure to object to the alleged defect in the
Information before entering his plea amounted to a waiver of such defects, especially
since objections as to matters of form or substance in the Information cannot be made for
the first time on appeal. Hence, petitioner can no longer be allowed to raise this issue
before the Court.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that the prosecution - through
a plethora of documentary evidence - had established by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that during the period of July 1997 to June 2000, FENICS failed to remit its employees'
SSS contributions despite withholding such amounts from their respective salaries. It is
settled that "[f]actual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported
by the evidence on record," as in this case.

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 EDWIN PFLEIDER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. 208001 JUNE 19, 2017)

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
At around 7 :00 a.m. of September 15, 2010, Granados was fatally shot by Bautista
in front of his home in Tacloban City. After the shooting, Bautista attempted to flee the
crime scene but was unsuccessful because his getaway motorcycle failed to start its
engine. A neighbor of the victim, Butch Price, came to the rescue and shot and wounded
Bautista. Granados was immediately rushed to the hospital but was declared dead.
Bautista was also brought to the hospital. On the same day, SP02 Norman Loy Fevidal
interviewed Bautista while the latter was still confined. Bautista executed an extrajudicial
confession implicating Pfleider as the mastermind of the assassination claiming that
Pfleider induced himby means of a price of P60,000 for the hit. An Information for Murder
was filed with the RTC of Tacloban but the judge dismissed the case for lack of
probable cause. However, the OSG filed a certiorari with the CA which was granted.
Hence, this petition questioning the reversal of the CA of the finding of lack of probable
cause by the RTC. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of the presence of probable cause may be made
by the Supreme Court.

RULING:
NO. It must be emphasized that the SC is not a trier of facts. The determination of
probable cause is and will always entail a review of the facts of the case. The CA, in
finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but raised
questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts.
It ruled that, "Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate
Pfelider as the inducer and why the other witnesses would associate CPfleider to the
crime." From this query, the CA has raised doubt. In this case, the judge of the RTC, not
finding the existence of probable cause, outrightly dismissed the case.
The contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well-noted and from the very
provision of the Rules of Court, the remedy, in case ofdoubt, is for the judge to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence.Therefore, the SC finds it appropriate to
remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination
of probable cause based on the evidence presented by the prosecution.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULITO DIVINAGRACIA, SR.
(G. R. NO. 207765 JULY 26, 2017)

PONENTE: LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Divinagracia and CCC were husband and wife with seven (7) children. The family
lived in a one (1)-room house. Sometime in November 1996, Divinagracia and CCC
quarrelled, prompting CCC to leave and spend the night at her sibling's house. Their
daughters AAA and BBB were then left by themselves since their other siblings were
either at their grandmother's house or with their friends. Later that evening, while AAA
and BBB were sleeping side by side inside their house, BBB suddenly woke up to her
father's tight embrace from behind and felt him roughly running his hand over her leg and
breasts. BBB then felt her father poking his hard penis against her buttocks. BBB begged
her father to stop, saying that she still had to go to school the following day. Divinagracia
moved away from BBB and went out of the house. BBB was nine (9) years old at that
time.
A few minutes later, Divinagracia went back inside the house and lay down beside
AAA. AAA woke up and asked her father where her mother was. Divinagracia pinched
her ear and ordered her to keep quiet. AAA noticed that BBB, who was then lying beside
her, slowly moved away. AAA tried to follow BBB, but Divinagracia pulled AAA towards
him and made her face him. Divinagracia pulled down AAA's shorts and put his finger
inside her vagina. Afterwards, Divinagracia got on top of AAA and inserted his penis
inside her vagina. AA.A:s father then continued to molest her. AAA cried to her sister for
help but BBB could do nothing but weep and cover her ears. AAA was eight (8) years old
at that time.
On November 13, 2000, Divinagracia was charged with rape and acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
The trial court fou8nd the accused guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the
decison of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Julito is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.

RULING:
YES. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, and Sister Mary
Ann are immaterial as these are not elements of the crime and do not detract from the
credibility of the witnesses. In fact, minor inconsistencies may even be expected from
AAA and BBB who are not accustomed to public trial and were only eight (8) and nine (9)
years old, respectively, at the time of their father's sexual abuse.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provides the elements for the crime of rape:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed (1) By a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Rape becomes qualified when committed by a parent against his child less than 18
years of age. This is provided for under paragraph 1, Article 266-B: Article 266-B.
Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
The elements of qualified rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3)
[done] by force and without consent; ... (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at
the time of the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOCELYN CARLIT y GAWAT
(G.R. NO. 227309 AUGUST 16, 2017)

PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:
P03 Christian Carvajal was assigned at Dagupan City Police Station when he was
tasked to act as poseur buyer in the buy bust operation against Jocelyn Carlit in the
squatters area in Mayombo District of the city. During their preparation, they recorded the
buy bust money to be used in the police blotter. The police officer did not know whether
there was coordination with the PDEA.
It was around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he, with a civilian asset, went to
conduct the buy bust at Highlander, Mayombo District, Dagupan City. They approached
the Accused and personally bought shabu from her, handing the buy bust money
consisting of five (5) 100-peso bills, while the Accused handed a sachet of shabu. After
he got hold of the shabu, the police officer introduced himself as a police officer and
arrested the Accused. The shabu was marked in the police station with the officer's
initials and also recovered the buy bust money from the Accused. The officer declared
that he did not know the Accused prior to the buy bust and confirmed the identity only
through the asset. The officer said that the Accused and his supervising officer were both
present when he prepared the confiscation receipt which was signed by a DOJ
representative although there was no media. At the police station, the police blotter,
request for laboratory examination and coordination with the PDEA as well as his affidavit
were prepared. The police officer also narrated that he was the only one in sole
possession of the specimen from its seizure up to the station where it was only shown to
the investigator and thereafter brought by him to the crime laboratory, where it was
received by PSI Myrna Malojo.
After evaluating the evidence on record, the R TC held that the prosecution
established with moral certainty that accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in
a legitimate buy-bust operation. Subsequently, the case was elevated to the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts a quo correctly convicted Carlit for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

RULING:
YES. The prosecution failed to prove every link in the chain of custody. Section 5 of
R.A. 9165 provides:The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the, quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly
established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly,
the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by
the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore,
is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti.
To refresh, the substance of P03 Carvajal's testimony was that he was the poseur-
buyer who received the sachet containing the dangerous drug from Carlit, and that he
was the only arresting officer who handled the same until it was turned over to PSI
Todeño at the PNP Crime Laboratory.
PSI Todeño confirmed receiving the narcotic substance from P03 Carvajal for
testing, and added that her specimen was then handed to one P02 Manuel, the evidence
custodian, for safekeeping. This is where the chain breaks.
Clear in Salvador is that the final link of the chain must be on how the drug item
seized came into the court's physical custody. Unfortunately, P02 Manuel was never
presented as witness in this case. Needless to say, the probability of the integrity and
identity of the corpus delicti being compromised is present in every single time the

6
prohibited item is being stored or transported, be it from the PNP crime laboratory directly
to the court or otherwise. It was therefore imperative for the prosecution to have
presented as witness P02 Manuel, and anyone else for that matter who may have
handled the drug after him. For during the interim time - from when the specimen was
placed under his custody until the time it was brought to court - the threat of tampering,
alteration, or substitution of the corpus delicti still existed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONAS GERONIMO y PINLAC
(G.R. NO. 225500 SEPTEMBER 11, 2017)

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations 5 filed before the RTC accusing
Geronimo of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The prosecution alleged that at around ten (10) o'clock in the morning of April 12,
2010, a tip was received from a confidential informant that Geronimo was peddling illegal
drugs in Caloocan City. Acting on the said tip, Intelligence Agent 1 Arquero immediately
organized a buy-bust operation, which was coordinated with the PDEA and the PNP. IA1
Arquero then instructed the informant to order shabu from Geronimo. At around 9 the
evening, the buy-bust team composed of IA1 Arquero, IO1 Lorilla, IO2 Advincula, a
certain IO1 Camayang, and one IO1 Mellion reached the target area in Caloocan City
and conducted a surveillance thereof. Moments later, Geronimo arrived, took out from his
right pocket a transparent plastic sachet containing a suspected shabu, and handed it
over to the poseur-buyer, IO1 Lorilla, who, in turn, paid him with the buy-bust money.
Shortly after, IO1 Lorilla lit a cigarette to signal the rest of the team that the transaction
was completed, prompting IO2 Advincula to rush towards the scene to arrest Geronimo.
Subsequently, IO1 Lorilla and IO2 Advincula frisked Geronimo's pockets. IO1 Lorilla
recovered the buy-bust money, while IO2 Advincula recovered the marijuana leaves
wrapped in a newspaper and gave them to the former. The team proceeded to the
headquarters in Quezon City, and the confiscated items were supposedly marked,
photographed, and inventoried by IO1 Lorilla in the presence of Geronimo and
Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz. IO1 Lorilla secured the letter-request for laboratory
examination from IO1 Jay son R. Albao and delivered the specimens to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for testing. Consequently, the specimens were received and examined by
Forensic Chemist Jappeth M. Santiago, who later on revealed that the substance found
in the plastic sachet tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and mefenorex, while the other wrapped specimen tested positive for the
presence of marijuana, all dangerous drugs. The RTC found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 5 and 11 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Subsequently, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Geronimo's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, as respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of RA 9165, should be upheld.

RULING:
YES. At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the
entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."
In this case, Geronimo was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165. For the successful prosecution of unauthorized sale of
dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the essential elements thereof are proven beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. On the other hand,
in cases wherein an accused is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the
accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; ( b) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary
doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in

7
court as evidence of the corpus delicti. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21
of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal
drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its
IRR, Geronimo's acquittal is perforce in order
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEHLSON AGUIRRE y ARIDIDON, et al.
(G.R. NO. 219952 NOVEMBER 20, 2017)

PONENTE: TIJAM, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellants and accused Jeffrey Roxas y Aragoncillo (Roxas) were charged
with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a), 4(a) and 6 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, in relation to violation of RA
7610, known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, for recruiting, transporting, harboring, providing or receiving, in
conspiracy with one another, ten girls, including seven minors, for purposes of
prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Of the ten girls, four testified in Court against accused-appellants - private
complainants AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD. Their testimonies showed that at different
times, they were convinced by accused-appellants to go swimming and drinking, and to
have sex, with foreigners in exchange for money and/or shabu. Arabit and Aguirre
convinced AAA to go swimming and drinking with foreigners for which she would get
paid. As on a previous occasion, accused-appellants induced BBB to have sex with a
man in exchange for money and shabu. DDD initially declined Aguirre's proposition to
introduce her to a foreigner who would give them money and shabu for sex with her. She
relented after hearing that aside from money, they would also have
one "bulto" of shabu for their personal use. Thereafter, Paralejas fetched DDD from her
house. Private complainants and six other girls (EEE, FFF, GGG, HHH, III and JJJ) were
later assembled at Arabit's house where accused-appellants told them to primp
themselves as they had to look good for the foreigners. Subsequently, a white van
arrived and all ten girls, together with accused-appellants and Roxas, boarded the van
and travelled to Quezon City. Inside the apartment, the girls, as instructed by accused-
appellants, fixed their clothes and make-up to look pleasing to the foreigners. Arabit and
Paralejas also instructed the girls not to leave the house. Arabit and Aguirre then offered
to the girls what appeared to be shabu, which was payment for sex with the foreigners in
addition to money. Six of the girls accepted and they were separated from the rest.
Several people, who came running down from the second floor of the apartment,
identified themselves as the police and told the girls to sit together. The police officers
arrested accused-appellants and Roxas.
According to Roxas, he agreed to join them when Paralejas invited him to a drinking
party. A van subsequently took them, along with the other accused-appellants and "many
girls," to a two-storey apartment in Quezon City. While he was left outside the apartment,
he was handcuffed and brought inside by a man wearing a black jacket after he admitted
knowing Paralejas.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.

RULING:
NO. It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court's factual
findings - including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight
of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings - are accorded
great respect and even conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume
greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA, as in this case. The Court refrains from
disturbing the CA's findings if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of
facts can be gleaned from them.
The Court finds no reason to overturn the CA's findings and conclusion as to the
guilt of accused-appellants. Based on Section 3(a) of RA 9208, 24 the elements of
trafficking in persons are: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders;" (2) The means i1sed which include "threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another;" and (3) The

8
purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes at a minimum "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."
The prosecution has satisfactorily established these elements.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSHUA QUE y UTUANIS

(G.R. NO. 212994 JANUARY 31, 2018)

PONENTE: LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Acting on a report of an informant, P/C Insp. Muksan organized a buy-bust operation
with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. PO3 Lim and the informant then left for the area of Fort
Pilar. There, the informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he
intended to purchase P100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed him shabu inside a
plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the marked P100.00 bill and gave the
pre-arranged signal to have Que arrested. After the arrest, the marked bill and another
sachet of shabu were recovered from Que. Que was then brought to the police station
where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned over to the investigator,
SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), who then marked these items with his initials. He also
prepared the letter request for laboratory examination of the sachets' contents. Arresting
officer SPO1 Jacinto also testified to the same circumstances recounted by PO3 Lim.
RTC found Que guilty as charged. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant Joshua Que's guilt for violating Sections 5 and 11
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:
NO. In People v. Morales, the Court explained that failure to comply with Paragraph
1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implies a concomitant failure on the part of the
prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti." It produces doubts as to the
origins of the seized paraphernalia. Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody
requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items. Non-compliance with them
tarnishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which prosecutions under the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very
claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.
This case is tainted with grave, gratuitous violations of Section 21 (1). There is no
showing that a proper inventory and taking of pictures was done by the apprehending
officers. The marking of the sachets of shabu supposedly obtained from accused-
appellant was conducted at a police station without accused-appellant, or any person
representing him, around. There was not even a third person, whose presence was
required by Section 21 (1) prior to its amendment —"a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official." This Court is left with
absolutely no guarantee of the integrity of the sachets other than the selfserving
assurances of PO3 Lim and SPO1 Jacinto. This is precisely the situation that the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act seeks to prevent.
The very process that Section 21 requires is supposed to be a plain, standardized,
even run-of-the-mill, guarantee that the integrity of the seized drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia is preserved. All that law enforcers have to do is follow Section 21's
instructions. They do not even have to profoundly intellectualize their actions. An
admitted deviation from Section 21's prescribed process is an admission that statutory
requirements have not been observed. This admitted disobedience can only work against
the prosecution's cause. When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-
compliance with Section 21, critical elements of the offense of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs remain wanting. It follows then, that this non-compliance
justifies an accused's acquittal.

9
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIA REGALADO ESTRADA
(G.R. NO. 225730 FEBRUARY 28, 2018)

PONENTE: MARTIRES, J.

FACTS:
Julia Estrada was charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under
RA 8042 and Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Julia met with
three private complainants separately where she represented herself as having power
and authority to deploy persons abroad for overseas employment. The private
complainants paid for fees necessary for their overseas placement. However, Julia did
not issue a single receipt on any of the transactions. After repeated promises, she failed
to deliver on her promised deployment of the private complainants. Both the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted her of illegal recruitment in large scale
under RA 8042 and three counts of estafa under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a conviction for illegal recruitment would preclude conviction for
estafa.

RULING:
NO. A conviction for illegal recruitment would not preclude conviction for estafa.
Double jeopardy will not attach from the prosecution and conviction of the accused for
both crimes because they are penalized under different laws and involved elements
distinct from one another. Julia was convicted for illegal recruitment because: (1) she has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable her to lawfully engage in the
recruitment or placement of workers; and (2) she unlawfully promised and recruited
private complainants for employment abroad for a fee, an activity punishable under the
Labor Code and RA 8042. Likewise, she was convicted for estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
because: (1) by falsely representing herself as possessing power to deploy persons for
overseas placement, she deceived the complainants into believing that she would
provide them overseas jobs; and (2), complainants parted with their money which they
thought are necessary for their deployment, resulting in damage to each of them. Based
on the foregoing, her conviction for the two offenses was grounded on different elements.

10
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX, ALFREDO GILLES, et al.
(G.R. NO. 229860 MARCH 21, 2018)

PONENTE: GESMUNDO, J.

FACTS:
On October 2, 2010, at about 2:00 o'clock dawn, province of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
each other, with lustful intent and lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, threats and intimidation, successfully have sexual
intercourse with the victim [AAA], without her consent and against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said victim and of social order. The RTC ruled in favor of the
prosecution. The RTC noted that AAA's unrefuted testimony that all the appellants raped
her, started by Castil who removed her pants and panty, placed himself on top of her and
placed his penis inside her vagina, followed by XXX, Monter, and Gilles who did the
same, already established the essential element of sexual congress. To the RTC, XXX's
testimony corroborated the fact that there was sexual congress between him and AAA.
In contrast to AAA's testimony, described as candid and unwavering, XXX's version
appeared contrived and ineffectual. In sustaining the conviction of appellants, the CA
noted that the victim was a retardate, and therefore the force or intimidation required to
overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult. In this case,
considering AAA is feeble-minded, the force required by law is the sexual act itself. The
CA highlighted that appellants were convicted of the crime of simple rape through force
and intimidation under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
However, it was established by testimonial evidence of FFF and the medical report of Dr.
Esclamado that AAA is known to have mental deficiency. From these pieces of evidence,
the CA determined AAA to be mentally deficient.

ISSUE:
Whether the courts a quo erred in convicting the appellants of the crime charged in
giving full weight and credence to the materially unreliable and uncorroborated
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

RULING:
YES. Specifically, for the review of rape cases, the Court has consistently adhered
to the following established principles: a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility;
it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Following
these principles, the Court has also refined how rape is proved. The credibility of the
complainant is the single most important issue in the prosecution of rape cases. The
categorical and candid testimony of the complainant suffices, and a culprit may be
convicted solely on the basis of her testimony, provided that it hurdles the test of
credibility.It should not just come from the mouth of a credible witness, it should likewise
be credible and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward and in accord with human
experience. Where the discrepancies and contradictory statements on important details
in the testimony seriously impair its probative value, cast serious doubt on its credibility,
and erode the integrity of the testimony, the Court should acquit the accused. It is true
that the Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings on witnesses' credibility.
This is because trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect cues and expressions
that could suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will, not reflected in the documentary or
object evidence.
The exception, of course, is when the trial court and/or the CA overlooked or
misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected the outcome of the case. It was
never fully established whether sexual congress took place, especially as to some of the
appellants. AAA asserted that Castil placed his penis inside her vagina, followed by XXX.
But then as to Gilles and Monter, the story is confusing and unclear. The chronology of
events is also hazily narrated. AAA claimed she fell asleep, but in the same testimony,
said she was aware of Gilles and Monter raping her. The Court cannot take this as a

11
positive allegation of Gilles and Monter's participation in the defilement. The participation
of these appellants is tenuous at best, and based only on conjecture. More importantly,
there was also no clear showing of force, threat, or intimidation from AAA's story. She
narrated that only Castil held her arm, without even saying how he held it or describing
the force, if any, that was inflicted upon her. This hardly comprises the force, threat, or
intimidation contemplated by law.

CARLOS JAY ADLAWAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. NO. 197645 APRIL 18, 2018)

PONENTE: MARTIRES, J.

FACTS:
Carlos Jay Adlawan, accused and petitioner herein, was charged in two separate
informations with Frustrated Homicide and Attempted Robbery. The victim, Adlawan’s
stepmother, Georgia, arrived home on the day of the incident and heard the petitioner
talking with the Adlawans' houseboy, in the backyard. The petitioner asked Cornelio in a
loud voice "unsa na?" ("what now?"). Georgia proceeded to the backyard to ask Cornelio
what the conversation was about. On her way to the yard, she met the petitioner who
proceeded to his room on the second floor.
While Georgia was talking to Cornelio, the petitioner came back and angrily asked
Georgia "asa ang kwarta?" ("where is the money?"). She replied saying, "unsa, wa mo
kahibalo nga na ospital inyong amahan?" ("why, don't you know that your father is in the
hospital?").Apparently, earlier that day, Georgia instructed her secretary withdraw
P100,000.00 from the bank to pay for the hospital bills of Alfonso.Thereafter, the
petitioner furiously told her "mura kag kinsa!" ("as if you are somebody!"), and started
hacking her using a katana, hitting her on the left portion of the neck and on the stomach.
Georgia parried the blows using her hands.Georgia ran towards the garage in front of the
house, but petitioner pursued her and continued his attack, hitting her shoulders and her
back until she fell down. Sensing that petitioner would finish her off, she summoned all
her strength, kicked his leg, and then grabbed and squeezed his sex organ.
The medical certificaterevealed that Georgia sustained multiple deep hack wounds
on her head, neck, and abdomen, among other parts of her body. The petitioner,
however, argues that the prosecution witnesses failed to establish intent to kill, and the
injuries were not so serious as to cause her death. The RTC acquitted him of Attempted
Robbery, but found him guilty of Frustrated Homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for Frustrated Homicide.

RULING:
YES. In criminal cases for frustrated homicide, the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number
of wounds he inflicted on his victim. In this case, intent to kill was sufficiently shown not
only by the testimonies of Georgia,the victim herself, and Fred, the eyewitness, but also
by the established fact that Georgia sustained multiple deep hack wounds on her head,
neck, and abdomen, among other parts of her body. The gravity of these wounds was
clearly shown by the photographs presented by the prosecution, and the medical
certificate. Dr. Kangleon even testified that Georgia could have died if no medical
attention was given to her. That petitioner intended to kill Georgia, and that the injuries
she sustained were fatal and would have caused her death if not for the timely medical
intervention, were therefore established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

12
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL GAMBOA y FRANCISCO
(G.R. NO. 233702 JUNE 20, 2018)

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE,J.

FACTS:
Manuel Gamboa was charged with two informations of Illegal Sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. According to the prosecution, a buy-bust operation was
organized against accusedappellant Manuel Gamboa who was allegedly engaged in
selling of Shabu in Tondo, Manila. The team was composed of PO2 Richard Nieva as
poseur-buyer, PO3 Brigido Cardiño and PO3 Noel Benitez as back-ups. The informant
introduced PO2 Nieva as a buyer of shabu to Gamboa. PO2 Nieva handed P200.00 buy-
bust money to Gamboa. In turn, Gamboa gave PO2 Nieva a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. Then PO2 Nieva gave his pre-arranged signal to the back-up
officers prompting them to rush towards the scene and arrest Gamboa. They recovered
another plastic sachet and the buy-bust money when they conducted a preventive search
on him. PO2 Nieva immediately marked the two plastic sachets and inventoried them at
the place of the arrest in the presence of Gamboa and a media representative named
Rene Crisostomo. Photographs of the items were taken by PO3 Benitez during the
marking and inventory. PO2 Nieva delivered the seized drugs to the PNP Crime
Laboratory and inspected by Police Chief Inspector Erickson Calabocal. The seized
items were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the
crimes of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, and that there was no break
in the chain of custody of the seized drugs. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedures prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 were
properly complied with.

RULING:
NO. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous
drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
its presentation in court as evidence of the crime. Under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.
However, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
may not always be possible. RA 10640 provides that the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and
its IRRdoes not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.
In the case at bar, the Court found that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized from Gamboa. Based on the records,
the seized items were properly marked by PO2 Nieva immediately upon confiscation at
the place of the arrest and in the presence of Gamboa and a media representative,
however this was not done in the presence of any elected public official, as well as a
representative from the DOJ. PO2 Nieva stated that there were no barangay officials
present. The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as the

13
representatives from the DOJ or the media to ensure that the chain of custody rule is
observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting or
contamination of evidence. The absence of these representatives does not per se render
the confiscated items inadmissible. A justifiable reason however for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses must be
adduced.
In this case, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression.
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
(G.R. NO. 212761-62 JULY 31, 2018)

PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners are charged as co-conspirators for their respective participation in the
illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) of Estrada for the years 2004 to 2012. The charges are contained in two (2)
complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder 5filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod (NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for
Plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 6 filed by the Field Investigation Office of
the Ombudsman (FIO Complaint).
The NBI Complaint alleged that, based on the sworn statements of Benhur Luy
along with several other JLN employees, the PDAF scheme would commence with
Napoles and the legislator - in this case, Estrada – discussing the utilization of the latter's
PDAF. During this stage, the legislator and Napoles would discuss the list of projects,
description or purpose of the projects, corresponding implementing government agency,
project cost, and "commission" or "rebate" of the legislator, ranging from 40-60% of the
total project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO).
Thereafter, Napoles would submit the "Listing" to the legislator. The legislator would
prepare a letter, which incorporated the "Listing" submitted by Napoles, addressed to the
Senate President and the Finance Committee Chairperson in the case of a Senator, or to
the House Speaker and Chairperson of the Appropriations Committee in the case of a
Congressman, who would then endorse such request to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for the release of the SARO. Upon receipt by the DBM of a copy of
the letter with the endorsement, the legislator would give Napoles a copy of the letter with
a "received" stamp and Napoles would give the legislator the agreed advance legislator's
commission.
The COA Report also made the following observations applicable to all of the PDAF
disbursements of Estrada for 2007-2009: (1) the implementation of most livelihood
projects was undertaken by the NGOs, not the IAs, in violation of existing laws; (2) the
selection of NGOs and implementation of the projects were not compliant with existing
regulations; (3) the selected NGOs, their suppliers and beneficiaries are unknown, or
could not be located at their given addresses, or submitted questionable documents, or
failed to liquidate or fully document the utilization of funds; and (4) irregularities
manifested in the implementation of the livelihood projects, such as multiple attendance
of the same beneficiaries to the same or similar trainings and multiple receipt of the same
or similar kits.
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Joint Resolution finding
probable cause to charge petitioners and several other respondents in the NBI and FIO
Complaints for one (1) count of Plunder and eleven (11) counts of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. The motions for reconsideration were denied in the Joint Order issued
by the Ombudsman. Following the denial of the petitioners' motions for reconsideration,
the Ombudsman filed several Informations before the Sandiganbayan, charging
petitioners with one (1) count of Plunder and eleven (11) counts of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of the charges file against them..

RULING:

G.R.Nos. 212761-62 (Sen. Estrada)

NO. To reiterate, the elements of the crime charged should in all likelihood be
present in order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed.
This rule is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without
which there should be – at the most – no criminal offense.The crime of Plunder is defined
under Sec. 2 of R.A. 7080 in the following wise:

14
 Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million
pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State
To constitute the crime of plunder, the following elements must be alleged
and established: (1.) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons; (2.) That the offender
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts: through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason
of the office or position of the public officer; by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; by obtaining, receiving or accepting
directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or by taking advantage
of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, That the aggregate
amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
is at least P50,000,000.00.
On the other hand, a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3 (e) 5of RA No. 3019
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the offender must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
`Sen. Estrada likewise cannot be said to have been complicit with his co-
respondents in allegedly giving unwarranted benefits to Napoles by funneling his
PDAF to her NGOs. Sen. Estrada neither exercises control over the DBM or the
IAs, nor is he allowed to dictate the course of the implementation of his projects.
Accordingly, the finding of probable cause against Sen. Estrada crumbles in the
absence of competent, admissible, and independent evidence of any overt act on
the part of Sen. Estrada to intentionally commit illegal acts constituting plunder
and/or violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

G.R. Nos. 213473-74 (De Asis)

YES. De Asis similarly takes exception to the charge of violation of Sec. 3
(e) of RA No. 3019 in the Joint Resolution, noting that the FIO Complaint did not
include him among those charged therefor. He avers that his inclusion in the
complaints was based solely on his functions as driver and messenger of
Napoles and is insufficient to charge him for the crimes of Plunder and violation
of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. His alleged act of delivering monies to Sen.
Estrada, without proof that he was knowingly and purposely delivering his
commissions or kickbacks, belies any reasonable ground to doubt his criminal
intent and overt act constitutive of Plunder. Finally, he claims that, as a private

15
individual, he cannot be held liable for Plunder in the absence of proof that he
conspired with the public officials charged.
Notably, the arguments and defenses raised by De Asis herein are similar to
those raised in G.R. Nos. 213477-78. Specifically, that his performance of his
duties as driver and messenger of Napoles does not amount to a willful
participation in the crimes for which he is being charged.
Notably, Sen. Estrada is not the only named public officer involved in this
issue; there are others against whom the Ombudsman found probable cause. De
Asis, therefore, may be charged with Plunder despite being a private individual
due to the existence of probable cause that he acted in concert with other public
officers.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAJETO CABILIDA, JR. Y CANDAWAN

(G.R. NO. 222964 JULY 11, 2018)

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
At around midnight, AAA and with her four minor children were all awake and
awaiting the arrival of their father, when there was a knock on their door. Thinking it was
their father, one of the children called out "Pang" but no one replied. AAA called out
again, and then heard somebody replied "O" (yes). A[s] it was raining very hard, AAA
mistook the voice she heard as that of her husband. When she opened the door,
appellant was standing outside completely naked with Toto beside him. Before she could
react, appellant immediately hugged AAA and kissed her as they both fell on the floor.
Despite her resistance, appellant successfully removed AAA's panty, and inserted his
penis inside her vagina. All this time, AAA tried to resist, was crying while being
assaulted and repeatedly entreated for accused to stop. AAA cried as did her children
who witnessed the alleged rape right before their eyes. While appellant was raping AAA,
Toto remained standing by the door, holding a knife and a flashlight, directing its beam
towards AAA and appellant. In his defense, appellant claimed that the sexual intercourse
were consensual and pre-arranged as they had an ongoing relationship for more than
one year. To support the "sweetheart theory," the defense presented a friend of
appellant,who testified that appellant and AAA had gone to his house twice; that they
requested to stay in one of his rooms to rest; that he did not see what happened inside
the room as it was covered by a curtain; and that he was surprised to hear about the
charges against appellant because according to appellant, he and AAA had an ongoing
relationship.
RTC rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty of rape. CA denied the appeal
affirming the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of the accused is tenable.

RULING:
NO. Sweetheart theory does not negate the commission of rape. Appellant's
defense that he and AAA were having an illicit affair and that it was AAA who asked him
to come to her house that night so that they could have sex fails to inspire belief from the
Court. Besides, even if true, the existence of such relationship did not negate the
commission of rape. Having a relationship with the victim is not a license to have sexual
intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate the accused from the criminal charge
of rape as "[b]eing sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act.
A medical certificate is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape. The Court has
consistently ruled that "[a] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of
rape and a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape x x x [because] the expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not
essential to conviction." In fact, an accused may be convicted based on the sole
testimony of the victim as long as her testimony is clear, positive, and convincing. In this
case, the testimony of AAA was not only clear, positive, and convincing but was also
corroborated by the testimony of her daughter BBB.

16
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO QUIAPO
(G.R. NO. 218804 AUGUST 06, 2018)

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with one count of attempted rape and six counts of rape
committed against AAA and MMM. AAA stayed with appellant Leonardo Quiapo, and
Aunt BBB Quiapo at their residence BBB. While living with the spouses, AAA helped out
in the daily household chores . While AAA was fetching water, Leonardo followed and
beckoned her to come to him. At first, AAA did not respond to Leonardo's call. Eventually,
AAA succumbed to appellant's unrelenting request and came near him. Immediately
thereafter, Leonardo undressed AAA and threatened her not to shout.Terrified by the
bolo hanging at the side of Leonardo and the threat of killing her, AAA yielded to her
uncle's desire. Leonardo laid her on the grass and took out his penis and positioned
himself on top of AAA. However, Leonardo was not able to fully insert his penis into
AAA's vagina.
The attempted rape, however, was consummated days after. While AAA was
sleeping together with her aunt and cousins in the same room - which was dark because
the lights were off - Leonardo advanced towards AAA. Despite AAA's shouts for help, her
aunt and cousins did not wake up. Leonardo succeeded in penetrating her causing her
severe pain and vaginal bleeding. She was sure that it was Leonardo because she
recognized his voice. On the part of MMM, she was invited by her Aunt BBB to stay in the
latter's house to be a playmate to the latter's two children. MMM would be sleeping in a
small room beside her Aunt BBB who was, in turn, lying beside Leonardo.MMM was
sleeping inside her Aunt BBB and Leonardo's bedroom. At that time, her aunt was not
around. While she was sleeping, appellant came to lie beside her. While MMM tried to
move away, Leonardo pulled her towards him. Leonardo held her hand, then shoulders,
covered her mouth and undressed her. MMM attempted to shout but Leonardo managed
to cover her mouth.Eventually, after successfully pulling down MMM's panty, Leonardo
removed his own clothes and laid on top of her. MMM suddenly felt much pain when
Leonardo inserted his penis into her vagina maintaining such position, Leonardo
continued with a series of 'push and pull' movements until MMM felt something flowed
inside her vagina. The RTC convicted the accused of his charges and the CA affirmed
the conviction modified the crime to statutory rape for the two cases.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be held guilty in the crime of rape.

RULING:
YES. Apellant submitted that the dates of the commission of the crimes were wrong.
The Court ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time
or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. Neither the delay of
AAA and MMM in reporting the incidents undermines their credibility. We have already
ruled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence,
cannot be taken against the victim because delay in reporting an incident of rape is not
an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility
of the complainant." The courts below correctly rejected appellant's defenses of denial
and alibi. Well established is the rule that "a mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him." The same is true with his claim
of alibi. As observed by the courts below, appellant failed to prove his physical
impossibility to be at the crime scene during their alleged commissions. Anent appellant's
ascription of ill-motive in filing the charges against him, the Court already ruled that

17
"motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. The elements of statutory
rape were present on two cases. Thus based on records, the prosecution had
established the element of carnal knowledge through the testimony of MMM with her age
of being under 12 years old supported by her Certificate of Live Birth. However, for the
three cases, it cannot be done. While it may appear that AAA was under twelve years old
at the time appellant raped her, the same was not properly alleged in the Information.
Consequently, due to the defect in the information charging appellant of rape, he can
only be made liable for simple rape even if it was proven during trial that AAA was under
12 years old at the time of the commission of the crimes charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO BAGABAY y MACARAEG

(G.R. NO. 235297 OCTOBER 17, 2018)

PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Armando was charged with the crime of Murder under the following Amended
Information. On or about the 7th day of September 2010, at Barangay San Antonio, in the
Municipality/City of CUYAPO, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Armando Bagabay, with intent to kill, while armed
with a stainless knife, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Alfredo M. Guevarra, Jr. with the said knife
inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds on different parts of his body which caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's family and heirs.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of murder. Aggrieved, Armando
appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming Armando's conviction for Murder despite the fact
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious. is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts
are generally accorded great weight; except when it appears on the record that the trial
court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some significant fact or
circumstance which if considered, would have altered the result.
The accused failed to prove self-defense. In questioning his conviction, Armando
argues that he should not be criminally liable for the death of the victim because he only
acted in self-defense. He posits that unlawful aggression was present when Guevarra
allegedly pointed and cursed at him then drew out a knife. This argument deserves scant
consideration. An accused who pleads self-defense admits to the commission of the
crime charged.
He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is indispensable. Unlawful aggression
refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense
has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.The Court agrees with the CA that
Armando failed to discharge his burden. All the requisites of self-defense are wanting in
this case.
Treachery was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Treachery must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. Thus, for
Armando to be convicted of murder, the prosecution must not only establish that he killed
Guevarra. It must also be proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing of
Guevarra was attended by treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. To appreciate treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the
following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were

18
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
himself.
In this case, although the attack was sudden and unexpected, the prosecution did
not prove that Armando deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly
ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the victim might offer. As testified to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the
incident happened in broad daylight outside Dr. Ramon De Santos National High School,
a public place where there were plenty of other people present who could have offered
their help. If Armando wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could
have chosen another time and place to stab the victim. In a similar case, the Court held
that when aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant
circumstances showed that there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, including the
victim's family, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed
consciously adopted means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen
another place or time. Thus, the Court can reasonably conclude that Armando acted
impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim.

19
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEPH ESPERA y BANNANO
(G.R. NO. 227313 NOVEMBER 21, 2018)

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 in an Information.  On September 02, 2010, in the City of
Tuguegarao, the accused alias "Jojo", without authority of law and without any permit to
sell, transport, deliver, and distribute dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, sell, and distribute one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.17 gram of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
commonly  known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, to IO1 Sumalag, who acted as a
poseur buyer; that when the accused received the total amount of P3,000.00 consisting
of two (2) pcs. of genuine P500.00 peso-bills marked as buy bust money which were
placed on top of Two Thousand Pesos (P2000.00) Boodle Money consisting of four (4)
pcs. P500.00 peso-bills which was the agreed purchase price of the dangerous drug from
the said poseur buyer, he in turn handed the heat-sealed plastic sachet containing the
dangerous drug to the said poseur buyer and this led to the apprehension and arrest of
the accused and the recovery of the genuine two (2) P500.00 buy-bust money and the
four (4) pcs of P500.00 peso-bill boodle money from his possession and control, and the
confiscation of the dangerous drug at an alley at the back of the Barangay Gymnasium of
Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao City, by members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), Regional Office N[o]. 02, Camp Adduru, this city, who formed the buy-
bust team.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications that appellant shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, or the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in accordance
with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

RULING:
YES. "In a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the
following elements must be duly established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor." In other words, the prosecution must prove that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation of the seized dangerous drugs as evidence in
court.
In People v. Dumlao, we explained that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
consummated upon the completion of the sale transaction between the buyer and
seller, viz.:
x x x The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. which
happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled
is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as
a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous
drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by
the delivery of the goods.

20
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EANNA O’COCHLAIN
(G.R. NO. 229071 DECEMBER 10, 2018)

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national married to a Filipina and residing in Barangay
Aring, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. On or about July 14, 2013 in the City of Laoag and the
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession,
custody and control: two (2) sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous drug, with an
aggregate weight of 0.3824 grams, without any license or authority to possess, in
violation of the aforesaid law. With the assistance of a counsel de parte and in the
presence of a public prosecutor, Eanna pleaded "NOT GUILTY" in his arraignment. He
was allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty, but a hold departure order was issued
to prevent him from leaving the Philippines and his passport was surrendered to the court
for its custody in the course of the proceedings.
After trial, Eanna was convicted of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the assailed
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eanna was correctly convicted of the crime charged.

RULING:
YES. Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search.
The search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made
pursuant to the aviation security procedures has been sustained by this Court in a
number of cases.
Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution,22a routine security check being conducted in air and
sea ports has been a recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of jurisprudence
ruling that search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search; (4) seizure of evidence
in "plain view"; (5) consented warrantless search; (6) "stop and frisk" search; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstance. Searches and seizures are ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. However,
because administrative searches primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting
criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion. 
The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the
individual screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the
existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and
aircraft. The search cannot also serve unrelated law enforcement purposes as it
effectively transforms a limited check for weapons and explosives into a general search
for evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who travel
through the system. Hence, an airport search remains a valid administrative search only
so long as the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; "once a
search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified
under an administrative search rationale."
Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in this case. The
constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. A person may voluntarily consent to have government officials

21
conduct a search or seizure that would otherwise be barred by the Constitution.
There is substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule. The chain of custody
rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its
admission into evidence. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence
admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude
that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. In a criminal case, the prosecution
must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that
an item still is what the government claims it to be. As regards the prosecution of illegal
drugs, the well-established US federal evidentiary rule is when the evidence is not readily
identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require
a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged
with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
In the present case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the documentary
and testimonial evidence, that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved in every step of the way.
EDWIN FUENTES y GARCIA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. 228718 JANUARY 07, 2019)

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC separately
charging petitioner and Calotes with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
The prosecution alleged that at around 2:30 in the afternoon of August 25, 2006,
PO1 Forastero, SPO1 Madriaga, and several other members of the SAID-SOTF of the
PNP, after coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, went to Barangay
Bayanan, Muntinlupa to conduct a surveillance on certain persons suspected of illegal
drug peddling, including herein petitioner. Upon arrival at the area, PO1 Forastero and
SPO1 Madriaga entered an alley near the PNR site, where they saw Calotes in the act of
handing petitioner what appeared to be a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. Immediately, PO1 Forastero grabbed Calotes and confiscated a plastic
sachet from him while SPO1 Madriaga apprehended petitioner from whom he recovered
two (2) more plastic sachets. They then proceeded to the SAID-SOTF headquarters in
Muntinlupa City, where PO1 Forastero and SPO1 Madriaga marked the seized plastic
sachets, and conducted an inventory thereof in the presence of Gianan, the City Architect
of Muntinlupa City. After preparing a request for laboratory examination of the seized
items, PO1 Forastero together with SPO1 Madriaga brought the said request and the
seized items to the crime laboratory, where a qualitative examination conducted by
P/Insp. Bonifacio on the specimens yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shabu," a dangerous drug.
In defense, petitioner and Calotes denied the charges against them and claimed that
the seized drugs were planted evidence. The RTC found petitioner and Calotes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 and sentenced
each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment.. The CA concurred the decision of
the RTC. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

RULING:
NO. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of
the crime. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs. are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. s
part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires that the apprehending team,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses namely: (a)
if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the
media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official"; or (b)
if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "[a]n elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the media.”
The Court takes this opportunity to clarify that compliance with the chain of custody
rule is not a mere technical rule of procedure that courts may, in their discretion, opt to

22
relax. In the first place, the chain of custody procedure is embodied in statutory
provisions which were "crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential
police abuses [in drugs cases], especially considering that the penalty imposed may be
life imprisonment." It is not a Supreme Court - issued rule of procedure created under its
constitutional authority to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts." Rather, it is an
administrative protocol that law enforcement officers and operatives are enjoined to
implement as part of their police functions. Indeed, while the chain of custody rule is
"procedural" in the sense that it sets a step-by-step process that must be followed, it is by
no means remedial in nature since it is not, properly speaking, a requirement or process
that pertains to court litigation.
As a final note, it must be pointed out that although petitioner's co-accused, Calotes,
no longer joined in filing the instant petition, the Court nevertheless deems it proper to
likewise acquit him of the crime charged. This is because the criminal case against
Calotes arose from the same set of facts as the case against petitioner and that such
acquittal is definitely favorable and beneficial to him.
ROLANDO DIZON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. 239399 MARCH 25, 2019)

PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
An Information was filed against Dizon for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.
On or about the 26th day of November 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then
and there wil[l] fully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control
three point zero one nine one (3.0191) grams of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. When arraigned, Dizon entered a
plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
In a Decision, the RTC found Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Unsatisfied, Dizon appealed his conviction to the
CA. In a Decision dated November 10, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether Dizon is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

RULING:
NO. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR), on the other
hand, supplied additional custody requirements and added a "saving clause" in case of
non-compliance with such requirements under justifiable grounds. Thus, Section 21 (a),
Article II of the IRR states:cralawred
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition.
Thus, while as a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is
mandatory, a deviation may be allowed only if the following requisites concur: (1) the
existence of "justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict
compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team. Thus, when there is a showing of lapses
in procedure, the prosecution must recognize such and accordingly justify the same in
order to warrant the application of the saving mechanism.
In this case, the apprehending team plainly failed to comply with the witness
requirements under the law, i.e., that the photographing and inventory of the seized
items be witnessed by a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official. The records are clear: only two (2) barangay officials were
present to witness the operation, as observed by the RTC.
At the outset, the Court finds it brazen of the police officers to recognize their fatal
error in procedure and yet at the same time offer no explanation or justification for doing
so, which, as stated above, is required by the law. What further catches the attention of
the Court is the fact that Dizon was apprehended pursuant to a search warrant and
therefore with more reason, the police officers could have secured the presence of the
other witnesses, i.e., the DOJ representative and media representative.

23
 However, despite the advantage of planning the operation ahead, the apprehending
team nonetheless inexplicably failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 21
of R.A No. 9165. Such interpretation of the law is simply not discernible from a plain
reading thereof. To repeat, the procedural requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 are mandatory and may be relaxed only if the following requisites are availing: (1)
the departure in procedure is based on "justifiable grounds;" and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.
The Court has held in previous instances that lapses in the procedure under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, when left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been compromised.24 All things
considered, the acquittal of Dizon has now become inevitable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEMUEL GONZALES y BANARES

(G. R. NO. 229352 APRIL 10, 2019)

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
On August 8, 2007, a male person informed the officers of an alleged illegal sale of
dangerous drugs by one alias "Memel" at Jollibee, Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. As
such, P/Insp. Gatus formed a team. P/Insp. Gatus instructed PO1 Bautista to prepare the
request for coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and also instructed
PO1 Flores to act as the poseur-buyer.
Later, on the same day, at around 8:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the designated
place. After PO1 Flores and the informant alighted from the vehicle, the latter pointed
towards the appellant who was standing outside Jollibee, Araneta Avenue. The two
approached appellant. The informant and appellant talked; and then, the latter
approached PO1 Flores and asked the latter how much would he get. PO1 Flores
replied, "dalawang piso" which meant P200.00 worth of shabu. As PO1 Flores handed
appellant the marked P200.00 bill, the latter, in turn, opened the compartment of his
motorcycle and gave PO1 Flores a sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO1
Flores then lit a cigarette, a signal to the buy-bust team that the sale had been
consummated. Immediately thereafter, the rest of the team approached appellant. SPO4
Abong held appellant and told him to empty his pockets. SPO4 Abong was able to
recover the marked money; he arrested the appellant and apprised him of his
constitutional rights. PO1 Flores then searched appellant's motorcycle and found another
sachet containing what appeared to be shabu, and then properly marked the sachets that
were confiscated.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The accused appealed to the CA which the latter denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charge.

RULING:
NO. According to appellant, the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs were not sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant argues
that there was no buy-bust operation; thus, the sachets of shabu that were allegedly
recovered in the trunk of his motorcycle may not be admitted in evidence as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Lastly, appellant claims that Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 was not
complied with, and that the chain of custody was not proved to be unbroken.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in
order to be convicted of the said violation, the following must concur: (1) [T]he identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually
happened and that the procured object "is properly presented as evidence in court and is
shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following must be proven before an accused can be convicted: [1] [T]he
accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized
by law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs.
In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit and that which

24
was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from the suspect. Thus, the
chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."
To ensure art unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This Court, therefore, must acquit the appellant for the prosecution's failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, discussion of the other issues is no longer
necessary.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR VILLAMOR CORPIN

(G.R. NO. 232493 JUNE 19, 2019)

PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Corpin was charged for the crime of Murder. On or about the 1st day of September,
2010, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, the accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
swiftly hack one PAULO MENDOZA PINEDA, with a butcher's knife on his face, giving
the latter no opportunity to defend himself, thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and
mortal wound which directly caused his death.
The RTC found Corpuin guilty of the crime of murder. Agrrieved, Corpin appealed to
the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Corpin is guilty of the crime of murder.

RULING:
NO. Corpin is guilty of the crime of homicde. It is settled that findings of fact of the
trial courts are generally accorded great weight; except when it appears on the record
that the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some significant
fact or circumstance which if considered, would have altered the result. This is axiomatic
in appeals in criminal cases where the whole case is thrown open for review on issues of
both fact and law, and the court may even consider issues which were not raised by the
parties as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
After a careful review and scrutiny of the records, the Court affirms the conviction of
Corpin, but only for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of Paulo. Treachery was not
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Seeking the reduction of his criminal liability to Homicide, Corpin admits that he
indeed killed Paulo, but contends that said killing was not attended by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. He argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he
consciously adopted the particular mode of attack he employed to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
The fact that Corpin killed the victim is undisputed as said act was admitted by
Corpin himself. However, the Court is not convinced that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. It is established that qualifying circumstances must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, for Corpin to be convicted of Murder, the
prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the killing of Paulo was
qualified by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist:
(1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act
which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by
the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an

25
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough
that the attack was "sudden", "unexpected," and "without any warning or
provocation." There must also be a showing that the offender consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the
crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself. In this case,
the circumstances negate the presence of treachery.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NESTOR DOLENDO y FEDILES

(G.R. NO. 223098 JUNE 03, 2019)

PONENTE: LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:
By Information dated January 15, 1997, appellant Nestor Dolendo y Fediles was
charged with arson resulting in the death of Leonardo Perocho, Jr. On or about
September 18, 1996 in the afternoon thereof, the accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set on fire a house owned by Leonardo Perocho, Sr., knowing
it to be occupied at that time by one or more persons and as a result thereof LEONARDO
PEROCHO, JR., 6 yrs. old boy suffered massive bums and injuries which directly
caused his death thereafter.
The trial court found appellant guilty of arson with homicide. It gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and disregarded appellant's defense of alibi.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether of not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

RULING:
YES. Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1613 (PD 1613), otherwise known as the
New Arson Law reads:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform
or tunnel;
5. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard,
bamboo grove or forest;
6. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
7. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
Further, Sec. 5 reads:
Section 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to
death shall be imposed.
` Arson requires the following elements: (1) a fire was set intentionally; and (2) the
accused was identified as the person who caused it. The corpus delicti rule is satisfied by
proof of the bare fact of the fire and that it was intentionally caused.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEXTER ASPA ALBINO, et al
(G.R. NO. 229928 JUNE 22, 2019)

PONENTE: LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:
By Information dated May 12, 2009, appellant Dexter Aspa Albino @ Toyay was
charged with murder for the killing of Marlon Dionzon Soriano.
On or about the 10th day of May 2009, the above-named accused, conspiring with
unidentified persons, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery, did, then and there
willfully and unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot MARLON DIONZON SORIANO
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, which the above-named accused provided himself
for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim a gunshot wound at the left chest at the
level of 7th ICS which was the direct and immediate cause of death of said Marlon D.
Soriano. On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty." During the trial, Marlon's older
brother Jerome Soriano, neighbor Arwin Terrado, mother Gertrudes Soriano, PO2 Noel
M. Melgar, and Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana testified for the prosecution. On the other
hand, appellant and one Pablo Flores testified for the defense.
The trial court found appellant guilty of murder. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC with modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Albino is guilty of murder.

RULING:
NO. The court is guilty only of the crime of homicide. Murder is defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:cralawreArticle 248. Murder.
- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:cralawred1. With treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing does not
amount to parricide or infanticide.
Here, appellant prays that his conviction be downgraded from murder to homicide.
We therefore focus on the third element: the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC.
The Information alleged that treachery attended the killing of Marlon. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without
risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is
done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim with no chance to resist or escape.
In conclusion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not shown to have
attended the killing of Marlon Dionzon Soriano. Verily, therefore, appellant may be
convicted only for homicide in accordance with Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz.:cArticle 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides, thus:cralawred

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 Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by
reclusion temporal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO MARTIN y ISON

(G.R. NO. 231007 JULY 07, 2019)]

PONENTE: LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:
Appellant Antonio I. Martin was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II, RA
9165.
On or about the 17th day of February 2010 in the Municipality/City of San Leonardo,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, the accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his control and custody one (1) piece of plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride ("shabu"), and sell the same to a civilian asset, without
the necessary permit and/or license having been issued to him by the proper government
agency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
The trial court found the accused guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the assailed
decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Martin is guilty for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 (illegal
sale of dangerous drugs).

RULING:
NO. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.
The prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed
by the accused is the same substance presented in court.
To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for
each link in its chain of custody enumerates the links in the chain of custody that must
be shown for the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, i.e.  first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
This is the chain of custody rule. It came to fore due to the unique characteristics of
illegal drugs which render them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs allegedly committed on
February 17, 2010. The applicable law is RA 9165 before its amendment in 2014.
Indeed, the multiple violations of the chain of custody rule here cast serious
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did
not link at all, albeit, it unjustly restrained appellant's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a
verdict of acquittal is in order.
Strict adherence to the chain of custody rule must be observed; the precautionary
measures employed in every transfer of the seized drug item, proved to a moral certainty.
The sheer ease of planting drug evidence vis-à-vis the severity of the imposable
penalties in drugs cases compels strict compliance with the chain of custody rule.
We have clarified though that a perfect chain may not be possible to obtain at all
times because of varying field conditions. In fact, the IRR of RA 9165 offers a saving
clause allowing leniency whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation from
established protocol so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.

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 Suffice it to state that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot substitute for compliance and mend the broken links. For it is a mere
disputable presumption that cannot prevail over clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. And here, the presumption was sufficiently overturned by compelling evidence
on record of the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule.

CICL XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. NO. 237334 AUGUST 14, 2019)

PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of January 2010 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused [CICL XXX], a minor, 17 years old, but acting with discernment
conspiring together, confederating with CHRISTOPHER PUYO AND JAYJAY NARAG
and mutually helping one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously[,] with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of one GLENN REDOQUERIO by then and there mauling him and hitting him in
the head with a piece of stone, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds, the
offender thus performing all the acts of execution that would produce the crime of
homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or
cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said GLENN REDOQUERIO, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party. During the arraignment, CICL XXX pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and
trial thereafter ensued.
The RTC convicted CICL XXX of the crime of Frustrated Murder. Aggrieved, CICL
XXX appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the assailed decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CICL XXX is guilty of frustrated homicide.

RULING:
NO. In the case of Dorado v. People, the Court had the occasion to state that "when
a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it
cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the
prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL XXX
committed the alleged crime with discernment." 
"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony
either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is
the mental capacity to understand the difference between tight and wrong." As earlier
stated, the "prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances
must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and
shrewdness."
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald.
Discernment is different from intent. From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent"
and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental
processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter
relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may
not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act
which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not
correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of
age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He

29
may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time
recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they both equated
"intent to kill" - which was admittedly established through the evidence presented by the
prosecution - with acting with discernment, which, on the contrary, was not proved,by the
prosecution. The prosecution, in fact, never endeavored to prove that CICL XXX acted
with discernment. This is highlighted by the prosecution's cross-examination of CICL
XXX, which focused only on whether Redoquerio had the motive to falsely accuse CICL
XXX of committing a crime, and whether CICL XXX's father owned a gun. 
As the nature and extent of the injuries were not sufficiently established, it was error
for the lower courts to conclude that the injuries were fatal and that Redoquerio would
have died if not for the timely medical assistance he received. In the final analysis, it was
therefore error for the courts to conclude that the crime committed was Frustrated
Homicide instead of Attempted Homicide.

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