MODULE 3:

1. i. Ansaldo vs. Sheriff, 64 Phils. 115

FACTS: The Philippine Trust Company granted Romarico Agcaoili a credit in current account of
P20,000 with Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands as guarantor. Ansaldo, in turn,
agreed to indemnify the Fidelity & Surety Company.. However, Agcaoili defaulted, and the
surety company, as his guarantor, paid the Philippine Trust Company the sum of P19,065.17.

The surety company brought an action against Angel A. Ansaldo for the recovery of the said
amount. After obtaining a judgment on its favor, caused the sheriff of the City of Manila to levy
on the joint savings account in the name of Angel A. Ansaldo and Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo
in the said Bank of the Philippine Islands amounting to P165.84.

Ansaldo filed a third party claim alleging that the money levied execution was the property of the
conjugal partnership existing between them and not liable for the payment of personal
obligations of the appellee Angel A. Ansaldo; but upon execution of an indemnity bond by Luzon
Surety Company, the sheriff retained the money in his possession.

Subsequently, Ansaldo instituted an action against the Surety Companyin the CFI to have the
execution levied declared null and void. The court granted the relief prayed for and sentenced
the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay the appellees the sum of P636.80 with interest
thereon at the rate of ten per centum per annum from June 6, 1934 until paid, and the costs of
suit.

ISSUE: Whether a joint savings account and a joint current account, in a bank, of a husband
and his wife are liable for the payment of the obligation of the husband.

RULING: No. The sum of P636.80 was derived from the paraphernal property of the appellee,
Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, the wife of the other appellee Angel A. Ansaldo. It therefore
belongs to the conjugal partnership of the said spouses. (Civil Code, art. 1401.)

The provision of article 1408 of the Civil Code to the effect that the conjugal partnership as
subject to the qualifications established by article 1386 of the same Code, which provides that:
“The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to the payment of personal obligations
of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the
family.”

Here, it was not proven that the obligations contracted by the appellee, Angel A. Ansaldo was
productive or of some benefit to his family.

2. ii. JOSEPHINE AND HENRY GO vs. LEONARDO YAMANE

FACTS:
In the civil case “Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation”, Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman was the counsel who handled the plaintiffs
in the said case.
To satisfy the lien for attorney's fees, a parcel of land, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay
Yamane (wife of Leonardo Yamane), was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11,
1981. Spouses Josephine and Henry Go, herein petitioners, were awarded the said land as the
highest bidders in the auction. Respondent Leonardo Yamane filed a complaint for annulment
and cancellation of Sale to petitioners, invoking a third-party claim. Respondent contended that
the land was a conjugal property and could not be held responsible for the personal obligations
of Muriel and the two other Pucays. RTC ruled against respondent, reasoning that the subject
parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of
respondent -- and was not their conjugal property.

The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise, saying that the property acquired during marriage is
presumed to be conjugal unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been
used for the purpose. The property was acquired by couple from a certain Eugene Pucay
during their marriage and, therefore, was a conjugal property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in Muriel Pucay’s name was a conjugal property and should not be
held responsible for the obligations of Muriel Pucay and her sisters.

HELD:
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife."

"As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name the same
is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

As to the responsibility of the then established conjugal property, the contract or transaction
between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appear[s] to have been incurred for the
exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when she
joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them.
Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters'
private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged
against the contested conjugal property.

3. iii. Abalos vs. Macatangay, 439 SCRA 649

FACTS: Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Macatangay,
binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party
within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as soon as possession of the
property shall have been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money
amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the
spouses.
Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time Esther, through
her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her
conjugal interest less the sum already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the
property to Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment.
Macatangay was ready to pay the amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he
sued the spouses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING: No. Arturo and Esther, married before the effectivity of the Family Code with no
indication that they adopted a different property regime, would automatically be under the
conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land, acquired during marriage, forms part of their
conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. granted to
him by law.The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.

The husband cannot validly alienate any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot do the same.

The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when
it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition
that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that
it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of
the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui
non habet. No one can give what he has not.

4. iv. Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank vs. Dallo, 453 SCRA 283

FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in the
name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife.

In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo, Marcelino obtained
a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the property in San
Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in
favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured and
remained outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage.

In 1993, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of it.
She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and so she consequently filed for the
Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her knowledge
was valid. NO
2.) Whether or not the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo. NO

HELD: The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is
silent on the matter.

Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were governed by the system of Conjugal
Partnership of gains, which was made also made applicable after the effectivity of the Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The Court ruled
that the mortgage entered into by Marcelino without his wife’s consent and, thus, was void.

As to the issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino, the court held
that for failure to present clear proof that the said obligation redounded to the benefit of the
family which under Article 121 of the Family Code, the subject property could not be held liable.

5. v. Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon, 120 SCRA 628

Facts: During the marriage of Maximo Aldon and Gemina Almorasa, they bought several pieces
of land. The lands were divided into three lots. Subsequently, Gemina sold the lots to the
spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena Felipe without the consent of her husband. Maximo
died. Afterwhich, his heirs, namely Gemina and their children Sofia and Salvador filed a
complaint against the Felipes alleging that they are the owners of the lots. The Felipes asserted
that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them.
The trial court sustained the claim of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue: WON the sale of the lots by Gemina without the consent of the husband is defective.

Held:
The sale made by Gemina is certainly a defective contract, that is, a voidable contract.
According to Article 1390 of the NCC, among the voidable contracts are “Those where one of
the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract.” In the instant case Gemina had no
capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even
to the husband alone but to both spouses.

6. vi. Valdez vs. RTC, 260 SCRA 221

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. Valdez filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court
granted the petition. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that
Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing
that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of
the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio
on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently
with Article 129.

Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such
as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares,
as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95)
of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to
void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. (Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).

7. vii. Mercado vs. Fehr, 414 SCRA 288

FACTS:

In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and
lived with him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG
Condominium on installment. They got married in 1985.

In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The
properties were divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children. The
custody of children was awarded to Elna, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is
directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG Condominium because it was declared to have
been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of
the Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded
Elna of the previous agreement in dividing properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them. It also affirmed the previous ruling regarding Suite 204. Elna filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its Decision
dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno
Fehr.

RULING:

No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno and
the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article
147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under
Article 36. All these elements are present in the case..

The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards to the settlement of the common properties
of Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable marriages and to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code.

8. viii. Buenaventura vs. CA, 454 SCRA 261

FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are
joined in this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio
are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant parents Leonardo
Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding
certificates of title issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver that the purported sale of
the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the
rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale

RULING:

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As
the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and
vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to
dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value
of their parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value
replaced the lots taken from the estate.

9. ix. Mallilin vs. Castillo, 333 SCRA 628

FACTS:

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children
but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages
still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union
of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and
Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner
then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused
alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent
denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married
at the time of cohabitation.

Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under
the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they
started living together.

HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other
and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence,
there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each
other.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process
and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such
dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not
parties in the case.

The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

10. x. Metrobank vs. Pascual, 547 SCRA 24

Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married. During the union,
Florencia bought from a lot with a three-door apartment. Florencia filed a suit for the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code and was granted on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.

RTC, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal... partnership of gains.

Florencia, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank)

To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate
mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the subject property

Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283,
a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver"
that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia,
covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.

Florencia and the spouses Oliveros failed to pay their loan obligation so Metrobank, initiated
foreclosure proceedings

At the auction sale, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.

Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property.
Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his
consent.

Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,[4] alleged that the disputed lot,
being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having
approved the mortgage in good faith.

Issue: Whether or not the subject property is conjugal

Whether or not... the declaration of nullity of marriage... ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.

Ruling:

The Disputed Property is Conjugal

Art. 160 of the Civil Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior
to the enactment of the Family Code.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife." This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal
Ownership

While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership.

The relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties
before a regime of separation of property reigns.

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.

But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two
years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the
liquidation of the partnership. Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the
rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia
owned.

11. xi. Matabuena vs. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284

Facts: In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a property to his common-law spouse, Petronila
Cervantes. In March 1962, Felix and Petronila got married. After five months, Felix died
intestate, survived by Petronila and Cornelia, Felix's sister. Subsequently, Cornelia, being the
only sister and the nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a case to recover the
property which was donated Petronila on the ground that under Art.133 of the Civil Code,
“every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void."

The trial court ruled that the case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was
made at the time Felix and Petronila were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

Issue: Does the ban on donation between spouses during the marriage apply to common-law
relationships?

Held:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law
is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations
between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and
improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.
However, the lack validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila does not
necessarily mean that the Cornelia will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because
the relationship between Felix and Petronila were legitimated by marriage. She is therefore his
widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half. (Matabuena vs. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771.

12. xii. Agapay vs. Palang, 276 SCRA 341

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in
Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. In
1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the
other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed
the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However,
their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If
actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed
money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20
years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically
for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the
money for the purchase price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.

13. xiii. Harding vs. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 38 Phil 464
Facts: (page 546)

Henry Harding bought a car for 2T in 1915. He then gave the car to his wife Mrs. Harding.
While Mrs. Harding was having the car repaired at the Luneta Garage (Luneta was an agent of
Smith Bell and Co., which in turn is Commercial Union’s agent), the latter induced Mrs. Harding
to insure the care with Commercial. Mrs. Harding agreed, and Smith Bell sent an agent to
Luneta Garage, who together with the manager of LUneta, appraised the car and declared that
its present value was P3T. This amt was written in the proposal form which Mrs. Harding
signed. Subsequently, the car was damaged by fire. Commercial refused to pay.

Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile at the time of the
issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable interest in it. The court below found that
the automobile was given to plaintiff by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here
in question. Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this finding, but contends that the gift
was void, citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which provides that "All gifts between spouses
during the marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on
festive days of the family are not included in this rule.

Issue:Whether or not Commercial is liable.

Held: YES. Commercial is liable.

Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the
article referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes
with their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked.

Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a defense, the burden would
be upon it to show that the gift in question does not fall within the exception therein established.
We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not
a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties, as
to which nothing is disclosed by the record.

Where it appears that the proposal form, while signed by the insured was made out by the
person authorized to solicit the insurance (Luneta and Smith Bell) the facts stated in the
proposal, even if incorrect, will not be regarded as warranted by the insured, in the absence of
willful misstatement. Under such circumstances, the proposal is to be regarded as the act of the
insurer.

14. xiv. Docena vs. Lapesura, G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001

FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed
ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed
the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one
of the petitioners.

HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the
writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and
is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the
province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the
rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing the certification in his
behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the
petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena
alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners
in this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a
conjugal property. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs
to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the
consent of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.
15. xv. Uy vs. CA, G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed
a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such
necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124
of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of
his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised
Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing
on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on
“Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses
are disposing of mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in
law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial
court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding
under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that a wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who
desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary
judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide
for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

16. xvi. PNB vs. CA, 153 SCRA 435

17. xvii. Villaranda vs. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447, February 23, 2004

FACTS:
On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of Exchange. Under this
instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his inherited portion to Honorio, in exchange for a
property in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 2138.7

After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took possession of the said property.

Honorio and his wife, Respondent Ana Maria Y. Villaranda,brought an action for specific
performance before the RTC to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of
Exchange: Vicente had yet to identify and delineate his undivided portion of the property before
the spouses could not fully use or dispose of the property

Vicente averred that he was not bound thereby contending that because the property had not
been delivered, the Deed had not been consummated and had already been revoked by both
parties.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent spouses and was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of Respondent
Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and enforceable.

RULING:
The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code took effect only on August 3,
1998. Laws should be applied prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.47
Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code,48 are applicable to the present
case. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio and Ana’s conjugal properties. The relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on the disposition of real properties of the conjugal partnership are
the following:

"Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. x x x

"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband."

According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. This provision, however, must be read in
conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code. The latter states that an action to annul an
alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make
the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but
merely voidable.49 Hence, the Deed is valid until and unless annulled.

In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by
Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten years from "the transaction questioned." Her right
to bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still
valid and enforceable

18. xviii. Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao, GR No. 176556, July 4, 2012

FACTS: Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They had no
separate properties prior to their marriage. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido
for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered
a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.
Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody
of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to
the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was
partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to
define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each
of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that
NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the
FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s
property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree
on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative
community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

—————

19. i. Noveras vs. Noveras, GR No. 188289, August 20, 2014

 Facts: In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in California and
eventually were granted with American citizenship. Out of this marriage, they produce
two children and also several properties both in USA and Philippines.

In 2001, David returned to the Philippines to supervise their business. But after a year,
Leticia learned that David had an extra-marital affair. She filed a petition for divorce in
California and in 2005 the court granted the decree of nullification of their marriage and
granted her custody of her two minor children and couple’s property in USA.

In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora.
In his answer, David filed for a petition to grant him all of their properties in the
Philippines considering that Leticia got all of their properties in USA.

Issue: Whether or not David can claim all of their properties in the Philippines?

Ruling: NO, David cannot claim all of the properties in the Philippines.

Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and during marriage are
under ACP of Absolute Community Property.

In this case their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP governs. But,
considering that they are both American citizen, the California court decision with
regards to their property in USA governs. The property in the Philippines will be equally
divided between them.

20. ii. Wong vs. IAC, 200 SCRA 792

FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina in January 1964. They had 3 children; most
of the time living separately.

Katrina consigned from Anita Chan pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. The
spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money
against Katrina and her husband Romarico.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued
upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina
Henson.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied
through the conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal
with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the
loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof
that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living
separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
 necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the
judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she
exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound
to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before
said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the
debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.

21. iii. Jocson vs. CA, 170 SCRA 333

FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then the
husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of
Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio
Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3)
share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that
they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between
him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot
validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because
they were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160
he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner
rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See
Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio
Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties
were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so because the words “married
to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In
other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the
properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Alejandra Poblete.

22. iv. Dela Pena vs. Avila, et al., GR No. 187490, February 8, 2012

FACTS: Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena, obtained a loan from
Aguila Sons and Co. As a security for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina. However, Antonia
also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of Gemma Avila over the same property
because of Antonia’s failure to pay her obligation from Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged the
same property to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a loan from the
bank. Antonia, together with her son Alvin John, filed against Gemma praying for the annulment
of the said deed of sale. She claims that the said property was conjugal property and was sold
without the consent of his husband who already died by that time. She also invokes the
presumption of Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia
and upheld the presumption of conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the said property that was sold is part of the Conjugal Partnership

HELD: The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies only for the property
acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela
Penas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the
Marriage between Antonia and Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the
actual acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.

Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of, “Antonia Dela Pena,
married to Antegono dela Pena,” such is merely a description of the civil status of the wife and
cannot mean that the husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the inconclusiveness
of the said description is that it is possible that the property was acquired when she was single
but only registered when she got married.

23. v. Fransisco Munoz, Jr. vs. Erlinda Ramirez, et.al., GR No. 156125, August 25, 2010

FACTS: Subject of the present case is residential house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 7650 in the name of the petitioner.
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT, in the name of Erlinda
Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents).

On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged it with Erlinda’s
consent, to the GSIS to secure a housing loan. The respondents then constructed a residential
house on the lot.

On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-
fact of Eliseo

On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of
the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and
the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified.

ISSUE:(1) whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal; and,

(2) whether the contract between the parties was a sale or an equitable mortgage.

RULING:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.34

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.35 Pursuant to Articles 9236 and
10937 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the
marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each
spouse.38 The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.

24. vi. Joe Ros & Estrella Aguete vs. PNB, GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011

On January 13, 1983, spouses Joe A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB

The averments in the complaint disclosed that the husband obtained a loan from PNB on
October 14, 1974 and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security for
the loan.

Upon maturity, the loan was unpaid and PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in
favor of PNB.

Claiming that wife (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by
her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property — a
complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation
of the property — interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.

ISSUE:
How is the benefit to the family proven so as to render the loan contracted by the husband
binding upon the conjugal property?

HELD:

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term “x
x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

Court denies the petition.

||| (Spouses Ros v. Philippine National Bank - Laoag Branch, G.R. No. 170166, [April 6, 2011],
662 PHIL 696-707)

25. vii. Sps. Buado vs. CA & Nicol, GR No. 145222, April 24, 2009
FACTS:
On April 30 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado, petitioners, filed a complaint for damages
against Erlinda Nicol for her civil liability arising from criminal offense of slander filed by petitioners.
Trial court rendered a decision to let Erlinda Nicol pay for damages. Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s
personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff levied and auctioned the
property of Erlinda and sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.
After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment
of certificate of sale against petitioners and deputy sheriff. He argued that there was no proper
publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of
Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500, 000 worth of
property for only P51,685.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.
RULING:
NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-
spouse.

26. viii. Francisco vs. Gonzales, 565 SCRA 638

Facts: Francisco Gonzales and Erminda Gonzales were living as husband and wife and they have
blessed 4 children. During the times they lived together they acquired properties. Erminda
managed their pizza business and work hard for its development.
Erminda filed for annulment of marriage to Francisco on the grounds of psychological incapacity.
She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. But Francisco denied that allegations and claimed that he exclusively owns
the properties existing during their marriage.
The court rendered its decision, ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and
dividing the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda.
Francisco was not satisfied with the manner of dividing their properties, but he did not contest the
part of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent void ab initio, so he appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court. He
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was also denied.
Issue: Whether or not, Francisco exclusively owns the properties existing during their marriage.
RULING:No,
The marriage of Francisco and Erminda is declared null and void consequently; their property
relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated
to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property
regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties
and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties
have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in
equal shares.

27. ix. Alipio vs. CA, 341 SCRA 441

FACTS:
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco,
Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On
June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses
Placido and Purita Alipio and the Manuel Spouses.
The sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00.
Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had
passed away on December 1, 1988.
RTC: Surviving spouse should pay. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that
since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely
resulted in his exclusion from the case.
CA: Surviving spouse should pay. It is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by
claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, or
RULING:
 (1) Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is liable. It is clear that
Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however,
a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money and the corresponding
action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after
the death of either of the spouses, no complaint about the collection of indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse.
Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of
the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers
of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator
appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made
by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void. the inventory of the Alipios’ conjugal property is necessary before
any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to
the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent’s estate and not to any other
court.
(2) The obligation is joint. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into
as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio
spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of
P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of
P25,300.00.

28. x. Sps. Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, et al., GR No. 160708, October 16, 2009

FACTS:Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife.
They have four children.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-88674 in their names. Said
lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is
registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in
the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and
an annex.
In 1991, Pedro had an affair. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support
the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two
lots to petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina without Mary Ann’s consent.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property of
Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange. Petitioner insist that the subject
lot remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the
exclusive funds or money of the latter.
ISSUE: WON The subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property of Pedro
RULING: NO
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive
property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the
lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary
Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange
or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject
property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12 Petitioners' bare assertion would not suffice to
overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and
Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house.

29. xi. Melania Roxas vs. CA, et al., GR No. 92245, June 26, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"), although
they are already estranged and living separately. Melania discovered that Antonio leased to
Respondent Antonio Cayetano ("Mr. Cayetano") their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her
knowledge and consent. Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of
the contract of lease between Antonio and Mr. Cayetano. Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the
complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of action.The RTC Judge
resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.
ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease involving conjugal
real property without the consent of the wife.
RULING: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC)
Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does not include
acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he
cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty.
Thus, in case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has
the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract.

30. xii. Marietta Barrido vs. Leonardo Nonato, GR No. 176492, October 20, 2014
FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta
N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a house and lot, with TCT No. T-140361. On March 15,
1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Nonato asked
Barrido for partition, but she refused. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo
and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod
City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
iSSUE: WON THE LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD
TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.||| (Barrido
v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, [October 20, 2014], 745 PHIL 608-617)
RULING:
During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations.
Although Article 129 11 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses'
property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names
of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It
must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be
converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact,
she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property
remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance
with the rules on co-ownership.

31. i. Toda, Jr. vs. CA, 183 SCRA 713

FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno) and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose Marie) were married
on 9 June 1951 and had two children. Apparently, individual difference of the two came about,
and an alleged infidelity of Benigno prompted Rose Marie to file on 18 December 1979 a petition
for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal
funds against Benigno. On 1 April 1981, a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of
conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code was consolidated with the former civil
case. The latter petition embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their
respective shares in the conjugal partnership of assets, was signed by the parties on 30 March
1981 beforehand. Said petition and compromise agreement were approved by the trial court on
9 June 1981. However, said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable settlement
of all the disputes of the spouses. Benigno appealed from the orders of the trial court, but was
subsequently disposed by the Court of Appeals. Rose Marie argues that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the compromise agreement of the parties became effective only after its
judicial approval on 9 June 1981, and not upon its execution on 30 March 1981.
ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement became effective on its approved date of the trial
court or when the parties signed it. (DATE OF APPROVAL OF THE TRIAL COURT).
RULING: Article 190 of the Civil Code states, “in the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place sae in virtue of a judicial order.” Simply put, separation of property is affected by the
decree of the court approving the same; mere execution of contract or agreement of the parties
does not suffice. Without judicial approval, it shall be deemed void. Therefore, the conjugal
partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be considered dissolved only on 9 June 1981
when the trial court approved their joint voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. .

32. ii. Rodolfo Espinosa, et.al., vs. Atty. Julieta Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12,
2011
FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s
legal advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared
a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the
conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took
possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow
employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was
not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-
CBD. Omana denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her
and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to
persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature
and notarized the contract.
ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” W/N the
Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

33. iii. Valdes vs. RTC, 260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a
clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family

34. iv. Juan Salas Jr., Eden Aguilar, GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013

Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married.
Aguila gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child.

On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have
no conjugal properties whatsoever”.
On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of their conjugal
property, if any.

On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion stating that she discovered 3
properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.

However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.

RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the discovered
properties. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and
Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.

Ruling: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the
validity of their marriage.

The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner, Salas.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property acquired during marriage is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by
the rules of co-ownership.

Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

35. v. Soledad L. Lavadia vs. Heirs of Atty. Juan L. Luna represented by Gregorio Z.
Luna & Eugenia Zaballera-Luna, GR No. 171914, July 23, 2014

FACTS: Atty Juan Luna was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first
wife,Eugenia Zaballero-Luna ---whom he initially married in a civil ceremony
On January 12, 1976, Atty Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of
Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. And he contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad
L. Lavadia. They returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

After the death of Atty Luna, his condominium shares and law books were taken over by his son
of the first marriage Gregorio Z. Luna, And then leased out the 25/100 portion of the unit to
Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,[9] holding and
ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]
Issues: Who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share
in the condominium unit; and to the law books

Ruling:
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death

Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous was void; properties acquired during their
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed... by the rules
on co-ownership.(n)
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent
funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in
contention in this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article

MODULE 4
Cases On Filiation:

i. Herrera vs. Alba, 460 SCRA 197

The Facts

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent's mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University
where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural
Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former
professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the
Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation.

RULING: YES.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to
incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of
paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except
for identical twin

ii. Agustin vs. CA, 460 SCRA 315

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendent lite before the Quezon City RTC.In
their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal
and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This
incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and
has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support. Fe
and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a
form of unreasonable search.

RULING:

No. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing

In no uncertain terms, the Court also underscored that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. Intrusions into the right must
be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision
and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, was correct.

iii. Mendoza vs. CA, 201 SCRA 675

iv. Jinkie and Jacqueline de Jesus, et. al. vs. The Estate of Juan Dizon, et.al., G.R.No.
142877, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline
and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died
intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting”
of the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

Issue:

Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.

Ruling:

No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
children of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid marriage of their
parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as their
father. There is a presumption in law that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,of the Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This step
cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when
the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can
be rejected.

v. Miller v. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019

Cases on Illegitimate Children:

i. Eceta vs. Eceta, 428 SCRA 928

FACTS:

Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926. They had a son named
Vicente. The husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory
heirs. However, the deceased has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose grandmother
was Rosalina, the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough
to prove the filiation with the deceased.

HELD:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:

(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. However, what was tried before the trial court and CA was
for partition and accounting of damages only. The filiation or compusolry recognition by Vicente
of Theresa was never put in issue. In fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that
Theresa was Rosalina’s granddaughter. The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his
paternity over Theresa nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the
latter. Hence, the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.

ii. Rodriguez vs. CA, 509 SCRA 113

iii. Verceles vs. Posada, 522 SCRA 518

FACTS:

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started
making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort
room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel.
Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of
her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.

On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes
Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They
met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the
restaurant at the upper floor.

Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told
her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances.
But again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.

RULING:

The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation
under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented by
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of
his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters.

iv. Tayag vs. Tayag-Gallos, 549 SCRA 68

On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.3 Respondent alleged in
the petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three
(3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was
married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of
their own.

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both
of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10
October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent's estate. Petitioner allegedly
promised to give respondent and her brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds
of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.

Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of
5 September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the
paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these properties
to the respondent's and her brothers' prejudice.

v. Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October18, 200

vi. Macadangdang vs. CA [1980]

FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in March 1967 she allegedly had
intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967. October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter)
– she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held
on December 24, 1967.

April 25, 1972 – Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.
February 27, 1973 – lower court dismissed the complaint.

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando to be
an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was
denied.

ISSUE:
WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth
Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES

HELD:
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the veracity of the states or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held
that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be
shown by proof recognized by law.
The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court of appeals that
Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which is
self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence.
Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and
is contradicted by evidence on record.
Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was
not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress