PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent
Doctrine:
Laws shall take effect fifteen days after its complete publication in
Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Facts:
The respondent was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua for
violating the Dangerous Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea
bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a buy-bust operation which
was sold for P40.00. The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about
October 22, 1988.
In this case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.
Held:
Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22 of
the RPC.
Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December 31, 1993 after its
publication on December 16, 1993 while the respondent was still serving his
sentence. (RA 7659 an act to impose the death penalty on certain heinous crimes,
amending for that purpose the revised penal laws, as amended, other special penal laws, and

for other purposes)

Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto

mayor or prision correctional instead of serving its full sentence of reclusion
perpetua.

People vs. Martin Simon G.R. No. 93028

July 29, 1994 Sale of Prohibited Drugs
NOVEMBER 28, 2017

FACTS:

Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams,
when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked up
by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted
to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he
was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or
nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the
documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money or the 4 teabags of
dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of
Pejoro.

Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared
that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that
the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or
serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand
pesos and to pay the costs.

Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It
must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two
twenty-peso bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and
there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling
for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less
than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750
grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and
regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to
give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the
quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20
of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the court
applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within
the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.

US vs. Merced, G.R. No. 14170, Nov. 23, 1918

Leopoldo Rovira, for Appellants.

Attorney-General Paredes, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. HOMICIDE; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — When, during the act of violently killing a

person, no disinterested witness was present and the record discloses proof that there
was a struggle between the assaulted and the person assaulted, as a. result of which
and in consequence of a serious or mortal wound the latter lay stretched out and dead
on the floor a few moments or a few hours after such struggle took place, it may safely
be held, in default of proof to the contrary, that only the crime of homicide was
committed, unless there was attendant some qualifying circumstance determinative of
a more serious classification and penalty.

2. ID.; WIFE SURPRISED IN ADULTERY; NATURAL, RIGHT OF OFFENDED HUSBAND;

RISK ASSUMED BY PARAMOUR. — Although it were true that Pantaleon Arabe, the
deceased, upon his appearance in the house in which he surprised his wife and her
codefendant immediately assaulted the latter with a dagger, which certainly was not
proven, such an assault, had it been made, could not, on account of its being both
natural and lawful, justify the punishable act committed by the defendant Merced
during the struggle that ensued, between him and the deceased, for the reason that,
even if the deceased had killed his wife and her codefendant, he would but have
exercised a lawful right, for the defendant Merced well knew that by maintaining illicit
relations with a married woman he was committing an unlawful act of a criminal nature
and was exposing himself to the vengeance of the offended husband, and when the two
defendants met in a dwelling room of a house near that in which the offended husband
lived, they well knew that they were running the danger of sometime being surprised as
it so occurred.

3. ID.; ID.; ADULTEROUS WIFE AS AN ACCOMPLICE; INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. —

The circumstance of the unfaithful wife having been present during the struggle
engaged in between her husband and her paramour, and there being no positive
evidence that this woman furnished the latter with the dagger, Exhibit B, in order that
 with it he might assault her own husband, there are lacking sufficient grounds upon
which to establish proof that the wife participated or cooperated as an accomplice in the
execution of the crime at the time her husband was assaulted by her codefendant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

Before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros the defendants Catalino Merced
and Apolonia Patron were charged by the provincial fiscal with the crime of homicide,
and after the trial of this cause judgment was rendered on April 29th of the present
year whereby Catalino Merced was sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, with allowance of one-half of the time of preventive
imprisonment suffered, to the accessory penalties, and to pay, jointly and severally
with the other defendant, an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and also
one-half of the costs; and Apolonia Patron, to eight years and one day of prision mayor,
to the accessory penalties, to pay the heirs of Pantaleon Arabe, jointly and severally
with the other defendant, the same amount of indemnity fixed for the latter, and to the
payment of the other one-half of the costs. From this judgment defendants’ counsel
appealed.

On the night of March 4th of the present year, Catalino Merced went to the house of
Teodora Sarasin, situated in the barrio of Palimpinon of the town of Luzuriaga, and, at
the invitation of the mistress of the house, sat down to supper with her; a short while
afterwards Apolonia Patron also arrived, and, fetching some morisqueta or cooked rice
from her house nearby, likewise sat down to supper with the two other persons above-
mentioned. After supper Merced and Patron successively went down from the house,
and the former, upon his return to it and with the permission of its owner, went into the
main room thereof to rest. Apolonia Patron, who returned to the house a short while
afterwards, did likewise, and they both met in said room to lie down to sleep there.
Thereupon, the mistress of the house, Teodora Sarasin, went to bed with her children,
and while asleep was awakened by the noise caused by a struggle waged in the
aforementioned room. Just at that moment Sarasin heard Apolonia say to her (the
latter’s) husband that she (Apolonia) was wounded, and heard the husband reply to
her, saying: "That is what you got." On account of these happenings, and out of fear,
the owner of the house left it, passing through the kitchen, and on her return a few
moments afterwards to get her children, she found Pantaleon Arabe, the husband of
Apolonia Patron, stretched out on the mat on which she had been sleeping; he was
bloody and was pressing in his stomach. This witness now found the light which had
previously been put out lit inside the house. When, several hours afterwards, the justice
of the peace proceeded with the investigation of the crime, he found Arabe’s body on
the river bank, near the house of the deceased. Such was the testimony of Teodora
Sarasin.

Upon the examination of Filomena Ago, the defendant Merced’s sister-in-law, she
testified as follows: On the morning of March 2, 1918, two days prior to the crime,
Apolonia Patron went to witness’ house and complained that her husband Pantaleon
Arabe had quarreled with her because he suspected that she was maintaining relation
with Catalino Merced, her brother-in-law. Witness Filomena replied to her, saying that,
in order to avoid such quarreling, she ought not to have any dealings with Merced. This
advice angered the defendant Patron and, at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon of that
same day, she again went to Ago’s house; she had a dagger (Exhibit B) in her hand and
showed a disposition to quarrel with witness. Several days afterwards witness found
this same dagger on the floor of Patron’s house, near the bed on which the defendant
Merced lay down on the night of the 4th of March of this year when he returned to the
said house in which he was living as a brother of witness’ husband. When Merced was
questioned as to where he had been wounded, he replied that it was in the house of
Teodora Sarasin, and then witness learned of the occurrence, for it was told to her
while Sarasin was in witness’ store. Ago had seen the dagger, Exhibit B, bathed in
blood, and it was the same one that Apolonia Patron was carrying two days before
when she became angry in witness’ house.

The health officer who examined Pantaleon Arabe’s corpse testified that, as he had
stated in his certificate Exhibit A, the corpse bore a serious wound between two ribs of
the left side; that this wound ran obliquely from the left part of the shoulder toward the
right diaphragm and had been inflicted with a double-edged dagger.

The defendant Catalino Merced pleaded not guilty. He testified that while he was
resting, in company with Apolonia Patron, in the house of Teodora Sarasin, where he
and Apolonia had eaten their supper at Sarasin’s invitation, Pantaleon Arabe entered
the place and, after telling the defendant to prepare himself because he, Arabe, was
going to kill him, put out the light and gave him several blows with the bolo, Exhibit B,
with which he was provided, inflicting three wounds in his right leg and one in his right
arm; that these wounds were inflicted while witness was lying on the floor of the house,
wherefore he arose to defend himself and a struggle ensued between them during
which he succeeded in snatching from Arabe’s belt the dagger, Exhibit B, and with it
wounded Arabe in the back, as a result of which wound, he, Arabe, died. The defendant
Apolonia Patron, who also pleaded not guilty, did not testify at the trial.

The facts related above certainly constitute the crime of homicide comprised within
Article 404 of the Penal Code. The record does not show that the violent death of
Pantaleon Arabe, as the result of one single serious and mortal wound in the left side of
his back, was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article
503 of said code, for, at the time of the struggle, no disinterested eye-witness was
present aside from the two defendants and the owner of the house, which latter person,
awakened by the fight waged between the deceased and his assailant within the main
room of the house, was unable to see and witness what occurred, on account of there
being no light in the house, and learned that one of the fighters was Pantaleon Arabe
only because, on returning to her house, which she had left through fear, to get her
children, she found the deceased, covered with blood, lying stretched out on the bed
where she had lain, and, from the presence of the deceased in her house, she deduced
the conclusion that the fight had been between the deceased and the defendant
Merced. Furthermore, with respect to the qualification of the crime, it may be held to
have been proven, there being no proof to the contrary, that the crime committed was
only that of homicide, for the reason that the mortal wound which caused Arabe’s death
was a consequence of the struggle engaged in by the latter and the defendant Merced.
Aside from the fact that there is no proof in support of the statement made by the
defendant Merced to the effect that when Pantaleon Arabe entered the house in
question, he told the defendant to prepare himself for he, Arabe, was going to kill him,
and that immediately thereafter Arabe put out the light and assaulted him with the
weapon which he was carrying, on which account he claims it became necessary for
him, in self-defense, to wound Arabe with the dagger which he succeeded in snatching
from the latter’s belt, this plea is unsustainable, because it is not true and because,
even though it were true and even if the deceased did succeed in entering the room in
which the defendants Merced and Patron were lying, and did immediately thereupon
assault Merced, giving him several blows with the bolo which he, Arabe, carried, that
assault was natural and lawful, for the reason that it was made by a deceived and
offended husband in order to defend his honor and rights by punishing the offender of
his honor, and if he had killed his wife and the other defendant, he would have
exercised a lawful right and such acts would have fallen within the sanction of Article
423 of the Penal Code, and not of the article thereof which penalizes the crime of
homicide.

Despite the testimony given by the defendant, it is unquestionable that Apolonia

Patron, the wife of the deceased, was that night in the room in which Catalino Merced
was lying; in fact he finally admitted that, on account of the illicit relations between
himself and this woman, they were in the habit of keeping trysts and meeting each
other on other occasions, and that, on the night in question, he was in the house where
the crime was committed, in company with his codefendant Patron, for, during the
struggle, the owner of the house Teodora Sarasin heard Patron say to her (Patron’s)
husband, the deceased, that she herself was wounded.

The defendant Merced well knew that, by maintaining unlawful relations with Apolonia
Patron, a married woman, he was performing an unlawful and criminal act and exposed
himself to the vengeance of the offended husband, and that, by the defendants’
meeting each other in the living room of said house, which was near the house in which
the offended husband was living, he was running the danger of the latter’s surprising
them there, as in fact it did occur.

As regards the participation which the unfaithful wife may have had in the killing of her
husband, for she was present during the struggle that ensued between the deceased
and her codefendant, the record does not disclose conclusive proof that she cooperated
with, or aided, Catalino Merced when he assaulted her husband and inflicted upon him
the single mortal wound that produced his death, for the defendant Catalino Merced
himself confessed that he inflicted this wound upon the deceased with the dagger which
he succeeded in taking from the latter’s belt.

It was not proven who was the real owner of the dagger, Exhibit B, and,
notwithstanding the defendant Merced’s testimony, there is no circumstantial evidence
in the record to show that the weapon belonged to the deceased.

The witness Filomena Ago, a sister-in law of Catalino Merced, testified that several days
before the crime she had seen this dagger in the hands of Apolonia Patron, and that on
the night of the crime, upon the defendant Merced’s return to her house where he was
living, she saw blood on his clothes, and noticed that he left the dagger on the floor
beside his bed, wherefore she picked it up and it was afterwards handed to the justice
of the peace.

Notwithstanding the testimony just alluded to, it cannot be affirmed that the dagger
belonged to the defendant Patron, because, for the very reason that the defendant
Merced admitted and confessed that he seriously wounded the deceased with this
dagger, it is to be presumed that Merced was its owner, and that he carried it with him
when he went to the house of the crime in agreement with his codefendant Patron;
besides, there is no proof that the latter carried the dagger that night, and therefore it
cannot be asserted that the unfaithful wife furnished the weapon with which her
codefendant Catalino Merced inflicted upon her husband serious wound followed by his
death. For these reasons it must be concluded that the record does not show any proof,
circumstantial or other, that Apolonia Patron was at least an accomplice in the
commission of the punishable act of which her husband was the victim. The acquittal of
this defendant is all the more proper in that the complaint did not charge her with
having taken any part as an accomplice in the commission of the crime. For the
foregoing reasons, and no generic extenuating or aggravating circumstance having
attended the execution of the crime, and the first error assigned to the judgment
appealed from being held to have been refuted, said judgment should be, as it hereby
is, affirmed, in so far as it concerns Catalino Merced, with the proviso, however, that he
shall pay P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and one-half of the costs of both
instances; and the Judgment appealed from is reversed in respect to Apolonia Patron,
who should be, and hereby is, absolved from this cause. The other one-half of the costs
of both instances shall be borne de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

People vs. Dulin

Case No. G.R. No. 171284 / 29 June 2015Case Name
People vs. Dulin
Ponente Bersamin
 I.

There was no self-defense

The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime.
The burden of proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then
prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[19] The most important of all the elements is unlawful
aggression,[20] which is the condition sine qua non for upholding self-
defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the two other essential elements
of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful
aggression to prevent or repel.

Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-

defense is aptly described in People v. Nugas,[21] as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of

the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression,
there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful

aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent
to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying
circumstance of self-defense in his favor because all its elements had been
present in the commission of the crime.

In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had

initiated the attack against Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan
effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter. The
CA thus found and held in its assailed decision:

Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able
to take possession of the weapon and ran towards the second level of the
house of Vicente Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that point, the
unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When FRANCISCO and
appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon, appellant now
became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to wrest the
weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that moment,
appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and
limb from FRANCISCO.

xxxx
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer
be considered as unlawful aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel.
Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was merely defending himself when he
killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would be no basis for the
second requisite of self-defense.[22]
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial
aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had
dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin
despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again
grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not
amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of
the weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing
Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this
regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked
him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the
accused injured the aggressor.[23] As such, there was no unlawful aggression
on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.

Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by

Batulan did not cease because the latter followed him into Danao’s house
with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there was no gap in
the aggression initiated by Batulan.[24]

The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully

disarmed Batulan and then running away from him. With the aggression by
Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent
threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression
when Dulin fatally stabbed him.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination

indicating Batulan to have sustained twelve stab wounds[25] confirmed the
cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the
wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan,
and the fact that he was not defending himself.[26]
 II.

Incomplete self-defense was not proved

Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating

circumstance of incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused must
prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but
unlawful aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present.
Either or both of the other requisites may be absent, namely: reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[27]

Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts
constituted incomplete self-defense, and must be appreciated as a
privileged mitigating circumstance.[28]

Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should

prove the elements of incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing
that the victim had committed unlawful aggression against him. With
Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment that Dulin
divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-
defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several times,
Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but
instead to inflict injury on Batulan.

III.

The RTC and CA erred in appreciating the attendance of

treachery

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the

circumstances listed Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Treachery,
which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying circumstance.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
[29]
 Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated,
namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the
execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
[30]
 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and
clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.
[31]

Based on the established facts, Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of
the weapon Batulan had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested
Batulan of it and ran with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in
immediate pursuit. They continued to grapple for the weapon inside the
house of Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan
several times. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be
appreciated in the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not
take Batulan by surprise due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of
Dulin’s impending assault,[32] and being thus afforded the opportunity to
defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover control of the weapon from
Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or
is done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape, without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[33] The mode of attack
must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.

Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for
which is reclusion temporal.[34] There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14 years,
eight months and one day to 17 years and four months). The indeterminate
sentence of Dulin is, therefore, eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal,
with full credit of his preventive imprisonment, if any.