E

Early Childhood Parental Life history theory provides the most comprehen-
Acceptance-Rejection sive framework to understand how circumstances
Questionnaire experienced in early life might influence person-
ality. It proposes that personality traits develop
▶ Parental Acceptance-Rejection Questionnaire into a certain profile depending on different con-
(PARQ) ditional factors. Actual circumstances define
resource allocation, that is, how the individual
utilizes available resources (e.g., food, parental
support, etc.) in order to maximize survival
Early Environmental Effects and/or reproduction. The most dominant environ-
on Personality and Individual mental components to affect allocation strategies
Differences are level of mortality, level of stability or predict-
ability of conditions, and level of heterogeneity of
Bela Birkas the trait in the local environment. Less favorable
Medical School, Department of Behavioral conditions (i.e., higher mortality rates and less
Sciences, University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary parental investment) are suggested to form per-
sonality traits linked to more exploitative behav-
ioral strategies with unrestrictive sexual behavior,
Synonyms whereas more advantageous circumstances pro-
posedly shape rather prosocial behaviors and
Attachment; Environmental unpredictability and more restricted sexuality. Early childhood experi-
harshness; Evolutionary personality psychology; ences (i.e., quality of caregiving, low socioeco-
Life history strategy; Life history theory; nomic status of the family) can be seen as
Trade-offs indicators for such environmental factors which
might also promote the development of personal-
ity profiles linked to certain life history strategies.
Definition

Various theories and models of evolutionary psy- Introduction

chology posit that personality traits are part of
adaptive strategies regulating behavioral adapta- Initial stages of human development can be char-
tion to various environmental (ecological and/or acterized with an extended period of vulnerability
social) conditions encountered during childhood. and dependence, so the survival of the individual
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
V. Zeigler-Hill, T. K. Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3
1232 Early Environmental Effects on Personality and Individual Differences
depends mostly from parental effort. Quality
of caregiving is formed by several factors such
as availability of resources, ability to control
resources, personality traits of parents, and
numerous more (Buss 2009, 2015). Accordingly,
the development of psychosocial processes during
childhood is affected by various environmental
conditions. This results in the emergence of per-
sonality traits which can be seen as functional
strategies enabling the individual to adapt to spe-
cific challenges to survival or reproduction (Buss
2009, 2015). More specifically, children have to
be flexible and to be able to adapt to the rearing
styles of their parents/caregivers in order to max-
imize the time, effort, and other resources invested
in them. With the help of these functional strate-
gies, they can ensure their survival, gain more
time and opportunity to develop their skills and
abilities, and reach sexual maturity. Individuals
with more advanced skillset (e.g., being more
empathic or being an achiever) have improved
access to resources or are able to control them
more. Possessing preferable characteristics and
sufficient resources leads to advantages in mating,
creating more success in reproduction and better
changes to survival and development of the indi-
vidual’s offspring. Correspondingly, the genetic
basis of advantageous traits which facilitate repro-
ductive success will be transmitted to the next
generation and spread in the population.
The evolutionary approach of personality
emphasizes the adaptive function(s) of personality
traits, but it also highlights a question in regard to
individual differences. Namely, if some traits are
more beneficial than others, it should be no vari-
ability or only a narrow variation in personality
traits (Tooby and Cosmides 1990). Large body of
research demonstrated the presence of consequen-
tial individual differences in personality traits
which have heritable components and are stable
over time (Nettle 2006). Former studies have
found a heritability of around 50% for the major
personality traits indicating that non-shared
environmental effects might be as determinative
for individual differences as genetic factors
(Bouchard 2004). Consequently, individuals
adopt a particular personality profile as a result
of adaptive psychobiological processes responding
to past or present environmental conditions
(Buss 2009, 2015). An evolutionary psychological
framework dedicated to describe the mechanisms
how early-life conditions affect the development of
certain personality traits is the life history theory
(LHT).
Life History Theory and Adaptive
Trade-Off Strategies
The model of life history theory provides a frame-
work for understanding and describing the differ-
ent strategies individuals develop for allocating
their limited resources (e.g., energy, time, etc.) in
order to maximize survival and reproduction.
Resource scarcity necessitates trade-offs, that is,
to prioritize the specific life domain(s) on which
they divide up and utilize available resources
(Kaplan and Gangestad 2005). Trade-offs deter-
mine whether the individual expends time and
energy to its own further development or rather
starts reproduction. After the onset of reproduc-
tion, resource limitations force individuals to
recurrent decisions about resource expenditure
between actual or future reproduction and
supporting existing offspring or producing
another (Kaplan and Gangestad 2005; Bjorklund
and Ellis 2014). The adaptive value of resource
expenditure strategy varies according to circum-
stances. For example, children and adults differ in
their optimal energy allocation strategies based on
their level of maturity, ability to access resources,
and other characteristics: for children, it is more
advantageous to invest more time and energy in
their growth and development to reach maturity,
while adults, who are mature and self-sufficient,
benefit more from producing offspring or support
their children and spend energy to their own sur-
vival. Accordingly, individual characteristics and
differences in environmental conditions shape
optimal allocation strategies, which may alter
across the lifespan. More importantly, these
trade-off strategies can be accounted for differ-
ences in timing of life events (e.g., maturation,
reproduction, etc.) (Kaplan and Gangestad 2005;
Bjorklund and Ellis 2014). Individual configura-
tion of life history trade-offs determines the
Early Environmental Effects on Personality and Individual Differences
individual’s overall life history (LH) strategy
(Kaplan and Gangestad 2005). Life history strat-
egies enable an optimal adaptation to local condi-
tions, yet, they show a wide range of variation
across individuals within the same environmental
constraints.
Correspondingly, LH strategies can be consid-
ered as coordinated and integrated patterns of
metabolic, cognitive, behavioral, and personality
traits (Bjorklund and Ellis 2014; Del Giudice et al.
2015). It has been suggested that all LH traits vary
on a slow-fast continuum, where humans are
toward the slow end of the continuum, but simi-
larly to other species, humans also display a vari-
ety of slow and fast life history traits (Del Giudice
et al. 2015). Slow LH strategies are associated
with future-oriented attitudes and with a prefer-
ence of long-term focus in behavioral outputs
such as the ability to delay gratification. Core
features of slower strategies are higher parental
investment (i.e., expend time and effort in caring
for offspring) together with a restricted number of
offspring. In contrast, fast LH strategies involve
behavioral strategies with a relatively short-term
focus and present-orientated attitude of taking
risks in order to maximize immediate rewards.
Furthermore, faster strategies can be characterized
with an overall prioritizing of mating efforts in
forms of early reproductive maturity, frequent
mating, and little investment in social relation-
ships or offspring (Belsky et al. 1991; Del Giudice
et al. 2015).
Early Environmental Conditions, Life
History Strategies, and Personality
Development
Two critical environmental determinants of life
history strategies were suggested: unpredictability
and harshness (Brumbach et al. 2009).
Unpredictability covers the predictability of
change in environmental conditions, whereas
harshness refers to the availability of resources
and morbidity-mortality rates. Harshness repre-
sents the probability of disability or death caused
by actual circumstances at each developmental
stage within a population. Unpredictability can
1233
be seen as the spatial and temporal variability in
harshness (Brumbach et al. 2009). Higher adult
morbidity-mortality rates suggest that individuals
have a narrow time-window of reproduction,
because death or severe health problems occur
more frequent at younger ages. In this case, accel-
eration of physiological development and sexual
maturation (i.e., faster LH strategies) are more
adaptive, but if morbidity-mortality can be
reduced (e.g., through increased parental invest-
E
ment), so children have better chances to live
longer and healthier – thus the age-range of repro-
duction lengthens – slower LH strategies become
more adaptive. In other words, faster strategies
are more advantageous if the future is uncertain
and lifespan is unpredictable or mortality and
morbidity rates appear to be high (i.e., high
unpredictability); however more stable conditions
reducing environmental threats on the survival of
offspring favor slower LH strategies (Del Giudice
et al. 2015; Brumbach et al. 2009).
Environmental conditions experienced in
early-life form not only individual LH strategies
but also influence responses to adversities or other
life events in adulthood. For example, childhood
socioeconomic status (SES) was established as a
reliable indicator for environmental harshness
(Belsky et al. 2012): low SES was found to be
related to greater environmental harshness and
can be also associated with higher levels of impul-
sivity and risk-taking, along with unrestricted
sociosexual orientation (Belsky et al. 2012;
Brumbach et al. 2009). Consequently, personality
is influenced by early-life conditions in several
ways, on the levels of interpersonal, socio-
cognitive, and affective functioning (Bjorklund
2015; Brumbach et al. 2009). Exposure to
unpredictable and harsh environments in child-
hood was found to be linked to heightened per-
ception of risk, a more hedonistic attitude with
relatively hostile and malevolent interpersonal
styles and with relatively poor social skills
(Belsky et al. 2012; Bjorklund 2015; Brumbach
et al. 2009).
Accordingly, LH strategies can be linked to
personality development in a relatively direct
way as well. For instance, low self-control and
impulsivity, openness to experience together
1234 Early Environmental Effects on Personality and Individual Differences
with some facets of extraversion were related to
indicators of faster LH traits (e.g., increased mor-
tality, unrestricted mating behavior, and exploit-
ative interpersonal behavior) (Belsky et al. 1991;
Del Giudice 2014; Del Giudice et al. 2015).
Conversely, agreeableness and conscientiousness
from the Big Five along with honesty-humility
were associated with reduced rates of mortality,
reduced sociosexuality, and higher investment in
factors influencing emotional stability and quality
of parental effort (e.g., relationship quality and
stability) (Del Giudice 2014; Del Giudice
et al. 2015).
Parental Investment and Personality
Development
Quality of parental care is also crucial to the
development of socio-cognitive, affective, and
interpersonal personality functions, and nurturing
may mediate the effects of environmental factors
on development (Belsky et al. 2012; Bjorklund
and Ellis 2014). Furthermore, in early childhood
children’s social, emotional, and physiological
responses to environmental factors are shaped
primary by the quality of care they receive from
their primary caregivers (in most cases the
parents, especially the mother). The quality of
parental care is proximately determined by an
emotional bond between the child and the primary
caregiver, also referred to as attachment (Bowlby
1980). Higher parental investment in care creates
a more consistent and predictable socio-emotional
environment for the child, resulting in a secure
attachment style. In contrast, lower-quality paren-
tal care and conflict between the child and his or
her caregivers lead to insecure attachment, which
is associated with social and emotional develop-
mental difficulties (Griskevicius et al. 2013;
Young et al. 2017).
The quality of the parent-offspring relationship
is not only a key component of personality devel-
opment; it also influences behavioral and neuro-
endocrine responses to stress. There is a large
body of evidence showing that negative familial
experiences, such as parental absence or parent-
offspring conflict, can alter the epigenetic
regulation of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
functions (for review see Ellis 2013). Correspond-
ingly, experiencing insecure or unstable
emotional environment during childhood unques-
tionably changes stress responsivity and influ-
ences adult functioning. Greater exposure to
stress in early life (e.g., parent-offspring conflict)
was found to be related with indicators of fast LH
strategies (Young et al. 2017). Thus, quality of
parental care can be linked to certain adult per-
sonality traits (Bowlby 1980; Young et al. 2017),
suggesting that parental investment modulates
both LH trade-offs and personality development.
Social Environments: The Frequency of
Personality Traits in Others
Although families create an influential environ-
ment to form personality, the traits of other
people, that is, the distribution of traits within
the local population, also impact the development
of personality trait. As pointed out earlier, in cer-
tain conditions individual differences can be
maintained even in heritable traits (Nettle 2006).
Frequency-dependent selection can create such
circumstances, where adaptive traits show both
high heritability (i.e., having strong genetic
basis) and an appreciable variation within the
population (i.e., there are individuals who are
low on the trait; others show moderate level of
this trait, whereas others are high on that certain
personality feature) (Buss 2009; Nettle 2006).
Limited resources or the limited access to
resources create a competition within the popula-
tion enhancing the importance of interindividual
variation. The adaptive value of a trait depends
not only on its character or output, but it is
affected by the traits of others in the group
(Simpson et al. 2011). For example, being aggres-
sive toward other competitors might be advanta-
geous if the majority of the peers are peaceful or
submissive. However, if aggressive behavior
becomes more frequent and large proportion of
the group acts more aggressively, the adaptive
advantage of this trait will decrease (Nettle 2006).
Evolutionary models of trait variability under-
line that there are trade-offs linked to every level
Early Environmental Effects on Personality and Individual Differences
of a certain trait. In other words, being high or low
on a certain trait produces both cost and benefits
for the person (Buss 2009; Nettle 2006). For
example, individuals high on neuroticism may
be more vigilant to threatening stimuli, which
help them to avoid potential dangerous or harmful
situations. Conversely, high neurotic individuals
are more prone to depression, showing an
increased sensitivity to stress and a decreased
likelihood to having stable relationships (see
Nettle 2006 for citations). Nevertheless, the costs
and benefits also depend on the frequency of the
variations of that trait across contestants.
Conclusion
Research on personality offers a comprehensive
taxonomy about the structure of personality and a
wide-scale field of studies about the behavioral
outputs or neurobiological processes linked to
certain personality traits (Mischel and Shoda
1999). However, despite the superabundance of
knowledge about personality and its longitudinal
developmental characteristics, investigating the
possible evolutionary origin or specific conditions
which evoke the development of certain person-
ality traits is still wanting. Evolutionary personal-
ity psychology covers personality traits as
adaptations, that is, evolved psychological mech-
anisms tailored to solve recurrent social problems
our ancestors faced throughout our evolution
(Buss 2009).
Childhood environmental conditions alter the
adaptive strategies to solve evolved problems of
survival or reproduction. Different circumstances
create specific environments in which the adap-
tive value of personality traits varies according to
several life history trade-offs. These trade-offs
necessitate condition-dependent strategies in per-
sonality development in order to prioritize
resource allocation. Resource expenditure strate-
gies and associated personality traits enable indi-
viduals to maximize benefits within a specific,
personalized environment which is shaped by
local mortality-morbidity rates, stability of envi-
ronmental conditions, parental investment, and
interindividual variability of the traits.
1235
Cross-References
▶ Belsky-Steinberg-Draper Hypothesis
▶ Current Versus Future Reproduction Trade-Offs
▶ Environmental Stability
▶ Extended Growth Versus Early Reproduction
References
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Belsky, J., Steinberg, L., & Draper, P. (1991). Childhood
experience, interpersonal development, and reproduc-
tive strategy: An evolutionary theory of socialization.
Child Development, 62(4), 647–670.
Belsky, J., Schlomer, G. L., & Ellis, B. J. (2012). Beyond
cumulative risk: Distinguishing harshness and
unpredictability as determinants of parenting and
early life history strategy. Developmental Psychology,
48(3), 662.
Bjorklund, D. F. (2015). Developing adaptations.
Developmental Review, 38, 13–35.
Bjorklund, D. F., & Ellis, B. J. (2014). Children, childhood,
and development in evolutionary perspective.
Developmental Review, 34(3), 225–264.
Bouchard, T. J., Jr. (2004). Genetic influence on human
psychological traits: A survey. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 13(4), 148–151.
Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachment and loss: Vol. 3. Loss:
Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books.
Brumbach, B. H., Figueredo, A. J., & Ellis, B. J. (2009).
Effects of harsh and unpredictable environments in
adolescence on development of life history strategies.
Human Nature, 20(1), 25–51.
Buss, D. M. (2009). How can evolutionary psychology
successfully explain personality and individual differ-
ences? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(4),
359–366.
Buss, D. (2015). Evolutionary psychology: The new
science of the mind. New York: Psychology Press.
Del Giudice, M. (2014). An evolutionary life history
framework for psychopathology. Psychological
Inquiry, 25(3–4), 261–300.
Del Giudice, M., Gangestad, S. W., & Kaplan, H. S.
(2015). Life history theory and evolutionary psychol-
ogy. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary
psychology. Vol. 1. Foundations (2nd ed., pp. 88–114).
New York: Wiley.
Ellis, B. J. (2013). The hypothalamic–pituitary–gonadal
axis: A switch-controlled, condition-sensitive system
in the regulation of life history strategies. Hormones
and Behavior, 64(2), 215–225.
Griskevicius, V., Ackerman, J. A., Cantu, S. M.,
Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., Simpson, J. A., . . .
Tybur, J. M. (2013). When the economy falters, do
people spend or save? Responses to resource scarcity
depend on childhood environment. Psychological
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1236
Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history
theory and evolutionary psychology. In The handbook
of evolutionary psychology (pp. 68–95). Hoboken, NJ,
US: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1999). Integrating dispositions
and processing dynamics within a unified theory of
personality: The cognitive-affective personality sys-
tem. In Handbook of personality: Theory and research
(Vol. 2, pp. 197–218). New York: Guilford Press.
Nettle, D. (2006). The evolution of personality variation in
humans and other animals. American Psychologist,
61(6), 622.
Simpson, J. A., Griskevicius, V., & Kim, J. S. (2011).
Evolution, life history theory, and personality.
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Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990). The past explains the
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Early Recollections
▶ Style of Life
EAS
▶ EASI Temperament Survey
EAS Temperament Model
Diane Purper-Ouakil
CHU Montpellier, Medecine Psychologique de
l’Enfant et de l’Adolescent (MPEA), Hopital
Saint Eloi, Montpellier, France
Synonyms
Individual differences; Personality
Early Recollections
Definition
The EAS is a developmental, multidimensional,
and causal personality model described by Buss
and Plomin (1984). The acronym EAS refers to
three basic dimensions: emotionality, activity, and
sociability. Emotionality, activity, and sociability
manifest before socialization, persist later in life,
and show substantial heritability.
The EAS Dimensions
The individual characteristics of children are often
referred to as temperament, the constitutional
early basis of adult personality. However, the
dimensions of the EAS model are considered sta-
ble and not restricted to a specific age range.
Emotionality is a dimension referring to the
quality and intensity of emotional reactions. Indi-
viduals with high emotionality tend to react even
to low-intensity stimuli with negative emotions
such as anxiety or sadness. At the other end of
the dimension, individuals are emotionally stable.
Emotionality shows similitudes to the adult equiv-
alents of neuroticism and harm avoidance.
Activity is the expenditure of physical energy.
Its major components are tempo (i.e. pace of
action) and vigor (i.e. responses of greater inten-
sity) and its minor components are endurance and
motivation.
Sociability is defined as a preference for being
with others rather than alone. Individuals with
high sociability seek and are gratified by social
rewards. In adult personality models, extraversion
has similar characteristics.
Development of the EAS Model
The initial model of Buss and Plomin featured
four temperament dimensions: emotionality,
activity, sociability, and impulsivity (Buss and
Plomin 1975). However, the impulsivity trait did
not show sufficient stability and heritability in
children and was removed in later versions of
the model. The sociability dimension was
redefined as shyness, an inhibited behavior with
EAS Temperament Model
strangers and a tendency to escape from social
interaction, and an experimental sociability scale
was added.
The EAS Temperament Survey
The EAS temperament survey has three different
versions: parent, teacher, and child-rated ques-
tionnaires. Each questionnaire has 20 items, five
items for each of the four temperament dimen-
sions. The items are rated on a 5-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (not typical) to 5 (very
typical). The psychometric properties of the EAS
dimensions examined by Boer and Westenberg
(1994) showed independence of emotionality,
activity, and shyness. The factorial structure of
sociability was more ambiguous, raising the
possibility that high shyness and low sociability
may not be distinguishable in younger children.
However, the subsequent study of Mathiesen and
Tambs (1999) in Norwegian children aged 18, 30,
and 50 months confirmed the usability of the
sociability scale. Gender differences were moder-
ate and increased with age, boys showing higher
activity and lower shyness compared with girls.
Age trends indicated increasing emotionality and
shyness and decreasing activity and sociability.
The EAS temperament survey has been translated
in different languages and has been used in
adolescents and adults (Naerde et al. 2004).
Applications of the EAS Model
The EAS model has been applied to the study of
behavioral genetics (Saudino et al. 2000) and to
the field of normal and abnormal development. As
a comprehensive review of this research domain is
beyond the scope of this report, a brief focus on
longitudinal studies and those having examined
temperamental precursors of disorder is
provided here.
Regarding depression, a cohort study showed
that emotionality at age 6 increased the odds of
depression at 18 years by 20% (Bould et al. 2014).
In the same cohort, oppositional deviant disorder
at 91 months was predicted by emotionality and
1237
activity at 38 months, whereas temperamental
activity predicted hyperactive-impulsive and
combined types of attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (Stringaris et al. 2010).
Familial antecedents of temperament have
been examined in a longitudinal assessment of
1903 mother-child pairs. Results show that high
emotionality and activity were predicted by
family risk, a combination of both maternal
depression and low family income (Melchior
E
et al. 2012).
Conclusion
The EAS model has been widely used in devel-
opmental research and, unlike other personality
models, has shown to be applicable across
different age ranges. The most recent four-
dimensional model captures stable and primordial
forms of individual differences that are involved
in trajectories of normal development and
psychopathology.
Cross-References
▶ Child Temperament
▶ EASI Temperament Survey
▶ Personality Development in Childhood
▶ Sociability
▶ Temperament
References
Buss, A. H., & Plomin, R. (1975). A temperament theory
of personality development. New York: Wiley-
Interscience.
Buss, A. H., & Plomin, R. (1984). Theory and measure-
ment of EAS. In Temperament: Early developing per-
sonality traits (pp. 98–130). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
Boer, F., & Westenberg, P. M. (1994). The factor structure
of the Buss and Plomin EAS temperature survey
(parental ratings) in a Dutch sample of elementary
school children. Journal of Personality Assessment,
62(3), 537–551.
Bould, H., Araya, R., Pearson, R. M., Stapinski, L.,
Carnegie, R., & Joinson, C. (2014). Association
between early temperament and depression at
18 years. Depression and Anxiety, 31(9), 729–736.
1238 EASI

Mathiesen, K. S., & Tambs, K. (1999). The EAS temper-

ament questionnaire: Factor structure, age trends, reli- EASI Temperament Survey
ability, and stability in a Norwegian sample. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40(3), 431–439.
Melchior, M., Chastang, J. F., de Lauzon, B., Galéra, Yukiko Ohashi1,2 and Toshinori Kitamura1,3
1
C., Saurel-Cubizolles, M. J., Larroque, B., & EDEN Kitamura Institute of Mental Health Tokyo,
Mother–Child Cohort Study Group. (2012). Mater- Tokyo, Japan
nal depression, socioeconomic position, and temper- 2
ament in early childhood: The EDEN mother–child Department of Nursing, Faculty of Health
cohort. Journal of Affective Disorders, 137(1), Science Technology, Bunkyo Gakuin University,
165–169. Tokyo, Japan
Naerde, A., Roysamb, E., & Tambs, K. (2004). Tempera- 3
Department of Psychiatry, Graduate School of
ment in adults: Reliability, stability, and factor structure
of the EAS temperament survey. Journal of Personality Medicine, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
Assessment, 82(1), 71–79.
Saudino, K. J., Cherny, S. S., & Plomin, R. (2000).
Parent ratings of temperament in twins: Explaining Synonyms
the ‘too low’ DZ correlations. Twin Research, 3(4),
224–233.
Stringaris, A., Maughan, B., & Goodman, R. (2010). EAS; EASI; EASI I; EASI II; EASI III; Emotion-
What’s in a disruptive disorder? Temperamental ante- ality, activity, sociability, and impulsivity temper-
cedents of oppositional defiant disorder: Findings from ament survey
the Avon longitudinal study. Journal of the American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 49(5),
474–483.
Definition

The EASI Temperament Survey, developed by

Buss and Plomin, is one of the first instruments
EASI developed to measure the temperament of chil-
dren. It is a 20-item questionnaire with five items
▶ EASI Temperament Survey for each of the four temperament domains: Emo-
tionality, Activity, Sociability, and Impulsivity.
Therefore, the acronym represents the four tem-
perament domains. All items measure broad dis-
positions and are rated on a five-point scale (Buss
EASI I and Plomin 1975).

▶ EASI Temperament Survey

Introduction

Arnold H. Buss and Robert Plomin, two psychol-

ogists, developed a theory of personality pursuing
EASI II Allport’s definition that “temperament refers to
the characteristic phenomena of an individual’s
▶ EASI Temperament Survey nature, including his susceptibility to emotional
stimulation, his customary strength and speed of
response, the quality of his prevailing mood, and
all peculiarities of fluctuation and intensity of
mood, these being phenomena regarded as depen-
EASI III dent on constitutional make-up, and therefore
largely hereditary in origin” (Allport 1961, cited
▶ EASI Temperament Survey by Buss and Plomin 1975). Initially, Buss and
EASI Temperament Survey
Plomin listed five criteria that defined tempera-
ments, distinguishing them from other personality
traits: inheritance, stability during childhood,
retention into maturity, adaptive value, and the
fact that they exist in our animal forebears (Buss
and Plomin 1975). Later, they emphasized two
crucial criteria: inheritance and the presence
in early childhood, preferably during the first
two years of life (Buss and Plomin 1984). They
explained that temperament is concerned more
with style than with content, more with expressive
behavior than with instrumental (coping) behav-
ior, and more with what a person brings to a role or
situation than what either of these demand of him
(Buss and Plomin 1975).
Their theory suggests the existence of four tem-
peraments: Emotionality, Activity, Sociability, and
Impulsivity. Emotionality in the theory is focused
on unpleasant emotions such as distress, fear, and
anger. Activity is a person’s energy output, thus
equivalent to movement. Sociability is the only
temperament that has a directional component
such as seeking out other people, preferring their
presence, and responding to them. Considering the
modest correlation size, Buss and Plomin said that
it is not the same trait as shyness (i.e., some sociable
people are also shy while some unsociable people
are not shy). Impulsivity in the theory reflects
inhibitory control, decision time, persistence, and
sensation seeking. They explained metaphorically
that Impulsivity may be regarded as “brakes” and
Emotionality as “engines.” Thus, the EASI was
generated deductively from their theory.
Variations
EASI
The original version (EASI I) is used to measure
children’s temperaments. However, they also pro-
posed another version for measuring adults’ tem-
peraments, which slightly revised the EASI to
produce a self-reporting inventory for an adult
(EASI I for adults). Subsequently, they revised
the EASI I slightly to eliminate two overlapping
items loaded on more than one scale and to change
two items which did not consistently load on the a
priori scale. It is called EASI II. Furthermore,
1239
they suggested several components for each
temperament domain. EASI III, a 54-item EASI
survey, includes these expanded components
(Buss and Plomin 1975).
EAS
In the development of the EASI, Impulsivity was
later dropped because they concluded that Impul-
sivity was composed of various subcomponents
that had shown only some replication by factor
E
analyses; moreover, it does not meet their criteria.
The new version is called EAS, the acronym for
Emotionality, Activity, and Sociability (Buss and
Plomin 1984). There are several variations of the
EAS: the EAS Temperament Survey for children
(parental rating), the EAS Temperament Survey
for adults (adult self-report), and the EAS Tem-
perament Survey for children (teacher ratings).
Psychometric Properties
Buss and colleagues (Buss et al. 1973; Buss and
Plomin 1975) conducted factorial analyses and
scale correlations of EASI I using 139 pairs of
same-sex twins as rated by their mothers and
revealed that at least three of the five items
assigned to each a priori scale loaded highest on
the appropriate factor. For both boys and girls,
Activity and Impulsivity were related, and Emo-
tionality was moderately related to Impulsivity.
A remarkably similar factor solution was obtained
by Gibbs et al. (1987) who had administered the
survey to 105 mothers of British children aged
1–5 years old.
The EASI has been translated into other lan-
guages and studied. For example, Kitamura et al.
(2014) studied the psychometric properties of the
Japanese version of the EASI. They performed an
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the EASI
items in a randomly halved population of Japa-
nese fathers (n = 237) and mothers (n = 412) of
children under four years of age. The factor struc-
ture was cross-validated by a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA). Their EFA yielded a two-factor
structure but according to the original report, a
four-factor structure showed a better fit with the
data. In a CFA, the new four-factor model
1240
(excluding items with low factor loadings)
showed an acceptable goodness-of-fit with the
data. These four subscales showed moderate inter-
nal consistency. Kitamura et al. concluded that the
EASI Survey may be applicable to a Japanese
nonclinical child population.
In addition, the original developers adminis-
tered the EASI I for adults to a college sample of
162 men and 207 women, then confirmed a very
similar factor-loading pattern to the children’s
version. They concluded that the consistency of
factor patterns for children and adult groups, as
well as for ratings by others versus self-ratings, is
encouraging evidence for factorial stability.
The psychometric properties of the self-
reporting version of the EASI II were much better.
In a college student sample of 82 men and
89 women, better factorial unity was shown
by constructing more discrete factors (Buss
and Plomin 1975). The only significant scale
relationship for both genders was between Emo-
tionality and Impulsivity.
There are ample worldwide reports of the EAS
temperament survey with good psychometric
properties (e.g., Bobes Bascarán et al. 2011;
Naerde et al. 2004; Spence et al. 2013; Gasman
et al. 2002; Mathiesen and Tambs 1999; Boer and
Westenberg 1994).
Applications
In addition to psychometric studies as well as twin
studies deconstructing the heritability of chil-
dren’s temperaments, the EASI was used in stud-
ies on the associations between a child’s
temperament and parenting styles (e.g., Coplan
et al. 2009; Latzman et al. 2009) and between
temperament and reaction to a surgical operation
or dental treatment (e.g., Kain et al. 2000;
Lundgren et al. 2007).
Conclusion
The EASI has demonstrated excellent factorial
stability from childhood to adolescence and
across different cultures. Among several kinds of
EASI Temperament Survey
temperament measurement scales, the EASI con-
sists of only 20 simple items, so it is easy to use in
both clinical and research settings.
References
Bobes Bascarán, M. T., Jover, M., Llácer, B., Carot, J. M.,
& Sanjuan, J. (2011). Spanish adaptation of the EAS
Temperament Survey for the assessment of child tem-
perament. Psicothema, 23(1), 160–166. In Spanish.
Boer, F., & Westenberg, P. M. (1994). The factor structure
of the Buss and Plomin EAS Temperament Survey
(parental ratings) in a Dutch sample of elementary
school children. Journal of Personality Assessment,
62(3), 537–551.
Buss, A., Plomin, R., & Willerman, L. (1973). The inher-
itance of temperaments. Journal of Personality, 41,
513–524.
Buss, A., & Plomin, R. (1975). A temperament theory of
personality development. New York: John Wiley.
Buss, A., & Plomin, R. (1984). Temperament: Early devel-
oping personality traits. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
Coplan, R. J., Reichel, M., & Rowan, K. (2009). Exploring
the associations between maternal personality, child
temperament, and parenting: A focus on emotions.
Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 241–246.
Gasman, L., Purper-Ouakil, D., Michel, G., Mouren-
Siméoni, M. C., Bouvard, M., Perez-Diaz, F., &
Jouvent, R. (2002). Cross-cultural assessment of child-
hood temperament: A confirmatory factor analysis of
the French Emotionality Activity and Sociability
(EAS) questionnaire. European Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry, 11(3), 101–107.
Gibbs, M. V., Reeves, D., & Cunningham, C. C. (1987).
The application of temperament questionnaires to a
British sample: Issues of reliability and validity. Jour-
nal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 28(1), 61–77.
Kain, Z. N., Mayes, L. C., Weisman, S. J., &
Hofstadter, M. B. (2000). Social adaptability, cognitive
abilities, and other predictors for children’s reactions
to surgery. Journal of Clinical Anesthesia, 12(7),
549–554.
Kitamura, T., Ohashi, Y., Minatani, M., Haruna, M.,
Murakami, M., & Goto, Y. (2014). Emotionality Activ-
ity Sociability and Impulsivity (EASI) survey: Psycho-
metric properties and assessment biases of the Japanese
Version. Psychology and Behavioral Sciences., 3(4),
113–120.
Latzman, R. D., Elkovitch, N., & Clark, L. A. (2009).
Predicting parenting practices from maternal and ado-
lescent sons’ personality. Journal of Research in Per-
sonality, 43, 847–855.
Lundgren, J., Elfström, M. L., & Berggren, U. (2007). The
relationship between temperament and fearfulness in
adult dental phobic patients. International Journal of
Paediatric Dentistry, 17(6), 460–468.
Mathiesen, K. S., & Tambs, K. (1999). The EAS temper-
ament questionnaire-factor structure, age trends,
Eccentricity 1241

reliability, and stability in a Norwegian sample. Journal
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40(3), 431–439.
Naerde, A., Røysamb, E., & Tambs, K. (2004). Tempera-
ment in adults: Reliability, stability, and factor structure
of the EAS Temperament Survey. Journal of Personal-
ity Assessment, 82(1), 71–79.
Spence, R., Owens, M., & Goodyer, I. (2013). The longi-
tudinal psychometric properties of the EAS tempera-
ment survey in adolescence. Journal of Personality
Assessment, 95(6), 633–639.
Easily Sidetracked
▶ Distractibility
Eating Disorders
Attempts to define “normal,” in the context of
socially or culturally accepted human interac-
tions, including but not limited to personality
and behavior, are often listed as characteristics
which deviate from seemingly common percep-
tions of “normal,” otherwise stated as being
“abnormal” or against the norm. Eccentricity, in
the context of human behavior, can thus be
defined as any behavior that is abnormal. The
phrases used to describe eccentric behavior and
E
eccentricity such as “deviate” further emphasize
that behavioral norms are pre-established. Deno-
tations of eccentricity are set and do not falter
between social and cultural norms. Connotations
of eccentricity are twofold and come with pre-
established positive or negative social and cul-
tural meanings.

▶ Personality and Eating Disorders

Eccentricity and Personality

The expression of personality is accepted as

Eccentricity “normal” for a variety of reasons. What is under-
stood to be “normal” varies greatly throughout
Kaylan Peterson, Jasmine L. Misner and the country, leaving the same behavior to be
Steven M. Dunn eccentric in one region while quite “normal” in
University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, another. Within reason, the variant expressions
OK, USA of personality rarely move into significance, but
what is odd in a specific region might be odd
enough to gain attention. Individuals exhibiting
Synonyms behaviors outside of social norms often are not
classified as having treatable symptoms of psy-
Idiosyncratic; Irregular; Odd; Peculiar; chological disorders. Problematic behaviors
Whimsical; such as greed, ruthlessness, aggression, mendac-
ity, and even criminal misconduct are rhetori-
cally highlighted as parallel to mental disorders;
Definition however, only a trivial amount of these behaviors
is defined in the current DSM (Nasrallah 2012).
Eccentricity is the nature of being odd; exhibiting There is a problem differentiating between “mad-
peculiarity; or any instance of deviation from an ness” and eccentricity. Andrei identified the ori-
established pattern or norm. gin of the problem as lying in not understanding
where the quirks of the eccentric become the
social damage of the madman (2015). Typically,
Introduction the use of eccentricity is not used to go as far as
psychological disorders, but the term does
Throughout history, societies have attempted to include odd behaviors that reach into what
define characteristics, behavioral boundaries, could be diagnosed as a disorder, being problem-
and ideological perceptions of normality. atic to the individual and/or others.
1242
Sexual Eccentricity
Shared with nourishment and sleep, sex is cate-
gorized as a basic human need. Disregarding
sexual orientation or choice of sexual partner(s),
“normal” sexual behavior is accepted as being
between two and more legally consenting partners
conducting sexual activity or intercourse. Socially
and legally accepted sexual activities include
intimate touching, oral sex, vaginal intercourse,
and anal intercourse. Engaging in sexual stimula-
tion is a normal, appropriate human activity.
However, deviant sexual behaviors fall outside
of established boundaries of “normal” and often
are categorized as paraphilic in nature. The
American Psychiatric Association defines para-
philia as consistent or recurring strong sexual
arousal or urges associated with inanimate
objects, sadism/masochism, transvestic expres-
sion, children, or nonconsensual individuals
(2013). Legality would play a rather significant
role in interests of sexual interactions with
children or nonconsensual individuals; however,
the other three areas of concern would be legal
if conducted within the confines of the law. These
three areas sit outside of the realm of “normal”
and are pathologized eccentricities. It is important
to note that such a classification or understanding
can change with understanding. For instance,
in the last 50 years, homosexuality has moved
from a pathological problem to an understood
orientation, where instead of attempting to treat
mere existence, practitioners can focus on the real
biological and mental health of people (Drescher
2015). Homosexuality used to be understood as a
pathological eccentric behavior and now finds
itself closer and closer to normal.
Conclusion
Eccentricity is a “weighted” word that exists out-
side the safety of “normal,” stretching all the way
up to and including pathological or illegal behav-
ior. Considering the term and its use, one should
understand that “normal” is a fluid term, even if it
flows slowly through generations.
Ecological Momentary Assessment
Cross-References
▶ Schizotypal Personality Disorder
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Arling-
ton: Author.
Andrei, E. M. (2015). Eccentricity between scientific dis-
course and literary discourse. Cultural and Linguistic
Communication, 5(1), 40–46.
Drescher, J. (2015). Out of dsm: Depathologizing homo-
sexuality. Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 5, 565–575.
Nasrallah, H. (2012). Beyond psychiatry’s reach: Fringe
behaviors that defy treatment. Current Psychiatry,
11(2), 20–21.
Ecological Momentary
Assessment
▶ Experience Sampling Methods
Ecological Niche
▶ Niche
Economics and Well-Being
Daniel Brou
Management and Organizational Studies,
The University of Western Ontario, London,
ON, Canada
Definition
Economics and well-being is the study and mea-
surement of welfare at both the individual and
societal level. Traditionally, economists have
measured well-being indirectly, by observing the
choices people make in markets. More recently, as
a result of advances in behavioral economics and
Economics and Well-Being
availability of data, economists are measuring
people’s preferences as expressed in subjective
surveys.
Introduction
The economic analysis of well-being has been
criticized for focusing too narrowly on material
well-being. Although economists have always
recognized that happiness (a term used inter-
changeably with utility, satisfaction, welfare, and
well-being) is not solely derived from being finan-
cially well-off, the inherent difficulty of measur-
ing well-being and theoretical results that
rationalize money-metric measures of utility led
to the use of income measures as substitutes for
well-being in economic analysis. Recent advances
in behavioral economics and in the measurement
of well-being through subjective surveys have led
to a rethinking of the economics of well-being.
The purpose of this entry is to summarize the
traditional and new approaches to understanding
the relationship between economics and well-
being, of which material well-being is only one
aspect.
The Traditional Economic Approach:
Revealed Preferences and Income
Economic analysis of the individual as a con-
sumer is based on the principle of utility
maximization – individuals attempt to make
themselves as well-off as possible through the
choices they make as market participants. Individ-
uals are characterized by their preferences over
the goods available to them in markets. (It is worth
noting that the set of goods analyzed is not limited
to consumer goods and can include a variety of
lifestyle choices including the ‘consumption’ of
leisure.) An individual’s preferences must be
known in order to assess how she is affected by
a change in her environment, for example, a
change in prices or tax policy. Unfortunately, an
individual’s preferences are not observable and
must be inferred. Economists have traditionally
been skeptical of self-reported measures of
1243
well-being, believing that the only credible data
come from revealed consumption choices made
within a budget and requiring genuine trade-offs.
The revealed preference approach, first formal-
ized in the work of Samuelson (1938, 1948),
uses observed market choices (e.g., the quantity
of each good a consumer purchases under differ-
ent prices), along with the assumption of rational-
ity, to reconstruct individual preferences. Having
derived an estimate of the underlying preferences,
E
it is possible to assess how well-being will be
affected by changes in the economic environment.
As a simplified example, consider an individual in
the market for fruit. If this person is observed to
continue buying apples rather than oranges, even
as the relative price of apples rises, then it can be
concluded that the person has strong preferences
for apples and these preferences can be quantified.
It is then possible to approximate the effect on the
individual’s well-being of changes in the markets
for apples and oranges. This type of analysis has
led to money-metric measures of welfare, for
example, calculating the amount of additional
income the individual would have to receive in
order to compensate her for an increase in the
price of apples. The resulting link between
income, consumption, and well-being has given
a foundation to the view that welfare may be
approximated through observed market out-
comes, including prices, production, and income.
At roughly the same time as the theory under-
pinning revealed preferences was developed,
countries were improving on their systems of
national accounting. The main goal was to mea-
sure short-term economic fluctuations. Gross
domestic product (GDP) is an aggregate measure
of production and is defined as the dollar value of
final goods and services produced during a given
time within the borders of a country. The focus is
on traded goods and services because only market
transactions have reliable price information and,
building on the revealed preferences approach,
people’s willingness to pay for a good is the best
indication of the value a good adds to individuals
in a society. Aggregation is also simplified
because all measures are in dollar terms and can
easily be added up. Comparisons across countries
and time are facilitated by the fact that there are
1244
international standards on the collection and
aggregation of production data and on price level
(inflation) data.
In the absence of measurement error, produc-
tion should be equal to the income generated
within a country as well as expenditures within a
country. Any good or service that shows up in
GDP must have been produced in the country
and sold in a market. This transaction must show
up as income for the seller of the good or service
and as an expenditure for the buyer. As such, GDP
can be said to capture not just economic activity
but also income and consumption. Building on the
logic of revealed preferences, changes in con-
sumption and expenditure patters, as well as
prices, can serve as proxies for material well-
being. Furthermore, this data are widely available,
reliable, and objective, allowing for cross-
sectional and time series analysis. GDP is also
highly correlated with many other dimensions of
well-being, including health, education, and life
expectancy. For these reasons, GDP has com-
monly been used as a measure of aggregate well-
being and growth in GDP as an indicator of how
well-being changes over time.
Criticisms of GDP as a Measure
of Well-Being
Criticism of GDP as a measure of well-being and a
guide for policy evaluation can be grouped into
four main strands: errors in measuring production,
errors in measuring material well-being, omission
of important determinants of well-being, and
omission of considerations of sustainability.
Many of these criticisms have been made since
its inception, but in the absence of better data and
due to the widespread availability of GDP figures
for a large sample of countries over time, GDP
continues to be the benchmark for measuring
aggregate well-being. Only recently, national gov-
ernments have begun to consider large-scale
improvements in the gathering of national
accounts data (Stiglitz et al. 2009).
In measuring aggregate production by valuing
goods and services traded in markets, GDP does
not fully account for important components of
Economics and Well-Being
production, including nonmarket activities, gov-
ernment services, and changes in quality.
Although some effort is made to impute the
value of nonmarket activity, it is likely underrep-
resented. Consider two households with the same
total market income: the first has one adult earning
the full amount in market wages and one adult
who takes care of the child care and household
chores, while the second has two working adults
and must purchase child care and other home
maintenance services in the market. The market
value of the production of the two households is
the same, but their total production (and well-
being) are clearly not. Furthermore, as societal
changes lead to shifts from nonmarket to market
production (i.e., from the first to the second type
of household), increases in GDP overstate
increases in production. Similarly, government
expenditures are generally valued at cost because
they are not bought and sold in markets. Consider
the case of health spending. Whereas in a market-
based system, health insurance services are valued
at market prices, in a publicly funded system
health services would be valued at cost, with little
attempt to account for the value added by govern-
ments. Finally, measures of GDP also have diffi-
culty accounting for changes in quality, which are
increasingly important and likely have a growing
impact on output and well-being. By failing to
account for nonmarket activity, government ser-
vices, and changes in quality, GDP may be prob-
lematic even as a measure of production.
Setting aside issues of measuring production,
which may not have an easy solution, GDP has
shortcomings as a measure of material well-being.
Although in theory the product, income, and
expenditure methods of calculating GDP should
yield the same results, in an increasingly global-
ized world driven by technological change, pro-
duction aggregates may differ considerably from
measures of aggregate income or consumption.
Furthermore, GDP is a measure of income over a
period of time and as a result does not account for
a country’s wealth. Relying solely on GDP to
assess material well-being is comparable to
assessing the performance of a company by only
considering the income statement and not the
balance sheet. Clearly, a full accounting of a
Economics and Well-Being
country’s material well-being should, in addition
to measuring what is produced, also account for
the income, consumption, and wealth that result
from said production.
Well-being is multidimensional and material
well-being is only one aspect. The use of GDP
as a measure of overall well-being omits impor-
tant aspects of quality of life, including health,
education, political voice, social connections,
and insecurity. Although GDP is correlated with
many of these dimensions, the link is not strong
enough to fully capture the level or changes in all
of them. The Easterlin paradox is an empirical
statement of this failure. Over time, measures of
subjective well-being do not increase when a
country’s income increases (Easterlin 1974).
This is despite the fact that there is overwhelming
evidence that in the short-term the relationship
between income and well-being is positive and
strikingly consistent within countries and across
countries (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). A final
criticism of GDP as a measure of well-being is
that it ignores considerations of sustainability.
GDP does not distinguish between increases in
national wealth and resource depletion, and it
does not account for incurred future costs.
A New Approach: Expressed Preferences
and Subjective Well-Being
Recent developments in economics have given
greater impetus to finding alternative ways of
measuring well-being. Behavioral economics
incorporates psychological, social, and cognitive
factors in studying economic decision-making.
For example, theories based on bounded rational-
ity incorporate the idea that people are only as
rational as their available information, environ-
ment, and intellect permit. Advances in these
fields have formalized the conditions under
which the revealed preference approach fails and
established that these conditions are empirically
relevant (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Observed
market choices are a poor guide for approximating
underlying preferences when individuals have
limited or no choice or are powerless to make
changes, when considering public goods, or
1245
when information is difficult to obtain (Graham
2011). In these cases, preferences are best
observed directly through surveys of subjective
well-being.
Large survey data sets on subjective well-being
have recently become available and are being
used in econometric analysis. Individuals are typ-
ically asked, among other things, to rank their
well-being. There are different definitions of
well-being. Questions about hedonic well-being
E
require that individuals characterize how happy
they feel in general. Life satisfaction questions
focus on evaluating their life circumstances as a
whole. Somewhat related are questions that ask
people to evaluate their capacity to pursue a mean-
ingful life. Questions can be open-ended, allo-
wing respondents to apply their own definition
of well-being, or framed, as in Cantril’s ladder of
life question. Traditional economists have
expresses skepticism about these data because
the content of responses in unclear and can be
biased by the wording of the questions and the
order in which they appear. But new research
using these data is shedding light on the relation-
ship between income and well-being, the determi-
nants of well-being, and the importance of
adaptability and agency in measuring well-being.
Income and Well-Being
The relationship between income and well-being
has important policy implications. If the two are
not related, policies aimed at raising income levels
or pursuing economic growth may not be serving
the public. Early research on this topic utilized
country-level data on per capita GDP and average
country well-being levels, mostly for OECD
countries due to data limitations. As countries
grow wealthier over time, average happiness
levels do not increase, even though within coun-
tries wealthier people are on average happier than
poorer ones (Easterlin 1974). Later studies incor-
porating lower-income countries have posited that
income is good for well-being only at low levels
of income – there is a satiation point above which
additional income does not contribute to well-
being. A common interpretation of these results
1246
is that people adapt relatively quickly to new
levels of income (once they have achieved a
basic level of material well-being) and revert to
their original level of well-being. An alternate
explanation is that people only care about their
income relative to that of a comparison group so
that economic growth, which raises the average
income, needs not make the average person
better off.
Recent research using well-being surveys has
taken advantage of the wealth of worldwide,
individual-level data to clarify some of the fea-
tures of the Easterlin paradox. There is a positive
and robust relationship between income and well-
being that is similar for country averages and
within country levels (Stevenson and Wolfers
2008). Furthermore, the relation between income
and well-being is stronger for evaluative measures
than hedonic ones (Kahneman and Deaton 2010).
The income-well-being relationship for the poor is
similar to that for the rich and in fact may be
stronger for the rich (Stevenson and Wolfers
2013). Relative income does not appear to explain
reported levels of well-being (Deaton and Stone
2013). Although these results refute some of the
interpretations of the Easterlin paradox, there
remains debate about whether the new data refute
the absence of a long-term relationship between
income and well-being (Easterlin et al 2010).
A focus on the level of income or its growth
rate may be misguided. There is evidence that
what people do not adapt well to is uncertainty.
During the worst of financial crisis, levels of
reported well-being decreased steadily, but as sta-
bility was restored, these levels recovered quickly
to levels higher than before the crisis, even though
material well-being was still significantly lower
(Graham and Sukhtankar 2004). This suggests
that people adapt to unpleasant certainty about
their income better than to uncertainty.
Determinants of Well-Being
The determinants of happiness and well-being are
surprisingly consistent across the world, regard-
less of culture or level of development. Wealthier
people are on average happier than poorer ones.
Economics and Well-Being
Health is very important for happiness. Employ-
ment and marriage are associated with greater
well-being. Age has a U-shaped relationship
with well-being, with the low point coming in
the mid-1940s. Although modest differences in
these relationships can be found across some
countries, cultures, or demographic groups, they
can typically be explained by large differences in
economic conditions (Graham 2011).
The consistency of determinants allows
researchers to use them as controls when looking
at differential effects of other variables. Because
answers to well-being questions are ordinal rather
than cardinal, ordered logistic or probit models
can be used to yield the probability that an indi-
vidual will place himself in a given category of
well-being. The estimated coefficients are then
used as a basis for relative weights, which allows
researchers to estimate how much income a typi-
cal individual would need to experience a level of
well-being sufficient to compensate for the loss in
well-being resulting from a change in the variable
of interest. For example, one study using data on
the USA and UK estimates that it would take
$100,000 to compensate the average person for a
divorce and $60,000 for a job loss (Blanchflower
and Oswald 2004). It is worth noting that, similar
to revealed preferences approach, this generates a
monetary equivalent to the event in question. The
difference is that the focus is on quantifying
expressed preferences, rather than reconstructing
preferences from observed actions.
This literature has produced a variety of inter-
esting results. The relationship between income
and well-being runs both ways: happier people
tend to perform better in the labor market
(Graham et al 2004). Unexpected lottery gains
have a positive but temporary effect on happiness,
supporting the idea that people adapt to changes in
their life situation (Gardner and Oswald 2001).
The effect of inequality on reported well-being
depends on context. In Europe and the USA,
there is little or no relation between the two,
while in Latin America inequality has a negative
effect on poor and positive effect on the rich. This
suggests that inequality, in addition to being an
outcome of markets and policy, serves as a signal
of future opportunity (Alesina et al., 2004).
Economics and Well-Being
Inflation and unemployment have negative effects
on happiness, but unemployment effects are stron-
ger. This has direct implications for the trade-offs
typically considered by central banks in deciding
monetary policy (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2001).
Evidence from tobacco taxes suggests that the
negative financial effects of taxes on addictive
substances are outweighed by positive self-
control effects (Gruber and Mullainathan 2002).
Results like these are useful in providing quanti-
tative estimates of the relative costs and benefits of
different policies.
Adaptability, Capacity, and Agency
When making comparisons using subjective mea-
sures of well-being, several issues arise which can
complicate its usefulness in guiding policy deci-
sions. A first is that differences in norms and
tolerance for adversity imply that people can
report being happy in conditions that are objec-
tively intolerable. For example, unemployment
makes people unhappy, but less so when it is
prevalent (Clark and Oswald 1994). The same
has been found for obesity, crime, and corruption.
The capacity to adapt may lead to collective tol-
erance for a bad equilibrium. A second complica-
tion is that individuals report and seek out
different types of well-being depending on their
capacity to pursue a meaningful life. When they
have limited capacity, individuals value hedonic
well-being and cite friendship, family, and reli-
gion as important factors in their well-being.
When individuals have a greater capacity, they
tend to care more about evaluative happiness and
focus on achieving objectives, as well as the qual-
ity of institutions (Graham 2011). Interpreting
subjective well-being comparisons is further com-
plicated by the conflict between agency and peo-
ple’s evaluation of that agency. People who have
children report lower satisfaction, even though
they typically had them willingly (Hansen 2012).
Greater autonomy for women is associated with
decline in self-reported well-being for women
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2009). But many would
argue that the capacities that come with greater
freedom of choice are as or more important than
1247
reported feelings about these freedoms. Taken
together, these issues suggest that using measures
of subjective well-being to guide policy is
problematic.
Conclusion
Economists have traditionally used income and
production measures as proxies for well-being.
E
This practice was justified by the theoretical results
of revealed preference theory and the relative abun-
dance of quality, standardized income data.
Although it has always been recognized that there
were limitations to the usefulness of income mea-
sures, recent developments in behavioral econom-
ics and the availability of large sets of survey data
on subjective measures of well-being have resulted
in a move toward using expressed preferences in
evaluating well-being. In particular, subjective
well-being data is useful for studying welfare
implications when individuals have limited or no
choice. The clearest application of this research is
in understanding and quantifying the costs and
benefits of policy changes.
The question of whether a measure of well-
being comparable to GDP can be created from
subjective well-being data remains unanswered.
The goal is to create a metric that allows us to
make well-being comparisons across time and
location, much like GDP is an accepted way of
measuring and comparing what an economy pro-
duces. But it is not clear how to aggregate well-
being, or even which definition to consider. Soci-
eties which care more about achieving equality in
outcomes may favor hedonic measures, while
societies that care more about equality of oppor-
tunity or process are likely to favor evaluative
measures. Many rich people report being
unhappy, but it does not necessarily follow that
society should dedicate scarce resources to sad
millionaires, even if the poor report being happy.
Cross-References
▶ Agency
▶ Happiness
1248
▶ Personal Agency
▶ Personality and Subjective Well-Being
▶ Social Cooperation
References
Alesina, A., Di Tella, R., & MacCulloch, R. (2004).
Inequality and happiness: Are Europeans and Ameri-
cans different? Journal of Public Economics, 88,
2009–2042.
Blanchflower, D., & Oswald, A. J. (2004). Well-being over
time in Britain and the USA. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 88, 1359–1387.
Clark, A., & Oswald, A. J. (1994). Unhappiness and unem-
ployment. Economic Journal, 104, 648–659.
Deaton, A., & Stone, A. A. (2013). Two happiness puzzles.
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
103(3), 591–597.
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R., & Oswald, A. J. (2001).
Preferences over inflation and unemployment: Evi-
dence from surveys on happiness. American Economic
Review, 91, 335–341.
Easterlin, R. A. (1974). Does economic growth improve
the huma lot? Some empirical evidence. In P. A. David
& M. W. Reder (Eds.), Nations and households in
economic growth: Essays in honor of Moses
Abramovitz (pp. 89–125). New York: Academic.
Easterlin, R. A., Angelescu McVey, L., Malgorzata, S.,
Sawangfa, O., & Smith Zweig, J. (2010). The
happiness-income paradox revisited. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 22463–22468.
Gardner, J., & Oswald, A. (2001) Does Money buy happi-
ness? Some evidence from windfalls. (unpublished
paper). University of Warwick.
Graham, C. (2011). The pursuit of happiness: An econ-
omy of well-being. Washington: Brookings Institution
Press.
Graham, C., & Sukhtankar, S. (2004). Does economic
crisis reduce support for markets and democracy in
Latin America? Journal of Latin American Studies,
36, 349–377.
Graham, C., Eggers, A., & Sukhtankar, S. (2004). Does
happiness pay? An initial exploration based on panel
data from Russia. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organizations, 55, 319–342.
Gruber, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2002). Do cigarette taxes
make smokers happier? (NBER Working Paper
No. 8872). Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Hansen, T. (2012). Parenthood and happiness: A review of
folk theories versus empirical evidence. Social Indica-
tors Research, 108(1), 29–64.
Kahneman, D., & Deaton, A. (2010). High income
improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-
being. Proceedings of the National Academies of Sci-
ence, 107(38), 16489–16493.
Samuelson, P. A. (1938). A note on the pure theory of
consumer’s behavior. Economica, 5(17), 61–71.
Ecstasy
Samuelson, P. A. (1948). Consumption theory in terms of
revealed preference. Economica, 15(60), 243–253.
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2008). Economic growth and
subjective well-being: Reassessing the Easterlin Para-
dox (NBER Working Paper No 14282). Cambridge,
MA: NBER.
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2009). The paradox of declin-
ing female happiness. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 1(2), 190–225.
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2013). Subjective well-being
and income: Is there any evidence of satiation? Amer-
ican Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
103(3), 581–604.
Stiglitz, J.E., Sen A., & Fitoussi J.P. (2009). Report
of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic
Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP) Avail-
able at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/docu
ments.htm
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving
decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Ecstasy
▶ Pleasure
Edelstein, Robin S.
Robin S. Edelstein
Department of Psychology, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Early Life and Educational Background
Robin Edelstein was born on January 13, 1975, in
Los Angeles, California.
She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Psychology from the University of California,
Berkeley, in 1997, and her Ph.D. in Social/Per-
sonality Psychology from the University of Cali-
fornia, Davis, in 2005. Her Ph.D. was completed
under the supervision of Phillip Shaver and Gail
Goodman, and her dissertation focused on the
implications of individual differences in adult
attachment for attention to and memory for emo-
tional experiences and information. In particular,
Edelstein, Robin S.
she was interested in why individuals with an
avoidant attachment style (i.e., those who are
uncomfortable with closeness) have difficulty
remembering potentially threatening information
and the mechanisms that might contribute to these
difficulties. After completing her Ph.D., Edelstein
spent 2 years as a postdoctoral fellow in the
Department of Psychology and Social Behavior
at the University of California, Irvine, where she
worked with Linda Levine, Jodi Quas, and Ilona
Yim. Her postdoctoral work extended her research
on individual difference in emotional memory by
investigating the physiological implications and
correlates of these differences.
Professional Career
After completing her postdoctoral work,
Edelstein moved to the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor in 2007, where she began as an Assis-
tant Professor of Psychology, in the Personality
and Social Contexts area. She was promoted to
Associate Professor of Psychology with tenure in
2013 and appointed as head of the Personality
and Social Contexts area in 2018. She serves on
the editorial boards of several journals, including
the Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, Social Psychological and Personality
Science, and Emotion, and has been serving as
an Associate Editor at Journal of Personality
since 2015.
Edelstein has authored or coauthored over
60 peer-reviewed articles and book chapters,
including in journals such as the Journal of Per-
sonality, the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Social Psychological and Personal-
ity Science Hormones and Behavior, Emotion, and
Psychological Science. She has also supervised
numerous undergraduate and graduate students,
many of whom have been very successful in
obtaining prestigious fellowships, such as from
the National Science Foundation, the Canadian
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Coun-
cil, and the Fulbright program, as well as positions
in highly ranked academic programs, such as
Michigan State University and the Pennsylvania
State University.
1249
Research Interests
Edelstein’s work is motivated by a desire to
understand how important emotional and inter-
personal processes, which are typically assumed
to apply to all people, may instead differ across
people in meaningful ways. She is particularly
interested in individual differences in people’s
approaches to and experiences in close relation-
ships; how these differences develop and change
E
over time and across the lifespan; and the impli-
cations of these differences for interpersonal,
dyadic, and physiological outcomes. She
approaches these issues from an integrative,
multidisciplinary perspective, incorporating
measures of basic cognitive processes (e.g.,
attention and memory), biological markers
(e.g., hormones), and dyadic and longitudinal
data analytic techniques to address meaningful
questions about human behavior. Edelstein’s cur-
rent projects focus on links between hormones
and romantic relationship processes; the inter-
personal, physiological, and health implications
of personality traits such as attachment avoid-
ance and narcissism; and lifespan changes in
these traits.
Selected Bibliography
Chopik, W. J., Edelstein, R. S., & Grimm, K. J. (in press).
Longitudinal changes in attachment orientation over a
59-year period. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology.
Edelstein, R. S. (2006). Attachment and emotional mem-
ory: Investigating the source and extent of avoidant
memory deficits. Emotion, 6, 340–345.
Edelstein, R. S., & Chin, K. (in press). Hormones and
close relationship processes: Neuroendocrine bases
of partnering and parenting. In O. C. Schultheiss &
P. H. Mehta (Eds.), Routledge international
handbook of social neuroendocrinology. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Edelstein, R. S., & Gillath, O. (2008). Avoiding interfer-
ence: Adult attachment and emotional processing
biases. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
34, 171–181.
Edelstein, R. S., Alexander, K. W., Shaver, P. R.,
Schaaf, J. M., Quas, J. A., Lovas, G. S., &
Goodman, G. S. (2004). Adult attachment style and
parental responsiveness during a stressful event.
Attachment and Human Development, 6, 31–52.
1250
Edelstein, R. S., Ghetti, S., Quas, J. A., Goodman, G. S.,
Alexander, K. W., Redlich, A. D., & Cordon, I. M.
(2005). Individual differences in emotional memory:
Adult attachment and long-term memory for child sex-
ual abuse. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
31, 1537–1548.
Edelstein, R. S., Yim, I. S., & Quas, J. A. (2010). Narcis-
sism predicts cortisol reactivity to a psychosocial
stressor in men. Journal of Research in Personality,
44, 565–572.
Edelstein, R. S., Chopik, W. J., & Kean, E. L.
(2011). Sociosexuality moderates the association
between relationship status and testosterone in
men and women. Hormones and Behavior, 60,
248–255.
Edelstein, R. S., Kean, E. L., & Chopik, W. J.
(2012a). Women with an avoidant attachment
style show attenuated estradiol responses to emotion-
ally intimate stimuli. Hormones and Behavior, 61,
167–175.
Edelstein, R. S., Newton, N. J., & Stewart, A. J. (2012b).
Narcissism in midlife: The developmental course and
correlates of women’s narcissistic personality traits.
Journal of Personality, 80, 1179–1204.
Edelstein, R. S., van Anders, S. M., Chopik, W. J.,
Goldey, K. L., & Wardecker, B. M. (2014). Dyadic
associations between testosterone and relationship
quality in couples. Hormones and Behavior, 65,
401–407.
Edelstein, R. S., Chopik, W. J., Saxbe, D. E., Wardecker,
B. M., Moors, A. C., & LaBelle, O. P. (2017). Prospec-
tive and dyadic associations between expectant par-
ents’ prenatal hormone changes and postpartum
parenting outcomes. Developmental Psychobiology,
59, 77–90.
Levine, L. J., & Edelstein, R. S. (2009). Emotion and
memory narrowing: A review and goal-relevance
approach. Cognition & Emotion, 23, 833–875.
Saxbe, D. E., Edelstein, R. S., Lyden, H.,
Wardecker, B. M., Chopik, W. J., & Moors, A. C.
(2017). Fathers’ decline in testosterone and hormonal
synchrony with partner testosterone during pregnancy
predicts greater postpartum relationship investment.
Hormones and Behavior, 90, 39–47.
Wardecker, B. M., Smith, L. K., Edelstein, R. S., &
Loving, T. J. (2015). Intimate relationships then and
now: How old hormonal processes are influenced by
our modern psychology. Adaptive Human Behavior
and Physiology, 1, 150–176.
Educational and Occupational
Attainment
▶ Life Outcome Assessment of Personality and
Individual Differences
Educational and Occupational Attainment
Educational Guidance and
Placement
▶ Vocational Selection
Effectiveness
▶ Need for Competence, The
Ego
Eva Patrick and Elizabeth Diamond
Wright Institute, Los Angeles, CA, USA
The ego is one of the three components of the
psyche, according to Freud’s structural model of
1923. In 1923, Freud moved his map of the mind
from a topographical model, which divides the
psyche into the conscious, preconscious, and
the unconscious, to a structural model. This mod-
ification emerged out of Freud’s clinical experi-
ence with patients and his growing realization
that the former model was insufficient to
capture the central element of the analytic treat-
ment: the internal conflict between different parts
of the mind (Mitchell and Black 1995). Freud
therefore suggested that the conflict primarily
occurs in different structures within the uncon-
scious rather than between the strata of conscious-
ness (Mitchell and Black 1995). The structural
model is focused on the division of the uncon-
scious into three primary components of the psy-
che: the id, (see: ▶ “Id”) the ego, and the superego
(see: ▶ “Superego”).
The ego is an organizing part of the personality
and includes defensive, perceptual, intellectual,
cognitive, and executive functions. The primary
task of the ego is to balance an individual’s prim-
itive drives with the demands of reality and soci-
ety. Originally, Freud used the word ego to mean a
sense of self, but later amended it to represent
Ego
a collection of psychic functions including
judgment, tolerance, reality testing, control, orga-
nization, information synthesis, and memory
(Snowden 2006).
The ego is comprised of regulatory struc-
tures aimed at containing and attenuating the
id impulses (Mitchell and Black 1995). Because
the id is driven by the pleasure principle and is
not subject to the impact of the external world,
the ego aims to modulate the pressures of the id
with the reality principle. The driving force of
the id, the pleasure principle, represents the
instinct to satisfy biological and psychological
urges and is motivated by both the pursuit of
pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Freud
1922). The reality principle is the ego’s medi-
ating system that allows the individual to oper-
ate effectively in his external reality, frequently
by employing delayed gratification (Schacter
et al. 2011).
The ego is constituted as it navigates the mod-
eration between the demands of the superego,
which represents the constraints of society, and
the demands of the id, which comprises the
impulses and desires that press for immediate
gratification (Freud 1961/1923). The ego is
influenced by – and is in service to – the demands
of the external world and reality, the drives of the
id, and the austerity of the superego. Due to these
opposing and compelling forces, conflict often
arises in the psyche. Ego strength refers to the
ego’s ability to function in the face of these duel-
ing forces. Appropriate ego strength indicates an
ability to effectively manage these pressures,
while excessive or insufficient ego strength may
result in behavior that is too unyielding or too
disruptive for optimal functioning (Barnett
2012). According to Freud, balance between the
id, the ego, and the superego manifests a healthy
personality. Due to the powerful pressure of these
three entities and the attempts to maintain equilib-
rium between them, the ego is subject to signifi-
cant anxiety. The ego experiences angst when the
pressures from either the external world or the
internal libido (see: libido) are threatening or
potentially overwhelming (Freud 1961/1923).
When the superego induces guilt, anxiety, or infe-
riority in the ego or when the ego is overwhelmed
1251
with the impulses of the id, the ego employs
various defense mechanisms to protect the self
from painful or intolerable emotions. Defenses
employed by the ego when reality’s demands
and the id’s demands collide and conflict include,
but are not limited to, denial, displacement, intel-
lectualization, regression, repression, and subli-
mation (Freud 2013/1894; Erdelyi 2006). These
defense mechanisms generally do not typically
operate consciously or recognizably; they may
E
function in ways that are often indirect, obscured,
or indiscernible.
The ego, which receives regimented messages
from the superego regarding what is acceptable
and what is not, hides from the self and from
others the purely bestial drives (the id) in order
for the self to maintain safety, security, and soci-
etal acceptance. As a result, the mind, as it holds
disavowed aspects of experience, becomes dis-
connected from parts of itself. Therefore, when
there is pressure from these disowned impulses, or
when the defenses fail, they may break through
and result in the presentation of symptoms
(Mitchell and Black 1995).
Cross-References
▶ Ego Psychology
▶ Proprium
▶ Self
▶ Secondary Process
References
Barnett, B. (2012). Psychoanalytic learning, training,
teaching, and supervision in relation to the ego and
especially the superego. In P. Williams, J. Keene, &
S. Dermen (Eds.), Independent psychoanalysis today
(pp. 163–179). London: Karnac books.
Erdelyi, M. H. (2006). The unified theory of repression.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29, 499–551.
Freud, S. (1922). Beyond the pleasure principle.
(C. J. M. Hubback, Trans.). London: The International
Psycho-Analytical Press.
Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey
(Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud
(Vol. 19, pp. 3–66). London: Hogarth Press. (Original
work published 1923).
1252
Freud, S. (2013). The neuro-psychoses of defence.
Worcestershire: Read Books Ltd. (Original work
published 1894).
Mitchell, S. A., & Black, M. J. (1995). Freud and beyond:
A history of modern psychoanalytic thought.
New York: Basic Books.
Schacter, D. L., Gilbert, D. T., & Wegner, D. M. (2011).
Psychology. New York: Worth Publishers.
Snowden, R. (2006). Freud. Chicago: Contemporary.
Ego Depletion
Nicholas E. Sosa1 and Jennifer L. Howell2
1
Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA
2
University of California, Merced, Merced,
CA, USA
Synonyms
Depletion; Self-control; Self-regulation
Ego Depletion: Definition, Theoretical
Models, and the Role of Individual
Differences
Forty-one percent of Americans make New Year’s
resolutions each year; however, only about 9%
report that they were successful in achieving
their resolution by the end of the year (New
Year’s Resolution Statistics 2017). Why do 81%
of people fail to keep their New Year’s resolu-
tions? For many, the cause is a failure of self-
regulation – the ability to engage self-control to
resist immediate temptation in pursuit of long-
term ambitions and interests (Baumeister and
Vohs 2007). Self-regulation is a key component
to success in multiple contexts including school,
workplaces, relationships, physical health, and
mental well-being. Nevertheless, people often
fail to exert self-control. The present entry dis-
cusses one theoretical account self-regulation fail-
ures: the ego-depletion model of self-control.
Research suggests that self-regulation
becomes less effective after continuous use – a
process called ego depletion (Baumeister and
Vohs 2007). Since the early 2000s, researchers
Ego Depletion
have investigated ego-depletion effects in a vari-
ety of different contexts and types of people (see
Hagger et al. 2010; Inzlicht and Schmeichel 2012,
for reviews). The present entry aims to summarize
the area of ego depletion by first examining two
models of ego depletion – the resource model and
the process model – and then discussing the role
of individual differences in the ego-depletion
process.
The Resource Model of Ego Depletion
The first and perhaps most prominent account of
ego depletion is the resource model of self-
control. The resource model suggests that self-
control relies on a limited resource that becomes
depleted as self-control is exerted (see Baumeister
and Vohs 2007; Hagger et al. 2010 for a review).
In other words, self-control functions similarly to
a muscle: becoming fatigued and unusable with
continued exertion. Most of the work on the
resource model of self-control comes from exper-
imental social psychology. In a typical experi-
ment, researchers ask participants to work on
two consecutive tasks. For half of participants –
those in ego-depletion condition – the two con-
secutive tasks require self-control (e.g., resisting
tempting foods, suppressing emotions, complet-
ing effortful cognitive tasks, squeezing a hand-
grip). For the other half of participants – those in
the control condition – only the second task
requires self-control. Researchers assume ego
depletion when participants in the ego-depletion
condition perform worse on the second task rela-
tive to participants in the control condition.
Resource model theorists argue that engaging in
the initial self-regulation task depletes people’s
self-regulation stores and thus impairs perfor-
mance on the second task.
Additional support for the resource model
comes from evidence that people can employ a
number of strategies to attenuate the influence of
ego depletion (see Hagger et al. 2010 for a
review). First, just as exercising a muscle
improves its strength, people who practice self-
control are less susceptible to ego-depletion
manipulations. For example, participants in one
Ego Depletion
study either practiced or did not practice self-
control exercises (i.e., monitoring posture, regu-
lating mood, monitoring eating) for 2 weeks. Sub-
sequently, when they completed a classic ego-
depletion study in the lab, those who had practiced
self-control over the prior 2 weeks showed less
susceptibility to ego depletion – persisting longer
on a handgrip task – than did those who had not
practiced self-control. Additionally, just as dis-
tance runners preserve their energy to clock their
fastest times at the end of a race, people who
anticipate engaging in future self-control strategi-
cally conserve their self-regulatory resources to
best prepare for the future demands. Finally, just
as resting a muscle can restore its strength, people
who rest after self-regulating perform better on
consecutive self-control task.
The Process Model of Ego Depletion
Despite hundreds of studies providing evidence
for resource model of self-control, some
researchers have recently questioned the validity
of the model including a recent failure to replicate
the ego-depletion effects in large-scale registered
replication (Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2016).
Emerging from these criticisms is the more recent
process model of ego depletion, which suggests
that self-regulation failures result in shifts in moti-
vation and attention rather than depletion of lim-
ited stores of self-control ability (Inzlicht and
Schmeichel 2012). The process model of ego
depletion argues that after engaging in self-
control, people’s motivation and attention to sub-
sequent self-control efforts decrease, while their
motivation and attention to impulses and tempta-
tions increase. Thus, the process model does not
view ego depletion as a result of lost resources but
instead as a result of low motivation for and atten-
tion to self-regulatory goals.
Support for the process model comes from two
primary sources. Supporting a motivational compo-
nent of self-control is evidence that external incen-
tives for self-regulation (e.g., money) can eliminate
ego-depletion effects altogether (Muraven and
Slessareva 2003), Supporting an attentional com-
ponent of self-control is neural evidence that
1253
self-regulatory tasks reduce activation of the ante-
rior cingulate cortex – the neural system responsible
for attending to goal progress (Inzlicht and Gutsell
2007). The resource model struggles to account for
these findings, suggesting that the process model
might provide a better, though less pithy, account of
ego-depletion findings.
Individual Difference Moderators E
Important to understanding the nature of ego
depletion are the individual differences that con-
tribute to and moderate experimental ego-
depletion effects (see Hagger et al. 2010; Inzlicht
and Schmeichel 2012, for reviews). Research sug-
gests a variety of individual differences important
to ego depletion, which fall into two broad cate-
gories: (1) self-control tendencies and (2) self-
control mind-sets.
Self-control tendencies. People high in trait
self-control abilities – those who regularly excel
at self-regulation – appear to be less susceptible to
ego depletion. For instance, in one study, people
high in self-control motivation gambled less often
than did those with low self-control motivation
after depletion (Schmeichel et al. 2010). Similarly,
traits that indicate that people regularly engage in
self-control also relate to people’s apparent immu-
nity to ego depletion. For instance, those who are
high in self-monitoring – attending to and regu-
lating one’s behavior to match the social
situation – are less susceptible to ego depletion.
Additionally, people high in trait consideration of
future consequences – those who attend to and
peruse long-term goals – are less susceptible to
ego depletion. Finally, people high in fluid
intelligence – an ability related to executive func-
tioning and self-regulation – are also less suscep-
tible to depletion (Shamosh and Gray 2007).
Self-control mind-sets. Individual differences
in beliefs about willpower also moderate ego
depletion. Compared to people who believe will-
power is a finite resource, those who believe that
willpower is an unlimited resource perform better
on a self-regulatory task (i.e., a Stroop task) after
being depleted. Relatedly, research suggests that
believing a task depletes self-regulatory stores is
1254
more important than actually completing a deplet-
ing task in creating ego-depletion effects
(Clarkson et al. 2010).
Conclusion
Engaging in sustained self-control remains one of
people’s most difficult challenges. The onset of
this chapter referenced the low success rate for
sticking by New Year’s resolutions. Although
people become disheartened at their resolution
failures, research on ego depletion suggests that
it is often difficult for people to maintain self-
control over a short experimental session,
let alone an entire year. To date, the resource and
process models of ego depletion remain compel-
ling explanations for failures of self-control. Most
relevant to this handbook, some types of people
(e.g., those whose traits cause them to engage in
regular self-control) are more inclined to sustain
self-control despite depletion. Nevertheless, the
majority of research on and theorizing surround-
ing ego depletion has focused on situations that
induce ego depletion. Needed is a more robust
body of work pinpointing the importance of indi-
vidual differences in ego depletion.
References
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2007). Self-regulation,
ego depletion, and motivation. Social and Personality
Psychology Compass, 1, 115–128.
Clarkson, J. J., Hirt, E. R., Jia, L., & Alexander, M. B.
(2010). When perception is more than reality: The
effects of perceived versus actual resource depletion
on self-regulatory behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 98, 29–46.
Hagger, M. S., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2016). A multilab
preregistered replication of the ego-depletion effect.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 546–573.
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. D.
(2010). Ego depletion and the strength model of self-
control: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136,
495–525.
Inzlicht, M., & Gutsell, J. N. (2007). Running on empty:
Neural signals for self-control failure. Psychological
Science, 18, 933–937.
Inzlicht, M., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2012). What is ego
depletion? Toward a mechanistic revision of the
resource model of self-control. Perspectives on Psy-
chological Science, 7, 450–463.
Ego Functioning
Muraven, M., & Slessareva, E. (2003). Mechanism of self-
control failure: Motivation and limited resources. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 894–906.
New Year’s Resolution Statistics. (2017). Statistic Brain
Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.
statisticbrain.com/new-years-resolution-statistics/.
Schmeichel, B. J., Harmon-Jones, C., & Harmon-Jones, E.
(2010). Exercising self-control increases approach
motivation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 99, 162–173.
Shamosh, N. A., & Gray, J. R. (2007). The relation
between fluid intelligence and self-regulatory
depletion. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 1833–1843.
Ego Functioning
▶ Ego Psychology
Ego Identity Versus Role
Confusion
Rebecca Kitchens1 and Steven Abell2
1
University of Detroit Mercy, Detroit, MI, USA
2
Department of Clinical Psychology, University
of Detroit Mercy, Detroit, MI, USA
Synonyms
Eriksonian identity theory; Identity versus role
confusion; Psychosocial development in adoles-
cence; Psychosocial identity development
Definition
The following entry describes the psychosocial
stage of ego identity and crisis of role confusion
during adolescence, proposed by Erik Erikson.
Introduction
As with many transformative thinkers, the foun-
tain of new ideas produced by Erik Erikson was
the direct result of his unique life experiences.
Nowhere is this more salient than in his fifth
Ego Identity Versus Role Confusion
stage of psychosocial development, identity ver-
sus role confusion. Unbeknownst to Erikson, he
was born to a Jewish mother and a Danish father.
The father he knew was a Jewish man, a
Dr. Homburger, who had married his mother and
adopted Erikson as a toddler. As a child, Erikson
was then teased by his Jewish classmates for his
Nordic appearance yet taunted by his gentile
classmates for being Jewish. Decades before he
coined the term identity crisis, he experienced one
of his own that was so profound that he renamed
himself. He was no longer Erik Homburger but
Erik Erikson – not the son of his Nordic biological
father nor his Jewish adoptive father but the son of
himself (Friedman 2000). The main text of the
current entry describes the development and
nature of Erikson’s psychosocial stage of ego
identity versus role confusion as well as current
uses of his theory.
Identity
After years of drifting through Europe as a painter,
Erik Erikson began work as a portrait artist and
teacher in Anna Freud’s psychoanalytic pre-
school. Here he began to observe children learn-
ing, creating, and interacting with the world
around them. His years of wandering and
watching gave him a unique perspective on devel-
opment that would reimagine and expand
Sigmund Freud’s psychosexual theory. Erikson
observed that throughout the lifespan we attain
certain ego qualities during specific stages of
development. Although presented in a linear man-
ner, the crisis and potential virtue that define each
stage can be revisited again later in life by an
individual depending on development and cir-
cumstance (Erikson 1950).
While the crisis of identity versus role confu-
sion arises in adolescence, it occurs at a powerful
nexus between the outcome of one’s development
throughout childhood and what one has the poten-
tial to become in adulthood (Erikson 1959).
Through infancy and childhood, an individual
develops skills and tools to explore and interact
with his or her environment, and identity begins to
form in association with these facets of an
1255
individual’s true self. As one learns to walk, a
child comes to view themselves as “one who can
walk” (Erikson 1950, p. 235). Once puberty
begins, the physiological revolution prompts
new relationships with the aforementioned skills
and tools they gained with the industry and initia-
tive they felt.
The sameness and continuity that occur in child-
hood identifications with others are no longer sat-
isfactory and produce an identity crisis, often
E
requiring individuals to refight many of the earlier
battles they thought they had mastered. Adoles-
cence is when individuals begin questioning who
they are and perhaps, more importantly, how they
are viewed by the social and cultural milieu around
them. According to Erikson (1950), identity is not
just about true self but it is about the self in context.
We have a need to be seen by others as we see
ourselves, as well as a need to know that our skills
relate to aspirations and goals that our society sees
as valid and worthwhile. Ideally, an adolescent is
able to develop a stable ego identity that is authen-
tic to who they have been and which can realisti-
cally be actualized and mirrored in their society.
Although the options for each one of us can seem
endless, the virtue of this stage is fidelity or the
ability to commit oneself to ideas or others. When
one is fully matured, Erikson (1962, p. 23) defines
fidelity as “strength of disciplined devotion.”
Essentially, this means one does not feel diffuse
or confused but is able to devote themselves to
long-term career goals and commit to a significant
other in a monogamous relationship.
Role Confusion
Realistically, the formation of identity is not an
insignificant task for any adolescent. Erikson
described the adolescent mind as in moratorium,
or at a standstill, and the risk of this stage is role
confusion. While confusion about sexual, reli-
gious, ethnic, and gender identity is all possible,
occupational role confusion is particularly prom-
inent in adolescence, especially in capitalist soci-
eties that stress individualist notions of self-
definition (Erikson 1956). The question, “what
am I going to do with my life?” can nag at those
1256
who are experiencing role confusion. During this
stage, an individual may feel lost and suffer
deeply. In order to alleviate their angst and feeling
of confusion, they may make hasty, impulsive
decisions which prematurely attempt to resolve
and dissolve the identity crisis. In reaction to this
confusion, individuals often compensate by over-
identifying with a love interest, a clique, or a
subculture. This can be resolved in healthy
ways, such as in love when one can project a
vague identity on a partner and clarify the image
once it is reflected back to them. On the other
hand, adolescents who experience role confusion
may be more likely to overidentify with subcul-
tures like drug culture or gangs (Erikson 1956).
Identity Status Theory
Since Erikson (1950) first published his eight
stages of psychosocial development in Childhood
and Society, generations of researchers and
scholars have continued to investigate the forma-
tion of identity. The most well-known of these
researchers is probably James Marcia, a Canadian
developmental psychologist who clarified
Erikson’s ideas about identity and role confusion.
Marcia (1966) posited that identity requires two
things – (1) a crisis where an individual actively
explores his or her occupational, ideological, or
sexual options and (2) commitment to or personal
investment in goals, occupations, or beliefs.
Based on these requirements, Marcia developed
four different identity statuses or individual styles
of coping with the monumental task of identity
development. Ideally, an adolescent is fully able
to explore alternative options but is also eventu-
ally able to commit to a goal, ideology, or occu-
pation. This is identity achievement. In contrast, if
someone is experiencing identity diffusion, one
has not actively begun to explore his or her
options and is also unable to commit to any one
path. This person may be genuinely apathetic or
could be overwhelmed by the diversity of choices
presented to them. While these two statuses are
opposites of each other, an adolescent can have
exploration without commitment or vice versa.
Those in identity moratorium experience many
of the problems that one might describe as
Ego Identity Versus Role Confusion
“typically adolescent” as they are working toward
answering what may feel like unanswerable ques-
tions. These individuals are in crisis, actively in
the process of exploring their options, but they are
unable to commit to anything. In identity foreclo-
sure, a youth does not or is not exploring oppor-
tunities but has prematurely committed to ideals
or beliefs. This status is typically expressed in
those who are content, at least presently, being
who others expect them to be instead of develop-
ing an authentic identity.
Ego Identity Today
Although both Erikson (1950) and Marcia (1966)
agree that adolescents are often preoccupied with
discovering and committing to an identity, psy-
chologists who follow a narrative approach con-
sider identity as the work of the lifespan and not
just a crisis to be resolved before adulthood.
While Marcia’s identity status theory is easy to
research and compartmentalize, the narrative
approach suggests that identity is much more per-
sonal and idiosyncratic. Theorists see the devel-
opment of identity as parallel to the development
of autobiographical reasoning which originates in
the conversations and shared meaning-making
between parent and child. By developing autobio-
graphical reasoning, one can form meaningful
connections between past events and the current
self through narration. This allows for a personal
narrative to emerge. Narrative identity is an “inter-
nalized and evolving life story” that allows for
sameness and continuity of past and present self,
not by committing to a life purpose but by linking
our experiences and events together into a cohe-
sive personal history (McAdams 2001, p. 117).
Life stories are not just authored by the individual
but also the larger cultural context of which a
person is a part (McAdams 2001).
As the title of Erikson’s seminal work, Child-
hood and Society, suggests, children develop in
the context of their social world (1950). Com-
pared to the time of Erikson, the realities of mod-
ern western society such as the common
experience of university education have required
a more flexible approach to the ending of adoles-
cence and the beginning of adulthood. The lack of
Ego Integrity Versus Despair
definite roles for a long period during the teens
and twenties is a distinguishing feature of the
contemporary American transition to adulthood.
As a result, social scientists have developed the
idea of emerging adulthood. In this stage of the
lifespan, an individual is clearly no longer an
adolescent but has yet to achieve full adult status
(Arnett 1998). Contemporary American society is
highly individualistic, and therefore, the skills
needed to have a culturally congruent adult iden-
tity are generally based on autonomous decision
making and financial independence. Even so,
Erikson’s own personal identity crisis lasted well
into his twenties (Friedman 2000).
While status and narrative approaches to iden-
tity have built upon and clarified Erikson’s under-
standing of identity versus role confusion,
McAdams and Zapata-Gietl (2015) have pro-
posed a theory of integration that posits three
strands of identity: (1) a social actor who performs
traits and roles and establishes a reputation in
society, (2) a motivated agent who pursues ambi-
tions and engages in goal-directed behavior, and
(3) an autobiographical narrator who bridges the
gap between past and possibilities in terms of a
life story. These three aspects develop and interact
throughout the lifespan to produce a comprehen-
sive and evolving sense of identity. While based
on a full reading of Erikson’s work, this theory
attempts to appreciate the dichotomies of status
theory as well as the broad perspective of the
narrative approach to identity.
Conclusion
Erik Erikson’s impact on developmental psychol-
ogy and the study of the theory of identity has
been lasting and profound. Perhaps because he
was so intimately acquainted with role confusion
and the unrest of moratorium, he was able to
illuminate how adolescents come to terms with
and resolve identity crises. While neo-Eriksonian,
identity status, and narrative approaches all con-
tinue to contribute to the study of identity forma-
tion, the field of identity development is still
deciding on an identity in its own right
(Schwartz et al. 2015). However, given the con-
tributions of Erikson as a sound base, the field
1257
appears to be using the tools of its past and nav-
igating its own crisis in order to commit to an
integrated and culturally sensitive approach in
the future.
References
Arnett, J. J. (1998). Learning to stand alone: The contempo-
rary American transition to adulthood in cultural and
historical context. Human Development, 41(5), 295–315. E
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York:
Norton.
Erikson, E. H. (1956). The problem of ego identity. Journal
of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 4(1),
56–121. https://doi.org/10.1177/000306515600400104.
Erikson, E. H. (1959). Identity and the life cycle: Selected
papers. New York: International Universities Press.
Erikson, E. H. (1962). Youth: Fidelity and diversity. Dae-
dalus, 91(1), 5–27.
Friedman, L. J. (2000). Identity’s architect: A biography of
Erik H. Erikson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-
identity status. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 3(5), 551–558. https://doi.org/10.1037/
h0023281.
McAdams, D. P. (2001). The psychology of life stories.
Review of General Psychology, 5(2), 100.
McAdams, D. P., & Zapata-Gietl, C. (2015). Three
strands of identity development across the human life
course: Reading Erikson in full. In K. C. McLean &
M. U. Syed (Eds.), Oxford handbook of identity devel-
opment (pp. 81–94). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Schwartz, S. J., Luyckx, K., & Crocetti, E. (2015). What
have we learned since Schwartz (2001)?: A reappraisal
of the field of identity development. In K. C. McLean &
M. U. Syed (Eds.), Oxford handbook of identity devel-
opment (pp. 539–561). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Ego Integrity Versus Despair
Thiera D. Lane1 and Cheryl C. Munday2
1
University of Detroit Mercy, Detroit, MI, USA
2
Department of Psychology, University of Detroit
Mercy, Detroit, MI, USA
Synonyms
Eighth stage of psychosocial development
1258
Definition
Ego integrity versus despair is the eighth stage of
Erikson’s psychosocial stages of development
during which the aging individual strives to accept
the value of her life experience.
Introduction
Ego integrity versus despair is the eighth stage of
Erikson’s psychosocial stages of development.
Throughout the lifespan, the individual is faced
with developmental tasks characterized by oppos-
ing personality features that must be mastered
before successfully moving on to the next stage.
The stages are experienced in a social context and
represent a developmental sequence. During each
stage, the aim of each developmental task is to
develop an ego skill that will better prepare the
individual and build upon previous skills, in prep-
aration for the next psychosocial stage of
development.
In each stage, there are developmental tasks
characterized by conflicts that exist that correlate
with the success or failure in mastery within the
given stage. In each of the stages, there exists a
spectrum that represents the characteristics of
either failure or mastery. In relation to ego integ-
rity versus despair, the object is mastery gained
from learning and utilizing wisdom gathered from
previous stages. Failure to master the eighth stage
would result in a failure to acquire the ego skill of
Wisdom. Erikson (1963 and 1998) purposed that
failure in mastery during this stage would result in
the opposite of wisdom and manifest itself as
disdain.
Wisdom
Wisdom is the ego strength that results from expe-
rience and resolution of the dilemma of ego integ-
rity versus despair. Erikson acknowledged that
this stage is associated with aging and
approaching death, which does not correlate with
an individual’s chronological age. Mastery of ego
integrity is denoted by an individual’s acceptance
Ego Integrity Versus Despair
of his or her life and achievements. In moving
through the process of mastering ego integrity
versus despair, there must be the acceptance and
disdain of life experiences. Therefore, those who
attain wisdom will inevitably experience both
integrity and despair as altering states that need
to be balanced (Westerhof et al. 2015). This bal-
ance is necessary during this stage as it supports
the gaining of wisdom and acceptance needed for
mastery. The resulting balance involves acknowl-
edging despair and its role in the individual’s
experience of self. The individual’s task is ulti-
mately accepting the choices made during the past
and becoming more satisfied with one’s self,
hence shifting from despair to integrity. Individ-
uals who are satisfied with their life are not afraid
to face death. This acceptance is representative of
the mastery of developmental conflict and effec-
tive use of the skills learned in previous stages of
psychosocial development.
Despair
According to Erikson, despair results from dissat-
isfaction with one’s life as one considers aging
and approached death. The fear of death is an
unconscious phenomenon that is ultimately a
result of not being able to “start over” at this
stage in life. Individuals feel as though they have
“run out of time” and are anxious to complete the
milestones of previous stages of development.
The anxiety reflects both the fear of dying and
the fear of not achieving life’s goals. The failure to
achieve a sense of integrity is a reflection of stag-
nation or failure to fully master ego skills associ-
ated with previous psychosocial stages of
development (Erikson 1963).
The Ninth Stage
Erikson later proposed a ninth stage of develop-
ment in response to criticism of the eight stage
model. The average life span in developed coun-
tries now extends past the age of 65, resulting in
an extension of later stages of psychosocial devel-
opment. For adults approaching their late eighties
Ego Integrity Versus Despair
and nineties, Erikson and Erikson (1998) devel-
oped the ninth stage. This stage addressed the
change within the ego that occurs after trans-
itioning through ego integrity versus despair.
Older adults in their late eighties and nineties
first experience inconsistencies with his or her
fundamental beliefs in the ninth stage. This often
occurs as an effort to understand the challenges
during this phase in the life cycle. In relation to the
eighth stage of psychosocial development, integ-
rity versus despair becomes despair versus integ-
rity during the ninth stage of development.
Despair in the ninth stage is in response to current
experiences, for example, the loss of many impor-
tant capabilities. This contrasts with the experi-
ence of retrospective despair that is associated
with the eighth stage. Ninth stage losses include
the death of significant others, loss of indepen-
dence, and perceived loss of purpose due to a lack
of social involvement (Erikson and Erikson
1998). The ninth stage challenges the individual
with the previously stated losses and may poten-
tially impact self-image. Erikson and Erikson
(1998) noted that this stage is an opportunity to
experience growth from the conflicts by working
through despair.
Ego Integrity Versus Despair in Clinical
Practice
The concept of ego integrity versus despair may
be helpful in understanding the individual in a
clinical setting. In a study by Westerhof,
Bohlmeijer, and McAdams (2015), Erikson’s the-
ory of psychosocial development at the ego integ-
rity versus despair stage was explored by
assessing individual status within this psychoso-
cial stage. Integrity and despair were found to
relate to personality traits and various characteris-
tics indicative of mental health. Understanding
how the individual resolves this stage of develop-
ment was found to be more useful in a therapeutic
setting than previously thought (Westerhof
et al. 2015).
Westerhof et al. (2015) found that neuroticism
is significantly related to despair and to depres-
sive symptoms. Extraversion and higher levels of
1259
openness were found to be indirectly related to
integrity when well-being served as a mediator.
Well-being was defined as having a positive out-
look on life and possessing positive emotions. It
should be noted that the presence of well-being is
not always the absence of mental health issues
(Westerhof et al. 2015). In utilizing the psycho-
social stages of development as a framework for
clinical evaluation, the clinician is able to pro-
vide more quality interventions essential to
E
advancing and resolving the stages of develop-
ment. Marcia and Josselson (2013) proposed the
use of Erikson’s stages as a means of understand-
ing normative crisis within the context of the
individual’s unique psychosocial world. Knowl-
edge of the changes encountered during this
stage provides a platform for clinicians to under-
stand their clients as well as provides a founda-
tion for more effective interventions for clients
who are currently in the ego integrity versus
despair developmental stage (Marcia and
Josselson, 2013).
Achieving and maintaining ego integrity is the
primary goal during this stage of development as
it promotes both physical and mental well-being.
To assist in the promotion of ego integrity, remi-
niscence therapy has been deemed a beneficial
intervention to improve life quality and to con-
serve mental health. Interventions such as group
socialization and group activities serve as a means
of reminiscence therapy and support the idea of
ego promotion (Jo and Song 2015). The presence
of family members also serves as an intervention
strategy that promotes ego integrity. The ability to
reconnect through socialization and activities
when one may be stagnant provides an opportu-
nity to resolve some of the tasks that were not
completed in previous stages and assists in pro-
viding balance between the integrity versus
despair dichotomy.
Conclusion
Integrity versus despair is Erikson’s eighth stage
of development and offers the individual an
opportunity to acquire the ego skill of wisdom.
During the eighth stage, many of the stages (trust
1260
vs. mistrust, autonomy vs. shame, etc.) are expe-
rienced again; however, this time, the individual
has the opportunity to fine-tune his or her skills in
an effort to improve personal experience and to
move towards ego integrity. In response to
increases in average life span in developed coun-
tries, Erikson developed the ninth stage as a sup-
plement to the original psychosocial stages of
development. Erikson and Erikson (1998) under-
stood that psychosocial development presented
itself differently during late, older adulthood.
Studies have shown that the clinical utility of
ego integrity versus despair may contribute to a
higher quality of care for the elderly receiving
mental health treatment. The framework of ego
integrity versus despair has utility as a means of
understanding normative development as well as
psychopathology in an effort to provide better
quality of mental health services.
References
Erikson, E. H. (1963). Childhood and society. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc..
Erikson, E. H., Erikson, J., & Kivnick, H. (1989). Vital
involvement in old age. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc..
Erikson, E. H., & Erikson, J. M. (1998). The life cycle com-
pleted (extended version). New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc.
Jo, H., & Song, E. (2015). The effect of reminiscence
therapy on depression, quality of life, ego-integrity,
social behavior function, and activities of daily living
in elderly patients with mild dementia. Educational
Gerontology, 41(1), 1–13.
Marcia, J., & Josselson, R. (2013). Eriksonian personality
research and its implications for psychotherapy. Jour-
nal of Personality, 81(6), 617–629.
Westerhof, G. J., Bohlmeijer, E. T., & McAdams, D. P.
(2015). The relation of ego integrity and despair to
personality traits and mental health. The Journals of
Gerontology. Series B, Psychological Sciences and
Social Sciences, 70, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1093/
geronb/gbv062.
Ego Mechanisms of Defense
▶ Defense Mechanisms
Ego Mechanisms of Defense
Ego Psychology
Graham Danzer
California School for Professional Psychology
(CSPP), Alliant International University,
San Francisco, CA, USA
Synonyms
Defenses; Ego; Ego functioning; Ego strengths
Definition
Among the founding Freudian analytic theories,
ego psychology is the study of the ego as the
operating center of the tripartite psyche wherein
defensive, adaptive, and coping processes are
generated and called upon as resources to address
psychopathological and environmental forms of
conflict.
Introduction
Ego psychology is an under-discussed clinical
theory that will be shown to have significant
implications for clinical practice. Often over-
looked and even disregarded, ego psychology
was among the first theoretical schools to formu-
late the manner in which individual functioning
may lie in the balance between psychopathology
and adaptive resources within a larger social envi-
ronment. Such perspectives on human develop-
ment are regaining foothold in contemporary
discussions of cultural theory and competency as
well as the extent to which defensive and adaptive
functioning are affected by broader systemic
forces such as poverty, racism, resource depriva-
tion, and changing political climates. Whereas
ego psychology was initially intended to explain
intrapsychic functioning in the more immediate
environment, it will also be shown to apply to an
understanding of attachment, strengths and assets,
and trauma phenomena that are roundly promoted
as informative to contemporary intervention
Ego Psychology
planning. Moreover, contemporary analytic
movement away from a stricter focus on the
unconscious to increasing levels of attention to
affect, attunement, and the here-and-now should
be understood as commensurate with the thinking
behind the early development of the Freudian
schools as follows (Busch 2013).
The Freudian School
Ego psychology was founded upon Sigmund
Freud’s (1975) theory that human development
is rooted in conflict within the tripartite psyche.
Within the psyche are the id, ego, and superego.
The id is where instinctual drives for sex and
aggression originate. The drives are necessarily
repressed by the superego as the basis for human
morality. The superego has been theorized to more
fully develop in adolescence and necessarily
inhibits the inappropriate expression and dis-
charge of socially inappropriate impulses. Con-
flict between the drives and superego is negotiated
through compromises in the forms of unconscious
defenses (Freud 1966). The function of defenses
is to allow the drives to be discharged in ways that
are relatively appropriate and on some level
acceptable to the individual.
Freud’s initial identification of the ego was
later elaborated upon by developmental ego psy-
chologists, including his daughter Anna Freud
(1966), Heinz Hartmann (1958), and Erik Erikson
(1963, 1964). They were largely in agreement
about the ego being a defensive structure, though
S. Freud viewed the ego’s primary purpose as
repressing reality, while the developmental ego
psychologists theorized about its more positive
potential to facilitate adaptive behavior (Mitchell
and Black 1996). They were also among the first
to psychologically theorize about how individual
circumstances may be at least partially if not
largely explainable through forces outside of
human psychopathology, including parent-child
relationships and more broadly applicable courses
of normal-abnormal human development.
Freudian defenses have been conceptualized as
relatively mature or immature depending on the
extent to which utilization tends to predict
1261
positive psychosocial adjustment, adaptation,
and more effective negotiation of internal and
external forms of tension and conflict. The origi-
nal Freudian defenses, stated in order of maturity,
include regression, repression, reaction formation,
isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turn-
ing against the will, reversal, and sublimation
(Blanck and Blanck 1994; Freud 1966, p. 44;
Goldstein 1984).
E
Heinz Hartmann Hartmann (1958) expanded
the founding theories of the conflict-ridden ego
into a more growth-oriented theory about how
individuals adapt and progress through forms of
conflict. Hartmann was among the first to develop
and advance a theory of adaptation and human
development. He departed from the founding
Freudian school in advancing the theory that the
ego operates autonomously from birth. He agreed
that individuals are greatly affected by uncon-
scious conflict, though developed the theory that
individuals are able to adapt via conflict-free
capacities including perception, memory, psycho-
motor coordination, language, gifts, and talents
(Hartmann 1958). Hartman also advanced the the-
ory that an average expectable environment per-
mits conflict-free capacities to grow into ego
functions that operate independently from the
drives. In effect, the human ego was formulated
as more than just an arbitrator but also a center and
supplier of creativity, inspiration, and deeper
human experience, identity, and reconciliation.
Erik Erikson Like Hartmann, Erik Erikson for-
mulated theories of the ego that progressed
beyond the initial acknowledgement and explora-
tion of conflict. As another of the developmental
ego psychologists, Erikson expanded the theory
of the ego into a broader psychosocial model
covering the entirety of human life span and
remaining influential in contemporary discussions
of human development. Erikson theorized that
organic human development occurs through
eight stages of growth (Mitchell and Black 1996;
Erikson 1963, 1964). These stages included trust
v. mistrust, autonomy v. shame and doubt, initia-
tive v. guilt, industry v. inferiority, identity v. role
confusion, intimacy v. isolation, generativity
1262
v. stagnation, and ego integrity v. despair (Erikson
1963). Another of Erikson’s unique contributions
was that he expanded theories of environmental
influence on individual functioning. He identified
that individuals had a sense of origin and belong-
ing within the psyche as well as the social envi-
ronment and community (Mitchell and Black
1996). He maintained the early Freudian theory
that individuals are driven by sexual and aggres-
sive impulses, though added that the human
superego and social institutions cooperatively
attempt to regulate the drives (Mitchell and
Black 1996, p. 143).
Wilfred Bion A British psychoanalyst, Bion is
often acknowledged for his contributions to theo-
ries of group psychotherapy, though he also war-
rants mention for his theories of infantile ego
development. Bion conceptualized early infantile
development as not merely passive or instinctual
(Brown 2009). Rather, infants with the assistance
of their primary caregivers actively and con-
sciously participate in the process of growing in
their ability to attribute emotionally laden mean-
ing to their experiences and to also learn from/
adapt to their surroundings (Brown 2009). Para-
lleling Hartmann’s discussion of conflict-ridden
and conflict-free capacities of the ego, Bion
described two basic forms of human thought.
These forms included beta elements, which
pertained to information that was stored,
non-synthesized, and often projected outward, as
well as alpha elements, which are deeper capaci-
ties for narrative, metaphor, and abstract symbol-
ism (Brown 2009). Although ego psychologists
had long formulated ideas about the primary care-
giver’s role in early adaptive functioning, Bion
added that the caregiver is also the locus of infan-
tile thinking and learning (Brown 2009). This
theory can be considered an application of devel-
opmental ego psychology that in turn parallels the
contemporary attachment theory of mentalization.
Contemporary Ego Psychologists
Markstrom A contemporary researcher on ego
psychology, Markstrom advanced research
Ego Psychology
demonstrating additional applications of
Erikson’s theories. Her research demonstrated an
association between ego strength (as a core mea-
sure of adaptive functioning) and indicators of
psychosocial development, self-esteem, social
support, and resilience (Markstrom and Hunter
1999; Markstrom and Kalmanir 2001; Markstrom
et al. 1997; Markstrom and Marshall 2007). Ego
strengths identified and discussed in Markstrom’s
research and their corresponding Eriksonian psy-
chosocial stages are as follows: Hope (which
emerges in early infancy from Trust), Will
(which emerges in early childhood from Auton-
omy), Purpose (which emerges in early childhood
from Initiative), Competence (which emerges in
adolescence from Industry), Fidelity (which
emerges in young adulthood from Identity), Love
(which emerges in young adulthood from Inti-
macy), Care (which emerges during adulthood
from Generativity), and Wisdom (which emerges
in late adulthood from Integrity). Per this theory,
ego strengths generalize into a broader store and
resource of adaptive capacity and identity which
is expressed in a general sense of positivity, pur-
pose, and meaning.
Goldstein The late Eda Goldstein (1984) was a
social worker who more fully differentiated
defenses and coping skills in a manner that paral-
lels Hartmann’s theories of conflict-free capaci-
ties. Goldstein (1984) purported that defenses and
coping skills coexist and are both necessary for
survival. Goldstein (1984) identified defenses as
operating in a more rigid, unconscious, and auto-
matic manner, whereas coping skills are compar-
atively flexible and require active and conscious
decision making and choice. Defenses distort real-
ity while coping skills orient one’s experience to
reality in an adaptive manner. The premise of
Goldstein’s (1984) theories about coping skills is
that individuals should identify and apply internal
and external resources to suffering in a manner
that maintains and promotes a present and future
focus.
McEwann As a currently practicing psycholo-
gist, McEwann essentially applied developmental
ego psychology theory to an understanding of
rape trauma in the context of research studies.
Ego Psychology
The first of these studies was conducted by
McEwann et al. (2002) on 122 women in order
to determine whether women’s ego functioning
was differentially affected by stranger and
acquaintance rape at different stages of adolescent
and adult development. McEwann et al. (2002)
found that women whom reported any history of
being sexually assaulted reported significantly
poorer self-image, identity development, and
anticipation of threat/risk in intimate relationships
(as compared to women who reported no such
history). Lower ego-identity achievement and
anticipation of threat in romantic relationships
was pronounced among women who experienced
acquaintance rape during adolescence. Rape dur-
ing adulthood and stranger rape at varying ages
appeared to have less severe effects on ego func-
tioning. In a follow-up study of 113 women,
McEwann et al. (2005) confirmed prior findings
on acquaintance rape and lower ego-identity
achievement. Survivors of acquaintance rape in
the 2005 study also reported significantly stron-
ger belief systems indicative of an unhealthy
external locus of control, including a belief in
their lives being controlled by chance or oppres-
sive and powerful others. High levels of pre-
morbid ego-identity achievement mediated
negative outcomes. Findings from both studies
are consistent with developmental ego psycho-
logical theories of psychosocial growth as being
inhibited or skewed when adaptive relationship
resources and coping resources become less
accessible or insufficient to overcome external
crises.
Critiques
Critiques of Freudian ego psychology are well
summarized by Boag (2014). Consistent with
early critiques of psychoanalytic theories in gen-
eral, a major limitation of ego psychology is that
sub-concepts and operating premises are highly
abstract, deterministic, and explained via circular
relationships. It is debatable that the mind can be
separated into three distinct components with the
ego as inherently integrated, mature, and near-
invulnerable from corruption. In particular, there
may not be a universal definition of what is and
1263
should be considered adaptive or maladaptive.
Rather, what is adaptive-maladaptive may be
partially specific to the individual and partially
culturally bound. Accordingly, the ego’s motiva-
tions, assumed rationality, and autonomy may be
questioned to the extent that individuals learn
and adjust their behavior not only based on inter-
nal drives and morality but also via super-
imposed rewards and punishments. These
possibilities begin to refute the founding Freud-
E
ian theory of the tripartite psyche, though may
also indirectly suggest a level of support for
theoretical expansion from the founding Freud-
ian school and progressively greater consider-
ation of critical person-in-environment
phenomena.
Implications for Practice
To summarize, the primary focus of ego psycho-
logical treatment is of course the ego as the locus
of defenses, adaptive functioning, and coping. In a
more traditional analytic sense, the goal is to help
clients become increasingly aware of their
defenses and how their defenses are called upon
and utilized in different circumstances. This
marks the beginning of bringing the unconscious
to consciousness, which in turn helps to generate
insights. Interpretation of defenses is the primary
intervention by which clients become increas-
ingly aware of them. Clients whom become
aware of defensive resurfacing may be better
able to choose a less automatic and potentially
problematic response to various forms of conflict.
In such instances, access to coping skills and
conflict-free capacities may be increasingly
healthy, more adaptive, and perhaps an initial
step toward broader and generalized maturation
of defensive functioning.
Progressive theories of ego psychological
practice are summarized by Busch (2013). Build-
ing upon Hartmann’s theories, contemporary ego
psychologists continue to work primarily with the
ego as the intrapsychic capacity to receive, inter-
nalize, and make usage of the analyst’s interven-
tions in their daily lives. Whereas earlier ego
psychologists interpreted resistance to conscious
awareness of the defenses, contemporary ego
1264
psychologists increasingly focus on understand-
ing feelings behind resistance, respecting
defenses as related to adaptive functioning, and
listening for optimal opportunities to intervene/
interpret in a manner reminiscent with what is
contemporarily regarded as attunement and here-
and-now therapeutic work. Interpretation remains
the central intervention, though considers and
makes use of conflict-free capacities in attempt
to avoid unnecessary and unproductive client anx-
iety. Interpretation in this manner may facilitate
healthy intrapsychic functioning and reflective
thought as pathways to insight. In effect, the
results of therapeutic work may be conceptualized
as dependent on the extent to which the client’s
ego and the analyst operate in partnership. While
therapies focused on behavioral activation may
critique ego psychology and other analytically
rooted theories as passively discouraging client
doing, contemporary ego psychology conceptual-
izes analyst intervention and client receipt of
intervention, indeed, as forms of doing. Interven-
tion and receptivity to intervention help clients
tolerate distressing thoughts and emotions so
that they are increasingly capable of refraining
from instinctive and self-destructive action in
favor of heathier coping and behavioral
alternatives.
In a traditional sense, ego psychological treat-
ment is generally of a longer-term nature, though
shorter-term and contemporarily regarded
models (which consider ego functioning) have
gained foothold in modern clinical practice.
Among these models, crisis intervention posits
that individuals in overwhelmingly stressful and
potentially life-threatening circumstances may
benefit less from deeper exploration of past cir-
cumstances. Rather, the goal of treatment in
cases of crisis should be to facilitate emotional
regulation, resource acquisition, and immediate
safety planning so that basic functioning is
restored. Similarly, trauma theories of seeking
safety promote the psychoeducational teaching
and awareness generation of coping skills and
grounding techniques. It is theorized under this
model that trauma survivors may become
re-traumatized and further dysregulated by
revisiting their traumas before physical and
Ego Psychology
emotional safety has been reestablished. Thus,
the goals of coping and grounding interventions
are to lower physiological arousal and encourage
trauma survivors to transition from symptoms to
physical and emotional safety. Both the crisis
intervention and trauma models focus on adap-
tation and parallel early ego psychological theo-
ries of facilitating growth in times of crisis by
utilizing internal and external resources to help
clients work through stressful and dangerous
circumstances.
Cultural Considerations
Ego psychology may also be informative to an
understanding of clinical practice methods in
socioeconomically and culturally diverse set-
tings. Unlike many other theoretical orientations,
ego psychology conceptualizes psychopathol-
ogy and unconscious processes as well as the
potential resources of client creativity, coping,
and spirituality that are the subject of increas-
ingly more prevalent clinical discussions. It can
be considered common knowledge among prac-
titioners in under-resourced/under-managed care
settings that neither intrapsychic nor systemic
deficiencies should be ignored and that both
must be targeted for either individual or
broader-systemic intervention in the form of
advocacy. In such cases, empowering clients to
become increasingly aware of their defensive
processes, confident in their abilities to utilize
coping skills, and empowered through inner per-
sonal resources may promote psychiatric and
psychosocial stabilization. In an era of managed
care and scarce systemic resources, psychother-
apy clients and particularly those from marginal-
ized backgrounds may be increasingly expected
to address their conflicts via personal resources
when external resources are unfortunately
unavailable. Whereas resource deprivation is
often regarded with frustration, there is also a
possibility that reinforcement of client internal
locus of control, personal agency, and conscious
decision making may be a larger pathway to
addressing if not beginning to resolve intrapsy-
chic conflicts and related negative impacts on
Ego Strengths
functioning. For traumatized, distrustful, and
disenfranchised clients, this may be central to
building self-esteem in a manner that is theoret-
ically central to ego psychology.
Conclusions
In spite of undermentioning in clinical circles and
perhaps underemphasis in clinical training, ego
psychology should be understood and discussed
as a theory offering psychological deeper and
highly informative explanations of inner conflict
and adaptation at the root of evidence-based prac-
tices. Ego psychology has great potential to
inform a balance of clinical practitioner attention
to client’s internal sources of conflict and defen-
sive functioning as well as coping resources and
strengths. This form of balance is typically thera-
peutically acceptable to clients and may be addi-
tionally informative to a deeper understanding of
how best to facilitate or at least guide forms of
treatment in underprivileged communities and
trauma/crisis settings. As a result, ego psychology
should no longer be considered archaic but rather
a foundational theory to guide interventions
intending to help clients manage their symptoms
and stress via coping and other personal
resources.
Cross-References
▶ Conscious, Preconscious, and Unconscious
▶ Defense Mechanisms
▶ Functional Autonomy
▶ Neo-Freudians
▶ Psychoanalysis
▶ Psychodynamic Perspective
▶ Psychosocial Stages of Development (Erikson)
▶ Structural Model
References
Blanck, G., & Blanck, R. (1994). Ego psychology: Theory
and practice (2nd ed.). New York: The New York
Press.
1265
Boag, S. (2014). Ego, drives, and the dynamics of internal
objects. Frontiers of Psychology, 5, 1–13.
Brown, J. (2009). Bion’s ego psychology: Implications
for an intersubjective view of psychic structure. The
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 78(1), 27–55.
Busch, F. (2013). Transforming the under-represented:
The Unacknowledged influence of Ego Psychology.
The Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 21(2),
292–312.
Erikson, E. (1963). Childhood and society. New York:
Norton.
Erikson, E. (1964). Insight and responsibility. New York:
Norton. E
Freud, A. (1966). The ego and the mechanisms of defense
(revised ed.). London: The Hogarth Press.
Freud, S. (1975). The ego and the id (revised ed.).
London: The Hogarth Press & The Institute of
Psychoanalysis.
Goldstein, E. (1984). Ego Psychology and social work
practice. New York: The Free Press.
Hartmann, H. (1958). Ego Psychology and the problem of
adaptation. New York: International Universities
Press.
Markstrom, C., & Hunter, C. L. (1999). The roles of ethnic
and ideological identity in predicting fidelity in African
American and European American adolescents. Child
Study Journal, 29(1), 23–39.
Markstrom, C., & Kalmanir, H. (2001). Linkages between
the psychosocial stages of identity and intimacy and the
ego strengths of fidelity and love. Journal of Theory
and Research, 1(2), 179–196.
Markstrom, C., & Marshall, S. (2007). The psychosocial
inventory of ego strengths: Examination of theory and
psychometric properties. Journal of Adolescence,
20(1), 63–79.
Markstrom, C., Sabino, V., Turner, B., & Berman,
R. (1997). The psychosocial inventory of ego strengths:
Development and validation of a new Eriksonian
measure. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 26(6),
705–733.
McEwann, S., de Man, A., & Simpson-Housley, P. (2002).
Ego-identity achievement and perception of risk in
intimacy in survivors of stranger and acquaintance
rape. Sex Roles: A Journal of Research, 47(5, 6),
281–287.
McEwann, S., de Man, A., & Simpson-Housley, P. (2005).
Acquaintance rape, ego- identity achievement, and
locus of control. Social Behavior & Personality,
33(6), 567–592.
Mitchell, S., & Black, M. (1996). Freud and beyond: A
History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought.
New York: Basic Books.
Ego Strengths
▶ Ego Psychology
1266 Ego, Id, Super-Ego

Ego, Id, Super-Ego Electrodermal Level (EDL)

▶ Structural Model ▶ Skin Conductance Tests

Egocentric Electrodermal Response (EDR)

▶ Independence ▶ Skin Conductance Tests

Egocentricity Electroencephalography
(EEG)
▶ Neurotic Pride (Idealized Image) and Neurotic
Self-Hate Tamara Paulo Tavares
Graduate Program in Neuroscience, The Brain
and Mind Institute, University of Western
Ontario, London, ON, Canada
EIA

▶ Hormone Assays Definition

Electroencephalography is a neurophysiological
technique used to record brain activity.
Eighth Stage of Psychosocial
Development
Introduction
▶ Ego Integrity Versus Despair
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a widely recog-
nized neurophysiological technique used to
directly measure the electrical activity of the
Einfühlung brain. The history of EEG began in 1875 with
Richard Carlton who successfully recorded elec-
▶ Empathy trical activity from the cerebrum of rabbits and
monkeys. Subsequently, Hans Berger recorded
electrical activity from the human scalp in 1924
(Freeman 2013). Berger used the German word
Elation “elektrenkephalogramm” to describe the recorded
activity and suggested that the brain’s electrical
▶ Optimism activity was dependent on its functional status
(Siuly et al. 2016). Currently, EEG signals are
most commonly recorded extracranially with
electrodes placed on the scalp; however, EEG
Electrodermal Activity (EDA) signals can also be recorded directly from the
cortical surface using subdural electrodes, or sub-
▶ Skin Conductance Tests cortically with surgically implanted depth
Electroencephalography (EEG)
electrodes. This chapter will provide a brief over-
view of the mechanisms of extracranial EEG and
its utility in research and in clinical practice for
epilepsy.
The Basis of EEG: Neuronal Activity
A neuron is composed of dendrites, a cell body,
axon, and terminal buttons. The dendrites receive
electrical inputs from other cells through synapses
and propagate the signal to the cell body. The
axon propagates the electrical signal down the
length of the neuron where it reaches the terminal
buttons which connect to other cells. At rest, a
neuron has an unequal distribution of negative
and positive ions intracellularly and extracellu-
larly, resulting in a resting membrane potential
of approximately
70 mV. When an electrical
signal arrives at a neuron, ion channels open allo-
wing positively charged extracellular ions to
move into the cell. Once the membrane potential
reaches a threshold level (
50 mV), an action
potential is generated leading to further depolari-
zation (to 30 mV). Action potentials are propa-
gated down the axon reaching the terminal buttons
and causing the release of neurotransmitters into
the synapse. Neurotransmitters bind to receptors
on the connecting cell (postsynaptic membrane)
where they may cause an excitatory postsynaptic
potential (EPSP), making it more likely that the
postsynaptic cell will have an action potential, or
an inhibitory postsynaptic potential (IPSP), mak-
ing it less likely that the postsynaptic cell will
have an action potential. As action potentials are
relatively short in duration (<2 ms; Ebersole et al.
2003), EEG signals are derived from the summed
EPSPs and IPSPs. In some cases, specifically
during synchronous events such as sleep tran-
sients and seizure activity, action potentials can
contribute to the EEG signal (Olejniczak 2006).
EEG: Advantages and Disadvantages
EEG is able to detect brief electrical changes
(in the order of milliseconds), leading to its excel-
lent temporal resolution (Stern and Engel 2013).
1267
In addition, EEG recordings are noninvasive and
accessible at a relatively low cost in comparison to
other neuroimaging methods (Freeman 2013).
These advantages make it possible to conduct
research experiments or clinical work on a broader
group of individuals, who may have contraindica-
tions such as a metallic implant for magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI). However, extracranial
EEG has poor spatial resolution since the record-
ing is based on a group of neurons, and the signal
E
is attenuated due to the distance and the presence
of resistive tissue between the recording elec-
trodes and the neurons. The detection of EEG
signals requires a synchronization of approxi-
mately 108 neurons within an area of 6–10 cm2
(Olejniczak 2006; Stern and Engel 2013). There-
fore, EEG recordings reflect electrical activity of
numerous neurons over a large area. Additionally,
in clinical practice, EEG requires the categoriza-
tion of signals as abnormal or normal based on
visual interpretation (Stern and Engel 2013), lead-
ing to increased subjectivity of the recorded elec-
trical activity.
EEG Electrodes and Placement
EEG recordings are completed using high con-
ductance electrodes adhered to the scalp using
electrode recording gel in order to increase the
conductivity with the skull (Freeman 2013). The
electrodes are placed on the skull following the
standard international 10–20 electrode system,
which indicate the distance between the elec-
trodes (Siuly et al. 2016). Specifically, the elec-
trodes are placed at 10 and 20% of the distance of
the sagittal midline, defined by the nasion and
inion, and the coronal midline, defined by the
region that the ears attach to the scalp (Stern
and Engel 2013).
The designation of electrodes consists of letters
and numbers indicating the position of the elec-
trode on the scalp. Specifically, odd numbers
identify electrodes on the left hemisphere and
even numbers identify electrodes placed on the
right hemisphere (Tatum 2008). Larger numbers
reflect greater distances from the sagittal midline
(Stern and Engel 2013). Electrodes placed on
1268
the frontopolar, frontal, temporal, occipital, cen-
tral, parietal, and midline are designated FP, F,
T, O, C, P, and Z, respectively (Tatum 2008).
Additional electrodes may also be included to
increase spatial resolution; for example, temporal,
frontotemporal, or sphenoidal electrodes can be
added to increase the localization of the signal
within the temporal cortex (Tatum 2008).
EEG Recordings
EEG recordings are displayed as channels
representing the differences between two elec-
trodes. The EEG recordings can be organized
based on a variety of different montages such as
referential, bipolar, average, and laplacian. The
referential montage consists of a designated elec-
trode to which all other electrodes are compared
to; the designated electrode is often the Cz (central
midline) or mastoid electrodes (Stern and Engel
2013). The bipolar montage consists of channels
representing the difference between two adjacent
electrodes (Stern and Engel 2013). The average
reference montage uses the averaged signal as the
common reference for all channels (Siuly et al.
2016), except for the frontopolar and anterior
temporal electrodes as they are susceptible to
eye movement artifacts (Misulis and Abou-Khalil
2014). Finally, the laplacian montage uses the
weighted average of electrodes as the reference
(Siuly et al. 2016).
Patterns of EEG recordings can reflect different
behavioral states resulting in five main wave pat-
terns: alpha, beta, theta, delta, and gamma.
Alpha waves comprise electrical activity
occurring at 8–13 Hz. The frequency of the
alpha wave increases to 8 Hz by the age of
3 years, then stabilizes during adolescence
(Ebersole et al. 2003). In late adulthood, the fre-
quency of alpha waves decreases, likely related to
changes in cerebral metabolic rate (Ebersole
et al. 2003). During a relaxation state, alpha
waves occur bilaterally in the occipital lobes
(Misulis and Abou-Khalil 2014; Siuly et al.
2016). The alpha rhythm is also found anteriorly
during periods of drowsiness (Tatum 2008).
Hemispheric asymmetries in the voltage that are
Electroencephalography (EEG)
greater than 50% are often indicative of abnormal-
ities (Tatum 2008).
Beta waves comprise electrical activity often
occurring at 18–25 Hz (Ebersole et al. 2003;
Tatum 2008). Beta waves often occur during
drowsiness and sleep (Tatum 2008). Beta activity
is found in infants but not evident in young chil-
dren. In late adulthood, the amplitude of beta
waves is usually lower, especially among males
(Ebersole et al. 2003). Beta activity of 25 mV is
considered abnormal but has no clinical utility as
it is not specific to a disorder (Ebersole et al.
2003). Certain drugs such as barbiturates, chloral
hydrate, and benzodiazepines increase beta activ-
ity (Tatum 2008).
Theta waves comprise electrical activity
occurring at 4–7 Hz. During periods of concen-
tration and mental tasks, increased theta activity
is found in the frontal lobes (Tatum 2008).
Frontal theta activity is increased in children
and young adults during enhanced emotional
states; however, there is no consensus regarding
a threshold indicative of abnormal activity
(Ebersole et al. 2003).
Delta waves comprise electrical activity occur-
ring at <4 Hz (Tatum 2008). There is a gradual
increase in delta waves as the individual pro-
gresses from stage 2 to stage 4 of the sleep cycle
(Misulis and Abou-Khalil 2014).
Gamma waves: Low gamma waves comprise
electrical activity occurring at 30–60 Hz and have
been related to attention and sensory perception.
On the other hand, high gamma rhythms occur at
80–120+ Hz (Freeman 2013).
Research and Clinical Usages
EEG has a variety of clinical and research impli-
cations. Changes in EEG recordings in response
to the presence of a stimulus are known as event-
related potentials (ERPs) and can be used to
study various cognitive processes. The ERPs
can be aligned to the onset of the stimulus
(stimulus-locked waveform), or it can be aligned
to the onset of the behavioral response (response-
locked waveform; Amodio et al. 2014).
Stimulus-locked ERPs may reflect automatic
Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)
processes and perceptual and attentional func-
tions in response to the stimulus. Response-
locked ERPs may reflect the cognitive processes
associated with producing and regulating behav-
ioral responses (Amodio et al. 2014). Although
ERP signals can be aligned to behavioral
responses, it is important to note that ERPs may
be involved in a variety of cognitive processes,
and it cannot be assumed that an ERP signal is
involved in a single behavioral or cognitive con-
struct (Amodio et al. 2014).
In addition to research, EEG is used widely in
clinical settings as a diagnostic procedure for
neurological disorders such as epilepsy. Epilepsy
is associated with interictal epileptiform dis-
charges (IEDs) which are: (1) paroxysmal,
(2) include abrupt changes in polarity, (3) have
duration of less than 200 ms, and (4) recorded
from more than one electrode (Ebersole et al.
2003). EEG recordings can help identify epi-
lepsy syndromes, which assist in determining
the prognosis and treatment options (Noachtar
and Remi 2009). Specifically, IEDs can help
determine whether the epilepsy is localized or
generalized and help distinguish between idio-
pathic and symptomatic epilepsy (Ebersole et al.
2003). Additionally, IEDs may help localize the
epileptogenic zone which is important when con-
sidering surgical treatment (Tatum 2008).
Although IEDs are associated with an epilepsy
diagnosis, the absence of these EEG signals does
not preclude epilepsy diagnosis, as activity
within subcortical structures may not be evident
at the level of the scalp (Tatum 2008).
Conclusion
EEG is a neurophysiological technique used to
directly measure and assess neuronal activity
with remarkable temporal resolution. EEG signals
can be measured extracranially, directly on the
cortical surface, or subcortically. Furthermore,
the extracted signals can be used to study cogni-
tive processes during experimental paradigms,
and it can also be applied in clinical settings to
diagnose and monitor neurological disorders such
as epilepsy.
1269
Cross-References
▶ Neuroimaging
References
Amodio, D. M., Bartholow, B. D., & Ito, T. A. (2014).
Tracking the dynamics of the social brain: ERP
approaches for social cognitive and affective neurosci-
ence. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, E
9(3), 385–393. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst177.
Ebersole, J. S., Pedley, T. A., Lippincott, W., & Wilkins.
(2003). Current practice of clinical electroencephalog-
raphy (Vol. 3). Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams &
Wilkins.
Freeman, W. J. (2013). Imaging brain function with EEG.
New York: Springer.
Misulis, K. E., & Abou-Khalil, B. (2014). Atlas of EEG,
seizure semiology, and management (Vol. 2). Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Noachtar, S., & Remi, J. (2009). The role of EEG in
epilepsy: A critical review. Epilepsy & Behavior,
15(1), 22–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yebeh.2009.
02.035.
Olejniczak, P. (2006). Neurophysiologic basis of EEG.
Journal of Clinical Neurophysiology, 23(3), 186–189.
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.
wnp.0000220079.61973.6c.
Siuly, S., Li, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2016). EEG signal analysis
and classification: Techniques and applications.
Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Stern, J. M., & Engel, J. (2013). Atlas of EEG patterns
(Vol. 2). Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer/Lippincott
Williams & Wilkins.
Tatum, W. O. I. V. (2008). Handbook of EEG interpreta-
tion. New York: Demos Medical Pub.
Electronically Activated
Recorder (EAR)
Allison M. Tackman and Matthias R. Mehl
Department of Psychology, University of
Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
Personality, or an individual’s characteristic pat-
tern of thought, emotion, and behavior, is com-
plex. It is therefore not surprising that a
comprehensive assessment of a person’s person-
ality requires collecting multiple kinds of data,
such as asking the person what he or she is like,
1270
asking somebody who is well acquainted with the
person to describe what he or she is like, and
observing what the person does and says. Unfor-
tunately, this third type of data, behavior, has long
been neglected in the field of personality and
social psychology, and when it has been collected
to inform our understanding of personality, it is
usually through global retrospective self-reports
(Furr 2009). While retrospective self-reports do
relate to actual behavior, they are far from perfect
indicators of it. Experience-sampling methods,
the current gold standard for real-world assess-
ments, evade memory problems associated with
retrospective self-reports, but other measurement
issues around self-reports (e.g., self-enhancement
response bias) can still affect participants’
momentary reports of their behavior (Conner
et al. 2007). Further, several habitual behaviors
that show meaningful relations to personality,
such as people’s idiosyncratic word choices or
linguistic styles, tend to fly under the radar of
consciousness (Ireland and Mehl 2014). What
we need then, to complement existing daily life
methods, is a method for the momentary assess-
ment of daily behavior that does not rely on self-
reports. In this chapter, we highlight one such
method, the Electronically Activated Recorder or
EAR (Mehl in press). As an unobtrusive natural-
istic observational method, the EAR can measure
a range of psychological constructs that are rele-
vant to personality psychology (Mehl in press;
Wrzus and Mehl 2015).
Past and ongoing research in our lab shows that
the EAR can be used to identify behavioral man-
ifestations of personality. In a first empirical
investigation, Mehl et al. (2006) found that the
behavioral manifestations of the Big Five person-
ality domains were largely consistent with their
trait definitions. For example, less time spent
alone and more time spent talking were indicative
of extraversion, using fewer swear words was
indicative of agreeableness, and more time spent
in class was indicative of conscientiousness.
Additional EAR studies have identified behav-
ioral manifestations associated with other individ-
ual differences (see Mehl in press). For example,
people who score high on measures of well-being
Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)
are more social than solitary (i.e., they spend less
time alone and more time talking to others) and
have more deep and fewer superficial conversa-
tions (i.e., they engage in less small talk and more
substantive conversations). Also, narcissists
behave in more extraverted and less agreeable
ways and use more sexual language in their daily
lives compared to their less narcissistic peers.
Prior to discussing other ways in which the EAR
can inform or advance research on personality
psychology, we first provide a brief overview of
the EAR.
The Electronically Activated Recorder
(EAR)
What Is the EAR?
The EAR is a portable audio recorder that inter-
mittently records brief snippets of ambient sounds
(e.g., 30 s every 12.5 min). Participants wear it
while going about their daily lives, unaware of
when exactly the device is recording. Since its
initial development in 1999, the EAR has evolved
from a chip-triggered microcassette recorder to a
smartphone app. Currently, we are using a fourth-
generation “iEAR” system that runs on iOS; an
Android version will be available in 2017. The
device is minimally obtrusive to participants and
those around them, and compliance rates are gen-
erally high. Because the audio recordings are short
in duration and together make up only a small
fraction of the participant’s day (5% when record-
ing 30 s every 12 min or five times an hour), the
EAR makes large-scale naturalistic observation
studies feasible while at the same time protecting
the privacy of its participants. Further, at the com-
pletion of an EAR study, participants have the
opportunity to review their sound files and delete
any that they do not want researchers to hear (see
Mehl in press for more detailed information on
participant and bystander privacy protection).
What Information Can Be Extracted from the
EAR Recordings?
Information can be extracted from the raw ambi-
ent audio recordings at the molar (psychological
Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)
rating) or molecular level (behavior coding). At
the molar level, trained research assistants listen to
the full set or selected segments of the partici-
pants’ EAR sound files and then judge the degree
to which they indicate the presence of a psycho-
logical construct of interest. For example,
Holleran et al. (2011) had research assistants rate
the degree to which male and female STEM fac-
ulty members sounded competent during conver-
sations about research or social matters with their
colleagues. Consistent with the idea that women
in STEM fields experience social identity threat,
women experienced greater job disengagement
when discussing research with male colleagues,
and perhaps as a consequence, they appeared less
competent during those conversations. In a similar
way, the EAR sound files can serve as stimulus
material for observer ratings of personality (e.g.,
zero-acquaintance personality judgments; Mehl
et al. 2006).
At the molecular level, we tend to extract two
types of information. First, trained research assis-
tants transcribe what the participant said in each
EAR sound file. The entirety of these transcripts
or selected parts of the transcripts (e.g., transcripts
where participants were talking to their romantic
partners only) can then be submitted to qualitative
or quantitative text analysis. Second, the trained
research assistants code each sound file using the
Social Environment Coding of Sound Inventory
(SECSI; Mehl and Pennebaker 2003). The SECSI
has four broad coding categories: (1) location, or
where the participant was (e.g., at home, in transit,
etc.); (2) activities, or what the participant was
doing (e.g., watching TV, doing housework,
etc.); (3) interactions, or with whom the partici-
pant was (e.g., alone, with others, talking, etc.);
and (4) affect expressions, or what emotion the
participant displayed (e.g., laughing, crying, argu-
ing, etc.) during a given sound file. In addition to
the basic SECSI coding system, behaviors can be
added or refined to reflect the research goals of
particular EAR studies (e.g., couple, parent-child,
or peer interactions). The EAR-derived language
and behavior categories tend to demonstrate sub-
stantial between-person variability and tend to be
considerably stable over time (Mehl and
1271
Pennebaker 2003). In fact, many of the test-retest
correlations for the EAR-derived behaviors are
similar to what is typically observed for personal-
ity traits during adulthood.
How Can the EAR Advance Research on
Personality Psychology?
It Can Help Calibrate Personality Effects
E
Historically and, in fact, still up to this day, the
field of personality psychology has had to defend
itself against criticisms about the practical mean-
ing of its effect sizes. One way to more effectively
communicate effect sizes is to express study find-
ings in intuitively accessible metrics. Because
EAR data is expressed in a naturally meaningful
metric (i.e., the percentage of a person’s valid
EAR recordings or, by extension, waking hours
in which an EAR behavior was displayed), corre-
lations between individual difference measures
and EAR-observed behaviors are easier to com-
prehend. For example, Mehl et al. (2006) found
that conscientiousness correlated r = 0.42 with
EAR-derived time spent in class. Converted into a
more meaningful metric, this suggests that indi-
viduals who marked a 4 on the five-point consci-
entiousness scale, compared to those who marked
a 2, spent about three times as much time in class
(11.9 vs. 4.1%).
Another way the EAR can help calibrate per-
sonality effects is by examining whether small
effects found using personality trait question-
naires produce meaningful differences in every-
day behavior. For example, in order to interpret
the modest gender difference among US adults in
self-reported extraversion, and self-reported gre-
gariousness in particular, Mehl et al. (2007) exam-
ined whether men and women differed noticeably
in EAR-observed talkativeness. They found that
among students primarily attending colleges in
the United States, women spoke on average
16,215 words, while men spoke on average
15,669 words. This difference of 546 words did
not reach the threshold for being considered a
statistically reliable (and practically meaningful)
gender difference.
1272
It Can Be a Valuable Method for Studying
Personality Differences Across Culture
and Time
The EAR can be used to clarify paradoxical find-
ings in research on cultural differences in person-
ality. One prevalent cultural stereotype is that
Mexicans are more sociable than Americans;
however, in self-report personality questionnaires,
Mexicans consistently rate themselves less socia-
ble than Americans. Using the EAR to track
American and Mexican college students’ behav-
ior over 2 days, Ramírez-Esparza et al. (2009)
found that although Mexican students tended to
report being less sociable than American students,
they behaved more sociably in their daily lives.
More specifically, compared to their American
counterparts, Mexican students were less likely
to agree with the item, “I see myself as a person
who is talkative,” but they spent almost 10% more
time talking with others than American students
did. In other words, there may be truth to at least
some of the cultural stereotypes we hold, but
methodological issues associated with comparing
means on self-report scales (e.g., reference group
effect and cultural differences in response biases)
may prevent us from detecting cultural
differences.
With regard to personality development, the
EAR can be used to help disentangle the degree
to which changes in self-reported personality
traits over time reflect changes in actual behavior
versus changes in how people perceive them-
selves over time. Some research suggests that the
former may be the case. In two experience-
sampling studies, Noftle and Fleeson (2010) had
young, middle-aged, and older adults report on
their current behavior in terms of the Big Five
personality traits (e.g., during the last 12 min,
how cooperative have you acted?). Although the
pattern of age differences in the behavioral ratings
of the Big Five was similar to the pattern of age
differences in the global self-reports of the Big
Five, the magnitude of the age differences was
greater for the behavioral ratings. Since the EAR
has been successfully used in age groups ranging
from childhood to old age, the EAR can be a
valuable method for extending these findings
using observed behavior.
Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)
Since the EAR measures specific behaviors
(e.g., laughing, watching TV, going to church), it
may be better at tracking changes in the Big Five
facets than at tracking changes in the broader Big
Five domains. As previously illustrated, sociabil-
ity or gregariousness, a facet of extraversion,
could be measured using EAR-observed amount
of time spent with or talking to others as well as
the number of words uttered in a day. Depression,
a facet of neuroticism, could be measured using
EAR-observed sighing, use of negative emotion
words, or first-person singular pronoun use, all of
which have been found to be positively associated
with self-reported depression. Finally, several of
the EAR-derived moral behaviors, such as show-
ing sympathy, empathy, and concern, might be
good candidates for measuring behavioral mani-
festations of compassion, a facet of agreeableness.
Conclusion
As a naturalistic observation method, the EAR
complements traditional experience-sampling
methods in that it allows researchers to collect
observational real-world data on people’s
moment-to-moment social behaviors, interac-
tions, and environments. In that, it can help the
field to again become more of a behavioral science
rather than a science of self-report (Furr 2009) and
enables researchers to study personality where it
naturally happens, that is in its “daily habitat.”
References
Conner, T., Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Tenner,
H. (2007). Idiographic personality: The theory and
practice of experiencing sampling. In R. W. Robins,
R. C. Fraley, & R. F. Krueger (Eds.), Handbook of
research methods in personality research (pp. 79–96).
New York: Guilford Press.
Furr, M. R. (2009). Personality psychology as a truly
behavioural science. European Journal of Personality,
23, 369–401.
Holleran, S. E., Whitehead, J., Schmader, T., & Mehl,
M. R. (2011). Talking shop and shooting the breeze:
A study of workplace conversations and job disengage-
ment among STEM faculty. Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 2, 65–71.
Ellis, Albert
Ireland, M. E., & Mehl, M. R. (2014). Natural language use
as a marker of personality. In T. Holtgraves (Ed.),
Oxford handbook of language and social psychology.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Mehl, M. R. (2017). The Electronically Activated
Recorder (EAR): A method for the naturalistic obser-
vation of daily social behavior. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 26, 184–190.
Mehl, M. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2003). The sounds of
social life: A psychometric analysis of students’ daily
social environments and natural conversations. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 857–870.
Mehl, M. R., Gosling, S. D., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2006).
Personality in its natural habitat: Manifestations
and implicit folk theories of personality in daily life.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90,
862–877.
Mehl, M. R., Vazire, S., Ramírez-Esparza, N., Slatcher,
R. B., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2007). Are women really
more talkative than men? Science, 317, 82.
Noftle, E. E., & Fleeson, W. (2010). Age differences in big
five behavior averages and variabilities across the adult
lifespan: Moving beyond retrospective, global sum-
mary accounts of personality. Psychology and Aging,
25, 95–107.
Ramírez-Esparza, N., Mehl, M. R., Álvarez-Bermúdez, J.,
& Pennebaker, J. W. (2009). Are Mexicans more or less
sociable than Americans? Insights from a naturalistic
observation study. Journal of Research in Personality,
43, 1–7.
Wrzus, C., & Mehl, M. R. (2015). Lab and/or field? Mea-
suring personality processes and their social conse-
quences. European Journal of Personality, 29,
250–271.
Elevated Mood
▶ Euphoria
Elicitor
▶ Stimulus
ELISA
▶ Hormone Assays
1273
Ellis, Albert
Debbie Joffe Ellis
Columbia University, New York City, NY, USA
Early Life and Education Background
Albert Ellis was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
E
on September 27th, 1913. He was the eldest
of three children of Henry Ellis, a business man,
and Hettie Ellis. The family moved to the Bronx
in New York City when Ellis was around 3 years
of age, and he was raised and educated there.
From early on it was clear that he had unusual
intelligence, teaching himself to read prior to
attending kindergarten and school, with only
the help of a childhood friend. He read almost
every book in the children’s section of the local
library, and during his teen years, he read all of
the books that he could find on ancient and con-
temporary philosophies, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, and works of fiction about
topics he found of interest during his teen years.
He greatly enjoyed reading Stoic philosophers,
including Epictetus, and agreed with Epictetus’s
view that emotions were not created by adverse
events but by the perceptions people had about
those events. This idea was embraced by Ellis
and in years ahead was incorporated into his
psychotherapeutic theory. Starting from the age
of 4, without prompting or help from others, he
constructed helpful attitudes to help him cope
with serious illnesses that he endured throughout
his childhood years. He did so well academically
in classes, that schools had him skip a year more
than once, despite and including the fact that
he often missed months of school attendance due
to his frequent, and sometimes long, hospitaliza-
tions. In his adult years, he was a member
of Mensa, his IQ being in the highest percentile
of members IQ’s – and in the same highest quad-
rant as Einstein. He was given the nickname
“Encyclopedia” by his friends during his school
days due to his, according to them, knowing
everything. Unique to the pioneering cognitive
approach of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy
1274
(REBT), which he created, is that some of
its elements were created by Ellis during his
childhood years as means to help him endure the
physical pain of his illnesses, which included
nephritis, stomach issues, and severe migraines,
and to help him lessen his sadness about his fam-
ily rarely visiting him at the hospital during his
lengthy stays there. They included focusing on
interesting and absorbing activities when he felt
sad or depressed, which became the “cognitive
distraction” element of REBT. Beginning at a
very early age, he used his mind to create less
misery, and to increase his satisfaction and happi-
ness, when difficult times were endured. As a
teen, he attended the High School of Commerce
and in his late teens attended the Baruch School
of Business and Civic Administration of CCNY.
During these years, he constructed the means for
overcoming one of his greatest challenges at that
time – that of social anxiety – and those methods
also would become part of REBT. Having read
about John B. Watson’s Behaviorism and the
success Watson had in helping young children
overcome extreme fears and phobias, Ellis
decided to use in-vivo desensitization on himself
to overcome his shyness and anxiety about
talking with females. Through pushing himself
to have 100 conversations with women through-
out the month of August, doing uncomfortably
what he wanted to feel comfortable at while
reminding himself all the while that if he was
rejected it was not any tragic event, and that he
could stand it, he achieved his goal. During that
30-day self-created experiment, he made one
date, however that woman didn’t show up for
the date. Nonetheless, he succeeded at reducing
and then removing his anxiety and shyness. He
applied in-vivo densitization again to help him
successfully overcome his fear of public speak-
ing when called upon to do so during his time as
president of a political group at college. This
method has become one of the REBT’s basic
techniques. Ellis studied psychology at Colum-
bia University Teachers College, attaining his
Masters and PhD there. At that time, psychoanal-
ysis was the dominant approach in psychother-
apy, and he studied it, and subsequently practiced
Ellis, Albert
it, under supervision, in the years following the
attainment of his PhD. When he used that
approach with his patients, he observed that
while many felt better after sessions, they were
not getting better. They may have acquired some
insights or relief in freely expressing during ses-
sions, but they were not realizing that they were
mainly creating their disturbed emotions from
their beliefs, and not from any past or present
experiences or traumas. Ellis became more
active-directive with the patients he worked
with and found that many began to take greater
responsibility for their emotions, thoughts, and
behaviors as a result and benefitted greatly from
doing so. Concurrently, he was reading and
researching about issues connected to love, rela-
tionships, and marriage, and became quite the
expert in those areas. Many of his friends
would come to him seeking help, which Ellis
was able to give, again with many successful
outcomes. Lessons learnt from heartache he
experienced when he was around 24 years of
age were folded into the theory and philosophy
of REBT. He was madly in love with a young
woman, Karyl, who was on-again, off-again,
regarding their relationship. One night after she
suggested they break up, feeling extremely
despondent and hopeless, Ellis had the realiza-
tion that in fact it wasn’t Karyl’s rejection that
created his despondency, rather it was his
demanding that she should love him consistently
and in the way that he loved her, and that without
her he could never be happy or find meaning in
life. He thought about these beliefs, recognizing
the irrationality of them, he disputed them, and
came up with healthy and realistic thoughts
about the situation. Following that, he felt sad
and disappointed but no longer felt despondent
and hopeless. He formed what now is known as
the ABC self-help framework in REBT, in which
“A” is the activating event, “B” the irrational
beliefs that create the “C” – consequences: both
emotional and behavioral. The “D” stage of dis-
puting the identified irrational beliefs follows,
after which “E” – effective new rational beliefs
are formulated and repeated often. REBT teaches
the precise distinctions between rational and
Ellis, Albert
irrational thinking, and healthy and unhealthy
emotions.
In the late 1940s, he set up LAMP, the “Love
and Marriage Problem institute,” and in the early
1950s founded, and was the first president of, the
Society for the Scientific Study of Sexuality,
which continues to be a thriving and influential
organization to this day.
Ellis was one of very few in his generation
who loudly championed the importance of civil
rights, and of equal rights for women and
homosexuals. He spoke up and wrote about the
importance of legalizing interracial marriages.
He fought against censorship. Through the late
1940s and early 1950s, Ellis continued work
on what was to become his approach of Rational
Emotive Behavior Therapy. Influenced by
eastern philosophies, contemporary philosophies,
elements of Behaviorism and certain aspects of
the writings of Alfred Korzybski, Bertrand
Russell, Paul Dubois, Alexander Herzberg,
Hippolyte Bernheim, Emile Coue, and Alfred
Adler among others, coupled with his visionary
and unique genius, and along with the methods he
had constructed during his earlier years – REBT
was born. In its early days, it was named Rational
Psychotherapy (RT), then Rational Emotive
Therapy (RET), and finally in 1993, he called it
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) to
reflect its holistic nature in acknowledging the
inseparable interplay of emotions, beliefs, and
behaviors. Articles he wrote were published in
the early 1950s, and Ellis presented his approach
to his peers at the American Psychological
Association’s annual convention, held in Chicago,
in 1956. He was met with criticism and
jeers, called superficial, simplistic, and worse.
Nonetheless, he persisted, and as he continued
to write about and present about REBT, its
popularity grew and resulted in REBT heralding
in the cognitive revolution in psychotherapy.
Considered one of the most influential therapists
of all time, surveys done in the 1980s demon-
strated that Ellis had more influence on the field
than Freud. Currently, cognitive approaches are
more widely practiced in the USA and other coun-
tries than psychoanalytic ones. REBT is seen to
1275
have influenced, inspired, and/or contributed to
many of the therapeutic approaches that came
after it, including CT/CBT, Positive Psychology,
ACT, DBT, and others. Its principles are also at
the heart of coaching, and many contemporary
self-help approaches.
Professional Career
E
In 1959, Ellis founded the non-for-profit Albert
Ellis Institute and, as its president and therapist,
trainer, supervisor, and presenter, catapulted
REBT into remarkable prominence. It trained
thousands of therapists over its years, offered
regular lectures and workshops for both profes-
sionals and members of the general public includ-
ing the famous “Friday Night Workshop,” and
offered individual and group therapy. In 2004,
he was ousted by his institute, dismissed from
the board of which he had been president, and
stopped from teaching and working for the insti-
tute. He fought for justice but did not live to
complete two pending law suits. The lawsuit that
related to his being dismissed from the board of
the institute was completed, however, in 2006,
with the Supreme Court judge in that case rein-
stating Ellis to the board, stating that what was
done was “disingenuous” and “offensive.” Soon
after, Ellis succumbed to pneumonia, and he
fought to recover and resume his work for the
remaining 15 months of his life. Even in the
hospital and rehabilitation center, despite his
declining health and immense pain, whenever he
was able to, he would continue to write: working
on three books and some articles, give talks from
his bed to visiting students, attend to correspon-
dence, and give interviews to journalists and other
writers.
Throughout his career, he traveled throughout
the USA and to countries around the world, teach-
ing and presenting his approach to millions of
professionals in fields of psychology and other
areas of health care, education, and to members
of the general public.
During his career, Ellis had over 85 books
published; countless chapters that he wrote were
1276
included in books that were edited or authored by
other writers; he was editor and co-editor of
numerous books; and he produced thousands of
published articles. The American Psychological
Association and various divisions within it, the
American Counseling Association, and many
other psychology and counseling organizations
and societies, honored him with numerous awards
and honors throughout his lifetime and
posthumously.
He was a regular presence in articles in popular
newspapers and magazines, and on radio and
TV talk shows during the final decades of the
twentieth century, and during the early years of
the twenty-first century. Evidence of the wide-
spread prominence of Ellis outside of academic
and therapeutic communities was the title Variety
magazine gave to him in 2005 naming him one of
the icons of the century. Ellis entrusted his wife,
Debbie Joffe Ellis, to continue his work after his
passing.
Research Interests
Ellis’s REBT is considered by many to be the
most holistic, scientific, and philosophical
approaches in the cognitive field of psychother-
apy. Its philosophical component, particular its
emphasis on the importance and benefits of
unconditional self-acceptance, unconditional
other acceptance and unconditional life accep-
tance, are not so much emphasized in other
cognitive approaches. In addition to the REBT
research that exists, the immense body of CBT
research also relates to and supports REBT
premises and related topics. This is not surpris-
ing as REBT preceded other cognitive
approaches, and Dr. Aaron Beck has acknowl-
edged the influence of Ellis’s work on his
development of CBT. Ellis hoped that more
research specific to REBT would be done, par-
ticularly on the contribution of irrational think-
ing and its demandingness, should and musts,
to the creation of debilitating negative emo-
tions. It is hoped that REBT does not become
Ellis, Albert
marginalized, and folded into more general
CBT, but rather that it continues to be taught
and applied with its unique emphases,
and celebrated for its massive contribution to
the well-being of millions of people who have
used it over the years. It is also hoped that
REBT will be increasingly taught and practiced
in more schools as REBE (Rational Emotive
Behavior Education).
Selected Bibliography
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy.
Secaucus: Citadel.
Ellis, A. (2001). Overcoming destructive beliefs, feelings,
and behaviors. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Ellis, A. (2002). Overcoming resistance: A rational emo-
tive behavior therapy integrative approach. New York:
Springer.
Ellis, A. (2003a). Similarities and differences between
rational emotive behavior therapy and cognitive ther-
apy. Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 17, 225–240.
https://doi.org/10.1891/jcop.17.3.225.52535.
Ellis, A. (2003b). Anger: How to live with and without it
(rev. ed.). New York: Citadel Press.
Ellis, A. (2003c). Sex without guilt in the twenty-first
century. Teaneck: Battle-side Books.
Ellis, A. (2004). The road to tolerance. Amherst:
Prometheus Books.
Ellis, A. (2005a). Discussion of Christine A. Padesky
and Aaron T. Beck, “Science and philosophy: Com-
parison of cognitive therapy and rational emotive
behavior therapy”. Journal of Cognitive Therapy,
19, 181–185.
Ellis, A. (2005b). The myth of self-esteem. Amherst:
Prometheus Books.
Ellis, A. (2010). All out: An autobiography. Amherst:
Prometheus Books.
Ellis, D. J. (2015). Reflections: The profound impact
of gratitude: in times of ease and times of chal-
lenge. Journal of Spirituality in Clinical Practice,
2(1), 96–100. American Psychological Association
(APA).
Ellis, A., & Ellis, D. J. (2019). Rational emotive behavior
therapy (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Padesky, C. A., & Beck, A. T. (2003). Science and
philosophy: Comparison of cognitive therapy and ratio-
nal emotive behavior therapy. Journal of Cognitive
Therapy, 17, 211–229. https://doi.org/10.1891/jcop.
17.3.211.52536.
Wedding, D., & Corsini, R. J. (2019). Current psychother-
apies (11th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning.
Embarrassment
Embarrassment
Lesley A. Withers
Department of Communication and Dramatic
Arts, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant,
MI, USA
Synonyms
Abashment; Chagrin; Discomposure; Humilia-
tion; Mortification
Definition
Embarrassment is a social and moral emotion
characterized by an acute feeling of awkward,
abashed chagrin following a predicament that
threatens one’s desired image before real or imag-
ined others (Buck 1999; Miller 1996). It often
involves a display of involuntary blushing,
averted gaze, and nervous body movement and
vocalization (Keltner 1995).
Introduction: A Social and Moral
Emotion
Embarrassment is a social emotion; the experi-
ence of embarrassment requires the real or imag-
ined presence of others, the need to meet or
exceed others’ expectations, and the need to be
accepted and create and maintain social bonds
(Buck 1999; Withers 2002). Embarrassment
does not occur in the absence of any one of these
elements.
Embarrassment is also a moral emotion; one
must have learned social rules involving fairness
judgments and be aware when a rule has been
violated (Buck 1999). To create social bonds and
understand complex social and moral codes takes
time, social experience, and cognitive develop-
ment; for these reasons, babies and toddlers do
not experience or display signs of embarrassment
(Withers 2002).
1277
Display of Embarrassment
The display of embarrassment typically involves
involuntary blushing, averted gaze, speech
disfluencies, and uncomfortable or nervous body
movements. These signs may be accompanied by
self-conscious smiling and touching or covering
of parts of the face. This display may serve as a
nonverbal apology for a social transgression; in
fact, those who display embarrassment after a
E
transgression are more likely to be positively eval-
uated than those who have shown no signs of
being embarrassed (Edelmann 1982).
Causes of Embarrassment
Two models offer competing explanations for
what causes embarrassment (Miller 1996). The
first, the social evaluation model, posits that
embarrassment occurs when one fears others’
unwanted, negative social evaluation. The sec-
ond, the dramaturgic or awkward interaction
model, is based in the assumption that social
interaction is similar to a theatrical performance
(Goffman 1956, 1959). This model holds that
embarrassment occurs when one fails to perform
a social role and, lacking a social script for further
interaction, becomes flustered and uncertain about
how to act. Others find evidence of different
models working together; from this perspective,
embarrassment is a multidimensional communi-
cative process that occurs when one becomes
aware of a discrepancy between one’s expectation
of a consistent self-presentation and one’s actual
presentation of self, resulting in uncertainty about
how to act and/or the potential for negative social
evaluation (Withers and Vernon 2006; Withers
and Sherblom 2008).
Types of Embarrassing Situations
Since the 1960s, several researchers have
attempted to develop comprehensive typologies
for embarrassment (see Miller 1986 for an excel-
lent overview). Of these efforts, the work of
1278
Cupach and Metts (1994) stands out for dividing
the types of embarrassment into two overarching
categories: self-induced predicaments and predic-
aments created by others. These distinctions are
helpful for categorizing many embarrassing situ-
ations, but struggle to classify situations in which
the responsible party is not entirely clear. Simi-
larly, Miller (1992) constructed a typology with
four major types: individual behavior, interactive
behavior, audience provocation, and bystander
behavior; again, these distinctions are useful for
situations in which the responsible party can be
clearly identified, adding in categories for embar-
rassment that occurs in the interaction itself or by
a third party. Sabini et al. (2000) switched the
focus from which party was responsible to three
situational triggers: faux pas (social mistakes),
sticky situations (awkward situations that threaten
another’s identity), and being the center of atten-
tion. The latter is considered an anomaly in that
being the center of attention may not threaten
one’s sense of self, as when one is recognized
publicly for a great achievement. Many people,
however, experience embarrassment when on the
receiving end of such praise.
Self-Report Measures of Embarrassment
Several measures of embarrassment and
embarrassability have been created and tested
over the years. Of these, two are used frequently.
Modigliani’s (1968) Embarrassability Scale, as
revised by Miller (1987; see Leary 1991) to use
gender inclusive language, is a 26-item unidimen-
sional measure of the tendency to experience
embarrassment; the scale has demonstrated reli-
ability and validity (Edelmann 1987; Leary 1991;
Withers and Vernon 2006). Although the measure
was designed to evaluate embarrassability as a
trait, the items are situationally based.
In 2000, Sabini et al. created a 40-item measure
to evaluate three embarrassment trigger types:
faux pas, sticky situations, and being the center
of attention. Withers and Vernon (2006), in their
comparison of the two measures, found Sabini
et al.’s (2000) measure also had strong reliability
Embarrassment
and validity. Sabini et al.’s trigger subscales, how-
ever, were able to independently predict related
personality variables, suggesting that embarrass-
ment, as a construct, is multidimensional.
Conclusion
Because it combines our need for affection from
others and our recognition of the importance of
following social rules, embarrassment is a com-
plex emotion that is as much interpersonal and
socially constructed as it is intrapersonal and bio-
logically based.
Cross-References
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
▶ Facial Expressions and Emotion
▶ Guilt and Shame
References
Buck, R. (1999). The biological affects: A typology. Psy-
chological Review, 106, 301–336.
Cupach, W. R., & Metts, S. (1994). Facework. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Edelmann, R. J. (1982). The effect of embarrassed reac-
tions upon others. Australian Journal of Psychology,
34, 359–367.
Edelmann, R. J. (1987). The psychology of embarrassment.
Chichester, England: Wiley.
Goffman, E. (1956). Embarrassment and social organiza-
tion. American Journal of Sociology, 70, 1–15.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday
life. New York: Anchor.
Keltner, D. (1995). Signs of appeasement: Evidence for the
distinct displays of embarrassment, amusement, and
shame. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
68, 441–454.
Leary, M. R. (1991). Social anxiety, shyness, and related
constructs. In J. Robinson, P. Shaver, & L. Wrightsman
(Eds.), Measures of personality and social psycholog-
ical attitudes (pp. 161–194). New York, NY: Academic
Press.
Miller, R. S. (1986). Embarrassment: Causes and conse-
quences. In W. H. Jones, J. M. Cheek, & S. R. Briggs
(Eds.), Shyness: Perspectives on research and treat-
ment (pp. 295–311). New York: Plenum.
Emic/Etic Approach
Miller, R. S. (1992). The nature and severity of self-
reported embarrassing circumstances. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 190–198.
Miller, R. S. (1996). Embarrassment: Poise and peril in
everyday life. New York: Guilford.
Miller, R. S. (1987). The nature of embarrassability: Cor-
relates and sex differences. Unpublished manuscript.
Modigliani, A. (1968). Embarrassment and embarras-
sability. Sociometry, 31, 313–326.
Sabini, J., Siepmann, M., Stein, J., & Meyerowitz,
M. (2000). Who is embarrassed by what? Cognition
and Emotion, 14(2), 213–240.
Withers, L. A. (2002). To err is human: Embarrassment,
communication apprehension, attachment, and
attribution styles. Doctoral dissertations, paper
AAI3066267. http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/dis
sertations/AAI3066267
Withers, L. A., & Sherblom, J. C. (2008). Embarrassment:
The communication of an awkward actor anticipating a
negative evaluation. Human Communication, 11(2),
237–254.
Withers, L. A., & Vernon, L. L. (2006). To err is human:
Embarrassment, attachment, and communication
apprehension. Personality and Individual Differences,
40, 99–110.
Embodied Capital Theory
▶ Current Versus Future Reproduction Trade-Offs
EMD
▶ Eye Movement Desensitization and
Reprocessing (EMDR)
Emic/Etic Approach
Satoshi Moriizumi
Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan
Synonyms
Cultural similarities and differences; Culture-
general; Culture-specific; Subjective and objec-
tive views on culture
1279
Definition
Etics refer to a universal (culture-general) phe-
nomenon while emics refer to culturally unique
(culture-specific) phenomenon of human psycho-
logical processes and traits.
Introduction
E
Psychologists, particularly in cross-cultural psy-
chology, have sought both similarities and differ-
ences in human cognition, emotion, and behaviors
across cultures. Through efforts to explain and
predict both particularities of certain cultures and
universality of human psychological processes
across cultures, the terms etic and emic evolved
from the linguistic usages and were coined by a
notable linguist Kenneth Pike (1967). The term
etic (whose first letter is pronounced as in empire)
was derived from the linguistic term phonetics
which features universal sound properties in any
language. On the other hand, the term emic
(whose first letter is pronounced as in peacock)
was created from the linguistic term phonemics,
which denotes the minimal sounds that can distin-
guish the meaning between the two sounds.
Concept and Approach
Etics refer to the universal phenomenon that can
be applied to any culture, while emics are defined
as culture-specific psychological processes or
behavior. For example, nearly every culture
might understand personality and the components
of personality known as the Big Five, which is
nearly universal (McCrae et al. 2005). Therefore,
the five-factor model of personality could be con-
sidered as an etic. However, at the same time,
some aspects of personality vary culturally,
which can be considered as an emic. Another
example is the concept of happiness. Many cul-
tures tend to perceive happiness as luck or fortune
(an etic), while the meaning associated with the
term and how this is achieved is culture-specific
(an emic) (Oishi et al. 2013).
1280
The notions of emic and etic are also related to
approaches to cultural research (Berry 1989). An
emic approach is a study of a particular culture
from cultural insiders’ or a more subjective point
of view. Indigenous psychology tends to use this
approach to understand human psychological pro-
cesses in specific cultures. Notable earlier exam-
ples of early research on personality and
interpersonal relations from an emic approach is
to study Amae (Doi 1981) in the Japanese context
and Mien-tsu (Ting-Toomey 1994) in the Chinese
culture and the like. In contrast, an etic approach
to research involves focusing on the commonali-
ties of human behavior from cultural outsiders’ or
more objective views. This approach has been
often used by cross-cultural researchers by utiliz-
ing the scales and measurements across cultures
that they are interested in studying.
A major hindrance to cross-cultural research is
that researchers consciously or unconsciously
assume that a new culture that they are studying
has the same or equivalent meanings, expectations,
and constructs underlying the concepts or phenom-
ena that they are investigating. These phenomena
are characterized as an “imposed etic.” Because the
scales and instruments have been largely developed
by researchers in the Western cultures, researchers
not only in the West but also in other parts of the
world have tended to use the scales and instruments
developed by Western researchers in their studies in
non-Western cultures. By doing so, they often tend
to neglect the nuanced differences in constructs and
meanings attached to the psychological processes
that they are investigating. To avoid the error of the
imposed etic, Berry (1989) suggested a “derived
etic” approach. By conducting parallel emic studies
in multiple cultures, researchers come up with
some commonalities in psychological processes
among cultures. A recent research has used this
approach to understand personality and human pro-
cesses (e.g., Oishi et al. 2013).
Conclusion
Because researchers cannot live in a vacuum, there
is a danger associated with etic approach of impos-
ing their own cultural biases and expectations on
Emic/Etic Approach
other cultures, which may result in losing equiva-
lence and rightful interpretation of other cultures
(Segall et al. 1999). However, recently, more
sophisticated techniques of statistical analyses
such as confirmatory factor analyses and neural
imaging make it easy to identify areas in which
equivalence of constructs and human processes
across cultures exist. Additionally, today, in addi-
tion to explaining simple cultural differences and
similarities in personality and psychological pro-
cesses, cross-cultural researchers have attempted to
pay closer attention to contexts and processes in
which cultural differences might be observed
(Beins 2011). In this line of research, notions of
emic and etic and their application to cross-cultural
methods help researchers to ponder their position
in conducting more valid cross-cultural studies.
Cross-References
▶ Cross-Cultural Research
References
Beins, B. C. (2011). Methodological and conceptual issues
in cross-cultural research. In K. D. Keith (Ed.), Cross-
cultural psychology: Contemporary themes and per-
spectives (pp. 37–55). Malden: Wiley.
Berry, J. W. (1989). Imposed etics – emics – derived etics:
The operationalization of a compelling idea.
International Journal of Psychology, 24, 721–735.
Doi, T. (1981). The anatomy of dependence. New York:
Kodansha America.
McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A., & Members of the Person-
ality Profiles of Cultures Project. (2005). Universal
features of personality traits from the observer’s per-
spective: Data from 50 cultures. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 88, 547–561.
Oishi, S., Graham, J., Kesebir, S., & Galinha, I. C. (2013).
Concepts of happiness across time and cultures.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39,
559–577.
Pike, K. L. (1967). Language in relation to a unified theory
of the structure of human behavior (2nd ed.).
The Hague: Mouton.
Segall, M. H., Dasen, P., Berry, J., & Poortinga, Y. (Eds.).
(1999). Human behavior in global perspective:
An introduction to cross-cultural psychology. Boston:
Allyn & Bacon.
Ting-Toomey, S. (Ed.). (1994). The challenge of facework:
Cross-cultural and interpersonal issues. Albany:
SUNY Press.
Emotion Regulation
Emotion Focused Therapy
▶ Person-Centered Therapy (Client-Centered)
Emotion Recognition
▶ “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET),
The
Emotion Regulation
Rianne Kok
Department of Psychology, Education and Child
Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Synonyms
Affect regulation; Emotional control; Emotional
intelligence; Emotion-related self-regulation;
Mood regulation; Stress-regulation
Definition
Emotion regulation refers to the conscious or
unconscious processes of monitoring, evaluat-
ing, modulating, and managing emotional expe-
riences and expression of emotion in terms of
intensity, form, and duration of feelings,
emotion-related physiological states and
behaviors.
Introduction
In order to function in society, in which we are
exposed daily to situations in which uncontrolled
expression of emotions are not accepted, it is
essential to regulate our emotions. Emotion
1281
regulation refers to all the processes involved in
shaping which emotions one experiences, when
emotions are experienced, and how these emo-
tions are experienced and expressed (Gross
2015). In science as well as in day-to-day conver-
sation, the scope of emotion regulation is often
limited to suppressing negative emotions
(Kashdan et al. 2015). However, emotion regula-
tion also refers to the downregulation of positive
emotions (e.g., concealing one’s enthusiasm
E
about a prospect house in front of the realtor),
and to the upregulation of both positive and neg-
ative emotions (e.g., respectively, sharing good
news to prolong the excitement, and listening to
violent music to get pumped up for a confronta-
tional negotiation at work).
Emotion regulation is one of the fastest evolv-
ing fields of psychological study. By highlighting
and discussing the main theoretical frameworks of
emotion regulation, we will explore the scope and
conceptual boundaries of the topic. Moreover, the
current state of knowledge on the relevance of
emotion regulation for human development and
functioning is addressed, as well as the develop-
ment of emotion regulation from infancy into
adulthood.
Defining Emotion Regulation
Theories of Emotion Regulation
Since the early 1990s, empirical interest in emo-
tion regulation increased and different theories on
emotion regulation processes emerged, of which
the process model of emotion regulation has been
most influential (Gross 2015). In this model, emo-
tion regulation refers to all the processes that
are involved in changing the duration and inten-
sity of feelings, and emotion-related physiological
states and behaviors. These processes can be con-
scious and controlled, but also unconscious and
automatic. The process model is closely
connected to the modal model of emotions,
which describes an emotional experience as the
result of the nature of a situation, the attention that
is paid to this situation, the appraisal of the mean-
ing of this situation, and the emotional response
tendency that determines the behavioral,
1282
physiological, and experiential component of the
emotion.
The process model builds on the modal model
of emotions, by describing how emotion regula-
tion processes can change the experience of emo-
tion at every stage in this process; either by
regulation processes activated before the emotion
is triggered, referred to as antecedent-focused reg-
ulation, or by processes that change the emotional
response after the emotion is already generated,
summarized as response-focused regulation (John
and Gross 2004). Examples of antecedent-focused
regulation are selecting or adjusting the emotion-
eliciting situation – by avoiding a confrontation
with a colleague – or adjusting one’s focus of
attention – by distracting yourself from a scary
picture or by ruminating about a bad grade – or
deliberately changing the appraisal of the
situation – by reframing arousal due to an impor-
tant presentation as excitement that will help you
focus, rather than anxiety that will increase the
chance of failure. Response-focused regulation is
characterized by emotional response modulation –
by using breathing techniques to calm yourself
down. As such, there is a tight link between emo-
tion regulation and coping; a related and partly
overlapping concept which describes the more
long-term process of dealing with and responding
to negative affect or stress (Compas et al. 2017).
The process model has recently been expanded to
the extended process model which additionally
describes how emotion regulation strategies are
selected and implemented (Gross 2015).
Whereas the original process model was
mainly focused on intrinsic emotion-regulation
processes – where an individual regulates its
own emotion – it was later extended to incorporate
extrinsic or interpersonal processes of regulation,
for instance regulation of one’s emotion by a
parent, partner, or friend (Bloch et al. 2009).
These interpersonal regulation processes predom-
inate early childhood, since young children do not
have the cognitive capacity to regulate their own
emotions and depend on their caregivers to do so
(see also section “Development of Emotion Reg-
ulation”) (Fox and Calkins 2003). In the last
decade, there has been a growing interest in the
Emotion Regulation
interpersonal processes by which people seek reg-
ulation from others, or regulate emotions of
others. Unsurprisingly so, considering that about
98% of emotion regulation takes place in social
contexts (Gross et al. 2006) and most emotional
stressors are interpersonal in nature. The interper-
sonal regulation of emotion is therefore consid-
ered a key function of social relationships and
social proximity (Beckes and Coan 2011; Cassidy
1994).
Some theorists have argued that emotion reg-
ulation should refer not only to the processes that
alter emotions, but also to emotions as regulator:
all the changes in behavior within the individual
or within others that result from the activated
emotion (Cole et al. 2004). An example of this
second type of emotion regulation is if a young
child is upset about her mother leaving the room
and as a result is whimpering, refrains from
playing, and keeps its eyes glued on the door.
Many consider this view too broad for the defi-
nition of emotion regulation (e.g., Eisenberg and
Spinrad 2004) and emphasize that behavior
should only be considered emotion regulation if
it is intentional and motivated to achieve a goal,
and not a mere response to an emotional
situation.
Difficulties in Defining Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation processes are for a large part
covert and not directly observable. Therefore,
emotion regulation is often operationalized as
the lack of expression of frustration or anger, or
a change in expression of an emotion over time
(Cole et al. 2004). However, the question arises
whether the absence of emotion is a sign of emo-
tion regulation, or if outward appearance of emo-
tional control might actually be a sign of low
arousability.
A distinction is often made between adaptive
and maladaptive emotion regulation processes,
where the former is considered a helpful way of
dealing with emotions, and the latter a harmful
way of handling emotions. However, it is diffi-
cult to determine which emotion regulation pro-
cesses should be considered a form of
adaptation or maladaptation. In general, the
Emotion Regulation
experience and expression of both positive and
negative emotions can be adaptive as well as
maladaptive. For example, strong expression of
fear or discomfort in the first few years of life,
crying, is a sign of healthy development, and an
evolutionary adaptation that is essential for sur-
vival and wellbeing. Adaptive emotion regula-
tion can thus entail the upregulation, the
downregulation, and the maintenance of posi-
tive or negative emotions (Kashdan
et al. 2015).
Whether we label emotion regulation adaptive
or maladaptive depends on individual and con-
textual factors, and on the framework that is
adopted. The timing of the consequences influ-
ences our appraisal of the chosen strategy. For
example, avoiding the experience of fear can be
beneficial in the short-term – as it allows for a
more focused response to an alarming situation –
but has long-term negative consequences – as
avoidance is a key symptom of both an anxiety
disorder as well as posttraumatic stress disorder.
Adaptiveness of emotion regulation processes
can also depend on one’s individual goals. If a
child is hit by a peer, holding in anger could be
considered adaptive emotion regulation, if the
aim is to maintain the relationship. However, if
retaliation, to prevent the wrongdoing from
reoccurring, is the goal, the adaptive strategy is
to increase anger (Thompson 1994). Social and
cultural influences can also affect how emotion
regulation is appraised (Cole et al. 1994).
Although emotional suppression is considered a
maladaptive form of emotion regulation in West-
ern culture, with negative short- and long-term
outcomes, in Asian culture, characterized by
higher interdependency, suppression is consid-
ered an adaptive strategy with less harmful or
even beneficial outcomes. Lastly, in a more clin-
ical psychology perspective, adaptive emotion
regulation allows one to be aware of emotional
distress, to understand and accept emotions, to
control impulses in order to perform goal-
directed behavior, to flexibly use situationally
appropriate emotion regulation strategies, and
to willingly experience negative emotions in pur-
suit of desired goals (Gratz et al. 2015).
1283
The Relevance of Emotion (Dys)
Regulation in Human Functioning
Emotion Regulation
Individual differences in emotion regulation
capacity and strategy exist and can influence
developmental processes and outcomes. Already
in infancy, children show considerable variation
in reactivity to the environment and in the regula-
tory capacity to modulate this reactivity, summa-
E
rized in the term temperament (Rothbart 2007).
These temperamental differences in experiencing,
expressing, and regulating emotions seem to be
consistent over situations and over time, and to be
biologically based, influenced by heredity, matu-
ration, and experience. Temperament and experi-
ence together help grow an individual’s
personality, a stable set of characteristics that
determine one’s thinking, feeling, and behavior
(Rothbart 2007). Self-regulation (of emotions) is
considered one of the most important elements of
personality.
The predictive value of individual variation in
emotion regulation has been extensively studied,
and ample evidence shows its importance for
functioning in a variety of domains. Emotion reg-
ulation for instance predicts better social function-
ing in childhood (Eisenberg et al. 2000) and adults
high in emotion regulation are more sensitive and
prosocial (Lopes et al. 2005). Emotion regulation
is also related to academic success in childhood
(Graziano et al. 2007) and professional function-
ing, demonstrated by higher work performance in
adults (Aldao et al. 2010).
Emotion Dysregulation
When one’s individual pattern of emotion regula-
tion impairs or jeopardizes functioning, this is
referred to as emotion dysregulation (Cole et al.
1994). Emotion dysregulation has many faces; it
can be the lack of access to a typical emotion in
a pertinent situation – a blockage of anger – as
well as having a disproportional domination of a
particular emotion – always feeling sad. More-
over, dysregulation can be expressed in the inten-
sity and duration of experienced emotions, or be
apparent from emotional instability, or rigidity in
1284
emotional experience and expression (Cole et al.
1994). In temperament research, two types of
emotional dysregulation are described. Besides
the typically functioning group of optimally reg-
ulated children, exists a group of highly inhibited
children, who are involuntarily over controlled
and rigid, and a group of under controlled chil-
dren, who are generally low in emotion regulation
(Eisenberg et al. 2000).
Emotion dysregulation can serve an adaptive
purpose in the present, even though it interferes
with or has serious implications for adjustment
and development (Cole et al. 1994). For example,
it is a well-known phenomenon that survivors of
parent-child incest do not recollect either a part or
all of their abusive experiences, and experience a
sense of emotional cut-off from the situation. This
form of emotion dysregulation helps one handle
and survive the intense emotions and generalized
distress of the incest, but also leads to a serious
truncation of emotionality that seriously hampers
(social) functioning in adulthood.
Although emotion dysregulation does not nec-
essarily imply a psychiatric condition or clinical
concern, it is considered a general vulnerability
for developing psychopathology (Cole et al.
1994). Studies on emotion regulation and psycho-
pathology have often focused on specific regula-
tion strategies that are usually considered
adaptive, for instance reappraisal (of a stressful
situation) and problem solving, versus strategies
that are considered maladaptive, for instance sup-
pression (of negative thoughts) and avoidance
(see “Difficulties in Defining Emotion Regula-
tion” for a commentary on the equivocal distinc-
tion between maladaptive and adaptive
strategies). An elaborate meta-analysis showed
that in adults, maladaptive strategies, including
rumination, avoidance, and suppression of emo-
tion, are related to higher levels of psychopathol-
ogy, whereas adaptive strategies, including
problem solving, acceptance, and reappraisal, are
associated with less psychopathology (Aldao
et al. 2010). Maladaptive strategies were more
strongly related to psychopathology than adaptive
strategies. This finding may indicate that the use
of maladaptive emotion regulation is more harm-
ful than the relative absence of particularly
Emotion Regulation
adaptive ways of regulating one’s emotions
(Aldao et al. 2010). Mood-related disorders,
including the internalizing disorders of anxiety
and depression, were more strongly related to
emotion regulation strategies than externalizing
disorders, including substance use disorders, in
which problem behavior is directed toward the
environment. Surprisingly so, the adaptive strate-
gies of reappraisal and acceptance were not
strongly related to (the absence of) psychopathol-
ogy, although these strategies play a prominent
role in two major therapeutic approaches:
acceptance-based treatment and cognitive behav-
ior therapy (Aldao et al. 2010). A meta-analysis
with a similar framework focused on children and
adolescents, showed that adaptive emotion regu-
lation was related to lower levels of internalizing
as well as externalizing problems (Compas et al.
2017). In contrast to the study of Aldao et al.
(2010), little evidence was found for an associa-
tion between specific emotion regulation strate-
gies and problem behavior (Compas et al. 2017).
The close connection with psychopathology is
further illustrated by the fact that emotion
dysregulation is central in the definition of
many psychiatric disorders, as described in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM), including among others, mood
disorders, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disor-
der (ADHD), substance- or alcohol-dependency,
borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia,
and suicidal ideation (Crowell et al. 2015). In
general, many of the psychiatric disorders in the
DSM appear to coexist, a phenomenon named
comorbidity. For example, of every person meet-
ing the diagnosis of major depressive disorder,
about 50% also meet the criteria for a second
DSM-disorder (Caspi et al. 2014). A variety of
theoretical and empirical studies have tried to
explain this comorbidity, and results suggest emo-
tion dysregulation to be a common trait. In chil-
dren and adolescents, a distinctive diagnostic
profile has been described, for youth that exhibit
a combination of severe emotional, attentional,
and behavioral dysregulation, named the
dysregulation profile (Ayer et al. 2009). This gen-
eral pattern of dysregulation in childhood marks
an early risk of persisting deficits in regulation of
Emotion Regulation
emotions, cognitions, and behavior, underlying a
variety of severe psychiatric disorders in adult-
hood. In adults, attempts to derive empirically an
overarching construct that can more parsimoni-
ously describe different psychiatric disorders,
have also demonstrated an underlying dimension
which unites all psychiatric disorders (Caspi et al.
2014). Similar to the empirical findings in child-
hood, it was found that problems in regulation or
control when dealing with others, the environ-
ment, and the self, lie at the core of this dimension
(Beauchaine 2015; Caspi et al. 2014). Emotion
dysregulation is even proposed to underlie a vari-
ety of physical health problems, including cardio-
vascular disease, type II diabetes, and sleep
problems (Crowell et al. 2015). The risky and
unhealthy behaviors of individuals with regula-
tion problems, including emotional overeating,
excessive smoking and drinking, and the exposure
to prolonged stress, are hypothesized to explain
this link between emotion dysregulation and
physical health.
Psychological interventions aimed at reducing
emotion dysregulation and improving emotion
regulation skills are effective methods in preven-
tion and treatment of psychopathology (Compas
et al. 2017). Empirical research shows that many
interventions, including cognitive-behavioral and
acceptance-based behavioral interventions, influ-
ence emotion regulation and that changes in emo-
tion regulation as a result of these interventions
are related to changes in clinically relevant out-
comes (Gratz et al. 2015). Emotion regulation is
also implicated in the increasingly popular pre-
vention and intervention method of mindfulness
training. Mindfulness is a psychological construct
derived from Buddhism which emphasizes the
importance of purposefully and nonjudgmentally
paying attention to the present moment. Mindful-
ness (training) is considered a useful method to
reduce stress and increase wellbeing, and initial
empirical studies show that emotion regulation
could be the driving mechanisms explaining its
beneficial effects (Roemer et al. 2015). Although
emotion regulation improvements appear to be a
means for preventing and alleviating psychologi-
cal problems, more research is needed to clarify
which elements of interventions are effective in
1285
improving emotion regulation, and which emo-
tion regulation strategies are subject to change.
Development of Emotion Regulation
To understand the development of emotion regu-
lation it is necessary to address firstly the under-
lying processes that are involved in adapting the
experience and expression of emotions. Emotion
E
regulation requires, for instance, the ability to
recognize the emotional significance of a situa-
tion, to appreciate the need for regulation, and
then to select and implement appropriate strate-
gies to regulate these emotions (Ahmed et al.
2015). In all these steps in the process of emotion
regulation, several (cognitive) processes are
involved, including attention, inhibition, modula-
tion of arousal, and executive functions: the
higher-order cognitive functions seated in the pre-
frontal cortex, including cognitive flexibility,
working memory, and planning of coordinated
action (Fox and Calkins 2003).
Emotion regulation development is impacted
by both biological and innate factors, including
the temperamental disposition of a child, cogni-
tive capacity, and the workings of neural and
physiological systems that are involved in regula-
tion and control, as well as environmental influ-
ences, including parental socialization, and
influences of peers or siblings (Fox and Calkins
2003).
Biological Nature of Emotion Regulation
In the last decades, the biological nature of emo-
tion regulation is being unraveled by empirical
studies, taking full advantage of the technological
advances in research fields on physiology and
neurobiology. Behavioral and molecular genetic
studies demonstrate that processes involved in
enabling emotion regulation are moderately heri-
table (estimates vary between 25% and 55%) and
that specific genetic variation (more precisely,
common variations in 5-HTT gene and COMT
genes) might be involved in emotion regulation
processes or brain activity in areas related to emo-
tion regulation (Hawn et al. 2015). On a neurobi-
ological level, emotion regulation is described as
1286
the result of the interplay between bottom-up
processes – driven by subcortical brain networks
that mature early in life and are involved in emo-
tion activation, such as the amygdala – and top-
down processes – driven by cortical brain net-
works which develop until early adulthood and
are involved in regulatory processes, such as the
prefrontal cortex (Thompson and Goodman
2010). The prefrontal cortex, the cerebral cortex
which covers the frontal part of the frontal lobe,
has a central role in decision making, planning,
and other higher-order cognitive functions
(executive functions) and therefore controls
many of the prerequisites for emotion regulation
(Beauchaine 2015). More specifically, the anterior
cingulate cortex – a region of more primitive
prefrontal cortex, which is strongly connected to
the subcortical limbic system, a set of structures
involved in emotion and motivation, including the
amygdala – has been specifically linked to the
cognitive control of emotions in children (Lewis
and Stieben 2004). Emotion regulation is also
related to peripheral nervous system (PNS)
markers of prefrontal cortex functioning, includ-
ing vagal tone; an index for the functional state of
the entire PNS. Suppression of vagal tone is
thought to be a physiological strategy to sustain
attention and behaviors that are indicative of
active coping (Fox and Calkins 2003). Empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis, as more adap-
tive emotion regulation in difficult tasks relates to
suppression of vagal tone in preschoolers (Fox
and Calkins 2003).
Emotion Regulation: Environmental
Influences and Development across the
Life Span
In the first years of life, emotion regulation capac-
ity is limited and children largely depend on the
environment to help them regulate their emotions.
Basic child-guided emotion regulation strategies
are already observed in infancy in the form of for
instance, self-soothing behavior, in which an
infant attempts to decrease arousal by sucking on
its hand or thumb (Thompson and Goodman
2010). This initial stage of emotion regulation is
mainly characterized by attempts to modulate
arousal, and the infant’s mastery of state
Emotion Regulation
regulation, and control of sleep-wake cycles
(Fox and Calkins 2003).
The most important environmental source of
emotion regulation for infants are parents, who
manage children’s emotional states by for exam-
ple, comforting in case of distress, engaging in
exuberant play, and organizing daily routines to
create manageable emotion demands. Even when
parents are not (yet) actively present, social
expectations developed from experiences with
parents can serve the purpose of emotion regula-
tion; for instance, an infant already stops crying
when it hears the mother’s approaching footsteps.
These social expectations form the basis of the
parent-child relationship, as described in attach-
ment theory (Cassidy 1994): one of the most
influential conceptual frameworks for understand-
ing emotion regulation in young children.
According to this theory, individual differences
in emotion regulation are the result of (a child’s)
attachment history, and thus emotion regulation
strategies are socially shaped. Empirical studies
show that the interactive dynamic between a par-
ent and an infant is not only crucial for emotion
regulation processes at that particular moment,
but also predicts the quality of self-controlled
emotion regulation capacity in toddlerhood and
preschool age (Cole et al. 2004). Children are
active contributors in this parent-child dynamic
and in their caregiving environment. Emotion
regulation strategies or behaviors of children
feed back into and influence emotion regulation-
related parenting, which illustrates the reciprocal
nature of parent-child interactions.
However, besides environmental influences,
early emotion regulation is also influenced by
the child’s innate level of temperamental reactiv-
ity and regulation; some infants are more difficult
to sooth than others, and some children tend to
respond more impulsively than others. This innate
vulnerability in reactivity and regulation deter-
mines emotion regulation capacity in interaction
with stress or support in the social environment
(Crowell et al. 2015). If infants more prone to
negative emotions receive less sensitive parental
responses to their distress, they are more likely to
develop severe regulation problems. However, a
sensitive response to their distress can help them
Emotion Regulation
develop better emotion regulation skills (Crowell
et al. 2015). The maturation of attentional control
and inhibitory motor control in the first year
increases the infant’s ability to become more
deliberate in their efforts to manage distress by
reaching toward the caregiver for comfort, or
disengaging from a distressing situation (Fox
and Calkins 2003; Thompson and Goodman
2010).
In the toddler and preschool years, children
take important steps in emotion understanding
(Thompson and Goodman 2010). Language
development enables them to mentally represent
emotions and communicate about emotions. This
allows children not only to elicit more control
over their environment, but it also permits care-
givers to explain, forecast, and issue direct emo-
tion regulation instructions (Thompson and
Goodman 2010). Cognitive progress enables chil-
dren to understand that emotions are subjective,
and connected to one’s goals and desires. All these
contribute to the complexity of emotional experi-
ences, but also the enhancement of emotion regu-
lation (Thompson and Goodman 2010). Because
of the child’s increased knowledge and under-
standing of their own emotions, parents are no
longer limited to merely controlling the child’s
emotions, but can explicitly teach them to develop
emotion regulation strategies (Compas et al.
2017), for example, cognitive reframing “It’s just
a game,” or problem-focused coping “What can
you do to fix this?” (Thompson and Goodman
2010). The realization that emotions relate to spe-
cific situations, and to perceptions, desires, and
expectations, makes children aware that emotions
can pass, be changed, and be reduced by
restricting their perception of the emotionally
arousing events, for example, by shifting their
attention (LeBlanc et al. 2017). Toddlers and pre-
schoolers actively use these elementary attention-
based emotion regulation strategies, as is apparent
from this quote of an 18-month-old: “I scared of
the shark. Close my eyes” (Bretherton et al. 1986,
in Thompson 1994).
Preschoolers expand their social network
quickly, including new siblings, peers, and
teachers, and thereby emotion regulation chal-
lenges increase. They must learn how to attune
1287
the intensity and duration of emotions to preserve
these relationships (Cole et al. 1994). Children
develop elementary internal emotion regulation
skills, which make them capable of delaying grat-
ification, adhering to social expectations, and
adapting to rules at home or in the school envi-
ronment (LeBlanc et al. 2017). Although the emo-
tion regulation strategy toolbox of preschoolers is
expanded, with the ability to shift attention or to
reason, in novel situations they tend to fall back on
E
adult intervention and support, or resort to more
immature ways of coping, such as denial or mis-
behavior (Cole et al. 1994).
From middle childhood onward, children’s
emotion regulation strategies become more cog-
nitive in nature; partly as a result of the increased
ability for self-reflection (Thompson and
Goodman 2010). This progress is related to the
development in executive functions, which have a
profound effect on the level of thinking and prob-
lem solving, as well as behavioral and emotional
self-control. Children become able to reflect on,
conceptualize, and verbalize their emotions in a
more abstract way (Cole et al. 1994). Moreover,
children learn to identify, understand, and analyze
emotion-eliciting situations in terms of cause and
effect, and learn alternative ways of expressing
emotions (LeBlanc et al. 2017). Their emotion
regulation strategies become more psychologi-
cally informed. For instance, children use internal
distraction strategies – thinking about happy
things in difficult circumstances – use cognitive
reframing techniques, or directly alter the physio-
logical expression of the emotions, by using
breathing techniques (Thompson and Goodman
2010). With increasing importance and deepening
of peer relationships, children’s interpersonal pro-
cesses of emotion regulation start to shift from the
family to a wider network of friends.
From childhood to adolescence, children
become better able to tailor emotion regulation
attempts to specific situations (Riediger and
Klipker 2014) and to independently manage
their emotions (Compas et al. 2017). Moreover,
emotion regulation strategies become more
unique and personal, for instance playing your
favorite song to make yourself feel better
(Thompson and Goodman 2010). However, the
1288
adolescents’ emotion regulation capacity is
severely challenged, as this age period is charac-
terized by heightened emotional reactivity due to,
for instance, the hormonal changes in puberty, and
increased pressures in the field of academics,
employment, and social relations (Ahmed et al.
2015). This combination of an intense strain on
emotion regulation, with emotional challenges
explains the typical adolescent behavior, includ-
ing impulsive emotional outbursts. Decreased
emotion regulation capacity in adolescents has
been hypothesized to be the result of an imbalance
in the neural development of systems supporting
emotional reactivity and regulation. The develop-
ment of the prefrontal cortex – involved in emo-
tion regulation – lags behind the development of
subcortical, limbic structures, including the
amygdala – involved in reactivity – which could
explain why adolescents are less effective in reg-
ulating their emotions and are more affected by
emotional contexts (Ahmed et al. 2015; Riediger
and Klipker 2014). However, empirical evidence
is mixed and this hypothesis thus warrants more
research.
Emotion regulation development covers the
whole lifespan, extending even into old age. It
has been repeatedly demonstrated, across cul-
tures, that older adults experience more positive
emotions and show greater emotional stability
(Sims et al. 2015; Turk Charles and Carstensen
2014), sometimes referred to as the la dolce vita
effect. This change is probably not the result of a
continuous optimization of emotion regulation as
people age, but it is assumed that the antecedent-
focused emotion regulation strategy of “selection”
lies at the core of this emotion regulation improve-
ment. Socioemotional selectivity theory proposes
that the age-related decline of resources and
awareness of limited time left to live, leads people
of age to adopt a more narrow focus on the most-
valued domains of life (Turk Charles and
Carstensen 2014). This narrow focus would
enhance emotion regulation, as older people select
situations that demand less response modulation
(Sims et al. 2015). Moreover, empirical studies
have demonstrated that older people tend to
reappraise negative daily experiences positively,
Emotion Regulation
due to the adoption of a more selective attention
focus on positive aspects over negative aspects, a
so-called positivity effect or selective cognitive
processing (Sims et al. 2015).
Conclusion
Research into emotion regulation is a fast-
evolving field of psychological study, inquiring
into up- and downregulation of both positive and
negative emotions. New insights in emotion reg-
ulation are continuously incorporated in existing
theoretical models to fully capture the complexity
of the topic. A central theoretical model on emo-
tion regulation is the process model, which
describes how emotions are regulated before
they are triggered (antecedent-focused) and how
the responses to these emotions are regulated
(response-focused). This model has been
complemented with the influence of external
agents on emotion regulation, the so-called extrin-
sic regulation processes. A recent extension of the
process model helps clarify how emotion regula-
tion strategies are selected and implemented.
What the focus of the field of emotion regula-
tion ought to be is subject of many theoretical
discussions, and conceptual boundaries of emo-
tion regulation have yet to be agreed on. Some
theorists regard all changes in behavior due to
emotions as regulation (emotions as regulator),
where others stress emotion regulation should
entail intentionality. A lack of expression of emo-
tion is sometimes equated with emotion regula-
tion, as actual regulation processes are often not
directly observable. However, this oversimplifica-
tion could cause emotion regulation to be con-
fused with a temperamental tendency of low
arousal. Further complication arises as specific
emotion regulation processes can be considered
both adaptive and maladaptive, depending on
context.
Emotion regulation is considered a central ele-
ment of child temperament and adult personality,
and emotion regulation strengths predict function-
ing in a variety of life domains. Emotion
dysregulation is considered a vulnerability for
Emotion Regulation
developing psychopathology and is central in
many of its definitions. Psychological interven-
tions aimed at emotion dysregulation are effective
methods in prevention and treatment of
psychopathology.
Emotion regulation is impacted by both bio-
logical and innate factors, as well as socialization
influences and other environmental experiences.
Technological advances are steadily helping
us unravel the biological nature of emotion reg-
ulation. The environmental factors interplay
with innate temperament and form different
capacities for emotion regulation throughout the
various developmental stages, from infancy to
adulthood.
With many difficulties yet unresolved and
many technological advances still to be made,
the inquiry into emotion regulation is a young
and dynamic field where great strides can still be
made. However, this also hampers providing a
clear definition and concise summary of the
field. For this reason, this chapter is painted in
broad strokes with its details open to discussion.
The exponential growth of empirical studies in the
last decades, demonstrating how emotion regula-
tion underlies numerous developmental outcomes
and general wellbeing across the life-span, marks
the relevance of further endeavoring into emotion
regulation.
Cross-References
▶ Appraisal Theory of Emotion
▶ Child Temperament
▶ Cognitive Theory of Emotion
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
▶ Emotional Intelligence
▶ Emotional Intensity
▶ Emotional Lability
▶ Emotional Networks in the Brain
▶ Emotion-Focused Coping
▶ Inhibited and Uninhibited Children
▶ Personality and Memory
Acknowledgments The author thanks T. A. J. van Gestel
for reviewing and editing an earlier version of this chapter.
1289
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Emotion Regulation
Difficulties Scales
▶ Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale
Emotional Affectivity
Emotion Regulation Training
▶ Social Emotional Learning (SEL) Programs
Emotional Abuse
▶ Child Abuse and Neglect
Emotional Affectivity
Monika Wróbel
Institute of Psychology, University of Lodz, Lodz,
Poland
Synonyms
Affective traits; Affectivity; Dispositional affect;
Dispositional affectivity; Dispositional emotion-
ality; Dispositional mood; Emotionality; Emo-
tional traits; Habitual emotionality; Trait affect;
Trait affectivity; Trait emotion; Trait emotional-
ity; Trait mood
Definition
Emotional affectivity is a relatively stable individ-
ual trait that refers to the extent to which people
generally experience various affective states.
Introduction
Although the capacity to experience moods and
emotions is an integral part of human existence,
people differ in the frequency and intensity of
affective experiences. This relatively stable indi-
vidual characteristic, referred to as emotional
affectivity, trait affect, or trait emotion, is defined
as an overall tendency to experience various
moods and emotions (Izard et al. 1993; Revelle
and Scherer 2009; Watson 2000). For example,
1291
individuals who are high in the trait of happiness
are prone to more frequent and more intense epi-
sodes of joy than those who are low in this trait.
They are also characterized by higher reactivity to
happiness-inducing stimuli. Similarly, those who
score high on trait anxiety run an increased risk of
experiencing anxiety and are more reactive to
anxiety-inducing stimuli than those who score
low on this trait. Put differently, emotional affec-
tivity increases the odds of experiencing affective
E
states that are congruent with it (Revelle and
Scherer 2009; Watson 2000).
State Versus Trait Affect and Emotion
The term affect refers not only to consistent, long-
term individual differences in affective experience
(emotional affectivity or trait affect; Watson 2000)
but also to transient fluctuations in mood (state
affect). A similar trait-state distinction has been
applied to emotions, e.g., trait and state anxiety
(Spielberger et al. 1983) or trait and state anger
(Amodio and Harmon-Jones 2011). This indicates
that an individual is capable of experiencing a
diverse range of affective states, but some of
these states are more frequent and more intense in
his or her everyday “stream of affect” than others
(Watson 2000). In other words, emotional affectiv-
ity refers to how a person typically feels and how
his or her typical moods and emotions differ from
someone else’s moods and emotions. Thus, trait
affect and trait emotions constitute a baseline
around which a person’s everyday affective states
vary (Watson and Clark 1994a). Importantly, emo-
tional affectivity scores – similarly to other indi-
vidual traits scores – approximate a normal
distribution (Watson 2000; Quirin et al. 2009),
which indicates that most people typically experi-
ence moderate levels of diverse affective states.
Dimensions of Emotional Affectivity
Similarly to state affect, emotional affectivity is
usually organized around two general
dimensions – positive affectivity (PA) and
1292
negative affectivity (NA). Although these terms
might suggest that PA and NA are negatively
correlated, they are conceptualized as orthogonal
or at least separable factors (Watson 2000; Yik
et al. 2011). High PA describes the tendency to
experience such states as enthusiasm, excitement,
and high energy, whereas low PA refers to the
tendency to be sleepy, drowsy, and dull. High
NA is characterized by being nervous, fearful,
and distressed most of the time, whereas low NA
is characterized by being relaxed, calm, and
placid. Individual differences in both PA and NA
have been shown to persist over time and gener-
alize across situations (for a review, see Watson
2000). PA and NA are both related to a bipolar
dimension called pleasantness–unpleasantness.
High PA and low NA are associated with pleasant
feelings (e.g., happiness, satisfaction), whereas
low PA and high NA are associated with unpleas-
ant feelings (e.g., sadness, loneliness; Watson and
Tellegen 1985; Watson et al. 1999). According to
some authors (e.g., Russell and Carroll 1999), the
existence of this bipolar dimension provides the
evidence that in fact PA and NA are not indepen-
dent factors.
Research also indicates that individual differ-
ences in the tendency to experience specific emo-
tions (e.g., fear, sadness, happiness) are relatively
stable (Izard et al. 1993; Watson 2000), which
means that some emotional states keep
reoccurring in everyday affective experience
(Scherer et al. 2004). The fact that not only gen-
eral affect but also specific emotions persist over
time and situations suggests that emotional affec-
tivity has a hierarchical structure, with certain
global dimensions (e.g., PA and NA) and sub-
dimensions corresponding to specific emotions
or mood states (Izard et al. 1993; Watson 2000).
Measurement of Emotional Affectivity
Emotional affectivity is commonly measured
with retrospective self-reports (Humrichouse
et al. 2007). Most often, participants are pre-
sented with a list of adjectives referring to vari-
ous affective states and asked to indicate to what
extent they generally feel this way or how they
Emotional Affectivity
feel on average. The most popular measure, the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson et al. 1988), consists of two 10-item
scales that measure PA and NA. Some instru-
ments also enable researchers to measure specific
trait emotions. For instance, the Differential
Emotions Scale (DES; Izard et al. 1993) consists
of 12 subscales for 12 discrete emotions. Partic-
ipants are asked to rate the extent to which they
experience these emotions on a scale ranging
from rarely or never to very often. Scores can
be averaged within each subscale to produce
individual trait emotion scores (e.g., trait enjoy-
ment or trait anger). Additionally, two global
scores may be computed (a positive emotionality
score that corresponds to PA and a negative emo-
tionality score that corresponds to NA). An
extension of the PANAS, called the PANAS-X
(Watson and Clark 1994b), also contains two
general scales (PA and NA) and 11 subscales
that assess specific mood states (e.g., joviality
and hostility) corresponding to 11 fundamental
emotions (e.g., happiness and anger).
Although retrospective self-reports can pro-
vide reliable and valid information about individ-
uals’ emotional affectivity, they are restricted by
the limits of memory (Robinson and Clore 2002;
Schwarz 2007). Thus, when measuring emotional
affectivity, some researchers rely on the experi-
ence sampling method that captures emotional
feelings as they occur in real-time. Participants
are usually asked to report their feelings at several
randomly selected times per day for one or more
weeks. These scores are then used to calculate
the frequency and intensity of these feelings,
which is interpreted as an index of emotional
affectivity (Carstensen et al. 2011; Larson and
Csikszentmihalyi 2014).
Emotional affectivity can also be measured
indirectly. In comparison with retrospective self-
report and the experience sampling method, indi-
rect assessment is believed to be less sensitive to
social desirability bias and less limited by partic-
ipants’ small capacity for self-insight because they
are not aware of what is being measured (Quirin
and Bode 2014). For instance, the Implicit Posi-
tive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin
et al. 2009) measures affectivity by asking
Emotional Affectivity
participants to rate the extent to which nonsense
words (purportedly originating from an artificial
language) bear positive or negative meaning. As
stated by the authors, the IPANAT draws on the
principle of affect infusion (Forgas 1995).
Accordingly, individual differences in the ten-
dency to ascribe positive/negative meaning to
the words reflect individual differences in PA
and NA. Moreover, similarly to direct measures,
a recently developed version of the IPANAT,
called the IPANAT-DE (Quirin and Bode 2014),
enables researchers to measure the tendency to
experience four discrete emotions (happiness,
anger, sadness, and fear).
The Biological Origins of Emotional
Affectivity
Much research suggests that emotional affectivity
is to a considerable extent biologically deter-
mined. This conclusion has been supported by
genetic and neurobiological evidence (for a
review, see Watson 2000). For instance, twin stud-
ies indicate that approximately half of the variance
in both PA and NA can be attributed to genetic
factors (Goldsmith et al. 1997; Tellegen et al.
1988). Moreover, neurobiological studies high-
light the role of individual differences in frontal
brain asymmetry. For example, people demon-
strating greater left anterior activation report
higher PA and lower NA compared with those
demonstrating greater right anterior activation,
Importantly, these patterns of activation, similarly
to PA and NA, are relatively stable over time
(Tomarken et al. 1992).
Emotional Affectivity and Demographic
Variables
Although women are often considered to be char-
acterized by higher emotional affectivity than
men, research does not support this popular belief.
For example, Watson and Clark (1994b) found no
gender differences in the PANAS-X scales in
10 large normative samples including over 8,000
participants. No gender differences were also
1293
observed for the earlier version of the scale (the
PANAS; Watson et al. 1988), the experience sam-
pling method (Oatley and Duncan 1994), and the
IPANAT (Quirin et al. 2016). This suggests that
although men and women may differ in their
emotional expressiveness, they do not differ in
subjective affective experience (Kring and
Gordon 1998).
There is also some evidence that emotional
affectivity is related to age but the findings are
E
mixed. According to Watson (2000), trait affect
does not vary as a function of age except for a
small decline of NA between the ages of 20 and
30. Some studies using the experience sampling
method (e.g., Carstensen et al. 2011), however,
suggest that affective experience improves from
early adulthood to old age (i.e., positive affective
states become increasingly more common than
negative affective states).
Correlates of Emotional Affectivity
Being an individual trait, emotional affectivity is
closely related to dimensions of temperament and
personality. The strongest and most consistent
relations are observed between PA and extraver-
sion and between NA and neuroticism (Revelle
and Scherer 2009; Watson 2000). Moreover, spe-
cific positive and negative trait emotions are also
systematically related to these two personality
dimensions (Izard et al. 1993). This, according
to Watson (Watson 2000; see also Hermes et al.
2011), indicates that PA and NA are the core
features of extraversion and neuroticism, respec-
tively. Studies using functional brain imaging sup-
port this conclusion by indicating that individual
differences in extraversion and neuroticism are
linked to individual differences in brain activation
in response to positively and negatively valenced
stimuli (Canli 2004).
Emotional affectivity is also related to subjec-
tive well-being (Watson 2000). Individuals char-
acterized by higher levels of PA and lower levels
of NA tend to be happier than individuals charac-
terized by lower levels of PA and higher levels of
NA. Importantly, trait affect accounts for more
variance in happiness than objective factors such
1294
as income, social relationships, or positive and
negative life events (Watson 2000).
Emotional affectivity is also correlated with
many forms of psychopathology including mood
and anxiety disorders. For instance, according to
the two-factor affective model, high NA is related
to both depressive and anxiety symptoms,
whereas low PA is associated only with depres-
sion (Jolly et al. 1994; Watson 2000). Moreover,
emotional affectivity is linked to physical func-
tioning. For instance, individuals who are charac-
terized by high NA show increased reactivity to
stressors and have difficulties in coping with them
(O’Brien et al. 2008). They also report more
somatic problems such as chest pain or angina
than those who are characterized by low NA
(Watson 2000).
Conclusion
Overall, substantial evidence demonstrates that
individuals differ in their predisposition to expe-
rience certain moods and emotions. Importantly,
these differences (1) are relatively stable across
time and situations; (2) could be measured with
both direct and indirect methods; (3) are to a
considerable extent biologically determined;
(4) are related to personality traits, subjective
well-being, and mental and physical health.
Cross-References
▶ Depressivity
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
▶ Emotional Intensity
▶ Extraversion
▶ Negative Affect
▶ Negative Affectivity
▶ Neuroticism
▶ Personality and Depression
▶ Positive Affect
▶ Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS)
Emotional Affectivity
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1296
Emotional Expressing
▶ Emotional Expressivity Scale
Emotional Expression
▶ Emotional Expressivity Scale
Emotional Expressiveness
Heidi R. Riggio
Department of Psychology, California State
University, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Synonyms
Emotional expressivity; Expression of emotion;
Nonverbal emotional expression
Definition
Individual ability to communicate emotional
states through nonverbal movements and
gestures.
Introduction
Emotional expressiveness can be defined as indi-
vidual ability to communicate emotional states
through nonverbal movements and gestures,
including through the face (Friedman et al.
1980a; R. E. Riggio 1986). Emotional expressive-
ness has been a construct of interest to natural
scientists since Charles Darwin and to psychology
since at least William James. Capturing the
essence and meaning of human emotions, and
our communication of emotions to each other,
has been a challenge to scholars for hundreds of
years. Nonverbal emotional expressiveness has
Emotional Expressing
been considered extensively by psychologists,
biologists, animal behaviorists, communications
scholars, anthropologists, philosophers, artists,
and scholars from a variety of other disciplines.
Social scientists and others have attempted to
study emotional expressiveness scientifically, by
measuring it in various ways, by examining rela-
tionships between expressiveness and other indi-
vidual differences, and by predicting positive and
negative psychological and social outcomes based
on its facility and regulation. This chapter exam-
ines the evolutionary basis of emotional expres-
sion, the measurement of expressiveness in
humans by social scientists, and individual psy-
chological and social outcomes associated with
emotional expression.
The Nature of Emotional Expressiveness
Facial expressions are a primary means of emo-
tional communication. They reflect internal emo-
tional states and are readily understood by
comembers of the same species or conspecifics
(Hopkins et al. 2011). Facial expressions are used
to communicate basic emotions (fear, anger, sad-
ness, disgust, happiness, and surprise; Ekman and
Friesen 1975) when in close proximity to conspe-
cifics, including about environmental stimuli that
are present (Burrows 2008). Facial expressions
signal threats (Mattavelli et al. 2014), and signal
that approach is desirable or undesirable (Fiske
et al. 2002). The most complex and easily recog-
nizable facial expressions tend to occur in highly
social species (Burrows 2008). Humans and other
primates regularly communicate internal emo-
tions through vocalizations and facial expres-
sions. Marmosets are observed to make as many
as 23 distinct facial expressions that involve com-
binations of movements of the mouth, eyes, ear
tufts, brows, and tongue (Stevenson and Poole
1976). Bonobos and other primates even show a
“play face,” a relaxed face with a slightly open
mouth that invites others to engage in playful
interaction (van Hooff and Preuschoft 2003).
Dogs are also expressive in the face
(Albuquerque et al. 2016), an evolutionarily adap-
tive quality for a domesticated species, and people
Emotional Expressiveness
agree in their identification of different canine
facial expressions (Bloom and Friedman 2013).
Human infants recognize differences in facial
expressions early after birth and show early abil-
ities to recognize and imitate a variety of facial
expressions (Field et al. 1982). Human beings
around the world recognize the posed and spon-
taneous expressions of the six basic emotions
indicated above (Ekman and Keltner 1997),
suggesting such expressions are largely universal
and not strongly influenced by socialization pro-
cesses or culture (except in terms of intensity and
frequency of expression; van Hemert et al. 2011).
Brebner (2003), using self-report measures from a
large, international sample, documented the expe-
rience of eight fundamental emotions, namely,
affection, joy, contentment, pride, fear, anger, sad-
ness, and guilt. Studies of identical twins reared
apart suggest a substantial genetic influence on
facial displays of several emotions, namely, posi-
tive emotions and anger (Kendler et al. 2008).
This body of research supports an evolutionary
basis for emotional expression; that explicit
knowledge of emotions or the role of facial
expressions and other gestures in communicating
emotions is not required. In normally developed
animals, emotional communication just happens;
it does not need to be learned. Facial expression of
emotion is said to be hardwired in the brain
instinctively (Ekman and Cordaro 2011). People
can certainly pose emotions (R. E. Riggio 1986),
but spontaneous expression of emotion is an
innate ability in normally developed humans and
other animals that is essential for communication,
social life, and survival (Kret et al. 2016).
Measures of Emotional Expressiveness
Behavioral scientists have used two broad
approaches in measuring human emotional
expressiveness, behavioral, and self-report mea-
sures. Behavioral measures generally involve
videotaping a participant’s face while he is
expressing emotions. This method can utilize
either posed or spontaneous expressions. With
posed expressions, the participant is asked to por-
tray facial expression of certain emotions, most
1297
typically the six basic emotions of surprise, hap-
piness, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness (Ekman
and Friesen 1975). With spontaneous expressions,
participants are commonly videotaped without
awareness while watching a type of emotion-
eliciting stimuli (e.g., film clips, pictures). With
both types of facial expression measures, expres-
sive ability is determined by having judges eval-
uate or score the degree to which the participant’s
facial expressions accurately express the
E
instructed or elicited emotion. The Facial Action
Coding System (FACS; Ekman and Friesen 1978)
is a well-known, highly used, thoroughly vali-
dated measure used to code various facial move-
ments associated with spontaneous expression of
different emotions. Clearly, spontaneous and
posed measures reflect different aspects of expres-
sion, with posing skills reflecting “social acting”
ability and regulation of emotional expression,
and spontaneous expressive ability more related
to an individual tendency to display emotions, a
type of dispositional expressiveness (H. R. Riggio
and R. E. Riggio 2002). Abilities to pose and
spontaneously communicate emotions nonver-
bally are positively linked, however, suggesting
that either type of measure may adequately cap-
ture dispositional emotional expressiveness.
Several validated self-report measures of emo-
tional expressiveness have been developed,
including the Affective Communication Test
(ACT; Friedman et al. 1980a), the Berkeley
Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross and
John 1995), the Emotional Expressivity Scale
(EES; Kring et al. 1994), and the Emotional
Expressivity subscale of the Social Skills Inven-
tory (SSI; R. E. Riggio 1986). Such items include
“I have been told that I have ‘expressive’ eyes”
and “quite often I tend to be the ‘life of the party’”
(R. E. Riggio 1986, p. 652). These self-report
scales are designed to measure pure emotional
(nonverbal) rather than verbal expressiveness
(i.e., expression of emotions through language).
Self-report measures of emotional expressiveness
are less costly and time-consuming and easier to
use than behavioral measures (R. E. Riggio and
H. R. Riggio 2001). Although there are clear
differences between behavioral and self-report
measures, with behavioral measures nearly
1298
always considered superior to self-report mea-
sures in psychological research (Prince et al.
2008), research indicates that scores on self-report
measures are reliably linked with other individual
differences and meaningful social and psycholog-
ical outcomes.
Emotional Expressiveness and
Personality
Various researchers, but particularly social psy-
chologists, have examined links between emo-
tional expressiveness as an individual trait (i.e.,
one’s trait-like tendency to accurately communi-
cate emotions nonverbally to others) and other
major features of human personality. There are
two ways to describe “emotional expressiveness”
as a trait. First, the term is used to denote skill in
sending messages nonverbally and facially. The
“expressive” person is the individual who is high
in emotional encoding ability; she can accurately
nonverbally communicate what she is feeling.
Emotional expressiveness is also conceptualized
as a general expressive style (Friedman et al.
1980b). Research indicates that emotional expres-
siveness as a personal style is relatively consistent
across situations (Allport and Vernon 1933) and
across the course of development (Kagan
et al. 1988).
Friedman (1979) suggested that there was a
connection between ability to express emotions
and specific personality characteristics such as
extraversion, dominance, and affiliation. In sup-
port, research indicates that posed encoding of
basic emotions is positively correlated with dom-
inance, but not with extraversion or affiliation
(Friedman et al. 1980b). But posing emotions on
cue is only one aspect of emotional expressive-
ness. Friedman et al. (1980b) argue that emotional
expressiveness involves both posed and sponta-
neous expression of emotions and that the idea of
a “natural” emotionally expressive style is a key
element of “charisma.”
In a meta-analysis of 27 studies, Riggio and
Riggio (2002) found that different measures of
emotional expressiveness are differently related
to the major personality traits of extraversion
Emotional Expressiveness
and neuroticism (emotional stability). While
extraversion (being talkative, outgoing, impul-
sive, uninhibited, sensation-seeking versus being
quiet, retiring, cautious, low-social involvement)
was positively correlated with all measures of
emotional expressiveness, self-report measures
of emotional expressiveness were significantly
more strongly correlated (with a larger effect
size) with extraversion than behavioral measures.
The opposite was true for the trait of neuroticism
(being anxious, moody, emotional versus being
calm, relaxed, low emotionality), with self-report
measures of expressiveness unrelated to neuroti-
cism and both types of behavioral measures sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with emotional
instability. Emotional expressiveness as a trait
appears to be meaningfully related to skill in and
desire for social interaction. It is also linked with
emotionality, with more emotional individuals
showing lower accuracy in expression of emo-
tions, whether posed or spontaneous measures
are used.
Sex Differences in Emotional
Expressiveness
There are clear sex and gender differences in
emotional expression. Sex (biological, physio-
logical) differences include those related to hor-
mones and other daily processes linked with
emotionality (e.g., personality traits) (Lippa
2005). In a study of 200,000 participants from
53 nations, Lippa (2010) found that women are
higher in tender-mindedness (includes sensitivity
to others and nurturance), a component of the
major trait of agreeableness, than men. Women
are also higher in fearfulness and anxiety
(components of emotional stability or neuroti-
cism) than men. In a self-report investigation
involving 6,500 adults from 41 countries,
Brebner (2003) found that women all over the
world reported more frequent and intense emo-
tional experiences than men, although differences
are rather small in terms of effect sizes. Hall
(1990) found that women were more nonverbally
expressive than men, and women have also
been found to smile more often than men
Emotional Expressiveness
(LaFrance et al. 2003). Women around the world
cry more often than men as well (van Hemert
et al. 2011).
Emotional Expressiveness and
Psychological and Social Outcomes
Expressing emotions is natural and healthy. Inten-
tionally holding in emotions is associated with
negative physical and psychological outcomes
(King and Emmons 1990). Expressive individuals
are more physically and psychologically adjusted
when confronted with stressful events, including
illness, compared to less emotionally expressive
people (Stanton et al. 2000). Medical psycholog-
ical interventions promoting expression of emo-
tion have been found to effectively improve
physical and psychological adjustment in cancer
patients (Fawzy et al. 1990). Socially, expressive
people are seen as more attractive and are more
well-liked than unexpressive people (Friedman
et al. 1988). Emotionally expressive people report
a greater number of close friends and daily
acquaintances, and lower shyness, than individ-
uals lower in expressiveness (R. E. Riggio 1986).
Research indicates that greater emotional expres-
siveness of marital partners increases mutual
understanding of partners, which leads to greater
relationship intimacy and satisfaction (Gottman
1999). Husbands’ and wives’ level of emotional
expressiveness are positively associated with per-
ceived marital quality among women (Lavee and
Ben-Ari 2004). Training in appropriate and
increased emotional expression within families is
associated with greater family communication
and family satisfaction among parents (Platsidou
and Tsirogiannidou 2016).
While greater emotional control (one’s ability to
pose, control, and mask emotional expressions;
R. E. Riggio 1986) and self-monitoring
(individual differences in ability and motivation
to regulate one’s emotional expressions across sit-
uations; Snyder 1974) are not necessarily linked to
positive social and interpersonal outcomes (Leone
and Hall 2003), low ability to regulate and control
emotional expressions is linked to poor social and
psychological outcomes, including pathology.
1299
Poor self-regulation of emotions is linked with
various psychopathologies, including borderline
personality disorder (Gratz et al. 2006), major
depression (Ehring et al. 2010), anxiety disorders
(Salters-Pedneault et al. 2006), eating disorders
(Lavender et al. 2014), and risky sexual behavior
and substance use (Tull et al. 2012).
In examining links with psychopathology,
most scholars take a broad view of emotion regu-
lation, including abilities to cognitively reassess
E
emotions, to wield control over felt emotions, and
to shape and redefine emotional experience.
Defined as such, broad emotion regulation is
linked with emotional intelligence (Flurry and
Ickes 2006). Fewer studies have specifically
examined the trait-like tendency to express emo-
tions in terms of psychological and adjustment
difficulties. The Berkeley Expressivity Question-
naire (BEQ), developed by Gross and John
(1995), is a self-report measure of three facets of
trait emotional expressivity: positive expressivity,
negative expressivity, and impulse strength.
Using the BEQ, research indicates that tendency
to express positive emotions is associated with
higher self-esteem, lower depression, and lower
anxiety and that tendency to express negative
emotions is associated with lower control of
anger and anxiety and greater emotional instabil-
ity (Lin 2016). While expressing positive emo-
tions is socially skillful and healthy and
associated with mainly positive outcomes, clearly
control overexpression of negative emotions is an
important skill for the highly expressive person
associated with positive psychological and social
outcomes.
Expressive Style: Manipulation Versus
Authenticity
In his pioneering work, Gordon Allport described
individual differences in what he called expressive
style (Allport and Vernon 1933). Expressive style
is a person’s characteristic way of doing things,
the manner in which they accomplish tasks, which
is independent of the tasks themselves. Expres-
sion of emotion is inherent in such a construct.
Ability to control and regulate emotional displays,
1300
a central feature of self-monitoring (R. E. Riggio
1986), is also important. Self-monitoring involves
the ability to mask, control, and shape emotions to
fit with current situations. Closely linked with
emotional control and self-monitoring is social
manipulation, which Riggio (1986) describes as
“a general attitude or orientation. . ..that in certain
social situations it is necessary (and useful) to
manipulate others or alter elements of the situation
to affect the outcome of social encounters”
(p. 651). Riggio (1986) assesses social manipula-
tion with items like “if I really have to, I can ‘use’
other people to get what I want” (p. 652). As
measured by the Social Skills Inventory (Riggio
1986), emotional expressivity, emotional control,
and social manipulation are significantly corre-
lated with aspects of self-monitoring. This
research suggests that emotional expressivity
may be in fact somewhat false, where individuals
are using emotional expression to manipulate
others and situations, posing emotion and acting,
rather than expressing genuinely felt emotion.
Indeed, research on self-monitoring indicates
that high self-monitoring is linked with
maintaining individual power and status in rela-
tionships with others (Gangestad and Snyder
2000), and it is the success demands of situations
that drive the high self-monitors’ expression of
emotion more than actual felt emotions (Snyder
et al. 1983).
The socially manipulative person stands in
contrast to the person who is high in emotional
expressivity, but lower in expression regulation
traits like emotional control and self-monitoring.
This person is honestly expressive; they tend to
express genuine emotions that they actually feel
across situations. The honestly expressive person
does not necessarily attend to situational cues as
guidance for emotional expression, and they do
not display emotions for purposes of social
manipulation, maintaining power, and attaining
individual goals. This type of authenticity
involves an honest display of emotions that are
appropriate to social norms and situational fea-
tures. The authentic person honestly displays
emotions without violating norms and bound-
aries of others; the emotional display is real,
Emotional Expressiveness
genuine, and does not cause discomfort in others.
Emotionally authentic individuals influence
others with their emotional displays; they draw
near to others and express emotions that others
are also experiencing. Such individuals are seen
as highly attractive, rather independently of their
actual physical attractiveness (R.E. Riggio et al.
1991). Such honest yet skillfully controlled
expressions inspire liking, loyalty, and feelings
of attraction and group cohesion in others.
Expressiveness of this kind, the courage to dis-
play real emotions in an appropriate manner
shows personal maturity and is psychologically
fulfilling.
Conclusion
Emotional expressiveness can be defined as indi-
vidual ability to communicate emotional states
through nonverbal movements, including
through the face (Riggio 1986). Expressing emo-
tions through facial and body movements is an
evolved adaptation. The ability to communicate
emotions quickly with little thought (i.e., in a
rather automatic, implicit fashion) has enhanced
the ability of hominid species to survive, begin-
ning very early in the evolutionary chain and
peaking in the modern era. As the hands were
put to greater use and as the mouth and face of
hominids changed over time, nonverbal commu-
nication became increasingly essential to sur-
vival. Human beings around the world
recognize the same basic emotions (Ekman and
Keltner 1997), a recognition that begins in
infancy (Field et al. 1982). Research supports
the role of emotional expressiveness in accuracy
of communication (Hall 1990) as well as impor-
tant psychological and social outcomes for indi-
viduals (Flurry and Ickes 2006; Gangestad and
Snyder 2000).
Scientists have developed various means of
measuring emotional expressiveness, including
measures used posed and spontaneous expression
of emotions (Ekman and Friesen 1975, 1978).
Emotional expressiveness is largely considered
to be a trait, a personal style that is consistent
Emotional Expressiveness
across situations (Allport and Vernon 1933) and
across the lifespan (Kagan et al. 1988). Emotional
expressiveness is positively correlated with extra-
version and negatively correlated with neuroti-
cism (Riggio and Riggio 2002), and women
around the world are higher in emotional expres-
siveness than men (LaFrance et al. 2003; van
Hemert et al. 2011). Repression of emotional
expression is associated with negative self-esteem
(King and Emmons 1990), and tendency to
express positive emotions is associated with
higher self-esteem, lower depression, lower anxi-
ety, and greater emotional stability (Lin 2016).
Understanding emotional expressiveness
requires an in-depth investigation of individual
variations in expressive style and the role
of emotional expressiveness in communication
processes, including one-on-one influence, leader-
ship, and group dynamics, and the transformations
in others that result from such influence. Emotional
expressiveness is vital to communication, interper-
sonal relationships, group action, social identity,
personal meaning, and worth; healthy expressive-
ness is linked to an array of individual physical,
psychological, and social outcomes. Continuing
research on the import of emotional expressiveness
for individual and group outcomes, as well as
continued development of clinical interventions
focused on improving emotional communication
for individuals, couples, and families (Platsidou
and Tsirogiannidou 2016), is essential. Increasing
research may consider the use of symbols in mod-
ern and electronic communications, including
emoticons (an image of a facial expression) and
“liking” (or being saddened by, etc.) the messages
of others. How technological advancements in
communication will impact human evolution in
the long-term should be a focus of prospective
evolutionary research examining human expres-
sion of emotions.
Cross-References
▶ Body Language
▶ Emotional Expressivity Scale
▶ Importance of Agreeableness, The
1301
▶ Personality and Romantic Relationship
Satisfaction
▶ Self-Monitoring Scale
▶ Social Interaction
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Emotional Expressivity
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
1303
Emotional Expressivity Scale
Zhuo-ya Yang, Jia Huang and
Raymond C. K. Chan
Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive
Neuroscience Laboratory, CAS Key Laboratory
of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology,
Beijing, China
Department of Psychology, University of Chinese
E
Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
Synonyms
Emotional expressing; Emotional expression;
Emotional expressiveness
Definition
A 17-item self-report measure of emotional
expressiveness.
Introduction
The self-report Emotional Expressivity Scale
(EES) was developed and validated by Kring
et al. (1994). The emotional expressiveness
assessed via this scale is conceptualized as out-
ward display of emotion in general, regardless of
the content of emotion and the way it expressed
(i.e., verbal or facial). Based on the general con-
struct of emotional expressiveness, the EES aims
to assess the extent of expressed emotions across
diversified channels. The EES is a 17-item check-
list rated by a 6-point Likert scale, with higher
score indicating higher level of emotional
expression.
Psychometric Properties
The EES was supposed to comprise a unifactorial
structure and was later supported by both explor-
atory factor analysis (EFA) (Dobbs et al. 2007;
1304
Gross and John 1998) and confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) (Dobbs et al. 2007). The EES
shows high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
a = 0.91) and test-retest (4-week interval, corre-
lation coefficient = 0.90) reliability (Kring et al.
1994). Convergent and discriminant validity of
the EES have also been established (Kring et al.
1994). The EES is correlated with various self-
rated, other-rated, and observational emotional
expression measures (Barr et al. 2008; Kring
et al. 1994). For instance, the EES was correlated
with the Emotional Expressivity Questionnaire
(EEQ) (King and Emmons 1990), which is
another self-report scale capturing specific aspects
of emotional expressivity including positive emo-
tion, negative emotion, and expression of inti-
macy. In addition, the EES was positively
correlated with affect intensity (Kring et al.
1994), extraversion, and life satisfaction (Kring
et al. 1994) and was inversely correlated with
social anhedonia and neuroticism (Kring
et al. 1994).
Validation in Different Cultures
In the past years, the EES has been translated
and validated in different cultures. The Spanish
version of EES (Piemontesi 2012) demon-
strated a one-factor model resembling the orig-
inal version of EES and showed good internal
consistency (Cronbach’s a = 0.94) and tempo-
ral stability (4-week interval, test-retest coeffi-
cients, 0.88 in women and 0.86 in men). The
Korean version of EES (Lee and Lee 1997)
also has good reliability with a Cronbach’s a
of 0.88.
However, the Chinese version of EES demon-
strated a two-factor model comprising emotion
suppression and expression rather than the
unifactorial model in the original version
(C-EES) (Chan et al. 2010). These results may
reflect cultural differences between western and
Chinese people, as Chinese people are more likely
to suppress their emotion compared to western
counterparts. A good internal consistency reliabil-
ity (Cronbach’s a = 0.88) has also been
established in the C-EES.
Emotional Expressivity Scale
Applications
The EES has been widely used in general,
subclinical, and clinical populations including
college students (Chan et al. 2010), elderly
people (Kumar 2015), people with social anhe-
donia and schizotypy (Wang et al. 2012), and
people with schizophrenia (Chan et al. 2015) as
well as post-traumatic stress syndrome (Benoit
et al. 2010).
The application of the EES yielded significant
findings on emotional expressivity in diversified
samples. Women scored significantly higher on
EES than men, supporting that women are more
emotionally expressive than men (Chan et al.
2010; Kring et al. 1994). Emotional expressivity
is also found to be a predictor of psychological
well-being (Kumar 2015) and level of psycholog-
ical distress (Marx and Sloan 2002). A high level
of emotional expressivity significantly predicted
psychological well-being, while a reluctance to
express emotion is related to high level of psycho-
logical distress (Kumar 2015).
Conclusion
In summary, the EES is a self-rated scale measur-
ing generalized emotional expressivity, which has
good reliability and validity. Different language
versions of the EES have been validated in past
years. The EES has been widely used in a variety
of clinical and non-clinical populations.
Cross-References
▶ Emotion Regulation
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
▶ Emotional Intensity
References
Barr, L. K., Kahn, J. H., & Schneider, W. J. (2008). Indi-
vidual differences in emotion expression: Hierarchical
structure and relations with psychological distress.
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 27(10),
1045–1077.
Emotional Intelligence 1305

Benoit, M., Bouthillier, D., Moss, E., Rousseau, C., &

Brunet, A. (2010). Emotion regulation strategies as Emotional Inhibition
mediators of the association between level of attachment
security and PTSD symptoms following trauma in adult-
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Chan, R. C.-k., Wang, Y., Li, H., Shi, Y., Wang, Y., Liu, W.,
& Huang, J. (2010). A 2-stage factor analysis of the
emotional expressivity scale in the Chinese context.
Psychologia, 53(1), 44–50.
Chan, R. C.-k., Shi, C., Lui, S. S. Y., Ho, K. K. Y., Hung,
K. S. Y., Lam, J. W. S., et al. (2015). Validation of the Emotional Instability
Chinese version of the clinical assessment interview for
negative symptoms (CAINS): A preliminary report. E
Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/ ▶ Emotional Lability
fpsyg.2015.00007
Dobbs, J. L., Sloan, D. M., & Karpinski, A. (2007).
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1
emotional expression: Psychological and physical cor- Department of Psychology, University of New
relates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA
58(5), 864. 2
Department of Psychology, Reed College,
Kring, A. M., Smith, D. A., & Neale, J. M. (1994). Indi-
vidual differences in dispositional expressiveness: Portland, OR, USA
Development and validation of the emotional expres-
sivity scale. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 66(5), 934.
Kumar, M. V. (2015). Emotional expressivity, loneliness
and subjective happiness as predictors of psychological Definition
wellbeing among the elderly. Indian Journal of Health
and Wellbeing, 6(12), 1169. Emotional intelligence has been conceived of in
Lee, S., & Lee, H. (1997). The research on the validation of several ways, but this entry will focus on emo-
the trait meta-mood scale: The domain exploration of
the emotional intelligence. Korean Journal of Social tional intelligence as a mental ability. The ability
and Personality Psychology, 11(1), 95–116. model of emotional intelligence defines it as the
Marx, B. P., & Sloan, D. M. (2002). The role of emotion in capacity “to reason validly with emotions and
the psychological functioning of adult survivors of with emotion-related information and to use
childhood sexual abuse. Behavior Therapy, 33(4),
563–577. emotions to enhance thought” (Mayer et al.
Piemontesi, S. E. (2012). The emotional expressivity scale 2016, p. 295). The approach has several advan-
validation in Argentine university students. Suma tages relative to other models, including its con-
Psicológica, 19(1), 59–68. ceptual clarity, the validity of its associated
Wang, Y., Neumann, D., Shum, D. H.-k., & Chan, R. C.-k.
(2012). A cross-validation study of clustering of measurement procedures, and its predictions of
schizotypy using a non-clinical Chinese sample. Psy- outcomes (Côté 2014; Mayer et al. 2008). There
chiatry Research, 200(1), 55–58. are, however, other meanings of the term.
According to the mixed model approach, emo-
tional intelligence is a diverse mixture of self-
reported personality traits such as assertiveness,
Emotional Impulsivity self-regard, independence, and empathy (Bar-On
and Parker 2000). Alternatives to the ability
▶ Emotional Lability model will be discussed in a later section of this
▶ Urgency entry.
1306
Introduction
Emotional intelligence is a cognitive ability that
operates on emotional feelings and information.
Consider Emily, a highly emotionally intelligent
young wife, who returns home with the expecta-
tion of rejoicing in her solitude. Once home, she
slumps on the couch to read. Using her emotional
intelligence, she realizes that her initial delight at
having a moment to herself has actually turned to
melancholy over being alone. Although she had
thought she was missing the plentiful solitude of
her earlier life, she now registers surprise that she
prefers to be with her husband. From that, she
reasons that she treasures her new married life.
Now feeling lonely, Emily again uses her emo-
tional intelligence to regulate her emotions by
going for a jog – an activity she knows will
improve her mood. In this example, emotional
intelligence is a mental ability that serves to iden-
tify emotions accurately, interpret their meaning,
and handle them effectively.
Intelligence in any domain involves the mental
abilities of reasoning abstractly and of success-
fully adapting to the environment. In the contem-
porary Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of
intelligences, mental abilities are arranged hierar-
chically in three levels (McGrew 2009). General
intelligence, known as “g,” is the overarching
factor at the top of the hierarchy. The second
level consists of a number of broad intelligences
including verbal intelligence, perceptual-
organizational intelligence, spatial intelligences,
and many others, each of them further divided
into specific abilities at the third tier of the
model. Emotional intelligence is currently
regarded as a broad intelligence, situated at the
second level of the hierarchy (MacCann
et al. 2014).
Broad intelligences such as emotional intelli-
gence are further classified as “cool” or “hot”
(e.g., Mayer et al. 2016). If an intelligence is
expressed in a relatively impersonal domain, that
intelligence is classified as “cool.” For example,
verbal intelligence (a broad intelligence) may be
used to understand the objective meaning of a
written passage; it is one of the “cool” intelli-
gences. In contrast, “hot” intelligences – of which
Emotional Intelligence
emotional intelligence is a member – are abilities
exercised in areas likely to involve or elicit strong
personal feelings. Other “hot” intelligences are per-
sonal intelligence and social intelligence.
Emotional intelligence is the narrowest of the
hot intelligences, as it concerns problem-solving
in the realm of emotions only. By comparison,
other hot intelligences are somewhat broader.
For example, personal intelligence is the ability
to recognize and reason about information rele-
vant to one’s own and others’ personalities
(Mayer 2008); social intelligence concerns under-
standing, reasoning about, and successfully navi-
gating the social world – particularly the world of
groups and interpersonal interactions (e.g.,
Conzelmann et al. 2013; Mayer et al. 2016).
Dealing with the interrelated, personal aspects
of human life, hot intelligences are understand-
ably correlated with one another. For example, the
strategic area of emotional intelligence and per-
sonal intelligence correlated r = 0.69 in one
study (Mayer et al. 2012a). Their correlation
with social intelligence is yet unknown because
measures of social intelligence are less developed.
Emotions are primary and universal modes of
human communication (Darwin 1872/1998); con-
ceptualizing emotional intelligence as an ability
means that people will vary in the extent that they
are able to perceive, communicate, reason about,
and manage this crucial information. Those who
are better able to detect and navigate their own
emotional states are then better able to direct
themselves to successful outcomes such as living
healthier lives (Zeidner et al. 2012).
How Did Emotional Intelligence Become
a Subject of Study?
In 1920, E. L. Thorndike posited the existence of a
social intelligence, defining it as the ability to deal
effectively with others and to behave wisely in
social relationships. Initial attempts to support this
concept empirically were unsuccessful, suffering
from both an inconsistent definition of what social
intelligence entailed and how it could be mea-
sured somewhat separately from verbal intelli-
gence (Cronbach 1960). Two decades later,
Emotional Intelligence
emotions research burgeoned, and in the late
1970s and 1980s, research examining the ways
emotion and thought influenced each other
flourished (e.g., Alloy and Abramson 1979;
Taylor et al. 1985).
By the late 1980s, researchers in psychology,
evolutionary biology, and computer science had
identified several abilities involved in understand-
ing emotions and the information they conveyed
(e.g., Isen and Means 1983). In a 1990 article,
Salovey and Mayer (1990) drew these abilities
together and suggested they were part of a unitary
construct of emotional intelligence. Over the next
decade, research interest in emotional intelligence
increased, and findings supported the possibility
that it was a unique and newly measured intelli-
gence (e.g., Mayer et al. 1999; Mayer and Geher
1996).
The ability model of emotional intelligence
centers on the idea that emotions are feeling states
that communicate signals about consequential
changes in people’s relationships with others as
well as with themselves. The abilities concern an
individual’s understanding of the emotional
meanings of inner states (such as happiness, sad-
ness, anger, and related responses) and success-
fully reasoning about them (Mayer and Salovey
1997). When someone is looking through an old
photo album, for example, she may become a bit
contemplative and melancholy. Emotional intelli-
gence would allow her to determine that she was
feeling wistful, and it would help her to identify
the source of the feeling. Was it the picture of an
old friend who had moved away that caused her
emotion, or was it the picture of her own younger
self – or perhaps both?
The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso (MSC) Theory
of Emotional Intelligence
In 1997, Mayer and Salovey proposed their four-
branch model of emotional intelligence, specify-
ing four areas (or branches, labeled after a visual,
branch-like diagram) of problem-solving about
emotions: (1) perceiving and expressing emotion,
(2) using emotion to benefit thought, (3) under-
standing and reasoning about emotion, and
1307
(4) managing emotion in one’s self and in other
people (Mayer and Salovey 1997).
The branches of the model are arranged
according to the sequence in which they develop
across the life span and the cognitive complexity
required to perform them. The first branch, consid-
ered the most psychologically basic, is the percep-
tion, appraisal, and expression of emotion. This area
concerns recognizing emotional signals and accu-
rately interpreting them, as well as communicating
E
emotion effectively. If a child appears distressed,
her emotionally intelligent father may accurately
interpret that she is worried about something.
The second branch, using emotion to facilitate
thought, represents an increased level of cognitive
complexity. This branch concerns assisting intel-
lectual processing through the use of emotional
information. For example, imagining the way he
feels when he is worried may help this dad find a
way to comfort his daughter.
Understanding emotions is the third branch in
the model, and it concerns linking feelings to
other feelings and to situations. Realizing that
the first day of school is 2 days away, the emo-
tionally intelligent father in our example may
reason that his daughter is worried about the first
day of school. Moreover, his daughter’s silence
and upset expression may alert the father that she
is hesitant to discuss the issue.
Managing and regulating emotions in oneself
and others is the fourth and most cognitively
advanced branch of the MSC model. The ability
to attend to helpful emotions and to diffuse prob-
lematic ones is the focus of this area. For example,
when talking with his daughter, the emotionally
intelligent father may choose a setting such as
hiking in nature that is likely to burn up energy
and help her manage her stress.
Alternative Conceptualization
of Emotional Intelligence: Mixed Models
There are several alternatives to ability models of
emotional intelligence. Mixed models – also
referred to as “trait emotional intelligence” – are
so-called because they mix together a variety of
different positive personality qualities and
1308
dispositions such as self-actualization, optimism,
and flexibility (Bar-On and Parker 2000) that are
neither entirely emotional nor entirely cognitive in
nature. Thus, mixed models conceptualize and
measure a construct that varies considerably
from one version to another and is not strictly
limited to intelligence about emotions. In addi-
tion, measurement using a mixed model relies on
self-report that includes, in this context, variance
unrelated to the construct being measured:
A person with high self-esteem, for example,
may overestimate herself on many socially desir-
able qualities. In terms of current standards in
testing, self-judgment elicits an inappropriate cog-
nitive process for the assessment of actual ability
and adds to construct-irrelevant variance. Both
issues argue against the validity of the approach.
How Is Ability Emotional Intelligence
Measured?
Ability-based emotional intelligence is measured
by assessing test-takers’ accurate problem-
solving in relevant areas. For example, a respon-
dent may be asked what emotion is likely to result
when feelings of fatigue and sorrow intensify (the
answer is “depression”), or what strategy might be
best to reduce anger (Mayer et al. 2003). Of
course, posing questions to people in order to
examine patterns of responding requires that
there be a “best” answer to those questions – an
answer considered “correct.” These answers can
be determined by consulting prevailing research
on the subject, by convening a panel of experts to
identify a correct response, and/or by using the
“majority rule” of test-takers in which the correct
answer is the one most respondents choose. For
many answers, expert and everyday “majority
rule” of test-takers converges (Mayer
et al. 2003), but this may not always be the case.
Expert consensus or veridical scoring is generally
regarded as superior for more complex problems
(MacCann and Roberts 2008; Mayer et al. 2016).
The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelli-
gence Test (MSCEIT) is the most commonly used
test of emotional intelligence (Côté 2014;
Emotional Intelligence
Fernández-Berrocal, and Extremera 2016). It has
tasks designed to measure problem-solving ability
in each of the four branches specified by the
theory – perceiving emotions, facilitating thought
using emotion, understanding emotion, and regu-
lating emotion (Mayer et al. 2016). Although the
underlying factor structure of emotional intelli-
gence remains in question, the four problem-
solving areas employed by the MSCEIT and the
overall test provide reliable scores (Mayer
et al. 2012b).
Two other promising tests are the Situational
Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU) and the
Situational Test of Emotional Management
(STEM). These present test-takers with hypothet-
ical situations, asking them to indicate the emo-
tion that the situation might bring about (in the
STEU), or the effectiveness of different kinds of
emotional management (in the STEM). The
STEM and STEU appear to measure problem-
solving in the areas of appraising emotion and
regulating emotion, respectively. Evidence for
their validity is just beginning to be collected
(Allen et al. 2015; MacCann and Roberts 2008).
What Does It Mean to Be Emotionally
Intelligent?
Research assessing the relation between emo-
tional intelligence (as measured by the MSCEIT)
and various outcomes is robust, and a full review
is beyond the scope of this entry. For that reason,
we present some of the most common correlates,
as indicated by several recent reviews. Major
areas of research have examined emotional intel-
ligence as it relates to quality of life and relation-
ships, mental and physical health, and education
and employment.
People higher in emotional intelligence tend to
be agreeable, open to new experience, and con-
scientious (Mayer et al. 2016). They tend to view
themselves as interpersonally sensitive and pro-
social, and other people view them the same way
(Lopes et al. 2005). For children as well as adults,
emotional intelligence is associated with better
social relationships and decreased use of negative
Emotional Intelligence
interpersonal strategies such as criticism and
avoidance. People feel more comfortable with
closeness, and they have relationships they per-
ceive as supportive. They are also less likely to
create interpersonal conflict (Brackett et al. 2011).
In addition to satisfying and healthy relation-
ships, people higher in emotional intelligence are
more likely to be mentally and physically healthy.
They are less likely to suffer from depression, and
they are more likely to experience higher life
satisfaction (Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera
2016). In addition to better psychological health,
emotional intelligence may promote better physi-
cal health (Zeidner et al. 2012). There is some
evidence of an inverse relationship between emo-
tional intelligence and unhealthy behavior like
substance use and abuse (Brackett et al. 2011).
At school, the emotionally intelligent student is
more likely to have a positive attitude toward
education. He or she is less likely to experience
learning problems or issues with bullying,
although evidence showing a relation to academic
performance has been mixed (Brackett et al.
2011). At work, employees with higher emotional
intelligence respect the corporate culture and
receive high ratings from supervisors and peers.
He or she is likely to have high job satisfaction,
to be seen by managers as an effective leader,
and to take negative learning incidents in stride
(Côté 2014).
Conclusion
Emotional intelligence is a cognitive ability that
operates on emotional information. It involves
problem-solving in the areas of perceiving emo-
tion, using emotion to facilitate thought, under-
standing emotion, and regulating emotion.
Emotional intelligence, as determined by the
MSCEIT ability measure, predicts important out-
comes such as quality of relationships and health-
promoting behavior. Emotional intelligence has
also been conceptualized through mixed models
that include personality characteristics and moti-
vations in addition to the intellectual qualities
connoted by the term “intelligence.”
1309
Viewing emotional intelligence as an individ-
ual difference variable that assesses an ability
carries certain implications. A person’s emotional
intelligence, for instance, should be considered in
career selection so that his or her abilities are equal
to the tasks required on the job. Interpersonally,
conceptualizing emotional intelligence as an abil-
ity may change the way we view those with whom
we have a relationship. Perhaps that friend really
cannot understand why we are upset – and we
E
should no longer expect them to. Defining emo-
tional intelligence as an intelligence may also
influence societal values. Recognizing that some
people are particularly good at reasoning about
emotions may make that quality more prized and
sought after by those who do not possess the same
degree of ability.
The future of research in emotional intelli-
gence will continue to extend its application into
education, employment, and health. There is evi-
dence that emotional intelligence can be taught in
schools, resulting in greater academic success for
students, better teacher-student relationships, and
decreased problematic behaviors among students
(Durlak et al. 2011). In employment, there is
evidence that emotional intelligence enhances
leadership (Ashkanasy and Humphrey 2011),
and this continues to be a flourishing area of
research. In the area of health, substantial evi-
dence links emotional intelligence to well-being
(e.g., Zeidner et al. 2012), and there is interest in
developing programs using emotional intelli-
gence to alleviate issues such as depression.
Attention to and interest in emotional intelligence
has risen over the past 25 years; compelling find-
ings and the pervasive nature of emotional infor-
mation in human life promise that this trend will
continue.
Cross-References
▶ Emotion Regulation
▶ Intelligence
▶ Mayer, John D.
▶ Personal Intelligence
▶ Social Intelligence
1310
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Emotional Intensity
Nobuhiko Goto1 and Alexandre Schaefer2
1
School of Business, Monash University
Malaysia, Bandar Sunway, Selangor Darul Ehsan,
Malaysia
2
Department of Psychology, Monash University,
Malaysia Campus, Bandar Sunway, Selangor
Darul Ehsan, Malaysia
Synonyms
Affect intensity; Strength of emotional experiences
Definition
Emotional intensity refers to variations in the
magnitude of emotional responses.
Introduction
Research on emotional intensity started receiving
more attention when Frijda et al. (1992) expressed
their concerns about a lack of research on this topic.
They argued that, although people often express
their emotional experiences in terms of intensity,
no systematic investigation had been done on how
emotional intensity should be defined, operationalized,
and measured. This state of affairs resulted in the
proposal of a number of prominent theories of
emotional intensity during the 1990s. However,
despite the relevance of these proposals, not much
effort has been made to articulate them into an
integrated model. Furthermore, interest in empirical
research focusing explicitly on emotional intensity
appears to have decreased after 2000s.
1311
Nevertheless, interesting developments involving
research using neuroimaging techniques have pro-
vided new insights into this question.
This entry first introduces three theories about
subjective emotional intensity. While there may
be more theories addressing the issue of emotional
intensity, it is important to note that this text is not
intended to be an exhaustive list of all these the-
ories. Instead, this entry provides a focus on those
that are generally perceived as being the most
E
influential in this field. Discussion of these theo-
ries is followed by a brief outline of studies that
investigated the physiological correlates of sub-
jective emotional intensity. These studies include
earlier and more recent research that examined
emotional intensity using techniques such as facial
muscle electromyography (EMG), skin conduc-
tance, EEG, and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). Next, issues of individual differ-
ences in emotional intensity are discussed, and
finally, the question of emotional intensity mea-
surement is examined in depth.
Subjective Emotional Intensity
The Five Dimensional Model of Subjective
Emotional Intensity
Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) proposed and exam-
ined a five -dimensional model of subjective emotional
intensity. These five dimensions are (1) frequency
and strength of recollection and reexperience of
an emotion, (2) latency and duration of an emo-
tion, (3) strength and “drasticness” of action ten-
dency and actual behaviors, (4) changes in beliefs
and long-term behaviors, and (5) strength and dura-
tion of perceived bodily changes and inertia/pas-
sivity. Examples of questionnaire items for each
of these dimensions include (1) “Were these rec-
ollections accompanied with an emotion?,”
(2) “How long did the whole emotion last?,”
(3) “How drastic were the actions you had an
impulse to take? (e.g., killing someone is more
drastic than calling names, to embrace someone is
more drastic than to hold someone’s hand.),”
(4) “To what extent did the emotion and the events
change your opinion about or feelings towards
yourself?,” and (5) “How long did the bodily
1312
changes last (the bodily change with the longest
duration)?.” The authors demonstrated that these
are relatively independent from each other and
moderately correlated with an overall rating of
subjective emotional intensity. While higher rat-
ings on given dimensions should indicate more
intense emotional experiences, Sonnemans and
Frijda (1994) found mixed results for the relation-
ship between duration and intensity. They found
that the correlation between duration and the over-
all subjective intensity for fear was small and
negative and for anger was positive yet very
small. Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) reported evi-
dence that these small correlations were specific to
cases in which the emotional state had come to an
end because of factors beyond the control of the
individual, whereas this correlation was strong
and positive when the emotional state ended because
of regulation efforts made by the individual.
In fact, this theoretical approach suggests that
external situations could influence the intensity of
any emotions. Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) found
that the relationships between each of their pro-
posed dimensions and overall intensity varied
according to different emotions. In addition they
also suggest that these relationships may vary
according to different individuals and temporal
contexts. Therefore, they argued that any particu-
lar dimension or the overall intensity rating cannot
be consistently connected to a particular emotion,
while combinations of these five dimensions
would be better predictors of the intensity of spe-
cific emotions.
While Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) explicitly
focused on the subjective aspect of emotional
intensity, despite past failures (c.f., Frijda et al.
1991), they thought that emotional intensity could
be measured objectively. They suggested that
actual physiological responses and observable
behaviors could be potential measures of inten-
sity. Physiological correlates of emotional inten-
sity are discussed later in this entry.
Emotional Intensity as a Function of
Deterrence to an Aim of an Emotion
In the late 1990s, Jack Brehm proposed an inter-
esting model of emotional intensity (Brehm 1999)
based on functionalist views of emotion. He
Emotional Intensity
proposed that the intensity of an emotional state
was under the influence of mainly two factors: the
potential outcome that “instigates” an emotion
and the “perceived deterrence” against attaining
these outcomes. Emotions are seen as urges to
attain a given outcome, and the “importance” of
these outcomes was seen by Brehm as being
essential to the emotional intensity. This aspect
of Brehm’s theory is largely compatible with
many other emotion theories positing that the
degree of motivational relevance of an emotion
determines its intensity. For instance, for most
people, the fear triggered by a tangible threat to
survival (e.g., someone pointing a weapon toward
the individual) will be felt more intensely than the
fear of arriving late to a meeting. The second
aspect of Brehm’s theory is more idiosyncratic:
He posited that emotional intensity was modu-
lated by the perceived deterrence, which was
defined as the factors that impede the achievement
of the outcome of a given emotional situation. In
fact, deterrence seemed to be operationalized by
Brehm (1999) as anything that could induce emo-
tional states contrary to the main emotional state
induced by a given situation. For instance, Brehm
(1999) uses the example of an individual who
feels anger caused by someone “jumping a
queue.” A deterrent to this anger would be a
situation in which this individual receives a com-
pliment from the person who caused the anger.
Specifically, Brehm hypothesized that deterrence
would have a nonlinear relationship with emo-
tional intensity: Low levels of deterrence would
not fuel emotional intensity, while moderate levels
would increase emotional intensity, and yet high
levels would inhibit emotional intensity.
Brehm (1999) provides several empirical
examples of the effects of deterrence on emo-
tional intensity. One of them is a study on
sadness (Brehm et al. 1999). In this experi-
ment, participants were asked to read a short
story designed to induce sadness. Right after
reading the story, participants were given mon-
etary rewards ($1, $2, or $3), which suppos-
edly induced pleasure, an emotion contrary to
sadness. In the control condition, participants
indicated their feeling without receiving the
reward. The results showed that participants
Emotional Intensity
receiving $1 reported less sadness than those
in the control condition. Participants receiving
$2 reported more sadness than those in the
other experimental conditions. When the deter-
rence was too high ($3), the intensity
decreased, thereby supporting the notion of a
nonlinear relationship between deterrence and
intensity.
A Bidimensional Approach of Assessing
Emotional Intensity
A popular theoretical approach to emotions (Russell
1980) posits that all emotional experiences can be
described in a two-dimensional space delimited
by emotional valence (positive vs. negative emo-
tions) and arousal (high-low). This approach is
still influential nowadays, and many authors
seem to implicitly assume that the dimension of
arousal reflects emotional intensity. Reisenzein
(1994) proposed a more complex approach: He
argued that the quality of an emotion can be deter-
mined by the proportion of pleasure (i.e., emo-
tional valence) and arousal and the intensity of an
emotion by the sum of the absolute values of both.
For instance, an individual may rate pleasantness
of his/her feeling on a 7-point scale (
3 to 3) as

2 and arousal on another 7-point scale (1–7) as
6 to report anger. Another individual may report
stronger levels of anger. In such case, he or she
may rate
3 on the pleasantness scale and 7 on the
arousal scale. That is, the proportion between
pleasantness and arousal remains identical for a
same emotion (e.g., 1 point down on one scale
always accompanies 1 point up on the other, as
long as these scores are rated for a same emotion.),
and their intensity can be differentiated by their
absolute values (i.e., |
2| and |6| = 8 vs. |
3| and
|7| = 10). In the empirical research presented by
Reisenzein, participants were asked to rate more
than 30 emotion words based on their beliefs
about levels of pleasure and arousal linked to
those words. Each word was presented three
times; one with a word indicating low intensity
(e.g., “a little”), a second time with a word indi-
cating high intensity (e.g., “extremely”), and the
third time without any accompanying words.
Results were largely consistent with Reisenzein’s
model: The proportion of pleasure and arousal
1313
remained similar regardless of the intensity,
while the absolute values increased from the low
to high intensity.
Commonalities and Differences of
Subjective Emotional Intensity Theories
A basic assumption common to the three theories
explained above is that any basic emotions can
E
vary in intensity levels. For example, one can feel
a little sad or extremely sad. It should be noted,
however, that this does not mean an emotion can
take any levels of arousal and/or valence beyond
other kinds of emotions. If arousal is extremely
high beyond the level of sad, it may be called by
different names such as “sorrow” (e.g., Russell
1980). The proposed dimensionality of emotional
intensity is an aspect in which the three aforemen-
tioned theories differ. Sonnemans and Frijda
(1994) proposed five dimensions, while Brehm
(1999) suggested that emotional intensity can be
measured with a unidimensional scale. Reisenzein
(1994) proposed two components, pleasure and
arousal, to measure emotional intensity.
These differences between theories might be
due to different assumptions of inter- and intra-
subject consistency. Sonnemans and Frijda (1994)
explicitly admitted that different individuals have
different ways of reporting intensity and same
individuals may also report intensity differently
for the same emotion on different occasions, and
thus they suggested that using their five proposed
dimensions was the most adequate way to mea-
sure emotional intensity. On the other hand,
Brehm (1999) and Reisenzein (1994) assume
that individuals can report their emotional inten-
sity consistently on the overall intensity rating or
the two-dimensional scale, respectively. How-
ever, Reisenzein (1994) found that some individ-
uals rated pleasure and arousal of some emotions
differently than others. When assessing subjective
emotional intensity, researchers need to consider
how consistently a targeted emotion can be rated
by different individuals at different times. If inter-
and intra-individual consistency cannot be expected
for a targeted emotion, more extensive, multi-
dimensional scales may be more adequate.
1314
Physiological Correlates of Emotional
Intensity
Facial Muscle Responses and Valence
Lang et al. (1993) provided a physiological per-
spective to emotional intensity that has conceptual
links with the pleasure-arousal dimensions discussed
above. Their study presented pictures to partici-
pants while recording facial electromyographic
and visceral reactions. They also asked partici-
pants to rate pleasure and arousal of presented
pictures. The results found that pleasure ratings
were negatively associated with EMG activity on
the corrugator supercilii (frown muscle) and pos-
itively with EMG activity in the zygomaticus
major (smile muscle). The corrugator activity
was particularly strong for unpleasant pictures,
while the zygomatic activity was strong for pleas-
ant pictures. These results indicate that the
strength of facial EMG activity could be used to
measure emotional intensity in a differentiated
way for positive and negative emotions. The link
between facial EMG and emotional experience
has been demonstrated many times, and EMG
activity measured from the corrugator activity
when participants are viewing unpleasant pictures
is known to be greater than EMG measured, while
participants view neutral pictures. In addition,
corrugator EMG is smaller during pleasant com-
pared to neutral picture viewing (Larsen et al.
2003). Therefore, corrugator activity by itself is
perceived by many as an estimation of emotional
intensity that can differentiate negative and posi-
tive emotional intensity. However, it is relatively
uncertain if corrugator activity measures grada-
tions in intensity or if it just indexes the negative
or positive quality of an emotional state. Existing
evidence suggests that the corrugator may not be
sensitive to different gradations of positive emo-
tional arousal (Fujimura et al. 2010). On the other
hand, the zygomaticus seems to be more linked to
positive emotional states and can measure grada-
tions of positive emotional arousal (Fujimura
et al. 2010).
Skin Conductance Responses and Arousal
Lang et al. (1993) also found that arousal was
positively correlated with skin conductance
Emotional Intensity
responses. Again, based on Reisenzein (1994),
this indicates that the stronger skin conductance
responses are, the more intense (more arousing)
emotions individuals are feeling. In general, skin
conductance responses are sensitive to the inten-
sity of emotional stimulation, regardless of the
type of emotions. For instance, Schaefer and
Philippot (2005) showed that skin conductance
levels were higher when participants were
recollecting emotional rather than neutral autobio-
graphical memories, regardless of the positive or
negative nature of the memories. In addition, both
Bradley et al. (1992) and Greenwald et al.
(1989) have demonstrated that skin conductance
increases gradually as subjective arousal increases.
These findings suggest that skin conductance
measures are a robust physiological method to
estimate varying levels of emotional intensity.
Event-Related Potentials (ERP)
ERPs are patterns of electrical brain activity
derived from scalp electroencephalogram (EEG)
measures and evoked by particular events (e.g.,
visual stimuli displayed on a screen). Emotional
arousal and intensity have often been associated to
a specific type of ERP termed the late positive
potential (LPP), which is characterized by a
more positive voltage for emotional than neutral
pictures (Walker et al. 2011). This differentiation
typically starts at around 300 ms after stimulus
onset and can persist during several seconds after
the stimulus was first shown to the participants
(Cuthbert et al. 2000; Foti and Hajcak 2008). In an
experiment in which participants were exposed to
pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral pictures, Schupp
et al. (2000) found that unpleasant and pleasant
pictures produced larger LPPs than neutral pic-
tures from 350 to 700 ms after the stimulus onset.
Schupp et al. (2000) also found that highly arous-
ing pictures, based on the normative arousal rat-
ings, elicited larger LPPs than less arousing pictures.
This result is consistent with Cuthbert et al. (2000)
and indicates that the LPP is sensitive to different
grades of emotional intensity. Differences in LPPs
between pleasant and unpleasant pictures were
not found. LPPs usually do not differ between
positive and negative pictures if arousal levels
are properly equated (Olofsson et al. 2008). Taken
Emotional Intensity
together, these results seem to suggest that ERPs
are able to index the strength of emotional intensity.
Functional Neuroimaging
Emotional intensity has also been investigated
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
a method that measures brain activity through the
estimation of blood flow changes in the brain.
A number of studies have found that the amyg-
dala, a subcortical structure located in the medial
temporal cortex, is consistently linked to emo-
tional intensity regardless of the type of emotion
(positive vs. negative). This result was obtained
with emotional pictures (Kensinger and Schacter
2006), olfactory stimuli (Anderson et al. 2003),
and gustatory stimuli (Small et al. 2003). The link
between the amygdala and changes in emotional
intensity may be caused by the hypothesized link
between the amygdala and the evaluation of the
relevance of the current situation for the goals of
the individual (Schaefer et al. 2006).
Another interesting development on fMRI
explorations of emotional intensity has been pro-
vided by Waugh et al. (2010), who focused on
neural temporal dynamics of blood-oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) responses. More specifically,
they focused on height and width of BOLD
responses, which can be assumed to roughly
refer to “neural firing rate” and “duration of neural
firing,” respectively, and argued that emotional
intensity should be related to the width of brain
activation or duration of neural firing. They also
argued that, based on Larsen and Diener (1987),
people would feel more intense emotions when
they relate themselves with emotion-instigating
events or when they put themselves into situa-
tions and hypothesized that emotional intensity
would be reflected in cortical midline regions
which are associated with self-referential thought.
In their experiment (Waugh et al. 2010), partici-
pants were presented with negative, neutral, and
positive pictures, while their brain activities were
recorded with fMRI. They were also asked to rate
emotional intensity and valence of the presented
pictures with single-item measures.
The results indicated that height of activation
to high-intense negative pictures was greater than
to low-intense negative ones only in the inferior
1315
occipital cortex. On the other hand, longer width
of activation to high-intense negative pictures was
observed compared to low-intense negative ones
in the cortical midline regions (anterior medial
prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex),
which supported their argument. For positive pic-
tures, greater height of activation to the high-
intense than low-intense pictures was observed
in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, inferior
frontal gyrus, mid-insula, thalamus, and hippo-
E
campus. However, differences in width of activa-
tion between high- and low-intense positive
pictures were not observed in any region. Waugh
et al. (2010) explained these different activation
patterns to positive and negative pictures by argu-
ing that people may not elaborate on self-referent
thoughts when they experience positive emotions.
At a glance, Waugh et al. (2010) may appear
to have added another dimension to emotional
intensity by referring to self-referencing process.
However, it may be a part of a wider process. Self-
referencing process may make individuals moti-
vated to take some actions. When valence of the
emotion evoked by the event is extreme, individuals
would engage in self-referencing thought more, be
motivated further, and take probably more drastic
actions to change or adapt to the situation. There-
fore, these constructs of motivation (Brehm 1999),
(drastic) action tendency (Sonnemans and Frijda
1994), and the self-referencing process may be
related to each other and all together with emotional
intensity. More research is still needed to examine
whether they are actually related and whether there
are causal relations or temporal order among them.
Individual Differences
It is often assumed that the same emotional stim-
ulus can lead to different levels of emotional
intensity for different individuals. This section
focuses on variables that cause such individual
differences.
Appraisals
Individuals can differ in the way that they “appraise”
or evaluate the significance of an emotional situ-
ation. These differences can stem from differences
1316
in personal history, genetics, or culture (Scherer
et al. 2001). Several authors defined lists of
“appraisal components,” which can be seen as
discrete criteria along which individuals evaluate
an emotional situation. One of the most important
appraisal components has been termed “motiva-
tional relevance” (Lazarus 1991) or “goal condu-
civeness” (Scherer et al. 2001). This concept refers
to the evaluation of the extent to which a situation
is relevant for one’s goals and can be found, under
different names, in the models of Sonnemans and
Frijda (1995), and Brehm (1999). The evaluation of
motivational relevance is highly dependent on the
individual’s history of personal experiences
(Scherer et al. 2001), which can in part form the
basis for individual differences in emotional intensity.
Personality
Personality is also believed to play a role in emo-
tional intensity. For example, Bachorowski and
Braaten (1994) developed the Emotional Intensity
Scale (EIS) which focused on the level of arousal
and “drasticness” of behavior. These authors
obtained results indicating that emotional inten-
sity correlated with two well-known personality
dimensions, extraversion and neuroticism. Specif-
ically, positive emotional intensity correlated with
extraversion and that negative emotional intensity
correlated with neuroticism. The authors also exam-
ined correlations of these personality dimensions
with Affect Intensity Measure (AIM), which they
criticized on the grounds that this measure con-
founded intensity with frequency. The results
indicated that AIM correlated with both extraver-
sion and neuroticism, but when the correlations
were calculated separately for male and female
participants, the correlations were significant
only for female participants. McFatter (1998)
also used EIS but separated it into three catego-
ries, positive intensity (PI) such as happiness and
pleasure, anger-related intensity (AI) such as anger
and frustration, and other negative intensity (NI)
such as guilt, sadness, and worry, and examined
their relations with personality with ten times
more participants than Bachorowski and Braaten
(1994). The regression results indicated that,
unlike Bachorowski and Braaten (1994), PI was
positively associated with both extraversion and
Emotional Intensity
neuroticism, although the association was stron-
ger with extraversion than neuroticism. NI was
also negatively associated with extraversion, and
it was positively associated with neuroticism,
although the association with neuroticism was
stronger than with extraversion. AI was positively
associated with both of them, while the associa-
tion with neuroticism was stronger. The results
also found that sociability, another personality
trait defined by the motivation to interact with
others, was positively correlated with PI and neg-
atively with NI and AI, particularly among female
participants. Impulsivity was correlated positively
with PI, negatively with NI, and positively with
AI for both male and female participants, although
the effects were much smaller. These results sug-
gest that personality has a complex relationship
with emotional intensity that can be modulated by
gender and emotional category.
Gender
It has been generally supported that women expe-
rience, or at least report, more intense emotions
than men with different measures of subjective
emotional intensity (Diener et al. 1985; Fujita
et al. 1991; McFatter 1998). Lang et al. (1993)
found that corrugator response of women was
greater than men and that the association between
valence judgments and facial muscle responses
(corrugator and zygomatic activity) was also stronger
among women than men. On the other hand, the
authors found that associations between skin con-
ductance response and arousal judgments were
stronger among men than women.
Group Identification
Emotions described above so far refer to those
experienced as an individual. However, people
also feel emotions relative to their commitment
to their group. Such emotions are called group-
based emotions or collective emotions or intergroup
emotions when they are instigated in the context
of relationships between different groups. It is
thought that there are important individual differ-
ences regarding the extent to which an individual
can feel identified to a group. These individual
differences can potentially modulate the intensity
of the emotions felt toward their own or other
Emotional Intensity
groups (Mackie et al. 2000). It is assumed that for
emotions targeted at other groups, such as anger,
group identification is positively related with
intensity of the emotions (Mackie et al. 2000).
However, for negative emotions elicited by one’s
group actions, such as guilt, the relationship is
more complex, and some studies have argued
that the relationship between emotional intensity
and group identification is negative in this case
(e.g., Doosje et al. 1998). That is, strong identi-
fiers should experience less guilt as they are moti-
vated to justify the act or to underestimate its
outcome. Others have argued that it depends on
how group identification is measured (Roccas
et al. 2006) or which aspect of the group individ-
uals is identified with (Goto and Karasawa 2011).
In summary, this trend of research strongly sug-
gests that processes of social identification can
significantly modulate the intensity of emotions
felt toward a group with which individuals feel
identified and toward another group which they
perceive as different.
Conclusion: How to Define and Measure
Emotional Intensity?
The ideas and findings presented above lead to a
number of conclusions: (1) Emotional intensity is
typically defined as a quantitative dimension relatively
independent from qualitative differences between
emotional categories. In other words, it is often
seen as a variation in the magnitude of emotional
activation, regardless of the type of emotion (e.g.,
anger vs. happiness, negative vs. positive). (2) An
important aspect of emotional intensity seems to
be its hypothesized motivational root: Emotional
intensity is often believed to be directly related to
the motivational relevance of a situation (Brehm
1999; Sonnemans and Frijda 1994; Lang et al.
1993). (3) Emotional intensity is multifaceted: It
can be manifested through subjective emotional
experiences, but also in terms of facial, visceral,
and neural responses.
The main consequence of this multifaceted
definition is that there are multiple ways to mea-
sure emotional intensity. To measure emotional
intensity as a subjective experience, several
1317
methods have been explored: First, a specific
scale can explicitly require an individual to rate
its global level of perceived intensity of emo-
tional feelings (Schaefer et al. 2010). Second,
existing questionnaires measuring a profile of
different types of emotional categories can be
used (e.g., the Differential Emotions Scale,
Izard et al. 1974). Next, ratings of a peak-rated
emotional category can be used to estimate emo-
tional intensity (Gross and Levenson 1995; Allen
E
et al. 2014). Additionally, Sonnemans and Frijda
(1994) also proposed to measure subjective emo-
tional intensity on the basis of five specific eval-
uative dimensions.
Regarding physiological measures of emotional
intensity, existing data suggests that both the LPP
and skin conductance measures are reliable mea-
sures of emotional intensity because they are sen-
sitive to graded differences in intensity, regardless
of emotional valence (positive vs. negative).
Finally, hemodynamic estimates of neural activity
in the amygdala seem to provide a robust indica-
tion of emotional intensity, although amygdala
activity cannot be seen as a unitary measure of
emotional intensity as it also reflects other cogni-
tive and motivational processes.
In summary, emotional intensity is a multifac-
eted phenomenon with a rich theoretical history
that has inherent confounds with the concept of
emotion itself. The validity of its measurement
depends on many factors: Which emotional categories
are under investigation, which aspects of intensity
are the most important for the research question
(subjective vs. physiological), is the research ques-
tion dependent on a social context (e.g., intergroup
emotions), are individual differences relevant to
the research question?
Cross-References
▶ Appraisal Theory of Emotion
▶ Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
▶ Facial Expressions and Emotion
▶ International Affective Picture System
▶ Negative Affect
▶ Positive Affect
▶ Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion (Plutchik)
1318
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1319
Emotional Lability
Kirsten D. Leaberry, Danielle M. Walerius,
Paul J. Rosen and Nicholas D. Fogleman
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences,
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA
Synonyms
E
Affective instability; Affective lability; Emotional
impulsivity; Emotional instability; Emotional var-
iability; Mood instability; Mood lability
Definition
Emotional lability is a distinct emotional process
characterized by frequent, excessively rapid, and
intense changes in emotions resulting in an inabil-
ity to maintain a consistent emotional state
over time.
Introduction
Emotional lability is a distinct maladaptive pattern
of emotion dysregulation characterized by fre-
quent, rapid, and intense shifts in emotional states.
Greater emotional lability tends to indicate that an
individual has a more emotionally reactive
response style to positive and negative events
(Larsen et al. 2000). This reactive response style
likely contributes to emotion dysregulation both
immediately and longitudinally. Immediately, it
may manifest through rapid and intense emotional
shifts in response to an encountered emotional
stimulus. The rapidity and intensity of such emo-
tional shifts may prevent the usage of effective
regulatory strategies (Sheppes and Levin 2013).
Over time, this pattern of impulsive emotional
responding and deficient emotion regulation
leads to more unstable and unpredictable emo-
tional states and greater deviation from an emo-
tional baseline (Larsen et al. 2000). Not
1320
surprisingly, this pattern of emotional lability has
been associated with numerous negative out-
comes in children and adults, including poor frus-
tration tolerance, internalizing and externalizing
difficulties, irritability, more intense experiences
of positive and negative affect, and greater func-
tional impairment (Anastopoulos et al. 2011;
Sobanski et al. 2010).
Research on emotional lability is rather convo-
luted as the construct has been given numerous
labels in the scientific literature. Indeed, emo-
tional lability has been referred to as affective
instability, affective intensity, affective lability,
emotional impulsivity, emotional instability,
mood instability, and mood lability. Notably, the
variability in such terminology is not always con-
sistent or correct, and although various terms are
used to describe emotional lability, it is necessary
to make distinctions. In a review on “affective
instability,” Marwaha et al. (2014) found that the
terms affective, mood, and emotional instability/
lability are often used interchangeably because
they refer to similar attributes. Thus, the defini-
tions of these terms across papers likely apply to
each other and can potentially assist in improving
the conceptualization of emotional lability as a
unique dysregulatory process. For instance,
Marwaha et al. (2014) noted that the attributes of
emotional instability include three core elements:
oscillation, intensity, and subjective ability to reg-
ulate affect and its behavioral consequences.
Based on this description, it is evident that emo-
tional lability is a multidimensional construct
comprised of the frequency, intensity, volatility/
instability, and duration of emotional states.
In another review conceptualizing “affective
instability,” Koenigsberg (2010) defined affective
instability as frequent affective category shifts and
disturbances in affect intensity. More specifically,
Koenigsberg (2010) stated that affective instabil-
ity leads to an overdramatic expression of emo-
tions through internally driven rapid-cycling
changes, which is caused by excessive reactivity
to social or environmental cues, rapid emotional
rise-times, and a delayed ability to return to a
physiological baseline. This definition essentially
captures how the emotional response pattern of
emotionally labile individuals leads to excessive
Emotional Lability
emotionality in the moment due to difficulties
regulating physiological arousal and difficulties
maintaining or returning to a more adaptive emo-
tional state. Over time, this emotionally labile
response pattern may affect variability in mood,
which may in turn have severe social and psycho-
logical consequences.
To date, the exact prevalence rates of emo-
tional lability are unknown; however, Marwaha
et al. (2013) conducted a study investigating prev-
alence rates of “affective lability” in an English
population of individuals 16 years of age and
older. Thus, some assumptions regarding the
prevalence rates of emotional lability may be
drawn from this study despite the different termi-
nology used. Marwaha et al. (2013) found that
affective lability occurred in 13.9% of study par-
ticipants, with a peak prevalence in young women
ages 16–24. Although the current study was iso-
lated to English individuals 16 years and older,
these findings suggest that a large percentage of
individuals demonstrate sudden and frequent
shifts in emotions and have difficulty maintaining
a consistent emotional state. Furthermore, these
findings suggest that women between the ages of
16 and 24 may be particularly vulnerable to
experiencing higher rates of emotional lability
relative to others in the English population.
Given that cultural considerations exist in the
understanding of emotional lability (Sobanski
et al. 2010), these findings may not generalize to
populations throughout the world. Indeed,
Sobanski et al. (2010) note that frequent and sud-
den shifts in emotional states are only deemed
inappropriate when they violate cultural norms.
Therefore, emotional lability may be difficult to
study on a global scale as it may be a culturally
ambiguous construct. Further research examining
the prevalence of emotional lability cross-
culturally is an area of research that is needed.
This review of emotional lability seeks to use
terms as originally labeled in their respective stud-
ies, distinguish between different terminologies
when appropriate, and define emotional lability
as a unique theoretical construct by streamlining
findings from the numerous studies. Given that
affective lability, emotional lability, and mood
lability are often used interchangeably to refer to
Emotional Lability
the process of experiencing sudden and intense
shifts in emotional states, studies using any of
these terms will be considered in this chapter.
The current chapter seeks to provide information
on the etiology and development of emotional
lability, identify effective measurement tech-
niques for assessing emotional lability, describe
disorders commonly associated with emotional
lability, and recommend future areas of study.
Etiology
There is a paucity of information on the etiology
of emotional lability. Given that emotional lability
is often examined in the context of psychiatric
disorders (Marwaha et al. 2014), very few studies
have focused on the etiology of emotional lability
as a distinct construct. Indeed, the studies which
have investigated the etiology of emotional labil-
ity do not refer to emotional lability directly.
Rather, these studies focus on affect variability
and mood variability. One study by Coccaro
et al. (2012) investigated the genetic and environ-
mental components for affect lability and intensity
in 182 monozygotic and 119 dizygotic twin pairs.
Coccaro et al. (2012) found that additive genetic
influence, defined as “the degree to which geno-
typic values combine linearly in their effect on
phenotype” (i.e., sum of multiple genes),
accounted for 40% of the variance in affect inten-
sity and 25% of the variance in affect lability for
anxiety-depression mood shifts (p. 1012). These
results suggest that multiple genes may combine
to influence lability between anxious and depres-
sive mood states. Furthermore, Coccaro et al.
(2012) found that nonadditive genetic influence,
defined as “hereditary influences that are not due
to dominance (interactions between alleles at a
single locus),” accounted for a 27% shift between
normal mood and anger and a 29% shift between
normal mood and depression (p. 1012). Their
results also revealed that the impact of nonshared
environmental influences on these variables
ranged from 52% to 74%. Ultimately, Coccaro
et al. (2012) concluded that both genetic and envi-
ronmental influences contribute to observed dif-
ferences in emotional lability. Although this study
1321
has several weaknesses, including its limited gen-
eralizability to clinical populations and its failure
to include females and measure the unique impact
of environmental factors, the findings from this
study provided rudimentary evidence for under-
standing the role of genetics in the etiology of
emotional lability.
Another study that examined etiological fac-
tors related to emotional lability was conducted by
Riemann et al. (1998). These researchers assessed
E
self-report ratings of positive and negative moods
in a sample of 168 monozygotic and 132 dizygotic
twin pairs. They examined genetic and environ-
mental influences on the variability and stability
of moods across settings and found that genetic
influences as well as shared and nonshared influ-
ences contributed to the consistency of moods.
Additionally, Riemann et al. (1998) found that
the variability of positive and negative moods
was mainly attributed to nonshared environmental
influences. These findings suggest that a host of
factors, including genetics and the environment,
contribute to the ability to maintain a consistent
mood over time. In contrast, it is primarily factors
within the environment that lead individuals to
have the fluctuations in mood that ultimately rep-
resent lability. Notably, although mood and emo-
tions share commonalities in affect, expression, and
physiology (Larsen et al. 2000), they are unique
constructs. Previous literature suggests that mood
often has a greater duration and is associated with
an internal state value, whereas emotions are sud-
den and intense and are associated with greater
environmental information value (Larsen et al.
2000). Since the findings from Riemann et al.’s
(1998) study were specific to the etiology of mood
lability, the conclusions may not fully generalize to
the process of emotional lability.
Although there has been limited research
examining specific heritability estimates of emo-
tional lability, there has been considerable
research investigating the impact of infant tem-
perament on self/emotion-regulation capacity.
Temperament is often referred to as one’s “dispo-
sition” and encompasses biological, individual
differences in reactivity and self-regulation
(Rothbart 1981), and may therefore be relevant
when considering the etiology of emotional
1322
lability. In an early study on temperament, Chess
et al. (1968) identified three types of children:
(1) the easy child, (2) the difficult child, and
(3) the slow-to-warm-up child. These children
were distinguished based upon temperament
dimensions (i.e., adaptability, quality of mood,
intensity of reaction, rhythmicity). For instance,
“slow-to-warm children” were characterized by
negative quality of mood, and slow adaptability
to novel situations, while “difficult children” were
characterized by intense reactivity to environmen-
tal demands. This model was one of the first
models examining differences in temperament
among children.
The temperament dimensions identified by
Chess et al. (1968) were further examined by
Rothbart and colleagues. Rothbart’s (1981)
model of temperament, currently one of the most
prominent models of infant temperament, outlines
behavioral temperament dimensions (i.e., activity
level, fearful/irritable distress, soothability of
response, positive affect, and distractibility) and
how each dimension affects individuals’ reactiv-
ity and self-regulatory capacity. Infants differ in
reactivity on each dimension such that some
infants biologically display dispositional positive
affect while other infants have a predisposition to
exhibit fearful or irritable distress. Additionally,
infants differ in their capacity to regulate these
behavioral manifestations of temperament, as
some infants are capable of suppressing reactivity,
while others have more difficulty regulating reac-
tivity. These results suggest that individuals expe-
rience differences in emotional reactivity and
regulation that appear at birth. Additionally, stud-
ies examining “higher order” infant temperament
dimensions have implicated “emotional state
lability” as a distinct temperament dimension
(Rothbart et al. 1994). Thus, “emotional state
lability” may in fact be a biological, trait-like
dimension that contributes to observed differ-
ences in emotional lability.
In regards to the role specific environmental
factors play in the etiology of emotional lability, a
study by Kim-Spoon et al. (2013) suggested that
maltreatment in childhood was associated with
higher rates of emotional lability, which then con-
tributed to poorer emotion regulation at a later
Emotional Lability
age. Although this study was not conducted
using a twin study design, this finding suggests
that environmental influences, specifically nega-
tive childhood experiences, may account for
higher rates of emotional lability. It is likely that
early negative childhood experiences may predis-
pose children to respond more negatively and
reactively to emotional events increasing vulner-
ability to experiencing emotional lability later in
life. Additional studies examining the impact of
negative events or environmental stressors (e.g.,
adverse childhood life experiences, trauma) on the
development of emotional lability would provide
further evidence of the relation between environ-
mental influences and emotional lability.
In sum, these studies provide encouraging evi-
dence for the etiology of emotional lability, such
that emotional lability may be partially accounted
for by genetic (i.e., additive genetic influences,
temperament) and environmental influences (i.e.,
negative childhood experiences). However, given
the scarcity of studies which have attempted to
examine the etiology of emotional lability, future
studies are warranted and may help to tease apart
the relation between genetic and environmental
influences in the development of emotional labil-
ity. These studies appear especially necessary
given Marwaha et al. (2013) findings that affec-
tive lability occurs in 13.9% of individuals in
Europe, and evidence suggesting that emotional
lability is present in a wide range of psychiatric
disorders, all of which have been known to be
influenced by genetic and environmental factors.
Measurement of Emotional Lability
The general construct, emotional lability, has been
studied extensively in the literature as an impair-
ment associated with a number of psychiatric dis-
orders. Research has been unclear on the best
approach for measuring this construct, as it is
defined by variability in emotions over time. Lim-
itations of retrospective self-report are well
known in the psychological literature. Individuals
have a more difficult time recalling past events,
which can lead to challenges in research settings
that rely heavily on retrospective self-report data.
Emotional Lability
When individuals attempt to recall events or emo-
tions from memory, they are often inaccurate,
which may result in unreliable self-reports
(Shiffman et al. 2008). Additionally, there are
several cognitive biases that contribute to even
greater difficulty in measuring emotional lability
via retrospective self-report. A peak memory heu-
ristic occurs for highly salient and intense phe-
nomena. Thus, individuals may be biased to recall
intense, novel events (Shiffman et al. 2008),
which could potentially skew self-report of emo-
tional lability. Additionally, present emotional
state may bias emotional recall. When asked to
retrospectively report past emotional experiences,
individuals may be biased to report their current
emotional state or mood. Research also indicates
that individuals may be biased to report greater
stability in behavior than actually exists; thus,
individuals may report less lability in their behav-
ior and emotions. Despite these challenges and
limitations, research has largely relied on retro-
spective, self-report scales to measure emotional
lability.
In a review on the measurement of affective
lability, Marwaha et al. (2014) identified 24 mea-
sures of affective or emotional lability, most of
which were self-report scales. Most measures
assessed either rapid changes in affect, affect
intensity, subjective report of affect control, or
whether changes in affect were caused by internal
or external cues. These measures of emotional
lability were largely utilized to examine the pres-
ence of emotional lability in clinical patients, par-
ticularly in patients with borderline personality
disorder. Other studies examined emotional labil-
ity in patients with attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorders, bipolar dis-
order, depression/dysthymia/mood disorders, per-
sonality disorders, PTSD, social anxiety disorder,
and schizophrenia. The authors reported moderate
to excellent internal consistency (a= 0.6–0.9) for
most of the measures of emotional lability. How-
ever, they indicated that test-retest, inter-rater reli-
ability, and validity assessments were unavailable
for most measures. Additionally, the authors indi-
cated that most scales did not measure all facets of
emotional lability (i.e., oscillation, intensity, inter-
nal/external cue, regulation). Instead, most
1323
measures only assessed for one facet of emotional
lability.
Some studies have started to combat the limi-
tations associated with assessing variability retro-
spectively by using daily electronic diaries or
ecological momentary assessment (Shiffman
et al. 2008). Both methods involve collecting
real-time data in a naturalistic setting at several
time points throughout the day for an extended
period of time. Data collection in naturalistic set-
E
tings allows for more ecological validity, as
results are more generalizable to individuals’
daily lives. Electronic diaries and ecological
momentary assessment (also known as experience
sampling) allow researchers to examine variabil-
ity in behavior or emotions more prospectively
and longitudinally, decreasing retrospective bias
and increasing accuracy. Additionally, researchers
can use random sampling to select when individ-
uals complete daily ratings, which allows for more
accurate assessment of variability (Shiffman et al.
2008). Despite the numerous advantages of these
methods, they are limited by the greater time
consumption for research participants, and the
need for portable technologies (i.e., telephones,
computers, and palm pilots) to assess variability
ecologically. Currently, there is no standard pro-
cedure or gold standard measure for assessing
emotional lability. Studies have indicated a need
for a psychometrically sound measure that more
thoroughly captures the multidimensional con-
struct of emotional lability (Marwaha et al. 2014).
Psychiatric Disorder Overview
Emotional lability has been associated with a
broad range of psychiatric disorders, including
mood and anxiety disorders, personality disor-
ders, and neurodevelopmental disorders. Many
psychiatric disorders are characterized by an
inability to maintain a consistent emotional state,
and given that emotional lability describes sudden
shifts in emotions in response to internal or exter-
nal cues, emotional lability is often described as a
symptom of specific psychiatric disorders.
Indeed, emotional lability is referred to in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
1324
Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American Psy-
chiatric Association 2013) as a trait-like dimen-
sion which is marked by reactivity of mood.
Mood and Anxiety Disorders Mood and anxi-
ety disorders have often been linked to emotional
lability. Indeed, previous literature suggests that
emotional lability is associated with the develop-
ment of internalizing symptoms, such as depres-
sion and anxiety (Kim-Spoon et al. 2013). In
particular, negativity-lability (i.e., rapidity of
responding to negative events) appears to be
linked to the development of internalizing symp-
toms, such that individuals experiencing emo-
tional lability to negative events also experience
increasing levels of internalizing symptoms over
time (Kim-Spoon et al. 2013). Internalizing disor-
ders (e.g., depression and anxiety) are often asso-
ciated with negative affect and/or excessive
irritability (APA 2013). Symptoms of negative
affect inherent in internalizing disorders likely
influence higher rates of negativity-lability
observed in individuals with internalizing disor-
ders. Although emotional lability has been impli-
cated in depression and anxiety, considerable
research has focused on emotional lability in indi-
viduals affected by bipolar disorder.
Bipolar disorder is a disorder that is character-
ized by shifts in mood states (i.e., mania, hypo-
mania, depression; APA 2013) and appears to be
associated with emotional lability. Individuals
with bipolar disorder may experience mood epi-
sodes encompassing a broad mood spectrum that
ranges from periods of manic or hypomanic epi-
sodes (i.e., elevated, expansive, or irritable mood)
to depressive episodes (i.e., depressed mood, loss
of interest or pleasure; APA 2013.) Based on the
nature of this disorder, it is not surprising that
bipolar disorder is also associated with emotional
lability. Indeed, a study conducted by Aminoff
et al. (2012) revealed that individuals with bipolar
disorder exhibited greater amounts of affective
lability relative to healthy controls. Aminoff
et al. (2012) concluded that affective lability is a
trait characteristic of bipolar disorder as well as a
state-based phenomenon occurring as a result of
internal and external environmental emotional
cues. Furthermore, a study by Henry et al.
Emotional Lability
(2008) found that bipolar patients in a euthymic
state reported higher affective lability and more
intense emotions relative to controls, suggesting
that patients with bipolar disorder experience
emotional lability even during times in which
their mood is positive and (momentarily) consis-
tent. From their examination of euthymic bipolar
patients, Henry et al. (2008) concluded that affec-
tive lability and affect intensity may be two core
dimensions of bipolar disorder during euthymic
mood states. Notably, higher rates of affective
lability have also been associated with an earlier
age of bipolar disorder onset (Henry et al. 2008).
As an earlier age of onset is often associated with a
more severe presentation of the disorder, it is
likely that emotional lability may play a role in
the prognosis of bipolar disorder. Overall, such
studies suggest that emotional lability occurs at
elevated rates in individuals with bipolar disorder
regardless of their current mood state (i.e.,
euthymic, manic, depressed) and may be associ-
ated with the prognosis of the disorder.
In sum, individuals with various mood and
anxiety disorders appear to experience greater
emotional lability than individuals without these
difficulties. As previously stated, the characteris-
tic features of emotional lability (i.e., more intense
rapidity of response to negative emotional events,
difficulty maintaining a consistent emotional
state) may contribute to ineffective regulation
and coping techniques in individuals with mood
and anxiety disorders. This may further amplify
emotionally labile responses and other emotional
difficulties in these clinical populations who
already present with emotional impairments.
Future research should continue to parse out
whether emotional lability is a by-product of
mood and anxiety disorders or whether emotional
lability predisposes individuals to these disorders.
Additionally, research should also seek to investi-
gate how emotional lability affects the behavioral
functioning of individuals suffering from mood
and anxiety disorders.
Personality Disorders Certain personality dis-
orders, such as borderline personality disorder,
have also been linked to emotional lability. In
fact, affective instability is a core symptom of
Emotional Lability
borderline personality disorder. Other criteria
include symptoms of intense episodic dysphoria,
irritability, and/or anxiety that range in duration
from a few hours to a few days (APA 2013). In a
study by Henry et al. (2001), borderline personal-
ity disorder patients demonstrated significantly
higher affect lability scores and higher scores for
impulsivity and hostility. Research suggests that
individuals with borderline personality disorder
experience the greatest emotional lability of
anger and anxiety, and oscillate the most between
depression and anxiety (Koenigsberg et al. 2002).
Some research posits that the high affective labil-
ity present in borderline personality disorder
populations may account for the usage and effi-
cacy of mood stabilizers in treatment (Henry et al.
2001). Further research is needed to determine the
extent to which emotional lability is associated
with other personality disorders.
Eating Disorders Research has indicated that
emotional lability is associated with poorer behav-
ioral outcomes among individuals with eating dis-
orders (e.g., bulimia nervosa, binge eating
disorder). For instance, a study by Anestis et al.
(2009) revealed that in women with bulimia
nervosa, affective lability was predictive of higher
impulsive behavior, excessive reassurance seeking,
and a more severely dysregulated behavioral pro-
file. Eating disorders are often associated with a
dysregulation of behaviors and emotions (e.g.,
self-injury, substance use, negative affect; Anestis
et al. 2009). It is evident that emotional lability may
further impede regulation of intense emotions and
concurrent behavioral reactions in this population.
Future studies need to examine the extent to which
emotional lability is associated with poorer out-
comes across a broader range of eating disorders
(e.g., anorexia nervosa, binge-eating disorder).
Additionally, future research should attempt to dif-
ferentiate between the role emotional lability plays
in the outcomes of men with eating disorders as this
population has been understudied in regards to
eating disorders in general.
Neurodevelopmental Disorders Neurodevelop-
mental disorders, such as attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), are often
1325
considered to be associated with emotional labil-
ity. Research has indicated that emotional lability
occurs at high rates in individuals with ADHD. In
particular, research has indicated that as many as
50% of children with ADHD experience emo-
tional lability (Anastopoulos et al. 2011). Emo-
tional lability was a symptom of the syndromes
that preceded ADHD (i.e., hyperkinetic disorder,
minimal brain dysfunction; Carlson 1998), and
some researchers have suggested that emotional
E
lability be added as a core ADHD diagnostic
criterion due to the high prevalence of emotional
lability among individuals with ADHD (Skirrow
et al. 2009). These researchers argue that the high
overlap between ADHD symptoms and emotional
lability warrant the addition of emotional lability
as a core component of ADHD rather than an
associated feature of the disorder (Skirrow et al.
2009). Due to the high prevalence of emotional
lability among individuals with ADHD, this chap-
ter will provide a detailed review of emotional
lability among children with ADHD.
Emotional Lability in Children
with ADHD
ADHD is a neurodevelopmental disorder charac-
terized by core inattentive, hyperactive, and
impulsive symptoms (APA 2013). Childhood
ADHD is linked to impairments in social and
academic domains of functioning in addition to
higher rates of comorbid diagnoses. In fact,
research suggests that more than 50% of children
with ADHD have one or more comorbid diagno-
ses. Furthermore, numerous studies suggest that
children with ADHD experience emotional labil-
ity at a greater prevalence than typically develop-
ing children (Anastopoulos et al. 2011; Sobanski
et al. 2010). The relation between emotional labil-
ity and ADHD may in part reflect the association
between comorbid internalizing and externalizing
disorders and emotional lability (Stringaris and
Goodman 2009). Internalizing and externalizing
disorders are often independently related to emo-
tional lability, and children with ADHD are at a
heightened risk of developing them. Due to
emerging research identifying the strong
1326
correlation between emotional lability and child-
hood ADHD (e.g., 46% of children with ADHD),
this section will focus on emotional lability
among children with ADHD.
Research suggests that emotional lability is
associated with the core ADHD symptoms (i.e.,
inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity; Merwood
et al. 2014). In a large twin study of 1,920 child
and adolescent twin pairs, Merwood et al. (2014)
discovered that all ADHD symptom dimensions
(i.e., inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity) were
significantly associated with emotional lability.
The genetic association between hyperactive/
impulsive ADHD symptoms and emotional labil-
ity was significantly stronger than the association
between inattentive ADHD symptoms and emo-
tional lability, although this effect was small.
Merwood et al. (2014) also found that the rela-
tionship between emotional lability and core
ADHD symptoms was primarily due to genetic
influences, suggesting a phenotypic link between
core ADHD symptoms and emotional lability.
These results lend support to the notion that
ADHD symptoms, particularly hyperactive/
impulsive symptoms, highly overlap with the con-
struct of emotional lability. These findings also
provide an explanation for the high rates of emo-
tional lability among children with ADHD.
Differences in emotional lability and emotion
regulation capacity begin to be apparent in the
preschool years. Emotional lability has been
documented to occur at higher rates among pre-
schoolers with ADHD compared to typically
developing preschoolers (Overgaard et al. 2015).
Indeed, a study of 495 preschoolers found that
emotional lability was significantly more preva-
lent among preschoolers with ADHD compared to
controls (Overgaard et al. 2015). Specifically,
25% of preschoolers with ADHD displayed emo-
tional lability compared to only 7% of controls.
Emotional lability among children with
ADHD becomes more apparent throughout child
development. Research suggests that approxi-
mately 46% of children aged 5–12 with ADHD
experience high rates of emotional lability
(Anastopoulos et al. 2011). Thus, the prevalence
of emotional lability among children with ADHD
Emotional Lability
almost doubles from preschool to middle child-
hood (i.e., 25–46%). This may correspond with
critical developmental changes that occur from
preschool to childhood. In preschool, children
begin to understand emotional display rules, or
socially accepted norms for emotional behavior
(Zeman et al. 2006). In preschool, these rules
include exaggerating and minimizing emotional
expressions to fit the social context (Zeman et al.
2006). Throughout childhood, children’s range of
emotional expressions increases; yet, their capac-
ity to regulate emotions also increases. Even
though children in middle childhood have a
broader range of emotional expressions and
understand more complex emotional display
rules, they should be better equipped to manage
their emotions than preschoolers (Zeman et al.
2006). Children who are less capable of
displaying appropriate emotionality and/or regu-
lating their emotional responses may become
more recognizable in middle childhood due to
the more complex emotion display rules and the
higher expectations for regulatory skills. Notably,
the research on normative samples of children
suggests that emotional lability becomes more
stable with age (Maciejewski et al. 2015), yet the
preceding findings imply that children with
ADHD have higher levels of emotional lability
over time. Thus, it appears as if typically devel-
oping children experience a greater normative
decline in emotional lability (i.e., stabilization in
emotional lability) than children with ADHD.
This is significant, given emotional lability con-
tributes to significant impairment and greater rates
of comorbidity among children with ADHD
(Anastopoulos et al. 2011).
Numerous studies suggest that emotional labil-
ity contributes to impairment among children with
ADHD. For example, emotional lability impacts
both children’s emotional and behavioral func-
tioning (Rosen and Factor 2015). In a study uti-
lizing ecological momentary assessment to
examine emotional lability and emotional and
behavioral difficulties over a 28-day period
among children with ADHD, greater emotional
lability was associated with greater behavioral
and emotional difficulties (Rosen and Factor
Emotional Lability
2015). Emotional lability has also been associated
with impairment in social skills, daily life impair-
ment, and overall impairment in adaptive function-
ing among children with ADHD (Anastopoulos
et al. 2011). Research suggests that children with
ADHD combined presentation who display both
inattentive symptoms and hyperactive/impulsive
symptoms are at the greatest risk for experiencing
emotional lability and associated functional impair-
ment (Anastopoulos et al. 2011). Additionally,
emotional lability is also associated with the pres-
ence of comorbid disorders among children with
ADHD. Children with ADHD and high levels of
emotional lability have higher rates of comorbid
oppositional defiant disorder, conduct disorder,
affective disorders, and substance use disorders
compared to children with ADHD and lower levels
of emotional lability (Sobanski et al. 2010). Exter-
nalizing symptoms seem to account for the greatest
amount of variance in emotional lability among
children with ADHD. One study found that oppo-
sitional behavior and conduct problems accounted
for the most variance in emotional lability among
children with ADHD (Sobanski et al. 2010). Inter-
nalizing symptoms accounted for less variance in
emotional lability compared to externalizing symp-
toms. However, emotional problems and anxious-
shy behaviors remain significant predictors of emo-
tional lability among children with ADHD
(Sobanski et al. 2010).
In sum, emotional lability is a prevalent diffi-
culty linked to both high rates of comorbid disor-
ders and functional impairment among children
with ADHD. Research has revealed a genetic
association between core ADHD symptoms (i.e.,
inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity) and emo-
tional lability, suggesting a direct relationship
between ADHD symptomatology and emotional
lability. Furthermore, children with ADHD and
emotional lability experience greater impairment
in their daily lives that may result from the inter-
action of emotional lability and comorbid difficul-
ties (i.e., oppositionality, conduct problems,
anxious-shy behaviors; Sobanski et al. 2010)
that are particularly prevalent among children
with ADHD. Future research examining the clin-
ical utility of adding emotional lability as a core
1327
diagnostic construct in the diagnosis of ADHD is
warranted.
Conclusion
Emotional lability is a multidimensional construct
that describes sudden and intense shifts in emo-
tional states. Much of the scientific literature has
utilized disparate terminologies to refer to emo-
E
tional lability. Future research would benefit from
the use of a single term such as emotional lability,
to guide scientific investigation and understand-
ing. Additionally, the development of a universal,
psychometrically sound measure that captures the
multidimensional nature of emotional lability is
needed, as there is currently no gold-standard
method for assessing this construct. Emotional
lability is associated with a variety of psychiatric
disorders including mood and anxiety disorders,
personality disorders, eating disorders, and
neurodevelopmental disorders. Given high herita-
bility estimates for psychiatric disorders, and
higher rates of emotional lability present in psy-
chiatric disorders, studies on etiology appear nec-
essary to better identify genetic and
environmental influences of emotional lability.
Emotional lability is associated with a host of
consequences including increased rates of psychi-
atric illness and greater functional impairment.
Further research investigating the impact of emo-
tional lability on emotional and behavioral pro-
files of individuals suffering from psychiatric
illnesses is warranted. Additional research specif-
ically examining the experience of emotional
lability among individuals with ADHD is
warranted given the high overlap between emo-
tional lability and ADHD symptomatology.
Cross-References
▶ Emotion Regulation
▶ Emotional Affectivity
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
▶ Emotional Intensity
▶ Emotion-Focused Coping
1328
▶ Experience Sampling Methods
▶ Negative Affect
▶ Negative Affectivity
▶ Positive Affect
▶ Self-Regulation
▶ Temperament
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Emotional Memory
▶ Personality and Memory
Emotional Networks in the
Brain
Dean Sabatinelli1, David W. Frank2 and
Megan M. Filkowski2
1
Departments of Psychology and Neuroscience
BioImaging Research Center, University of
Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
2
University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
Definition
Human evolution has resulted in efficient neural
circuits supporting emotional behavior. These
1329
broad networks are founded on subcortical and
cortical structures that are highly conserved across
mammalian species. In the following chapter, a
collection of brain regions that contribute to the
execution of what are commonly thought to be
emotional behaviors in psychological science are
briefly catalogued.
Introduction
E
Human emotion can be described as a disposition
to action. To attain resources and procreate while
avoiding injury or predation, mammals have
evolved distinct appetitive and defensive neural
systems that foster reliable and efficient approach
and avoidance behaviors. Both motivational sys-
tems involve elevated metabolic demands, the
intensity of which forms an independent dimen-
sion of emotion. As a pleasant or unpleasant cue
gains imminence (e.g., proximity in time or
space), its emotional intensity increases. Thus, at
its most basic level, human emotion can be con-
sidered to be the preparatory activity appropriate
to a location in a two-dimensional “affective
space” represented by valence (pleasant
vs. unpleasant) and arousal (Lang et al. 1997).
The following chapter discusses the neural
aspects of human emotion, as described by non-
invasive functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) research. Using fMRI of scene perception
as an example (although the effects are supra-
modal), the basic impact of emotional relative to
neutral scene perception (i.e., an attacking dog
compared to a sitting dog) is an enhancement of
neural activity across reactive structures, with the
frequent exception of primary sensory cortex. The
degree of activation enhancement varies from
~20% in secondary sensory cortex to ~90% in
corticolimbic regions (Bradley et al. 2003;
Sabatinelli et al. 2005; Sabatinelli et al. 2006).
The great majority of this activation increase is
insensitive to valence; highly arousing pleasant
cues enhance reactivity as much as highly arous-
ing unpleasant cues. An exception is the meso-
limbic reward circuit, including the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and the nucleus accumbens,
which is strongly sensitive to stimulus
1330
pleasantness (O’Doherty et al. 2003; Sabatinelli
et al. 2007). The orchestration of this generalized
emotional modulation is hypothesized to occur
via a reentrant feedback process from the amyg-
dala and possibly ventral prefrontal cortex, via
direct and thalamic pathways (Bar et al. 2006;
Freese and Amaral 2005; Lang et al. 1997; Pessoa
and Adolphs 2010).
As a means of cataloging reliable brain net-
works associated with human emotion, empirical
evidence based on noninvasive recording
methods will be briefly reviewed as well as a
discussion of the human brain networks identified
in three recent fMRI meta-analyses of emotional
processing. In addition, a “super meta-analysis”
was conducted by assembling the results of six
additional published neuroimaging meta-analyses
of human emotional perception, with the intent to
further distill common neural contributions to
emotional behavior.
Functional Imaging of Emotional
Perception
A useful paradigm in the study of human affective
neuroscience is natural scene perception. Photo-
graphic images can depict any subject and can be
balanced across basic stimulus characteristics
such as brightness, color, and complexity, thus
enabling controlled comparisons across semantic
categories of scene content that vary in emotional
content and intensity. Employing this paradigm, a
considerable amount of knowledge has accumu-
lated regarding the brain mechanisms of human
emotional perception. Using fMRI, it has been
established that broad regions of extrastriate dor-
sal and ventral visual system show enhanced
activity during emotional picture perception,
whether pleasant or unpleasant, to images shown
in color or grayscale, in both males and females
(Bradley et al. 2003). This visual cortical
enhancement is evident despite extremely fast
picture presentation rates (Junghöfer et al. 2006).
Importantly, these emotional modulation effects
are not limited to the visual system, as similar
effects are evident in the auditory cortex during
emotional auditory stimulation and in the
Emotional Networks in the Brain
premotor cortex during emotional imagery
(Sabatinelli et al. 2006; Zald 2003).
Using a method of regionally focused imaging
developed to maximize signal quality from the
subcortical areas (a region that is difficult to mea-
sure with fMRI), it has been established that the
fusiform gyrus, an emotion-modulated visual
structure in the inferior temporal visual cortex,
shows a strong and specific correlation of activity
across picture contents with the subcortical amyg-
dala, increasing in activity equivalently across
pleasant and unpleasant picture perception and
showing parallel sensitivity to individual differ-
ences in fear relevance (Sabatinelli et al. 2005).
Additional support for a reentrant feedback pro-
cess was provided by rapid fMRI studies capable
of quantifying the relative time at which rostral
and caudal visual structures and amygdala
showed differential activation between arousing
and non-arousing scenes (Sabatinelli et al. 2009).
Using grayscale emotional and neutral scenes that
equated brightness, complexity, and the presence
of humans, no difference in calcarine fissure activ-
ity was found. However, both the amygdala and
fusiform gyrus showed enhanced activation dur-
ing arousing (pleasant and unpleasant) scenes
prior to such discrimination in the middle occipi-
tal gyrus. This differential timing effect was rep-
licated and extended to include coverage of the
frontoparietal network, which is also enhanced
during emotional scene perception, but not prior
to amygdala and fusiform gyrus (Sabatinelli et al.
2014). Together, these results and others suggest
that the widespread neural enhancement associ-
ated with emotional perception originates in a
transaction between the rostral ventral visual cor-
tex and amygdala, which then distributes the sig-
nal widely across the brain to foster appropriate
and efficient processing of the emotional event.
Meta-Analysis of Emotional Perception
A meta-analysis of 157 fMRI studies (Sabatinelli
et al. 2011) assessed two widely used classes of
stimuli in the investigation of emotional pro-
cessing, namely, posed expressive faces and nat-
ural scene photographs. The analyses compared
Emotional Networks in the Brain
the effects of emotional arousal, after controlling
for the basic effects of face and scene perception.
Therefore, only significant emotion-driven clus-
ters (e.g., emotional face > neutral face, emo-
tional scene > neutral scene) were represented,
the results of which are shown in Fig. 1. Blue
clusters represent highly reliable emotional face
processing areas, red clusters represent highly
reliable emotional scene processing areas, and
Emotional Networks in the Brain, Fig. 1 Neural acti-
vation clusters resulting from an fMRI meta-analysis of
157 emotional face and scene processing studies
(Sabatinelli et al. 2011). Clusters resulting from 100 emo-
tional face processing studies are shown in blue, clusters
resulting from an fMRI meta-analysis of 57 emotional
1331
purple areas represent the overlap of emotional
face and scene processing. The emotional face
and scene cluster locations are listed in Tables 1
and 2 in standardized coordinate locations within
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coor-
dinate space, which normalizes brain size across
participants, enabling brain averaging within a
study and meaningful comparison of results
across studies.
E
scene processing studies are shown in red, and the overlap
of the two analyses is shown in purple, overlaid on a
standardized structural volume. The neurological conven-
tion is used (right lateralized clusters are located on the
right side of the slice) (Figure adapted from Sabatinelli
et al. 2011)
1332 Emotional Networks in the Brain

Emotional Networks in X Y Z Structure

the Brain,
4 47 7 Medial prefrontal cortex
Table 1 Standardized
coordinate locations (MNI 42 25 3 R Inferior frontal gyrus
space) and neuroanatomical
42 25 3 L Inferior frontal gyrus
regions of clusters derived 48 17 29 R Middle frontal gyrus
from meta-analysis of
42 13 27 L Middle frontal gyrus
100 studies reporting

2 8 59 Superior frontal gyrus
emotional face > neutral
face contrasts 20
4
15 R Amygdala

20
6
15 L Amygdala

20
33
4 L Parahippocampal gyrus
14
33
7 R Parahippocampal gyrus
53
50 4 R Middle temporal gyrus
38
55
20 R Fusiform gyrus

40
55
22 L Fusiform gyrus
38
76
16 R Posterior fusiform gyrus

40
78
21 L Posterior fusiform gyrus
Data from Sabatinelli et al. (2011)

Emotional Networks in X Y Z Structure

the Brain,

4 52 31 Medial prefrontal cortex
Table 2 Standardized
coordinate locations (MNI 36 25
3 R Orbitofrontal cortex
space) and neuroanatomical
38 25
8 L Orbitofrontal cortex
regions of clusters derived 2 19 25 Anterior cingulate
from meta-analysis of 22
3
17 R Amygdala
57 studies reporting

20
6
17 L Amygdala
emotional scene > neutral
scene contrasts 0
15 10 MDN Thalamus

2
31
7 Pulvinar
59
44 9 R Superior temporal gyrus
40
54
12 R Fusiform gyrus

28
70
14 L Fusiform gyrus
46
68
4 R Lateral occipital cortex

48
72
4 L Lateral occipital cortex
Data from Sabatinelli et al. (2011)

These meta-analytic results demonstrate that
there is both considerable overlap, partial overlap,
and exclusivity in emotional brain networks asso-
ciated with face and scene perception.
A comparison of emotional face clusters and emo-
tional scene clusters reveals the greatest overlap in
the amygdala, the multimodal subcortical struc-
ture most consistently associated with emotional
processing in the fMRI literature. Both emotional
stimulus types also prompted reliable blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal in
regions of the medial prefrontal cortex, inferior
frontal cortex, inferior temporal cortex, and extra-
striate occipital cortex. However, the spatial
extent of clusters within these regions varied con-
siderably, such that in most clusters, generally
minor overlap is evident across face and scene
clusters. In addition, several cortical and subcor-
tical clusters were unique to one class of stimuli.
Table 1 lists the clusters of activity identified
by the meta-analysis of emotional face perception,
and includes regions implicated in the Haxby
model of face processing (Haxby et al. 2000),
specifically the anterior fusiform gyrus, middle/
superior temporal gyrus, and inferior occipital
gyrus. Reliable BOLD signal in basic face pro-
cessing areas is evoked by emotional face percep-
tion, despite a nonemotional (or less emotional)
Emotional Networks in the Brain
face comparison condition. Emotionality thus
increases activation in much of the basic circuit
of face perception.
Listed in Table 2, clusters identified in the
meta-analysis that are specifically associated
with emotional scene perception include the lat-
eral occipital cortex (LOC), orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
and subcortical structures including the pulvinar
and the medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus
(MDNT).
The lateral occipital cortex (LOC) has been
associated with object perception (Grill-Spector
and Malach 2004) and emotional scene pro-
cessing (Bradley et al. 2003; Sabatinelli et al.
2007, 2009). Both emotional faces and scenes
reliably activate the posterior extrastriate cortex,
yet face-specific areas are centered inferior, and
extend anterior to the scene-specific areas, which
occupy a broad area of the middle and lateral
occipital cortex. The role of the lateral occipital
complex in object processing is consistent with
this distinction between faces and scenes, in that
objects are often depicted in scene stimuli and not
included in the controlled backgrounds of posed
face photographs.
Both emotional faces and emotional scenes
elicited activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, yet
clusters associated with emotional scene studies
are situated more ventrally in what is commonly
referred to as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The
OFC has a well-described role in emotional per-
ception and evaluative processing (Rolls 2004).
Inferior frontal clusters associated with facial
emotion studies are also well supported in the
literature (Adolphs 2002); however, the superior
and lateral location of the bilateral clusters relative
to those associated with emotional scene studies
may represent a regional specialization. Emo-
tional scene studies led to activity in a dorsal
region of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
that falls in a transition area between hypothesized
“emotional” and “cognitive” subsections (Bush
2000), a region that was not reliably active during
emotional face perception.
The pulvinar of the thalamus plays a critical role
in visual scene discrimination (Pessoa and Adolphs
2010; Frank and Sabatinelli 2014). It receives input
1333
from the occipital visual cortex and is connected
with the prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex,
and superior colliculus. Demanding visual tasks
such as attention shifting, spatial selective atten-
tion, and complex visual discrimination consis-
tently activate the human pulvinar (Shipp 2003).
Thus, the identification of pulvinar recruitment
during emotional scene processing is consistent
with the perceptual complexities of processing het-
erogeneous natural stimuli. The meta-analysis of
E
emotional scene processing studies also led to a
cluster of activation in the medial dorsal nucleus of
the thalamus (MDN). The MDN shows strong
connectivity to the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, the superior temporal gyrus, and occipital
regions. The MDN is hypothesized to function as a
thalamo- corticothalamic loop of the lateral
orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices
(Buchsbaum et al. 2006; Frank and Sabatinelli
2014) and, thus, may represent a component of
sensory-planning integration. Thus, while the
human brain networks driven by face and scene
emotionality are generally consistent, within-
region variance is substantial. An overarching
result of the meta-analysis therefore suggests that,
despite within-study contrasts controlling for the
basic elements of visual stimuli (neutral faces or
scenes), the particular class of stimuli has a consid-
erable impact on the resulting emotion effects.
Super-meta-analysis of Emotional
Perception
In an empirical approach to define brain networks
of emotion, a grand analysis of seven published
meta-analyses (listed in Table 3) was conducted,
using activation likelihood estimation (Eickhoff
et al. 2009), which is a coordinate-based quanti-
tative meta-analysis method used to identify
regions of brain activation that are consistently
engaged across studies employing similar tasks.
As each published meta-analysis reported a statis-
tically reliable table of coordinate locations
resulting from the contributions of multiple stud-
ies of emotional perception, the process of aggre-
gating these results was straightforward. In place
of the number of subjects, the number of studies
1334 Emotional Networks in the Brain

Emotional Networks in the Brain, Table 3 Seven published meta-analyses of human emotional processing included
in the super-meta-analysis
Year First author Number of studies Basic contrast
2003 Murphy 106 fMRI and PET studies Pleasant and unpleasant emotion, any modality
2003 Wager 65 fMRI and PET studies Pleasant and unpleasant emotion, any modality
2008 Kober 162 fMRI and PET studies Pleasant and unpleasant emotion, any modality
2009 Fusar-Poli 105 fMRI and PET studies Pleasant and unpleasant faces, visual modality
2010 Vytal 83 fMRI and PET studies Pleasant and unpleasant emotion, any modality
2011 Sabatinelli 157 fMRI studies Pleasant and unpleasant emotion, visual modality
2016 Lindquist 395 fMRI and PET studies Pleasant and unpleasant emotion, any modality

Emotional Networks in the Brain, Fig. 2 Neural acti- a standardized structural volume. The neurological con-
vation clusters resulting from a super-meta-analysis of vention is used (right lateralized clusters are located on the
seven published neuroimaging meta-analyses, overlaid on right side of the slice)

was included as a means of weighting the reliabil-
ity of the estimate (Eickhoff et al. 2009). Finally,
and arguably unnecessarily, an uncorrected
threshold of p < .05 was applied to the output
map, overlaid on a standardized brain shown in
Fig. 2. These results depict an essentially bilateral
distribution of activation in the ventral visual cor-
tex including fusiform and parahippocampal gyri,
superior temporal gyrus (biased toward the right
hemisphere), thalamus, striatum, amygdala,
insula, ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cor-
tex, and lateral premotor/supplementary motor
cortex. These regions represent a considerable
proportion of the human brain, focused primarily
in subcortical and multimodal associative cortex.
A caveat regarding the contributions of the ventral
prefrontal cortex should be explicitly noted – this
region of the brain is highly subject to artifact and
signal loss in fMRI recording. Thus, the apparent
lack of involvement of this region in human
Emotional Networks in the Brain
emotional processes cannot be adequately
addressed in this global manner.
Emotional Networks in Men and Women
Sex differences in behavioral and physiological
studies of emotional reactivity are well
Emotional Networks in the Brain, Fig. 3 Neural acti-
vation cluster differences between women and men in
response to visual emotional cues (Filkowski et al. in
press). Cool-colored clusters including the left superior
frontal gyrus, mPFC/ACC, right parahippocampal gyrus,
mediodorsal nucleus, and left posterior insula represent
greater activation in men relative to women
1335
documented (Bradley et al. 2001; Stevens and
Hamann 2012). A recent fMRI meta-analysis
assessed 56 functional brain imaging studies
reporting within-experiment contrasts of men
and women (n = 1907) engaged in the same
emotion-evoking task (Filkowski et al. in
press). As shown in Fig. 3, distinct activation
was found in men relative to women within the
(men > women). Hot-colored clusters including the bilat-
eral amygdala, dorsal midbrain, right anterior insula, and
left parahippocampal gyrus represent greater activation in
women relative to men (women > men). The neurological
convention is used (right lateralized clusters are located on
the right side of the slice) (Figure adapted from Filkowski
et al. in press)
1336
medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cor-
tex, frontal pole, and mediodorsal nucleus of the
thalamus. Women exhibited activation in the
bilateral amygdala, hippocampus, and regions
of the dorsal midbrain including the peri-
aqueductal gray/superior colliculus and locus
coeruleus compared to men. In addition, several
regions exhibited differential lateralization in
activation between the sexes including the infe-
rior frontal gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, and
insula. These findings suggest that both cortical
and subcortical structures underlie sex differ-
ences in emotional reactivity, distinctions that
may partially explain differences in the preva-
lence of psychiatric illness particularly for mood
and anxiety disorders.
Brain Networks of Emotional Regulation
A hallmark of human behavior is the ability to
willfully exaggerate or dampen the intensity of
Emotional Networks in the Brain, Fig. 4 Neural acti-
vation meta-analytic clusters resulting from an analysis
(Frank et al. 2014) of emotional downregulation effects
(a) resulting in diminished activity (blue clusters) in the
amygdala and inferior parietal lobule and enhanced activ-
ity in prefrontal regions and middle temporal lobule (red
Emotional Networks in the Brain
our emotional experience by employing a variety
of strategies, such as reappraisal, suppression, or
attentional redeployment. This process is
thought to reflect the top-down influence of the
prefrontal cortex on more basic emotional brain
regions. A recent meta-analysis of 49 human
fMRI studies (n = 1073) assessed the neural
impact of willful emotion regulation, including
both upregulation and downregulation, and iden-
tified brain regions that increased as well as those
that decreased in activation (Frank et al. 2014).
The results (Fig. 4) revealed signal change in the
bilateral amygdala/parahippocampal gyrus that
decreased in downregulated states and increased
in upregulated states, while cortical regions
including the superior frontal gyrus, cingulate,
and premotor cortex showed enhanced activity
across all regulation conditions. These results
provide strong evidence for the role of amygdala
activity in experienced emotional intensity,
where intentional dampening and exaggeration
are clearly expressed. However, the execution of
clusters). Upregulation results (b) are depicted in enhanced
activation (purple clusters) of prefrontal cortex and
amygdalar regions. The neurological convention is used
(right lateralized clusters are located on the right side of the
slice) (Figure adapted from Frank et al. 2014)
Emotional Networks in the Brain
emotional upregulation and downregulation
appears to involve distinct subsets of prefrontal
cortex structures.
Conclusions
In this work, we have reviewed the processing of
stimuli that represent emotionally engaging
events, assessing the hypothesis that appetitive
and aversive cues activate basic motivational cir-
cuits in the human brain that have evolved to
promote the survival of individuals and their prog-
eny. Neuroimaging data suggests that all emotion-
ally relevant cues are identified early in the
discrimination stage and tagged for enhanced pro-
cessing, as information intake is elaborated across
recurrent neural iterations. Meta-analyses of large
imaging datasets support the perspective that
(1) emotional cues prompt enhanced perceptual
processing in the service of selecting and
implementing effective preparatory and adaptive
actions, (2) that these processes are sensitive to the
differing evolutionary demands of women and
men, and (3) these basic processes are subject to
deliberate regulation via prefrontal efferent
modulation.
Taken together, neuroimaging and behavioral
data are consistent with the interpretation that
features of emotional scenes draw attention and
facilitate perception. It has been suggested
(Bradley et al. 2015; Lang et al. 1997) that emo-
tional stimuli naturally engage attention, such that
in the absence of specific tasks or explicit instruc-
tions, evolved mechanisms modulate activity in
fundamental appetitive or defensive motivational
systems that are the foundation of human
emotion.
Cross-References
▶ Ascending Tegmental Systems for Emotional
Arousal
▶ Emotion Regulation
▶ Emotional Affectivity
▶ Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
▶ Feedback Loops
1337
▶ Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI)
▶ Selective Attention
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Emotional Release
▶ Catharsis
Emotional Speech
▶ Vocal Communication of Emotion
Emotional Stroop
▶ Emotional Stroop Task
Emotional Stroop Task
Emotional Stroop Effect
▶ Emotional Stroop Task
Emotional Stroop Task
Jacopo De Angelis1 and Paola Ricciardelli1,2
1
Department of Psychology, University of
Milano – Bicocca, Milan, Italy
2
Milan Center for Neuroscience, Milan, Italy
Synonyms
Emotional Stroop; Emotional Stroop effect; Emo-
tional Stroop task; ES
Definition
The emotional Stroop (ES) task is a modified
version of the traditional Stroop task (Stroop
1935) in which participants are required to name
the ink color of words with emotional or neutral
valence (Williams et al. 1996). This task is com-
monly used to measure the attentional biases (i.e.,
the orientation of attention) toward emotional
stimuli typically observed in humans. In relation
to this, the emotional Stroop has also been widely
used to better understand individual differences in
terms of emotional processing, by taking into
consideration dimensions such as personality,
anxiety, and several pathological conditions.
Introduction
In the original version of the task (i.e., the Stroop
task), participants are required to name the ink
color of a list of words displaying names of colors.
In the congruent condition, the ink color of the
word matches the name of the color (e.g., “red”
written in red), whereas, in the incongruent con-
dition, the ink color does not reflect the name of
the color (e.g., “red” written in yellow).
1339
A consistent facilitation effect consisting of
lower reaction times (RTs) is typically observed
in congruent conditions. By contrast, in incongru-
ent conditions, the participants’ performance is
significantly delayed.
In the ES, the primary difference with the tra-
ditional Stroop is the emotional valence of the
stimuli. Specifically, the words do not represent
names of colors but contain words varying in
accordance with their emotional valence (e.g.,
E
“hate,” “suicide,” “tree”). It follows that two
types of conditions characterize this task. Specif-
ically, the neutral condition including words with-
out emotional valence (e.g., “tree”) and the
emotional condition containing words with an
emotional valence (e.g., “suicide”). What emerges
from this task is the so-called emotional interfer-
ence effect on performance, which behaviorally
reflects the tendency to take longer to name the
ink color of emotional words than neutral words
(Williams et al. 1996). Thus, the classic Stroop
task and the ES involve two different interference
mechanisms. The classic Stroop determines a con-
flict in the incongruent conditions between the
perceptual and semantic attributes of the stimuli
(i.e., color and name of the word) which emerges
when the correct response has to be selected. By
contrast, in the ES it is the emotional meaning of
the word that tends to capture and hold the partic-
ipant’s attention and cause the slowdown of RTs,
regardless of the ink color (McKenna and Sharma
2004). Therefore, in the classic Stroop task, the
participant responds to the ink color by
inhibiting the distracting characteristic of the
stimulus (i.e., the meaning of the color word),
while in the ES the performance in naming the
ink color is automatically disrupted by priori-
tizing the processing of the emotional valence
of the word, although task irrelevant (McKenna
and Sharma 2004). Thus, in the classic Stroop
task, the interference is semantic, whereas in
the ES the interference is emotional, and its
effect likely occurs at different stages of the
information processing (later vs earlier stages,
respectively). In detail, the emotional interfer-
ence observed in the ES may be the result of an
appraisal process that enables the attribution of
emotional valence to the stimulus.
1340
The ES effect has been interpreted considering
the concept of emotional attention, or automatic
attentional bias toward emotional stimuli,
suggesting that people have an automatic predis-
position to having their attention significantly
more captured by emotional stimuli than neutral
stimuli, probably for adaptive and evolutionary
reasons (Vuilleumier 2005). Neuroimaging stud-
ies have shown that the amygdala plays a crucial
role in the explanation of this attentional bias and
in the typical performance pattern observed in the
ES (Vuilleumier 2005). Although emotional
attention bias automatically occurs with the same
patterns and in most of population, the literature
has shown a degree of individual differences in
performance in the ES task. For example, it is
modulated by the anxiety level, personality traits,
and clinically relevant conditions. These individ-
ual differences will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Emotional Stroop and Anxiety Traits
The ES is commonly recognized as a measure
of anxiety level since the literature has indi-
cated that people with higher levels of anxiety
report longer RTs when attending to emotional
words, specifically those with a threat-related
meaning (Bar-Haim et al. 2007). Neuroimaging
research supports the implication of the amyg-
dala in this result pattern as demonstrated by a
recent study on people with hypochondriasis
which is considered the primary pathogenic
precursor to the development of anxiety disor-
ders (Mier et al. 2017). Other similar patterns
have been replicated in people with specific
forms of anxiety. For instance, there is evidence
suggesting a possible interplay between the fear
of rejection or abandonment within a close rela-
tionship (i.e., attachment anxiety) and delayed
RTs associated with threating words (Bailey
et al. 2012). In addition, an interesting dissoci-
ation has been reported between patients with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and
patients with social phobia (SP). In detail,
GAD patients took longer to respond to all the
words with an emotional meaning, whereas SP
Emotional Stroop Task
patients showed this pattern only for speech-
related words (e.g., talk, stutter, blush) (Becker
et al. 2001).
Emotional Stroop and Personality
Another area that has been investigated through
the administration of the ES is personality. With
regard to healthy personality, the literature has
shown associations between specific personality
traits, types of temperament, and task perfor-
mance. Two dimensions, that is, extraversion
and approach temperament, were demonstrated
to be related to the higher interferences exerted
by pleasant words. On the other hand, neuroti-
cism and avoidance temperament were found to
be significantly correlated with higher interfer-
ence exerted by unpleasant words (Paelecke
et al. 2012). Furthermore, another study
reported an interesting emotional interference
effect to disgust related words in individuals
with high nonclinical schizotypy (Yaffe and
Walder 2016). Other evidence of an effect of
personality on ES comes from studies which
have analyzed task performance in groups of
patients with personality disorder or atypical
personality traits.
Emotional Stroop Paradigm in Clinical Studies
The most prominent area of personality disorders
reported in the literature regards borderline per-
sonality disorder. A recent meta-analytic study
focused on 11 ES studies involving borderline
patients. The results clearly revealed a stronger
attentional bias toward negative words in border-
line patients than in nonpatients (Kaiser et al.
2016). The authors suggested that the childhood
traumatization and the comorbidity with anxiety
disorders may explain this effect. In support of
this conclusion, a neuroimaging study found that
borderline patients tend to exhibit higher activity
in the brain area involved in the emotional pro-
cessing of negative stimuli (i.e., insula) compared
to controls (Krause-Utz et al. 2012). Since recent
studies have put emphasis on the fact that the ES
may be effectively considered as an alternative
measure of emotion regulation (Kappes and
Emotional Stroop Task
Bermeitinger 2016), these findings are also in line
with the fact that borderline patients are charac-
terized by a difficulty in regulating their own
emotions (Carpenter and Trull 2013).
Specific emotional Stroop performance pat-
terns were also reported in individuals with anti-
social personality disorder, with and without
psychopathic traits. Regardless of the presence
of psychopathic traits, offenders with antisocial
personality disorder exhibited a substantial atten-
tional bias toward violence-related words. This
pattern was enhanced in offenders experiencing
maltreatment during childhood (Domes
et al. 2013).
Finally, similar results were observed in a
group of alcoholic people who showed a signifi-
cant RTs slowdown when responding to alcohol-
related words (Compton et al. 2003). Further-
more, a suggestive scenario provided by recent
research has considered the possibility of using
the ES as a predictor screening measure of suicide
risk among young people (Chung and Jeglic
2016). Specifically, Chung and Jeglic (2016)
found that emotional interference with suicide-
related words and past suicidal behaviors were
both important predictors of suicide risk in a sam-
ple of college students. As specified by authors,
these findings provide preliminary evidence of the
potential role of the ES as a part of a suicide risk
screening battery to better estimate the likelihood
of suicide risk.
It needs to be noted, however, that future
research is required to confirm the reliability
and applicability of the ES in the fields men-
tioned above. Indeed, the ES has been found to
be characterized by several factors affecting its
validity and reliability. Firstly, the stimulus pre-
sentation order has been demonstrated to signif-
icantly affect task outcomes since there is
evidence that it is significantly influenced by
the so-called habituation effect toward emo-
tional stimuli (Ben-Haim et al. 2016). Secondly,
in the literature there is some dispute concerning
task outcome interpretation and analysis
(Dresler et al. 2012). Finally, it is still an open
question as to whether the ES effect originates
from a rapid attentional engagement and/or from
a slow attentional disengagement.
1341
Conclusion
In conclusion, as well as serving as a measure of
attentional bias, the ES has had a crucial role in the
study of individual differences. In detail, data
from the healthy, subclinical, and clinical popula-
tion have been considered. They suggest that the
ES can be applied as a screening tool in several
fields. For example, as suggested by Chung and
Jeglic (2016), this measure may be considered as
E
an alternative screening indicator of the emotional
processing difficulties underlying psychopatho-
logical disorders or risky behaviors, in forensic
settings as well.
On the treatment front, a recent review has
provided evidence of a new frontier for anxiety
disorders’ treatment that is focused on the use of a
computerized task procedure employed in atten-
tion bias modification (Mogg and Bradley 2016)
to shift attention away from the location of the
threat. The purpose is to modify the attentional
biases to threat that have been usually reported in
this population (Mogg and Bradley 2016). Spe-
cifically, the authors suggested using a Stroop-
type training task, which contains stimuli having
both threating and non-threating attributes, and to
train participants to attend only to goal-relevant
nonthreat attributes and to ignore goal-irrelevant
threat attributes, in order to rebalance the mal-
adaptive bias (Mogg and Bradley 2016).
Cross-References
▶ Emotional Stroop Task
References
Bailey, H. D., Paret, L., Battista, C., & Xue, Y. (2012).
Attachment anxiety and attentional control predict
immediate and delayed emotional Stroop interference.
Emotion, 12(2), 376–383.
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-
Kranenburg, M. J., & van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2007).
Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and non-
anxious individuals: A meta-analytic study. Psycholog-
ical Bulletin, 133, 1–24.
Becker, E. S., Rinck, E., Margraf, J., & Roth, W. T. (2001).
The emotional Stroop effect in anxiety disorders:
1342 Emotional Suppression

General emotionality or disorder specificity? Journal of emotional Stroop tasks. European Journal of Person-
Anxiety Disorders, 15, 147–159. ality, 26(2), 111–122.
Ben-Haim, M. S., Williams, P., Howard, Z., Mama, Y., Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal
et al. (2016). The emotional Stroop task: Assessing reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18(6),
cognitive performance under exposure to emotional 643–662.
content. Journal of Visual Experiments, 112, Vuilleumier, P. (2005). How brains beware: Neural mech-
e53720. anisms of emotional attention. Trends in Cognitive
Carpenter, R., & Trull, T. J. (2013). Components of Sciences, 9(12), 586–594.
emotion dysregulation in borderline personality dis- Williams, J. M., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The
order: A review. Current Psychiatry Reports, 15(1), emotional Stroop task and psychopathology. Psycho-
335–347. logical Bulletin, 120, 3–24.
Chung, Y., & Jeglic, E. L. (2016). Detecting suicide risk Yaffe, B., & Walder, D. J. (2016). Schizotypy and speci-
among college students: A test of the predictive validity ficity of negative emotions on an emotional Stroop
of the modified emotional Stroop task. Suicide and paradigm in the general population. Psychiatry
Life-Threatening Behaviour, 23, 1–12. Research, 239, 291–300.
Compton, R., Banich, M. T., Mohanty, A., Milham, M. P.,
Herrington, J., et al. (2003). Paying attention to emo-
tion: an fMRI investigation of cognitive and emotional
Stroop tasks. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neu-
roscience, 3(2), 81–96. Emotional Suppression
Domes, G., Mense, J., Vohs, K., & Habermeyer, E. (2013).
Offenders with antisocial personality disorder show ▶ Overcontrol
attentional bias for violence-related stimuli. Psychiatry
Research, 209(1), 78–84.
Dresler, T., Ehlis, A. C., Hindi Attar, C., Ernst, L. H.,
Tupak, S. V., et al. (2012). Reliability of the emotional
Stroop task: An investigation of patients with panic
disorder. Journal of Psychiatry Research, 46, Emotional Traits
1243–1248.
Kaiser, D., Jacob, G. A., Domes, G., & Arntz, A. (2016). ▶ Emotional Affectivity
Attentional bias for emotional stimuli in borderline
personality disorder: A meta-analysis. Psychopathol-
ogy, 49, 383–396.
Kappes, C., & Bermeitinger, C. (2016). The emotional
Stroop task as an emotion regulation task. Experimen-
tal Aging Research, 42(2), 161–194. Emotional Variability
Krause-Utz, A., Oei, N. Y., Niedtfeld, I., Bohus, M.,
Spinhoven, P., et al. (2012). Influence of emotional ▶ Emotional Lability
distraction on working memory performance in border-
line personality disorder. Psychological Medicine, 42,
2181–2192.
McKenna, F. P., & Sharma, D. (2004). Reversing the
emotional Stroop effect reveals that it is not what it
seems: The role of fast and slow components. Journal Emotionality
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 30(2), 382–392. ▶ Emotional Affectivity
Mier, D., Bailer, J., Ofer, J., Kernster, T., Zamoscik,
▶ Temperament
V., et al. (2017). Neural correlates of an atten-
tional bias to health-threatening stimuli in individ-
uals with pathological healthy anxiety. Journal of
Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 42, 200–209. In
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Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2016). Anxiety and attention Emotionality, Activity,
to threat: Cognitive mechanisms and treatment with Sociability, and Impulsivity
attention bias modification. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 87, 76–108.
Temperament Survey
Paelecke, M., Paelecke-Habermann, Y., & Borkenau,
P. (2012). Temperament and attentional bias in vocal ▶ EASI Temperament Survey
Emotion-Focused Coping
Emotional-Social Intelligence
▶ Social Intelligence
Emotion-Focused Coping
Hasida Ben-Zur
School of Social Work, University of Haifa,
Haifa, Israel
Synonyms
Palliative coping
Definition
Emotion-focused coping, one of the main coping
modes, functions to regulate (tolerate, reduce,
or eliminate) the physiological, emotional, cogni-
tive, and behavioral reactions that accompany the
experience of stressful encounters.
Introduction
The conceptualization of emotion-focused coping
was introduced by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) in
the framework of their cognitive model of stress
and coping. According to this model, coping strat-
egies are initiated when people encounter stressful
events such as daily hassles (e.g., discovering a
flat tire in one’s car, or being treated rudely by an
official), life events (e.g., spouse illness, or being
fired from work), or large-scale threatening events
involving a great number of people (e.g., natural
disasters and terror attacks). When such stressful
encounters present demands that tax or exceed
the person’s resources, the situation is appraised
as a threat and/or loss, and these appraisals
result in physiological, emotional, cognitive, and
behavioral reactions. Coping represents the per-
son’s cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage
1343
(master, reduce, or tolerate) the demands and
has two functions: a problem-focused function
aimed at changing the stressful situation for the
better, or solving the problem, and an emotion-
focused function aimed at regulating the stress-
related reactions.
The classification of coping according to
function is most common among top-down typol-
ogies (see Skinner et al. 2003). Notably, despite its
popularity in stress and coping research, the
E
problem-focused and emotion-focused coping
dichotomy was criticized on several grounds, the
most disparaging being the realization that most
coping options can serve both problem- and
emotion-focused functions (see Skinner et al.
2003). Furthermore, while Lazarus and Folkman
(1984) treated coping as a process or a reaction to
a specific person-environmental relationship, a
trait approach to coping is also evident, with a
specific coping mode – emotion-focused or
problem-focused – conceived to be a stable cog-
nitive and behavioral disposition of the individual
(see Ben-Zur 2009; Carver et al. 1989; Endler and
Parker 1994).
Emotion-Focused Coping Strategies
Coping modes can be expressed in a variety
of behaviors and cognitions conceptualized as
coping strategies. Emotion-focused coping can
include such strategies as wishful thinking, dis-
tancing, emphasizing the positive, self-blame, and
self-isolation (see Lazarus and Folkman 1984).
Carver et al. (1989) viewed emotion-focused cop-
ing as including an even larger number of coping
strategies: seeking support for emotional reasons,
focusing and venting of emotions, mental and
behavioral disengagement, positive reinterpreta-
tion and growth, denial, acceptance, turning to
religion, and alcohol/drug disengagement. Fur-
thermore, some emotion-focused coping strate-
gies offer unlimited ways of coping options. For
example, mental disengagement can be attained
by diverting attention to another topic, listening
to music or a talk on the radio, chatting with a
friend, watching television, engaging in sport, etc.
1344
As is evident from the list above, emotion-
focused coping strategies include highly diverse
strategies, namely, emotional expression and seek-
ing support on the one hand and disengagement
and denial on the other. This realization led to an
important classification of emotion-focused coping
strategies according to whether they tend to
approach, or to avoid, the stressor. Thus, Endler
and Parker (1994) suggested that emotion-focused
coping can be classified as emotional expression or
emotion oriented vs. disengagement or avoidance
oriented, and such a division is justified on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically,
emotion oriented coping includes approach type
strategies such as ventilation, so that engagement
with the stressor is maintained, while avoidance-
oriented coping, such as denial, is characterized by
strategies that separate or distance the person from
the stressor. Empirically, emotion and avoidance-
oriented coping sometimes show different
outcomes.
Effectiveness and Outcomes
The effectiveness of emotion-focused coping
may depend on the environmental aspects of the
stressful encounter: if nothing can be done by the
person to change the situation, then emotion-
focused coping may be effective in emotional
regulation and stress reduction. Carver et al.
(1989) suggested that some emotion-focused cop-
ing strategies may be more or less effective
depending on the time frame – for example, ven-
tilation or denial can help during the short period
following the stressor encounter, but be harmful
in the long run. The effectiveness of coping
can also be assessed by examining the outcomes
of the stressful encounter. Thus, a multitude of
outcomes have been investigated both in the
field and in lab studies in relation to stress and
coping: (1) emotional outcomes – distress, anxi-
ety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), positive and negative affect; (2) cognitive
outcomes – life satisfaction, task performance;
(3) physiological outcomes – bodily symptoms,
illnesses, psycho-physiological measures such
as heart rate, blood pressure, immune system
Emotion-Focused Coping
functions; (4) behavioral outcomes – risk taking
behavior, suicide attempts.
The most prominent result over many studies
is that emotion-focused coping strategies, and
especially avoidance strategies, are associated
with negative outcomes, that is, higher levels of
negative affect, distress, depression, and PTSD,
and lower levels of positive affect and satisfac-
tion. For example, emotion-focused coping has
been shown as negatively associated with good
health in terms of both physical and psychological
health outcomes (Penley et al. 2002).
Context, Culture, and Individual
Differences
The use of coping strategies depends on
both context and individual differences. Findings
show that people used both emotion- and
problem-focused strategies in 98% of stressful
events reported, but there were more incidents of
problem-focused coping in the context of work
and more emotion-focused coping incidents in the
context of health problems (see Lazarus and
Folkman 1984). Culture is also considered a fac-
tor influencing coping styles, with the frequency
of using specific coping strategies changing as a
function of national, ethnic, and racial differences.
For example, a recent review (Kuo 2011) con-
cluded that in the context of the problem- and
emotion-focused coping model, emotion-focused
coping is mostly prevalent among persons of
Asian backgrounds and also prominent among
people with African and Latino backgrounds.
Personal resources such as intelligence, socio-
economic status, health and family status, as
well as psychological traits, such as optimism,
mastery or locus of control, self-efficacy, self-
esteem, and social support, can help the person
in his/her efforts to cope with stress (Hobfoll
2002). Resources can assist in choosing and
implementing problem-focused strategies, thus
helping to manage or remove the stressor so that
emotion-focused strategies are not necessary. For
example, having resources such as self-esteem
or locus of control is linked with lower use of
emotion-focused strategies, and especially with
Emotion-Related Self-Regulation
low levels of avoidance coping (Kammeyer-
Mueller et al. 2009).
Gender and age have also been investigated
as factors in coping, but despite popular beliefs
that women and older people cope more by means
of emotion-focused strategies, there are no
consistent findings attesting to these claims. Con-
ceivably, emotion-focused coping prevails when
women confront severe stressors, or elders lose
their sense of mastery due to health problems.
Lastly, of the big-five personality traits, variants of
emotion-focused coping, including avoidance strat-
egies, are mainly related to neuroticism (Connor-
Smith and Flachsbart 2007; Cosway et al. 2000).
Conclusion
Emotion-focused coping is a construct which rep-
resents a variety of cognitions and behaviors ini-
tiated during stressful encounters and aimed at
tolerating or reducing the physiological activation
and emotional reactions of the stressed person
without solving the actual problem. Such regula-
tion of emotional states may sometimes be profit-
able in uncontrolled situations and for short
periods, but is usually not beneficial in the long
run. Thus, some emotion-focused strategies are
considered functional, such as positive reframing
and growth, or acceptance, as they can aid the
person in accommodating him/herself to the situ-
ation, and sometimes also in moving towards
problem-focused coping (Carver et al. 1989).
Other strategies, such as focusing on and ventila-
tion of emotions, or behavioral disengagement,
may be adaptive during the first stages of coping
following stressor occurrence, but are considered
dysfunctional and harmful in the long run. Spe-
cifically, avoidance coping prevents the solution
of the problem as well as an awareness of positive
changes in the situation. Emotion-focused coping
may contribute to better functioning and long
term health and satisfaction if it eventually helps
to initiate problem-focused actions.
Cross-References
▶ Avoidance Coping Strategies
▶ Transactional Model of Stress and Coping
1345
References
Ben-Zur, H. (2009). Coping styles and affect. International
Journal of Stress Management, 16, 87–101. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0015731.
Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Weintraub, J. K. (1989).
Assessing coping strategies: A theoretically based
approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 56, 267–283. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.
56.2.267.
Connor-Smith, J. K., & Flachsbart, C. (2007). Relations
between personality and coping: A meta-analysis.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,
E
1080–1107. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.
1080.
Cosway, R., Endler, N.S., Sadler, A.J., & Deary, I.J.
(2000). The Coping inventory for stressful situations:
factorial structure and associations with personality
traits and psychological health. Journal of Applied
Biobehavioral Research, 5, 121–143.
Endler, N. S., & Parker, J. D. A. (1994). Assessment
of multidimensional coping: Task, emotion, and
avoidance strategies. Psychological Assessment, 6,
50–60.
Hobfoll, S. E. (2002). Social and psychological
resources and adaptation. Review of General Psy-
chology, 6, 307–324. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-
2680.6.4.307.
Kammeyer-Mueller, J. D., Judge, T. A., & Scott, B. A.
(2009). The role of core self-evaluations in the coping
process. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 177–195.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013214.
Kuo, B. C. H. (2011). Culture’s consequences on cop-
ing: Theories, evidences, and dimensionalities.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42,
1084–1100. https://doi.org/10.1177/002202211038
1126.
Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal
and coping. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Penley, J. A., Tomaka, J., & Wiebe, J. S. (2002). The
association of coping to physical and psychological
health outcomes: A meta-analytic review. Journal of
Behavioral Medicine, 25, 551–603. https://doi.org/
10.1023/A:1020641400589.
Skinner, E. A., Edge, K., Altman, J., &
Sherwood, H. (2003). Searching for the structure of
coping: A review and critique of category systems for
classifying ways of coping. Psychological Bulletin,
129, 216–269. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.
129.2.216.
Emotion-Related Self-
Regulation
▶ Emotion Regulation
1346
Emotions
▶ Cognitive-Affective Processing System
Empathic Concern
▶ Empathy
Empathizing-Systemizing
Theory
Marjaana Lindeman
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Related Terms
▶ Mentalizing; ▶ Theory of mind
Definition
Empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory concerns
two fundamental cognitive processes known as
empathizing and systemizing. It was developed
by Simon Baron-Cohen in the early 2000s and
endeavors to explain autism and Asperger syn-
drome as well as sex differences in the general
population (Baron-Cohen 2002, 2009, 2010;
Baron-Cohen et al. 2005).
Introduction
As with many other empathy researchers, Baron-
Cohen describes empathizing as consisting of two
components, cognitive and affective empathy. Cog-
nitive empathy means a drive to identify another
person’s emotions and thoughts, as well as an abil-
ity to put oneself into someone else’s shoes and to
imagine their thoughts and feelings. Affective
empathy in the E-S theory is a response element,
Emotions
that is to say, having an appropriate emotional
reaction to another person’s thoughts and feelings.
Systemizing is defined as a drive to analyze or
construct systems. A system is something that
follows rules. When we systemize we are
attempting to identify the rules that govern the
system. The concept of systemizing is derived
from intuitive physics. Whereas intuitive physics
focuses mainly on physical causal systems, sys-
temizing also involves understanding the rules
governing noncausal systems such as libraries or
timetables (Wakabayashi et al. 2007). E-S theory
describes several types of systems, including
mechanical (e.g., machines), motoric (e.g., sports
techniques), abstract (e.g., mathematics), organiz-
able (e.g., plant taxonomies), numerical (e.g., cal-
endars), natural (e.g., the weather patterns),
sensory (e.g., wanting the same food each day),
and social systems (e.g., law).
Empathizing and systemizing are suggested to
be independent dimensions that are present to vary-
ing degrees in the general population. An individ-
ual can thus be either good or poor at both, or at one
or the other. E-S theory has two basic premises, as
follows. First, more females than males have a
female-type cognition (empathizing is more devel-
oped than systemizing) and more males than
females have a male-type cognition (systemizing
is more developed than empathizing). These two
types of cognition are also referred to as female
brain and male brain type, and they are proposed to
be determined both by biology and socialization.
Second, individuals with autism or Asperger syn-
drome are proposed to show a delayed ability to
empathize and an average or even above-average
ability to systemize. Baron-Cohen (2002) refers to
this extension of E-S theory as the extreme male
brain theory of autism. Genetic and hormonal fac-
tors may predict sex differences and autistic traits,
but their exact nature is not known.
Assessment of Empathizing
and Systemizing
To assess empathizing, systemizing, and autistic
traits, Baron-Cohen and colleagues have devel-
oped the Empathy Quotient (EQ), the
Empathizing-Systemizing Theory
Systemizing Quotient (SQ), and the Autism Spec-
trum Quotient (AQ). The EQ is a questionnaire
that includes 40 empathy items and 20 filler items
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004). System-
izing can be assessed with the Systemizing
Quotient – Revised (Wheelwright et al. 2006), a
75-item self-report scale (for the original SQ, see
Baron-Cohen et al. 2003). The AQ questionnaire
has 50 items and was developed to assess autistic
traits among adults with normal intelligence
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). The AQ items partly
overlap the EQ and SQ items.
In addition, the website of the Cambridge Uni-
versity Autism Research Centre, led by Baron-
Cohen, includes several other tests in different
languages for children, adolescents, and adults.
The tests can be downloaded, and they focus on
different manifestations of empathizing, system-
izing, and autistic traits.
Researchers are working to further develop
methods by which empathizing, systemizing,
and related constructs could be studied in greater
detail. Apart from the EQ and other empathy self-
report measures, methods assessing actual empa-
thizing abilities among healthy adults in particular
are limited.
Evidence
In the early days of E-S theory, Baron-Cohen
reviewed evidence for the theory from previous
findings on sex differences and on individuals
with autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen
2002; Baron-Cohen et al. 2005). This evidence
shows, for example, that 1-day-old boys look
longer at a mechanical mobile than at a person’s
face, whereas 1-day-old girls show the opposite
preference. In addition, females are better at emo-
tion recognition, and in terms of social sensitivity,
they are more interested in people and value
developing altruistic relationships. Girls begin to
speak earlier than boys; they talk more about
feelings and are more likely to play with dolls as
children. Males, in contrast, are often better at
mental rotation, spatial navigation, map reading,
and problems concerning mathematics, physics,
and engineering; they have better constructional
1347
abilities, they more often choose occupations
linked to systemizing (e.g., in fields involving
engineering and mathematics), and they are
more likely to play with mechanical toys as
children.
In addition, individuals with autism spectrum
disorder are more often male than female, and
they show deficits in domains relating to empa-
thizing, whereas their abilities relating to system-
izing are normal or even superior to males that
E
have no autism spectrum disorder. Their superior
abilities are manifested as extra-close attention to
detail and a passion for collecting and organizing
things and sometimes also as exceptional achieve-
ments, for example, in mathematics, science, or
chess. Moreover, they score higher than average
on tests relating to intuitive physics and system-
izing, and their fathers and grandfathers are over-
represented in occupations that require good
systemizing.
The empirical research designed to test E-S
theory directly has been extensive. Most of the
studies have focused on autistic traits and, to a
lesser extent, on gender differences. The role of
empathizing and systemizing in such areas as
brain function, decision making, learning, think-
ing, personality, religiosity, social intelligence,
and occupational choices has also been
researched. In addition to other researchers inter-
nationally, Baron-Cohen and colleagues have
conducted hundreds of studies to empirically test
E-S theory. The articles are available at the
website of the Cambridge University Autism
Research Centre. As a whole, the results broadly
support the theory’s main propositions.
Critique of the Theory
Although most researchers accept Baron-Cohen’s
major premises and propositions, the theory has
also received criticism. Some critics argue that
many of the studies have used only self-report
measures, such as EQ, SQ, and AQ, and have
focused mainly on high-functioning autism.
Whether self-perceptions are accurate and
whether the results apply to autistic individuals
who have intellectual disabilities is said to be
1348
uncertain. Critics also claim that the arguments
about sex differences are exaggerated and that
males and females have equal abilities in terms
of language learning, spatial reasoning, and math-
ematical and scientific thinking. Moreover, some
researchers regard the concept of systemizing as
ambiguous. For example, Badcock (2009) sug-
gests that mechanistic cognition, rather than sys-
temizing, would be a better term for concrete,
repetitive, and literal autistic thinking, which
tends to miss the deeper meaning of the systems.
Conclusion
Despite some criticism, E-S theory is a valuable
addition to the fields of autism spectrum disorders,
gender differences, as well as personality and
cognition in general. The definitions of the terms
“empathizing” and “systemizing” are detailed, the
theory is clear in its proposals, and it has high
explanatory and predictive power. Probably for
these reasons, E-S theory has triggered an excep-
tionally large amount of theoretical and empirical
work during its short history.
References
Badcock, C. (2009). The imprinted brain. Dexter:
Thomson-Shore.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2002). The extreme male brain theory of
autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 248–254.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01904-6.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2009). Autism: The empathizing – sys-
temizing (ES) theory. Annals of the New York Academy
of Sciences, 1156, 68–80.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2010). Empathizing, systemizing, and
the extreme male brain theory of autism. In I. Savic
(Ed.), Sex differences in the human brain, their under-
pinnings and implications (pp. 167–175). New York.
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The Empathy
Quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger
syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex
differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Dis-
orders, 34, 163–175. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JADD.
0000022607.19833.00.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J.,
& Clubley, E. (2001). The Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(AQ): Evidence from Asperger syndrome/high-
functioning autism, males and females, scientists and
mathematicians. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Empathizing-Systemizing Theory: Past, Present, and Future
Disorders, 31, 5–17. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:10056
53411471.
Baron-Cohen, S., Richler, J., Bisarya, D., Gurunathan, N.,
& Wheelwright, S. (2003). The Systemizing Quotient:
An investigation of adults with Asperger syndrome or
high-functioning autism, and normal sex differences.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B:
Biological Sciences, 358, 361–374. https://doi.org/
10.1098/rstb.2002.1206.
Baron-Cohen, S., Knickmeyer, R. C., & Belmonte, M. K.
(2005). Sex differences in the brain: Implications for
explaining autism. Science, 310, 819–823. https://doi.
org/10.1126/science.1115455.
Wakabayashi, A., Baron-Cohen, S., Uchiyama, T.,
Yoshida, Y., Kuroda, M., & Wheelwright, S. (2007).
Empathizing and systemizing in adults with and with-
out autism spectrum conditions: Cross-cultural stabil-
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37, 1823–1832. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-006-
0316-6.
Wheelwright, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Goldenfeld, N.,
Delaney, J., Fine, D., Smith, R., . . . Wakabayashi,
A. (2006). Predicting Autism Spectrum Quotient
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and Empathy Quotient (EQ). Brain Research, 1079,
47–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.012.
Empathizing-Systemizing
Theory: Past, Present, and
Future
David M. Greenberg1,2,3 and Simon Baron-Cohen2,4
1
Department of Clinical Psychology, City College
of New York, New York, USA
2
Autism Research Centre, Department of
Psychiatry, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, UK
3
Department of Psychology, Cambridge
University, Cambridge, UK
4
CLASS Clinic, Cambridgeshire and
Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust (CPFT),
Cambridgeshire, UK
Definition
The empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory
(Baron-Cohen 2003, 2009) proposes an account
of two important dimensions of individual differ-
ences in cognition which has proved useful in
explaining psychological sex differences in
Empathizing-Systemizing Theory: Past, Present, and Future
human cognition and has helped to explain the
clinical condition of autism. Recent evidence sug-
gests that E-S brain types are not just a useful
psychological description but that these also
have a biological basis and can explain individual
differences in everyday human behavior.
Empathy is the ability to understand and predict
what another person is thinking and feeling and
to respond to another person’s mental state with
an appropriate emotion (Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright 2004). The cognitive component of
empathy is the ability to imagine or recognize
another’s mental state and to put yourself in
another person’s shoes (also referred to as “theory
of mind” or mentalizing), while the affective com-
ponent of empathy is the emotional reaction a
person has in response to the mental state of
another. Systemizing is a very different process:
the drive to analyze, build, understand, and predict
a rule-based system, including those that are cate-
gorical (e.g., the rules defining types of rock or
fungi), mechanical (e.g., the rules governing the
workings of your computer or your car engine),
natural (e.g., the rules governing the cardiovascu-
lar system or your garden pond), social (e.g., the
rules governing a legal system or a corporation),
motoric (e.g., the rules governing a golf swing or a
particular form of dance), and abstract (such as the
rules of mathematics or syntax) (Baron-Cohen
et al. 2003). In short, empathy centers on how we
make sense of and respond to people or other
animate entities in terms of their mental states
while systemizing centers on how we make sense
of (usually inanimate) objects or events.
Empathy can be measured using the empathy
quotient (EQ: Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright
2004), which is a 60-item self-report measure
(20 of which are “filler” items so are not scored)
that includes items such as “I can pick up quickly if
someone says one thing but means another”; “I am
good at predicting how someone will feel”; and
“Other people tell me I am good at understanding
how they are feeling and what they are thinking.”
Those that score high on the EQ typically also score
higher on performance tests of empathy including
the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET:
Baron-Cohen et al. 2001a). Systemizing can be
measured using the systemizing quotient-revised
1349
(SQ-R: Wheelwright et al. 2006) which is a
75-item self-report measure that includes items
such as “I am fascinated by how machines work”;
“In math, I am intrigued by the rules and patterns
governing numbers”; “When I look at a mountain,
I think about how precisely it was formed”; and “If
I were buying a computer, I would want to know
exact details about its hard disc drive capacity and
processor speed.” The EQ and SQ have been
translated into multiple languages (available for
E
free to the research community at www.autismre
searchcentre.com), and there are short versions of
each measure (Wakabayashi et al. 2006; Allison
et al. 2015).
Empathy and systemizing are not entirely inde-
pendent of each other as large-scale studies indi-
cate a small but statistically significant negative
correlation, implying that the higher one scores on
one dimension and the lower one scores on the
other. This has been interpreted as a trade-off
perhaps reflecting neural competition. An individ-
ual’s scores on these two dimensions can be used
to calculate their “brain type” or cognitive style.
Individuals whose empathizing (E) scores are
higher than systemizing (S) scores are categorized
as E > S or type E, those with an S > E profile are
categorized as type S, and those with relatively
equal E and S scores (E = S) are categorized as
type B (or balanced). The comparison of EQ and
SQ scores also identifies cognitive styles at the
extreme ends of this space: those with E > >
S scores are described as extreme type E and
those with S > > E scores are described as
extreme type S. Roughly 30% of the population
is estimated as type E, 30% as type S, 30% as
type B, 5% as extreme type S, and 5% as extreme
type S (Baron-Cohen et al. 2014). Significantly
more males (58%) than females (23%) are cate-
gorized as type S or extreme type S and more
females (47%) than males (13%) are classified as
type E or extreme type E (Baron-Cohen et al.
2014), such that type S has also been described
as the “male brain” and type E has been described
as the “female brain.” These terms of course do
not mean that all females have one brain type and
all males have another, simply that there are sta-
tistical trends differentiating groups of males and
females. Individuals by definition may be typical
1350
or atypical for the sex such that it is not possible
(and would be stereotyping) to prejudge a per-
son’s brain type on the basis of the sex.
E-S theory has proven to be a useful frame-
work for characterizing those with autism. Indi-
viduals on the autism spectrum are typically
classified as type S or extreme type S, with higher
systemizing scores than empathy scores
(Goldenfeld et al. 2005). A proportion of those
with autism may even show hyper-systemizing
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2009). This may explain the
remarkable talents often documented in autism,
including autistic savants, given that savant skills
often center on the understanding of a particular
system (e.g., music or mathematics or calendrical
calculation). E-S scores also predict autistic traits
as measured by the autism-spectrum quotient
(AQ: Baron-Cohen et al. 2001b) in both autism
and control populations.
Some have misinterpreted E-S theory to indi-
cate that people with autism do not have the abil-
ity to empathize. In fact, the evidence shows that
people with autism only score lower on the cog-
nitive components of empathy, but their affective
empathy typically remains intact (Dziobek et al.
2008). That is, they are able to react emotionally
to the suffering of others and respond with an
appropriate emotion; however, they have diffi-
culty recognizing the mental states of others and
using these to predict their behavior. This can
explain why social situations can be confusing
for them and why people with autism can be
taken advantage of. The mirror opposite of autism
is the profile of psychopaths (or those with anti-
social personality disorder) who have high cogni-
tive empathy and low affective empathy, which
enables them to manipulate others without being
caring about their victim (Baron-Cohen 2011).
There is emerging evidence that E-S theory has
implications for other clinical diagnoses. For
example, extreme empathizing was found to cor-
relate with psychosis (paranoia and mania) in
females (Brosnan et al. 2010), and a recent study
has also shown that individuals with autism who
have had a comorbidity of psychosis have higher
empathy scores than those without psychosis
(Larson et al. 2015). In separate studies, system-
izing has also been found to link to schizotypy
Empathizing-Systemizing Theory: Past, Present, and Future
(Russell-Smith et al. 2013) and anorexia nervosa
(Hambrook et al. 2008).
E-S theory is not just an explanation of
observed psychological sex differences and clini-
cal diagnosis but also of everyday human behav-
ior and interests. For example, E-S scores predict
what subject a person will study at a university: on
average, those with E > S profiles are more likely
to study humanities, and those with S > E profiles
are more likely to study the exact sciences
(Billington et al. 2007). Indeed, E-S scores are
better predictors than sex of an individual’s choice
of whether to study science or humanities
among college students. Greenberg et al.
(2015b) applied E-S theory to the psychology of
music. In one study, Greenberg et al. (2015a)
found that on average, individuals classified as
type E preferred music with low energy, negative
emotions, and emotional depth, while individuals
classified as type S preferred music with high
energy, positive emotions, and intellectual depth.
Future research should continue to investigate
how E-S theory predicts behavior in different
facets of everyday life, including occupational
choice, relationship style, parenting style, moral
values, or even voting behavior.
Research shows that there is a biological basis
underlying differences in cognitive styles. For
example, amniotic fluid hormones measured in
the second trimester of pregnancy show increased
levels of fetal testosterone in those with higher
autistic traits and autism (Auyeung et al. 2009;
Baron-Cohen et al. 2015) and in those with
stronger SQ scores, better attention to detail
(Auyeung et al. 2006) and narrower interests
(Knickmeyer et al. 2005). Lower levels of fetal
testosterone are associated with higher scores on
the EQ and the RMET (Chapman et al. 2006) and
better quality of social relationships and communi-
cation (Knickmeyer et al. 2005). Using fMRI, type
S and type E cognitive brain types in males are
associated with differences in hypothalamic and
ventral basal ganglia regions in the brain (Lai
et al. 2012). In several large genetic studies,
Warrier et al. (2016) showed that heritability of
both empathy and systemizing is associated with
variation in single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs).
Empathizing-Systemizing Theory: Past, Present, and Future
Conclusion
Though in the initial years of its development, E-S
theory was predominantly used to explain psycho-
logical sex differences and autism, it has proven to
be far more wide reaching. Indeed, it is linked to a
range of everyday behaviors and clinical diagno-
ses, even after controlling for sex differences.
Future research should investigate E-S theory as
a framework in which to understand individual
differences in a range of human behavior and
development. Importantly, it may provide alterna-
tive insights to widely used personality models
such as the Big Five.
References
Allison, C., Baron-Cohen, S., Stone, M. H., & Muncer,
S. J. (2015). Rasch modeling and confirmatory factor
analysis of the systemizing quotient-revised (SQ-R)
scale. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 18, E16.
Auyeung, B., Baron-Cohen, S., Chapman, E.,
Knickmeyer, R., Taylor, K., & Hackett, G. (2006).
Foetal testosterone and the child systemizing quo-
tient. European Journal of Endocrinology, 155(suppl 1),
S123–S130.
Auyeung, B., Baron-Cohen, S., Ashwin, E., Knickmeyer,
R., Taylor, K., & Hackett, G. (2009). Fetal testosterone
and autistic traits. British Journal of Psychology,
100(1), 1–22.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2003). Essential difference: Men,
women, and the extreme male brain. London: Penguin.
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Empathy
David A. Lishner1, Eric L. Stocks2 and
Steven W. Steinert1
1
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, Oshkosh,
WI, USA
2
University of Texas at Tyler, Tyler, TX, USA
Synonyms
Einfühlung; Emotional contagion; Empathic con-
cern; Personal distress; Perspective taking
Empathy
Definition
A term used to describe eight related, but distinct,
cognitive, affective, and behavioral interpersonal
reactions to another person, including various
forms of perspective taking, empathic concern,
personal distress, and other congruent emotional
and behavioral responses.
Introduction
Empathy is complex. Although most people can
provide a general definition of how they them-
selves define empathy, the term has been used by
social scientists to identify a number of distinct
but related phenomena. The broad range of phe-
nomena described by the term has, in turn, created
challenges in understanding and measuring the
construct from a personality and individual differ-
ences perspective.
Definitions of Empathy
Titchener first coined the term empathy in the
early 1900s as an English translation of the Ger-
man term einfühlung. Einfühlung is a concept
originally developed by Lipps to describe the
process of imagining or projecting oneself into
the state of another person or object, which in
turn facilitates aesthetic or interpersonal under-
standing of the object or person (Jahoda 2005).
However, contemporary use of the term empathy
has moved far beyond this original conceptualiza-
tion and is now used to identify a broad range of
cognitive, affective, and behavioral phenomena
(Batson 2011; Davis 1996).
Cognitive Empathy
In addition to the original form of aesthetic per-
spective taking identified by Lipps, empathy has
been used to label several forms of interpersonal
perspective taking that include adopting the per-
spective of another (imagine-other perspective
taking) and imagining oneself in the situation of
another (imagine-self perspective taking). These
forms of perspective taking were popularized in
Empathy
the work of Batson (2011) and Stotland (1969).
Some researchers have also used the term
empathic accuracy to refer to the ability of an
individual to accurately infer the thoughts and
feelings of others (e.g., Ickes and Hodges 2013).
Affective Empathy
In addition to this primarily cognitive view of
empathy, other researchers have used the term to
describe a broad range of affective phenomena.
One such phenomenon involves feeling the same
affective or emotional experience as another per-
son. This type of vicarious emotional reaction has
had many names, including parallel empathy
(Davis 1996), emotional contagion (Lishner
et al. 2008), and empathic resonance (Watson
and Greenberg 2009). A second affective phe-
nomenon that has been called empathy involves
feeling other-oriented concern for a person in
need. This phenomenon has been called sympathy
(Eisenberg et al. 1989) and empathic concern
(Davis 1996). A third affective phenomenon that
has been called empathy involves feeling self-
focused personal distress in response to the need
or suffering of another (Batson 2011). Note, how-
ever, that most researchers differentiate distress
from empathy, primarily because the former is
focused on oneself whereas the latter is focused
on another person.
Behavioral Empathy
Finally, the term empathy is occasionally used to
describe different forms of behavioral matching.
This involves mimicking or matching the behav-
ioral expressions or movements of another
(Bavelas et al. 1987). Behavioral matching of
this sort may perhaps arise from neural systems
that translate perception of others’ behaviors into
activation of motor neurons that would be neces-
sary for the perceiver to engage in the behaviors
(Gallese and Goldman 1998). However, it is not
clear that this translation process would necessar-
ily result in matching behavior. Indeed, it appears
that behavioral matching is often goal directed,
even among the very young (Meltzoff and Moore
1997). The urge to tap one’s foot when interacting
with a person tapping his or her foot is an example
of this type of empathic behavioral matching.
1353
Associations Among Empathy
Phenomena
The use of the term empathy to describe so many
different phenomena likely results from the relat-
edness of the various phenomena. There are three
general types of relatedness among empathy phe-
nomena that warrant discussion. First, it may be
that some of these empathy-related phenomena
reflect special instances of the other empathy-
E
related phenomena. For example, imagine-self
perspective taking may be a special case of aes-
thetic perspective taking, such that the object of
perspective taking is another individual rather
than an inanimate object. Similarly, feeling per-
sonal distress may be a special instance of feeling
the same emotion as another person when the
other’s negative emotion is triggered by a state
of need (i.e., when the other is also experiencing
distress).
Although it is worth considering whether the
number of empathy phenomena can effectively be
made smaller through such theoretical reduction,
little research has been conducted to definitively
establish whether such a reduction is warranted.
However, there is much research suggesting that a
distinction among a number of these phenomena
is useful. For example, imagine-self perspective
taking and imagine-other perspective taking pro-
duce different affective and behavioral outcomes,
suggesting that they are distinct processes (Batson
et al. 2003; Stocks et al. 2011). Research also
reveals a distinction between empathic concern
and personal distress in terms of differences in
the type of motivational states they produce
(Batson 2011). Moreover, empathic concern has
been found to vary as a function of characteristics
unrelated to the current emotional state of the
target for whom empathic concern is experienced
(e.g., target vulnerability or infant-like character-
istics) suggesting a distinction between empathic
concern and emotion contagion or empathic reso-
nance (Batson 2011). Some research has demon-
strated that viewing rapidly presented expressions
of basic emotions can produce the corresponding
emotional reactions in viewers, even in the
absence of clear contextual information about
the cause of the expression (Lishner et al. 2008).
1354
Such findings suggest that empathic resonance
can occur even when conditions offer little or no
opportunity for perspective taking. There also is
some research on behavioral matching of others
by infants that suggest matching can occur with
minimal perspective taking or empathic emotional
experience (Meltzoff and Moore 1997).
A second type of relatedness among empathy
phenomena is process relatedness. Much research
suggests that certain forms of empathic phenom-
ena can trigger other forms of empathic phenom-
ena. For example, in order to accurately predict
the mental states of others, it may be useful to
engage in either imagine-other or imagine-self
perspective taking (Decety and Grèzes 2006).
These perspective taking processes may in turn
promote empathic resonance, which also may
promote empathic accuracy (Gallese and
Goldman 1998). Imagine-other perspective taking
has long been used as a means to induce empathic
concern (Batson 2011), and imagine-self perspec-
tive taking has been used to induce empathic
resonance (Stocks et al. 2011). In addition, there
is evidence that viewing the emotional expres-
sions of others may create matching facial muscle
activity in observers. This muscle mimicry may,
in turn, produce an emotional experience in the
observer that is congruent with the emotion of the
other (Lishner et al. 2008). However, these find-
ings are more speculative, and it is unclear
whether the expression-consistent facial activity
precedes, is followed by, or occurs independently
of the reported emotional experience.
A third type of relatedness among empathy
phenomena is stimulus-antecedent relatedness.
Specifically, certain stimulus antecedents are
capable of evoking multiple empathy phenom-
ena. The classic example of a common stimulus
antecedent of empathy is witnessing another in
need. Encountering those in need is a particularly
potent stimulus that can elicit a range of empathy
phenomena, including imagine-self and imagine-
other perspective taking, empathic concern, per-
sonal distress, empathic resonance, or behavioral
matching (Batson 2011). Likewise, valuing the
welfare of another person (as opposed to
disliking that person) is important for several
Empathy
empathy phenomena, including feeling empathic
concern and feeling empathic resonance in
response to another’s need (Batson 2011; Stocks
et al. 2011). Antipathy produced by another’s
mean behavior or competition with another is
related to physiological responses that have
been interpreted as indicating inhibition of
empathic concern and “counter empathy”
(Harmon-Jones et al. 2004; Lanzetta and Englis
1989). Finally, neuroimaging findings indicate
that merely observing painful injuries of another
person can evoke brain activity similar to that
produced by one’s own experience of pain
(Jackson et al. 2005), which suggests a possible
matching of affective experience between one-
self and another.
Theoretical Organizations of Empathy
Phenomena
Due to the high degree of relatedness among
empathy phenomena, social scientists have long
struggled to develop a full theoretical account of
empathy. As may be obvious, such an endeavor is
complicated by differences in how scientists use
the term empathy and in what they choose to
include (or exclude) from the broad range of
possible empathy phenomena. Some have sought
to address this state of affairs by advocating
strongly for use of specific terms to distinguish
among phenomena (Wispé 1986). Others have
argued that a more comprehensive conceptual
definition of empathy is warranted (Cuff et al.
2016). Still, others have sought to advance theo-
retical models that permit different peripheral
empathy phenomena to be explained as manifes-
tations of one core empathy phenomenon
(deWaal 2008). However, to date, little clear con-
sensus about how to address the variety of phe-
nomena labeled as empathy is apparent,
suggesting instead that it may be better to con-
sider these phenomena as distinct but related
(Batson 2011). Given this state of affairs, it
becomes essential to be aware of the conceptual
complexity and confusion in the scientific litera-
ture on empathy when seeking to evaluate
Empathy
individual scientific studies, theoretical perspec-
tives, and measures of empathy.
Conceptualization and Measurement of
Empathy as a Dispositional Construct
Ultimately, empathy phenomena are transitory
states triggered by situations and contextual
cues. Almost always, these triggers involve the
imagined or actual experiences of other individ-
uals. In an interpersonal encounter, one may seek
to understand the thoughts or emotions of another
by adopting the other’s perspective or imagining
oneself in the other’s situation. One may be
exposed to another in need and come to experi-
ence feelings of distress or empathic concern in
response to the other’s situation. Although empa-
thy phenomena are considered to be transitory
states, many social scientists believe some people
are more likely to experience these states than
others or, when they do experience these states,
may experience them to a greater extent. Thus, it
is possible to conceptualize empathy phenomena
as dispositional constructs such that people will
vary in their natural tendencies to experience
various forms of empathy when placed in the
same situation or presented with the same
contextual cues.
A variety of different dispositional measures of
empathy have been developed. Most dispositional
measures of empathy are self-report in nature.
Usually the measures consist of a number of
items asking respondents to indicate the extent to
which they experience various empathic states
when encountering interpersonal situations or to
indicate their proneness to experience empathic
states more generally. Summing or averaging a
respondent’s ratings across all the items or subsets
of items are then used to derive the respondent’s
dispositional empathy score.
Several task-based empathy measures also
exist. These typically include stimuli (e.g., pic-
tures of emotional expressions or descriptions
ofemotion-inducing situations) designed to
evoke empathy along with items that assess the
corresponding cognitive or affective empathy
1355
phenomena evoked by the stimuli. Variation in
state empathy reactions across multiple stimuli
or variation in state empathic reactions to the
same stimulus constitutes the measure of dispo-
sitional empathy across the sample of respon-
dents. In some task-based measures, outcomes
other than self-reports of one’s own empathic
tendency or state are assessed. Examples of
such measurement include the degree of accu-
racy in identifying another’s mental states (Ickes
E
and Hodges 2013) or behavioral expression (e.g.,
facial expression of distress or concern;
Eisenberg et al. 1989). Task-based empathy mea-
sures that rely on behavioral expression as the
means of assessing empathic reactions may be
particularly useful when conducting research
with young children.
When interpreting a specific dispositional mea-
sure of empathy, it is important to consider which
empathy phenomenon or phenomena it claims to
assess. Examples of various dispositional empa-
thy measures, and the empathy phenomena they
measure, may be grouped into three general cate-
gories: measures of cognitive empathy, measures
of affective empathy, and measures of both cog-
nitive and affective empathy.
Dispositional Measures of Cognitive Empathy
Dispositional measures of cognitive empathy are
designed to assess one or more types of perspec-
tive taking or accuracy at inferring the mental
states of others. Although not a complete list,
examples of dispositional cognitive empathy
measures include the Hogan Empathy Scale
(HES; 1969) and the Jefferson Scale of Physician
Empathy (JSPE; Hojat et al. 2001). Both measures
assess imagine-other and imagine-self perspective
taking. An example of a task-based measure of
ability to accurately infer the mental states of
others (i.e., empathic accuracy) is widely used
by Ickes and his colleagues (e.g., Ickes and
Hodges 2013). Specifically, respondents are
asked to predict what a target person is thinking
and feeling over time while they watch a video of
the target person describing a life event. Accuracy
is determined by the extent to which respondents
predictions of the target’s thoughts and feelings
1356
correspond to the thoughts and feelings reported
by the target when the video was first recorded.
Dispositional Measures of Affective Empathy
Dispositional measures of affective empathy are
designed to assess empathic concern, personal
distress, feeling the same emotion as others (i.e.,
empathic resonance), or a combination thereof.
Examples of dispositional measures of affective
empathy include the Balanced Emotional Empa-
thy Scale (BEES; Mehrabian 1996) and the
Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng
et al. 2009). Both assess one’s general tendency
to experience affective empathy to others
(empathic concern, personal distress, and
empathic resonance). The Emotional Contagion
Scale (ECS; Doherty 1997) assesses the tendency
to experience empathic resonance of basic emo-
tions in response to the discrete emotional expres-
sions of others. The Empathy Index for Children
and Adolescents (IECE; Bryant 1982) assesses
empathic resonance of sadness, empathic con-
cern, and personal distress. The State Empathy
Task (SET; Lishner et al. 2015) assesses empathic
resonance of discrete emotions as well as
empathic concern. The SET is unique in that it
seeks to assess change in empathic reactions
between stimuli selected to produce relatively
high levels of affective empathy and stimuli
selected to produce relatively low levels of affec-
tive empathy. Variation of the stimuli and mea-
surement of empathic reactions are arranged in a
covert manner, so that respondents are unaware
that the purpose of the task is to measure empathy
phenomena.
Dispositional Measures of Both Cognitive and
Affective Empathy
A number of dispositional measures exist that
were designed to assess both cognitive and affec-
tive empathy phenomena. Examples of mixed
dispositional empathy measures include the Inter-
personal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis 1996),
which assesses a combination of imagine-other
and imagine-self perspective taking, empathic
concern, and personal distress. Another measure,
the Ethnocentric Empathy Scale (Wang et al.
Empathy
2003), assesses imagine-other perspective taking,
imagine-self perspective taking, empathic reso-
nance, and empathic concern directed toward eth-
nic outgroups. The Basic Empathy Scale (BES;
Jolliffe and Farrington 2006) assesses imagine-
other perspective taking and empathic resonance.
The Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright 2004) assesses imagine-self and
imagine-other perspective taking as well as per-
sonal distress. The task-based Multifaceted
Empathy Test (MET; Dizobek et al. 2008) is sim-
ilar to the SET discussed above, but assesses
imagine-other perspective taking in addition to
empathic concern. Like the SET, the MET also
assesses empathic resonance, but only of general
positive and negative affect and arousal. More-
over, the MET is not designed to evaluate
empathic reactions in a covert manner (i.e.,
respondents may be aware that their empathic
reactions are being measured).
Methodological Considerations When Using
Measures of Dispositional Empathy
When selecting a measure of dispositional empa-
thy for use in research, one must consider its
strengths and weaknesses. First, given the range
of different empathy phenomena, it is important to
ensure that the item or stimulus content of the
measure matches the particular empathy phenom-
ena of interest. Second, one must consider the
thoroughness of the measure’s content. Some
measures may consist of relatively minimal con-
tent (i.e., few items or stimuli) for capturing a
specific empathy phenomenon. Minimal content
may result in relatively low measurement reliabil-
ity or validity of the phenomenon and thus make it
difficult to detect true associations between the
empathy phenomenon and other constructs.
Third, most forms of dispositional empathy are
considered socially desirable, such that partici-
pants intuitively (and, perhaps, unconsciously)
strive to present themselves as exemplars of
empathic ability or as experiencing relatively
high levels of empathy in response to others. As
such, the content of most dispositional empathy
measures likely trigger biases to over-report one’s
empathic experiences or tendencies – that is,
Empathy
dispositional empathy measures possess item-
specific method biases. This problem can lead to
inflated associations between dispositional empa-
thy measures and measures of other socially desir-
able constructs due to sharing of common method
biases. In such instances, the measures likely
overestimate the true association between the
empathy and the non-empathy constructs of
interest.
A fourth potential weakness of many self-
report dispositional empathy measures is that the
general approach to validating a new measure is to
assess the associations between it and measures of
other constructs or behaviors that are considered
to be outcomes of empathy. Documenting associ-
ations between dispositional empathy measures
and these types of criterion outcome measures
can provide evidence of construct validity, but it
is, at best, an indirect form of evidence. More
direct evidence would be to demonstrate that
responses on dispositional empathy measures pre-
dict the corresponding state empathy phenomena
within specific situations. For example, if a
researcher finds that scores on a dispositional
empathy measure predict the degree of change in
the respondents’ transitory empathic reactions to
stimuli selected to produce strong and weak
empathic states, then the researcher has demon-
strated direct evidence of the measure’s construct
validity. However, even when such direct evi-
dence is found in studies, associations between
dispositional and state measures are almost
always reported without considering the possibil-
ity that the association is due to shared item-
specific common method variance (see above),
shared rater-specific method bias, or shared
context-specific method bias. Consequently, it
remains uncertain whether many dispositional
measures of empathy would be found valid if
exposed to such direct validity tests.
One way to address the problem of shared
method bias is to use task-based measures of
dispositional empathy in which empathic reac-
tions to stimuli selected to produce strong
empathic reactions and empathic reactions to
stimuli selected to produce weak empathic reac-
tions are obtained from respondents. The relative
1357
difference in empathic reactions to the two types
of stimuli is then computed and serves as the
measure of respondents’ empathic tendencies.
The advantage of this task-based approach is that
rater-specific and context-specific method biases
are “subtracted” out of the empathic tendency
measure once the relative difference is computed.
Thus, rater-specific and context-specific method
biases can no longer account for any association
between the dispositional measure of empathy
E
and measures of other constructs. However, it is
important to note that this approach may not
reduce or eliminate content-specific method bias
if respondents can ascertain that the measure
assesses empathy phenomena. Thus, although
certain task-based measures of dispositional
empathy can reduce problems of shared method
bias with measures of other constructs, they may
not eliminate the problem of shared method bias
completely if respondents are aware that their
empathic reactions are under investigation.
Associations Between Dispositional Empathy
Measures and Other Phenomena
Despite the conceptual and empirical challenges
of defining and measuring empathy phenomena
precisely, the compelling nature of empathy phe-
nomena rests in their widespread links to other
important or interesting interpersonal phenomena.
For example, research suggests that empathy
phenomena are associated with the following:
prosocial behavior, aggression, prejudice, dis-
crimination, and stigma (Eisenberg et al. 2010);
different forms of so-called divisive personality
constructs, including psychopathy, narcissism,
and borderline personality (Lishner et al. 2015);
sex and gender (Eisenberg and Lennon 1983);
moral development (Hoffman 2000); close rela-
tionship outcomes (Ickes and Hodges 2013); and
emotion regulation and social functioning
(Eisenberg et al. 1996).
When considering empirical associations
between measures of empathy and measures of
non-empathy phenomena, one must consider
which of the eight general forms of empathy is
assessed by the specific empathy measure in ques-
tion. Differences in the type of empathy
1358
phenomena measured can produce differences in
the empirical pattern of associations. For example,
those who report feeling a preponderance of
empathic concern compared to personal distress
are more likely to offer assistance to another in
need – regardless of how easy it is to avoid con-
tinued exposure to the person. However, those
who report feeling a preponderance of personal
distress compared to empathic concern are more
likely to offer assistance only when it is difficult to
avoid exposure to the person (Batson 2011). Sim-
ilarly, imagine-other perspective taking and the
empathic concern it produces are related to a
tendency to seek continued exposure to the person
who is the focus of these states. In contrast,
imagine-self perspective taking and the empathic
resonance it produces are not associated with this
tendency in most cases (Stocks et al. 2011).
One also should consider the way in which
empathy is measured. For example, relatively
large gender differences in affective empathy
are found when self-report dispositional empa-
thy measures are used. However, gender differ-
ences tend to be much smaller or nonexistent
when other types of empathy measures are used
(Eisenberg and Lennon 1983). Similarly, when
dispositional self-report measures of empathy
are used in conjunction with dispositional mea-
sures of other constructs in the same study, it is
possible that obtained associations between the
measures are due, at least in part, to common
rater-specific, context-specific, or item-specific
method biases.
Conclusion
Empathy is an important and complex concept
that has been used by social scientists to refer to
many distinct but related phenomena. When con-
sidering empathy phenomena from a personality
and individual differences perspective, it is impor-
tant to evaluate which empathy phenomenon a
given dispositional empathy measure is designed
to assess. Also, it is important to evaluate the type
of method bias that may be present in the measure.
Measures of empathy phenomena are associated
with measures of a variety of other phenomena.
Empathy
However, caution must be exercised when
evaluating these associations given the challenges
of conceptualizing and measuring empathy
phenomena.
Cross-References
▶ Altruism
▶ Compassion
▶ Cooperativeness
▶ Identification
▶ Prosocial Behavior
▶ Sensitivity
▶ Sympathy
▶ Tender Emotion
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Empathy Questionnaire
▶ Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Empirical Method
▶ Empirically Derived Personality Test
1360
Empirically Derived
Personality Test
James S. Korcuska1 and Jessica M. Hotchkiss2
1
School of Education and Director Community
Counseling Services, North Dakota State
University, Fargo, ND, USA
2
Counselor Education and Supervision,
North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND, USA
Synonyms
Criterion keyed; Empirical method; Empirically
keyed
Definition
Empirically derived personality tests utilize the
empirical method, a method designed to enhance
objectivity (Meehl 1945). Item selection and thus
scale development are based on the item’s ability
to distinguish between criterion and control groups
(Butcher 2000).
Introduction
Empirically derived personality assessments
are designed to distinguish between groups to
effectively measure. Therefore, although items
comprising a scale may be theoretically based
or have face validity, this is not a necessity
with empirically derived tests. Ultimately, this
approach may yield measures less susceptible
to faking, as even professionals may be unable
to surmise an item’s psychometric intent (Meehl
1945).
Assessment Construction
Empirically derived personality measures are
developed utilizing an approach known as an
external strategy (Butcher 2000), one of three
Empirically Derived Personality Test
basic strategies to personality measure construc-
tion. These strategies are broadly defined as
deductive, inductive, and external (Burisch
1984). The first two strategies – the deductive
and the inductive – assume to varying degrees
that personality constructs such as openness
exist and are measurable. Self-report personality
measures are developed under the proposition that
respondents are able and willing to portray them-
selves accurately (Bowling et al. 2016). In the
deductive and inductive approaches, concepts
are identified and then items are created that assess
the concept. Empirical means such as factor anal-
ysis can be employed to refine these scales. How-
ever, one strategy is not considered superior to
another (Grucza and Goldberg 2007).
Person reliability, which includes veridicality,
or truth, of self-report, challenges the preposition
that accurate self-report is possible (Jackson and
Paunonen 1980). Respondents have shown incon-
sistent motivation to reduce self-inconsistency
(Bowling et al. 2016; Briñol et al. 2006), and
rationally derived items are subject to faking
(Butcher and Han 2014). Moreover, a person’s
understanding of and response to items are subject
to problems of semantic consistency, i.e., shared
meaning of words across respondent’s own
responses (Kurtz and Parrish 2001) and literal
accuracy (Ben-Porath 2012). In contrast, devel-
opers utilizing the external strategy accept that
persons do not, and cannot, fully know and report
knowledgeably about themselves (Meehl 1945;
Butcher 2000).
Therefore, according to Butcher (2000), indi-
viduals who utilize the external strategy view
items as behavioral samplings with correlates to
address these limitations. Thus, adopters of the
external approach take the position that identify-
ing similarities and differences among groups of
individuals is empirically feasible. Empirically
derived personality measures comprise items
designed to distinguish between criterion and con-
trol groups, as well as meeting external validation
criteria, though they may not appear to have face
validity. In addition, the empirical strategy may be
employed to generate items when theoretical con-
cepts are complex and/or difficult to articulate
(Butcher 2000).
Empirically Derived Personality Test
Characteristics of Structured Tests
An empirically derived personality measure has
distinctive characteristics. Butcher (2000) draws
five conclusions from Meehl’s seminal work “The
dynamics of ‘structured’ personality tests” (Meehl
1945). First, items are valued as predictors more
so than as statements of personality’s features.
Second, item content, i.e., item subtlety, is imma-
terial to the item’s value in predicting criterion
behaviors. Regardless of their face validity,
items are valued for the ability to link responses
to behaviors. Third, since individuals cannot fully
know themselves, it is not pertinent to the items’
value whether the respondent is aware of a prob-
lem or process. Fourth, it is possible to assess
response motivation and validity of responses.
Fifth, and finally, item responses may reflect
enduring personality facets.
An Example: Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI)
The MMPI is an exemplar of structured person-
ality measures utilizing the empirical approach.
Hathaway and Brown employed the most
sophisticated statistical techniques available at
the time. Their aim was to develop a measure to
differentiate between normal and abnormal per-
sonality while also be less sensitive to veridi-
cality of self-report measurements (Ben-Porath
2012). The MMPI began its development in the
1930s and reflected the principles of the exter-
nal strategy for measurement development pre-
sented earlier, although the approach was not
entirely theoretical. Hathaway and McKinley
incorporated Kraepelinian nosology to develop a
large pool of initial items (Ben-Porath 2012).
They rejected the veridicality of self-report,
maintaining items served as behavioral stimuli
with empirical correlates such as group member-
ship. Next, they gathered a large candidate pool
of items and administered the original set to a
control group known as the Minnesota normal
and to criterion groups composed of individuals
with various diagnoses. After the initial analyses
of the data, they constructed eight clinical scales
1361
based on their relative ability to discriminate
between the two groups. The MMPI was
updated in 1989, incorporating statistical proce-
dures unavailable at the time of its first
construction.
Conclusion
Empirically derived personality assessments rep-
E
resent an external strategy of test construction.
This strategy incorporates the understanding that
individuals may not have the ability to report
knowledgeably about themselves (Ben-Porath
2012; Butcher 2000; Meehl 1945); therefore,
items are constructed to differentiate between cri-
terion and control groups. Regardless of face
validity or theoretical context, items are keyed to
link responses to behaviors, such as seen in the
MMPI. This approach may yield a measure less
susceptible to faking, as even professionals may
be unable to surmise an item’s psychometric
intent (Meehl 1945).
Cross-References
▶ MMPI
References
Ben-Porath, Y. S. (2012). Interpreting the MMPI-2-RF.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bowling, N. A., Huang, J. L., Bragg, C. B., Khazon, S.,
Liu, M., & Blackmore, C. E. (2016). Who cares and
who is careless? Insufficient effort responding as
a reflection of respondent personality. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 111(2), 218–229.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000085.
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Wheeler, S. C. (2006).
Discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-
concepts: Consequences for information processing.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
91(1), 154–170. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.
91.1.154.
Burisch, M. (1984). Approaches to personality inventory
construction: A comparison of merits. American
Psychologist, 39(3), 214.
Butcher, J. N. (2000). Dynamics of personality test
responses: The empiricist’s manifesto revisited.
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 56(3), 375–386.
1362
Butcher, J. N., & Han, K. (2014). Development of an
MMPI-2 scale to present the self in a superlative man-
ner: The S scale. In J. N. Butcher & C. D. Spielberger
(Eds.), Advances in personality assessment (Vol. 10).
New York: Psychology Press.
Grucza, R. A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The compara-
tive validity of 11 modern personality inventories:
Predictions of behavioral acts, informant reports, and
clinical indicators. Journal of Personality Assessment,
89(2), 167–187.
Jackson, D. N., & Paunonen, S. V. (1980). Personality
structure and assessment. Annual Review of Psychology,
31(1), 503–551.
Kurtz, J. E., & Parrish, C. L. (2001). Semantic
response consistency and protocol validity in struc-
tured personality assessment: The case of the
NEO-PI-R. Journal of Personality Assessment, 76(2),
315–332.
Meehl, P. E. (1945). The dynamics of “structured”
personality tests. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1(4),
296–303.
Empirically Keyed
▶ Empirically Derived Personality Test
Empiricists
▶ Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) of
Personality
Enactive Mastery Experience
Sonia Lippke
Department of Psychology and Methods, Jacobs
University Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Synonyms
Mastery experiences; Own (behavioral) experi-
ences; Performance accomplishments; Personal
behavior history; Vicarious experience
Empirically Keyed
Definition
Enactive mastery experiences are personal expe-
riences of managing efforts toward performance
accomplishments.
Introduction
Albert Bandura, who first developed the theory of
self-efficacy and social learning theory, already
hypothesized in the 1970s (e.g., Bandura and
Adams 1977) that self-efficacy stems from four
main sources of information, of which perfor-
mance accomplishments are the strongest. The
reason for this is that self-efficacy is developed
from enactive mastery experiences. The three
other sources of self-efficacy are vicarious mas-
tery experiences (by means of observing others
who are successfully managing efforts), verbal
persuasion (by means of receiving feedback on
one’s abilities to cope successfully), and physio-
logical arousal (from which one can judge one’s
level of anxiety and vulnerability to stress as well
as abilities). In addition, enactive mastery experi-
ence generates not only higher and stronger effi-
cacy expectations but also more generalized
expectations than the others.
Nature of Enactive Mastery Experience
In general, enactive mastery experiences (i.e.,
positive achievements) in the past raise mastery
expectations for the future, and repetitive disap-
pointments lower them. In an ideal development,
repeated successful experiences produce strong
efficacy expectations, which then help in manag-
ing the negative effect of some failures. As a
matter of fact, occasional setbacks which are
dealt with by the individual’s own effort may
even increase persistence because of the experi-
ence that impediments can be mastered by one’s
own effort. In other words, it is not only positive
experiences that are helpful, but it is also rather
important that problems emerge sometimes which
then need to be solved: “if people experience only
easy successes they come to expect quick results
Enactive Mastery Experience
and are easily discouraged by setbacks and fail-
ures” (Bandura 2012, p. 13). Thus, tasks and
obstacles should require enough effort to be per-
ceived as challenging but at the same time open
options for being managed. Already in the 1970s,
Bandura stated that “the effects of failure on per-
sonal efficacy therefore partly depend on the
timing and the total pattern of experiences in
which the failures occur” (Bandura 1977, p. 195).
Enactive mastery experiences communicate
efficacy information by giving evidence of perfor-
mance improvements. In addition, individuals
develop generalizable skills for coping with chal-
lenges through mastery experiences. This ability
is also needed to manage different dysfunctional
fears and their behavioral consequences. To have
this capacity to manage fears and to be aware of it
feeds into the persons’ self-efficacy expectancy.
Targeting and Enabling Enactive
Mastery Experience
To design treatments targeting enactive mastery
experience, Bandura (1977) suggested participant
modeling, performance desensitization
(stemming from his work on fears and anxiety
disorders), performance exposure, and self-
instructed performance. Participant modeling
means that the behavioral experience is elicited
by helping the individual to perform the behavior.
This can be by means of showing the target behav-
ior and asking explicitly or just supporting the
individual to mimic the behavior. Performance
desensitization is exposure to the stimulus to
weaken one’s emotional reaction to it. Repeated
occurrence of this negative or aversive stimulus
can have this consequence especially if the stim-
ulus is linked to other stimuli or environments that
are typically perceived to be irrelevant or unnec-
essary for emotional effects. Performance expo-
sure means that performance of the target
behavior is observed in other individuals, or one
becomes aware of oneself performing it. Self-
instructed performance relates to goal setting
and goal attainment as well as self-regulation in
general: individuals can learn how to perform the
goal behavior effectively by reading about it or
1363
observing others, by getting instructions and feed-
back from others, or spontaneously trying it out.
Self-instructed performance, however, requires
that individuals transfer these learnt skills to a
new situation or time and instructs themselves
without the help of other individuals.
Newer approaches (Michie et al. 2008, 2011,
2013) have developed a categorization of behav-
ior change techniques (BCTs). The aim, on the
one hand, was to advise treatment developers
E
how to appropriately design interventions
targeting different concepts. On the other hand,
the aim was to better understand what interven-
tions actually contained in terms of concrete
techniques and how they affected the targeted
constructs. The latter aim is key to better under-
stand the mechanisms of change and which tech-
niques work best.
One of the main techniques to affect enactive
mastery experience is prompt practice (Michie
et al. 2011). This approach involves encouraging
individuals to perform a target behavior, subparts
of the behavior or preparatory behaviors repeat-
edly. This can be done during an intervention
session itself or as an exercise after the session,
for instance, as “homework” (Michie et al. 2008).
Later, Michie et al. (2013) further developed
her categorization and her so-called taxonomy
(Behavior Change Technique Taxonomy of
93 Hierarchically Clustered Techniques; Michie
et al. 2013). At the same time, Michie and her
colleagues developed the definition and specifica-
tion of prompt practice and other techniques to
elicit enactive mastery experience. Enactive mas-
tery experience mainly consists of “repetition and
substitution.” In the following sections, different
behavior change technique (BCT) are described,
including behavioral practice/rehearsal, generali-
zation of a target behavior, graded tasks, and self-
monitoring of behavior.
• Behavioral practice/rehearsal means practic-
ing or rehearsing the performance of the behav-
ior to develop a habit and skill. An example
would be to encourage asthma patients to prac-
tice how to measure their peak flow in the
consulting room of their nurse, counselor, or
physician.
1364
• Generalization of a target behavior involves
advising people to perform the desired behav-
ior, which was performed before. An example
would be to advise participants in an exercise
class to repeat what they have learned when
they are at home.
• Graded tasks means that easy-to-perform
assignments are given with increasing diffi-
culty while keeping them achievable. This is
done until the desired behavior is performed.
An example would be to ask an individual to
walk for 10 min a day during the first week and
in the following week 20 min per day. When
the individual reaches this goal, she would then
walk 30 min per day and with that meet the
recommended level.
As it is often difficult to train the execution of
concrete behaviors, many interventions also use
self-monitoring of behavior to elicit mastery expe-
rience or at least enable study participants to cre-
ate opportunities for such experiences (e.g.,
Lippke et al. 2015). Such self-monitoring of
behavior requires the person to monitor and
record her behavior(s). An example would be to
instruct a person to monitor and record daily, for
instance, in a diary, how many 10-min walks she
has performed each day.
One empirical study employing these tech-
niques examined 205 young adults who received
two different interventions to improve regular
handwashing (Lhakhang et al. 2015). One inter-
vention aimed at increasing mastery experience
by prompting study participants to review and
visualize their past successes (i.e., “which success
experiences in washing your hands regularly did
you have?”). The effectiveness of this interven-
tion was higher than a motivational intervention
addressing risk perception and outcome expectan-
cies in terms of improvements to self-efficacy and
behavior performance (Lhakhang et al. 2015).
Empirical Evidence from Intervention
Studies
In a systematic review and meta-analysis, Ashford
et al. (2010) reviewed 27 intervention studies that
Enactive Mastery Experience
had the goal of improving self-efficacy for phys-
ical activity. Their main finding was that interven-
tions that targeted enactive mastery experience
showed larger effect sizes (d+ = .32) than those
that did not (d+ = .11). In general, 92 % of the
reviewed interventions contained components
that targeted enactive mastery experience.
The majority of these studies did so outside of
the sessions (81%, ineffective) and only 11%
performed the mastery experience during the
intervention sessions (d+ = .23 with technique
vs. d+ = .15 without). Astonishingly, the authors
could not find any intervention study that asked
their study participants to “think back to times
when you have previously been successful at
performing the behavior” (p. 278). Many studies
used self-monitoring (62%, ineffective) and some
used graded mastery by employing graded tasks
(see above, 24%, ineffective).
While more research definitely needs to be
done to tease out the specific psychological
mechanisms that promote self-efficacy, it can
already be concluded that interventions that pro-
vide individuals with enactive mastery experi-
ence are more effective in changing self-efficacy
expectations, and thereby behavior, than those
that do not.
Conclusion
Enactive mastery experience is one of the stron-
gest determinants of adaptive coping with chal-
lenges, by feeding into self-efficacy and
improving behavior. Although it appears rather
difficult to provide opportunities for adaptive
enactive mastery experience in experimental set-
tings or laboratory research, many studies have
been able to do so with moderate success, espe-
cially when enactive mastery experience is
targeted during intervention sessions directly.
More research needs to be done to better under-
stand the function of specific behavioral change
techniques. In general, mastery experience is
important to take into consideration and to design
interventions of moderate difficulty to actually
provide the opportunity to manage obstacles and
develop self-efficacy.
Encounter Group (T group) 1365

Cross-References
Encounter Group (T group)
▶ Albert B.
▶ Behavior Modification Peter F. Schmid
▶ Meta-Analysis Sigmund Freud University, Vienna, Austria
▶ Self-Efficacy
▶ Self-Efficacy Expectation
▶ Self-Efficacy Theory Synonyms

Dialogical relationship; Face-to-face relationship;

E
Meeting; Person-to-person-relationship
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Definition
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behaviour change techniques. Applied Psychology: an tential meaning. One can encounter an object
International Review, 57, 660–680. https://doi.org/
(a landscape for instance or a piece of art: “reality
10.1111/j.1464-0597.2008.00341.x.
Michie, S., Richardson, M., Johnston, M., Abraham, encounter”) or a person (“personal encounter”).
C., Francis, J., Hardeman, W., et al. (2013). The To en–counter another person first of all means
behavior change technique taxonomy (v1) of recognizing that the Other really “stands counter,”
93 hierarchically clustered techniques: Building an
because he or she is essentially different from
international consensus for the reporting of behavior
change interventions. Annals of Behavioral Medi- me. This is the precondition to respect him or
cine, 46(1), 81–95. her as a person.
1366
To regard the human being as a person means
to regard humans as substantial-relational beings
combining two inescapable dialectic dimensions
of human existence: the substantial (or individual)
dimension of being a person and the relational
(or dialogic) dimension of becoming a person.
These two strands can be found throughout the
history of occidental philosophy. On the one hand,
the substantial conception emphasizes indepen-
dence and uniqueness, freedom and dignity,
unity, sovereignty and self-determination, respon-
sibility, the human rights, etc.; therefore, being a
person means being-from-oneself and being-for-
oneself. The relational notion on the other hand
highlights relationship, dialogue, partnership,
connection with the world, interconnectedness
among humans, community; hence, being a per-
son means being-from-and-in-relationship; that is,
being through and toward others and, conse-
quently, also for others. We are not only in rela-
tionships; as persons, we are relationships. This
dialectic tension of autonomy and interconnected-
ness, self-reliance and commitment, sovereignty
and solidarity uniquely characterizes being
human (Schmid 1998, 2013).
The Epistemological Basis: Encounter as
Meeting Person-to-Person
The way to meet another individual as a person is
called personal encounter. It is a way of interper-
sonal relating which takes into account both the
fundamental equality of humans and their diver-
sity: being-with and being-counter, a face-to-face
relationship (Schmid 2006).
In the philosophy of personalism, encounter
means to regard the other person not as an object
to be investigated (which would mean to
instrumentalize him or her) and not as an alter
ego (a close friend a priori, an identifiable indi-
vidual), but rather an entirely different person. An
encounter always has the character of the unex-
pected, of surprise: it cannot be manufactured, and
it cannot be used. Its starting point is separateness,
distance. In the opposite resistance is met: there is
no encounter without confrontation as the word
“en–counter” suggests. Only appreciating this fact
of fundamental difference makes it possible to
Encounter Group (T group)
accept another person as truly an Other, thus
acknowledging them in their personhood, as “a
continuous enigma which keeps us awake”
(Levinas 1961). So, encounter is always a risk,
an adventure which contains a creative seed, a
breakthrough to something new. For an interper-
sonal encounter, this means that both affinity and
alienation can be experienced at the same time.
An encounter relationship originates and cen-
ters in the Other. This takes into account that the
epistemological direction, the way of understand-
ing, has its origin in the Other whose communi-
cation is a way of revealing him- or herself, thus
requiring a personal response – and is not a matter
of questioning, interpreting, or diagnosing. To
encounter does not mean to conclude from me to
the Other; on the contrary, the epistemological
movement goes from the Other to me. To learn to
know another person is not a matter of adding a
little difference to something already known (the
traditional way of diagnosis), it relies on the open-
ness for an immediate experience of the Other in
the “kairos,” the unique given moment.
The im–media–cy is born through the fact that
all means that separate us “decay” (Buber 1937)
become unnecessary, surplus. For this it is impor-
tant first of all to dispense with all techniques and
methods, all means, that serve as a protection to
defend against what comes across, what is
encountered. For encounter lies beyond all
methods. It is involvement in the immediacy of
the experience of relationship. So, a constitutive
element of personal encounter is also bodily con-
tact, touching, sensing, and being sensed, “phys-
ical interplay” (Buber 1937). Encounter is an
intimate, sensual event.
The Other, however, does not come up to me as
an anonymous stranger, but as Thou. As a person
the Other breaks the limits of our knowledge.
Instead of knowledge, acknowledgement is
required. In facing the Other, I can acknowledge
the Other’s uniqueness and qualities. I do not
think what I could know about them, but I am
ready to accept what they are going to disclose.
This happens by being present, which means
authentic (congruent, genuine) “empathic listen-
ing” with “unconditional positive regard” (Rogers
1970; Schmid 2001/2002) – with far-reaching
consequences for therapy: The other person is
Encounter Group (T group)
not someone to be treated or guided or given
advice by an expert but is met as person by a
person.
The movement always originates in the Thou,
also from a developmental perspective: it is the
call, the addressing of another human being,
which evokes a response, confronts with freedom
and risk. Encounter happens to a human long
before he or she can aim at obtaining such an
experience. Therefore, in an encounter there
always lies the response to a call, in therapy to a
call from a person in need. And from the response
follows respons–ability, which is grounded in the
fact that nobody else can respond in place of
me. This denotes the ethical dimension of
encounter.
The Anthropological Foundation:
Encounter Philosophy
Romano Guardini (1955) understands encounter
as an amazing meeting with the reality of the
Other. According to him, encounter means that
one is touched by the essence of the opposite. To
let this happen, a non-purpose-oriented openness
and a distance which leads to amazement are
indispensable conditions: encounter cannot be
made or created; it is, at one and the same time,
both being touched and touching.
According to Martin Buber (1937), being a
person consists in the event of encounter or dia-
logue, of communicating oneself. He defines
encounter as the immediacy of the I-Thou-
relationship, an event in which one becomes pre-
sent to the Other. The I is not constituted until such
an encounter relationship: ‘The I becomes
through the Thou. Becoming an I, I say Thou.
[. . .] All real life is encounter.’ (Buber 1937).
Emmanuel Levinas (1961) lays emphasis on
the priority of the Other. Levinas illustrates that
to exist means to be entangled in oneself, caught
in the totality of one’s own world. Accordingly,
the first alienation of the human being is not being
able to get rid of oneself. The awakening from the
totality of the being-caught-in-oneself does not
happen through “being independent.” Rather, the
Other is the power which liberates the I from
oneself. Consequently, the foundation of self-
1367
confidence is not the reflection on oneself, but
the relationship to the Other. This overcomes the
limits of the self: the self is born in the relationship
to another person, in an original, preceding dia-
logue. So we can say: The person is dialogue;
encounter takes place, where dialogue happens
and unfolds.
With this in mind, the basic idea of an I-Thou-
relationship was further developed to a Thou-I-
relationship with the movement from the Other to
E
me, thus also managing to get closer to the verge
of the underlying “fundamental We” (Schmid
2013). It is integral to the human nature to live
in groups, from the family onwards. Usually, the
group is also the place where problems arise.
Therefore, the group must be considered as the
primary locus of psychotherapy (with the dyad as
a special form of group under special circum-
stances) (Schmid 1994/1996; Schmid and
O’Hara 2007).
The Practice: Group Therapy as
Encounter
One of the pioneers of this way of group therapy
was Carl Rogers (1970), founder of the person-
centered approach. Among the characteristics of
encounter groups are the following (Schmid 1994/
1996; Schmid and O’Hara 2007):
• They are based on a personal anthropology as a
possibility for immediate encounter face to
face among the members, including the facili-
tator. Every given moment (kairos) is seen as a
challenging chance for intra- and interpersonal
experiences.
• The basic conditions of congruence
(authenticity), empathy, and unconditional
positive regard as modeled by the facilitator(s)
foster a climate of trust of being-with each
other that brings about a growth process for
each member and the group as whole.
• In such an atmosphere, a process of personal
and group development takes place enabling
an enhanced opportunity to tap one’s
resources, deal with problems, and advance
the possibility to develop intra- and intergroup
relationships.
1368
• The relationship person-to-person is seen as
the specific therapeutic agent. It enables multi-
ple and diverse (corrective) experiences of
relationship (“therapy through the group and
its members” as opposed to “therapy in front of
the group” or “the group as the client of the
group therapist”). The capability to become
open to such experiences is an important crite-
rion for indication for group therapy.
• The group’s process cannot be specifically pre-
dicted; special expectations are a hindrance.
However, given a personal climate can be
developed, it can be trusted that the group
develops toward more openness for experience
and a sense of interconnectedness and
mutuality.
• The leaders of the group understand them-
selves as facilitators, i.e., as persons that sup-
port the group and its members by
understanding themselves as authentic group
members trusting in the potential (“wisdom”)
of the group instead of taking leading, guiding,
or expert roles.
• The “moment–to–moment encounter of psy-
chotherapy” (Rogers) happens in the im-
media-te presence. To this corresponds the
existential attitude of “presence,” confidently
taking part in the present moment of life
(which means a lot more than the slogan of
“here and now”). In the encounter philosophi-
cal perspective presence is the authentic atti-
tude to be, to fully live in the presence:
unconditionally accepting the Other, empath-
ically becoming involved in his or her pres-
ence, without any prior intention, that is with
an openness and a wonder toward experience.
• In order to facilitate the immediacy of the
encounter the facilitators refrain from using
preconceived or structuring techniques, skills,
and training methods.
• Along with verbal communication, the mem-
bers may choose to communicate with otmeans
and on other levels, e.g., through bodily, crea-
tive, expressive ways of art.
• The group is seen as an important interface of
individual and society and thus has an antici-
patory function for societal and political
change and a sociotherapeutic impact.
Encounter Group (T group)
Summary
Encounter groups in psychotherapy and related
fields, based on a humanistic, personalistic,
dialogical image of the human being and of
society, serve the persons involved by facilitat-
ing their capability of acknowledging them-
selves and the others as truly Others and thus
develop their self and society in a constructive
way.
References
Buber, M. (1937). I and Thou. New York City: Charles
Scribner’s Sons.
Guardini, R. (1955). Die Begegnung: Ein Beitrag zur
Struktur des Daseins. Hochland, 47(3), 224–234.
Levinas, E. (1961). Totalité et infini : Essai sur
l’extériorité. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Rogers, C. (1970). On encounter groups. New York:
Harper and Row.
Schmid, P. F. (1994/1996). Personzentrierte Gruppenp-
sychotherapie. Ein Handbuch. Vol. I: Solidarität
und Autonomie. Cologne: EHP, 1994. Vol. II: Die
Kunst der Begegnung. Paderborn: Junfermann,
1996.
Schmid, P. F. (1998). “On becoming a person-centered
approach”: A person-centred understanding of the per-
son; “face to face”: The art of encounter. In B. Thorne
& E. Lambers (Eds.), Person-centred therapy:
A European perspective (pp. 38–52 and 74–90).
London: Sage.
Schmid, P. F. (2001/2002). Acknowledgement: The art of
responding. Authenticity: The person as his or her own
author. Comprehension: The art of not-knowing. Pres-
ence: Im-media-te co-experiencing and co-responding.
In G. Wyatt et al. (Eds.), Rogers’ therapeutic condi-
tions: Evolution, theory and practice, Vol. 1–4. Ross-
on-Wye: PCCS Books.
Schmid, P. F. (2006). The challenge of the other; towards
dialogical person-centered psychotherapy and counsel-
ing. Person-Centered and Experiential Psychother-
apies, 5(4), 241–254.
Schmid, P. F. (2013). The anthropological, relational and
ethical foundations of person-centred therapy. In
M. Cooper, M. O’Hara, P. F. Schmid, & A. Bohart
(Eds.), The handbook of person-centred psychotherapy
and counselling (2nd ed., pp. 66–83). Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Schmid, P. F., & O’Hara, M. (2007). Group therapy and
encounter groups. In M. Cooper, M. O’Hara, P. F.
Schmid, & G. Wyatt (Eds.), The handbook of person-
centred psychotherapy and counselling (pp. 93–106).
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Encouragement (Adler)
Encouragement
▶ Adlerian Group Interventions on Workplace
Behavior
Encouragement (Adler)
Bengu Erguner-Tekinalp1 and Richard E. Watts2
1
Drake University, Des Moines, IA, USA
2
Sam Houston State University, Huntsville,
TX, USA
Related Concepts
▶ Empathy; ▶ Fully functioning person;
▶ Mind-set; ▶ Social interest; ▶ Social support;
▶ Conditional positive regard
Introduction
Encouragement is one of the main concepts of
Adlerian theory. Encouragement is considers as
a set of skills as as well a process in therapy. this
chapter will describe the theoretical foundations
of encouragement and applications in therapy and
education.
Theoretical Foundations of
Encouragement
Alfred Adler (1956) was the first psychologist to
discuss encouragement in terms of therapeutic
relationship and child guidance. It was further
developed and expanded by others such as Rudolf
Dreikurs and Heinz and Rowena Ansbacher.
Adlerian theory considers clients and children
who misbehave as people who have lost the cour-
age to adequately engage in the tasks of living and
who are unable to reach their goals in positive,
effective, and useful ways. Therefore, encourage-
ment is paramount for learning and change
(Dinkmeyer and Dreikurs 2000; Ergün-Başak
1369
and Ceyhan 2011). Encouragement is a set of
skills that one gains and develops as well as a
process that manifests itself through one’s atti-
tudes and behaviors (Ergün-Başak and Ceyhan
2011; Watts and Pietrzak 2000). Adler believed
that human beings have a desire to belong and
contribute to the well-being of others, also known
as social interest. Encouragement plays a crucial
role in social interest, as many problems individ-
uals experience stem from discouragement with
E
being a contributing member of the social group
(Main and Boughner 2011). Encouragement can
be considered as the interpersonal conveyance of
community feeling and social interest and there-
fore a modeling of mental health (Watts 2012,
2014). In his extensive review, Wong (2015) pro-
vides a comprehensive definition. Wong states
encouragement is the “expression of affirmation
through language or other symbolic representa-
tions to instill courage, perseverance, confidence,
inspiration, or hope in a person(s) within the con-
text of addressing a challenging situation or real-
izing a potential” (page number needed). He also
argues that encouragement is embedded in many
strength-based approaches and that it fits the
criteria to be considered a character strength.
Character strengths are one of the main areas of
positive psychology and are described as pro-
cesses that allow a person to think and act to
benefit self and the common good (Peterson and
Park 2009).
Encouragement is also described as a form of
social and emotional support (Helgeson and
Cohen 1996). It can be seen as a process that
inspires others to find solutions to their problems
and to instill hope that they can cope (Sweeney
2009). Encouragement is a process of “facilitating
the development of a persons’ inner resources
and courage toward a positive movement”
(Dinkmeyer and Losoncy 1996, page number
needed). Encouragement, therefore, is a support-
ive social interchange, a character trait, and a way
of being conveyed through verbal and nonverbal
communication. Wong (2015) developed a com-
prehensive working model of encouragement
based on character strengths and virtues, verbal
persuasion, and Adlerian theory. This model
breaks down the encouragement process into
1370
three components, namely, foci, features, and
levels. Foci of encouragement can be challenge
focused or potential focused; encouragement fea-
tures include framing the message, the perceived
trustworthiness of the encourager, and the per-
ceived credibility of the encouragement message;
and the levels of encouragement include interper-
sonal communication, character strength, and
group norm. Encouragement is also conceptual-
ized as a process of eliciting a positive view of the
self, a sense of belonging, the courage to be
imperfect (Dagley et al. 1999), and openness to
new experiences (Evans et al. 1997). Encourage-
ment focuses on strengths and brings out courage,
perseverance, and optimism in people (Main and
Boughner 2011; Watts and Pietrzak 2000). It stim-
ulates motivation, a positive state of mind, and
positive emotions (Azoulay 1999). Through
encouragement, individuals are reminded that no
matter the challenges or failures they face, they
are valuable, they are worthy of love and accep-
tance, and they belong. In summary, encourage-
ment is a positive, strength-based process of
providing social and emotional support via focus-
ing on the efforts and good faith of the individual
communicated through verbal and nonverbal
methods.
Encouragement in Therapy
Adlerian counselors view clients’ presenting
problems in terms of discouragement; that is, cli-
ents may have lost their motivation to change or
may be pessimistic about their abilities (Watts and
Pietrzak 2000). Discouragement is the Adlerian
nomenclature for maladjustment. From this per-
spective, clients seek counseling because they are
discouraged and lack the courage to engage suc-
cessfully in the tasks or problems of living.
Therefore, the goal of Adlerian therapy is to
bring out courage and positive movement through
encouragement. Encouragement involves focus-
ing on assets, abilities, and strengths. As a result,
clients move from problem and weakness-based
perceptions of themselves to strength-based
perceptions. Through encouragement, clients
become more aware of their inherent worth
Encouragement (Adler)
regardless of their faulty decisions, mistakes, or
negative experiences. Therefore, encouragement
is a process of changing clients’ negative self-
concepts and negative anticipations. (Dinkmeyer
et al. 1987). Clients may be too focused on exter-
nal rewards, affirmations, evaluation, and
approval of others which is a discouraging state.
Through encouragement, counselors help clients
to develop more intrinsic motivation to change
(Sweeney 2009).
Encouragement is both a set of relationship-
building skills and a way of being with clients
(Watts 2014). The process of encouragement
indicates the quality of the relationship between
the counselor and clients, and it includes helping
clients regain their self-worth, identify their
strengths, and learn to use them effectively.
Encouragement requires the therapist to fully
trust that their clients can reach their full
potential. An encouragement-focused relationship
is characterized as cooperative, collaborative,
egalitarian, optimistic, and respectful (Watts and
Pietrzak 2000).
Encouragement also includes a set of skills that
involves empathy, unconditional positive regard,
active listening (Dinkmeyer and Losoncy 1996),
believing in clients’ capacity to change, under-
standing and validating clients’ goals, and
reframing behaviors in a more positive light
(Carns and Carns 2006). Encouragement, there-
fore, involves creating a space for clients to feel
safe, gain new understandings and perspectives
of problems, and regain courage. Encouragement
is communicated through focusing on the
individual, rather than comparisons with others
(operating on the horizontal plane versus the ver-
tical plane); being present oriented rather than
past; emphasizing the actions of the individual
not generalizations of the character; focusing on
effort rather than the outcome; stressing intrinsic
motivation, rather than external rewards and pun-
ishment; focusing on positives rather than nega-
tives (strengths rather than weaknesses);valuing
clients as they are; demonstrating concern and
care for clients through active listening; commu-
nicating empathy and respect; helping clients gen-
erate perceptual alternatives for discouraging
fictional beliefs and oppressive narrative and
Encouragement (Adler)
behavioral alternatives to problematic actions and
interactions; focusing on clients’ efforts and pro-
gress; helping clients view successful movement
or progress incrementally rather than only in terms
of an end goal or final outcome; communicating
affirmation and appreciation to clients; and help-
ing clients see the humor in life experiences
(Sweeney 2009; Watts and Pietrzak 2000).
Encouragement is a vital element in every
phase of counseling. During the first stages of
counseling in which a therapeutic rapport is
being built, encouragement is used to establish a
cooperative, collaborative, egalitarian, optimistic,
and respectful relationship. In the working phase
of counseling, encouragement elicits strengths,
helping clients understand their power to choose
and change, and facilitates change by stimulating
the client’s courage to change (Watts 2014).
Encouragement in Education
Encouragement is an essential element in educa-
tion, children who are encouraged develop a sense
belonging, become more open to cooperation,
become more empathic, develop a sense of
responsibility for their own actions, and develop
intrinsic motivation. Encouragement-based edu-
cation has a more democratic outlook than an
autocratic, hierarchy-based stance. Sherman and
Dinkmeyer (1987) listed the elements of encour-
agement in education as follows: valuing children
as they are; communicating in a way that would
build children’s self-esteem; planning activities
that would result in success; being genuine; show-
ing unconditional positive regard verbally and
nonverbally; using humor; spending quality time
with children; emphasizing effort not the out-
come; noticing cooperative behaviors; and foster
cooperation and avoiding comparing children to
one another.
Education applications of Adlerian theory
emphasize intrinsic motivation through attending
to and acknowledging children’s effort and hard
work, in other words, emphasizing growth
mindset in learning. For Adlerian educators, auto-
cratic, adult-driven, praise-based systems are dis-
couraging and are one of the main barriers to
1371
learning. Many adults, especially educators,
often do not know correct ways of encouraging
children and may inadvertently act in a discour-
aging manner (such as confusing encouragement
with excessive praising, being merely outcome-
oriented, not allowing child to take responsibility
for their actions, etc.).
Dinkmeyer and Dreikurs (2000) believe that
children need encouragement just like plants
need water. Children who are misbehaving,
E
uncooperative, and challenging are children who
are discouraged. Therefore, for children to learn,
respect others, and work cooperatively with
others, they need to be encouraged, not punished.
Having an encouraging attitude will help children
develop intrinsic motivation to learn and change.
Children who are encouraged tend to be more
positive in their views of self and others and
give greater effort in the learning process,
resulting in a more optimum development
(Dinkmeyer and Dreikurs 2000).
Encouragement in education is an alternative
process to praise, reward, and punishment.
Encouragement is significantly different from
praise and reward. In fact, their outcomes are
quite the opposite. Both praise and reward are
based on a hierarchy in a relationship, there is an
emphasis on the outcome, and most importantly
they both elicit extrinsic motivation. Eventually,
children start to rely almost exclusively on exter-
nal motivations such as awards, gifts, and affir-
mations of others. Encouragement, on the other
hand, requires egalitarian and mutually respectful
relationships. In praise and rewards, children are
conditioned to look for the approval of others and
constantly worry about being evaluated posi-
tively. Encouragement, on the other hand,
models unconditional acceptance, and in return
children develop unconditional self-acceptance
and confidence in their abilities (Dinkmeyer and
Dreikurs 2000).
Measures
The measures to assess encouragement are
mostly used in educational settings. The Praise-
Encouragement Preference Scale, developed by
1372
Pety et al. (1984), measures children’s preference
for praise versus encouragement statements,
among 16 dialogues. The Encouragement Scale
(Dagley et al. 1999) taken by 2nd to 5th graders
measures their feelings about encouragement and
discouragement.
Programs About Encouragement
Encouragement is discussed and researched in vari-
ous areas such as growth mindset, nudging, compas-
sion, and self-compassion (e.g., Wong 2015). The
applications of encouragement can be seen in lead-
ership (Dinkmeyer and Eckstein 1996), marriage
enrichment (Carlson and Dinkmeyer 2002), self-
help (Dinkmeyer and Losoncy 1996), parenting
(i.e., Active Parenting, STEP, Positive Discipline),
teaching (i.e., Partners in Encouragement, Thompson
1982; Kinder Therapy/Kinder Training, (White et al.
1997), and school counseling (Student Success
Skills; Brigman and Webb 2007).
Conclusion
The contemporary relevance of Adler’s thinking is
evident in many streams of contemporary psycho-
logical thinking. This is particularly true regarding
the Adlerian understanding of encouragement.
Many concepts and interventions in humanistic-
existential therapies, positive psychology, cognitive
therapies, postmodern, constructivist, and narrative
therapies resonate with the attitudes and skills of
encouragement (Watts 2014).
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Endocrine System
▶ Hormone Assays
Endophenotypes, Personality,
and Mental Disorder
Gerald Young
Department of Psychology, Glendon College,
York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
Definition
Either one or a group of components in the path-
way from distal genotype to psychiatric mental
disorder that is measurable, demonstrates herita-
bility, is expressed proportionality more in unaf-
fected family members than in the general
population, and is state-independent (even evident
before the disease is fully expressed).
Introduction
The concept of endophenotype has been given
prominence by Gottesman and Gould (2003).
They defined it as the ensemble of measurable
components in the pathway from distal genotype
to psychiatric “disease” that fills the “invisible”
gap between them. Individual endophenotypes
refer to any one measure that contributes to
1373
specifying the pathway from genes to mental dis-
order. In the original paper on the topic,
Gottesman and Shields (1972, 1973) referred to
endophenotypes as “internal” phenotypes.
By definition, endophenotypes lie between the
genotype and the disease at issue, but they might lie
closer either to the distal end of the pathway, or the
genetics involved, for example, in the protein
unfolding that they permit in neurodevelopment,
or, at the other extreme, proximally to the disease
E
itself. In this regard, endophenotypes might even
be quantitative measures of the symptoms involved
in the disease or the testing results that represent
them (Young 2014, 2016). That is, although endo-
phenotypes typically are considered more physio-
logical, neurological, or otherwise biological,
research is supporting different approaches to it
and measures of it. Importantly, for the present
context, endophenotypes might be less biological
and more psychological in some conceptions of it.
Endophenotypes need to be distinguished
from three related terms. First, sometimes
researchers refer to intermediate endophenotypes
(Lenzenweger 2013). However, the term is redun-
dant because, by definition, endophenotypes are
intermediate in nature, between genetic substrate
and manifest phenotype. Second, a marker is a
term that might be used in the same breath as
endophenotype. However, the concept of markers
constitutes a concept that is broader in scope than
that of endophenotype. That is, a disease marker
could be reliably present as an index of a disease,
but this could happen due to multifactorial factors
or nongenetic ones, and so not constitute endo-
phenotypes, per se. Third, a risk factor for a dis-
ease is not equivalent to an endophenotype for
it. Rather, a risk factor constitutes a vulnerability
factor only and, moreover, it might not be genetic.
Whether a candidate endophenotype qualifies
as a viable one depends on it meeting specified
criteria. The candidate (a) is associated with
the disease; (b) demonstrates heritability or
population-level genetically-related statistical
variation; (c) is expressed in unaffected family
members at a higher rate than found in the
general population; and (d) is especially “state-
independent,” being evident in individuals even if
the illness is not active (Taylor et al. 2016).
1374
The difficulty in establishing endophenotypes
lies in both ends of the equation. (a) Genetically,
individual genes and their alleles rarely help
explain any one complex psychiatric disorder.
Moreover, the contemporary view of etiology of
psychiatric disorder is that it is multifactorial,
interactive, context-sensitive, and so on (Young
2016). Therefore, generally there is a little evi-
dence for a simple etiological model of mental
illness from one gene to one pathway (and series
of possible endophenotypes) to one disease.
(b) Phenotypically, psychiatric disorders, gener-
ally, are different from the typical medical illness
because of the heterogeneity in its manifestation
and lack of clear association with causal mecha-
nisms. Even if there could be one gene or pathway
initially to a disorder, its heterogeneity might indi-
cate multiple pathways to later symptom expres-
sion (and so multiple parallel endophenotypes).
Neurobiological and Biopsychosocial
Approaches
The concept of endophenotype lends itself to the
neuroscientific approach to mental disorder par-
ticularly espoused in the RDoC (Research
Domain of Criteria; Insel and Lieberman 2013),
but the one-to-one search in the pathway from
genetics to disorder is complicated by the nexus
of factors impinging on the pathways involved
and the biopsychosocial model that applies to
both the causality in the link from genes to disor-
der and its symptomatic expression.
The concept of endophenotypes does not fit
easily with the major approaches to psychiatric
classification. The most recent version of the psy-
chiatric classification system DSM-5 (Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth
Edition, DSM-5; American Psychiatric Associa-
tion 2013) is especially oriented to clinical utility
rather than reflecting research-related validity
(Lilienfeld and Treadway 2016), as is the upcom-
ing ICD-11 (International Classification of Dis-
eases, 11th edition; World Health Organization
2018). In these senses, these diagnostic manuals
describe mental disorder phenotypes at a certain
Endophenotypes, Personality, and Mental Disorder
level, but neither at the neuroscientific level that is
conducive to the search for endophenotypes nor
any research-oriented approach, including the
biopsychosocial one, that would stress a neurosci-
entific component.
The most studied endophenotypes concern
disease pathways involving genes related to neu-
rophysiology, neuroanatomy, the cortex, neuro-
transmitters, and the HPA (hypothalamic
pituitary adrenal) axis and related stress-response
systems. Increasingly, brain scan data are provid-
ing more refined CNS (central nervous system)
measures in various psychiatric disorders, such as
measures related to neural circuitry, and struc-
tural/functional connectivity (e.g., through func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI).
Therefore, the task of relating candidate genes or
alleles to possible intermediate phenotypes in the
pathway to psychiatric disease will face new
empirical challenges. That being said, the poten-
tial for deciphering endophenotypic pathways in
psychiatric disease should advance with these
dynamic measures of brain function.
The evidence suggests that the more proximal
the proposed endophenotype to its presumed
genetic basis, the statistical effect size (and the
extent that the proposed endophenotype is valid)
increases. For example, Jonas and Markon (2014)
studied the psychiatric genetics of impulsivity,
and they found that measured neurobiological
phenotypes yielded larger effect sizes than neuro-
psychological or diagnostic trait ones. The genes
studies in this regard included three common
polymorphisms related to the neurotransmitters
serotonin and dopamine (5-HTTLPR (serotonin-
transporter-linked polymorphic region), DAT1 30
UTR VNTR (the variable number tandem repeat
polymorphism in the 30 untranslated region of the
dopamine active transporter gene), DRD4 (the
48 base-pair VNTR in exon-3 of the dopamine
D4 receptor gene)). At the other extreme, within
any one level of the pathway from genetics to
disease, there might be several equivalent mea-
sures or possible endophenotypes (e.g., Webb
et al. 2016, in a study of MDD).
In terms of specific disorders studied for endo-
phenotypes, the primary ones have a heavy
Endophenotypes, Personality, and Mental Disorder
biological component, such as schizophrenia
(e.g., Gottesman and Gould 2003). Recent
empirical endeavors in this regard span genetic
precursors to schizophrenia and their expression in
neurotransmission (Greenwood et al. 2016), in
central measures (e.g., cortical thickness;
Watsky et al. 2016; e.g., P300 EEG (electro-
encephalogram) data; Turetsky et al. 2016), and
in cognitive ones (related to memory on the CVLT
(California Verbal Learning Test, Zheutlin et al.
2016). This type of research has been applied to
schizotypal personality disorder in addition to
schizophrenia (using the P50 evoked EEG
response; Hazlett et al. 2015). These EEG
responses might reflect signaling and gating def-
icits in schizophrenia and schizotypal disorder.
Conclusions such as this last one indicate that
potential endophenotypes in various disorders
that are proposed need to relate to putative inter-
mediate causal mechanisms in the pathway to
disorder as much as to the measures proposed as
endophenotypes. Moreover, they indicate the util-
ity of considering endophenotypes as not only
neurobiological and neuroscientific intermedi-
aries but also biopsychosocial ones.
Personality and Individual Differences
The concept of endophenotypes has expanded to
multiple psychiatric disorders, including those
directly related to personality disorders and per-
sonality traits other than for schizoaffective disor-
der. In this regard, for OCD (obsessive-
compulsive disorder), the brain regions that
might be involved as candidate endophenotypes
seem to relate to an integrated anatomical circuit,
in this case referred to as the orbitofrontostriatal
and posterior brain circuitry (Shaw et al. 2015;
established with neuroanatomic magnetic reso-
nance imaging scans). Problems in inhibitory con-
trol have been related to OCD, and the circuitry
involved has been referred to as inhibition-related
frontolimbic connectivity (van Velzen et al. 2015)
as established with a stop signal task and neuronal
and functional connectivity analyses. The mecha-
nism involved in the expression of OCD might
1375
relate to overactive performance monitoring
(Riesel et al. 2015), as shown in EEG recordings
during a flanker stimulus task.
Tarafder and Mukhopadhyay (2015) related
personality factors in the five-factor model of
personality to OCD. Compared to controls, those
participants who expressed higher neuroticism
and lower extraversion, in particular, were more
liable to OCD. Other results applied to first-degree
relatives, implying a shared familial diathesis
E
(vulnerability) for personality in OCD probands.
As for neuroticism itself, Chang et al. (2014)
found an association with the oxytocin receptor
gene rs53576. Other personality-related studies
seeking endophenotypes include ones on the per-
sonality disorder of BPD (borderline personality
disorder). Pavony and Lenzenweger (2014) found
evidence for deficient somatensory processing in
BPD, related to signal detection analysis, pain
perception, and so on. Developmentally, one
speaks of temperament rather than personality. In
these regards, Barker et al. (2013) found that an
aberrant startle response to fear might be an endo-
phenotype in behaviorally inhibited young
children.
Taylor et al. (2016) noted that seeking endo-
phenotypes in OCD (and various forms of psy-
chopathology generally) is complicated by
general and specific etiological genetic factors,
aside from environmental ones. Both the symp-
toms of OCD and its endophenotypes have
complex etiological architectures, being both spe-
cific and general. This line of reasoning consti-
tutes all the more reason to differentiate core,
primary symptoms from secondary ones in psy-
chological disorders, as Young (2014) has argued
for PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder). Simi-
larly, Fortgang et al. (2016) argued that shared
endophenotypes might underlie BPD, MDD
(major depressive disorder), and schizophrenia
(related to impulsivity).
Conclusions
Perhaps the search for endophenotypes in psy-
chological disorder can move forward with their
1376
better definition, and symptom specification,
while separating core common symptoms, etiol-
ogies, and endophenotypes from more common
ones, which will help improve classification and
the ability to trace genetic-pathway-outcome
linkages (and endophenotypes). We maintain
that a comprehensive approach to endo-
phenotypes in mental disorder must consider
the biopsychosocial approach and not uniquely
the neuroscientific one. This is especially impor-
tant when considering personality disorders and
individual differences in mental disorders, in
general.
Cross-References
▶ Behavioral Genetics
▶ Gene-Environment Interplay in Developmental
Psychopathology
▶ Genetic Basis of Traits
▶ Genetic Polymorphism
▶ Genotype-Environment Interactions
▶ Heritability of Personality Traits
▶ Impulsivity
▶ Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
▶ Psychopathology
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Endurance
▶ Perseveration
1377
Enemies
Evan Johnson and Kimberly Rios
Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA
Synonyms
Adversaries; Foes; Foils
E
Definition
A negative personal relationship in which at least
one party wishes the downfall of the other.
Introduction
Enemyship is an understudied relationship
(Wiseman and Duck 1995; Adams 2005; Sullivan
et al. 2010; Li et al. 2018). Many researchers have
tended to focus on other types of relationships,
such as friendship (Wiseman and Duck 1995; Li
et al. 2018) and rivalry (Kilduff et al. 2010; Con-
verse and Reinhard 2016). However, researchers
studying enemyship have defined the term as dis-
tinct from rivalry, in which a relationship between
two or more people is entirely centered around a
competition between them (Converse and
Reinhard 2016). Additionally, enemies are not
simply annoyances (Sullivan et al. 2010), nor are
they superficial friends or acquaintances
(Wiseman and Duck 1995). The relationship
between enemies is intimate and complex: ene-
mies may be as psychologically close as friends
(Wiseman et al. 1995).
Though research on enemyship is limited, the
extant literature suggests that enemies can have a
significant impact on behavior (Wiseman and
Duck 1995; Motro and Sullivan 2017). For
example, the anger one feels toward an enemy
might motivate him/her to perform better at work
(Morto et al. 2017) or to avoid going to work to
avoid a potential interaction with the enemy if
they experience anxiety-induced feelings of loss
of control rather than anger (Wiseman and Duck
1378
1995). Furthermore, there are cultural differ-
ences in conceptions of enemyship, described
below (Adams 2005; Li et al. 2018). Finally,
even an enemy’s very existence can bolster or
hinder a person’s sense of meaning in life
(Sullivan et al. 2010; Morto et al. 2017). In this
entry, we review who our enemies are, why we
form those enemies, and how we treat those
enemies.
Who People Decide Are Enemies
Enemies can be the same or different gender
from oneself (Wiseman and Duck 1995).
They can be former friends or lovers (Wiseman
and Duck 1995; Adams 2005), as well as family
members (Wiseman and Duck 1995; Adams
2005) or even complete strangers (Wiseman and
Duck 1995; Adams 2005). Some people believe
that they have natural enemies who oppose them
at every turn (Wiseman and Duck 1995). This
belief is more common in some cultures (e.g.,
West African) than in other (e.g., North Ameri-
can) cultures (Adams 2005). Situational factors
such as an intense argument, a contractual dispute,
or competing for the same romantic partner can
cause people to become enemies as well
(Wiseman and Duck 1995). While some people
create enemies after one negative confrontation,
others determine that they have an enemy after
repeated negative interactions with this individual
over time, with the sense of hatred building up
until they consider the individual an enemy
(Wiseman and Duck 1995).
Members of different cultures can vary in their
ideas of what constitutes an enemy (Adams 2005).
For example, people from North America are
more likely to attribute enemyship to intergroup
differences (e.g., differences in political views),
whereas people from West Africa are more likely
to have a more intimate relationship with their
enemies. Indeed, West African popular slogans
(e.g., “Let my enemy live long and see what
I will be in the future”) and sayings (e.g., “Hatred
comes from the house”) reinforce the belief
that enemyship is deeply personal (Wiseman and
Duck 1995).
Enemies
Additionally, in cultures with low relational
mobility (i.e., cultures in which people do not
tend to change social groups very often), people
are more motivated to understand their enemies
(Li et al. 2018). In such cultures – for example,
Chinese culture – it is less common than in cul-
tures with high relational mobility to form new
social networks (Li et al. 2018). As a result, mem-
bers of cultures with low relational mobility find it
beneficial to understand and potentially thwart an
enemy they cannot easily avoid (Li et al. 2018).
By contrast, in cultures with high relational mobil-
ity, such as American or Canadian culture, one can
easily move on from a group that contains adver-
saries (Li et al. 2018). This makes understanding
an enemy less necessary, as people can simply
distance themselves from any social group
that contains individuals they don’t like
(Li et al. 2018).
Why Enemies Are Formed
There are many reasons that an enemyship might
develop. Some people form enemies based on
prejudices or intergroup differences, such as
between racial/ethnic majority and minority
group members or between members of different
political parties (Adams 2005).
However, enemies can result from intragroup
differences as well; even ingroup members may
become enemies if they threaten one’s position
in power (Mead and Maner 2012). Indeed,
researchers have found that individuals high in
social dominance orientation (i.e., who feel the
need to dominate their subordinates and to main-
tain a high-status position in the social hierarchy)
seek to identify and remain physically close to
potential threats to their power (Mead et al.
2012). This is because identifying and keeping
an eye on enemies who may threaten one’s
power makes it easier to thwart such threats
(Mead et al. 2012). In addition to making it easier
to identify and thwart potential threats to power,
forming enemyships may be beneficial because
doing so allows people to compensate for existen-
tial threats, such as loss of control (Sullivan et al.
2010). That is, those who feel a sense of loss of
control may simplify their lives by attributing
their issues to a singular enemy (Sullivan et al.
Enemies
2010). In one representative study, participants
who felt that their social lives were in disarray
were more likely to believe that an enemy had
influence over their lives (Sullivan et al. 2010).
Furthermore, feeling angry at an enemy can help
quell any negative effects of anxiety on motiva-
tion (Morto and Sullivan 2017). For instance,
when participants experience work-related anxi-
ety, their performance at work improves if they
also feel angry toward a specific enemy (Sullivan
et al. 2017).
How Enemies Are Treated
Once an enemyship is formed, the enemies may
treat each other in a variety of ways. People might
treat their enemies with outright hostility, be sar-
castic to their enemies, be hesitant to speak to their
enemies, or simply avoid their enemies altogether
(Wiseman and Duck 1995). Some individuals,
especially political conservatives, view their
enemies as physically small and ready to be
vanquished with violence (Holbrook et al. 2017).
People may also attempt to harm their enemies
from afar with hexes or curses (e.g., by using
voodoo dolls; Adams 2005).
Some researchers have suggested that friend-
ships are the opposite of enemies, but with some
slight differences (Wiseman and Duck 1995). For
example, enemies tend to be more aware of the
power distance between one another (e.g., posi-
tion on a social or professional hierarchy) than are
friends (Wiseman and Duck 1995). Moreover, in
contrast to friendship, two people need not regu-
larly interact to consider one another enemies
(Wiseman and Duck 1995). Over time, people
feel less close to their friends if they haven’t
seen one another in a long time, whereas the
hatred people feel toward their enemies takes
much longer to diminish (Wiseman and Duck
1995). Thus, it arguably takes more time and
effort to maintain a friendship than an enemyship.
Conclusion
Enemyship is its own phenomenon, distinct from
rivalry and much more than simply disliking
another person (Adams 2005). It involves a
1379
relationship between two or more people in
which at least one of the parties involved hopes
for the other to suffer. People can consider a wide
range of individuals – from co-workers to political
figures to former romantic partners, to name a
few – to be their enemies. Regardless of who is
or is not considered an enemy, however,
enemyship is intimate and can have a lasting and
profound effect on people, similar to other close
relationships.
E
Cross-References
▶ Personality and Friendships
▶ Prejudice
References
Adams, G. (2005). The cultural grounding of personal
relationship: Enemyship in North American and
West African worlds. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 88(6), 948.
Converse, B. A., & Reinhard, D. A. (2016). On rivalry and
goal pursuit: Shared competitive history, legacy con-
cerns, and strategy selection. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 110(2), 191–213.
Holbrook, C., López-Rodríguez, L., Fessler, D. M.,
Vázquez, A., & Gomez, A. (2017). Gulliver’s politics:
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Kilduff, G. J., Elfenbein, H. A., & Staw, B. M. (2010). The
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Li, L. M. W., Masuda, T., & Lee, H. (2018). Low relational
mobility leads to greater motivation to understand ene-
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Mead, N. L., & Maner, J. K. (2012). On keeping your
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Motro, D., & Sullivan, D. (2017). Could two negative
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1380
Wiseman, J. P., & Duck, S. (1995). Having and managing
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Engagement Coping
▶ Active Coping Strategies
Enjoyment
▶ Pleasure
Enterprising Personality
José Muñiz1,2, Ignacio Pedrosa1, Eduardo Garcia1
and Javier Suarez1
1
Department of Psychology, University of
Oviedo, Oviedo, Spain
2
Carlos III Health Institute, Research Centre in the
Mental Health Network (CIBERSAM), Madrid,
Spain
Synonyms
Entrepreneurship
Definition
Enterprising spirit is a multidimensional process
which shapes personal development toward the
proposal, resolution, and continuation of new pro-
jects, whether economic, personal, or social in
nature. Enterprising spirit, like most human
behaviors, depends on both personal factors (i.e.,
capabilities, attitudes, and personality) and con-
textual factors (i.e., society, culture, and econ-
omy). Among the personal factors, personality
traits have been shown to be good predictors of
both business creation and success. Various meta-
Engagement Coping
analyses show a general personality profile asso-
ciated with a person’s willingness or intention to
start a business (high conscientiousness, open-
ness, extraversion, and low neuroticism). There
are also studies which establish a specific enter-
prising personality profile associated with both
business creation and success (high achievement
motivation, risk-taking, innovation, internal locus
of control, self-efficacy, autonomy, and opti-
mism). In short, the best approximation of the
definition of enterprising spirit is one which is
comprehensive and integrated and which con-
siders the multidimensional reality of the con-
struct in a person’s culture.
Introduction
Enterprising spirit is a cornerstone of most mod-
ern societies, as it is one of the main sources of
employment, productivity, and economic growth.
In recent years, various organizations and profes-
sionals have tried to encourage and understand the
process associated with enterprising spirit. At pre-
sent there are a variety of indicators which provide
annual evaluations of enterprising activity in an
international context. A notable example is the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), which
has more than 1.3 million data points on the active
population (adults aged between 18 and 64) in
85 different countries. Similarly, the Entrepre-
neurship Indicators Program (EIP) from the Orga-
nization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) develops international
indicators to guide economic policy improve-
ments, which are published annually in the report
“Entrepreneurship at a Glance” (OECD 2014).
Before its current consolidation, the field of
research into enterprising spirit developed thanks
to contributions from multiple areas (Rauch and
Frese 2007). Economics and sociology have pro-
vided models and explanatory theories of enter-
prising spirit, highlighting its subjective,
individual nature, as well as the importance of
various factors involved in the process. For its
part, psychology has complemented this theoreti-
cal corpus through the development of rigorous
evaluation instruments underpinned by those
Enterprising Personality
theories, with the aim of quantitatively analyzing
enterprising personality and trying to predict busi-
ness creation and success.
Among the principal conclusions drawn so far,
it is worth highlighting the fact that the simple
combination of opportunities, capabilities, and
resources does not necessarily drive enterprising
activity. Situations in which opportunity costs
(e.g., loss of salary or worse healthcare coverage)
are higher than the potential benefits will curtail
it. Similarly, the importance of the subjective per-
ception of business opportunities and an individ-
ual’s capability of exploiting the market are more
determining factors than their mere existence. In a
more theoretical approach, another fundamental
factor is the multidimensional nature of enterpris-
ing spirit. This requires the development of
models and integrated explanations which realis-
tically reflect enterprising spirit and consider the
various factors which define it.
The Importance of Personality in the
Study of Enterprising Spirit
Various theoretical models to date have
highlighted the importance of personality charac-
teristics when it comes to enterprising intention or
behavior due to the evidence of predictive validity
with respect to business creation and success. Two
principal approaches can be distinguished in the
study of personality traits: the assessment of gen-
eral traits, such as the Big Five (Brandstatter 2011;
Zhao et al. 2010), and the study of more specific
traits which are more closely linked to business
activities (Muñiz et al. 2014; Rauch and Frese
2007).
Many meta-analyses reveal a general person-
ality profile associated with a person’s willingness
or intention to start a business (high conscien-
tiousness, openness, and extraversion and low
neuroticism). In addition, comparisons between
enterprising people and other population groups
show that enterprising people tend to score more
highly in traits that are specific to the enterprising
personality such as achievement motivation, risk-
taking, innovation, and internal locus of control.
Furthermore, innovation, self-efficacy, and
1381
proactive personality demonstrate a significant,
positive relationship with business success,
while internal locus of control and autonomy
have been established as valid predictors of both
business creation and success.
In short, achievement motivation, self-efficacy,
risk-taking, innovation, autonomy, tolerance to
stress, internal locus of control, and optimism
are the personality traits which have the best rela-
tionship with enterprising spirit (Muñiz et al.
E
2014; Rauch and Frese 2007; Zhao et al. 2010).
This approach, the evaluation of specific person-
ality traits, allows the explanation of more specific
aspects of the enterprising personality, thus pro-
viding more accurate predictions. Furthermore,
specific traits have been shown to have incremen-
tal validity in predicting business success com-
pared to the Big Five (Leutner et al. 2014).
Integrated Model of Enterprising Spirit
When it comes to attempting to understand enter-
prising spirit, the need to assess socioeconomic
and personal factors in a combined manner seems
clear. Therefore, integrated explanatory models
need to be developed which realistically reflect
enterprising spirit. Following this premise,
the theoretical model (Fig. 1) proposed by
Suárez-Álvarez and Pedrosa (2016) is notable.
This model combines the essence of the principal
theoretical frameworks from recent years (Rauch
and Frese 2007), considering the various factors
involved in enterprising activity, while at the same
time incorporating the latest findings in research
into enterprising personality.
According to the model, specific and general
personality traits, cognitive factors, and emotions
are defined by a person’s experiences, character-
istics, and abilities throughout their life. In turn,
these factors are framed within that person’s wider
context (socioeconomic and family), and the dif-
ferent opportunities and advantages offered by
that environment must be analyzed. The model
pays special attention to the dimensions making
up the zone of personal development, highlight-
ing, in addition to personality traits, aspects such
as emotional intelligence and cognitive factors.
1382
Enterprising Personality, Fig. 1 Comprehensive model of entrepreneurship
Business Success and Culture
Business success is commonly estimated by using
the rate of self-employment or other small-
business measures. However, a systematic cross-
country study carried out between 1996 and 2010
in 50 countries showed a negative correlation
between the level of multimillionaire business-
people and self-employment, small-business
ownership, and the rate of business start-ups
(Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014). This apparent
incongruence may be due to the lack of consensus
when it comes to defining business success: in
terms of business growth and innovation or sim-
ply in terms of business creation and self-
employment. The aforementioned study shows
that small-business activity and innovating, enter-
prising spirit are two distinct phenomena which
are explained by different variables and are asso-
ciated with different results. Small-business activ-
ity is associated with flexible employment,
mitigation of agency problems, and a safety
valve from dysfunctional economic systems,
whereas Schumpeterian enterprising spirit is
Enterprising Personality
fundamentally related to innovation and the ambi-
tion to grow a business. These results highlight the
need to recognize the difference between the two
concepts with the aim of gaining better insight
into how enterprising spirit should be understood,
measured, and ultimately encouraged.
Assessment Instruments
There have been notable contributions to the
assessment of specific traits of enterprising per-
sonality in recent years, with various instruments
having been developed in a variety of languages
(Suárez-Álvarez and Pedrosa 2016). Of those, the
Measure of Entrepreneurial Talents and Abilities
(META; Almeida et al. 2014) is probably the
instrument which shows the largest validity evi-
dence when aiming to evaluate enterprising spirit
in adult workers (Leutner et al. 2014).
To date, only one instrument has been devel-
oped in a computerized adaptive format (BEPE-
A; Pedrosa et al. 2016). This instrument allows the
progressive selection of items based on a person’s
Enterprising Personality
preceding answers, providing a customized test
and evaluating enterprising spirit accurately and
particularly rapidly.
Conclusion
Interest in the figure of the enterprising person has
changed over recent decades through the influ-
ence of different fields of knowledge. However,
the person has remained the constant central
aspect of the enterprising process. With respect
to the different characteristics which define an
individual, the importance of personality traits
has been demonstrated when it comes to pre-
dicting business creation and success. On this
point, while it is true that specific traits seem to
provide better evidence of predictive validity, the
contributions of both specific and general person-
ality traits must be combined to obtain better
predictive capability (Brandstatter 2011; Zhao
et al. 2010).
In addition to personality traits, enterprising
spirit must be understood from a multi-
dimensional perspective. So in addition to an
individual’s personality characteristics, it is
important to improve cognitive and emotional
aspects in such a way so as to make the most of
the interaction between an individual’s resources
and their surroundings. Furthermore, while the
person plays an essential role in enterprising activ-
ity, it is impossible to understand this complex
process without also evaluating the different
socioeconomic variables which influence
it. Factors such as education, availability of spe-
cific training, social support, and access to infor-
mation are considered essential for the integrated
development of an enterprising person.
With respect to the evaluation of enterprising
personality, while existing instruments represent a
significant advance in terms of measurement,
there is still a long way to go. For example, imple-
mentation of item response theory in this field
would allow to develop more computerized adap-
tive tests and take advantage of their multiple
benefits in terms of efficiency and efficacy. In
addition, there should be a wider collection of
information on enterprising spirit using different
1383
methods (e.g., using proxies, performance tasks,
or situational tests) which would reduce the
biases inherent in self-reporting (e.g., social
desirability).
Finally, considering the importance of entre-
preneurs in the economic development of coun-
tries, it is essential to develop a single, consensus
definition of business success. Only in this way
will it be possible to understand this complex
process, develop reliable measuring instruments,
E
define objective indicators, and optimize the var-
ious existing resources to encourage enterprising
spirit in different cultures.
Cross-References
▶ Big Five Inventory
▶ Big-Five Model
▶ Item Response Theory
▶ Personality Assessment
▶ Sex Differences in Personality Traits
References
Almeida, P. I. L., Ahmetoglu, G., & Chamorro-
Premuzic, T. (2014). Who wants to be an entrepreneur?
The relationship between vocational interests and indi-
vidual differences in entrepreneurship. Journal of
Career Assessment, 22(1), 102–112. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1069072713492923.
Brandstatter, H. (2011). Personality aspects of entrepre-
neurship: A look at five meta-analyses. Personality
and Individual Differences, 51(3), 222–230. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.07.007.
Henrekson, M., & Sanandaji, T. (2014). Small business
activity does not measure entrepreneurship. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(5),
1760–1765. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1307204111.
Leutner, F., Ahmetoglu, G., Akhtar, R., & Chamorro-
Premuzic, T. (2014). The relationship between the
entrepreneurial personality and the Big Five personal-
ity traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 63,
58–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.01.042.
Muñiz, J., Suárez-Álvarez, J., Pedrosa, I., Fonseca-
Pedrero, E., & García-Cueto, E. (2014). Enterprising
personality profile in youth: Components and assess-
ment. Psicothema, 26(4), 545–553. https://doi.org/
10.7334/psicothema2014.182.
OECD (2014). Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2014.
Retrieved on 17 June 2015 from http://www.OCDE-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/3014031e.pdf?expire
1384
s=1435 052455&id=id&accname=guest&checks
um=11BDE0005B81D5DC49095A37D7E
Pedrosa, I., Suárez-Álvarez, J., García-Cueto, E., &
Muñiz, J. (2016). A computerized adaptive test for
enterprising personality assessment in youth.
Psicothema, 28(4), 471–478.
Rauch, A., & Frese, M. (2007). Born to be an entrepreneur?
Revisiting the personality approach to entrepreneur-
ship. In J. R. Baum, M. Frese, & R. J. Baron (Eds.),
The psychology of entrepreneurship (pp. 41–65).
Mahwah: Erlbaum.
Suárez-Álvarez, J., & Pedrosa, I. (2016). Enterprising per-
sonality assessment: Current status and future direc-
tions. Psychologist Papers, 37(1), 62–68.
Zhao, H., Seibert, S. E., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2010). The
relationship of personality to entrepreneurial intentions
and performance: A meta-analytic review. Journal of
Management, 36(2), 381–404. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0149206309335187.
Entheogens
▶ Psychedelic Drugs and Personality
Entitled
▶ Glory (Horney)
Entitlement
Brian Miller
Department of Management, Texas State
University, San Marcos, TX, USA
Synonyms
Narcissism
Definition
Entitlement is a dispositional tendency to prefer or
insist upon more rewards than other persons
regardless of one’s contribution, effort, or
performance.
Entheogens
Introduction
Entitlement is a maladaptive personality trait that
is often used interchangeably with narcissism
(Twenge 2006) and has been most often studied
as a stand-alone trait (Campbell et al. 2004), as
part of the equity sensitivity spectrum (Sauley and
Bedeian 2000) with benevolence on the opposite
end (Huseman et al. 1987), and as a component of
narcissism (Raskin and Hall 1979). Persons with
high levels of entitlement tend to (1) be dissatis-
fied with rewards regardless of amount (Huseman
et al. 1987) and engage in greater amounts of
deviant behavior (Miller 2015).
Main Text
The etiology of entitlement has been suggested
(Miller and Konopaske 2014) to arise from a
postwar increase in overly permissive child-
rearing practices (Mosak 1959) and from the mis-
guided and ineffectual (Twenge 2006) self-esteem
movement of the 1980s (Mecca et al. 1989) that
promoted self-esteem as the panacea that cured all
that ailed young persons who would later mature
into the so-called Millennials or Generation Y. As
a result of the self-esteem movement, Millennials
participated as children in sports leagues that
refused to keep score because it was thought that
to assign winners and losers would cause irrepa-
rable harm to the psyche of children “branded” as
losers. As a result all children were awarded par-
ticipation trophies simply for showing up, instead
of trophies being earned only by the winners.
Members of the Millennial generation have
become the poster children for an unwarranted
sense of entitlement as a result of these experi-
ences. This entitlement mentality that engenders a
sense of specialness or uniqueness to some has
been greatly facilitated by social media and the
never-ending parade of shameless online posts
and the quest for fame at any cost by some.
The measurement of trait entitlement has been
greatly assisted by the development of the Psy-
chological Entitlement Scale (PES: Campbell
et al. 2004) and the Equity Preference Question-
naire (EPQ: Sauley and Bedeian 2000). These
Entrepreneurship
measures are preferred to the entitlement subscale
of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI:
Raskin and Hall 1979) because of poor reliability
of scores on most of the NPI subscales when used
as stand-alone measures. The PES uses nine items
to measure entitlement as a unidimensional con-
struct and results in scores that are consistently
reliable and that regularly relate to other con-
structs in an expected manner. The EPQ measures
two ends of the equity sensitivity spectrum and
Miller (2009) recommends that the eight entitle-
ment items be used separately from the eight
benevolence items of the EPQ because the two
spectrum ends are not exact opposites of each
other. The entitlement subscale of the EPQ results
in scores that are reliable and that relate to other
constructs in a meaningful and expected manner.
Conclusion
The underlying theoretical framework for entitle-
ment suggests that even though humans naturally
and inherently compare themselves to others,
there is great divergence in how some compari-
sons are viewed by some persons. Some people
consistently prefer or demand to come out ahead
in most comparisons and therefore display high
levels of entitlement. This underlying predisposi-
tion to consistently prefer more than others get can
lead to difficulty in forging meaningful interper-
sonal relationships.
Cross-References
▶ Benevolence
▶ Equality
▶ Equity
▶ Fairness
▶ Narcissism
References
Campbell, W. K., Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J.,
& Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement:
Interpersonal consequences and validation of a self-
1385
report measure. Journal of Personality Assessment,
83(1), 29–45.
Huseman, R. C., Hatfield, J. D., & Miles, E. W. (1987).
A new perspective on equity theory: The equity sensi-
tivity construct. Academy of Management Review, 12,
222–234.
Mecca, A. M., Smelser, N. J., & Vasconcellos, J. (Eds.).
(1989). The social importance of self-esteem. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Miller, B. K. (2009). Confirmatory factor analysis of the
equity preference questionnaire. Journal of Managerial
Psychology, 24(4), 328–347.
Miller, B. K. (2015). Conscientiousness and entitlement E
in the prediction of organizational deviance.
Personality and Individual Differences, 82,
114–119.
Miller, B. K., & Konopaske, R. (2014). Dispositional
correlates of perceived work entitlement. Journal of
Managerial Psychology, 29(7), 808–828.
Mosak, H. H. (1959). The getting type, a parsimonious
social interpretation of the oral character. Journal of
Individual Psychology, 15, 193–198.
Raskin, R. N., & Hall, C. S. (1979). A narcissistic
personality inventory. Psychological Reports, 45,
590.
Sauley, K. S., & Bedeian, A. G. (2000). Equity sensitivity:
Construction of a measure and examination of its psy-
chometric properties. Journal of Management, 26,
885–910.
Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today’s young
Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled – and
more miserable than ever before. New York: Free
Press.
Entity Beliefs
▶ Implicit Theories of Intelligence
Entity Theories
▶ Implicit Theories of Intelligence
Entrepreneurship
▶ Enterprising Personality
1386
Entry for Need for Closure
Ambra Brizi
Department of Developmental and Social
Psychology, Sapienza, University of Rome,
Rome, Italy
Synonyms
Need for closure; Need for cognitive closure;
Need for closure scale (NFCS)
Acronyms
NFC, NfCC, NCC
Definition
The need for closure construct is a dimension of
individual differences related to a person’s moti-
vation with respect to information processing and
judgment. The need for cognitive closure has been
defined as the “individual’s desire for a firm
answer to a question, any firm answer, as opposed
to confusion and/or ambiguity” (Kruglanski 2004,
p. 6). The word “need” is used here “to denote a
motivated tendency or proclivity rather than a
tissue deficit” (Kruglanski and Webster 1996,
p. 264).
Entry for Need for Closure
The need for closure (NFC) is conceived as a
continuum with a strong NFC at one end and a
strong need to avoid closure at the other. As such,
it prompts a preference toward closure-bound pur-
suits; it induces negative affect when closure is
denied and induces positive affect when it is
attained. The following paragraphs will describe
NFC consequences, the group centrism syn-
drome, the most important effects of NFC in a
real-world context (prejudice and authoritarian-
ism), and how closure is measured.
Entry for Need for Closure
Consequences of NFC at the Individual
Level
NFC can instill two tendencies: the urgency ten-
dency and the permanence tendency (Kruglanski
and Webster 1996). The urgency tendency refers
to one’s inclination to “seize” closure quickly.
People with high urgency need to make decisions
based on immediate answers without taking into
account additional information. As a conse-
quence, when making a decision or judgment,
they consider the most salient and available infor-
mation which is reflected in their need for deci-
siveness, and they feel discomfort when they
experience ambiguity and aversion in situations
where closure is lacking. The permanence ten-
dency refers to the desire to perpetuate closure,
originating two inclinations: (a) to preserve or
“freeze” past knowledge and (b) to safeguard
future knowledge. As a result, individuals with a
high NFC have a preference for order and predict-
ability; they have a necessity for secure, constant,
and stable knowledge. They are also closed-
minded, are resistant to information that is incon-
sistent with their firm opinions, and reject any
changes of their knowledge.
NFC may be temporarily increased by contex-
tual factors, such as time constraints, noise,
fatigue, and dull tasks, but people also substan-
tially differ in their chronic level of “dispositional
closure.”
Group Centrism
The following sections will describe how NFC
affects social entities such as social groups and
categories. The first section concerns a general
phenomenon called “group centrism,” and the
second section concerns NFC consequences at
the group and intergroup level.
Group centrism reflects “the degree to which
the “groupness” of a collectivity, or its coherence
[matters to a group] . . . the degree to which indi-
viduals strive to enhance the groupness of their
collectivity” (Kruglanski et al. 2006, pp. 84–87).
Moreover, when the members of a group expe-
rience group centrism, they show a general
Entry for Need for Closure
consensus and conformity to its norms, in-group
favoritism, and out-group discrimination. The
individual team members enjoy the team experi-
ences, resulting in a reinforced positive mood and
a common shared reality. Four elements are par-
ticularly important for defining group centrism:
(1) a rejection of the viewpoints perceived as
deviant from the group thinking, (2) a resistance
to the opinions of those who threaten or violate
the group consensus, (3) conservatism, and
(4) aggressive reactions toward out-group mem-
bers who violate norms and traditions.
Consequences of NFC at the Group
and Intergroup Levels
Over the last 10 years, evidence has mounted that
dispositional NFC is related to various measures.
Research on prejudice, essentialist beliefs about
racial groups, racism, and authoritarianism is of
great importance. Roets and Van Hiel (2011a)
suggested that the NFC construct captures excep-
tionally well the basic cognitive style of all types
of prejudice, as described by Allport (1954),
even if the NFC theory originates from a research
tradition outside the prejudice literature. Indeed,
Allport (1954) described individuals with high
prejudice as having a high preference for a struc-
tured world, a high need for social order, and an
intolerance for uncertainty and ambiguous situa-
tions. Moreover, NFC also leads to typical
expressions of authoritarianism, such as the der-
ogation of opinion deviants, an increased need
for conformity and consensus, and prejudice.
The results of a study by Chirumbolo
et al. (2004) showed that individuals with high
NFC hold more conservative attitudes and have
more of a preference to vote for right-wing
parties in comparison to individuals with low
NFC. Furthermore, the higher the NFC, the
more negative the attitude toward immigrants
and the stronger the nationalism and preference
for autocratic leadership. On the contrary, plural-
ism and multiculturalism are tendencies that are
stronger among low NFC individuals than
among individuals with high NFC. In the last
paragraph, how to measure NFC is illustrated.
1387
Measuring NFC
A 42-item scale named “Need for Closure Scale”
(NFCS; Webster and Kruglanski 1994) was
designed as a one-dimensional tool through five
different expressions: preference for order, prefer-
ence for predictability, (need for) decisiveness,
aversion for ambiguity, and closed-mindedness.
The scale has been translated into several lan-
guages, thus enabling a cross-cultural investiga-
E
tion of various NFC effects (for review, see
Kruglanki 2004).
More recently, Roets and Van Hiel (2011b)
validated a brief, 15-item version of the NFCS
(Table 1). Various studies have shown that the
effects obtained by the individual difference mea-
sure converge with those obtained by the situa-
tional manipulations of NFC (e.g., by time
pressure or by cognitive load).
Entry for Need for Closure, Table 1 Short version of
the revised NFC scale
I do not like situations that are uncertain
I dislike questions which could be answered in many
different ways
I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my
temperament
I feel uncomfortable when I do not understand the reason
why an event occurred in my life
I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what
everyone else in a group believes
I do not like to go into a situation without knowing what
I can expect from it
When I have made a decision, I feel relieved
When I am confronted with a problem, I am dying to
reach a solution very quickly
I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would
not find a solution to a problem immediately
I do not like to be with people who are capable of
unexpected actions
I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many
different things
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to
enjoy life more
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life
I do not usually consult many different opinions before
forming my own view
I dislike unpredictable situations
This scale is adapted from Roets and Van Hiel (2011b),
based on the full revised NFC scale (Roets and Van Hiel
2007), original scale by Webster and Kruglanski (1994).
1388
Conclusion
As discussed above, over the past three decades,
the research on need for cognitive closure has
focused on cognition domains (e.g., Kruglaski
and Webster 1996) and on cognitively driven
group dynamics (see Kruglanski et al. 2006). In
recent years, two different developments have
been studied: fundamental and applied research
in NFC (for a review, see Roets et al. 2015). The
first development, focused on basic psychologi-
cal research, concerns the motivational nature of
NFC and its interplay with cognitive ability and
capacity. The second development concerns
studying NFC in a real-world context, such as
in groups and organizations, and with some con-
sequences such as prejudice, discrimination, and
extremism.
Initial and interesting steps are being made to
explore the cognitive mechanisms and neural
underpinnings of need for cognitive closure
(e.g., Viola et al. 2014). This new research field
extends NFC theory to the brain-level phenomena
involved in knowledge formation. Because NFC
determines judgment and decision-making pro-
cesses in several domains of human activity
(including individual, interpersonal, group,
intergroup, and cultural-level phenomena) and
because it is known to vary across individuals’
groups and cultures, a window into the brain-level
substrates could make important contributions to
the psychological science of human behavior.
References
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading:
AddisonWesley.
Chirumbolo, A., Areni, A., & Sensales, G. (2004). Need
for cognitive closure and politics: Voting, political atti-
tudes and attributional style. International Journal of
Psychology, 39(4), 245–253.
Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). The psychology of the closed
mindedness. New York: Psychology Press.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated
closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing”. Psycho-
logical Review, 103, 263–283.
Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada,
E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: Need for
closure and the unfolding of group-centrism. Psycho-
logical Review, 113, 84–100.
Environment
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2007). Separating ability from
need: Clarifying the dimensional structure of the need
for closure scale. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 33, 266–280.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011a). Allport’s prejudiced
personality today need for closure as the motivated
cognitive basis of prejudice. Current Directions in Psy-
chological Science, 20(6), 349–354.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011b). Item selection and
validation of a brief, 15-item version of the Need for
Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences,
50(1), 90–94.
Roets, A., Kruglanski, A. W., Kossowska, M., Pierro, A.,
& Hong, Y. Y. (2015). Chapter Four-The motivated
gatekeeper of our minds: New directions in need for
closure theory and research. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 52, 221–283.
Viola, V., Tosoni, A., Kruglanski, A. W., Galati, G., &
Mannetti, L. (2014). Routes of motivation: Stable psy-
chological dispositions are associated with dynamic
changes in cortico-cortical functional connectivity.
PloS one, 9(6), e98010.
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual
differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049.
Environment
▶ Assessment of Situational Influences
▶ Segal, Nancy L.
Environment of Evolutionary
Adaptedness
▶ Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA)
Environment of Evolutionary
Adaptedness (EEA)
Kevin Bennett
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State
University, Beaver, Monaca, PA, USA
Synonyms
Ancestral environment; Environment of evolu-
tionary adaptedness; Niche
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA)
Definition
The environment of evolutionary adaptedness
(EEA) is the ancestral environment to which a
species is adapted. It is the set of selection pres-
sures that shaped an adaptation.
Introduction
A central premise of evolutionary science is that
forces in our distant past helped make us who we
are today. The environment of evolutionary adapt-
edness (EEA) refers to a group of selection pres-
sures occurring during an adaptation’s period of
evolution responsible for producing the adapta-
tion (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). A selection
pressure can be any factor in a population that
impacts reproductive success. Physical, social,
and intrapersonal pressures from our ancestral
past help to shape our current human design
because all animals have heritable variations
that are selectively favored or disfavored in
accordance with reproductive success (Buss
1999). Each adaptation has its own EEA, or
set of adaptive problems, that shaped it over
evolutionary time.
Not an Actual Place
The EEA does not exist as a single geographical
location during a discrete period of time during
human evolution. Rather it is a set of selection
pressures that formed a given adaptation. For
example, ancestral humans faced the adaptive
problem of securing and digesting food to maxi-
mize energy. Taste buds were shaped in response
to this adaptive problem. Our ancestors who
showed a preference for salt, fat, and sugar were
selectively favored over those individuals who did
not have similar preferences. The acquisition of
salt, fat, and sugar would have been challenging
for our ancestors given the absence of agriculture
and the inability to mass produce high concentra-
tions of those items. The probability of survival
and reproduction for individuals who showed a
preference for those foods would have been
1389
greater than for those who did not. Our taste
preferences were shaped in response to the prob-
lems posed by this environment.
Organisms living in different environments
faced different sets of adaptive problems. Every
species has a unique EEA – this is why not all
animals are the same. Humans and turtles, for
example, faced different reproductive problems
and therefore have different adaptations. Even
animals that coexisted in the same geographic
E
space during a similar time period have different
EEAs because they faced different reproductive
challenges.
Origins of EEA
The idea of EEA was first proposed by
John Bowlby (1969) in the context of attachment
theory. He described it as conceptual space – not a
specific place – that describes the conditions and
properties in which adaptation occurs: “In the
case of biological systems, structure takes a form
that is determined by the kind of environment
in which the system has been in fact operating
during its evolution. . .This environment I propose
to term the system’s ‘environment of adapted-
ness.’ Only within its environment of adaptedness
can it be expected that a system will work
efficiently” (p. 47).
Modern World and EEA Mismatch
An adaptationist approach to studying behavior
involves understanding the environment in which
the brain evolved. However, the modern industri-
alized world of today differs in many important
respects from the EEA. This mismatch serves
as a useful starting point for understanding the
function and design of current psychological
mechanisms. The list of novelties offered by our
modern world but not present in the EEA includes
agriculture, electricity, refrigeration, large-scale
weapons, medicines, mass communication, effec-
tive contraceptive devices, and virtually unlimited
access to all types of proteins and carbohydrates.
We are navigating our current social and physical
1390
world with psychological mechanisms designed
to solve problems associated with survival and
reproduction in an ancestral environment much
different than the one we live in now.
Because adaptations evolved over many gen-
erations, they are said to be “in tune” with reliable
features of the environment. It is possible for an
adaptation to fail to perform properly (i.e., fall
“out of tune”) if the environment changes.
A behavior that is maladaptive in one environ-
ment may not be maladaptive in other environ-
ments. Returning to an earlier example, one could
make the case that salt, fat, and sugar negatively
impact health when consumed in large quantities
over long periods of time. However, this is not
evidence of maladaptivity in the EEA. Moreover,
the “lack of fit” to the current environment does
not change the intense desire for those substances
formed in the EEA.
One approach to uncovering the selection
pressures responsible for a trait is to use “reverse
engineering” to figure out the adaptive problems
the trait was designed to solve (Pinker 1997).
In other words, “what in the EEA was this behav-
ior designed to solve”? The function of a trait
provides an indirect historical record of the selec-
tion pressures involved in shaping the trait.
The current universality of certain emotions
can provide insight into the adaptive problems
confronted by our ancestors. For example, the
concepts of anger and aggression appear in every
culture. This suggests that evolutionary pressures
in our distant past selected and shaped the emotion
of anger and the behavior of aggression in
response to specific adaptive problems posed by
the environment. Parental anger, for instance, can
be triggered in a mother or father if offspring
are being threatened. This emotional/behavioral
response is adaptive in current environments and
can be traced back to ancestral ones.
For the first 5 million years of hominid history,
our ancestors lived in small, nomadic bands
of hunter-gatherers. These groups were likely
made up of no more than 30–50 individuals;
thus many of our psychological adaptations are
in tune with small communities. This psycholog-
ical design poses a problem for tackling modern-
day, large-scale global issue like environmental
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA)
destruction, mass migration, and geopolitical con-
flict. Agriculture and modern city environments
were nonexistent for 99% of human history.
Because these human inventions emerged only
in the past 10,000 years, we are relying on psy-
chological mechanisms shaped in our ancestral
past to help us navigate the social and physical
complexities of the world today.
There is a competition between the demands
of selfish decision-making shaped in the EEA and
the less selfish altruistic desire required to ensure
long lasting peace and cooperation on a global
stage. The needs of the individual end up compet-
ing against the needs of the larger group. Our
psychological structure was designed to benefit
the propagation of our genes through direct and
indirect means and to promote non-kin reciprocal
alliances in close proximity (i.e., the people we
interact with frequently). For almost all of human
history, we have not had to solve massive global
population problems. Simply put, the EEA did not
design efficient mental machinery for solving
problems involving large groups of strangers we
will never meet or see.
Conclusion
The EEA for any species is the amalgamation
of reproductive problems faced by members
of that species over evolutionary time and is an
important concept for understanding the functional
properties and organization of the brain. Many
human preferences and behavioral decision-
making algorithms are adapted to the EEA and
not necessarily the modern environment.
Cross-References
▶ Evolutionary Perspective
▶ Evolutionary Psychology
References
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss. New York: Basic
Books.
Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
Buss, D. M. (1999). Evolutionary psychology: The new
science of the mind (5th ed.). New York: Allyn &
Bacon.
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: Norton.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological
foundations of culture. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, &
J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind (pp. 19–136).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Environmental – Contextual,
Situational, Circumstantial
▶ Environmental Stability
Environmental Conditions
and the Development of
Personality
Mona Ayoub1 and Brent W. Roberts1,2
1
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
2
University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
Environmental Predictors of Personality
Development
What are the factors that shape our personality
traits? Why are some people more extraverted,
conscientious, or less neurotic than others?
These are timeless questions for which we are
still seeking answers. The answers provided so
far can be roughly divided into two categories:
genetic and environmental. Behavioral genetics
researchers have used methods such as twin
models to explore the genetic underpinnings of
personality. Interestingly, they found that a sub-
stantial percentage of variation in personality
traits can be attributed to genes (e.g., Bouchard
and Loehlin 2001). On the other hand, other
researchers opted to explore the factors in the
individual’s environment that influence personal-
ity development. Psychologists as early as
William James (1890) argued that social environ-
ments influence our personalities. Since then,
1391
several theories about the influence of the social
environment on personality have been proposed.
Examples of these theories are social learning
theory (Bandura 1977), group socialization theory
(Harris 1995), Bronfenbrenner’s ecological sys-
tems theory (Bronfenbrenner 1979), and social
investment theory (Roberts et al. 2005).
Amidst the excitement about behavioral genet-
ics research findings, one might wonder about the
utility of exploring the environmental predictors
E
of personality. We argue for the necessity of
conducting research on these predictors for two
main reasons. First, genes do not explain all the
variations in personality traits. Although it is true
that heritability estimates of personality traits are
substantial, we should not overlook the substan-
tial portion of the variance that is not heritable.
This variation is attributed to environmental fac-
tors. In light of this, we argue that it is problematic
to look at one set of factors and ignore the others.
A comprehensive understanding of personality
development should incorporate the genetic and
environmental influences on personality. Second,
it is possible to intervene on environmental factors
to change personality. Actually, there has been
accumulating evidence for the success of inter-
ventions which aim to change personality traits
(Roberts et al. 2017). To advance these interven-
tions though, it is helpful to gain good understand-
ing of the environmental factors that are
associated with personality development in order
to intervene on them.
Based on our belief in the importance of study-
ing the environmental predictors of personality
development, we aim through this chapter to pro-
vide a general overview of the research that has
been conducted on some of these predictors. In
fact, there is research done on multiple predictors,
so we included the ones that meet the following
two criteria. First, the environmental predictors
should be relatively well researched. Second, the
environmental predictors should be experiences
undergone by people across the globe (e.g., work
experiences). We also focused on studies which
used the Big Five system (Goldberg 1981), which
is the most researched and most commonly used
system for organizing personality traits. The Big
Five personality traits are extraversion,
1392 Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism/
emotional stability, and openness to experience.
Whenever relevant, we also included studies
which used the Big Three temperament dimen-
sions, which are considered as the precursors of
the Big Five traits (Rothbart et al. 2000). These
dimensions are positive emotionality, negative
emotionality, and constraint. We start the chapter
by reviewing research on the influence of parental
socioeconomic status, which is a macro-level fac-
tor, on personality. Then, we move to review
research on four microlevel factors that have
direct influence on personality. These factors are
parenting practices, peer relationships, romantic
relationships, and work experiences.
Parental Socioeconomic Status
Socioeconomic status (SES) refers to the individ-
ual’s economic and social resources (House
2002). It is often considered as an important pre-
dictor of psychological development because it
influences a multitude of factors that directly
impact the individual such as neighborhood con-
ditions, quality of education, quality of peers, and
parenting relationships. The three main indicators
that are used to measure SES are educational
level, occupational status/prestige, and income
(Baker 2014). However, before individuals
become capable of creating their own socioeco-
nomic status, it is their parents’ SES which is
thought to influence their development. In this
section, we review research done on the associa-
tion of parental SES with offspring’s personality
development in childhood/adolescence and
adulthood.
Surprisingly, little research was done specifi-
cally on the association of parental SES with off-
spring’s personality. However, it is common to
use SES indicators as demographic control vari-
ables in personality studies. Therefore, a recent
meta-analysis identified these studies to examine
the association between parental SES and the
children’s Big Three temperament dimensions
and/or Big Five personality traits (Ayoub, Gos-
ling, Potter, Shanahan, & Roberts 2017). Contrary
to expectations, it was found that parental SES
had predominantly negligible associations with
personality traits or temperament dimensions.
The effect sizes were very small. Except for open-
ness to experience, these effect sizes ranged
between 0.04 and 0.07. The relatively bigger asso-
ciation with openness to experience (r = 0.14)
could be attributed to the association of this per-
sonality trait with intelligence (e.g., Block and
Kremen 1996), which has been recurrently found
to be correlated with parental SES (e.g., Damian
et al. 2015). Interestingly, the correlations found
in the meta-analysis between parental SES and the
Big Five were replicated in a sample of more than
two million participants (Ayoub, Gosling, Potter,
Shanahan, & Roberts 2017).
Based on the results of this research, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that parental SES does not
have immediate or long-term effects on personal-
ity development. These findings should allay con-
cerns of researchers about the influence of
parental SES as a confound in personality devel-
opment research. Whether one comes from an
advantaged or disadvantaged family plays almost
little role in personality development.
Parenting Practices
Parents are often considered the most important
people in children’s early life and a critical factor
for their personality development. They are the
primary caregivers who provide children with
nutrition, shelter, and care. Usually, parents are
the first people to interact with children and to
spend the majority of time with them before they
attend school. Because of their omnipresence in
children’s life, it is intuitive to assume that parents
play an influential role in their personality
development.
Specifically, there is a significant amount of
research done on the association of parenting
practices and children’s personality development.
Before reviewing this research, it is indispensable
to define parenting. Parenting refers to the range
of behaviors, attitudes, emotions, attributions, and
cognitions administered by the parents toward
Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
their children (Berg-Neilson et al. 2002). Parent-
ing researchers have discerned three major parent-
ing dimensions: parental warmth, control, and
monitoring. Depending on the researcher, the
dimensions might take different labels. The most
researched dimensions are warmth and control. In
general, parental warmth refers to parents’ aware-
ness and attendance to their children’s needs and
demands. Control refers to supervision and disci-
plinary practices that aim to integrate the child
into the family (Baumrind 1991).
Most research done on the influence of these
parenting dimensions on personality involved
children and adolescents. Therefore, there is
great focus on how temperament, which is usually
measured in these populations in contrast to the
Big Five, is shaped by parenting. For example,
Olson et al. (1990) found that parental nonrestric-
tive control, which was assessed when children
were 13 months old, correlated positively and
moderately with children’s inhibitory control at
age 6. Similarly, they found that parental non-
punitive control with 2-year-old children was
also positively correlated with age 6 inhibitory
control. Interestingly, the associations were statis-
tically significant for male but not for female
children. Another relevant study is that done by
Kochanska et al. (2000) who found that maternal
responsiveness to 22-month-old children posi-
tively and moderately predicted children’s effort-
ful control at 33 months. Furthermore, Belsky
et al. (1991) reported that infants with involved
parents increased in positive affect within a
3-month period compared to infants with less
involved parents. Besides research on infants,
there are studies done on older children. For
example, it was found that parental practices mea-
sured at age 10 significantly and positively pre-
dicted 11-year-old children’s fear and irritability
(Lengua and Kovacs 2005). A similar study found
that the average scores of maternal rejection and
inconsistent discipline assessed at age 10 corre-
lated negatively with children’s effortful control
and positively with children’s fear and irritability
assessed at age 11 (Lengua 2006). In addition to
longitudinal studies, researchers have used exper-
imental methods to examine the influence of
1393
parenting on temperament. For example, Acker
and O’Leary (1996) instructed mothers of tod-
dlers to respond to their children’ demands with
consistent scolding or with one of various incon-
sistent scolding strategies, and they measured
children’s negative affect (e.g., time spent crying),
which is a temperament dimension, after the
experiment. They found statistically significant
differences in children’s negative affect across
conditions, which means that parental consistency
E
in giving feedback had influence on the children’s
negative affect. Although the majority of these
developmental studies use temperament as their
personality construct, we found one study that
examined the association of overactive parenting
on the Big Five of children between 8 and 15 years
old. According to this study, over-reactive parent-
ing at Time 1 negatively predicted children’s
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional
stability when assessed at Time 2 (van den Akkar
et al. 2010) around 3 years later. In general, there
seems to be evidence for modest to moderate
associations between parenting practices and off-
spring’s temperament or Big Five traits.
On the other hand, less is known about the
influence of parenting practices on the personali-
ties of their adult children. One example is
research done by McCrae and Costa (1988)
where participants, whose ages ranged between
21 and 96, were asked to recall their parents’
practices. It was found that recalled parenting
was significantly, yet modestly, correlated with
the participants’ Big Five personality traits. More-
over, recalled parenting practices, such as restric-
tiveness, when participants were 16 years old, was
modestly correlated with the Big Five (Reti et al.
2002). The strongest correlations were with neu-
roticism and conscientiousness. Furthermore,
Pincus and Ruiz (1997) found associations
between recalled parenting at ages 5–10 and the
participants’ Big Five. For example, recalled
maternal affiliation was negatively correlated
with neuroticism but positively with extraversion,
agreeableness, and conscientiousness.
All in all, there is evidence that parental prac-
tices are modestly correlated with child and adult
personality. Nevertheless, the preponderance of
1394 Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
research has focused on childhood temperament.
Three important limitations of the parenting
practices-children’s personality research are
worth noting. First, almost all of the studies are
correlational and fail to control for parents’ per-
sonality and/or the potential genetic confounds
shared between parents and their children. It is
quite possible that genetic confounds contribute
to both parental practices and their children’s per-
sonality. Second, too much research involves ret-
rospective reports in which participants are asked
to recall their parents’ practices when they were
young, which is a procedure that increases bias.
Third, there is a substantial body of literature
which examined the influence of children’s tem-
perament on parenting. It is quite possible that
many of the reported relations between parenting
practices and their children’s personality may be
the result of the children, not the parents. Recent
studies have actually incorporated this reciprocal
relationship in one model and found evidence for
both directions (e.g., Lengua 2006).
Peer Relationships
As children grow up, their focus starts to shift
gradually from parents to peers, who represent a
wide category of people such as neighbors,
acquaintances, and friends. Researchers have
paid special attention to the influence of friends
because friendships are characterized by mutual
resource or social exchanges (Clark and Mills
1979). Therefore, the terms “peers” and “friends”
are often used interchangeably. Although it is
most often treated as a unidimensional variable,
there are three main dimensions in friendships
that, ideally, should be studied independently.
These dimensions are occurrence of friends,
friends’ norms and behaviors, and quality of rela-
tionship (i.e., whether the relationship is charac-
terized with conflict, cooperation, support, etc.)
(Hartup and Stevens 1997).
Because of the ubiquity of peer relationships, it
is plausible to assume that they are associated with
the individual’s personality development. Empir-
ical studies that examined peer relations have
focused on the influence of these relationships
on behavioral measures though, especially in ado-
lescent samples. Specifically, there is substantial
research done on association of peer influence
with behaviors such as smoking (e.g., Urberg
et al. 1997), alcohol and substance use
(Rosenquist, Murabito, Fowler, & Christakis
2010), obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007), and
even suicide (Bearman and Moody 2004).
Despite the presence of an ample of research
on the influence of peers on behavioral measures,
there is less known about the association of peer
relationships with the Big Five personality traits.
The few studies that examined the influence on the
Big five focused on adolescents and adults. For
example, it was found that conflictual relation-
ships with a best friend at age 17 was associated
with decreases in extraversion 6 years later, while
having a supportive best friend was associated
with increased extraversion (Sturaro et al. 2008).
Moreover, Zimmerman and Neyer (2013) found
that being a sojourner (i.e., temporary interna-
tional student) led to increases in openness to
experience and agreeableness and decreases in
neuroticism, and these changes were explained
in part through receiving support from peers. Fur-
thermore, it was found that young adults who
lived with roommates exhibited an increase in
openness to experience and, to a lesser extent,
conscientiousness (Jonkmann et al. 2014). Inter-
estingly, there is a study which looked at the
association of peer relations with the Big Five
facets. Mund and Neyer (2014) found that conflict
in friendships predicted increases in negative
affect and self-reproach, which are two facets of
neuroticism. On the other hand, feeling close to
friends predicted decreases in sociability, which is
a facet of extraversion. Although the Big Five
framework was not used, it was also found that
individual stress, which is a variable that is related
to neuroticism, increased in a way similar to the
mean stress level of adolescent peer groups
(Hogue and Steinberg 1995).
In general, the effect sizes of the peer influence
on personality development are modest. However,
there are two points that should be taken into
consideration. First, these effect sizes were
Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
derived from studies which looked at the influence
of peers on adult personality. Because research on
adolescent groups has focused on influence of
peers on concrete behavior and not personality,
we do not know whether the influence of peers on
personality is larger in adolescence than in adult-
hood. We lack a clear picture of the trajectory of
the influence of peer relationships on personality
development. Second, there is evidence for selec-
tion effects. In addition to influence of peers on
personality, an individual’s personality tends to
influence his/her relationships (e.g., Neyer and
Asendorpf 2001; Roberts and Bogg 2004).
Romantic Relationships
While engaging in peer relationships takes place
as early as childhood, establishing a satisfying
marriage or marriage-like relationship is consid-
ered one of the milestones of adulthood. Romantic
relationships are characterized with passion, trust,
and commitment. There are three aspects of such
relationships that are often studied by psycholo-
gists. They are relationship quality, conflict, and
abuse (Robins et al. 2002). Relationship quality
includes factors such as respect, intimacy, clear
communication, and shared interests. Relation-
ship conflict refers to disagreements between part-
ners about relationship issues.Because of the
characteristic closeness and intimacy of romantic
relationships, it is expected that higher marital
quality and lower conflict and abuse would posi-
tively influence personality development, while
lower marital quality and higher conflict and
abuse would have negative influence. This prop-
osition has been supported by empirical evidence
that is derived from longitudinal studies. For
example, Neyer and Asendorpf (2001) found
that relationship insecurity predicted increases in
neuroticism after 4 years. Also, it was found that
relationships that are characterized by low quality
and high conflict were associated with increases in
negative emotionality in a sample of young adults
(Robins et al. 2002). Moreover, Mund and Neyer
(2014) found that increases in closeness in roman-
tic relations predicted increases in agreeableness,
1395
and, interestingly, increases in conflict predicted
increases in conscientiousness. Furthermore, it
was found that cohabiting with a romantic partner
in young adulthood years was associated with
increases in agreeableness, openness to experi-
ence, and, to a bigger extent, conscientiousness
(Jonkmann et al. 2014). Other studies have looked
at the association of relationship characteristics
with specific personality facets of trait-like vari-
ables. For example, Roberts and Bogg (2004)
E
reported that the duration of marriage of women
between ages 21 and 43 positively predicted
changes in social responsibility, which is a trait
that is related to conscientiousness. Conversely,
women who got divorced by age 43 were more
likely to exhibit decreases in social responsibility
between ages 43 and 52. Moreover, it was found
that experiencing marital tension between ages
21 and 27 was associated with increases on mas-
culinity/femininity scale, which includes charac-
teristics that are associated with vulnerability
(Roberts et al. 2002). Also, experiencing divorce
between ages 27 and 43 was negatively associated
with dominance, which is a trait that is related to
assertiveness and leadership. It is worth noting
that historical contexts could have influenced the
results because the data were first collected in the
period of the 1960s, where women’s position in
society was generally different from their position
currently.
In general, the aforementioned studies show
that marriage or marriage-like relationships are
associated with personality change. The findings
come from studies of people in different adult-
hood stages (young adulthood, middle adulthood)
who were followed for few years or more than one
decade. Like the case with parenting practices and
peer relationships, the associations of romantic
relationships with personality change are modest.
Also, selection effects should not be ignored. It
has been recurrently shown that personality traits
influence relationships either positively or nega-
tively. Therefore, a more comprehensive under-
standing of relationships-personality influences
should integrate both personality and relationship
effects in one model, which some studies have
already done (e.g., Neyer and Asendorpf 2001).
1396 Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
Work Experiences
As it is attributed to Freud, “love and work are the
cornerstones of our humanness” (https://www.
freud.org.uk/about/faq/). Just as there are studies
which showed that romantic relationships influ-
ence personality, there are studies which exam-
ined the influence of work experiences on
personality traits. Work experiences are diverse.
They include a variety of variables which have
been examined separately in different studies.
Examples of work-related variables are work sat-
isfaction, occupation’s prestige, financial security,
work hours, work involvement, and work-related
stress (Roberts 1997).
Evidence of the effect of work experiences on
personality traits comes from longitudinal studies
of participants in young or mid-adulthood. For
example, Roberts (1997) found that women who
worked between ages 27 and 43 increased in
agency, which is a variable related to extraversion.
Women who were especially successful in their
work also increased in norm-adherence, which is a
variable related to conscientiousness. Moreover, it
was found that higher job income predicated
decreases in neuroticism after 10 years (Sutin
et al. 2009). Furthermore, Hudson et al. (2012)
found that changes in overall social investment at
work, which included factors such as job involve-
ment and work investment, predicted increases in
conscientiousness. This finding was replicated in
a similar study (Hudson and Roberts 2016). In
addition, it was found that individuals who have
stayed in their job during the 5 years of a longitu-
dinal study exhibited increases in extraversion,
agreeableness, and openness to experience
(Denissen et al. 2014).
On the other hand, negative job experiences
were associated with negative changes in person-
ality. For example, Wu (2016) found that job
stress was associated with increases in neuroti-
cism and decreases in extraversion and conscien-
tiousness in a 4-year longitudinal study.
Moreover, it was reported that participants who
engaged in counterproductive organizational
behaviors between ages of 18 and 26 exhibited
increases in negative emotionality, which is
related to neuroticism (Roberts et al. 2006).
Furthermore, it was found that the experience of
unemployment was associated with general
decreases in agreeableness, conscientiousness,
and openness to experience, although the change
trajectories were different for males and females
(Boyce et al. 2015).
In general, there is an abundance of research
done on the association between work experi-
ences and personality change. Like the influence
of the other environmental predictors, these asso-
ciations were small. Also, there is recurrent evi-
dence for the influence of personality traits on
work experiences too. The personality-work rela-
tionship goes in both directions, such that person-
ality traits affect the work experiences, and these
experiences influence personality too (e.g., Wille
et al. 2012).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed research done on five
environmental predictors that influence personal-
ity traits. These are considered “environmental”
because they, simply, don’t have a DNA. These
factors were parental socioeconomic status, par-
enting practices, peer relationships, romantic rela-
tionships, and work experiences. We noticed that
the associations between these environmental pre-
dictors and personality traits are, generally, mod-
est. Also, there is recurrent evidence for selection
effects, such that personality traits shape individ-
uals’ environments just as much as their environ-
ments shape their personality.
Besides these two observations, there are
points that are worth noting before making any
judgments about the importance of environmental
predictors in shaping personality. First, although
the correlations between the reviewed environ-
mental predictors and personality traits were
small, they are not atypical. The best estimate to
date of the average correlation in personality psy-
chology research is 0.24 (Fraley and Marks 2007).
Second, although small, these effects may have
substantial cumulative effects over the years.
Third, the cumulative influence of these predic-
tors, if combined, is likely to be more important
than the influence of the separate predictors.
Environmental Conditions and the Development of Personality
Nonetheless, it might be important to acknowl-
edge that no one environmental factor appears to
be the key factor for personality development. It
appears that it takes a village of experiences to
make a whole personality.
Obviously, there is much more research needed
on the predictors of personality and personality
development. There are several relevant lines of
research that can be pursued. For example, other
than parental SES, meta-analyses of the associa-
tion of the other reviewed environmental predic-
tors are still lacking. The associations that could
be found through meta-analyses might be smaller
than that of individual studies. Also, although
there are studies which looked at the influence of
the interaction of parenting with peer relationships
on behavioral or personality-related outcomes
(e.g., Lansford et al. 2003), we know little on the
effect of the interaction of these predictors on
personality traits. Additionally, it would be inter-
esting to examine the influence of these five fac-
tors, all included in one model, on personality
development.
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Environmental Stability
Jasmine L. Misner and Steven M. Dunn
University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond,
OK, USA
Synonyms
Environmental – contextual, situational, circum-
stantial; Stability – cohesion, dependability,
certainty
Definition
The cohesiveness with which tangible, material
objects exists outside of an individual maintaining
homogeneity in a particular space or place.
Introduction
Etymology for environmental illustrates the term
was first formulated in psychology in the nature
vs. nurture debate in 1923; and in psychology as a
whole in 1916 (Online Etymology Dictionary
2018a, b).
Etymology for stability was conveyed in the
mid-fourteenth century to describe one’s “firm-
ness of resolve,” and later applied to the environ-
ment in the early fifteenth century to describe a
“continuance in the same state.”
Environmental stability derives and shares its
overarching meaning from concepts found both in
environmental psychology and communications,
specifically, nonverbal communication.
1399
Environmental psychology is the “. . . scientific
study of the transaction and interrelationships
between people and their physical surroundings”
(Joireman and Kaiser 2018). Physical surround-
ings include one’s built and natural environments,
the use and abuse of nature and natural resources,
and sustainably related behavior. As a whole,
environmental psychology is an interdisciplinary
field concerned with the interplay between living
organisms and the environments they inhabit.
E
Questions of concern in environmental psychol-
ogy include how urban spaces may influence
crime; the effects of the outdoors on children and
adults; and often work alongside fields such as
city planning, landscape design, architecture,
environmental science, and the overarching con-
cept of environment and personality.
Nonverbal communication includes body lan-
guage, proxemics and physical environments and
appearance, and paralanguage and haptics. Envi-
ronmental stability specifically addresses proxe-
mics and physical environments/appearances
where proxemics is defined as “study of the
nature, degree, and effect of the spatial separation
individuals naturally maintain (as in various social
and interpersonal situations) and of how this
separation relates to environmental and cultural
factors” (Merriam-Webster 2019).
Environmental Stability in Personality
Environment, defined as space and place and
viewed as a socially constructed concept, is
imbued with meaning used to define particular
locations and spatial thinking of societies, as
well as how society and social practices are regu-
lated and disciplined. Place refers to a particular
location that is at least semi-bound, as a combina-
tion of material and symbolic qualities, and
embodied (Lefebrve 2000). Alone, place does
not create socially constructed ideals, just as envi-
ronment cannot be defined without considering
personality; intermingled and just as influential
is space. Space is the more general notion of
how society and social practices are regulated,
and sometimes disciplined, by spatial thinking.
1400
Additionally, space is a process under constant
construction, reconstruction, and even
deconstruction.
Environmental stability is the concept of same-
ness in physical and social markers which makeup
the world individuals live in. In as much as indi-
viduals living in the world effect environmental
conditions, those environmental conditions effect
individuals living in it. Current research suggests
that when an environment reaches stability, those
individuals in the environment have the capacity
to respond to and engage in the environment in
various ways to create change in themselves, or
further enact change in the environment to rein-
force their own personalities (Donnellan 2019).
Consequently, environmental conditions, sta-
ble or changing, serve as influencers in personal
and group dynamics. When an environment main-
tains stability over time, individuals have the abil-
ity to deepen their knowledge of self and others.
Personality in Environment
Environmental stability as a concept viewed inde-
pendently from personality creates an incomplete
picture. Just as environment maintains its ability
to influence personality, so too does personality
influence the construction of environment.
Where environmental stability is concerned with
the influence of environmental factors on individ-
uals, personality stability concerns itself with the
development of individual differences, or personal-
ity, formed through environmental contact. The
different interplay between individuals and their
environments are described as person-environment
transactions (Donnellan 2019), of which three types
of transactions have been identified:
Active person-environment transactions occur
when individuals seek out certain kinds of environ-
ments and experiences that are consistent with their
personality characteristics. Reactive person-
environment transactions occur when individuals
react differently to the same objective situation
because of their personalities. Evocative person-
environment transactions occur whenever individ-
uals draw out or evoke certain kinds of responses
Environmental Unpredictability and Harshness
from their social environments because of their
personality attributes. (Donnellan 2019)
Regardless of the person-environment transac-
tion taking place, the effect of environment on
personality is clear. It is persuasive, ever-changing,
and affects all aspects of life at all moments.
Conclusion
In as much as the individual is concerned with
autonomy, it cannot be created nor exist without
the environment in which it is situated. Thus,
while individuals can and do impact the environ-
ment in a multitude of ways, likewise the environ-
ment impacts individuals accordingly.
References
Donnellan, M. B. (2019). Personality stability and change.
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Environmental
Unpredictability and
Harshness
▶ Early Environmental Effects on Personality and
Individual Differences
Epigenetics 1401

are not caused by changes in the DNA sequence

Enzygotic Twins itself. In other words, the phenotype changes
while the genotype remains the same.
▶ Monozygotic Twins

Introduction

EPI Epigenetics is a natural process that occurs fre-

▶ Extraversion-Introversion (Eysenck’s Theory)
▶ Neuroticism (Eysenck’s Theory)
Epigenetic Adaptation
▶ Hypothalamic–Pituitary–Adrenal Axis
Epigenetic Processes
▶ Epigenetics
quently. For example, different cells in different
parts of the body serve different functions
E
(Williams 2013). However, except the gametes,
all cells house the same genes. Different cells need
different genes to perform their function. There-
fore, they need different genes to be active while
others are inactive. While the cells in the retina of
the eye need to have the genes activated that
enable them to sense light, the immune cells
need the genes activated that enable them to find
and fend off foreign invaders such as viruses and
bacteria. Epigenetic regulation is the mechanism
through which relevant genes for a specific cell
are activated while irrelevant genes are
deactivated (Moore et al. 2012; Williams 2013).

Epigenetics
Anita Schmalor
Department of Psychology, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Synonyms
Epigenetic processes
Definition
Genetics describes the study of changes in the
DNA due to mutations, deletions, insertions, and
translocations (Moore et al. 2012; Williams 2013).
These changes are heritable. On the other hand,
the much newer field of epigenetics describes the
study of changes in the expression of genes that
Epigenetic Mechanisms
The two most studied epigenetic mechanisms are
DNA methylation and histone remodeling
(Moore et al. 2012). Cells can control gene expres-
sion through DNA methylation which switches
genes “off.” DNA methylation happens when a
methyl group binds to the DNA. This usually hap-
pens at the cytosine nucleotide basis (there are four
nucleotide bases: cytosine, guanine, thymine, and
adenine). More specifically, a methyl group is re-
located so that it binds to the C5 position of the
cytosine (Moore et al. 2012). This binding of the
methyl group reduces the expression of neigh-
boring genes. DNA methylation has been found
to be essential to different cellular processes,
including embryonic development, gene sup-
pression, and X-chromosome inactivation; and
it has also been implicated in aberrant cellular
processes such as carcinogenesis (Moore et al.
2012; Robertson n.d.).
1402
DNA methylation varies between different
body parts as well as between gray and white
matter in the brain (Ladd-Acosta et al. 2007 as
cited in Moore et al. 2012). As technology pro-
gresses, new methods to uncover different meth-
ylation mechanisms in different body parts, and
potentially even in different cells, will become
available (Popp et al. 2010).
Histone remodeling involves the histone pro-
teins (Histone/histones 2014). Histones are pro-
teins around which the DNA in the nucleus is
wrapped. This helps to compact the DNA so that
it can fit it into the nucleus. By changing the
shape of the histone, histone remodeling also
alters the shape of the neighboring DNA. This
can serve to either ramp up or down gene expres-
sion. For example, when the histones are tightly
associated with the DNA, then gene expression
gets ramped down. When the histones are loosely
associated with the DNA, then gene expression
gets ramped up (Moore et al. 2012). The study of
epigenetics provides evidence that the expression
of a person’s genome can change over the course
of his or her life (Jirtle and Skinner 2007; Moore
et al. 2012).
More recent evidence suggests that epigenetics
not only influences the expression of a person’s
genes throughout the course of their own life but
that epigenetic changes can be passed on to off-
spring as well (Franklin et al. 2010). In one exper-
iment by Franklin et al. (2010), mice were put
under stress by separating them frequently and
unpredictably from their mothers between days
1 and 14 after birth. Not only did this lead to
behavioral changes in these stressed mice that
lasted into adulthood, the offspring of male mice
from the experiment also showed the same behav-
ior even though they were reared normally. That
offspring of male mice subjected to maternal sep-
aration showed the same behavioral changes sug-
gests that this is likely due to epigenetic changes.
It can be neither explained by the prenatal envi-
ronment (e.g., elevated levels of stress hormones
that the fetus is exposed to in the womb) nor is
it likely to be caused by genetic mutations. Fur-
thermore, the researchers also found the
Epigenetics
differences in DNA methylation that might be
involved in the behavioral changes in the separated
mice (Franklin et al. 2010).
Some studies suggest that epigenetic changes
in humans also affect their offspring. For example,
Swedish researchers found that dietary restric-
tions of fathers during their preadolescence are
correlated with less cardiovascular disease in
their offspring (Kaati et al. 2002). Other correla-
tional studies in humans have linked smoking to
epigenetic changes (e.g., Linshcooten et al. 2009).
However, even though there is a growing body of
evidence suggesting a link between environmen-
tal factors and epigenetic changes in humans, such
evidence is not yet conclusive.
Conclusion
More research is needed to elucidate the mecha-
nisms lying behind these connections. There has
been, however, success uncovering such mecha-
nisms in nonhuman animals. For example, there is
evidence for a link between psychosocial stressors
and epigenetic changes in rats (Mychasiuk et al.
2013). In their study, Mychasiuk and colleagues
found that paternal stress leads to increased meth-
ylation in the hippocampus of their offspring.
Further, the offspring showed a blunted stress
response. A reduced stress response, in turn, can
indicate behavioral problems in the future (Day
et al. 2016). More research in humans is needed to
establish whether such a causal relationship exists
in humans.
Finally, there is now also increasing research
that links different diseases (such as some forms
of cancer) to epigenetic changes. Researchers hope
that this will be a promising avenue of research
that can uncover treatments for different diseases
(Day et al. 2016).
Cross-References
▶ Developmental Plasticity
▶ Genetics
▶ Personality
Erickson’s Fourth Stage Productivity 1403

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EPMs
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682–688. ▶ Neuroticism (Eysenck’s Theory)
Ladd-Acosta, C., Pevsner, J., Sabunciyan, S., Yolken, R.
▶ Psychoticism (Eysenck’s Theory)
H., Webster, M. J., Dinkins, T. et al. (2007). DNA
methylation signatures within the human brain. Amer-
ican Journal of Human Genetics, 81, 1304–1315.
Linshcooten, J. O., Van Schooten, F. J., Baumgartner, A.,
Cemeli, E., Van Delft, J., Anderson, D., &
Godschalk, R. W. (2009). Use of spermatozoal mRNA Equality
profiles to study gene-environment interactions in
human germ cells. Mutation Research, 667(1–2), 70–76. ▶ Fairness
Moore, L. D., Le, T., & Fan, G. (2012). DNA methylation
and its basic function. Neuropsychopharmacology,
38(1), 23–38.
Mychasiuk, R., Harker, A., Ilnytskyy, S., & Gibb, R.
(2013). Paternal stress prior to conception alters DNA
methylation and behaviour of developing rat offspring. Equilibrium
Neuroscience, 241, 100–105.
Popp, C., Dean, W., Feng, S., Cokus, S. J., Andrews, S., ▶ Homeostasis
Pellegrini, M., et al. (2010). Genomewide erasure of
DNA methylation in mouse primordial germ cells is
affected by AID deficiency. Nature, 463, 1101–1105.
Robertson, S. (n.d.) What is DNA methylation? Retrieved
February 11, 2017, from News medical life sciences
website: http://www.news-medical.net/life-sciences/ Equity
What-is-DNA-Methylation.aspx
Williams, S. C. P. (2013). Epigenetics. Proceedings of the ▶ Fairness
National Academy of Science, 110(9), 3209.

Erickson’s Fourth Stage

Epigenomics Productivity

▶ Developmental Plasticity ▶ Industry Versus Inferiority

1404
Erik Erikson’s Psychosocial
Developmental Stages
▶ Autonomy Versus Shame and Doubt
Erikson’s Psychosexual Stages
of Development
▶ Intimacy Versus Isolation
Erikson’s Psychosocial Crisis
▶ Trust Versus Mistrust
Erikson’s Psychosocial Stage
of Development
▶ Trust Versus Mistrust
Erikson’s Second Stage of
Psychosocial Development
▶ Autonomy Versus Shame and Doubt
Erikson’s Sixth Stage of
Psychosexual Development
▶ Intimacy Versus Isolation
Erikson’s Theory of
Development
▶ Intimacy Versus Isolation
Erik Erikson’s Psychosocial Developmental Stages
Erikson’s Third Stage
▶ Initiative Versus Guilt
Eriksonian Identity Theory
▶ Ego Identity Versus Role Confusion
Ernst Becker
▶ Rank, Otto
Erogenous Zone
▶ Erotogenic Zone
Eros
Jonathan J. Detrixhe
Long Island University, Brooklyn, New York,
USA
Eros was the Greek god of sexual love. In
Hesiod’s Theogony (1988), Eros is among the
first children of Chasm, born to excite the forth-
coming gods into procreating (p. 6), while in
Ovid’s Metamorphoses (2004), Eros is Venus’
son and his arrow causes Apollo to fall in
love with Daphne (p. 28). Some accounts of the
Trojan War have Eros present at the seduction
of Helen by Paris, encouraging their fateful
union (Buxton 2004, p. 133). Though the god of
love whose principle attribute is sexual desire,
Eros does not hesitate to use violence to promote
lovemaking; he is often depicted with weapons,
such as a bow (Buxton 2004, p. 69) or a whip
(Dell 2013, p. 189).
Eros
Freud chooses Eros to represent the life side
in opposition to the death side (Thanatos) in
his latter theory’s instinctual dualism. Eros is a
central character in Beyond the Pleasure Principle
(1920/1961) and its companion volume The Ego
and the Id (1923/1960) where Freud seeks to
understand why people engage in destructive
acts that clearly violate the pleasure principle or
the seeming truism that people always act in their
own best interest. In pursing this question, Freud
is reacting to the carnage and waste of World War
I as well as to the suffering of patients in his
consulting room who seem wedded to their
sadism, masochism, and suicidal or murderous
wishes. Though Freud attempts to cleave to an
evolutionary perspective and proposes a scientific
basis for his hypothesizing, he also states,
“What follows is speculation, often far-fetched
speculation. . .an attempt to follow out an idea con-
sistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead,”
(1920/1961, p. 26). The result is an exciting
account of human nature that draws on the
power of myth to answer one of the great ques-
tions of human existence: why are we so full of
both love and hate, creativity and destruction?
To explain why humans do inhuman things to
themselves and others, Freud imagines the origin
of life and the first cellular organism that crossed
the threshold from nonliving to living matter. He
imagines this being as born into a state of ago-
nizing conflict, desiring both to go on living and
also to return to its former state of insentient
repose. “The emergence of life would thus be
the cause of the continuance of life and also at
the same time of the striving towards death; and
life itself would be a conflict and compromise
between these trends” (1923/1960, p. 38). Freud
proposes that this conflict is “timeless” (1920/
1961, p. 31), existing at a cellular level in all
living things and forming the basis of the uncon-
scious mental process.
Eros, the side of the being that strives for life,
is pitted against Thanatos, the side that strives for
death. Yet this is no simple battle of good versus
evil. Freud writes, “. . .the problem of the goal
and purpose of life would be answered dualisti-
cally” (1923/1960, p. 38), meaning human
1405
actions and their motivations cannot be under-
stood simply as right or wrong, creative or
destructive. Much of The Ego and the Id (1923/
1960) is devoted to describing the elaborate ways
in which the goals of Eros and Thanatos overlap
and express themselves simultaneously. Though
imagined as separate entities, the life and death
instincts are often “fused, blended, and alloyed”
(1923/1960, p. 38), resulting in behaviors whose
complex motivations stagger the understanding.
E
For example, the natural, unconscious will
toward self-destruction could be sublimated
into destructive actions against others. If these
actions find expression through sadistic sexual
behaviors, Eros and Thanatos could be said to be
working powerfully together. “The sadistic com-
ponent of the sexual instinct would be a classical
example of a serviceable instinctual fusion. . .,”
Freud writes. “We perceive that for purposes of
discharge the instinct of destruction is habitually
brought into the service of Eros...” (1923/1960,
p. 39). Since the life and death instincts relent-
lessly demand expression, they will find it, even
in the most uncomfortable alliances and
compromises.
Melanie Klein (1952) uses Freud’s dualism to
explain the behavior of infants. She imagines the
four-month-old’s developing Ego deriving energy
from the life instinct in order to dominate the Id’s
destructive will. She also recognizes the alloyed
nature of the instincts described by Freud, writing
“We assume that there is always an interaction,
although in varying proportions, between libidi-
nal and aggressive impulses, corresponding to the
fusion between life and death instincts” (1952,
p. 62). Thus, the infant she describes achieves a
state of synthesis and integration by tolerating
states of contrasting emotions and ambivalence
toward others. For Klein, health and progress
require no ultimate triumph of Eros over Thanatos
but rather an acceptance of the never-ending
tension between the two.
For Jacques Lacan, preserving a concrete sense
of the conceptual boundaries between Eros and
Thanatos – between the motivational trajectories
of love and hate – is less important than recogniz-
ing areas of overlap and opportunities for self-
deception. In Ecrits (1966/2006), he writes, “Is it
1406
our job to disguise Eros, the black God, as the
Good Shepherd’s curly-haired sheep?” (p. 607).
Loving, in terms of the demands it places on the
other for compliance and submission, may be a
manifestation of hate, just as hate, often a reaction
to rejection, may mask a desire for love. In this
sense, Freud’s choice of the whip- and bow-
brandishing god of seduction, whom Hesiod
calls “dissolver of flesh” (1988, p. 6), seems
particularly apt.
Further elaborating Freud’s choice of Eros to
represent the life instinct, Laplanche and Pontalis
(1973, p. 153) propose that referencing the Greek
texts allows Freud, not only to simultaneously
name and express the idea of a life instinct, but
also to connect his thinking to classical philoso-
phy and ancient tradition in order to establish a
greater universal standing for his theory.
Laplanche and Pontalis also propose a risk in
using a fictional character to represent the essen-
tial human sexual function: writing about real sex
via imaginary Eros may already count as a kind of
sublimation.
References
Buxton, R. (2004). The complete world of Greek mythol-
ogy. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd..
Dell, C. (2013). Mythology: The complete guide to our
imagined worlds. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd..
Freud, S. (1960). The Ego and the Id. (J. Riviere, Trans.)
New York: Norton. (Original work published 1923).
Freud, S. (1961). Beyond the pleasure principle.
(J. Strachey, Trans.) New York: Norton. (Original
work published 1920).
Hesiod. (1988). Theogony and works and days.
(M. L. West, Trans.) London: Oxford.
Klein, M. (1952). Some theoretical conclusions regarding
the emotional life of the infant. In M. Kahn (Ed.), Envy
and gratitude and other works, 1946–1963
(pp. 61–93). London: The International Psycho-
Analytical Library.
Lacan, J. (2006). Ecrits. (B. Fink, Trans.) New York:
Norton. (Original work published 1966).
Laplance, J., & Pontalis, J.-B. (1973). The language of
psychoanalysis. (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.) London:
Norton.
Ovid. 2004. Metamorphoses. (D. Raeburn, Trans.)
London: Penguin.
Erotogenic Zone
Erotogenic Zone
Megan O’Connor and Cheryl C. Munday
Department of Psychology, University of Detroit
Mercy, Detroit, MI, USA
Synonyms
Erogenous zone
Definition
An area of the body where irritating, excitatory
processes or tensions tend to become focused and
can be alleviated by an action, such as sucking or
stroking to that area. Manipulation to that area is
satisfying due to its relief of tension or irritation and
induces a pleasurable sensual feeling (Hall 1982).
Introduction
The term erotogenic zone was initially described
by Sigmund Freud to explain and describe per-
sonality structure, development, and psychopa-
thology. Freud theorized that specific parts of the
body called erotogenic zones were constituent
aspects of human sexuality, instincts, and
pleasure-seeking experiences. During develop-
ment, the child becomes aware of these zones as
sources of pleasure and sensual bodily experi-
ences, which influences subsequent personality
characteristics and behavior patterns. Erotogenic
zones can also become points of fixation which
leads to the development of psychopathology.
Freud’s view was refuted by object relations the-
orists like W. R. D. Fairbairn, who proposed that
individual pathology is a function of primitive or
impaired object relations rather than fixation at
specific erotogenic zones. Contemporary psycho-
analytic perspectives seek to explain psychopa-
thology and personality through an integration of
Freudian and object relations theories.
Erotogenic Zone
Erotogenic Zones and Freudian Theory
The term erotogenic zone is synonymous with
erogenous zone, although erogenous zone is
more commonplace in the literature. These zones
are specific parts of the body, such as the mouth,
anus, and genitals, which play an important role in
pleasure-seeking and the discharge of instinctual
drives. Sigmund Freud initially used this concept
to explain the role of instincts in human develop-
ment and psychopathology. Freud theorized that
instincts or drives become organized over the
course of development as different erotogenic
zones become highly salient during different
periods in development. The first zone to develop
is the oral zone, which is comprised of the mouth
with a primary focus on feeding. The oral zone
gains prominence during the first year of life. In
the oral phase, the child is dependent on others for
nourishment to be satisfied and feel pleasure
through behaviors like sucking, feeding, and put-
ting objects in one’s mouth. The second zone is
the anal zone, which gains prominence when the
child is between 1 and 3 years of age. This stage is
focused on achieving satisfaction and pleasure
from the process of elimination. The third phase
is the phallic phase, which occurs in development
when the child is 3–5 years old. The phallic phase
is organized around the child’s pleasure and drive
satisfaction gained from manipulation of her
genitals.
The erotogenic zones are theorized to influence
a child’s behavior and personality by organizing
the first set of tensions that the child has to endure
and creating their first experiences of pleasure. It
is these tensions that Freud described as irritating
excitatory processes that influence these zones
and consequently development (Hall 1982).
Actions that stimulate the erotogenic zones bring
the child into conflict with their parents and result
in frustrations and anxieties that foster the formu-
lation of numerous adaptations, displacements,
defenses, transformations, compromises, and
stimulations (Hall 1982). They are at the heart of
development in the libidinal phases, and a fixation
at a certain zone could lead to a disruption in
1407
development, which may lead to possible pathol-
ogy. It is important to note that a fixation is
the refusal to reject pleasure from an erotogenic
zone during development (Kline 2013). Fixa-
tions often manifest as a failure to move to a
more mature psychosexual stage from either the
overgratification or lack of gratification at a spe-
cific stage. The erotogenic zones are a major
component of “sexual excitation” and use subli-
mation to deflecting sexual aims on others (Freud
E
1908).
In the oral phase, the child first seeks to fulfill
needs for pleasure and satisfaction from feeding
either from the mother’s breast or bottle. Thumb-
sucking soon follows due to an adaptation to gain
pleasure from the erotogenic zone (Fenichel
1972). Thus, the child learns to experience plea-
sure from the stimulation of the erotogenic zone
and engages in a sensual physical experience,
oral eroticism. A fixation at this stage may result
in specific personality traits or psychopathology.
Traits that are linked to oral fixation are acquisi-
tiveness, tenacity, determination, destructive-
ness, rejection, greed, contemptuousness, and
negativism (Hall 1982). The appearance of
these traits and their expression will depend on
the degree of accompanying disturbance or anx-
iety. An example of pathology that could result
from a fixation at this stage is an exaggerated
sense of dependency. This occurs because the
child depends on his mother for nourishment
and help fulfilling oral erotic needs and experi-
ences anxiety when their needs are not being
fulfilled. This sense of anxiety can bolster the
need for dependency in the baby, which can con-
tinue into adulthood as a dependency on others.
Another example is an adult who is overly
aggressive, which may stem from a child that is
fixated on biting. In adulthood, the individual
retains this “biting” and commonly is combative
and lashes out at others (Hall 1982).
The anal phase is a developmental period dur-
ing which the child seeks pleasure and satisfaction
from the process of elimination typically focused
on urination, defecation, and toilet training. The
fecal matter pushes against the anal sphincter and
1408
creates a source of tension that is released when
the child defecates. This phase is experienced
between the ages of 1 and 3 when toilet training
occurs. In toilet training, the process of elimina-
tion changes from an involuntary excretion to a
voluntarily controlled elimination process due to
authoritarian demands of the caregiver. This is the
child’s first strong occurrence with authority and
punishment. Traits that can result from a fixation
during this phase are aggressiveness, cleanliness,
responsibility, and controlling behavior (Hall
1982). An example of pathology resulting from
an anal fixation is a person that feels the need to
please others and is overly generous. This can be a
reaction from a toilet training experience where
the caregiver relentlessly asks the child to defecate
in the toilet and then gives an abundance of praise
afterward. Another example is a child who has a
caregiver that places too much emphasis on elim-
ination. The child may struggle with this loss of a
valued object which may result in a sense of loss
and anxiousness. The child may try to retain
future bowl movements to prevent future experi-
ences of loss. If this fixation prevails, then in
adulthood, the child will be parsimonious and
frugal (Hall 1982).
The genital zone is the last of the primary
erotogenic zones. Here, the child seeks out plea-
sure through the manipulation of their genitals,
which is also known as masturbation. Freud the-
orized significant gender differences in the expe-
rience of and course of development during the
genital stage, which he labeled the “Oedipus com-
plex.” In this stage, children are required to suc-
cessfully identify with their same-sex parent to
assist in the construction of their gender identity,
attachments, and superego development. The
child’s success influences later internal conflicts,
adult attachments, and antagonisms (Hall 1982).
However, the process by which children formu-
late this identity is very different for each gender.
Boys develop a strong territorial love for their
mother and rivalrous feelings toward their father.
From this rivalry with his father, the boy experi-
ences castration anxiety and fears his father will
remove his penis in an act of dominance and
revenge. The Oedipus complex is resolved with
the boy’s successful identification with the father
Erotogenic Zone
or internalized masculine aspects. If he instead
identifies with his mother, and thus feminine com-
ponents of himself, he will express more stereo-
typical feminine characteristics. Freud suggested
females experience a lack of external genitalia,
which results in feelings of disappointment in
the mother, envy of male genitals, possessive
love of the father, and jealousy of her mother’s
place with her father. This complex will dissolve
once she matures or realizes that her father’s love
is out of her reach. From here, girls are expected to
identify more with their feminine aspects and her
mother. However, she may instead identify more
with her father and her internalized masculine
characteristics.
Erotogenic Zones and Object Relations
Theory
Object relations theorists, such as
W. R. D. Fairbairn, provided a critique to Freudian
theory’s classic conceptualization of erotogenic
zones. Fairbairn suggested that psychopathology
is not a function of fixation at erotogenic zones but
a function of the regulation of specific object
relationships. He argued that psychopathology
resulted from the child’s ability to manage inter-
personal relationships, where the people in the
child’s environment act as the object. As the
child progresses from infantile dependence to
adult dependence, they defend the maturation of
their personality against the effects of conflicts in
early object relationships (Fairbairn 1949). He
also argued that these zones are channels through
which the libido flows and only become eroto-
genic when the child is trying to obtain the desired
object (Fairbairn 1952).
Contemporary Critique of Erotogenic
Zones with Freudian and Object
Relations Theory
Denis (2016) seeks to integrate Freud’s concept of
erogenous zones with object relations theory. He
argues that libidinal catharsis occurs to satisfy ero-
togenic and mastery needs over ourselves and the
Error Management Theory
external world, both of which create a sense
of satisfaction that fulfills the drives. A representa-
tional image is formed to represent the drive, once
mastery and satisfaction toward that object are
achieved. A representational object can also be
created in a situation where the desired object is
unavailable. In other words, satisfaction is initially
focused on the functioning of the erotogenic zones,
which is extended to the child’s world of internal
objects, fantasy, and pleasure (Denis 2016).
Conclusion
Erotogenic zones are parts of the body that are
used to seek pleasure and describe psychosexual
development at different stages of childhood.
Each erotogenic zone corresponds to a specific
psychosexual stage of development. This view,
based on the theories of Sigmund Freud and clas-
sic psychoanalysis, describes body parts such as
the mouth, anus, and genitals as the source of
salient childhood experiences of pleasure and
satisfaction. Fixations at these stages can lead
to psychopathology or developmental deficits
in the child. This view was critiqued by
W. R. D. Fairbairn, who believed that early object
relations not erotogenic zones determined psy-
chopathology. Contemporary theory integrates
object relations and the classical psychoanalytic
drive theory to suggest that erotogenic zones func-
tion to satisfy the child’s need for an object and to
formulate a mental representation of the object.
Cross-References
▶ Anal Stage
▶ Fixation
▶ Phallic Stage
▶ Psychosexual Stages of Development (Freud)
References
Denis, P. (2016). The drive revisited: Mastery and satisfac-
tion. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis,
97(3), 759–784.
1409
Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1949). Steps in the development of an
object-relations theory of the personality. Psychology
and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 22
(1–2), 26–31.
Fairbairn, W. D. (1952). Psychoanalytic studies of the
personality (pp. 29–34). London: Tavistock Publica-
tions Limited.
Fenichel, O. (1972). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis
(pp. 61–82). New York: Norton.
Freud, S. (1908/1962). The standard edition of the com-
plete psychological works of sigmund freud. (pp.
168–175). London. Hogarth Press.
Hall, C. S. (1982). A primer of Freudian psychology E
(pp. 102–114). New York: Mentor.
Kline, P. (2013). Fact and fantasy in Freudian Theory
(RLE: Freud) (pp. 7–13). New York: Routledge.
Error Management Theory
Tara DeLecce
Department of Psychology, Oakland University,
Rochester, MI, USA
Synonyms
Cognitive bias; Cross-sex mind reading; False-
negative error; False-positive error
Definition
Error management theory refers to a theory that
explains how decisions are made under uncer-
tainty; specifically, cognition to arrive at such
decisions functions to minimize the net evolution-
ary fitness cost of errors in judgment. Such cost
minimization can sometimes, however, produce
biased reasoning that actually increases the
chances of arriving at erroneous conclusions.
Introduction
During humans’ ancestral history, they have
faced recurring problems that created selection
pressure for adaptive solutions. In general, such
problems included identifying mating opportu-
nities for reproductive success and staying alive
1410
through avoiding aggressive encounters and
infectious disease. Due to these recurring prob-
lems, error management theory (Haselton and
Buss 2000) suggests that the human brain has
evolved cognitive biases aimed at ensuring
reproductive success and survival even if it is
at the expense of perceptual accuracy. Appro-
priately, these cognitive biases are commonly
observed in mating scenarios and in social sit-
uations that may involve aggression or disease.
The following sections will elaborate on these
types of cognitive biases predicted by error
management theory.
Reproduction–Based Biases
From an evolutionary perspective, reproduction is
essentially the most important life goal, so cogni-
tion and behaviors that increase the chances of it
occurring successfully will likely be selected for
and retained in the population. Error management
theory has identified two main cognitive biases
related to mating and reproduction. The first of
these is male overperception of female sexual
interest. There exists asymmetry in parental
investment between the sexes (Trivers 1972),
such that women have higher minimum invest-
ment in offspring (in the form of gestation and
lactation) compared to men. Consequently, men
(unlike women) have less restrictions on their
reproductive potential and can increase their
reproductive success by engaging in multiple
short-term matings (Trivers 1972). Therefore,
from a man’s perspective, missing an opportunity
for a sexual encounter would be more detrimental
in fitness terms than assuming there is one when
there is not. Consequently, men are commonly
observed to overperceive sexual interest during
interactions with women.
It has been found that when men observe two
members of the opposite sex in an ambiguous
interaction, they tend to rate the woman in the
interaction to be expressing higher sexual interest
in her male interaction partner than women
observing the same interaction (Abbey 1982).
Error Management Theory
This effect also occurs in self-report scenarios
and vignettes rather than through observations
(Haselton and Buss 2000). In these situations,
men frequently perceive a woman’s behavior as
sexual intent, while women tend to perceive the
same behavior from a woman as just friendliness.
This perception bias has been replicated across
several studies as reported in a meta-analysis
(La France et al. 2009).
The second of these reproduction-related cog-
nitive biases is women’s tendency to underesti-
mate a man’s willingness to commit in a
relationship (Haselton and Buss 2000). This is
proposed to prevent women from choosing long-
term mates that are likely to abandon them and
their children. From an evolutionary standpoint, it
is a better reproductive strategy to be overly
demanding about a man’s willingness to commit
and put off reproduction until such a willingness is
established than to reproduce without paternal
care (as this decreases survival prospects for off-
spring). Similar to when men had biased percep-
tions of women’s intentions, women
underestimated men’s commitment willingness
in self-report situations (Haselton and Buss
2000) and in face-to-face interactions (Friesen
et al. 2005).
Survival-Based Biases
In order for genes to be passed to the next gen-
eration, humans must survive long enough to be
reproductively mature. Hence, the other class of
cognitive biases identified in error management
theory are those related to increasing survival
prospects. There are two main biases of this
class as well (Haselton and Galperin 2012). The
first is the tendency for humans to overestimate
hostile/dangerous intentions from outgroup
members in ambiguous situations. There is evi-
dence to support this proposition as Quillian and
Pager (2001) found that people’s perceptions of
crime in a given Chicago neighborhood are pos-
itively correlated with the number of young Afri-
can American males living in the said
Error Management Theory
neighborhood (independent of the actual crime
rate). However, this correlation was stronger
when Caucasian or Latino participants reported
their perceptions rather than when African Amer-
ican participants did. In this case, the two types
of outgroups were more likely to harbor stereo-
types related to danger. It has also been found
that, more generally speaking, individuals are
more likely to perceive the threat of conflict or
hostility from strangers, especially those from
outgroups. Such biases prevent people from
trusting too easily and suffering the possible
associated costs (Brewer 1999).
Along with concerns over a group’s hostility,
another common survival-based bias relates to
disease avoidance. It has been demonstrated that
people are easily disgusted by cues to disease;
and, once this disgust is activated to motivate
avoidance of a person thought to be diseased, it
is much more difficult to get rid of the disease
stigma (Kurzban and Leary 2001). This bias can
become exaggerated and exists even when the
disease in question is one that is not communica-
ble through casual contact such as AIDS or even
from exposure to physical handicaps sustained
through an injury (Haselton and Galperin 2012).
This asymmetry in inducing versus removing dis-
ease stigma is adaptive as being biased to avoid
sick/disfigured people is more likely to increase
survival prospects.
Conclusion
Error management theory has been successfully
able to explain ways of thinking that are erroneous
or illogical, especially in instances where there is
uncertainty and a decision needs to be made
quickly. Because such thought patterns are so
widespread in humans, it is likely that they serve
an adaptive purpose rather than being strictly
errors in cognition. Evidence from fitness-
relevant contexts such as mating, conflict avoid-
ance, and disease avoidance seems to support the
adaptive function of cognitive biases (Johnson
et al. 2013).
1411
Cross-References
▶ Attributions
▶ Beliefs
▶ Evolved Psychological Mechanisms
▶ Harm Avoidance
▶ Stereotypes
References E
Abbey, A. (1982). Sex differences in attributions for
friendly behavior: Do males misperceive females’
friendliness? Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 42, 830–838. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.42.5.830.
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice:
Ingroup love and outgroup hate? Journal of Social
Issues, 55, 429–444. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-
4537.00126.
Friesen, M. D., Fletcher, G. J., & Overall, N. C. (2005).
A dyadic assessment of forgiveness in intimate rela-
tionships. Personal Relationships, 12, 61–77. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1350-4126.2005.00102.x.
Haselton, M. G., & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management
theory: A new perspective on biases in cross-sex mind
reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
78, 81–91. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.1.81.
Haselton, M., & Galperin, A. (2012). Error management
and the evolution of cognitive bias. In Social thinking
and interpersonal behavior (pp. 45–64). New York:
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Quillian, L., & Pager, D. (2001). Black neighbors, higher
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descent of man (pp. 1871–1971). Chicago: Aldine.
1412
ES
▶ Emotional Stroop Task
Esteem Needs
Stefano I. Di Domenico1 and Marc A. Fournier2
1
Institute for Positive Psychology and Education,
Australian Catholic University, Strathfield, NSW,
Australia
2
Department of Psychology, University of
Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, ON, Canada
Definition
Within Maslow’s hierarchical organization of
motives and theory of personality development
(Maslow 1943), esteem needs refer to people’s
desires to have a stable and realistically positive
evaluation of themselves. Maslow (1943) concep-
tualized esteem needs as a broad category of moti-
vations that consist of two distinct but related sets
of strivings. One set of esteem needs consists of
people’s desires for achievement, competence,
and mastery. The other set of esteem needs con-
sists of people’s desires for admiration, status, and
respect from others. Maslow (1943) described the
satisfaction of esteem motives as being reflected
in feelings of efficacy and confidence, and the
thwarting of these desires in feelings of discour-
agement and inferiority. According to Maslow’s
(1943) hierarchical account, esteem needs
become salient only after one has sufficiently sat-
isfied the more primary desires for love, affection,
and belongingness; in turn, motivations toward
self-actualization become salient only after one
has sufficiently satisfied the need for esteem.
In later formulations, Maslow (1970) placed
esteem needs within the larger group of “defi-
ciency needs” because, like other motivations in
this group (i.e., physiological, safety, and belong-
ingness needs), the behaviors they energize are
aimed toward drive reduction, and their satisfac-
tion precedes the emergence of “growth needs”
ES
(i.e., strivings for self-actualization, knowledge,
and understanding). As Maslow (1970, p. 57)
himself put it, “The perfectly healthy, normal,
fortunate man has no sex needs or hunger needs,
or needs for safety, or for love, or for prestige, or
self-esteem, except in stray moments of quickly
passing threat.” This passage makes clear that
Maslow conceptualized esteem needs as drive
states that motivate people to stave off insecurity
through achievement and respect from others.
Contemporary Perspectives
Maslow’s (1943, 1970) hierarchical theory of
motivation and personality was historically
important because it helped to advance humanis-
tic psychology in the middle of the twentieth
century. It accordingly continues to be cited in
many introductory textbooks. Over the years,
however, empirical studies have found only
mixed support for Maslow’s ideas about the order-
ing of motives (e.g., Goebel and Brown 1981;
Hagerty 1999; Tay and Diener 2011).
Most researchers today appreciate the historical
significance and broad influence of Maslow’s the-
ory, but empirical studies examining his hierarchy
of needs are relatively rare (for a recent exception,
see Rasskazova et al. 2016). Nevertheless, ele-
ments of Maslow’s classic theory are every now
and again reflected in the literature to varying
degrees. Researchers working in diverse intellec-
tual communities have examined constructs that
bear a meaningful resemblance to esteem needs.
Self-esteem is perhaps the most obvious exam-
ple. Self-esteem is commonly defined as people’s
overall evaluations and feelings about themselves
(MacDonald and Leary 2012). The self-esteem
concept is of course much older than Maslow’s
notion of esteem needs and Maslow sometimes
referred to feelings of “self-esteem” to describe
the satisfaction of esteem needs. Indeed, James’
(1890) idea that people’s levels of self-esteem
represent the ratios of their successes to their pre-
tensions is well aligned with Maslow’s
description of the satisfaction and dissatisfaction
of esteem needs (i.e., feelings of competence
vs. inferiority). Still, it is clear from Maslow’s
Esteem Needs
writings that what he intended by esteem needs is
more differentiated than what is commonly meant
by self-esteem, which is often conceptualized as a
unidimensional construct. In fact, the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg 1965), the most
frequently used self-esteem measure
(MacDonald and Leary 2012), has a single sub-
stantive (self-esteem) factor (Marsh et al. 2010).
Recent theorizing about the motivational signifi-
cance of self-esteem, however, is what makes the
comparison between self-esteem and Maslow’s
esteem needs especially relevant.
Sociometer theory (ST; Leary and Baumeister
2000; MacDonald and Leary 2012) conceptual-
izes self-esteem as an evolutionarily derived
mechanism that promotes people’s need to belong
(Baumeister and Leary 1995). Specifically, ST
posits that “feelings that are associated with
changes in self-esteem provide feedback regard-
ing one’s relational value in other people’s eyes
and motivate behaviors that help to maintain or
enhance one’s relational value” (MacDonald and
Leary 2012, p. 356). Thus, whereas Maslow
explicitly differentiated esteem motivations and
belongingness motivations, ST views self-esteem
motivations as operating directly in the service of
the belongingness motivations. And whereas
Maslow emphasized the role of achievement and
status motivations in his conception of esteem
needs (including self-esteem), ST views achieve-
ment and status as being more indirectly related to
self-esteem, bearing on people’s self-esteem only
to the extent that achievement and status increase
the perceived likelihood of satisfying the need to
belong.
Social competition theory (SCT; Gilbert
2000; Price 2000) offers an alternative evolution-
ary account of self-esteem that is more aligned
with Maslow’s concept of esteem needs. A basic
premise of SCT is that many social animals have
to compete for reproductively relevant resources
(e.g., food, territory, mating opportunities) and
that they accordingly organize themselves into
status hierarchies that determine individuals’
priority of access to such resources. Status
competition among humans is of course more
sophisticated than that observed among other
species. Many species compete for status
1413
through face-to-face intimidation and aggres-
sion, but status competition among humans is
primarily based on one’s ability to attract the
interest, recognition, and investment of others.
Social status among humans is thus primarily
represented by the admiration, prestige, and
respect that one has in the eyes of others. These
goals closely describe what Maslow intended by
esteem needs. SCT posits that through evolution-
ary selection pressures, humans and other social
E
animals have acquired a repertoire of behavioral
strategies with which to assess and pursue social
status. Among humans, feelings of self-esteem
are thus theorized to reflect one’s social status in
the eyes of others, and motivations to enhance
self-esteem serve the purpose of increasing one’s
social status. Consistent with SCT, Fournier
(2009) found that peer-ratings of social status
explained variance in adolescents’ self-esteem
over and above attachment security, social sup-
port, and peer-rated likeability.
The account of self-esteem offered by SCT is
well aligned with Maslow’s concept of esteem
needs, particularly with that aspect that includes
people’s “desire for reputation or prestige
(defining it as respect or esteem from other peo-
ple), status, fame and glory, dominance,
recognition, attention, importance, dignity, or
appreciation” (Maslow 1970, p. 45). This is per-
haps not surprising because an early forerunner to
the concept of esteem needs that came from
Maslow’s own work on both nonhuman primates
(e.g., Maslow 1936) and humans (e.g., Maslow
1937) was “dominance-feeling.” In this earlier
work, Maslow assessed individual differences in
dominance-feeling among humans using inter-
view methods and interchangeably used the term
self-esteem to describe it (Maslow 1942).
Another perspective that has meaningful con-
nections with Maslow’s esteem needs is self-
determination theory (SDT; Ryan and Deci
2000, 2017). SDT is a contemporary theory of
motivation and personality development that
draws upon classic humanistic ideas. Central to
SDT is the premise that people have integrative
growth tendencies that are expressed through
intrinsic motivation and internalization. Intrinsic
motivation describes one’s spontaneous
1414
engagement with activities that one finds inter-
esting and challenging and that, in turn, foster
learning and growth. Internalization describes
the process through which one integrates socially
transmitted values and behavioral regulations
into their sense of self so that one may enact
them volitionally. SDT stipulates that these nat-
ural growth tendencies do not unfold automati-
cally but instead require the ongoing satisfaction
of basic psychological needs, namely, those for
autonomy (feeling volition), competence
(feeling effective), and relatedness (feeling
connected with others).
Unlike Maslow’s esteem needs, the needs
posited by SDT are growth needs, not deficiency
needs, because they represent the experiential
satisfactions that characterize optimal function-
ing and healthy development (Di Domenico and
Ryan, Growth Needs Nevertheless, Maslow’s
esteem needs do have differential relations with
SDT constructs. Insofar as esteem needs entail
strivings for effectance and mastery, they bear a
close resemblance to what SDT intends by the
need for competence. Research in SDT has
shown that the need for competence is an impor-
tant component of intrinsic motivation, and that
people’s feelings of competence are enhanced by
activities that afford them opportunities to exer-
cise and expand their skills, that are optimally
challenging, and that provide constructive feed-
back. However, insofar as Maslow’s esteem
needs entail holding the self as an attitudinal
object and striving for prestige and admiration
from others, they bear a closer resemblance to
what SDT calls introjected regulation. This par-
tially internalized, nonvolitional type of behav-
ioral regulation involves feeling pressured by self-
evaluation, internal threats of guilt and shame, and
goals to attain others’ approval. SDT argues that such
preoccupations with prestige and status stem from
socializing conditions that undermine people’s satis-
faction of autonomy, competence, and relatedness
and that they make people vulnerable to social pres-
sures, the pursuit of unfulfilling goals, and inauthentic
living (Ryan and Brown 2003). In this respect, SDT
offers a contemporary account of how self-esteem
motives function like Maslow’s (1970) deficiency
needs.
Esteem Needs
Conclusion
Maslow’s (1943, 1970) esteem needs refer to peo-
ple’s strivings to have a positive evaluation of
themselves. Esteem needs include motivations
for personal achievement and social status.
Although Maslow’s broader ideas about the hier-
archical organization of needs have been called
into question, his concept of esteem needs is var-
iously reflected in the literature today by theories
about the motivational significance of self-esteem
and by contemporary perspectives on basic
psychological needs and deficiency motivations.
References
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to
belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fun-
damental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin,
117, 497–529. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.
3.497.
Fournier, M. A. (2009). Adolescent hierarchy forma-
tion and the social competition theory of depres-
sion. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology,
28, 1144–1172. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2009.
28.9.1144.
Gilbert, P. (2000). Varieties of submissive behavior as
forms of social defense: Their evolution and role in
depression. In L. Sloman & P. Gilbert (Eds.), Subordi-
nation and defeat: An evolutionary approach to mood
disorders and their therapy (pp. 3–45). Mahwah:
Erlbaum.
Goebel, B. L., & Brown, D. R. (1981). Age differences in
motivation related to Maslow’s need hierarchy. Devel-
opmental Psychology, 17, 809–815. https://doi.org/
10.1037/0012-1649.17.6.809.
Hagerty, M. R. (1999). Testing Maslow’s hierarchy of
needs: National quality of life across time. Social
Indicators Research, 46, 249–271. https://doi.org/
10.1023/A:1006921107298.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. London:
Macmillan.
Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The nature and
function of self-esteem: Sociometer theory. In
M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psy-
chology (Vol. 32, pp. 1–62). San Diego: Academic
Press.
MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2012). Individual differ-
ences in self-esteem: A review and theoretical integra-
tion. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook
of self and identity (2nd ed., pp. 354–377). New York:
Guilford.
Marsh, H. W., Scalas, F. L., & Nagengast, B. (2010).
Longitudinal tests of competing factor structures for
Ethnocentrism 1415

the Rosenberg self-esteem scale: Traits, ephemeral

artifacts, and stable response styles. Psychological Ethnocentricity
Assessment, 22, 366–381. https://doi.org/10.1037/
a0019225.
Maslow, A. H. (1936). The role of dominance in the social ▶ Ethnocentrism
and sexual behavior of infra-human primates:
I. Observations at Vilas Park Zoo. The Pedagogical
Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology, 48(2),
261–277.
Maslow, A. H. (1937). Dominance-feeling, behavior, and
status. Psychological Review, 44, 404–429. https://doi. Ethnocentrism
org/10.1037/h0056714.
Maslow, A. H. (1942). Self-esteem (dominance-feeling) E
and sexuality in women. The Journal of Social Boris Bizumic
Psychology, 16, 259–294. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Research School of Psychology, The Australian
00224545.1942.9714120. National University, Canberra, Australia
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation.
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10.1037/h0054346.
Maslow, A. H. (1970). Motivation and personality Synonyms
(2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
Price, J. (2000). Subordination, self-esteem, and depres- Ethnocentricity; Parochialism
sion. In L. Sloman & P. Gilbert (Eds.), Subordination
and defeat: An evolutionary approach to mood disor-
ders and their therapy (pp. 165–177). Mahwah:
Erlbaum.
Rasskazova, E., Ivanova, T., & Sheldon, K. (2016). Com- Definition
paring the effects of low-level and high-level worker
need satisfaction: A synthesis of the self-determination
and Maslow need theories. Motivation and Emotion, Ethnocentrism is a multidimensional attitudinal
40, 541–555. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-016- construct, comprising intergroup and intragroup
9557-7. attitudes, emanating from the belief that one’s
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-
image. Princeton: Princeton University Press. own ethnic group is of immense importance.
Ryan, R. M., & Brown, K. W. (2003). Why we don’t
need self-esteem: On fundamental needs, contingent
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71–76. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI14
01_02. Introduction
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination
theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social Ethnocentrism is a human universal, a phenome-
development, and well-being. American Psychologist, non that has existed across all societies and time
55, 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/110003-066X.
55.1.68. periods (Brown 2000). It has been widely studied
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2017). Self-determination in many disciplines, such as sociology, anthropol-
theory: Basic psychological needs in motivation, devel- ogy, political science, psychology, philosophy,
opment and wellness. New York: Guilford Press. and marketing. In psychology, ethnocentrism has
Tay, L., & Diener, E. (2011). Needs and subjective well-
being around the world. Journal of Personality and predominantly been studied by personality and
Social Psychology, 101, 354–365. https://doi.org/ social psychologists. In fact, several central theo-
10.1037/a0023779. ries in personality and social psychology, such as
authoritarian personality theory, realistic group
conflict theory, and social identity theory, have
been developed to explain ethnocentrism.
A considerable problem in the area of ethnocen-
Ethics trism has been the lack of consistent conceptual-
izations, with different researchers and theories
▶ Morality seeing it in different ways.
1416
The Concept of Ethnocentrism
The concept of ethnocentrism was introduced
into the social sciences by one of the founders
of sociology, Ludwig Gumplowicz (e.g.,
Gumplowicz 1881). He saw ethnocentrism as a
delusion of ethnic groups who tend to see them-
selves as central, most important, and most emi-
nent, and therefore superior to any other ethnic
group that has ever existed. Gumplowicz com-
pared ethnocentrism to other delusions, such
anthropocentrism, whereby people think that
humans are the most important and central spe-
cies, and geocentrism, whereby people think that
the planet Earth is the most important and central
place in the universe. William G. Sumner,
although frequently credited with inventing the
concept of ethnocentrism (e.g., Adorno et al.
1950; LeVine and Campbell 1972), but most
likely taking it directly from Gumplowicz
(Bizumic 2019), popularized the concept. He
saw ethnocentrism as a complex attitudinal con-
struct whereby people give a lot of importance to
their own ingroup: “The sentiment of cohesion,
internal comradeship, and devotion to the
in-group, which carries with it a sense of superi-
ority to any out-group and readiness to defend the
interests of the in-group against the out-group, is
technically known as ethnocentrism” (Sumner
1911, p. 12). Both Gumplowicz and Sumner prin-
cipally referred to ethnic groups in their treatment
of ethnocentrism.
The concept of ethnocentrism became highly
popular, especially in personality and social psy-
chology, with the publication of the classic book
The Authoritarian Personality by Adorno et al.
(1950), who attempted to discover the origin of
ethnocentrism in the authoritarian personality.
These researchers conceptualized ethnocentrism
as an ideology concerning groups and group rela-
tions. They explicitly defined ethnocentrism as
rigid differentiation of ingroups from outgroups,
positive ingroup stereotypes, negative outgroup
stereotypes, hostility towards outgroups, submis-
siveness towards ingroups, ingroup supremacy,
and outgroup servility. The major aspect of their
operationalization, however, was a consistent
rejection of and hostility towards outgroups.
Ethnocentrism
This is evident in their measure of ethnocentrism,
the E-scale, which consists of numerous items that
measure negative outgroup attitudes, and only a
few items that measure pro-ingroup, mainly pro-
American, attitudes. This research has originated
an influential research tradition into the study of
ethnocentrism, generating thousands of follow-up
studies, including those testing new measures of
ethnocentrism, across cultures. Over time, how-
ever, researchers in this tradition have tended to
see ethnocentrism as an equivalent construct to
outgroup prejudice, and most subsequent mea-
sures of ethnocentrism in this tradition have
almost exclusively focused on generalized
outgroup prejudice.
Two other influential approaches to ethnocen-
trism have provided their own conceptualizations
of ethnocentrism. The first approach, commonly
known as realistic group conflict theory (LeVine
and Campbell 1972), assumed that ethnocentrism
is a syndrome, that is, a very complex phenome-
non, consisting of 23 distinct kinds of pro-ingroup
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., ingroup superiority,
ingroup cooperation, readiness to go to war, and
give life for one’s own ingroup), and anti-
outgroup attitudes and behaviors (e.g., hatred
towards outgroups, holding outgroups responsi-
ble for ingroup problems, perceiving outgroups as
weak). Social identity theorists, however, reduced
the complexity of ethnocentrism to ingroup bias,
which they perceived to be “the laboratory ana-
logue of real-world ethnocentrism” (Tajfel and
Turner 1986, p. 13). This form of bias involved
individuals allocating more resources to ingroup
members than to outgroup members or evaluating
ingroup members more positively than outgroup
members. With this tradition, concepts such as
ingroup bias and intergroup bias have become
widely popular in psychology, whereas the origi-
nal concept of ethnocentrism has become, at least
somewhat, marginalized.
The brief overview of the literature above
shows that ethnocentrism has meant different
things to different theorists and researchers. Con-
sequently, an important problem in the study of
ethnocentrism has been a reliance on diverse con-
ceptualizations. For example, a researcher who
maintains that ethnocentrism is hostility towards
Ethnocentrism
ethnic minorities studies a very different phenom-
enon to the one who maintains that ethnocentrism
is a preference for any kind of ingroup, including
artificially created ingroups, over outgroups.
In the light of these problems, a recent research
program by Bizumic, Duckitt, and colleagues (see
Bizumic 2019) analyzed numerous definitions of
ethnocentrism and clarified the construct of eth-
nocentrism in line with the original conceptuali-
zations. These researchers proposed that
ethnocentrism should refer to ethnic groups only,
that it consists of six dimensions (devotion, group
cohesion, preference, superiority, purity, and
exploitativeness), which denote ethnic group
self-centeredness and self-importance, and that it
is distinct from ethnic prejudice and mere ethnic
ingroup positivity. Their cross-cultural research,
using the newly developed culture-general Ethno-
centrism Scales 1 and 2, has shown that ethnocen-
trism exists at three levels of generalization: the
six dimensions as the first-order factors,
intragroup (devotion and group cohesion) and
intergroup ethnocentrism (preference, superiority,
purity, and exploitativeness) as the second-order
factors, and the overall ethnocentrism as the third-
order factor. Furthermore, the research indicates
that individual differences in ethnocentrism relate
to various factors, such as demographics (e.g., less
education, increased religious attendance), ethnic
identification, personality traits (e.g., conscien-
tiousness, lower openness to experience, lower
agreeableness), narcissism, personal and moral
values (e.g., power, ingroup loyalty, lower univer-
salism, lower fairness), conservative political ide-
ology, less contact with outgroups, ethnic
discrimination, and support for policies that ben-
efit one’s own ethnic group and harm other ethnic
groups.
Theories of Ethnocentrism
There have been numerous theoretical approaches
attempting to explain the origin of ethnocentrism.
These can be categorized into two broad kinds of
theories proposing proximal causes of ethnocen-
trism and two broad kinds of theories proposing
distal causes of ethnocentrism (Bizumic 2019).
1417
When it comes to proximal causes of ethnocen-
trism, numerous explanations have assumed that
ethnocentrism originates in fear: people are eth-
nocentric because they feel insecure, threatened,
and fearful, and they find security and protection
in their ethnic group and its ethnocentrism (e.g.,
Adorno et al. 1950; LeVine and Campbell 1972).
For example, Adorno et al. have assumed that at
the core of the authoritarian personality is intra-
psychic insecurity resulting from repressed hostil-
E
ity towards severely punitive parents, which is
displaced onto outgroups, allowing the authoritar-
ian personalities to idealize their ingroups and
reject outgroups. Another group of explanations,
also dealing with proximal causes, has assumed
that ethnocentrism originates in self-
aggrandizement. According to these explanations,
people are ethnocentric because they want to feel
good about themselves and superior to others
(e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1986), and because it
helps them exploit and dominate other groups,
including other ethnic groups and subgroups
within their ethnic group (e.g., Lanternari 1980).
When it comes to distal causes of ethnocen-
trism, numerous explanations have assumed
that ethnocentrism is a social construction: it
originates in socialization, social influence,
social norms, and social representations (e.g.,
van Dijk 1993). According to these explanations,
people learn, conform to, and internalize ethno-
centrism in the same way that they learn, con-
form to, and internalize any other attitude.
Another group of explanations, dealing with dis-
tal causes, however, has proposed that ethnocen-
trism is, being a human universal found across
societies and time periods (Brown 2000), a prod-
uct of evolution, being pre-wired in the human
biological makeup. For example, one evolution-
ary theorist claimed that “ethnocentrism evolved
during millions, or at least hundreds of thousands
of years as an extension of kin selection” (van
den Berghe 1978, p. 404).
Conclusion
The concept of ethnocentrism has been widely
studied across disciplines, including personality
1418
and social psychology. Although ethnocentrism
has meant different things to different researchers,
it can principally be seen as a complex attitude of
ethnic group self-centeredness and self-
importance. Individual differences in ethnocentric
attitudes appear to be caused by a complex inter-
play of biological, personality, and social factors,
and these individual differences predispose peo-
ple to various other attitudes and behaviors.
Although the social constructionist approach to
ethnocentrism has been popular in psychology,
ethnocentrism, despite its relative malleability,
has remained widespread across the world and is
having resurgence in the early twenty-first cen-
tury, with a widespread popularity of ethnocentric
politicians and ethno-populist movements. The
persistence of ethnocentrism across cultures and
time periods indicates that its ultimate origin is
most likely in evolutionary processes, including
in both biological and cultural evolution,
enforcing ethnic group strength, resilience, and
survival.
Cross-References
▶ Authoritarianism
▶ Prejudice
▶ Pride
▶ Social Identity Theory (SIT)
▶ Values
References
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., &
Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality.
New York: Harper.
Bizumic, B. (2019). Ethnocentrism: Integrated perspec-
tives. Abingdon: Routledge.
Brown, D. E. (2000). Human universals and their implica-
tions. In N. Roughley (Ed.), Being humans: Anthropo-
logical universality and particularity in
transdisciplinary perspectives (pp. 156–174). Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
Gumplowicz, L. (1881). Rechtsstaat und Socialismus
[Legal state and socialism]. Innsbruck: Wagner’schen
Universitäts-Buchhandlung.
Lanternari, V. (1980). Ethnocentrism and ideology. Ethnic
and Racial Studies, 3, 52–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01419870.1980.9993287.
Ethos
LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism:
Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behav-
ior. New York: Wiley.
Sumner, W. G. (1911). War and other essays. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory
of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin
(Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (2nd ed.,
pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson Hall.
van den Berghe, P. L. (1978). Race and ethnicity:
A sociobiological perspective. Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 1, 401–411. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987
0.1978.9993241.
van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Elite discourse and racism.
Newbury Park: Sage.
Ethos
▶ Morality
Eudaimonia
▶ Personal Growth
Eudaimonic Motivation
Lukasz D. Kaczmarek
Institute of Psychology, Adam Mickiewicz
University in Poznań, Poznan, Poland
Synonyms
Personal expressiveness; Self-determination
Definition
Eudaimonic motivation is the willingness to initi-
ate actions toward personal excellence (Huta and
Waterman 2014; Waterman 1990). Eudaimonic
pursuits are oriented toward the realization of
(a) individual potentials specific for a particular
person (e.g., pursuing athletic career) and (b) best
Eudaimonic Motivation
universal human potentials shared by each human
being (e.g., cultivating wisdom, kindness, or grat-
itude). The ultimate goal of eudaimonic motiva-
tion is the state of flourishing which marks the full
development of best potentials. Eudaimonic moti-
vation has been often used and characterized in
the opposition to hedonic motivation, i.e., seeking
pleasure and avoiding pain (e.g., Waterman 1990).
This duality also allows distinguishing between
eudaimonists and hedonists as individuals domi-
nated by eudaimonic or hedonic motives. While
hedonists primarily seek to feel in a particular
way, eudaimonists seek to be a particular type of
a person.
Introduction
Psychological theories of eudaimonia build upon
writings of Greek philosophers, most notably
Aristotle, who sought to reason what is the ulti-
mate good in life (Kesebir and Diener 2008;
Tatarkiewicz 1976). This term has been derived
from the Greek term “eudaimon,” which is the
English for a good spirit or the true self. From
the eudaimonic perspective, a happy individual
has an abundance of the most valuable goods
available to a human being (Tatarkiewicz 1976).
However, philosophers associated with eudaimo-
nism argued for the superiority of moral goods
and reason over material goods and feelings. The
development of true self (e.g., through exercising
of reasoning skills or moral personality traits, i.e.,
character) was indicated as a means to eudaimonia.
Current psychological theories of eudaimonia
build upon these concepts within the theoretical
frameworks of personal authenticity or expres-
siveness (Waterman et al. 2010), positive psycho-
logical functioning (Ryff and Keyes 1995), or
intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan 2000).
The Eudaimonic Well-Being Theory
Allan Waterman (a pioneer in the field of psycho-
logical conceptualizations of eudaimonia) along with
his colleagues proposed a distinctive psychological
model of eudaimonic pursuits (Waterman et al.
2010; Waterman 1990). This model is explicitly
based on philosophical works of Aristotle
1419
regarding eudaimonia. Yet, it is in contrast to
Aristotle’s work in that it also accounts for sub-
jective experiences resulting from eudaimonic
pursuits. This model includes the following
criteria that characterize eudaimonic functioning:
Self-discovery (recognition of one’s best poten-
tials as a prerequisite to self-realization)
Perceived development of one’s best potentials
(active strivings to self-realize)
E
A sense of purpose and meaning in life (using
talents and skills for the sake of personally
meaningful goals)
Investment of significant effort in pursuit of excellence
Intense involvement in activities
Enjoyment of activities as personally expressive
Psychometric analyses revealed that these facets
of eudaimonia are strongly interrelated forming a
single factor. Moreover, individuals with higher
levels of eudaimonic well-being are also more
committed to their particular identity and enjoyed
greater subjective well-being. Intensity of eudaimonic
striving is weakly associated with various demo-
graphic variables.
Other popular models focused on eudaimonic
motivations include psychological well-being the-
ory (Ryff and Keyes 1995) and self-determination
theory (Deci and Ryan 2000). The psychological
well-being theory breaks down eudaimonic hap-
piness into several desirable psychological char-
acteristics: self-acceptance, positive relationships
with others, autonomy, environmental mastery,
purpose in life, and personal growth (Ryff and Keyes
1995). The self-determination theory builds upon
the concept of intrinsic motivation that gives urge
to behaviors highly congruent with personal inter-
ests and values (Deci and Ryan 2000).
Eudaimonia and Pleasure
Eudaimonic motivation is often contrasted with
hedonic motivation that presents individuals as
primarily seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.
This might falsely suggest that eudaimonic activities
are either affectively neutral or prone to cause neg-
ative feelings. However, most authors emphasize
that successful eudaimonic actions result in posi-
tive experiences (Waterman 1990). These
1420
experiential benefits, however, are merely a
by-product of eudaimonic activities rather than
the intended outcome. Pursuing eudaimonic
motives is a sufficient, yet not a necessary, condi-
tion for hedonic well-being. This suggests that
pleasure can be derived from eudaimonic as well
as non-eudaimonic activities.
For these reasons, it can be often problematic
to distinguish between eudaimonic and hedonic
motivation based solely on the hedonic charac-
teristic of an activity. The same behavior can
be motivated either hedonistically or eudaimo-
nically. For instance, from the eudaimonic
perspective passion for learning can be best
explained by the desire to learn as much as
possible in order to understand the self and the
world and to use this knowledge to produce
greater personal and societal good. Yet, from
the hedonic perspective, an individual’s passion
for learning can be explained by positive experi-
ence derived from the activity, e.g., enhanced
interest or curiosity, or pride derived from one’s
accomplishments.
Differences Between Eudaimonic and
Hedonic Motives
Eudaimonic motivation differs from hedonic in
the following ways (Waterman 1990):
The range of available activities is wider for
hedonic motivation than for eudaimonic moti-
vation that is focused on personal development
exclusively.
Hedonic activities are relatively interchangeable
as long as they produce the same experiential
output, whereas hedonic activities are less
interchangeable as the goal of these activities
is more specific.
Eudaimonic motivation is focused on active pur-
suits, whereas hedonic motivation can either
result in active or passive functioning.
Eudaimonic motivation is focused on excellence
exclusively, whereas hedonic is not related to
any specific level of performance.
Fulfillment of a eudaimonic motive is self-
reinforcing in that it motivates individuals to
strive for even more opportunities (positive
feedback), whereas fulfillment of hedonic
Eudaimonic Motivation
motives is likely to result in satiation and rela-
tively longer inactivity (negative feedback).
Activities resulting from eudaimonic motives
tend to be more exceptional and personalized
(idiosyncratic) than activities resulting from
hedonic motives that are often shared within
larger groups.
Criticism of Eudaimonic Approach
Some psychometric analyses revealed that eudaimonic
well-being self-ratings emerge from the same
latent construct as hedonic well-being (Disabato
et al. 2016). This might suggest that eudaimonic
pursuits are motivated by the same psychological
process as hedonic pursuits. Moreover, despite
eudaimonic emphasis on objective states of affairs
(as opposed to mental states that are under inves-
tigation in hedonic approach), there is little avail-
ability of methods for the measurement of eudaimonic
outcomes other than through subjective reports
(Kashdan et al. 2008).
Measurement
Psychometric instruments have been proposed to
measure eudaimonic motives such as Psychological
Well-being Scales (Ryff and Keyes 1995), The
Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-being (Waterman
et al. 2010), and Hedonic and Eudaimonic Motives
for Activities (Huta and Ryan 2010) or the Flourishing
Scale (Diener et al. 2010).
Conclusion
Eudaimonic motivation is among the main motives
that give rise to enhanced personal development
and societal growth in the long turn. Furthermore,
a successful engagement in eudaimonic pursuits
or completion of eudaimonic milestones (e.g.,
obtaining an educational degree) is likely to result
in pleasant and rewarding experience (e.g., posi-
tive emotions) that plays the role of a “bonus
prize” for eudaimonistic efforts. However, this
eudaimonic route to happiness can backfire,
Eugenics Movement
when individuals fail to progress due to the over-
estimation or misspecification of their potential.
Although eudaimonic and hedonic approaches
stem from different theoretical assumptions
regarding human motivation, they often produce
very similar psychological conclusions. This might
suggest that both traditions offer different per-
spectives on very similar (or perhaps identical)
psychological processes.
Cross-References
▶ Deci, Edward and Ryan, Richard
▶ Happiness
▶ Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
▶ Optimal Functioning
▶ Personal Growth
▶ Self-Actualization
References
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of
goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination
of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.
Diener, E., Wirtz, D., Tov, W., Kim-Prieto, C., Choi, D. W.,
Oishi, S., & Biswas-Diener, R. (2010). New well-being
measures: Short scales to assess flourishing and posi-
tive and negative feelings. Social Indicators Research,
97, 143–156.
Disabato, D. J., Goodman, F. R., Kashdan, T. B., Short, J. L.,
& Jarden, A. (2016). Different types of well-being? A
cross-cultural examination of hedonic and eudaimonic
well-being. Psychological Assessment, 28, 471–482.
Huta, V., & Ryan, R. M. (2010). Pursuing pleasure or
virtue: The differential and overlapping well-being
benefits of hedonic and eudaimonic motives. Journal
of Happiness Studies, 11, 735–762.
Huta, V., & Waterman, A. S. (2014). Eudaimonia and its
distinction from hedonia: Developing a classification
and terminology for understanding conceptual and
operational definitions. Journal of Happiness Studies,
15, 1425–1456.
Kashdan, T. B., Biswas-Diener, R., & King, L. A. (2008).
Reconsidering happiness: The costs of distinguishing
between hedonics and eudaimonia. The Journal of
Positive Psychology, 3, 219–233.
Kesebir, P., & Diener, E. (2008). In pursuit of happiness:
Empirical answers to philosophical questions. Perspec-
tives on Psychological Science, 3, 117–125.
Ryff, C. D., & Keyes, C. L. M. (1995). The structure of
psychological well-being revisited. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 69, 719–727.
1421
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1976). Analysis of happiness. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Waterman, A. S. (1990). The relevance of Aristotle’s con-
ception of eudaimonia for the psychological study of
happiness. Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology,
10, 39–44.
Waterman, A. S., Schwartz, S. J., Zamboanga, B. L.,
Ravert, R. D., Williams, M. K., Bede Agocha, V.,
Kim, S. Y., & Brent Donnellan, M. (2010). The
questionnaire for eudaimonic well-being: Psychomet-
ric properties, demographic comparisons, and evidence
of validity. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 41–61.
E
Eudaimonic Well-Being
▶ Fully Functioning Person
Eugenics Movement
Michael A. Woodley of Menie
Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies,
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
Synonyms
Movement for human betterment
Definition
The eugenics movement encompasses intellectual
and political efforts, originating in the late nine-
teenth century, to raise awareness of and promote
solutions to the perceived socially undesirable
consequences of the propagation of genetic fac-
tors conducive to reduced population levels of
health, intelligence and good character.
Introduction
The term eugenic, which came from the Greek for
“good breeding,” was coined by Francis Galton in
1883. What could be termed folk eugenic thinking
can however be traced back to the Ancient
1422
Greeks – most notably to the writings of Plato.
The Twelve Tables of Roman Law, specifically the
Fourth Table, also made provisions for infanticide
on the basis of deformity and weakness. Despite
this, eugenic thought did not take on the character
of a sociopolitical movement until the Darwinian
revolution in the mid to late nineteenth century,
when the principles of eugenics were given a
scientific grounding. The origins of the eugenics
movement, whose principle aim was human bet-
terment via the control of heredity, can be traced to
Galton’s 1868 publication Hereditary Genius.
The fortunes of the movement waxed and waned
throughout the twentieth century, however the last
couple of decades have seen a resurgence of inter-
est in eugenics, fuelled by advances in biotech-
nology. This entry will divide the history of the
eugenics movement into two waves, which will be
examined separately – the first-wave eugenics
movement, which spanned from the 1880s to the
1960s, and the second-wave eugenics movement,
which spans from the 1990s to the present.
Review
First-Wave Eugenics Movement
The first-wave eugenics movement has its origins
in Francis Galton’s application of hereditarian
thinking to the issue of the causes of eminence
among British families (Galton 1868). Here he
postulated that “it would be quite practicable to
produce a highly gifted race of men by judicious
marriages during several consecutive genera-
tions” (p. 1). In subsequent work Galton (1883)
coined the term eugenics to describe scientific
approaches to improving the inborn qualities of
humans, in addition to enhancing those environ-
mental factors that optimize the cultivation of
those qualities. Thus, the movement was
grounded on the principle that efforts should be
made to better both human nature and nurture (the
two terms having also been coined by Galton).
Galton believed that any eugenics program
should focus on raising the levels of three socially
desirable trait sets, high levels of which he
Eugenics Movement
believed to be conducive to advanced
civilization – intelligence, character, and health.
He considered these traits to be both strongly
heritable and associated with socioeconomic sta-
tus, with those of low status tending toward low
intelligence, poor character (as manifest in crimi-
nality), and poor health and those of high status
being exemplars of high intelligence, good char-
acter, and good health. Galton noticed that those
of low status tended to produce larger families
than those of high status; hence he argued that, if
left unchecked, population levels of these traits
would diminish, leading to undesirable long-term
outcomes for society. Early in the twentieth cen-
tury, these trends would subsequently be termed
dysgenic – this being the antonym of eugenic.
Galton further made a distinction between
eugenic policies aimed at curbing the proliferation
of undesirable traits, such as laws restricting mar-
riage, and the use of sterilization, which he termed
negative eugenics, and policies that through vari-
ous means aimed to encourage those with high
levels of socially desirable traits to procreate,
which he termed positive eugenics.
In this respect, the eugenics movement
diverged sharply from the parallel Social Darwin-
ism movement, most strongly associated with
Herbert Spencer, a contemporary of Galton’s, in
that the former prescribed direct intervention in
the reproductive affairs of individuals in order to
avert the socially undesirable consequences of
dysgenic reproduction, whereas the latter
contended that it was only necessary to bring
about laissez-faire-type economic reforms (i.e.,
the abolition of welfare) in order to remedy dys-
genic reproduction. This distinction is historically
important, in that the interventionist nature of
eugenics led to socialists and other collectivists
in the early twentieth century developing a strong
affinity for these ideas. The classically liberal
principal of benign neglect championed by the
Social Darwinists conversely led to those ideas
being embraced by individualistic conservatives
and libertarians.
The growth of the eugenics movement early in
the twentieth century was explosive, with
Eugenics Movement
prominent Western academics and politicians ral-
lying behind the banner of eugenic ideals. Most
prominent among these early eugenicists was
Charles Davenport, who founded the US Eugen-
ics Records Office in 1910, and became the first
president of the International Federation of
Eugenics Organizations in 1925.
By the mid-1930s, eight countries, including
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland, had enacted steriliza-
tion laws as part of a campaign of negative eugen-
ics. By 1931, 30 US states had implemented
eugenic sterilization laws, with these laws
remaining enforcible in some states until the
1970s. Eugenics organizations were prevalent
also, serving the dual function of lobbying for
eugenic legislation as well as raising awareness
among the public of eugenic practice. Being a
movement strongly aligned with political collec-
tivists and interventionists, the cause of eugenics
came to be championed by leading figures in the
first-generation feminist movement, like Margaret
Sanger, who believed that birth control techniques
could ultimately serve eugenical aims. Prominent
Bolshevik leaders, such as Lenin and Trotsky,
believed eugenics to be a means of furthering
communism. A Russian Eugenics Society was
even founded in 1920, 3 years after Lenin took
power (Adams 1989).
The publication of the Social Biology and
Population Improvement document (commonly
known as the Eugenicists Manifesto) in the
journal Nature perhaps represents the high-
water mark of the movement. Written by a
group of prominent biologists, including Darling-
ton, Haldane, Dobzhansky, Muller, Price, and
Waddington, collectively styling themselves Sci-
ence Service (1939), this document outlines a set
of demands for social reform that would instanti-
ate eugenical and collectivist ethics at every level
of society, from economics to child rearing. Post-
1930s, the fortunes of the movement waned. Sev-
eral factors ultimately conspired to potentiate the
decline of the movement, including the rise of
Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union, which caused
fellow-traveling hard-left intellectuals in the West,
1423
who in previous decades had looked favorably
upon eugenics, to distance themselves from their
earlier advocacy, and the rise of Boasian anthro-
pology in the USA, which had a similar effect.
The latter movement in particular profoundly
altered the intellectual climate in the West via
vigorous criticism of genetical theories of human
nature and the fixity of human traits. The outbreak
of World War II also fundamentally altered the
priorities of Western publics and politicians. By
E
the 1950s, the apparent failure of dysgenic proph-
esies concerning the decline of intelligence to
manifest in cross-sectional studies dealt a great
deal of damage to the fundamental empirical ratio-
nale for the movement. The 1960s saw the biggest
blow dealt to the movement, when intellectual
activists associated with the New Left succeeded
in retroactively coupling eugenics in the minds of
Western publics with the genocidal racial hygiene
program pursued by the National Socialist gov-
ernment in Germany against the Jews (Glad
2011). This program was inspired more by a
racialist desire to outcompete a perceived compet-
itor group, than by the sorts of broadly universal-
istic and humanistic considerations that motivated
early advocates of eugenics (Lynn 2001).
The movement nonetheless limped on, with
some late-adopter countries, such as Japan having
enacted explicitly eugenic sterilization laws in
1948, which remained enforcible until 1996, and
both Singapore and China, which pursued eugenic
initiatives as recently as the 1990s. Eugenic laws
remained enforcible in several Western countries
until the 1970s, such as in Sweden and the USA,
when they were eventually struck down in
response to social pressure. The American Eugen-
ics Society changed its name to the Society for
Biodemography and Social Biology after the Roe
v. Wade ruling in 1972. Its British counterpart,
Galton’s Eugenics Education Society, which
became the Eugenics Society in 1926, quietly
dropped eugenics from its name altogether in
1989, becoming the Galton Institute. By the
1990s the movement’s pool of support among
academics had withered, with psychometricians
Raymond Cattell and Richard Lynn and Russian
1424
studies scholar John Glad counting among the
most prominent of the last active proponents of
the first-wave eugenics movement.
Second-Wave Eugenics Movement
The second-wave eugenics movement encom-
passes a loose-knit group of bioethicists, geneti-
cists, and other intellectuals, who are once again
promoting the idea that the intelligent control of
human heredity has the potential to enhance
human flourishing.
The mid-1990s saw the beginnings of the bio-
technology boom, and in 2003 the human genome
was sequenced. These developments gave rise to
heady optimism concerning the potential applica-
tions of biotechnology to the fight against genetic
disease. It wasn’t long before questions of bioeth-
ics arose concerning the possible applications of
biotechnology to the creation of so-called
designer babies, with genomes customized via
the use of embryo selection and germ line gene
therapy so as to alter the heritable traits of off-
spring in ways considered desirable by the par-
ents. While many intellectuals and politicians
have balked at the idea – tabula rasa theories of
human nature still exerting considerable sway
(Pinker 2003), public and intellectual interest in
the potential eugenical applications of biotechnol-
ogy nonetheless grew through the 1990s and into
the 2000s.
Eugenics Movement, Fig. 1 Frequency counts for eugenics, eugenic, eugenical, eugenicist, and eugenicists from
Google Ngram Viewer. 1883–2008, 3-year smoothing
Eugenics Movement
Most intellectuals who have embraced
eugenical applications of biotechnology have
been very careful to avoid using the word eugen-
ics in their advocacy. Those, like ethicist Nicholas
Agar (2004) and political scientist Frank Salter
(2015), who believe that the word still has cur-
rency are careful to emphasize what has become
the defining feature of the second-wave eugenics
movement – its essentially libertarian and volun-
taristic nature, rooted in the idea that modern
biotechnology has completely removed the need
for rights infringing procedures, such as steriliza-
tion. Agar even coined the term liberal eugenics
to describe this new social philosophy. Other
prominent thinkers, whose ideas are shaping the
second-wave eugenic movement, include the bio-
ethicist Julian Savulescu, who has argued that it is
morally wrong to limit reproductive choice when
it comes to selecting for good health and moral
character in offspring. Geneticist George Church
is also a leading light in this movement, having
argued that there is an emerging marketplace for
technologies that give people control over their
offspring’s genetic makeup.
Conclusions
The first-wave eugenics movement flourished
in the turn of the twentieth century; however,
Euphoria
its fortunes waned as tabula rasa theories of
human nature gained intellectual and political
traction, starting in the 1930s and peaking in
the 1960s, when universalist eugenics became
connected with the crimes of the National
Socialist movement in Germany. The second-
wave eugenics movement seems to have had
its origins in the 1990s and is a by-product of
the biotechnology boom, which yielded
methods of altering heredity that are more
consilient with regard to contemporary West-
ern moral sensibilities.
The two waves can be visualized via a text
search of Google Ngram Viewer’s database
using the concatenated terms of eugenics,
eugenic, eugenical, eugenicist, and eugenicists
(Fig. 1). Interest in the terms increases sharply
around 1905, peaks in around 1925, and troughs
around 1965, concomitant with the rise, cre-
scendo, and fall of the first wave. Interest in the
terms then increases again sharply in the early
1990s concomitant with the rise of the second
wave.
Cross-References
▶ Genetics
▶ Mutation
▶ Social Selection for Human Altruism
References
Adams, M. B. (1989). The politics of human heredity in the
USSR, 1920–1940. Genome, 31, 879–884.
Agar, N. (2004). Liberal eugenics: In defence of human
enhancement. New York: Blackwell Publishing.
Galton, F. (1868). Hereditary genius. London: Macmillian.
Galton, F. (1883). Inquiries into human faculty and its
development. London: Dent.
Glad, J. (2011). Jewish eugenics. Washington, DC:
Wooden Shore, L.L.C.
Lynn, R. (2001). Eugenics: A reassessment. Westport:
Praeger.
Pinker, S. (2003). The blank slate: The modern denial of
human nature. New York: Penguin.
Salter, F. (2015). Eugenics, ready or not. Part I. Quadrant,
59, 41–51.
Science Service. (1939). Social biology and population
improvement. Nature, 411, 521–522.
1425
Euphoria
Amy L. Duncan
Department of Psychology, University of Cape
Town, Cape Town, South Africa
Synonyms
E
Cheerfulness; Elevated mood; Happiness; Posi-
tive mood; Well-being
Definition
Euphoria is a type of affect that involves positive
or elevated mood.
Introduction
Euphoria is a state or symptom of mood or affect
that involves the experience of positive mood.
Euphoria
The term has be used to describe a state of
“cheerfulness” (Rodgers and Bland 1996),
“contentment” (Finger 1998), “intense happiness”
(Pearsall 1999), and “extreme happiness and well-
being” (Brookes et al. 2004). Although, as it can
be seen, definitions tend to vary, it is important to
note that euphoria is distinct from a number of
other, apparently similar, symptoms of mood and
affect. For example, euphoria is different from a
manic episode, which is defined by the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th
edition (American Psychiatric Association 2013)
as including elevated or irritable mood and
increased energy that persists for at least 1 week
and is accompanied by a number of additional
symptoms such as grandiosity, a decreased need
for sleep, increased psychomotor agitation, and
increased involvement in activities that may
have harmful consequences. It (i.e., euphoria) is
different from a hypomanic episode, which is
1426
defined by the same criteria as a manic episode but
it lasts for a shorter period of time (American
Psychiatric Association 2013). Euphoria is also
different from pathological laughing, which is
defined as uncontrollable expressions of intense
affect (i.e., laughing or crying) that last for a brief
period of time and may either be congruent or
incongruent with the underlying feelings of the
patient, but are the result of neurological involve-
ment (Wortzel et al. 2008). Finally, it is also dif-
ferent from emotional lability and emotional
incontinence, which, respectively, refer to rapid
mood swings and exaggerated expressions of
emotion that are out of proportion to the situation
(Harel et al. 2007).
It is often measured today by using the Neuro-
psychiatric Inventory (NPI; Cummings et al.
1994), which asks the following question, “Does
the patient seem too cheerful or too happy for no
reason?” The NPI explains the symptom further
by referring to a “persistent and abnormally good
mood” (Cummings et al. 1994).
This definition implies that euphoria may be
pathological, and it certainly can be found among
patients with psychiatric disorders, such as bipolar
mood disorder, epilepsy, or, more rarely, schizo-
phrenia (American Psychiatric Association 2013;
Jones and Sather n.d.). Euphoria is also found
among neurological patients. A subgroup of
patients with multiple sclerosis, for example, are
known to present with positive mood, optimism
regarding recovery that is incongruous given their
circumstances, and an unawareness or denial of
deficits, usually physical in nature, relating to their
condition (Duncan et al. 2015). Although some
have separated out the components, these symp-
toms are often collectively known as euphoria.
However, the term euphoria does not always
refer to a pathological condition, and euphoria can
also be experienced by individuals who do not
have psychiatric or neurological involvement,
during, for example, a sexual orgasm, as part of
a spiritual experience (MacKnee 2002), following
a sporting victory (The wildest celebrations
2016); during or after physical (aerobic) exercise
and other social activities such as laughter, music
making, or dancing (Cohen et al. 2010); or as a
result of alcohol, recreational drugs, and some
Euphoria
medications (Johnson 2010). While the former
types of euphoria (i.e., those relating to psychiat-
ric or neurological disorders) can be more long
lasting (Diaz-Olavarrieta et al. 1999), these latter
types of euphoria tend to be transient and brief.
Conclusion
Euphoria can be experienced by both neurological
and psychiatric patients as well as individuals
without these conditions. They may present
slightly differently in terms of duration and sever-
ity; however all types refer to feelings of elation
and positive mood.
Cross-References
▶ Bipolar Mood Disorder
▶ Emotional Lability
▶ Happiness
▶ Hypomania
▶ Optimism
▶ Pleasure
▶ Positive Affect
▶ Spirituality
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Arling-
ton: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Brookes, I., Munro, M., O’Donoghue, E., O’Neill, M., &
Thompson, M. (Eds.). (2004). Chambers concise dic-
tionary. Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd.
Cohen, E. E. A., Ejsmond-Frey, R., Knight, N., & Dunbar,
R. I. M. (2010). Rowers’ high: Behavioural synchrony
is correlated with elevated pain thresholds. Biology
Letters, 6(10), 106–108.
Cummings, J. L., Mega, M., Gray, K., Rosenberg-
Thompson, S., Carusi, D. A., & Gornbein, J. (1994).
The neuropsychiatric inventory comprehensive assess-
ment of psychopathology in dementia. Neurology,
44(12), 2308–2308.
Diaz-Olavarrieta, C., Cummings, J. L., Velazquez, J., &
Garcia de al Cadena, C. (1999). Neuropsychiatric man-
ifestations of multiple sclerosis. The Journal of Neuro-
psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 11, 51–57.
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European Association of Personality Psychology
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European Association of
Personality Psychology
Jaap J. A. Denissen1, John F. Rauthmann2,3 and
Mitja D. Back4
1
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
2
Department of Psychology, Wake Forest
University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
3
Department of Psychology, Universität zu
Lübeck, Lübeck, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany
4
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster,
Münster, Germany
European Association of Personality
Psychology (EAPP)
The European Association of Personality
Psychology (EAPP) is a scientific association
of personality psychologists from Europe
1427
and beyond. As of December 2018, there are
250 active members from various countries, pri-
marily from Europe but also beyond (e.g., USA,
Canada). More information can be found at
https://eapp.org/.
Purpose and Activities
The purpose of the EAPP is the promotion and
E
development of empirical and theoretical person-
ality psychology within Europe and the inter-
change of information between members of the
EAPP and other scientific associations throughout
the world (e.g., ARP, SPSP, ISSID, etc.). The
EAPP pursues the following activities:
• Organization of meetings and conferences
EAPP is the organizer of the European Con-
ference of Personality (ECP), which is held in
a different European city every 2 years. In
addition, EAPP regularly organizes expert
meetings, workshops, and summer schools
devoted to specific substantive, methodologi-
cal, and statistical topics.
• Promotion of mutual scientific communication
and research cooperation between members
and other scientists
Members of EAPP receive regular newslet-
ters and calls for special issues, symposia, or
meetings. Cooperation between scientists is
further encouraged through meetings funded
by the EAPP. To recognize scientific accom-
plishments, EAPP has established awards for
all career stages (travel stipends, ECP Poster
Awards, Early Career Award, Early Achieve-
ment Award, Mid-Career Award, Lifetime
Achievement Award).
• Publication of manuscripts
The EAPP publishes the European Journal
of Personality (EJP), which has become a
flagship journal in the area of personality
psychology.
• Cooperation with other associations and insti-
tutions within and outside Europe
There are regular contacts with other asso-
ciations, such as the Association for Research
in Personality (ARP) in the USA.
1428 Evaluation Anxiety

Current Status and Structure of

the EAPP Evaluation Anxiety

The EAPP is governed by an executive committee ▶ Test Anxiety

that consists of seven to nine elected members, not
including the editor of the European Journal of
Personality and the organizer of the next
European Conference of Personality (both are ex Evaluation of Desirable and
officio members). As of 2018, Jaap Denissen is Undesirable Consequences
the acting president of EAPP (2018–2020) and
will be succeeded by president-elect Anu Realo. ▶ Approach-Avoidance Conflict
John Rauthmann is treasurer, and Anna Baumert
is secretary. Only researchers with a background
in scientific psychology can become members of
EAPP, for which they can apply with the support
Evaluation Theory of Emotion
of two current members.
▶ Appraisal Theory of Emotion

History of the EAPP

Foundation Evaluative Cognitions

The EAPP was preceded by the organization of
the European Conference on Personality, held in ▶ Hot Cognitions
Tilburg (NL), May 17–19, 1982. During that con-
ference it was agreed that a European Association
of Personality Psychology (EAPP) should be
founded during the second European Conference
on Personality. Subsequently, the EAPP was
Evaluative Organization
founded in Bielefeld on May 19, 1984, during a
Justin D. Durham and Alicia Limke-McLean
plenary session, where the first executive commit-
University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond,
tee was elected and where all the attendants could
OK, USA
register as founding members. The EAPP was
notarially established in Groningen (NL), on
September 6, 1984.
Synonyms

Past Presidents Compartmentalization; Integration; Organization;

Jan Strelau (Warsaw University) served as its
first president between 1984 and 1988. Subse-
quent presidents have served for 2 years, in order
of appointment: Alois Angleitner, Gian Vittorio
Caprara, Wim Hofstee, Lars Nystedt, Jose
Bermudez, Ivan Mervielde, Sarah Hampson,
Andrzej Eliasz, Rainer Riemann, Boele de
Raad, Frosso Motti-Stefanidi, Jens Asendorpf,
Marco Perugini, Filip de Fruyt, and Jérôme
Rossier.
Self; Self-concept; Structure
Definition
Quantitative personality models of self-concept
structures that contain multidimensional and
dynamic components developed from theories
about personality and individual differences
(Showers 1992)
Evaluative Organization
Overview
The self-concept is contextualized. Research on
personality and individual differences have
attempted to quantitatively model how self-
concepts are structured differently among individ-
uals. One model includes the evaluative organiza-
tion of self-knowledge. This model has
demonstrated that some individuals organize
their self-concepts into primarily positive or neg-
ative valence, while others are organized with
both positive and negative self-concepts. This
model demonstrated the complexity and dynam-
ics of personality and individual differences.
Introduction
Fundamentally, self-concept structures are indi-
vidual beliefs about self-knowledge that emerge
and are self-organized according to their accessi-
bility (Showers and Zeigler-Hill 2003). The
dynamics of personality and individual differ-
ences can affect the impact of specific beliefs by
activating their accessibility. In other words, indi-
viduals who organize their self-concepts in posi-
tive ways report possessing positive self-feelings
despite possessing many negative self-beliefs and
vice versa. Psychological researchers in the field
of personality and individual differences have
demonstrated that the organizational structure of
the self-concept moderates the accessibility to
specific beliefs about self-knowledge (Showers
2000).
This type of research is important because
(a) most basic and applied research does not
account for differences in personality and individ-
ual differences; (b) the structural approach of the
self-concept assumes the self-concept is a multi-
dimensional construct organized into self-ratings
about various selves that represent situations, rela-
tionships, affective states, goals, specific times, or
public/private self-beliefs (Kihlstrom and Cantor
1984; McConnell 2011); and (c) this type of
research can provide insight into how individual
differences in evaluative organization of the self-
concept can effect choices and decision-making.
1429
Evaluative Organization of
Self-Knowledge
The self-concept structure has produced various
models including self-complexity (Linville 1985,
1987), self-concept saliency (Campbell et al.
1996), self-concept differentiation (Donahue
et al. 1993), differential importance (Pelham and
Swann 1989), and evaluative organization
(Showers 1992).
E
Evaluative organization is unique and perhaps
advantageous compared to other models because
it accounts for self-ratings on both the organiza-
tion of self-beliefs and the valence of those beliefs
by focusing on the distribution of positive and
negative beliefs about various self-concepts
(Showers et al. 2003). The general model of eval-
uative organization assumes that although indi-
viduals may self-rate primarily positive beliefs
about various self-concepts (e.g., Schwartz and
Garamoni 1986), most individuals have some sig-
nificant negative beliefs about themselves (related
to family/relationship dynamics, trauma-based,
risky behavior) and the dynamical process in
which these negative beliefs are distributed across
the self-concept (negative to only one or many
self-concepts) may determine their impact
(Showers 1992).
The original model of evaluative organization
refers to a structural dimension of the self-concept
with the two opposite continuums referred to as
evaluative compartmentalization and evaluative
integration (Showers 1992). Compartmentalized
self-concepts contain positive and negative self-
beliefs distinctly separated into aspects of the self
with each aspect containing primarily positive or
primarily negative beliefs about the self. For
example, an individual with a compartmentalized
self-concept structure may describe her/his “stu-
dent” self-aspect as comfortable, confident, and
intelligent, but her/his “employee” self-aspect as
lazy, inferior, and irritable (although roles are not
necessarily confounded with content; see also
Limke-McLean et al. 2017). In contrast, an inte-
grative self-concept structures contain both posi-
tive and negative beliefs about self-aspects.
For example, an individual with an integrative
1430
self-concept structure may describe her/his stu-
dent self-aspect as successful and capable but
also weary and tense.
The general model of evaluative organization is
based on the prediction that individuals with com-
partmentalized self-concept structures experience
higher ratings of self-esteem and more positive
mood than individuals with integrative self-concept
structures when they report possessing relatively
few negative beliefs about themselves or perceive
their positive self-aspects to be more important than
their negative self-aspects (Showers 1992). Individ-
uals with compartmentalized self-concept struc-
tures who have relatively positive beliefs about
themselves are positively compartmentalized.
These individuals are expected to report high rat-
ings of self-esteem and positive mood because they
have relatively few negative self-beliefs relegated to
relatively unimportant aspects of their self-concepts
which limit their accessibility. However, if individ-
uals with compartmentalized self-concept struc-
tures have a large number of negative self-beliefs
or their negative self-aspects are more important to
them than their positive self-aspects are, then they
are negatively compartmentalized. For these indi-
viduals, the accessibility of negative self-beliefs
results in low levels of self-esteem and relatively
negative mood compared to those individuals with
integrative self-concept structures. The terms posi-
tively integrative and negatively integrative refer to
individuals with integrative self-concept structures
that have important positive self-aspects or impor-
tant negative self-aspects, respectively. In summary,
the basic model of evaluative organization suggests
that when the content of the self-concept is essen-
tially positive (i.e., positive attributes or aspects are
most important or salient), compartmentalized self-
concept structures predict higher levels of self-
esteem and more positive mood than integrative
self-concept structures. However, when negative
aspects or attributes are important, compartmental-
ized self-concept structures predict lower levels of
self-esteem and more negative mood than integra-
tive self-concept structures. Predictions of the basic
model of evaluative organization have been
supported by the results of various studies showing
that self-concept structure is associated with various
outcomes including mood (Showers et al. 1998;
Evaluative Organization
Showers and Kling 1996), eating disorders
(Showers and Larson 1999), childhood maltreat-
ment (Showers et al. 2006), and bipolar disorder
(Taylor et al. 2007).
Conclusion
Evaluative organization of self-concept structures
that contain multidimensional and dynamic com-
ponents is a quantitative model of personality and
individual differences. Some individuals may
structure their self-concepts as primarily positive
or negative, while other individuals may structure
their self-concepts as being both positive and neg-
ative. Evaluative organization is one of the many
quantitative models predicting the complex differ-
ences in personality among individuals.
Cross-References
▶ Compartmentalization
▶ Integration
▶ Organization
▶ Self
▶ Self-Concept
▶ Structure
References
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Lavellee, L. F., & Lehman, D. R. (1996). Self-concept
clarity: measurement, personality correlates, and cul-
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Donahue, E. M., Robins, R. W., Roberts, B. W., & John,
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Psychology, 25–35.
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Linville, P. W. (1985). Self-complexity and affective
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Event
▶ Assessment of Situational Influences
1431
Everyday Disorders
▶ Dark Tetrad of Personality, The
Evidence-Based
Psychotherapy for Individuals
with Personality Disorders
E
Erlanger A. Turner and Jasmine Richardson
Department of Social Sciences, University of
Houston-Downtown, Houston, TX, USA
Introduction
The literature notes that the rise of evidence-based
treatments has changed the view that people with
a personality disorder (PD) are untreatable (Town
et al. 2011). The treatment of personality disorders
is a serious concern as it relates to the diminished
quality of life for patients and their families, as
well as, often being a burden on the clinicians that
provide treatment (Kramer and Levy 2016).
Efficacy of psychotropic medications as a treat-
ment for PDs is often associated with insignificant
reductions in symptoms (Zanarini 2004). How-
ever, the use of psychotherapy as a form of
treatment for personality disorders has been
proven to reduce symptomatology, maladaptive
behaviors, and hospital visits. Furthermore, psy-
chotherapy has been proven to improve social
and interpersonal functioning (Hadjipavlou and
Ogrodniczuk 2010).
Psychotherapy is known to encompass an
emphasis on the integration of mental representa-
tions of the self and others coupled with realistic
and unrealistic expectations. The use of psycho-
therapy as a form of treatment has been useful in
treating personality disorders such as antisocial
personality disorder (APD) and obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder (OCPD).
Research also notes that some types of psycho-
therapy are more useful for particular PDs, for
example, studies report that brief-psychodynamic
treatments are more suitable for disorders such as
1432 Evidence-Based Psychotherapy for Individuals with Personality Disorders
OCPD (Town et al. 2011), whereas dialectical-
behavior therapy has been found to be particularly
effective in treating borderline personality disor-
der (e.g., Linehan 1993; Linehan et al. 2006).
Research shows that some symptoms of border-
line personality disorder (BPD) are reduced when
the therapist is responsive to behaviors underlying
motives (Kramer and Levy 2016). By helping
patients deal with these problematic experiences,
the therapist’s goal in psychotherapy is to deter-
mine how internal networks and associations can
influence the mind.
Patients with PDs tend to suffer from a wide
range of negative symptoms including severe
anxiety, guilt, shame, anger, and sadness
(Dimaggio et al. 2013). By assisting the patient
in making dynamic changes within each of their
problematic areas in life through relearning to
cope properly, these symptoms are alleviated
through psychotherapeutic processes. Therapists
also issue interventions in empirically tested
techniques in order to provide the patients with
cognitive modifications. A meta-analysis of
research from over the past two decades has
shown that psychological treatments are proven
to be more effective than treatment as usual,
which is defined as minimal intervention or any
form of standard psychiatric care (Kramer and
Levy 2016). In a Collaborative Longitudinal
Study published in the American Journal of Psy-
chiatry, less than half of the patients met criteria
for PDs 2 years after treatment. Similarly, 88% of
patients diagnosed with severe PDs in a 10-year
follow-up in the McLean Study of Adult Devel-
opment no longer met the diagnostic criteria for
PDs (Zanarini et al. 2007).
Psychotherapy proven to be most effective
when treating personality disorders such as BPD
include dialectical-behavior therapy (DBT), trans-
ference focused psychotherapy, mentalization-
based psychotherapy (MBT), and schema-
focused psychotherapy (e.g., Carsky 2013;
Montgomery-Graham 2016; Town et al. 2011).
In addition to those noted above, research has
identified some evidence-based psychotherapies
that have been adapted to address the unique
needs of patients with PDs, including cognitive-
behavioral therapy, psychodynamic, humanistic-
experimental, dynamic-deconstructive, and inter-
personal psychotherapy (e.g., Davidson et al.
2010; Hopwood et al. 2014; Kramer and Levy
2016, Leichsenring and Leibing 2003;
Matusiewicz et al. 2010). These types of psycho-
therapy represent specific adaptations to the
unique requirements of patients with personality
disorders and can be proven to be valid treatment
options (Kramer and Levy 2016).
Due to the unique nature and varying needs of
PDs, multiple methods are used in conjunction
with one another in order to adapt to the individual
patient’s needs. A patient with an array of person-
ality dysfunctions and self-harm behaviors might
respond better to a combination of individual
and/or group therapy, case management, and
pharmacotherapy. For example, patients with
PDs face difficulties with the mentalization sys-
tem, which consists of a network of processes.
Alexithymia, which is the difficulty in describing
physical symptoms of anxiety with emotional
words, prevents patients from communicating
them with others. Patients also have issues with
maintaining focus on inner states, as opposed to
outer states (Dimaggio et al. 2013). This theory of
alexithymia, paired with emerging evidence, sup-
ports the idea that many patients with PDs are
emotionally unaware. To address this concern,
a very important feature of DBT and MBT is
self-observation. When a patient learns to better
understand and communicate their feelings, they
can decrease the occurrences of emotional
crises and, in turn, determine alternative solutions
(Paris 2010).
Building and maintaining a therapeutic alli-
ance is a factor that promotes change within PD
patients. The therapy relationship can be defined
as a pattern of behavior and inner experiences that
emerge between the patient and the therapist dur-
ing psychotherapy (Benjamin and Karpiak 2001).
In order to provide a patient with effective inter-
vention, a therapist should encompass flexibility,
creativity in therapeutic approach, patience, com-
petence in specific trainings in the treatment of
PDs, be open-minded, and be comfortable with
emotionally intense long-term treatment. The
focus of this section is to overview evidence-
based treatments for PDs and discusses important
Evidence-Based Psychotherapy for Individuals with Personality Disorders
implications for maintaining the therapeutic alli-
ance with this population.
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
Personality disorders (PDs) are perpetuated by
a combination of maladaptive beliefs about
oneself and others, mixed with environmental
and contextual factors that prohibit effective
behaviors and reinforces problematic behaviors
(Matusiewicz et al. 2010). Cognitive behavioral
therapy (CBT) is one of the most widely used
treatment options for patients who meet the
criteria for certain personality disorders. CBT
aims to modify these factors by incorporating a
wide range of techniques such as exposure,
psychoeducation, skills training, behavior modifi-
cation, and cognitive restructuring. In addition,
cognitive behavior therapy places a particular
emphasis on a supportive and collaborative ther-
apeutic alliance. Numerous studies have proven
the efficacy of various forms of CBT as a treat-
ment option for patients who suffer from person-
ality disorders.
CBT trials are also characterized by an
emphasis on therapeutic alliance, which is the
relationship between the therapist and the
patient, in conjunction with the competency of
the deliverance of therapy. In the therapeutic
alliance, the therapist’s understanding of the
patient’s problems, the ability to provide appro-
priate techniques and intervention strategies, and
delivering proficient interventions are crucial.
Experiential techniques such as imagery, meta-
phors, storytelling, and reconstructing the mean-
ing of childhood memories are notable
techniques used to help modify coping strategies
for clients with PDs.
There have been numerous studies that have
analyzed the efficacy of various forms of CBT as
treatment for some personality disorders. Studies
have mostly been done on patients who meet the
criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD)
and avoidant personality disorder (APD). In a
large RCT of varying personality types conducted
by Tyrer et al. (2004), patients that received CBT
were found to engage in less self-harming
1433
behaviors than those who were receiving treat-
ment as usual. Strauss et al. (2006) conducted a
trial of CBT treatment outcomes on patients with
avoidant personality disorder (AVPD) and found
that 67% of the patients no longer met the criteria
for AVPD post treatment. Furthermore, 65%
experienced a significant decrease in depressive
symptoms at the end of treatment (Matusiewicz
et al. 2010). A RCT using CBT on patients with
borderline personality disorder showed that cli-
E
ents made moderate improvements on levels of
depression, suicidal ideation, hopelessness, and
borderline symptoms after a year of treatment.
Furthermore, a significant amount of patients
were still exhibiting an improvement and consis-
tency post treatment; after an 18-month follow-
up, only 16% of the subjects met criteria for BPD
(Brown et al. 2004).
Dialectical Behavior Therapy
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) is an
evidence-based and empirically supported treat-
ment for borderline personality disorder (BPD). In
a meta-analysis of 16 randomized controlled tri-
als, Matusiewicz et al. (2010) identified DBT as
one of the most empirically supported forms of
CBT. One characteristic of DBT that makes it
different form other cognitive behavioral thera-
pies is its use of dialectics or the reconciliation
of opposites in a continual process of synthesis
(Montgomery-Graham 2016). DBT adopts a psy-
chosocial approach and is influenced by the East-
ern Zen philosophy of acceptance and change in
the therapeutic relationship. According to
Montgomery-Graham (2016), the most funda-
mental dialectic of DBT is the necessity of
accepting the patient as he or she is in the context
of teaching him or her how to change. Individual
DBT focuses on exposure, contingency manage-
ment, and cognitive reconstruction to decrease
problematic behaviors and enhance the patient’s
overall quality of life. DBT often includes group
skills training to enhance the ability to better
respond to difficult situations, and phone consul-
tation for skills coaching. Lastly, weekly consul-
tations are implemented in order to support and
1434 Evidence-Based Psychotherapy for Individuals with Personality Disorders
ensure that patients are adhering to the DBT treat-
ment model.
Criteria set by Chambless and Hollon (1998)
state that DBT is a “well-established” treatment
for BPD. As noted, the research on DBT provides
strong support for treatment of BPD. Studies have
supported the efficacy and effectiveness of DBT
for a range of symptoms including, suicide
attempts, suicidal ideation, self-injury, depres-
sion, social adjustment, identity issues, and sub-
stance abuse (Bliss and McCardle 2014). A pilot
study (Bohus et al. 2000) using a combination of
inpatient and outpatient DBT for treatment of
BPD among females demonstrated significant
improvements in symptomatology. The authors
noted that at inpatient admission 88% of patients
endorsed engaging in self-injury, and 61% of
patients reported self-injurious behavior was
reduced to zero in the first 4 weeks after discharge
(i.e., Bohus et al. 2000). One series of randomized
clinical trials compared the standard 12 months of
DBT to treatment as usual and found a greater
reduction in the frequency of self-injurious behav-
iors, hospitalization, and treatment dropout
among the DBT group (Montgomery-Graham
2016). Furthermore, a meta-analysis of DBT for
BPD using RCT and non-RCTs showing improve-
ments in overall global effects, self-injurious
behavior, and suicidal gestures (see Kliem
et al. 2010).
Psychodynamic Psychotherapy
Psychodynamic psychotherapy has been a topic
of interest for decades and some have questioned
whether it should be established as an empirically
supported treatment. Carsky (2013) notes that
psychodynamic psychotherapy has been referred
to as supportive psychoanalytic or psychody-
namic psychotherapy. Another term used to
describe psychotherapy based on psychodynamic
approaches is short-term psychodynamic psycho-
therapy, which is a brief treatment based on tradi-
tional psychoanalytic theory (Town et al. 2011).
Supportive psychodynamic psychotherapy (SPT)
has been found to be effective and efficacious for
PDs (Carsky 2013; Town et al. 2011). SPT
provides emotional support, praise, problem-
solving, and validation to maintain a preponder-
ance of positive over negative transference. In
SPT, conceptualization of the patient’s internal
world directs the therapist how to best offer and
maintain a relationship with the patient (Carsky
2013).
Short-term psychodynamic therapy demon-
strates some support for improvement in
symptomology and interpersonal functioning for
Cluster C personality disorders (Town et al. 2011).
Meta-analyses have shown that psychodynami-
cally oriented psychotherapy is beneficial for
reducing symptoms, improving personality dys-
function, and improving social functioning in
patients with features of PDs across all clusters
(e.g., Leichsenring and Lebing 2003; Town et al.
2011). However, studies often exclude PDs in
Cluster A and B. According to Town et al.
(2011), personality disorders such as narcissistic
and paranoid types are less suitable for psychody-
namic approaches. Furthermore, randomized clin-
ical trials have identified support for treatment of
BPD with short-term psychodynamic psychother-
apy with improvements maintained up to
24-months follow-up on measures of social dys-
function, symptomatology, and depression (e.g.,
Munroe-Blum and Marziali 1995; Abbass
et al. 2008).
The therapeutic alliance has been shown to be a
strong predictor of positive treatment outcomes
and may be even more important to outcomes
using SPT (Carsky 2013). To maintain or develop
an alliance requires that the therapist respond to
therapy ruptures in a nondefensive and nonhostile
manner (Carsky 2013). Specifically, the therapist
should not withdraw or become defensive in
response to the patients behavior in session. In
general, psychodynamic approaches such as sup-
portive psychodynamic psychotherapy have
found to be an efficacious treatment with medium
to long-term treatment effects (Town et al. 2011).
Schema Therapy
Schema therapy uses principles of cognitive and
behavioral therapy. Schema therapy places
Evidence-Based Psychotherapy for Individuals with Personality Disorders
emphasis on the family environment in which a
child’s basic emotional needs are unmet
(Montgomery-Graham 2016). There are a numer-
ous studies that support the effectiveness of
schema therapy in treating PDs. Schema focused
therapies suggests that personality disorders erupt
from early maladaptive schemas that interfere
with the individual’s ability to adhere to his/her
needs in life. In a short-term schema group ther-
apy with young adults diagnosed with personality
disorders or who meet the criteria, results showed
that patients receiving treatment experienced a
significant decrease in symptomatic distress dur-
ing treatment and post treatment (Matusiewicz
et al. 2010). In order to alter maladaptive schemas,
the flexibility of schema-focused therapy allows
for a broad range of techniques including behav-
ioral, psychodynamic, experiential, and interper-
sonal strategies (Matusiewicz et al. 2010).
In schema therapy, the therapeutic relationship
is used to test and change the maladaptive
schemas and the unmet emotional needs of the
patient (Montgomery-Graham 2016). To make
therapeutic gains, the patient requires longer treat-
ment, more time exploring childhood experi-
ences, and greater emphasis on the therapeutic
alliance. To date, four studies have evaluated
schema therapy’s effectiveness in the treatment
of BPD. Using schema therapy or transference-
focused psychotherapy, all patients showed sig-
nificant improvement in reduction of BPD symp-
toms (Montgomery-Graham 2016).
Cultural Competence and Treatment of
Personality Disorders
Cultural competence and psychological treatment
has been emphasized for decades. However, the
majority of efficacy and effectiveness studies
often include limited diverse patients, which
may impact the generalizability of these
evidence-based treatments. According to Gone
(2015), policy mandates for implementation of
evidence-based treatments with multicultural cli-
ents may be premature because interventions may
not generalize to ethnoracial and cultural minori-
ties. Furthermore, some note that systems of care
1435
often lack awareness, data, and infrastructure to
effectively treat racial and ethnic minority
populations (Turner et al. 2016). Therefore, we
must improve the representation of racial and
ethnic diverse clients in psychotherapy outcome
studies.
To improve treatment of PDs with diverse
racial and ethnic populations, attention must be
given to cultural competence and cultural humil-
ity. Research findings highlight that cultural com-
E
petence is paramount to treatment engagement
and success (Comas-Diaz and Minrath 1985;
Turner et al. 2016). To date there is limited empir-
ical support for treatment of personality disorders
among diverse ethnic groups (e.g., Native Amer-
icans, Asian Americans, African Americans, and
Latinos). A literature search of research in the past
decade yielded limited articles examining the effi-
cacy and effectiveness of psychotherapy treat-
ment for PDs among ethnic groups. More work
is needed in this area given the diversity of the
United States. In a case study, the authors noted
that in working with ethnic minority, borderline
clients using integration of a traditional theoretical
framework within a sociocultural context is essen-
tial for effective psychotherapy (Comas-Diaz and
Minrath 1985). According to Comas-Diaz and
Minrath (1985), therapists of all ethnic and racial
backgrounds must confront their own biases and
prejudices to become aware of the impact that
their attitudes could be perceived as unknowing
rejection or judgment towards their clients. These
interpersonal interactions – rejecting or being
judgmental – could be extremely problematic to
the therapeutic relationship with PD clients.
Conclusions
PDs are stable, enduring conditions that are per-
ceived as difficult to treat. However, decades of
research using efficacy and effectiveness studies
have demonstrated that treatment can decrease PD
symptoms and improve individual’s overall func-
tioning, the literature on treatment of PDs with
diverse racial and ethnic groups is sparse. Clini-
cians working with patients diagnosed with PDs
need to be clear on how transference and
1436 Evidence-Based Psychotherapy for Individuals with Personality Disorders
intersecting identities may result in therapeutic
ruptures in treatment (Carsky 2013; Comas-Diaz
and Minrath 1985; Gone 2015; Turner et al.
2016). For example, with ethnic minority border-
line clients, it is essential to enter the client’s life
as a real person, to actually take an interest in the
client’s daily activities, and to strive to fully
understand the client’s life circumstances to estab-
lish a “real relationship” before any honest disclo-
sure can take place (Comas-Diaz and Minrath
1985). With the rise in empirically validated treat-
ments, the view that people with a personality
disorder (PD) are untreatable is gradually chang-
ing (Town et al. 2011). However, continued work
is needed to better understand treatment with
diverse racial and ethnic groups.
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Christoph, P., & Beck, A. T. (2004). An open clinical
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Evolutionary Game Theory
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Zanarini, M. C. (2004). Update on pharmacotherapy of
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sub-syndromal phenomenology of borderline person-
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Journal of Psychiatry, 164(6), 929–935.
Evil
▶ Shadow
Evolutionary Game Theory
Tim Marsh
Department of Psychology, New York University-
Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Definition
Evolutionary Game Theory is an extension of
classical Game Theory that sought to account for
the properties of real-world populations of
1437
organisms and the ecosystems they inhabit, by
describing the fitness-enhancing strategies
maintained by the forces of evolution.
Game Theory is the study and mathematical
analysis of rational decision-making, typically
under conditions where there are clearly defined
constraints on the information one possesses
and the range of available response options.
The field of Game Theory is particularly
concerned with modelling the possible strate-
E
gies an agent may employ when engaged in
games where individual success critically
depends on the choices made by other players
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), either
because other players represent opportunities
for cooperation or because they are competitive
rivals for some scarce resource. Since its for-
mal, modern inception by mathematician and
polymath John von Neumann 1928 (see Tucker
and Luce 1959, for English translation), Game
Theory has been employed in a wide range of
disciplines, including computer science, moral
philosophy, and extensively within behavioral
science and economics (Newton 2018), owing
to the insights that Game Theoretical models
can offer into population-level trends that
emerge spontaneously from innumerable indi-
vidual agents each pursuing the most favorable
outcomes they can secure for themselves. One
of the earliest and most influential of these
emergent phenomena is the Nash equilibrium
(Nash 1951), a stable state a population reaches
where no individual agent is capable of improv-
ing their outcomes by changing from their pre-
sent strategy (see Gintis 2009, for a detailed
overview).
Introduction
In its classical formulation, Game Theory is
primarily a normative discipline, concerned
with modelling the most ideal decisions any
given agent could make in a given circum-
stance, rather than seeking to describe if real-
world agents do make optimal decisions or
when they do, precisely how said decisions
were accomplished (Simon 1957). An abstract
1438
Game Theoretical model will tacitly assume
that the agent in question is fully rational with
regard to their own interests and possesses
unlimited computational power to make best
use of the information available to it (Barros
2010). This rational idealization appeared more
puzzling still when biologists and ethologists
began to apply the logic of Game Theory to
the behavior of nonhuman animals, showing
that despite seeming to have even greater limits
on their insight and computational abilities,
creatures ranging from mammals to birds to
arthropods appeared to strategically coordinate
their behavior in ways that rationally maxi-
mized their survival and reproductive outcomes
(Lewontin 1961).
From these foundational insights, John May-
nard Smith and colleagues pioneered and popu-
larized Evolutionary Game Theory (Maynard
Smith and Price 1973), an extension of classical
Game Theory that sought to account for the
properties of real-world populations of organ-
isms and the ecosystems they inhabit, by describ-
ing the fitness-enhancing strategies that are
discovered and maintained by the forces of evo-
lution. Rather than focusing on the rational
agency of any given organism, the efficacy of
these strategies is attributed to trial-and-error
processes of natural selection, which reliably
converge over generations onto whatever func-
tional characteristics prove most conducive to
reproductive success (Maynard Smith 1976).
Game Theoretical models of the optimal strate-
gies an agent may employ in a particular ecolog-
ical contest (e.g., conflict over scares resources,
mating, parasite avoidance, etc.) provide us
with viable hypotheses for the kinds of traits
and mechanisms we should expect them to
possess. This approach is useful in modelling
the kinds of animal behavioral strategies
we should expect to be conserved as a stable
Nash equilibrium in diverse real-world
populations. Sets of strategies and traits which
can reach equilibria states that are robust to being
overrun by new or rival ‘mutant’ strategies are
known as evolutionarily stable strategies
Evolutionary Game Theory
(Maynard Smith 1982) and are foundational in
Evolutionary Game Theory models.
Evolved Signalling
Some of the most popular work in signalling
theory concerns mate choice and competition
over mates, not only in nonhuman animals
(Zahavi 1997) but also in humans (Buss 2009).
Due to the clustering together of both signalling
traits and heritable preferences for said traits in
sexual selection (which can give rise to extreme
exaggeration of traits via Fisherian runaway; see
Fisher 1915), traits that serve a signalling pur-
pose in mate selection are especially prone to
high degrees of individual variation within a
population, particularly when the signalling
value of the trait in question is derived from it
being costly (Grafen 1990). The most common
underlying rationale for traits that vary widely
within a species due to their costly signalling
value is described by the handicap principle,
first formalized by Amotz Zahavi (1975). Game
Theoretical models of this mode of costly sig-
nalling have been proposed for a range of indi-
vidual difference traits in humans, including
risk-taking (Farthing 2004), communal contribu-
tions to activities such as hunting (Gurven and
Hill 2009), and expressions of religious devotion
(Wood 2017).
Frequency-Dependent Selection
While evolution by natural selection is broadly
thought of as a process that consumes and reduces
the variation in a population in order to magnify to
fixation those traits that provide the greatest con-
tribution to fitness (Heino et al. 1998), Evolution-
ary Game Theory analyses have identified a
selection dynamic that not only permits but con-
serves levels of systematic variation within
populations: frequency-dependent selection
(Sinervo and Lively 1996). While many strategies
reach fixation as evolutionarily stable strategies
Evolutionary Game Theory
by virtue of achieving a sufficient majority
(of note, cooperation-focused strategies have the
highest fitness payoffs when surrounded by many
reliable cooperation partners), other strategies
(most notably predatory or mutually antagonistic
strategies) experience proportionally higher fit-
ness benefits when occurring at low frequency in
the population and are thus said to exhibit nega-
tive frequency dependence (Heino et al. 1998).
Negative frequency-dependent strategies are
robust in low concentrations, but undermine
their own payoffs when exceeding certain levels
of population prevalence, and thus are perfectly
suited to reach Nash equilibria at maintained low
levels in the population (perhaps permitting mul-
tiple such low-frequency strategies to coexist
together, see Henly et al. 2008). Several note-
worthy human personality features have been
studied through the lens of negative frequency
dependence, most notably antisocial personality
tendencies (Colman and Wilson 1997), leader-
ship qualities (Johnstone and Manica 2011), and
more extreme manifestations of typical person-
ality traits (Nettle 2006). It is important to note
that in addition to sustaining stable, systematic
variants such as these, the dynamics of
frequency-dependent selection can also function
by having low-frequency strategies appear only
rarely as a state-dependent contingent behavior
in individuals who typically adhere to other
strategies.
State-Dependent Strategies
Since the fitness payoffs of the different behav-
ioral strategies available to a species can vary
extensively on timescales shorter than a single
generation (McNamara 2013), there are adaptive
benefits available to organisms capable of
adopting or switching between strategies on
the basis of identifiable states (either internal
or external) that serve as cues for different stra-
tegic opportunities (Luttbeg and Sih 2010).
Although most ethology research into state-
dependent strategies has focused on
1439
intragenerational and situational plasticity that
activates in response to overt or temporary envi-
ronmental cues (such as antipredator behavior
and asset-protection behavior, see Clark 1994),
research into more consistent personality-like
variations (typically called behavioral syn-
dromes or coping styles, in ethology) has
revealed several Game Theoretical processes
that appear to give rise to individual differences
akin to those most extensively studied by psy-
E
chologists (Buss 2009). For example, in a man-
ner that mirrors developmental personality
theories in psychology, a range of animal behav-
ioral syndromes have been modelled as state-
dependent strategies fixed by critical stressors in
early development (Sih 2011), some of which
show their own niche of frequency dependence
akin to extreme personality variants in humans
(Nettle 2006). Some variants, such as the
winner-loser aggression dynamic studied by
Chase et al. (1994), do not track a single early
state but instead operate on a cumulative “push
your luck” logic where one’s strategy is deter-
mined by how long in one’s life an aggressive
state was able to yield victories. Furthermore,
even for state-dependent strategies that are not
constrained, in principle, from switching
repeatedly within one’s life history, cooperation
strategies are often more valuable when they
are at their most predictable, producing a com-
binatorial pressure for strategies with positive
frequency dependence to remain consistent
even when switching is a live option (see
Wolf and Weissing 2010).
Conclusion
Overall, Evolutionary Game Theory provides a
wide range of concepts and analytical models
that can help researchers in personality and
individual differences discover the mechanisms
that both cause and maintain the human varia-
tions that they study, opening up not only new
avenues for effective studies but grounds to
further integrate the insights of their discipline
1440
with biology and evolutionary science more
broadly (Marsh and Boag 2013).
Cross-References
▶ Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness
(EEA)
▶ Evolutionary Perspective
References
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rationality: Boundaries and procedures. Brazilian Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 30(3), 455–472.
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Chase, I. D., Bartolomeo, C., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1994).
Aggressive interactions and inter-contest interval -how
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protection principle. Behavioral Ecology, 5, 159–170.
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Farthing, G. W. (2004). Attitudes toward heroic and non-
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tion and Human Behavior, 26(2), 171–185.
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the unification of the behavioral sciences. Princeton:
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Henly, S. E., Ostdiek, A., Blackwell, E., Knutie, S.,
Dunlap, A. S., & Stephens, D. W. (2008). The
discounting-by-interruptions hypothesis: Model and
experiment. Behavioural Ecology, 19, 154–162.
Johnstone, R. A., & Manica, A. (2011). Evolution of per-
sonality differences in leadership. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 108, 8373–8378.
Lewontin, R. C. (1961). Evolution and the theory of
games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1(3), 382–403.
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logical Sciences, 365(1560), 3977–3990.
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gration. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 655.
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McNamara, J. M. (2013). Towards a richer evolutionary
game theory. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 10,
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ematics, 54, 286–295.
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Evolutionary Personality
Psychology
▶ Early Environmental Effects on Personality and
Individual Differences
Evolutionary Perspective
Evolutionary Perspective
Bianca L. Kahl1 and Phillip S. Kavanagh1,2,3
1
The School of Psychology, Social Work and
Social Policy, University of South Australia,
Adelaide, SA, Australia
2
ISN Psychology, Institute for Social
Neuroscience, Heidelberg, VIC, Australia
3
The Florey Institute for Neuroscience and Mental
Health, Heidelberg, VIC, Australia
Synonyms
Evolutionary Psychology; Evolutionary Theory;
Human Evolution
Definition
An evolutionary perspective of personality and
individual differences proposes that our personal-
ities and individual differences have evolved, in
part, to provide us with some form of adaptive
advantage in the context of survival and reproduc-
tion. This perspective is an evolutionary psychol-
ogy perspective, which in itself is based on
biological evolutionary theory. Evolutionary psy-
chology integrates psychological theory with evo-
lutionary biology, in an effort to understand traits,
cognition, and behaviors, and how individuals
may differ across these in light of achieving their
evolutionary goals.
Introduction
Evolutionary perspectives of personality and indi-
vidual differences are attempts at explaining our
human traits and characteristics at a species level,
group level (e.g., male and female differences,
differences in specific personality traits), and at
an individual level (i.e., how each of us are unique
in some aspect). To fully understand how various
evolutionary perspectives explain these similari-
ties, differences, and the various functions of these
behaviors, it is first useful to have a basic
1441
understanding of evolutionary processes and
how they shape the traits, characteristics, and
behaviors of organisms in general.
Evolutionary Theory: A Brief
Background
In 1859, Darwin published his revolutionary
work On the Origin of Species by Means of Nat-
E
ural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life. In short, the pro-
cess of natural selection follows along these
lines: organisms generally produce more offspring
than can realistically survive given environmental
conditions and then themselves reproduce; those
variations that lead an organism to survive, there-
fore, lead to more decedents, with those dece-
dents inheriting the variations that led to their
ancestors’ success; those organisms with variants
that unsuccessfully mesh with the environment
are selected out; and over time, the successful
variants come to characterize the entire species
(Darwin 1859). Natural selection is often er-
roneously reduced to “survival of the fittest”;
however, it is more like nonsurvival of the least
fit – you do not have to run faster than the lion,
you just need to be faster than the slowest. Within
this process, competition within the same species
for limited available resources is a crucial driver
of determining a successful variation (e.g., longer
beak = more nectar).
Reproduction is as equally important as sur-
vival. That is, if an organism survives but does not
reproduce, the genes that may have led to its
unique survival do not get passed down through
the generations. Likewise, if an organism repro-
duces but its offspring do not survive long enough
to reproduce the genetic lines are broken. Having
to successfully reproduce brings along with it its
own set of unique problems – finding and securing
a mate whose individual characteristics will likely
enhance the survival of any resulting offspring.
The task of successfully finding a mate will be
different for males and females as they have dif-
ferent reproductive capacities and costs. For
example, human males can father multiple chil-
dren from puberty until the time they die, with the
1442
minimum reproductive effort of a few minutes,
whereas human females have a finite number of
eggs and have a minimal reproductive effort of
numbers of years (i.e., pregnancy plus nursing).
These differences in reproductive capacities and
costs lead males in general to be less selective and
females in general to be more selective with
regard to choosing a mate for reproduction
(Trivers 1972).
Sexual selection is a process whereby traits
and characteristics that afford some benefit in
mating are selected for over time and result in
sex typical traits and characteristics, for example,
the vast difference in body mass between males
and females of many species (Darwin 1880).
There are two processes involved in sexual se-
lection: intersexual competition – members of
one sex selecting mates based on preferences
for particular characteristics (e.g., body symmetry
as an indicator of good genetic material); and
intrasexual competition – members of the same
sex competing with each other, with the winner of
these competitions gaining greater access to sex-
ual partners (e.g., having greater access to or being
able to provide more needed resources). Over
time, certain traits come to be characteristic of
each sex as those that possess desirable traits are
selected for more frequently as mates, thus pass-
ing on their genes to their offspring and so on
(Tooby and Cosmides 2015).
There are three products of the evolutionary
process: adaptations, by-products of adaptations
(exaptations and spandrels), and noise or random
variation (Buss et al. 1998). Adaptations are the
primary product of selection and can be thought of
as a “reliably developing structure in the organ-
ism, which, because it meshes with the recurrent
structure of the world, causes the solution to an
adaptive problem” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992,
p. 104). Exaptations are adaptations that initially
arose through natural selection and were subse-
quently co-opted for another function (e.g., large
human brain enabling speech), whereas spandrels
are features that are not the result of an adaptation
but a side effect of the adaptive process and have
been subsequently co-opted for another purpose
(e.g., reading, writing). Random noise is neutral
with regard to selection (Buss et al. 1998).
Evolutionary Perspective
Evolutionary Psychology: The Basics
At the species level, all modern humans have
come from a long line of various ancestors that
successfully survived and reproduced over a
period of millennia (Wood and Boyle 2016). Mod-
ern humans therefore carry the traits and mecha-
nisms that led to our ancestors’ and ultimately our
success. These traits and mechanisms include the
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors (i.e., psycho-
logical mechanisms) that have increased our
chances of survival and reproduction. Therefore,
it stands to reason that if our biology is under the
influence of the evolutionary processes, so is our
psychology.
Within the evolutionary psychology para-
digm, there are three key premises that determine
whether something is considered to be an evolved
psychological trait – these are: domain specificity,
numerousness, and functionality (Buss 1995).
Domain specificity refers to the idea that adapta-
tions are developed by evolutionary processes to
solve specialized adaptive problems. Numerous-
ness is the expectation that there are many dif-
ferent psychological adaptations as different
adaptations are required to solve different adap-
tive problems. Finally, functionality explains that
psychological adaptations are designed to achieve
particular adaptive goals (Buss 1995). Many of
our psychological adaptations have evolved to
assist us in solving specific adaptive problems
(i.e., anything that impedes survival or repro-
duction), as well as aid in increasing fitness and
reproductive success.
Evolution and selection have largely focused
on a species-typical view, and in the case of
humans, human universals. Selection has been
considered a homogenizing process, by which
favored traits are dispersed throughout the popu-
lation, leading to species-level characteristics that
all individuals share. Up until more recently,
individual differences and personality variation
have merely been considered random noise or a
basic material that selection operates upon, with
little research and theories exploring the poten-
tial adaptive benefits of such differences. There
are many powerful theories that explain species-
typical adaptation, including the theory of natural
Evolutionary Perspective
selection, the theory of reciprocal altruism, and
kin-selection theory, as well as theories exploring
sex differences, including the theory of sexual
selection. Through combining these larger theo-
ries with principles of modern psychology,
evolutionary psychology has given rise to a
number of unique theories that explain human
perceptions/cognitions, emotions, and behaviors;
for example, error management theory (Haselton
and Buss 2000), sexual strategies theory (Buss
and Schmitt 1993), and social exchange theory
(Cosmides and Tooby 2005). All these psy-
chological theories have made a significant con-
tribution to evolutionary literature and the
understanding of human behavior; however,
theories that explain personality variation and
individual differences have not received as
much attention. This is most likely a result on the
long-standing foundational assumption of evo-
lutionary biology that natural selection reduces
heritable individual differences, spreading ad-
vantageous traits throughout the population, with
these traits eventually becoming universal. More
recently, there has been growth in evidence
that these individual differences are not simply
by-products of adaptation, but are in fact central
to evolved psychological mechanisms, traits,
and behavioral functioning. Indeed, there is also
emerging evidence that personality is not limited
to just humans, with domesticated cats identified
as having similar personality traits to humans (i.e.,
“The Feline Five”; see Litchfield et al. 2017.
Evolutionary Psychology, Personality,
and Individual Differences
The field of evolutionary psychology has recently
experienced a substantial increase in the under-
standing of personality and individual differences
utilizing an evolutionary framework. Evolu-
tionary psychology plays an important role in
understanding personality and individual differ-
ences, rectifying one of the shortcomings of gen-
eral personality research. That is, rather than
merely describing individual differences, evolu-
tionary psychology endeavors to understand why
they exist and to what purpose they serve.
1443
There has been growing evidence that person-
ality and individual differences are developed and
maintained by selective processes, not simply
selected out in the drive toward human universals
or species-typical traits. Personality variation and
individual differences can no longer be ignored
as these differences are extremely important and
carry considerable consequence. Individuals have
been found to differ on a number of characteris-
tics, including personality, attitudes, mating strat-
E
egies, religious affiliations, political orientations,
general intelligence and cognitive abilities, as well
as worldviews (Buss and Penke 2015).
There has been a remarkable amount of cross-
cultural evidence suggesting that individuals dif-
fer on at least six major personality dimensions, as
measured by the five-factor model: extraversion,
agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and
emotional stability, and the six-factor HEXACO
model that adds honesty-humility as a sixth trait
(e.g., Ashton and Lee 2007; John et al. 2008;
McCrae and Costa Jr. 2008; McCrae et al. 2008;
McCrae et al. 2005). These traits have all shown
stability over time and situation, with many per-
sonality traits even demonstrating stability over
decades (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000).
Furthermore, all these individual differences
have shown moderate heritability, ranging from
30% to 80% (Bratko et al. 2017; A. M. Johnson
et al. 2008; Turkheimer et al. 2014; Vukasović and
Bratko 2015). There is a reasonable amount of
variation in the heritability coefficients; however,
the findings from these behavioral genetics stud-
ies indicate that these traits do show genetic var-
iation and therefore are potentially subject to
evolutionary selection (W. Johnson et al. 2011).
Individual differences in personality traits have
shown impressive ability in predicting objectively
measured behaviors (Fleeson and Gallagher
2009) as well as predicting general life outcomes
(Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006). Individual dif-
ferences in personality influence both health and
life expectancy (Caspi et al. 2005; B. P. Chapman
et al. 2011; Turiano et al. 2012), mating strategies
(Nettle 2005; Nettle and Clegg 2008), social
behavior (Buchanan et al. 2005), and reproductive
success (Eaves et al. 1990). For example, extra-
version has been found to predict access to a
1444
greater number of sexual partners – promoting
reproductive success (Nettle 2005). Conscien-
tiousness has been found to predict occupational
and marital outcomes as well as positive health
outcomes, and in turn longevity (Bogg and
Roberts 2004; Roberts et al. 2007). Furthermore,
agreeableness has been found to predict the for-
mation of reciprocal social alliances, peer accep-
tance, and friendship (Ozer and Benet-Martínez
2006). These individual differences as well as
many others can be systematically linked with a
number of different components that all contribute
to our evolutionary fitness.
Individual differences are ubiquitous, herita-
ble, demonstrate stability over time, and have
significant consequences for domains specific to
evolutionary fitness, with these differences pre-
dicting both objective behavior and also likely
life outcomes. Without these heritable individ-
ual differences, selection – the process respon-
sible for creating and maintaining adaptations –
could not occur. Evolutionary selection acts
upon these individual differences, and this can
be recognized in contemporary societies, as we
continue to adapt to our ever-changing
environments.
Three Evolutionary Perspectives of
Individual Differences
Environmental triggers of individual differ-
ences. The evolutionary framework identifies
three main sources of individual differences.
First, environmental triggers of individual differ-
ences. These are the individual differences that
arise from universal adaptations when the expres-
sions of such traits are dependent on the environ-
ment. This perspective has been repeatedly
demonstrated through research in early-life father
absence and an individual’s selection of sexual
strategy (Belsky et al. 1991). Research has found
that individuals who grow up in father-absent
homes during the first 5 years of their lives are
more likely to adopt a sexual strategy character-
ized by early sexual maturation, early sexual
activity, and a short-term sexual strategy (Ellis
et al. 2003; Ellis et al. 1999; Quinlan 2003).
Evolutionary Perspective
Adaptive self-assessment of heritable indi-
vidual differences. The second proposed source
of individual differences is adaptive self-
assessment of heritable individual differences.
That is, heritable individual differences are con-
tingent on other traits. This is when an individual
evaluates their strengths and weaknesses helping
them to choose a successful strategy. For example,
an individual could choose to engage in two dif-
ferent social strategies – an aggressive strategy
characterized by physical force or a nonaggressive
strategy characterized by cooperativeness. How-
ever, the strategy they choose is contingent on
their size and strength. Individuals who are larger
and more muscular pursue a more aggressive
strategy than those who are smaller and less mus-
cular (Ishikawa et al. 2001; Sell et al. 2012).
Through a process of adaptive self-assessment,
individuals can determine what strategy would
be more successful given their physical traits
and ability, creating stable individual differences
in levels of aggression and cooperation. In this
case, the tendency to be more aggressive or more
cooperative is not based on a heritable trait; rather
it is contingent on heritable physical qualities –
reactively heritable (Tooby and Cosmides 1990).
An example of how individual differences may be
contingent on other traits with regard to personal-
ity is demonstrated in a study that found a combi-
nation of physical attractiveness and physical
strength positively predicted extraversion – those
who were stronger and more attractive were also
more extraverted (Lukaszewski and Roney 2011).
Frequency-dependent strategic individual
differences. The final proposed source of individ-
ual differences is frequency-dependent strategic
individual differences. The process of selection
generally eliminates heritable variation, replacing
the less successful variants with the more success-
ful variants, resulting in species-typical adapta-
tions that show little to no heritable variation.
However, in some cases, two or more heritable
variants can exist within a population. An exam-
ple of this at the most basic level is biological sex.
As humans are a sexually reproductive species,
the two sexes exist in approximately equal num-
bers as a result of frequency-dependent selection.
If one sex was to become rare in comparison to the
Evolutionary Perspective
other, selection would produce an increased num-
ber of the rarer sex (Tooby and Cosmides 1990).
Furthermore, females’ sexual strategies are also
thought to be maintained by frequency-dependent
selection. That is, short-term and long-term sexual
strategies of women are maintained in the popu-
lation at a frequency where reproductive benefits
of strategies are equal (Gangestad and Simpson
1990; Thornhill and Gangestad 2008).
Evolutionary Genetics of Personality and
Individual Differences
Evolution by natural selection tends to produce
species-typical traits, resulting in genetic variants
that continue to replicate throughout the popula-
tion, increasing frequency over generations until it
becomes a universal trait. However, it is not only
these universal traits that appear to be a product
of natural selection. Geneticists have also found
a surprising amount of genetic individual differ-
ences in many species, including humans. There
are multiple mechanisms that could explain the
persistent genetic variation in heritable personal-
ity differences: selective neutrality, mutation-
selection, and balancing selection.
Selective neutrality. Selective neutrality sug-
gests that mutations are invisible to selection
and not consistently relevant to fitness (Tooby
and Cosmides 1990). Selective neutrality occurs
when fitness-neutral mutations – those that have
no effect on survival or reproduction – accumulate
increasing the genetic variance in a trait. This
perspective focuses on universal psychological
adaption, merely reducing individual differences
to minor evolutionary noise (Penke et al. 2007).
Selective neutrality as a mechanism for explaining
personality variation has been heavily refuted.
First, as neutral mutations are unaffected by natu-
ral selection, the only evolutionary process that
can affect neutral genetic variation is genetic drift,
which tends to decrease genetic variance; how-
ever, personality variation has shown to be stable
and persistent over time (Penke et al. 2007). The
strongest argument against selective neutrality is
that it implies no adaptive purpose of personality;
however, there are robust findings supporting the
1445
predictive association between personality and
life outcomes. Human personality traits have
been found to influence outcomes in many areas
of life (Ozer and Benet-Martínez 2006), including
both health and life expectancy (Caspi et al. 2005;
B. P. Chapman et al. 2011; Turiano et al. 2012),
mating strategies (Nettle 2005; Nettle and Clegg
2008), social behavior (Buchanan et al. 2005), and
reproductive success (Eaves et al. 1990).
Mutation-selection balance. A subsequent
E
mechanism that could explain genetic variation
in personality is mutation-selection balance.
Although selection eventually removes all harm-
ful mutations, the less harmful mutations are often
passed down through generations, and could be
considered a possible source of individual differ-
ences (Penke et al. 2007). Mutation-selection
balance implies that there is either an optimal
level of a personality trait and deviations from
the optimum are marked by mutations that are
selected against, or that one end of a personality
dimension would be consistently more adaptive;
whereas, the other end would be marked by muta-
tions (Gangestad 2011; Penke et al. 2007; Verweij
et al. 2012). Mutation-selection balance is a plau-
sible mechanism for maintaining genetic variance
in traits that are reflective of overall functionality
of an organism, including health and intelligence.
However, there is much debate over whether
mutation-selection balance is responsible for the
ongoing variation in personality traits, with some
arguing that genetic variation in personality traits
have been maintained by mutation-selection bal-
ance (Verweij et al. 2012), while others argue that
personality traits do not match the typical features
of mutation-selection balance (i.e., high additive
genetic variation, inbreeding and outbreeding,
and an elusive molecular genetic basis; Penke
et al. 2007). There is currently little evidence for
mutation-selection balance playing any role
genetic variance in personality traits (Camperio
Ciani 2010; Penke et al. 2007).
Balancing selection. Unlike selective neutral-
ity and mutation-selection balance, balancing
selection is a mechanism whereby selection itself
maintains the genetic variance (Penke et al. 2007).
Although heritable genetic variation is often the
result of mutation, if these traits promote fitness
1446
they are likely to be maintained and selected for
over time. Balancing selection occurs when selec-
tion maintains genetic variation, but in a way that
different levels of the traits are adaptive in differ-
ent environmental conditions. There are multiple
forms of balancing selection; however, the two
most relevant types for personality variation are
frequency-dependent selection and environmental
heterogeneity in fitness optima.
Frequency-dependent selection. Frequency-
dependent selection is where the fitness of one
phenotype is dependent on its frequency in the
population, relative to other phenotypes. An
example of frequency-dependent selection in per-
sonality is in explaining the behavioral character-
istic of psychopathy (e.g., exploitation, cheating,
and deception). Cheating is an exploitation strat-
egy that can be used to promote short-term
mating success, but the success of this strategy is
dependent on its frequency within the population.
That is, as the number of cheaters in the population
increases relative to the number of cooperators,
the relative success of this cheating strategy
decreases as there are fewer cooperators to exploit
(Buss and Duntley 2008). In the case of this
exploitation strategy, its success is dependent on
the balance within the environment – it remains
effective as long as it is rare.
Environmental heterogeneity in fitness
optima. This perspective looks at how selection
pressures can vary overtime and situation, and
how this may favor different levels of certain
traits. That is, selection may favor different levels
of personality traits for different environments.
For example, some environments may favor
risk-taking extraverts and novelty-seeking, or
aggression, whereas others may favor risk-averse
introverts, or cooperativeness (Eisenberg et al.
2008; Penke et al. 2007). Research has shown
that not only do environments favor certain traits,
but people are also likely to select particular envi-
ronments based on their traits, in an effort to show
the highest adaptive benefit (Figueredo et al.
2009). That is, humans are very apt in niche
picking, which helps them to live and thrive in
environments in which their traits demonstrate the
greatest adaptive benefit. This has been demon-
strated through migration studies, which explain
Evolutionary Perspective
that migration patterns can be influenced by per-
sonality traits (Camperio Ciani and Capiluppi
2011). From the perspective of balancing selec-
tion, the maintenance of genetic variation in
personality can be considered somewhat self-
supportive (Penke et al. 2007).
Conceptualizing Individual Differences
from an Evolutionary Perspective
Whatever the origin of individual differences,
it is clear that they play an important role in
solving adaptive problems and promoting evolu-
tionary fitness. Individuals differ in the adaptive
problems in which they encounter, selecting
some and avoiding others. As humans we face a
number of situations – defined by adaptive
problems – including, but not limited to, choosing
an appropriate partner for mating and social al-
liances, attracting desirable mates in light of
intrasexual competition, protecting relationships
from mate poaching, allocating limited resources
to kin, resolving social conflict within ones group,
and negotiating status (Buss and Penke 2015).
Some personality characteristics are considered
strategic individual differences that are utilized
to help different individuals solve these adaptive
problems. As these adaptive problems have
been encountered and solved by humans for
many years, engendering similar fitness payoffs,
humans have developed sensitivity to cues that
signal the presence of adaptive problems as well
as information relevant to solving these prob-
lems. These evolved psychological mechanisms
are referred to as adaptations (Buss and Penke
2015). These adaptations help individuals to rec-
ognize which aspects of the environment are con-
sidered psychologically important.
The personality characteristics and individual
differences of others in your surrounding environ-
ment also play an important role in solving adap-
tive problems. As such, we have developed a
difference-detecting adaptation, which allows us
to detect and act upon individual differences. For
example, humans have developed a personality
assessment adaptation, where they can gauge the
level of narcissism in others, to help avoid conflict
Evolutionary Perspective
of interest within social alliances. This ability to
detect narcissism would be valuable when trying
to determine how to best allocate your resources
to kin. If you were to allocate resources to a kin
member who is high on narcissism, they are more
likely to be exploitative and selfish, in comparison
to kin members who are low on narcissism (Buss
and Penke 2015). Therefore, the ability to know
the level of narcissism in kin members provides
valuable information when making resource allo-
cation decisions, ensuring that you can make deci-
sions that are going to result in the highest return.
Furthermore, this adaptation to recognize and
act on individual differences is important when
choosing who would be an appropriate partner.
When selecting a mate, we are not interested in
species-typical characteristics (e.g., bipedal walk-
ing or opposable thumbs); rather it is the indi-
vidual differences that give people a competitive
edge and that make them more or less appealing.
We are interested in how people differ in qualities,
such as attractiveness, intelligence, aggressive-
ness, health, status, and dependability (Buss and
Penke 2015). Typically, women have a preference
for men who have a greater resource potential,
higher status, good health, and who are more
intelligent; whereas, men show a preference for
youth and attractiveness, as a sign of good health
and fertility. These sex-differentiated preferences
are a result of the differences in adaptive problems
that each sex face.
The ability to detect personality traits in hu-
mans is also important in detecting undesirable
qualities in potential partners, such as narcissism.
For example, if you were to select a partner who is
higher on narcissism, there is an increased likeli-
hood that they will be unfaithful, in compari-
son to a partner lower on narcissism (Buss and
Shackelford 1997). This ability is extremely
important as infidelity can be very damaging to
one’s reproductive success.
Interestingly, the individual differences that
help to solve adaptive problems can also create
adaptive problems or interfere with the solu-
tion to existing adaptive problems. Consider the
difference-detecting adaptation, assisting us in
predicting who will cheat in a social exchange,
who is likely to act in an exploitative manner, or
1447
employ costly strategies to increase their fitness.
This difference-detecting adaptation helps us to
detect and avoid these individuals to ensure we
are not taken advantage of, but in turn this re-
duces the effectiveness of the person’s exploit-
ative strategy in solving the adaptive problems
they may be facing. This raises the issue of sexual
conflict and the antagonistic co-evolutionary
arms race (Arnqvist and Rowe 2002; Buss 2017;
T. Chapman et al. 2003).
E
A classic evolutionary adaptive problem that
women face is the issue of being sexually ex-
ploited by men. There are great costs of falling
victim to an exploitative strategy, especially for
women, including potential damage to reputation
and mate value, as well as substantial reproductive
costs. Due to the significant fitness cost of falling
victim to such a strategy, women have developed
the ability to detect which men are more likely to
be implementing these exploitative strategies,
allowing them to selectively avoid these men
(Buss 2017). However, now the men who employ
these sexual exploitative strategies face the issue
of women being able to detect and avoid them.
The solution to this problem is also a difference-
detecting adaptation, assisting these men in
identifying more vulnerable victims (e.g., naïve,
trusting, or gullible) allowing them to carry
out their sexually exploitative strategies (Arak
and Enquist 1993; Buss and Duntley 2008;
T. Chapman et al. 2003). The ability to detect
and act upon personality and individual differ-
ences is relevant to all humans in solving their
respective adaptive problems, whether this is
engaging in social exchanges, selecting a suitable
partner, avoiding people who may inflict fitness-
damaging strategies, or finding people with whom
your selected strategy may be more effective.
Life History Theory
Life history theory elucidates that all life requires
the capturing and allocation of energy; however,
these resources are limited and come at a cost.
That is, individuals have finite energy budgets and
cannot expend unlimited resources, maximizing
all life domains simultaneously. Life history
1448
theory offers a broad formulation of the major
trade-offs, relative to energy and resource alloca-
tion. The major trade-off is between somatic
efforts (i.e., growth and body maintenance) and
reproduction. Individuals can enhance their fit-
ness in two ways: (1) investing in traits that affect
the age schedule of mortality or (2) investing in
traits that affect the age schedule of fertility (Del
Giudice et al. 2015). Life history theory explicates
how organisms allocate energy to different life
domain in an effort to maximize their fitness,
including passing on their genetic material.
Life history traits influence individuals’ inclu-
sive fitness, expressed through changes in mortal-
ity and/or fertility, with strategies targeted at
enhancing the longevity or fertility of offspring
as well the parents’ own fecundity and lifespan.
Life history theory describes three main funda-
mental trade-offs of energy allocation, with each
of the selected traits having contrasting effects
on fertility and mortality, or on the fitness com-
ponents of offspring or oneself (Del Giudice
et al. 2015). First, the present-future reproduction
trade-off, where individuals can either allocate
energy to reproducing in the present or they can
allocate energy to body maintenance and future
reproduction. In this trade-off, the energy allo-
cated to growth and body maintenance reduces
fertility at younger ages, but increases fertility at
an older age. Either of these options do however
come at a cost – early reproduction may poten-
tially mean not being able to reproduce in the
future, and future reproduction at the cost of not
producing offspring now. For future reproduction,
there is also the potential risk of not surviving
long enough to reach sexual maturity and re-
produce – especially if the organism’s current
environment has a high mortality risk. The second
trade-off is the quality-quantity trade-off of off-
spring, where an individual decides to have a large
number of offspring or have fewer offspring, but
heavily invest in them. In the trade-off between
quality-quantity of offspring, an individual can
allocate energy resources (e.g., time spent nurtur-
ing and feeding) to existing offspring, which will
increase the quality of offspring, but in turn will
reduce their own survival and/or fertility. The final
trade-off is mating effort versus parental effort,
where you can invest more energy in mating and
Evolutionary Perspective
attracting multiple sexual partners, or securing
one partner and investing in parenting efforts. If
an individual chooses to engage in tasks to
increase fertility, such as increasing mating
frequency, they may be simultaneously com-
promising survival due to a cost to immune func-
tioning. Each of these fundamental trade-offs and
selected traits contribute to an individual’s fit-
ness, but they do involve substantial energy
investment, invoking both costs and benefits
(Kavanagh and Kahl 2016).
The optimal trade-offs between allocation
strategies will differ depending on environ-
mental factors as well as risk of morbidity-
mortality. These strategies are referred to as life
history strategies and are conceptualized along a
fast-slow continuum. Life history strategies can
be defined as functionally complex phenotypes,
which have resulted from the integration of
physiological and behavioral traits as an adaptive
solution to trade-offs and environmental pres-
sures (Del Giudice et al. 2015). Faster strategies
develop in response to unpredictable, unstable,
and harsh environments, and are characterized
by sensation seeking, risk-taking, disinhibition,
and impulsivity, low levels of conscientiousness
and agreeableness, and promiscuous sexuality,
with early sexual maturation. In contrast, slower
strategies develop in response to predictable and
stable environments, with few risks, and are char-
acterized by risk aversion, behavioral inhibition,
extremes of conscientiousness and agreeableness,
restrained sexuality, and delayed sexual matura-
tion (Del Giudice and Ellis 2016; Kaplan and
Gangestad 2005).
Humans vary along the fast-slow life history
continuum as a response to their environment and
competing demands throughout their life cycle,
resulting in a number of individual differences
and personality styles (Giosan and Wyka 2009;
Hurst and Kavanagh 2017). For example, individ-
uals who have a short life expectancy, potentially
as a result of an unstable and risky environment,
are more likely to discount future rewards with
preference for short-term gains. What may be
considered an undesirable personality, character-
ized by impulsivity and risk-taking, can be con-
ceptualized as an adaptive strategy developed
in response to the unpredictability of their
Evolutionary Perspective
environment and the appraisal of their potentially
shorter expectancy (Jonason et al. 2017). In con-
trast, individuals who live in a more stable and
predictable environment are more likely to be
future orientated and have higher levels of agree-
ableness and conscientiousness, as this is what is
considered adaptive in their given environment.
Life history theory has also been used to under-
stand individual differences in risk profiles of
developmental psychopathology. That is, varia-
tions in life history strategies could be useful in
determining individual differences in the likeli-
hood of developing a range of mental disorders,
with the life history perspective conceptualizing
psychopathology as a reflection of fast and slow
life history strategies. The proposed idea is that
the way an individual configures their life history
strategy may increase or decrease their risk of
developing a specific disorder or cluster of disor-
ders (Del Giudice 2016; Del Giudice and Ellis
2016; Hurst and Kavanagh 2017). For example,
traits typical of a faster life history strategy,
including impulsivity, disinhibition, risk-taking,
and presentism are considered indicative of
pathological self-impairment as per the general
diagnostic criteria of personality disorders; how-
ever, these traits could also be thought of as
behavioral dispositions that allow an individual
to suitably adapt and function in an unpredictable
environment (Kavanagh and Kahl 2016; Vall
et al. 2016). Overall, life history theory serves
as an evolutionary framework to organize and
understand species differences and sex differ-
ences, but also explain a number of individual
differences in physical growth, sexual matura-
tion, personality, and sexual, social, and parental
behaviors.
Conclusion
In the past, evolutionary psychology has largely
focused on species-typical adaptions and human
universals, ignoring the importance of individual
differences or merely reducing these differences
to random evolutionary noise. More recently there
has been an increased interest in and understand-
ing of these individual differences and the adap-
tive purpose they might serve. Humans have
1449
been found to differ on a number of personality
characteristics, including traits from the five-
factor model and the HEXACO model. These
traits show moderate heritability and demonstrate
stability over time and cross cultures. In addition
to personality, individuals differ on a number of
other factors including mating strategies, general
intelligence, cognitive abilities, and attitudes.
There are a number of explanations as to the
origins of these individual differences, including
E
genetics and heritability, reactive-heritability,
and environment-person interactions. Whatever
the origin, individual differences appear to be
selected for and developed as an adaptive re-
sponse to adaptive problems, having a substan-
tial influence on many domains that either
directly or indirectly contribute to our evolution-
ary fitness, including personality, health, mating,
social alliances, and longevity. In sum, although
research has largely focused on human univer-
sals, it may be our individual differences that
give us a competitive edge in achieving our evo-
lutionary goals.
Cross-References
▶ Competition
▶ Current Versus Future Reproduction Trade-
Offs
▶ Early Environmental Effects on Personality and
Individual Differences
▶ Evolved Psychological Mechanisms
▶ Extended Growth Versus Early Reproduction
▶ Genetics
▶ Inclusive Fitness
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Evolutionary Psychology
▶ Evolutionary Perspective
▶ Kin Relationships
▶ Sociobiology
Evolutionary Psychology and
the Emotions
Laith Al-Shawaf1,2 and David M. G. Lewis3
1
Department of Psychology and Interdisciplinary
Neuroscience Program, Bilkent University,
Ankara, Turkey
2
College of Life Sciences, Institute for Advanced
Study, Berlin, Germany
3
School of Psychology and Exercise Science,
Murdoch University, Murdoch, WA, Australia
Introduction: Evolutionary Approaches
to the Emotions
Charles Darwin launched the evolutionary study
of emotion with his 1872 book, The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals. However,
partly for historical reasons, the book had a nar-
row emphasis, focusing on the continuity of emo-
tional expression between humans and nonhuman
animals. The prevailing view in Darwin’s Victo-
rian England was that God had endowed humans
with specific facial muscles that He had specially
crafted to allow humans to communicate their
emotions to one another (e.g., Keltner et al.
2014). In such a social climate, Darwin’s goal
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
was to demonstrate to the scientific community
that human facial expressions bore the stamp of
their animal ancestry, and that close examination
of emotion expressions demonstrated the phylo-
genetic continuity between humans and other spe-
cies (Darwin 1872). In the century and a half since
the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of
Species (Darwin 1859), things have changed dra-
matically: the fact of evolution has been
established beyond any reasonable doubt, and
the theory of evolution is one of the most parsi-
monious, explanatorily successful, and predic-
tively powerful theories in all of science (Alcock
2009; Coyne 2009; Dawkins 2009; Dennett 1996;
Dobzhansky 1973). Now that there is no longer
any real (scientific) need to demonstrate that
humans share ancestry with all other species on
earth, scientists have found themselves free to
tackle a key question that Darwin largely avoided:
the evolved functions of emotions.
In the last few decades, evolutionists have
made considerable conceptual and empirical pro-
gress in understanding what emotions are and
why they evolved. There are several evolutionary
approaches in this tradition. The current entry
presents a theoretically powerful and empirically
promising contemporary approach that is closely
associated with evolutionary psychology and was
pioneered by John Tooby and Leda Cosmides
(Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Tooby and Cosmides
1990, 2008). We can refer to this perspective as
the coordinating mechanism view of the
emotions.
Coordinating Mechanisms: An
Evolutionary Psychological Approach
This evolutionary psychological perspective sug-
gests that emotions are coordinating mechanisms
whose evolved function is to coordinate a variety
of programs in the mind and body in the service of
solving a specific adaptive problem. For example,
fear coordinates programs in the service of pre-
venting or escaping danger (Tooby and Cosmides
1990; Marks and Nesse 1994), disgust regulates
mechanisms to prevent infection (Curtis et al.
2004; Oaten et al. 2009; Tybur et al. 2009), and
1453
sexual arousal orchestrates physiological and psy-
chological programs for an advantageous mating
opportunity (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b).
In their presentation of the coordinating mech-
anism approach, Tooby and Cosmides (1990;
Cosmides and Tooby 2000) suggest a list of pro-
grams regulated by the emotions, including:
(1) perceptual mechanisms, (2) attention,
(3) memory, (4) categorization, (5) motivational
priorities, (6) current goals, (7) information-
E
gathering adaptations, (8) specialized inference
mechanisms, (9) communication and expression,
(10) learning processes, (11) reflexes, (12) energy
level, mood, and effort allocation, (13) physiol-
ogy, and (14) behavior. The idea of the coordinat-
ing mechanisms approach is not that every
emotion is expected to regulate every program in
every instance of that emotion’s activation –
rather, the central idea is that emotions can be
best understood as regulatory mechanisms
whose evolved function is to coordinate a variety
of these programs to ensure their harmonious co-
activation in the service of solving an adaptive
problem.
Fear and Disgust as Illustrative Examples
Fear offers a useful illustration (Tooby and
Cosmides 1990; Cosmides and Tooby 2000).
When an organism is afraid of a potential threat
in the environment, a cascade of changes takes
place: perception becomes heightened (especially
to potential danger); attentional focus is narrowed
so that stimuli of less immediate relevance go
unnoticed; conceptual frameworks that cause
organisms to categorize stimuli as dangerous or
safe are activated while other conceptual frame-
works recede into the background; motivational
priorities change such that less urgent concerns
such as pathogen avoidance and status enhance-
ment fall by the wayside; and physiology shifts so
as to facilitate escape, for example by shunting
energy toward the muscles for flight (Tooby and
Cosmides 1990; Cosmides and Tooby 2000). The
central idea is that fear is a mode of operation for
the whole body and brain; a coordinating mecha-
nism that regulates a variety of physiological and
1454
psychological programs to facilitate the solution
of the adaptive problem at hand.
Disgust, an emotion whose complexity we are
just beginning to understand, provides a second
example. When a pathogen threat activates dis-
gust, many changes take place: attention is
narrowed (van Hooff et al. 2013), sexual arousal
becomes more difficult to achieve (Fleischman
et al. 2015), heart rate and skin conductance are
affected (Schienle et al. 2001; Vrana 1993), par-
ticipants are less willing to engage in potentially
pathogenic behaviors (Tybur et al. 2011), immune
responses are activated (Schaller et al. 2010),
avoidant behaviors are engaged (Mortensen et al.
2010), and people report feeling less extraverted
and less open to new experiences (Mortensen
et al. 2010). The key idea again is the same:
pathogen disgust is a coordinating mechanism
that regulates and synchronizes the activity of
programs in the body and mind to solve the adap-
tive problem of avoiding infection.
How Does This Approach Differ from
Previous Evolutionary Approaches?
This “coordinating mechanisms” view of the
emotions shares features with several other evo-
lutionary approaches to emotion. Key elements
of overlap include the view that emotions are
biological adaptations that evolved to serve a
function, that adaptive action would be difficult
or impossible without emotions, that many
emotions are cross-culturally universal, that our
emotions evolved from our hominin ancestors
and are phylogenetically related to the emotions
of other species, and that aversive emotions are
just as functional and beneficial as pleasant
emotions despite their inherent subjective
aversiveness.
That said, this approach also differs from other
evolutionary approaches in several key respects.
The following six are particularly important.
First, the coordinating mechanisms perspective
suggests that there is no principled, non-arbitrary
reason to draw a distinction between “basic” and
“non-basic” emotions (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b;
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
Tooby and Cosmides 1990; Cosmides and
Tooby 2000). There is no evolutionarily compel-
ling reason to privilege some emotions over
others, and no principled reason why the
privileged few should be limited to disgust,
anger, fear, sadness, joy, surprise, and sometimes
contempt (cf. Ekman 1992; Ekman and Cordaro
2011).
Second, most evolutionary accounts of emo-
tion have placed undue emphasis on survival to
the exclusion of reproduction. But evolutionary
scientists recognize that survival is important only
insofar as it facilitates reproduction: differential
reproductive success is the actual engine of the
evolutionary process (Alcock 2009; Hamilton
1964; Williams 1966). Both logic and empirical
evidence demonstrate that whenever survival and
reproduction conflict, the latter trumps the former
(Alcock 2009; Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b; Dawkins
1976; Williams 1966). Consistent with this fun-
damental evolutionary principle, the coordinating
mechanism approach expands the range of adap-
tive problems emotions evolved to solve to
include other adaptive problems tributary to
reproductive success, including problems such
as acquiring mates, retaining mates, competing
with intrasexual rivals, parenting and
childrearing, investing in kin, and more. Conse-
quently, the coordinating mechanism perspective
expands the range of evolved emotions to include
romantic love, parental love, sexual jealousy,
guilt, pride, shame, and many others (Al-Shawaf
et al. 2015b). An emotion does not need to facil-
itate survival per se; if it evolved to solve any
adaptive problem tributary to reproductive suc-
cess, then it is an evolved emotion.
Third, there is no need to stipulate that an
evolved emotion must have a recognizable signal
or facial expression (Tooby and Cosmides 1990).
Whether or not a given emotion evolved an
accompanying signal depends on the ancestral
costs and benefits of displaying that emotion to
others (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b). Evolved emo-
tions can have accompanying facial expressions
that are fixed and universal, or changeable and
context-dependent, or they may not come with
an accompanying facial expression at all.
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
Fourth, whereas other evolutionary approaches
often insist that an emotion needs to also exist in
other species for it to qualify as an evolved emo-
tion, an evolutionary psychological approach does
not. Many adaptations are unique to one species,
but this does not make them any less evolved or
“basic.” On this view, an evolved emotion can be
shared with other species, unique to humans, or
shared with other species but with uniquely human
features (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b).
Fifth, an evolutionary psychological perspec-
tive is integrative and inclusive – rather than
insisting on the primacy of one particular aspect
of emotions, such as physiology, behavioral out-
put, facial expressions, or subjective feelings
(phenomenology), the coordinating mechanism
approach regards all of these elements as impor-
tant components of emotion. Further, it links them
together with other cognitive and perceptual ele-
ments (e.g., attention, memory, conceptual cate-
gorization) to paint a picture of emotion that is
more comprehensive and less narrowly defined
than approaches that elevate one particular ele-
ment, such as physiology or phenomenology,
above all else (Tooby and Cosmides 1990;
Cosmides and Tooby 2000).
And sixth – obviously but importantly – this
approach differs in its definition of emotions as
evolved neurocognitive programs whose function
is to regulate psychological and physiological
mechanisms in the service of solving an adaptive
problem.
What Are the Benefits of This
Evolutionary Psychological Approach?
There are at least four major benefits of this
approach. First, it provides a non-arbitrary way
of classifying emotions. In particular, it avoids the
unwarranted basic versus non-basic division and
eschews the arbitrary insistence on particular
emotion elements such as facial expressions, dis-
tinctive physiology, or presence in other species in
order for an emotion to count as “basic” or “fun-
damental.” Second, in broadening the range of
adaptive problems that emotions have evolved to
1455
solve, this perspective has heuristic value,
pointing researchers toward emotions that have
so far received scant attention from evolutionary
emotions researchers, such as romantic love,
parental love, regret, guilt, embarrassment, pride,
shame, and gratitude. Third, and perhaps most
important, this perspective provides a principled,
systematic method for generating a priori predic-
tions about emotions: the method of evolutionary
task analysis (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b; Marr 1982;
E
see also Lewis et al. in press). An evolutionary
task analysis for an emotion consists of several
key questions: (1) what adaptive problem, if any,
did this emotion evolve to solve?, (2) which sub-
tasks must be solved in the solution of this adap-
tive problem?, (3) which information-processing
programs are capable of solving these subtasks?,
and (4) how should these programs be coordi-
nated to deliver a well-designed solution to this
adaptive problem? (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b).
Finally, this perspective can be used to gener-
ate subtle and nuanced predictions about individ-
ual differences in emotion as well as context-
specific effects on emotion (Al-Shawaf et al.
2015b). For example, a task analysis might sug-
gest that individuals who are immunocompro-
mised should exhibit higher levels of disgust
(Fleischman and Fessler 2011; Al-Shawaf and
Lewis 2013); that whether disgust leads to avoid-
ance or approach may depend on who else is
present in one’s immediate environment (e.g.,
approach and kill the pathogen vector if it might
endanger one’s offspring; Al-Shawaf et al.
2015b); or that men’s psychological and physio-
logical programs return to baseline after orgasm
more rapidly than do women’s, but that this dis-
crepancy is attenuated for men who are oriented
toward committed long-term mating (Al-Shawaf
et al. 2015b). The key point is that an evolutionary
psychological approach to the emotions offers a
principled method for generating nuanced
hypotheses about individual differences and con-
text effects. This approach is theoretically power-
ful, empirically promising, and to our knowledge,
unique among theories of emotions in its capacity
to generate truly a priori hypotheses – let alone
such diverse and nuanced ones.
1456
Is This Approach Making Empirical
Progress?
This perspective is relatively new, and only a tiny
fraction of its potential has been tapped. Never-
theless, there has been some important initial pro-
gress. For example, this perspective was recently
used to generate an array of novel hypotheses
about the effects of disgust on specialized infer-
ence mechanisms, information gathering, and
memory (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b). Many of
these hypotheses include nuanced predictions
about individual differences and the effects of
context. All of these hypotheses were generated
a priori using the coordinating mechanism
approach in conjunction with evolutionary task
analysis.
Importantly, this predictive power extends to
other psychophysiological programs that are not
usually regarded as emotions. For example,
despite its powerful effects on physiology, psy-
chology, and behavior, sexual arousal does not
appear in previous taxonomies of basic emotions
and is typically excluded from the category of
emotions altogether (e.g., Barrett et al. 2016;
Ekman 1992; Keltner et al. 2014). In contrast, an
evolutionary psychological approach regards sex-
ual arousal as a critical emotion that evolved to
solve one of the most important adaptive prob-
lems faced by sexually reproducing organisms –
the coordination of a number of disparate mecha-
nisms in the service of conception. Accordingly,
the coordinating mechanism approach has
recently been used to generate a host of novel
hypotheses about the effects of sexual arousal
and orgasm on memory, conceptual frameworks,
information gathering, specialized inference, and
learning (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b).
A similar logic may apply to hunger: hunger is
typically regarded as a “drive” rather than an
emotion, but it is an important psychophysiolog-
ical state that may coordinate a variety of pro-
grams in the body and mind in the service of
acquiring food. Recent work suggests that the
coordinating mechanism approach can be used
to generate a bounty of new hypotheses about
the effects of hunger and eating on perception,
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
attention, memory, problem-solving, and concep-
tual categorization (Al-Shawaf 2016).
Recent work on anger and shame is also highly
promising (Sell et al. 2009a, b; Sell 2011; Sznycer
et al. 2012, 2015, 2016). The recalibrational the-
ory of anger suggests that anger is triggered when
an organism detects evidence that another individ-
ual is placing insufficient value on its welfare. The
primary evolved function of anger, on this view, is
to “convince” the target of the anger to upregulate
the value he places on the angry individual’s wel-
fare (Sell et al. 2009). This work is guided by the
coordinating mechanism perspective: the central
idea motivating this research is that anger coordi-
nates physiology, attention, communication,
facial expressions, body posture, behavior, and
other psychological programs in order to cause
another individual to recalibrate the weight he
places on the angry individual’s welfare. This
research is relatively new but has already demon-
strated that: (a) the anger face is not an arbitrary
set of muscular contractions, but rather a specific
constellation of changes that increases the per-
ceived fighting ability of the angry individual
(Sell et al. 2014), (b) the conditions that trigger
anger are exactly what you would expect
according to the welfare-recalibration theory
(e.g., stronger anger is triggered when the cost to
the victim was large, the benefit to the perpetrator
was small, and the perpetrator knew exactly who
he was harming; Sell 2005; Sell et al. under
review), (c) the content of apologies and attempts
to decrease anger are also exactly what you would
expect according this theory (e.g., the benefit to
me was large, I thought the cost to you was small,
and/or I didn’t know you were the person incur-
ring the cost from my behavior; Sell 2005; Sell
et al. under review), and (d) individual differences
in anger thresholds are predictable a priori on the
basis of one’s bargaining power, such that those
who are better able to confer benefits and inflict
costs tend to anger more easily and more readily
(e.g., attractive women and attractive and muscu-
lar men; Sell et al. 2009).
Recent work on shame also points to the utility
of the coordinating mechanism approach. This
approach suggests that shame is a species-wide,
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
cross-culturally universal mechanism that
evolved as a defense against being devalued by
others (Sznycer et al. 2012, 2016). Guided by the
coordinating mechanism perspective, this
research proposes that shame coordinates changes
in physiology, perception, cognition, motivation,
and behavior in order to reduce the likelihood and
costs of social devaluation. This involves
(a) refraining from behaviors that may lead to
devaluation, (b) concealing information that may
lead to devaluation, and (c) minimizing the nega-
tive impact of devaluation when it does occur
(Sznycer et al. 2016). To this end, and consistent
with the coordinating mechanism approach,
researchers have discovered that shame motivates
the avoidance of behaviors and the concealment
of information that lead to devaluation
(Rockenbach and Milinski 2011), and that when
such information is discovered, shame leads an
individual to withdraw (Tangney et al. 1996),
accept subordination (Gilbert 2000), become
more cooperative (Masclet et al. 2003), and
appease social others (Keltner et al. 1997). Addi-
tionally, shame regulates endocrinology and
immunology, raising cortisol levels (Dickerson
and Kemeny 2004) and upregulating pro-
inflammatory cytokines to provide a defense
against infection (Dickerson et al. 2009).
The coordinating mechanism perspective on
the emotions has also led to important advances
in our understanding of pride, but space con-
straints prohibit us from discussing this research
in depth (see Sznycer et al. 2017; Tracy and
Robins 2007; Tracy et al. 2010, for more infor-
mation). Despite the relative youth of this theoret-
ical perspective and the novelty of the research
programs discussed above, researchers are using
this approach to make rapid gains in our under-
standing of emotions as varied as disgust
(Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b), sexual arousal
(Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b), hunger (Al-Shawaf
2016), anger (Sell et al. 2009a, b, 2014), shame
(Sznycer et al. 2012, 2015, 2016), and pride
(Sznycer et al. 2017; Tracy et al. 2010). The next
few years are sure to bring novel insights and new
discoveries – and to witness the extension of this
coordinating mechanism perspective to other
1457
emotions that are ripe for investigation within its
framework, including romantic love, parental
love, guilt, regret, gratitude, and many more.
Culture, Context, and Individual
Differences
Three theoretical sidenotes bear mentioning here.
First, an evolutionary psychological approach to
E
the emotions does not imply that emotions are
innate, rigid, and inflexible. As with the rest of
evolutionary psychology, our evolved neurocom-
putational emotion programs are built by the joint
interplay of genes and environment, and are
highly responsive to environmental input (Buss
1995; Confer et al. 2010; Tooby and Cosmides
1992). By definition, these emotions are inextri-
cably tied to what is going on in the environment
around us, and this evolutionary perspective on
the emotions would obviously not make sense if
one were to try to remove the environment from
the equation. An evolutionary psychological
approach to the emotions regards the environment
as critical in driving the evolution of the mecha-
nism in the first place, crucial in the ontogenetic
development of the mechanism, and indispens-
able as a trigger of the mechanism in the immedi-
ate present (see Buss 1995; Confer et al. 2010;
Lewis et al. in press). This evolutionary psycho-
logical perspective is thus environment-centered
at all three stages of the causal process: evolution
across generations, development within a genera-
tion, and immediate causation. Misinformed alle-
gations that evolutionary approaches regard the
emotions as rigid, inflexible, genetically deter-
mined, or environmentally insensitive are simply
incorrect. For example, see Al-Shawaf et al.
2015b for a number of evolutionary hypotheses
about context effects and individual differences in
emotions.
Second, it is worth noting that an evolutionary
psychological approach does not predict complete
invariance in emotions across cultures. Recall that
the computational architecture of a psychological
mechanism consists of three stages of
information-processing: environmental cues are
1458
taken as inputs, which are then stored and oper-
ated upon by computational procedures, which
are subsequently turned into outputs (e.g., behav-
ior). As a general principle, evolutionary psycho-
logical approaches do not predict universality at
the level of output, but rather at the level of com-
putational design (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b; Lewis
et al. in press; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Impor-
tantly, culturally variable input combined with
universal neurocognitive mechanisms often yields
culturally variable output (Gangestad and Buss
1993; Lewis et al. in press). This culturally vari-
able output is not necessarily a sign that the mech-
anism in question is not a product of evolution.
Rather, it is often a sign that the inputs that trigger
the mechanism differ across cultures. Stated dif-
ferently, if you start with different cultural or
ecological inputs you will likely get different out-
puts. Consequently, this view of the emotions
does not predict that every aspect of emotions
will be culturally invariant. Instead, it expects
variability in emotion output to be underlain by
cross-cultural uniformity in neurocomputational
design. This is precisely the pattern that seems to
emerge from cross-cultural studies on emotion
(e.g., Neumann et al. 2009; Sznycer et al. 2012,
2017). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this
discussion is that rather than being arbitrary and
unpredictable, these cultural differences are often
systematically predictable a priori. An evolution-
ary psychological perspective makes it possible to
generate theoretically principled predictions
about what cultural differences one should expect
to observe in advance rather than observing cul-
tural differences and then concocting post hoc
explanations for them (see e.g., Sznycer et al.
2012 for an emotion example or Gangestad and
Buss 1993 for a non-emotion example).
Third, an evolutionary psychological perspec-
tive does not imply the absence of individual
differences in emotion. On the contrary, individ-
ual differences in emotion are a natural part of the
coordinating mechanisms perspective. Providing
a nice parallel to the case of cultural differences,
an evolutionary psychological approach provides
one with a means for making theoretically
grounded a priori predictions about individual
differences. For example, it has been suggested
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
that individuals with less robust immune systems
may have lower disgust thresholds (e.g., Fessler
et al. 2004; Al-Shawaf and Lewis 2013;
Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b) and that the emotions
that arise after orgasm are likely different for
men oriented toward short-term mating compared
to those who are oriented toward long-term mat-
ing (Al-Shawaf et al. 2015b). Researchers using
this perspective have also predicted and found that
attractive women anger more easily than their
less-attractive counterparts (Sell et al. 2009b),
that attractive and physically formidable men
anger more readily than their less-attractive and
physically weaker counterparts (Sell et al. 2009),
that individuals with less bargaining power are
more prone to shame (Sznycer et al. 2012), that
individuals with lower relational mobility are
more shame-prone around their friends (but not
around strangers, Sznycer et al. 2012), and that
individuals with a stronger proclivity for short-
term mating have stably lower sexual disgust
(Al-Shawaf et al. 2015a). The key point here is
that, as with cultural differences, individual dif-
ferences are not only consistent with an evolution-
ary psychological approach to the emotions; they
can be predicted a priori according to theoretical
principles.
Future Directions
What are the next key steps for this evolutionary
approach to the emotions? First, researchers
should continue to generate and test novel hypoth-
eses based on this approach. The coordinating
mechanism view is heuristically valuable and pre-
dictively powerful, but given its youth, there is
still a great deal of work to be done at the
hypothesis-generation stage and even more to be
done at the design-and-testing stage. Researchers
have reaped only a small portion of the empirical
fruits of this approach so far, and this suggests an
exciting and promising future. Second,
researchers should continue to generate subtle
and nuanced hypotheses about context effects,
cultural differences, and individual differences in
emotion. As we move toward a more complete
explanation of species-typical mechanisms, sex-
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
typical mechanisms, cultural differences, and
individual differences, we move toward a more
comprehensive understanding of the mind – both
in the science of emotion and in psychology more
broadly. Finally, it would be valuable for evolu-
tionary psychologists to devote greater attention
to positive emotions. As it currently stands, we
understand the structure and evolved function of
the “negative emotions” a great deal better than
we do the “positive emotions.” This is slowly
starting to change with emotions such as gratitude
(Forster et al. 2016; McCullough et al. 2008) and
pride (e.g., Tracy and Robins 2007; Tracy et al.
2010), but our understanding of these emotions –
along with others such as joy, contentment, and
love – still does not compare to our understanding
of emotions such as anger, fear, and disgust. Great
benefit is likely to come from thinking about the
evolved function of positive emotions in a rigor-
ous, systematic, and theoretically principled way.
We look forward to this development and suggest
that the coordinating mechanism perspective pre-
sented here offers an especially fruitful path
forward.
Conclusion
Summary
An evolutionary psychological perspective sug-
gests that the emotions are coordinating mecha-
nisms whose evolved function is to orchestrate
psychological and physiological programs to
facilitate the solution of a particular adaptive
problem. The current entry presented this
approach, described how it differs from other
evolutionary approaches to the emotions, and
discussed the benefits of this approach. Key ben-
efits include a more theoretically principled
method of classifying emotions, a broader consid-
eration of the adaptive problems that emotions
evolved to solve and a broader consideration of
the range of emotions that evolved to solve them,
and – crucially – the use of evolutionary task
analysis to generate a priori hypotheses about
each emotion, including hypotheses about context
effects, individual differences, and cultural vari-
ability. We then detailed the empirical progress
1459
this approach has made in understanding certain
emotions, including anger, pride, shame, disgust,
and sexual arousal. Finally, this entry offers some
useful future directions, including further testing,
theoretical and empirical progress in understand-
ing cultural and individual differences, and
greater attention to positive emotions. We hope
that this entry helps introduce the coordinating
mechanism perspective to non-evolutionists as
well as to those familiar with other evolutionary
E
approaches to the emotions, and motivates
researchers to use this theoretically grounded
approach to generate and test novel a priori
hypotheses about a wide range of emotions.
Cross-References
▶ Anger
▶ Basic Emotions
▶ Culture
▶ Desire
▶ Disgust
▶ Embarrassment
▶ Facial Expressions and Emotion
▶ Fear
▶ Guilt and Shame
▶ Happiness
▶ Human Nature and Human Universals
▶ Jealousy
▶ Love
▶ Pride
▶ Reproduction
▶ Sadness
▶ Sexual Selection
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anger: Mapping the computational architecture of a
recalibrational emotion.
Sznycer, D., Takemura, K., Delton, A. W., Sato, K., Rob-
ertson, T., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2012). Cross-
cultural differences and similarities in proneness to
shame: An adaptationist and ecological approach. Evo-
lutionary Psychology, 10(2), 352–370.
Sznycer, D., Schniter, E., Tooby, J., & Cosmides,
L. (2015). Regulatory adaptations for delivering infor-
mation: The case of confession. Evolution and Human
Behavior, 36(1), 44–51.
Sznycer, D., Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., Porat, R., Shalvi, S.,
& Halperin, E. (2016). Shame closely tracks the threat
of devaluation by others, even across cultures. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
2625–2630.
Sznycer, D., Al-Shawaf, L., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Curry,
O. S., De Smet, D., Ermer, E., Kim, S., Kim, S., Li,
1461
N. P., Lopez Seal, M. F., McClung, J., O, J., Ohtsubo,
Y., Quillien, T., Schaub, M., Sell, A., van Leeuwen, F.,
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2017). Cross-cultural regu-
larities in the cognitive architecture of pride. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(8),
1874–1879.
Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H.
(1996). Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct
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Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990). The past explains the
present: Emotional adaptations and the structure of
ancestral environments. Ethology and Sociobiology, E
11, 375–424.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foun-
dations of culture. In The adapted mind: Evolutionary
psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 19–136).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2008). The evolutionary psy-
chology of the emotions and their relationship to inter-
nal regulatory variables. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-
Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of emotions
(3rd ed., pp. 114–137). New York: Guilford.
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2007). Emerging insights
into the nature and function of pride. Current Direc-
tions in Psychological Science, 16(3), 147–150.
Tracy, J. L., Shariff, A. F., & Cheng, J. T. (2010).
A naturalist’s view of pride. Emotion Review, 2,
163–177.
Tybur, J. M., Lieberman, D., & Griskevicius, V. (2009).
Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual differences
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sonality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 103–122.
Tybur, J. M., Bryan, A. D., Magnan, R. E., & Hooper,
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Vrana, S. R. (1993). The psychophysiology of disgust:
Differentiating negative emotional contexts with facial
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Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and natural selection.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Evolutionary Theory
▶ Evolutionary Perspective
Evolvability
▶ Genetic Coefficient of Variance
1462
Evolved Psychological
Mechanisms
Valerie G. Starratt
Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale,
FL, USA
Synonyms
EPMs; Psychological Adaptations
Evolved Psychological Mechanisms
Defined
Psychological adaptations are problem-solving
neurocognitive mechanisms that survived the pro-
cess of natural selection because of their value in
solving adaptive problems. The main feature of an
evolved psychological mechanism is its function-
ality, that is, how it contributes to the survival or
reproductive success of the individual in whose
brain the mechanism resides (Cosmides and
Tooby 1994). More inclusively, an evolved psy-
chological mechanism’s function can be viewed
in terms of its contribution to the survival or
reproductive success of individuals who share
genes with the individual in whose brain the
mechanism resides (Dawkins 2016).
Evolutionary psychologist David Buss has
identified six characteristics of evolved psycho-
logical mechanisms (Buss 1995). By these
criteria, each EPM exists as it does because
(1) it was designed by natural selection to solve
a specific adaptive problem; (2) it processes only
those bits of stimuli that are relevant to its spe-
cific adaptive problem; (3) it directs attention
toward the stimuli that are specific to its adaptive
problem; (4) it consists of a set of decision rules
that translate input to the mechanism into output
from the mechanism; (5) its output can take
many forms, including physiological activity,
input to a different mechanism, and visible
behavior; and (6) its output is directed toward
the solution of the adaptive problem it evolved
to solve.
Evolved Psychological Mechanisms
Although specificity is a key component in both
the Cosmides and Tooby (1994) and Buss (1995)
definitions of psychological adaptations, there is
some continued debate as to the importance of
that specificity. Some evolutionary theorists argue
for the existence of more general mechanisms. For
instance, it has been proposed that some executive
functions relevant to human learning abilities are
components of a factor of general intelligence,
which takes in various modes of stimuli and
which can be translated into output toward the
solution of numerous problems, both adaptive and
novel (Chiappe and MacDonald 2005). Whether
these domain-specific and domain-general mecha-
nisms represent diametrically opposed factors of
human psychology, different points along some
specificity-continuum, or simply differences in
semantic interpretation, is a question that has yet
to be settled.
Mechanisms in the Modern World
Each evolved psychological mechanism became
solidified in humans during a period called the
environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or
EEA. The EEA is not a geological time period,
although each adaptation has its own EEA and
most EEAs are considered to be contained within
the Pleistocene, which is a geological time period
between roughly 2.5 million years ago and
12,000 years ago. Rather, an EEA is the amalgam-
ation of all of the selection pressures operating on
members of a species at the time of a specific
adaptation’s initial development, which, again,
likely would have been sometime during the
Pleistocene (Starratt and Shackelford 2010).
The time between the end of the Pleistocene
and today represents roughly 6% of the time that
anatomically modern humans have existed. This
is not enough time for evolution to have produced
substantial and long-lasting changes in humans
(Uyeda et al. 2011). However, the changes to
human civilization that have occurred during that
time are immense. Consequently, there is often a
mismatch between the environment in which
humans now live and the evolved preferences
and motivations that humans have with which to
Evolved Psychological Mechanisms
navigate that environment. This mismatch can
produce unfortunately problematic results. For
example, an evolved preference for sweet and
fatty foods would have been advantageous in
ancestral environments where food was a scarce
resource. In modern industrialized societies,
though, where restaurants and food markets
abound, such preferences may contribute to health
problems like obesity and diabetes (Krebs 2009).
Developmental Importance
Much of evolutionary psychology focuses on adap-
tations that are important during the reproductive
years of adulthood. However, developmental evo-
lutionary psychologists also emphasize the impor-
tance of ontogenetic adaptations (Bjorklund and
Pellegrini 2000). Unlike other mechanisms, the
benefits of ontogenetic adaptations are specific
to childhood. For example, young babies natu-
rally imitate the facial expressions of others.
Evidence supports the hypothesis that this
mimicry functions to strengthen social bonds
between the child and its caregivers, perhaps
by serving as a proxy for meaningful communi-
cation before the child has developed the ability
to engage in such things. It is unlikely, though,
that this behavior would continue to produce
such a benefit if it extended much beyond
infancy, as adolescents and adults who overtly
mirror the facial expressions of every conversa-
tional partner are unlikely to be perceived in a
positive light.
Evolutionary developmental theorists also tout
the importance of childhood as a time when some
evolved psychological mechanisms are calibrated
to suit the needs of an individual given the con-
texts of their personal experiences. These condi-
tional adaptations can develop to produce one of
two or more different sets of preferences or moti-
vations, depending on the state of one’s physical
and social environments (Del Giudice et al. 2011).
This responsivity to one’s childhood environment
and subsequent effects on adult psychology can
potentially help explain individual differences in
adult human cognition and behavior despite
underlying evolved human universals.
1463
Conclusion
Evolution by natural selection has influenced the
species-wide development of human preferences
for beneficial stimuli and motivations to engage in
beneficial behaviors. Together, these preferences
and motivations make up human evolved psy-
chology. Individually, each preference and moti-
vation itself may be an evolved psychological
mechanism, provided it meets the criteria for an
E
adaptation.
Cross-References
▶ Adaptive Problems
▶ Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness
▶ Evolutionary Psychology
▶ Inclusive Fitness
References
Bjorklund, D. F., & Pellegrini, A. D. (2000). Child devel-
opment and evolutionary psychology. Child Develop-
ment, 71(6), 1687–1708.
Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new par-
adigm for psychological science. Psychological
Inquiry, 6(1), 1–30.
Chiappe, D., & MacDonald, K. (2005). The evolution of
domain-general mechanisms in intelligence and learn-
ing. The Journal of General Psychology, 132(1), 5–40.
https://doi.org/10.3200/GENP.132.1.5-40.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Origins of domain
specificity: The evolution of functional organization.
In L. Hirschfeld & S. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the
mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture
(pp. 85–116). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Dawkins, R. (2016). The selfish gene (4th ed.). New York:
Oxford university press.
Del Giudice, M., Ellis, B. J., & Shirtcliff, E. A. (2011). The
adaptive calibration model of stress responsivity. Neu-
roscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(7),
1562–1592.
Krebs, J. R. (2009). The gourmet ape: Evolution and
human food preferences. The American Journal of
Clinical Nutrition, 90(3), 707S–711S.
Starratt, V. G., & Shackelford, T. K. (2010). The basic
components of the human mind were solidified in the
Pleistocene epoch. In F. J. Ayala & R. Arp (Eds.),
Contemporary debates in the philosophy of biology
(pp. 231–242). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
1464 Exam Anxiety

Uyeda, J. C., Hansen, T. F., Arnold, S. J., &

Pienaar, J. (2011). The million-year wait for macroevo- Existential Approaches to
lutionary bursts. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 108(38), 15908–15913. Personality

Rachel E. Menzies
The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW,
Australia
Exam Anxiety

▶ Test Anxiety Synonyms

Individual differences in existential psychology

Excess Adiposity
▶ Personality and Dispositional Factors in Rela-
tion to Chronic Disease Management and Adher-
ence to Treatment
Definition
Existential psychology emphasizes the role of
fundamental aspects of the human experience,
including mortality, the search for meaning, free-
dom, and individual choice.

Excitement Seeking
Introduction
▶ Sensation Seeking
Existential psychology focuses on core aspects of
human existence, such as death, isolation, and
meaninglessness. Existential psychologists aim
Exclusion to reconstruct the inner world of human experi-
ence while exploring the more abstract issues
▶ Bullying associated with humanity’s place in the universe.
The work of early existential philosophers includ-
ing Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, and
Martin Heidegger, who expounded on topics such
Existential as the anxiety inherent to the human condition,
free will, and the concept of being, respectively,
▶ Humanistic Perspective formed the starting point for existential psychol-
ogy. These philosophical ideas were later inte-
grated into facets of psychology by prominent
figures such as Otto Rank and Viktor Frankl.
Existential Anger This entry will explore what is currently
known about individual differences and their con-
▶ Existential Rage nection to existential themes. Constructs such as
self-esteem, humility, neuroticism, perfectionism,
self-control, need for closure, and attachment
style will all be shown to relate to existential
Existential Angst issues, potentially buffering the dread of death,
fears of impermanence, and man’s sense of mean-
▶ Terror inglessness. Possible development and change in
Existential Approaches to Personality
personality structure across the life course will
also be examined.
Existential Psychology and Personality
According to existential psychology, the core ten-
dency of personality is to achieve “authentic
being” (Maddi 1980, p. 725). Being represents
the unique quality of human mentality, by which
life is conceptualized as a sequence of decisions
(Maddi 1980). In this way, an individual must
choose between one path which leads them to an
unknown future and an alternative path which
pushes them back into the stable and unchanging
past. While the former decision may invoke exis-
tential anxiety, the latter may bring existential
guilt or regret, due to the sense of a lost chance
(Cole 2016). In fact, any act of choice, in and of
itself, can similarly induce feelings of anxiety
(Lucas 2004). Authenticity therefore consists of
finding the courage to accept this painful aspect of
existence and push forward into the future in spite
of existential anxiety.
From the existential perspective, people are
largely responsible for their own existence and
have the freedom to determine not only what
they will do but who they will be (Bugental
1978). Thus, personality can be seen to emerge
from the choices one makes. For example, indi-
viduals who are overcome by anxiety or neuroses
can be seen as choosing to resist growth and may
require the help of a therapist to realize and
become their own authentic self (Misiak and Sex-
ton 1973). These libertarian views of existential-
ism have been criticized by some prominent
psychologists, such as Abraham Maslow, as
being “too narrow” in focus and ignoring factors
such as genetic inputs and physiological influ-
ences (Allen 2000, p. 225).
Despite a frequent emphasis on choice produc-
ing change, some existential psychologists have
proposed specific and fixed personality types.
Kobasa and Maddi (1977) argue that the differ-
ences between authentic and inauthentic being
can be viewed as separate habitual predisposi-
tions. From this, they propose two main personal-
ity types: the conformist and the individualist.
1465
Humans are said to have various biological,
social, and psychological needs. The latter cate-
gory includes needs for symbolizing, imagining,
and judging, and these epitomize the uniqueness
of humans relative to other species. Kobasa and
Maddi argue that when the capacity for these
psychological needs has been reduced, the per-
sonality type of conformism, representing inau-
thentic being, is said to emerge. The conformist
makes minimal use of these psychological pro-
E
cesses (i.e., symbolizing, imagining, and judg-
ing), and as a result, their thinking is
increasingly rigid. As well as showing reduced
psychological needs, Maddi (1970) argues that
conformists display both biological and social
reductionism. For example, their own sense of
identity is reduced to merely an incarnation of
biological needs and an actor of social roles. Due
to this view of humans as social actors and
embodied physical needs, the conformist’s world-
view is built on pragmatism and materialism, and
relationships are seen as transactional rather than
intimate. Despite the negative qualities attributed
to this personality type, conformism is seen as too
common to be regarded as psychopathology in
and of itself. Rather, Maddi (1970) regards con-
formism as a predisposition to psychopathology,
as it can render the person increasingly vulnerable
to particular stressors. Specifically, the conformist
is vulnerable to stressors which threaten one’s
identity as a personification of physical needs
and a player of social roles, such as the threat of
death, or deep interference with the social order.
The second personality type proposed is that of
individualism, which epitomizes authentic being
(Kobasa and Maddi 1977). Unlike conformists,
individualists show strong expression of psycho-
logical needs, as well as biological and social
needs. Their identity consists of a vigorous mental
life, by which they can perceive and comprehend
their biological and social experiences. Further,
although individualists acknowledge their biolog-
ical and social stresses, they enjoy substantial
freedom in navigating these pressures rather than
feeling vulnerable. They believe that they are
responsible for their own path and are capable of
free choice and have the independence to vigor-
ously pursue their own wants. However, they are
1466
not ignorant or naive and are able to accept the
presence of constraints on themselves and their
choices. In contrast to the conformist’s view of
people as mere players of social roles, individual-
ists see humans as masters of their own destiny,
due to the superior and uniquely human mental
capacity. Individualists are ultimately fortunate
because of their hardiness in the face of stress.
As such, neither the threat of death or nothingness
nor interference with the social order can disrupt
their own identity.
Personality Change and Existential
Psychology
Given that individuals are free to shape their own
lives from the existentialist position, there is
potential for personality change across the
lifespan (Wong 2006). According to existential
psychology, if one decides to pursue personal
fulfillment, their personality is expected to change
in positive ways, such as increased agreeableness
(Hounkpatin et al. 2015). Personality change is
therefore made possible when an individual rec-
ognizes their ability to shape their own future and
fully strive towards a meaningful existence. On
the other hand, if feelings of hopelessness inter-
fere with an individual’s capacity to achieve their
potential, their personality may develop in poten-
tially negative ways (e.g., increased introversion).
In order to test the theory of personality change
put forth by existential psychology, Hounkpatin
et al. (2015) explored the role of striving towards
fulfillment in changes in personality. The person-
ality development of more than 4,700 adult indi-
viduals across a 10-year period was recorded, as
well as their existential wellbeing, represented by
psychological wellbeing (PWB). PWB encapsu-
lates the emotions associated with an individual’s
pursuit of personal growth and development in the
face of life’s challenges, as well as one’s engage-
ment with the environment, the self, and others
(Waterman 1984). PWB consists of: autonomy,
environmental mastery, personal growth, positive
relations, purpose in life, and self-acceptance
(Ryff and Keyes 1995). Consistent with existen-
tial theories of personality, Hounkpatin et al.
Existential Approaches to Personality
(2015) reported that changes in an individual’s
personality over time were significantly related
to changes in their PWB. That is, poor existential
engagement with the self and with others was
associated with an increase in neuroticism, while
greater existential wellbeing was related to an
increase in openness, extraversion, agreeableness,
and conscientiousness. Further, existential
wellbeing was a stronger predictor of personality
change than other markers of wellbeing, such as
life satisfaction and depression (Hounkpatin
et al. 2015).
Experimental Existential Psychology
While some early influential psychologists, such
as Sigmund Freud and Otto Rank, adopted an
existential perspective in their work, the increas-
ing focus on examining overt behavior in psychol-
ogy shifted attention away from existential
concerns (Koole et al. 2006). However, in the
last decade of the twentieth century, the field of
experimental existential psychology emerged.
Experimental existential psychology focuses on
exploring the pervasive role of existential con-
cerns, such as death and meaning, on various
aspects of human behavior and thought
(Pyszczynski et al. 2004a). This subdiscipline of
psychology uses rigorous methods to measure
the overt behavioral effects of human confronta-
tion with deep existential issues (Koole et al.
2006). Thus, the current understanding of the
relationship between existential psychology and
personality traits has been largely explored
through the framework of experimental existential
psychology.
Terror Management Theory
Arguably the most prominent theory within
experimental existential psychology is terror man-
agement theory (TMT). TMT draws heavily on
ideas from existential psychology to understand
the way in which fears of death impact on our
sense of self and our behavior (Greenberg et al.
1990). TMT is strongly based on Ernest Becker’s
Existential Approaches to Personality
(1973) The Denial of Death. In this Pulitzer Prize-
winning work, Becker argued that the inherently
human motivation to stay alive, coupled with our
awareness that one’s death can occur at any
moment, has the power to produce a crippling
fear of mortality. TMT emerged from Becker’s
arguments, proposing that both self-esteem and
adherence to cultural worldviews serve to buffer
existential fear of death (Greenberg et al. 1986).
Cultural worldviews refer to shared symbolic con-
ceptions of reality, such as believing in an afterlife
or following a particular political party. TMT sug-
gests that by bolstering such worldviews, existen-
tial anxiety is allayed by providing order,
meaning, and a sense of belonging to a coherent
and ongoing life narrative. Similarly, self-esteem
is said to be obtained by meeting the standards of
the cultural worldview of the person and/or their
family (Greenberg et al. 1986). These dual mech-
anisms are argued to protect the self from
reminders of death by offering a kind of virtual
immortality.
Personality and Experimental Existential
Psychology
Self-Esteem
Self-esteem plays a central role in TMT.
According to this model, self-esteem serves to
protect the individual from the anxiety-provoking
existential concerns at the heart of human exis-
tence (Greenberg et al. 1986). That is, self-esteem
shields people from the terror induced by the
awareness of our own inevitable death and
decay. The aspirations, career, family, and identity
that make up a person’s self-esteem, are therefore
all an elaborate form of defense against mortality,
and offer the support needed in order to persist
with daily life in the face of this ultimate threat to
the self (Greenberg et al. 1997). From the view of
TMT, an individual gains a sense of self-esteem
by not only living up to the expectations of one’s
cultural worldview but also by viewing this
worldview as a valid one. Self-esteem is therefore
a cultural construction, suggesting cross-cultural
variability in the standards one must meet in order
to feel valuable. Further, the contingencies
1467
required to obtain self-esteem are often integrated
into a unique, personal worldview of each indi-
vidual, such that differences in requirements for
self-esteem may still exist among members of a
shared culture. Despite this variability, TMT
argues that the fundamental need for self-esteem
is universal across cultures (Greenberg et al.
1997).
Thus, when self-esteem is high, the individual
is protected from the deeply rooted death anxiety
E
at the heart of the human condition (Pyszczynski
et al. 2004b; Schmeichel et al. 2009). In contrast,
when self-esteem is low, this unmitigated anxiety
leads to various defensive attempts to bolster self-
worth. Further, TMT proposes that even in the
absence of current threats to self-worth, people
are constantly pursuing self-esteem and the belief
in one’s worldview in order to escape from the
implicit awareness of mortality (Pyszczynski et al.
2004a). While self-esteem unquestionably offers
other advantages, and conscious thoughts of death
are not necessarily required to motivate the pursuit
of self-worth, TMT views these benefits as addi-
tional to the primary role of self-esteem as a buffer
against anxiety.
The anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem
has been demonstrated in a variety of research.
Early TMT research revealed that participants
whose self-esteem was increased via positive
feedback on a personality measure reported
reduced anxiety following a video portrayal of
graphic death (Greenberg et al. 1992). Similarly,
Greenberg et al. (1993) investigated the relation-
ship between self-esteem and denial of one’s vul-
nerability to a shorter life expectancy. Both high
trait and high state self-esteem were significantly
associated with reduced defensiveness in the face
of the potential for an early death.
Self-esteem has also been shown to reduce the
effect of mortality salience (i.e., reminders of
death) on worldview defense (e.g., Schmeichel
et al. 2009). A common TMT paradigm involves
inducing mortality salience by asking participants
to answer two questions: “Please briefly describe
the emotions that the thought of your own death
arouses in you,” and “Jot down, as specifically as
you can, what you think will happen to you as you
physically die and once you are physically dead”
1468
(Greenberg et al. 1990). In response to this or
similar reminders of mortality, participants typi-
cally show increased defense of their cultural
worldview, consistent with TMT (e.g., Greenberg
et al. 1990). However, when self-esteem was
manipulated using bogus positive feedback, this
increased self-esteem completely eliminated the
effect of mortality salience on worldview defense
(Harmon-Jones et al. 1997). That is, individuals
with high state self-esteem failed to show the
worldview defense typically induced following a
reminder of one’s own death. A second study by
Harmon-Jones et al. revealed that while partici-
pants with medium levels of trait self-esteem
showed expected worldview defense following
mortality salience, those with high levels of trait
self-esteem did not show this same effect. While
mortality salience typically leads to an increase in
accessibility of death-thoughts, as shown by a
word-stem completion task (i.e., in which the
word fragment SK_ _ L can be completed as
either the death-related word skull or the neutral
word skill), this enhanced accessibility was elim-
inated by experimentally increasing self-esteem
(Harmon-Jones et al. 1997, Study 3). This finding
supports the TMT view that self-esteem serves to
shift death-related thoughts out of conscious
awareness, and it is this reduced accessibility of
death-thoughts that reduces the need for world-
view defense. Similarly, engaging in self-serving
attributions (e.g., attributing personal failure to
external factors), a well-documented strategy for
maintaining self-esteem, has also been shown to
reduce accessibility of death-related thoughts fol-
lowing mortality salience (Dechesne et al. 2000).
Despite much experimental research focusing
on reminders of death increasing worldview
defense, TMT also proposes that mortality
salience should increase the need for self-esteem
(Greenberg et al. 1992). Indeed, several studies
have explored the increased self-esteem striving
as a result of mortality salience. Individuals who
reported high personal investment in physical
strength were shown to increase strength output
on a hand dynamometer following reminders of
death, compared with those who reported low
personal investment in strength (Peters et al.
2005). In addition, participants who rated their
Existential Approaches to Personality
driving ability as a key source of self-esteem
demonstrated greater risky driving behavior fol-
lowing a mortality salience prime (Ben-Ari et al.
1999). Interestingly, this increase in risky driving
was not observed once an alternative boost to self-
esteem was provided to participants. Therefore,
paradoxically, while risky behavior may pose a
threat to one’s life, such dangerous behavior may
be heightened by reminders of mortality if it is a
source of self-esteem.
The dual process defense model of conscious
and unconscious responses to mortality
(Pyszczynski et al. 1999) has been shown to be
relevant to the role of self-esteem in buffering
death anxiety. This model proposes that when
thoughts of death are the subject of conscious
awareness, this triggers pragmatic proximal
defenses, such as denial or distraction from the
issue at hand. In contrast, when thoughts of death
shift towards the fringes of consciousness (i.e., are
accessible but not the current focus of attention),
distal defenses are employed, such as bolstering
faith in one’s cultural worldview and self-esteem.
Arndt, Schimel, and Goldenberg (2003) examined
the application of this dual process defense model
in relation to health-related behavior. Participants
who rated their physical fitness as being either
high or low in importance to their self-esteem
were randomly allocated to either a mortality
salience or control condition. Their intentions
regarding future fitness (e.g., predicted time
spent exercising in the following month) were
then measured either immediately following the
prime or following a time delay provided by a
distractor task. Consistent with the model, imme-
diately after the manipulation, when thoughts of
death were conscious, mortality salience
increased fitness intentions compared with the
control condition regardless of the relevance of
physical fitness to personal self-esteem. In con-
trast, following a delay, when death concerns are
likely to be outside of consciousness, mortality
salience only increased fitness intentions for par-
ticipants who ranked fitness as important for their
self-esteem and not for those who considered
fitness of little ego-relevance. This suggests that
the increased fitness intentions immediately fol-
lowing mortality salience represented a proximal
Existential Approaches to Personality
defense (i.e., a general mortality-induced concern
about health), whereas the increased intentions
after a delay represented a distal defense (i.e., the
bolstering of self-esteem among those who draw
their self-value from physical fitness). Similarly,
Routledge et al. (2004) found that participants
who ranked sun tanning as important to their
self-esteem reported greater intentions to
purchase sun protective products immediately fol-
lowing mortality salience, presumably demon-
strating the proximal defense of increased health
concerns. In contrast, when mortality salience was
followed by a time delay, participants subse-
quently showed a decreased intention to buy pro-
tective sun lotion, indicative of the distal defense
of maintaining self-esteem. Thus, self-esteem is
a well-established individual difference that
appears to serve an important role in buffering
death anxiety and existential concerns.
Notably, the anxiety-buffering effects of self-
esteem appear to be specific to the problem of
death reminders, rather than simply any aversive
or anxiety-inducing issue. While the earliest TMT
studies typically compared mortality salience with
a more neutral control condition, involving ques-
tions on topics such as television or food (e.g.,
Greenberg et al. 1990), recent studies have
employed more aversive control conditions. For
example, control conditions have included aver-
sive topics such as dental pain, social exclusion,
and public speaking, yet typically fail to yield
effects similar to the mortality salience condition
(e.g., Cox and Kersten 2016; Schindler and
Reinhard 2015; Strachan et al. 2007). Further,
given the varied operationalization of mortality
salience, ranging from videos of fatal car acci-
dents to subliminal mortality primes to proximity
to cemeteries (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1994; Nelson
et al. 1997), it appears probable that the observed
effects of death priming on self-esteem are in fact
specific to death, rather than aversive events more
generally.
Humility
Although much research suggests that self-esteem
is a crucial resource in coping with existential
threats and reminders of the fragility of life,
some studies have highlighted the problems with
1469
such a self-centered defense mechanism. Behav-
iors linked to self-esteem that may result from
death priming have included reduced prosocial
behavior, heightened risk-taking behavior, and
increased levels of outgroup derogation
(Baldwin and Wesley 1996; Landau and
Greenberg 2006; McGregor et al. 2007). These
findings mirror evidence that high self-esteem
increases the tendency towards more defensive
and aggressive responses to threats to the self. If
E
death can be understood as the most enduring and
final threat to the self, it is not surprising that
individuals with high self-esteem may be more
prone to defensive and hostile responses. Thus,
while much of the focus has remained on the
buffering effect of self-esteem, humility is another
personality trait that has been implicated as a
defense against existential anxiety. Defined as a
tendency to acknowledge one’s own limitations
and avoidance of the aggrandizement of the self,
humility is characterized by an acceptance of
one’s place in the grander scheme of things and
a connection to forces larger than oneself
(Tangney 2002).
Kesebir (2014) examined the buffering role of
humility in the face of existential threats across a
series of studies. Kesebir found that mortality
salience increased self-reported fears of death
solely for participants who were low in humility.
Conversely, individuals who had high levels of
humility actually demonstrated a lower fear of
death following mortality salience compared to
the control condition. Further, after controlling
for self-esteem, secure attachment, mindfulness,
and general virtuousness, humility still moderated
the effect of mortality salience on fears of death.
Similarly, Study 4 revealed that participants who
were primed with humility (i.e., “please write
about a time in your life when you felt humility.
How did you feel and what did you think?”
p. 617) reported significantly lower death anxiety
compared to both the baseline and those who were
instead primed with pride. Experimentally
induced humility was also found to buffer the
impairing effect of mortality salience on self-
control. Despite the focus on self-esteem in
much of TMT research, these results all suggest
that humility may similarly serve as a buffer
1470
against existential fears. This may be because
humility is characterized by a heightened aware-
ness of not only one’s strengths but also one’s
limitations. Individuals who are high in humility
should therefore have less need for defensive and
self-serving reactions to threats to the self, such as
reminders of mortality. Humility can also be con-
ceptualized as an accurate judgment and accep-
tance of one’s place in the greater scheme of
things (Tangney 2002). As such, and given the
findings of Kesebir (2014), it seems likely that the
humble individual has an increased awareness of
the fragile and finite nature of human existence in
the larger context of the universe.
Neuroticism
The personality dimension of neuroticism has
been of particular interest to existential research.
Neuroticism is characterized by a predisposition
to feelings such as fear, anxiety, depression, and
moodiness (Barlow et al. 2014). Given this ten-
dency towards negative emotions, it is not sur-
prising that existential concerns may be
especially potent to neurotic individuals. Indeed,
individuals who are high in neuroticism have
been shown to be particularly prone to existential
anxieties, with significant positive correlations
found between trait anxiety and seven dimen-
sions of death anxiety (e.g., fear of premature
death, fear for significant others, and fear of
being destroyed; Hoelter and Hoelter 1978).
Similarly, Loo (1984) reported moderate positive
correlations between neuroticism and fears of the
death and dying process of the self, as well as
fears of the dying process of others. No signifi-
cant relationship was found between extraver-
sion and fear of death, though small to
moderate positive correlations were revealed
between psychoticism and fears of the dying of
the self and dying of others, respectively.
Becker (1973) argued that this exaggerated
existential fear often originates from the neurotic
individual’s difficulty maintaining confidence in
their cultural worldview. Interestingly, neuroti-
cism has been linked to increased perceptions of
the world as incoherent (Gibson and Cook 1996).
That is, highly neurotic individuals were less
likely to view the world as a meaningful,
Existential Approaches to Personality
comprehensible, and manageable place. It is pos-
sible that this reduced ability to maintain a mean-
ingful and stable worldview may be related to the
increased vulnerability to existential concerns
among neurotic individuals.
Given this relationship, it is not surprising that
neurotic subjects may be particularly prone to
priming effects in studies that employ a mortality
salience paradigm. Goldenberg et al. (1999) found
that when the physical nature of sex is made
salient, presumably serving as a reminder of our
animality and mortality, death-related thought
accessibility increased only among more neurotic
individuals. Xu and Brucks (2011) have similarly
examined the moderating role of neuroticism in
TMT research, by focusing on creativity as a
buffer against death anxiety. Rank (1932) pro-
posed creativity as one attempt to solve the
problem of death, through the externalization
and continuation of the soul through the artistic
creation. Consistent with this conceptualization
of creativity, Xu and Brucks (2011) found a sig-
nificant interaction between salience condition
and neuroticism, such that mortality salience
increased creative interest among individuals
with low levels of neuroticism, while more neu-
rotic individuals were unaffected. That is, in the
absence of mortality salience, neuroticism was
associated with greater creative interest. However,
highly neurotic individuals were less likely to
pursue creative activities as a defense against
existential threats, compared with less neurotic
respondents.
Perfectionism
Numerous studies have linked neuroticism to per-
fectionism. In fact, perfectionism has become
known as a transdiagnostic construct that may
partially mediate a range of neurotic conditions
including obsessive compulsive disorder, gener-
alized anxiety disorder and the eating disorders
(see further, Shafran et al. 2010). Indeed, an over-
lap between Becker’s notion of “overstriving” to
meet cultural standards and the modern concept of
perfectionism seems apparent. Becker (1973)
describes the desperate striving to rise above
one’s fellow man in very similar terms to Shafran
et al.’s negative perfectionism.
Existential Approaches to Personality
Perfectionism has also been shown to predict
symptoms of depression above and beyond other
risk factors such as ineffective coping and low
self-esteem. In accordance with this, Graham
et al. (2010) proposed the existential model of
perfectionism and depressive symptoms
(EMPDS). This model focuses on the role of
“perfectionistic concerns,” conceptualized as sta-
ble personality traits involving concerns over crit-
icism and doubts about performance abilities, as a
contributing factor to depressive symptoms.
EMPDS asserts that people who are high in per-
fectionistic concerns struggle to find a sense of
purpose in life and are more prone to
catastrophizing lived experiences and perceiving
them as meaningless and inadequate. The model
therefore suggests that this catastrophic thinking
and inability to accept past experiences are two
explanatory mechanisms which may explain the
causative role of perfectionism in depressive
symptoms. Consistent with this, a study by
Sherry, Sherry, Hewitt, Mushquah and Flett
(2015) found that perfectionism predicted diffi-
culty accepting the past and exacerbated the
impact of this difficulty on depressive symptoms.
With an emphasis on one’s failure to find mean-
ing, EMPDS echoes the earlier work of Frankl
(1984), Yalom (1980) and other existential
theorists.
Self-Control
Self-control, defined as the ability to suppress
one’s emotions, impulses, and personally desir-
able behaviors, also appears to be a key tool for
managing anxiety about mortality. The personal-
ity domains of conscientiousness and agreeable-
ness both have been shown to be conceptually
linked to self-control (Ahadi and Rothbart 1994;
Rothbart et al. 2001). For example, self-control
and conscientiousness are both related to the abil-
ity to inhibit particular behaviors, persist in ardu-
ous tasks, and direct one’s attention. Further, both
self-control and agreeableness are associated with
inhibiting selfish or socially undesirable behav-
iors and greater cooperation during group tasks
(e.g., Graziano et al. 1997). Self-control has there-
fore been shown to be a highly adaptive trait,
predicting success in areas such as academic
1471
achievement, interpersonal functioning, and stress
management (e.g., Mischel et al. 1988; Tangney
et al. 2004).
Given that an awareness of one’s own mortal-
ity could be viewed as stress-inducing (Greenberg
et al. 2003), it is plausible that self-control may
serve to alleviate death-related fears. Similarly,
research indicates that people minimize distress
in the face of mortality cues by suppressing death-
related thoughts, further implicating the role of
E
self-esteem in managing existential anxiety (e.g.,
Greenberg et al. 1994).
Gailliot et al. (2006) explored the relationship
between self-control and managing the dread of
death across a series of studies. Trait self-control
was found to be negatively associated with preoc-
cupation with death, such that higher levels of trait
self-control predicted less preoccupation with
death (as indicated by fewer death-related words
given in a word fragment completion task),
reduced death-relevant perceptions of an ambigu-
ous image, and less death anxiety on a self-report
measure. Trait self-control was also found to
buffer the effect of mortality salience priming on
worldview defense. That is, while thinking about
death led participants who were low in self-
control to significantly increase support for their
country’s president (i.e., to bolster their belief in
their cultural worldview, as TMT would predict),
this effect was nonsignificant for participants who
were high in self-control. Further, participants
whose self-control had been depleted through an
experimental manipulation (i.e., those who were
allocated to a task requiring controlled direction of
visual attention) subsequently showed more
death-thought accessibility than those who had
not engaged in the depleting task. This effect of
self-regulation on death-thought accessibility
persisted when state self-control was simply mea-
sured, rather than manipulated. These findings are
consistent with the strength model of self-control,
which proposes that self-control is a limited
resource which can be depleted following use,
thereby impairing future performance on tasks
requiring self-regulation (Baumeister et al. 2007).
Finally, the Stroop task was used as a measure
of self-control. Successful performance on the
Stroop task requires the effortful direction of
1472
attention to the color of a printed word and inhi-
bition of the automatic attention to the reading of
the word itself (i.e., naming “red” if the word
“blue” is printed in red ink). Participants who
had been primed with mortality salience made
significantly more errors on the Stroop task, com-
pared with those in the control condition. Thus,
consistent with the strength model of self-control,
it appears that self-control may be depleted after
reminders of mortality, leading to poorer perfor-
mance on tasks requiring this resource. This is
presumably because mortality cues require the
subsequent exertion of self-control in order to
suppress thoughts and distress associated with
death. In contrast, performance was not impaired
as a function of mortality salience during tasks
which purely required analytical reasoning or rote
learning, suggesting that thoughts of death specif-
ically restrict self-control, rather than general cog-
nitive abilities. Taken together, these findings
provide strong evidence that both trait and state
self-control may play a significant role in mini-
mizing death anxiety and suppressing mortality-
related fears and thoughts.
Further, given the emphasis placed on self-
esteem in much of TMT research, Gailliot et al.
(2007) explored the differential roles of self-
control and self-esteem in buffering death anxiety.
Consistent with the findings discussed above,
mortality salience increased death-thought acces-
sibility and worldview defense but only among
participants who had low trait self-control. Nota-
bly, the results showed that the moderating effects
of self-control were observed over and above the
moderating effects of self-esteem. That is, once
the role of self-control was taken into account,
self-esteem had a nonsignificant effect on buffer-
ing death anxiety. This suggests that self-control
may have a unique influence on shaping responses
to mortality salience by suppressing death-related
thoughts.
Need for Closure
Need for closure is another personality variable
that has been the subject of existential research.
Need for closure has been conceptualized as a
stable dimension of individual differences involv-
ing a desire for quick and definite knowledge and
Existential Approaches to Personality
a reluctance to accept new information which may
undermine this (Kruglanski and Webster 1996). In
addition, people who are high in need for closure
appear more likely to use their preexisting knowl-
edge to form their opinions and to limit further
processing on a topic if they already have closure.
Conceptually, similar personality traits, such as
need for structure, have also been linked to
increased stereotype use and, in particular,
forming false negative stereotypes of a minority
group (Neuberg and Newsom 1993; Schaller et al.
1995).
Given that mortality salience increases dislike
of outgroup members, and high need for closure is
associated with increased stereotypy, Schimel
et al. (1999) hypothesized that individuals who
are high in need for closure would be significantly
more likely to increase liking for stereotype-
consistent outgroup members following a mortal-
ity salience prime. Results consistent with this
hypothesis would suggest that death reminders
increase the desire for a stable view of social
reality, and that need for control may affect an
individual’s response to mortality salience. Partic-
ipants were categorized as either high or low in
need for closure and then randomly allocated to
describe their thoughts about either death or a
control topic. Following this prime, participants
read a short description of a homosexual male,
which was manipulated to be either consistent or
inconsistent with common stereotypes of homo-
sexual men and were asked to rate their liking of
the individual described. The results revealed that
mortality salience led to a significant reduction in
liking for the stereotype-inconsistent gay target
among participants who were high in need for
closure but not among those low in need for
closure. Further, participants who were high in
need for closure, compared to those low in need
for closure, attributed significantly fewer positive
traits to the stereotype-inconsistent gay target than
to the stereotype-consistent target when mortality
was made salient. Thus, reminders of death led to
a preference for stereotype-consistent outgroup
members only among individuals high in need
for closure. This finding supports the TMT view
that stereotypes buffer against death fears by pro-
viding a sense of stability in an unpredictable
Existential Approaches to Personality
world. Given that mortality salience increases the
need to maintain stereotypical perceptions of
outgroup members, the protective utility of ste-
reotypes appears to be strongest among individ-
uals who are high in need for closure.
Similarly, Dechesne et al. (2000) investigated
the role of need for closure in responding to a
critic of a relevant group following mortality
salience. Participants were categorized as either
high or low need for closure. Following a mortal-
ity salience or control prime, participants read a
statement, purportedly written by an external stu-
dent, which heavily criticized the university of the
participant. The results revealed that mortality
salience led to increased derogation (i.e.,
decreased positive attributions and liking) of the
critic among participants who were high in need
for closure but decreased identification with the
university among individuals who were low in
need for closure. That is, individual differences
in need for closure resulted in either derogation of
a group-relevant critic or distancing from the
group, following reminders of death. Thus, need
for closure appears to be another personality var-
iable which may interact with reminders of mor-
tality and existential anxiety.
Attachment Style
Individual differences in attachment style have
been shown to influence the effects of reminders
of death. The attachment system is an important
inner resource in the face of stress, leading people
to seek proximity with others who can minimize
distress, such as a parent or partner. Attachment
styles represent enduring patterns of relational
behaviors and thoughts, reflecting an individual’s
attachment history. Three key attachment styles
have been identified: secure (characterized by
a confidence that others will be available
when needed and a comfort with physical prox-
imity), avoidant (defined by a discomfort with
emotional closeness), and anxious-ambivalent
(characterized by a fear of rejection and a prefer-
ence for enmeshed relationships). Across a series
of studies, Mikulincer and Florian (2000)
explored the role of attachment styles in
responding to reminders of death. Mortality
salience was shown to heighten the severity of
1473
judgments of moral transgressions only among
avoidant and anxious-ambivalent individuals but
not among those with a secure attachment style.
Further, worldview defense following mortality
salience was shown to reduce the accessibility of
death-related thoughts only among avoidant indi-
viduals. In addition, reminders of death increased
desire for intimacy, as well as a feeling of sym-
bolic immortality, only among secure individuals,
but not among those with an avoidant or anxious-
E
ambivalent attachment style. These findings sug-
gest that an individual’s attachment style impacts
the way in which they cope with the threat of
death. Specifically, in response to mortality
salience, attachment style was found to influence
judgments of moral transgressions, desire for inti-
macy, perceived symbolic immortality, death-
thought accessibility, and the defensive function
of worldview defenses. Given this, close relation-
ships have also been proposed as a buffer against
the terror of death. Mikulincer et al. (2003) have
argued not only that reminders of death increase
the desire to begin and continue close relation-
ships but also that the maintenance of strong rela-
tionships offers a symbolic defense against
existential anxiety. Thus, attachment style appears
to be an important individual difference in relation
to existential issues such as the dread of death.
Conclusion
Existential psychology examines the central prob-
lems of being human, namely, our awareness of
our mortality and impermanence and our search
for meaning. This field relies heavily on applied
philosophy and can be viewed as a theoretical and
empirical expansion of that field. This entry has
examined what is known about personality vari-
ables and their connection to existential themes.
Within the field of experimental existential psy-
chology, a range of constructs such as self-esteem,
humility, neuroticism, perfectionism, self-control,
need for closure, and attachment style have been
shown to play a potential role in buffering the
dread of death. From an existential viewpoint, it
is therefore unsurprising that several of these indi-
vidual differences have been linked to anxiety,
1474
depression, and a range of mental health prob-
lems. More research in these areas is clearly
needed, and alternative theoretical approaches to
existential psychology may enable further explo-
ration of relevant individual differences.
Cross-References
▶ Anxiety
▶ Attachment Theory
▶ Need for Closure
▶ Neurotic Personality (Horney)
▶ Perfectionism
▶ Personality and Mortality
▶ Self-Esteem
▶ Terror Management Theory
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Existential Rage
illusion of life. Also known as naturalism, this
philosophy admonishes that humans are not dual-
istic mind and spirit combinations working
toward harmonious unison, an idea advanced by
French philosopher Descartes (1637 and 1641/
2009), but are meaningless specks in an indiffer-
ent and unforgiving universe.
Explication of Existential Rage
Humans generally struggle when feeling mean-
ingless, demonstrating immense unease as the
prospect that along with being assigned to the
status of physical mechanism, their agency and
free will become stripped bare. One response to
the struggle of meaningless is existential rage.
Existential sources of anger stem from “[the] nat-
urally occurring, universal, and inescapable
aspects of the human condition” (Diamond
1996, p. 9). In Dynamics of Faith (1957/2001)
inferred that “Faith is the state of being ultimately
concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics
of man’s ultimate concern” (p. 1) in response to
the existential givens of human life, including
banality of human-induced evil and suffering,
the sense of isolation and aloneness that the indi-
vidual can feel in a crowded room on a massively
populated planet, the finitude of life, and our
inescapable mortality being prime examples.
However, the human condemnation to be free
(Sartre 1943/1992) and the inherent absurdity
and meaningless of existence (Camus 1942/
1955) reign king; existential rage is most promi-
nent in feeling that one’s very existence is for
nothing, that death is the end, and that all ambi-
tions are useless in a seemingly unkind universe
that does not care about anyone or anything.
Rage is not the only response humans leverage
against loss, meaninglessness, or the inability to
make commitments and take personal directive
and direction for their lives. Some may choose
not to concern themselves, as they seek religious
or spiritual guidance or answers to metaphysical
questions of existence, or externalize their rage to
tamer, if equally destructive, lifestyles choices,
indulgences, activities, and daily rhythms. Dwell-
ing within each of us, nonetheless, is an untamed,
1477
boundless, majestic reservoir of seething resent-
ment lingering at a pivot point directly beneath the
surface of social propriety and communally rec-
ognized expectations. In The Leviathan, Hobbes
(1651/1996) argued that in a state disillusioned
from institutionalized law and order, life “of man
[would be] nasty, brutish, and short....that Mature
should thus dissociate, and render men apt to
invade, and destroy one another” (p. 89). In a
Hobbesian account of the human state of nature,
E
aggression and inner torment are innate defense
mechanism to struggle in a world of scarcity and
unchecked competition.
Sartre (1948/2000) in The Emotions: Outline
of a Theory worked to parse out a broad explica-
tion of human emotions, anger being one, includ-
ing excavating their overarching structures and
place how the emotions come together to formu-
late a meaning behind the emotive facet of human
existence. He concluded that anger derives com-
monalities relating to another emotion, depres-
sion: “In anger, and doubtless all other emotions,
there is a weakening of the barriers which separate
the deep and superficial layers of the self. . .by the
deep personality and mastery of the self; a weak-
ening of the barriers between the real and unreal”
(p. 36). Based on this view as free agents, we take
risks, endeavor to complete tasks and projects, set
goals and benchmarks for ourselves personally
and professionally, and selectively choose and
respond to the cacophony of sensory stimuli and
obligations vying to etch in our psyche and sustain
our attention. We tolerate a certain amount of
frustration and setback, although most of us prefer
fulfillment and gratification. Rage explodes out of
an inability to escape the sense of meaningless-
ness found in an awe-stripped life, as Sartre noted,
“Thus, anger appears here as an escape; the sub-
ject in anger resembles a man who, lacking the
power to undo the knots of the ropes which bind
him, twists and squirms about in his bonds”
(p. 37).
The monotony of one’s Sisyphean struggle to
maintain a psychologically stable state does not
always induce acute rage. For many, episodes of
despair and seething anger arising out of sense of
helplessness can rush in at moments of great
upheaval in one’s life. Loss of all varieties –
1478
from more jarring instances of termination from
employment or death of a loved one – catapults us
from the slumber of routine activities we become
accustomed to through habit and socialization and
reminds us of our fragility. Often, there is little that
is explicitly existential pertaining to one’s rage.
Road rage ensues when one’s intentions and
desires in travel are thwarted by a long que of
vehicles or careless disregard by a fellow driver
who, whether consciously or not, is not at that
moment obeying socially recognized traffic laws
to speed at commute time, which can threaten the
life of the target of the rage as well as of the one
who rages. Political rage materializes out of deep
feelings of oppression, powerlessness, and confu-
sion regarding possible calluses and disregard by
a nation’s leaders or by obsolete public systems
that inflict a heavy financial burden on the general
public who are expected to pay for a system meant
to serve them that no longer does. Existentially,
graver indications of large-scale lack of care for
traffic safety and electing public officials mis-
aligned with the wider values of the general pop-
ulation might indicate any number of ontological
triggers. Perhaps the nation has become massively
polarized between differing opinions, or common
courtesy becomes less critical than risking one’s
life or the life of another to gain a few extra
seconds in travel time to meet the demands of
the day. However, personal resentment in these
two examples, while potentially leading to death,
rarely escalates to prolonged hostility, as human
beings bear a natural inclination to return to onto-
logical security. Human beings prize prolongation
and propagation; that is, studies in social psychol-
ogy continuously infer that we like the familiar.
From an evolutionary psychology perspective,
intellectual abstraction and emotional complexity
call for a greater need to love and like, therefore,
instilling a sense of belonging that propagates
one’s ontological security.
Humans require the experience of meaning in
their lives equal to the need for food, water, and
shelter. Recently, scholars studying an emerging
field of inquiry called neuroexistentialism (Caruso
and Flanagan 2017) compellingly argue that the
biological and chemical sciences continue to offer
strong evidence that human life is a matter of
Existential Rage
synaptic connections in the brain. Furthermore,
when one’s life ends in physical death, this is
considered the termination of the individual’s
entire experience, with no opportunity for won-
derment, reincarnation, or transfiguration into
other forms. Like Skinner’s (1952) laboratory
rats who learned to follow unconscious cues and
repeat behaviors to receive rewards out of a make-
shift contraption known as a Skinner box,
humans, according to the premises of the behav-
ioral school of psychology, are easily trained to
enact behaviors. The malleability of humans, as
reflected in the ease of operant conditioning based
on the underlying process of reward and punish-
ment, has been linked to the steadily rising num-
bers of reported cases of suicide in the Western
world in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
This link has been attributed to our living in the
age of anxiety Kierkeggard (1843/2006) and
Watts (1951/2011) cautioned. Controlling death,
escaping unpredictability, and cocooning oneself
in identities and associations of the times no lon-
ger have the potential to bring solace to the mean-
inglessness of life if the God referred to by
Nietzsche truly is dead.
Neuroexistentialists do not advocate suicide
and agree with classic existentialists that humans
are condemned to create meaning in an otherwise
meaningless world. However, the ability of one to
individually realize his or her unique sense of
meaning can be challenging, leaving one without
a stable ontological status. In the absence of mean-
ing to provide a psychological defense mecha-
nism against life’s struggles, irregularities, and
turmoil, one is not only left feeling beaten down
by unfortunate life circumstances but cannot see
any meaning to enduring them. Therefore, exis-
tential rage if internalized has the potential to lead
to suicide or to homicide if projected outward.
Conclusion
Hatred or existential rage that involves an impas-
sioned dislike toward something or someone,
unlike the opposite emotions of like or love,
incurs intense and serious behavior. Much of
human hatred, if not all, arises out of subjective
Exogamy
inference, out of one’s understanding of right and
wrong. At the most irrational, hatred oozes out as
an unconscious reaction to something that is other
(the gender/sex, sexual orientation, religious affil-
iation, political ideology, geographical location,
level of income or education, to list common
examples). Rage, unlike anger, indicates a potent,
even explosive, more intensely kindled emotion.
Rage lingers and does not subside easily with the
passage of time; it is not an isolated outburst, or a
free-flow of petulance as anger can be. Clinical
literature in the field of existential-humanistic
psychology primarily considers how a psycho-
therapy client might explore positive consider-
ations of his or her anger, perhaps that is directed
toward life events beyond control or railing
against the absurdity of life itself. Typically, prob-
ing questions include “How productive is your
anger?” or “How do you feel about the results of
your anger?” Further approaches focus on encour-
aging inner consent from the client by bringing
ownership to feeling and actions, in addition to
cultivating a sense of self-value in an existentially
indifferent universe.
Cross-References
▶ Being-in-the-World
▶ Daimonic (May)
▶ Existential Approaches to Personality
References
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essays. New York: Vintage. (Original work published
1942).
Caruso, G., & Flanagan, O. (Eds.). (2017). Neuroexis-
tentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age
of neuroscience. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Descartes, R. (2009). Discourse on method and medita-
tions on first philosophy (4th ed., trans: Cress, D.A.).
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Original
works published 1637 & 1641).
Diamond, S. A. (1996). Anger, madness, and the daimonic:
The psychological genesis of violence, evil, and crea-
tivity. Albany: SUNY Press.
Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
1479
Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan: Revised student edition.
Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. (Original
work published 1651).
Kierkegaard, S. (2006). In C. S. Evans & S. Walsh (Eds.),
Fear and trembling and the sickness unto death.
New York: Cambridge University Press. (Original
work published 1843).
Sartre, J. P. (1992). Being and nothingness. New York:
Simon and Schuster. (Original work published
1943).
Sartre, J. P. (2000). The emotions: Outline of a theory.
New York: Citadel Press. (Original work published
1948). E
Shakespeare, W. (2004). Macbeth. Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. (Original
work published 1606).
Skinner, B. F. (1952). Science and human behavior.
New York: Macmillan.
Watts, A. (2011). The wisdom of insecurity: A message for
an age of anxiety. New York: Vintage Books. (Original
work published 1951).
Exogamy
Sielo Coleman and Patrick Morse
Belmont University, Nashville, TN, USA
Synonyms
Intermarriage
Definition
Broadly speaking, exogamy refers to the sexual
relationships between people of different group or
clan memberships. However, its definition, and
associated terminology, has been historically
fluid as different times and cultures have taken
varying stances on the term. For example, some
focus their efforts on the study of exogamy, or the
related topic intermarriage, whereas others focus
their efforts on the study of its antonym endog-
amy, or the related topics homogamy or incest. As
such, the literature has yet to provide a standard
approach to the study of exogamy, let alone an
established definition of the term. In fact, Loeb
and Toffelmier’s (1939) early assertion that
1480
exogamy lacks a distinct meaning appears to have
stood the test of time.
Introduction
A common working definition of exogamy is
“incest avoidance,” with incest referring to rela-
tionships within the same clan (Tittmar 1990). In
recent decades following shifts in cultural norms,
the use of the term intermarriage has been used to
reflect exogamy. The definition for intermarriage
is also contingent on social implications, but it
typically refers to relationships between people
of different religions, ethnicities, races, or socio-
economic statuses (Safi and Rogers 2008). How-
ever, this definition is still debated as some
researchers do not support socioeconomic status
as a component of intermarriage given present
day’s open access to social climbing (Cerroni-
Long 1985). Even still, intermarriage essentially
encompasses exogamy and researchers have
opted to use this broader term, and this is a likely
reason for the dearth of research focusing exclu-
sively on exogamy. Subsequently, most knowl-
edge on exogamy must be inferred from findings
within the endogamy, incest, or intermarriage lit-
eratures. As a result, the story of exogamy remains
unclear, but what follows is a review of research
on exogamy and its related constructs organized
by the culture in which the research was
conducted.
American Research
The United States has developed as a cultural
melting pot resulting in high rates of intermar-
riage, but research on 94 ethnic groups between
1994 and 2006 revealed significant variation in
endogamy based on group (Kalmijn and Van
Turbergen 2010). The authors concluded that
lower levels of exogamy were found in both
Christian cultures and cultures promoting mar-
riage at a young age, higher levels of exogamy
were found in groups of non-English speakers,
and exogamy was negatively associated with cul-
ture size such that larger cultural groups displayed
Exogamy
less exogamy (Kalmijn and Van Turbergen 2010).
Qian and Lichter (2011) also analyzed patterns of
intermarriage in America using data from the
1980 census and 2008 American Community Sur-
vey. Consistent with other research, the authors
found lower rates of exogamy in large immigrant
populations and an overall increase in intermar-
riage rates over time, likely resulting in less dis-
tinct boundaries between groups (Qian and
Lichter 2011).
International Research
Compared to the United States’ relative frequency
of exogamy, other countries, such as France, are
more likely to display social homogamy (i.e.,
relationships between people of relatively equal
status; Safi and Rogers 2008). Safi and Rogers
(2008) assessed immigrant assimilation, or exog-
amy, in France using data from 1968 to 2000 and
found varied rates of assimilation among different
groups. Safi’s (Safi and Rogers 2008) results
supported the classic assimilation theory (i.e.,
immigrants adhere to and thrive with the social
norms of their new country) with intermarriage
having a positive correlation with financial pros-
perity. Three notable outliers were North Afri-
cans, Portuguese, and Asians, such that North
Africans remain highly assimilated despite unfa-
vorable economic circumstances, whereas Portu-
guese and Asians are less likely to assimilate in
light of favorable economic circumstances. Safi
and Rogers (2008) also noted that men tended to
be more exogamous as men are the primary
migrants resulting in uneven sex ratios. Compared
to France, Latin America adheres to slightly dif-
ferent societal norms with a wider range of eth-
nicities cohabiting. Valenzuela and Unzueta
(2015) sought to examine the racial classification
of Mapuche children in Chile. The researchers
found a high rate of exogamous relationships
along with high levels of inequality that mirror
Brazilian society, which is a highly integrated
society with an unevenly distributed economy
directly affecting social status. The findings of
this study display exogamy’s effects on colorism
and classism.
Expectancy (Rotter) 1481

Conclusion
Expansive Solutions
In considering the research on exogamy across
time and culture, a few conclusions emerge. ▶ Moving Against People
First, an understanding of exogamy requires the
consideration of research on its various synonyms
and antonyms. Of late, the term “intermarriage”
Expectancy
appears to garner the most research attention on
this broad topic, but by no means is it an over-
▶ Anticipation
whelming majority. Second, rates and acceptance
E
of exogamy appear to vary by culture and its
norms, and important predictors of rates of exog-
amy include ethnicity and social or economic Expectancy (Rotter)
class. With these conclusions in mind, it would
benefit the literature to consolidate its terms and to Brandon Q. Tran and Kate Sweeny
accumulate findings across cultures in order to University of California, Riverside, Riverside,
provide a more thorough understanding of exog- CA, USA
amy and its implications.

Synonyms

References Behavior potential; Reinforcement

Cerroni-Long, E. L. (1985). Marrying out: Socio-

cultural and psychological implications of intermar-
riage. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 16(1),
25–46.
Kalmijn, M., & Van Turbergen, F. (2010). A comparative
perspective on intermarriage: Explaining differences
among national-origin groups in the United States.
Demography, 47(2), 459–479.
Loeb, E. M., & Toffelmier, G. (1939). Kin marriage and
exogamy. The Journal of General Psychology,
20, 181–228.
Qian, Z., & Lichter, D. T. (2011). Changing patterns of
interracial marriage in a multiracial society. Journal of
Marriage and Family, 73, 1065–1084.
Safi, M., & Rogers, G. (2008). Intermarriage and assimila-
tion: Disparities in levels of exogamy among immi-
grants in France. Population (English Edition, 2002-),
63(2), 239–267.
Tittmar, H. (1990). Exogamy versus endogamy. Bulletin of
the Psychonomic Society, 28(1), 55–56.
Valenzuela, E., & Unzueta, M. B. (2015). Parental trans-
mission of ethnic identification in mixed couples in
Latin America: The Mapuche case. Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 38(12), 2090–2107.
Expansive Nonverbal Display
▶ Power Posing
Definition
Expectancy: an individual’s perception of the
probability that a behavior will lead to an out-
come, independent of its objective probability
and how desirable or undesirable it is.
Introduction
At its core, personality can be defined as an indi-
vidual’s behavioral tendencies. Put another way,
American psychologist Julian Rotter describes
personality as “the interaction of the individual
and his or her meaningful environment” (Rotter
1990). This entry provides a brief overview of
Rotter’s theoretical contributions to the develop-
ment of the personality construct, particularly his
concept of expectancy and its role in individual
differences in behavior and personality more
broadly. Despite sharing a title with Bandura’s
(1977) hallmark model, Rotter’s social learning
theory of personality and behavior serves as a
unique framework for outlining the intrapersonal
factors predictive of behavior across situations.
1482
Rotter’s Social Learning Theory of
Personality and Behavior
Rotter’s social learning theory of personality and
behavior proposes that personality represents an
interaction between the individual and their envi-
ronment, such that the internal self and the exter-
nal environment are dependent on one another
(Rotter 1966). In other words, behavior is not a
direct automatic response to objective environ-
mental stimuli, but rather a unique response
based on the individual’s subjective interpretation
of stimuli. Rotter’s theory of behavior consists of
four main components: expectancy (E), reinforce-
ment value (RV), behavior potential (BP), and the
psychological situation. Rotter combines these
components into the formula BP = f(E*RV),
such that behavior potential is a function of the
individual’s expectancy and reinforcement value.
Taking each component in turn, behavior
potential represents the overall likelihood that an
individual will engage in a specific behavior
within a situation. Behavior potential is based on
one’s expectancy or the individual’s perception
of the probability that the behavior will lead
to a particular outcome. Reinforcement value rep-
resents the desirability or aversiveness of the
anticipated outcome. If either the expectancy or
reinforcement value of a behavior’s outcome is
low, the likelihood that the individual will engage
in that behavior will also be low. In contrast, if
expectancy is high and the outcome is desirable
(reinforcement value is high), the likelihood that
the individual will engage in that behavior will be
also high. Lastly, the psychological situation
reflects the individual’s unique experience within
a given situation, based on behavioral expectan-
cies, reinforcement value of the outcome, and
actual behavior.
A Closer Look at Expectancies
Expectancies are an individual’s perception of the
probability that a behavior will lead to an out-
come, independent of its objective probability
and how desirable or undesirable it is. Put differ-
ently, expectancies reflect people’s subjective
Expectancy (Rotter)
understanding of the relationship between their
behavior and its consequences (Rotter 1966). Fur-
thermore, expectancies are contingent on two
facets of the individual: (1) one’s perceived com-
petence and (2) what they expect the outcome of
their efforts to be. Having a high expectancy
requires people to believe that they are capable
of effectively performing the behavior and that it
will result in some form of reinforcement (i.e., a
desirable outcome). Reinforcements act to
strengthen expectancies, such that successfully
performing a behavior that results in a desirable
outcome increases the individual’s belief in the
likelihood that the same behavior will lead to
further reinforcement, independent of its actual
likelihood (Rotter 1975). For example, hitting
the jackpot on a slot machine reinforces people’s
expectations that they will win again, despite the
objective odds of winning remaining unchanged.
As a result, people are more likely to continue
gambling after a win because their expectancy
regarding the desirable outcome (winning again)
has been reinforced by attaining the desirable
outcome once.
Generalized and Specific Expectancies
Considering the expectancy construct more
broadly, Rotter (1975) suggests that individuals
can form two types of expectancies, specific and
generalized. Specific expectancies reflect an indi-
vidual’s judgment of the likelihood that a behav-
ior will lead to a particular outcome within a
particular situation. In contrast, people derive
generalized expectancies from the culmination
of their specific expectancies across situations
and experiences. Generalized expectancies,
therefore, represent beliefs about the likelihood
that a behavior will lead to a particular outcome
based on the reinforcement of prior behaviors in
similar situations. When introduced to novel sit-
uations, individuals rely on generalized expec-
tancies as they reference their previous behaviors
in similar situations and the outcomes of these
behaviors. People utilize both specific and gen-
eralized expectancies to determine their behavior
across both familiar and novel situations,
Experience Sampling Methods 1483

reflecting upon past experiences and outcomes to References

navigate the present.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal
Expectancies and Personality versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological
Monographs: General and Applied, 80(1), 1–28.
According to Rotter (1966), trait-like individual Rotter, J. B. (1990). Internal versus external control of
reinforcement: A case history of a variable. American
differences arise due to variability in generalized
Psychologist, 45(4), 489–493.
expectancies when people are confronted with Rotter, J. B. (1975). Some problems and misconceptions
novel situations. Put differently, people’s general- related to the construct of internal versus external
control of reinforcement. Journal of Consulting and
E
ization of behavioral feedback across similar life
Clinical Psychology, 43(1), 56–67.
experiences prompts them to behave in a way that
is uniquely their own, giving rise to individual
differences in behavior across situations.
Referencing Rotter’s formula, BP = f(E*RV),
people’s behavior in a situation is based on the Expectation of the Worst
combination of their specific and generalized
expectancies that the behavior will result in an ▶ Pessimism
outcome they find valuable. Therefore, nuances
and individual differences in behavior reflect the
interaction between the present environment and
each person’s unique life experiences within sim-
ilar situations. Together, these factors create the Expected Consequences
psychological situation perceived by each person,
which influences their behavior within that ▶ Outcome Expectancies
situation.

Conclusion
Experience in Close
People do not have a universal, preset response to Relationships (ECR)
every environmental stimulus or situation. Rather,
behavior arises in response to an interaction ▶ Experiences in Close Relationships Scales
between individuals’ dynamic expectancies across
situations and their perception of whether an antic-
ipated outcome is a consequence or reward. Taken
together, Rotter’s arguments explain the emergence
of individual differences in patterns of behavior – Experience Sampling Methods
that is, the emergence of personality.
Cornelia Wrzus
Psychological Institute, Johannes Gutenberg
Cross-References University Mainz, Mainz, Germany

▶ If-then Behavioral Contingencies

▶ Locus of Control Synonyms
▶ Outcome Expectancies
▶ Person-Situation Interactions Ambulatory assessment; Ecological momentary
▶ Situation-Behavior Signatures assessment
1484
Definition
Experience sampling methods (ESM) refer to
repeated assessments in people’s daily life, that
is, sampling daily experiences where they occur –
previously with questionnaires, nowadays with
electronic devices such as smartphones. Ambula-
tory assessment and ecological momentary
assessment are sometimes used synonymously
with ESM. Strictly speaking, ESM refer only to
experiences (i.e., self-reported feelings, thoughts,
and behaviors), whereas ambulatory or ecological
momentary assessment are superordinate terms
that additionally include physiological and behav-
ioral measures (e.g., location based on GPS).
Thus, this entry uses the broader term ambulatory
assessment. Typically, ambulatory assessments
occur multiple times a day for several days,
whereas daily diary assessments refer to single
assessments per day over several days.
Introduction: Advantages of Ambulatory
Assessment
Compared to one-time laboratory assessments,
ambulatory assessments offer several advantages
together with some caveats, which will be
addressed in the end. Two major advantages of
capturing psychological phenomena (e.g., emo-
tions) the moment they occur and in daily life
are: (a) reduced retrospective report biases and
(b) enhanced generalizability (Mehl and Conner
2012). Regarding report biases, memory effects
typically distort immediate reports less than gen-
eral, retrospective reports days and weeks later.
Regarding generalizability, findings from mea-
surements under daily circumstances should bet-
ter apply to daily life than findings from
occasionally artificial laboratory settings. Further-
more, some phenomena that are difficult or
unethical to create in the laboratory – such as
abusive relationships – can only be assessed in
daily life. Finally, repeated assessment allows
within-person comparisons across multiple situa-
tions and examining the temporal structure of
phenomena; for example, whether people are
Experience Sampling Methods
more stressed after interpersonal or work-related
hassles, or whether recovery processes follow lin-
ear or nonlinear trajectories with ups and downs
(Mehl and Conner 2012, Chap. 1–3).
Research Designs: Different Sampling
Protocols
To study psychological phenomena in daily life,
researchers can decide between different assess-
ment protocols: Assessments can occur after spec-
ified events (i.e., event-contingent sampling; e.g.,
after stressful events), with a fixed schedule (i.e.,
interval-contingent sampling; e.g., every 2 h), at
pseudo-random times (e.g., every 2 h +/
a ran-
dom number of minutes), continuously (mainly
for physiological or behavioral assessments) or
following combinations of these schedules (e.g.,
Hektner et al. 2007; Mehl and Conner 2012). The
decision depends on the (assumed) frequency and
continuity of the focal phenomenon. Low fre-
quency phenomena (e.g., severe hassles) require
a higher sampling rate or event-contingent sam-
pling and higher total number of assessments
compared with very frequent or continuous states
(e.g., mood). Yet, a larger number and more fre-
quent assessments increase the burden of partici-
pants, which may cause higher selectivity among
the partaking people and/or selective responding
of participants to the momentary assessments
(Wrzus and Mehl 2015). Daily diaries, which
typically occur once a day in the evening, may
be an endurable alternative, where the retrospec-
tive bias is still weaker compared to general
reports (Mehl and Conner 2012, Chap. 2).
Although daily diaries mainly focus on self-
reports, they can be combined with physiological
(e.g., hormone measurements from saliva) and
behavioral assessments (e.g., videotaped tasks).
In first ambulatory assessment studies, partici-
pants answered paper-and-pencil questionnaires
at predefined times (e.g., morning, noon, eve-
ning). At that time, participants could answer the
questionnaires later or even all at once, jeopardiz-
ing central advantages of ambulatory assess-
ments: reduced retrospective bias and the
Experience Sampling Methods
possibility of examining within-person fluctuation
over time. Assessments using electronic devices
(e.g., smartphones) can remind participants to
answer questionnaires immediately, restrict the
time window of delayed responses, and record
the response times, which additionally allows
modeling the chronological trajectory of the
focal phenomenon.
Research Areas and Measures
Ambulatory assessments can involve self-reports,
partner-reports, cognitive tests, physiological
measures, and behavioral observations (Mehl
and Conner 2012; Wrzus and Mehl 2015). The
breadth of available measures makes ambulatory
assessment attractive for many research areas,
such as emotion, social interactions and relation-
ships, affective and social development, personal-
ity processes, work-life balance, health and
psychiatry (e.g., Bolger et al. 2003; Hoppmann
and Riediger 2009; Mehl and Conner 2012; Stone
2007). Within these different areas, ambulatory
assessment studies allow answering research
questions concerning the variability of the phe-
nomenon, its change across time, and associations
between phenomena – all within individuals and
with the option to compare individuals (Bolger
et al. 2003). For example, do people with different
levels of neuroticism vary systematically in both
the average level and the variability of negative
affect across time (Fleeson and Gallagher 2009)?
How does being alone at one moment predict
being with other people later, depending on peo-
ple’s personality (Wrzus et al. 2016)? How do
affective reactions to unpleasant events (i.e., asso-
ciations between events and affect) change across
the life span (Riediger and Rauers 2014)? Such
questions could not (sufficiently) be answered
with one-time laboratory assessments.
Caveats and Conclusion
Ambulatory assessments can be applied in many
different research areas and offer many
1485
advantages. At the same time, some drawbacks
need to be considered. Repeated assessments in
people’s daily life can be a considerable burden to
participants, leading to selectivity in samples (i.e.,
mainly highly motivated, robust, and well people
participate) and specific assessments (i.e., assess-
ments at inconvenient times are skipped).
Repeated assessment can lead to measurement
reactivity, that is, changing the phenomenon that
is measured, for example, because people monitor
E
their experiences and behavior more closely or
report their experiences in a socially desirable
way. Some methods have been established to
minimize and analyze selectivity and reactivity,
for example, concerning recruitment, design of
questionnaires, and configuration of assessment
protocol (see Mehl and Conner 2012; Wrzus and
Mehl 2015). In addition, most findings from
ambulatory assessment studies are correlational,
that is, phenomena can be observed and associ-
ated, yet causality among phenomena cannot be
established. Therefore, some ambulatory assess-
ment studies apply experimental variation.
Finally, ambulatory assessment studies often
demand large financial and personal resources
from researchers to develop and implement
assessments in daily life with representative sam-
ples. The increasing distribution of smartphones
and assessment programs (i.e., apps) facilitates a
more widespread application of ambulatory
assessment. Thus, eventually the psychological
laboratory will move to daily life to study the
psychological phenomena where they occur
(Miller 2012; Wrzus and Mehl 2015).
Cross-References
▶ Experimental Group
▶ Observational Learning
▶ Research Designs
References
Bolger, N., Davis, A., & Rafaeli, E. (2003). Diary methods:
Capturing life as it is lived. Annual Review of Psychol-
ogy, 54, 579–616.
1486 Experiences in Close Relationships – Relationship Structures (ECR-RS)

Fleeson, W., & Gallagher, P. (2009). The implications of

big five standing for the distribution of trait manifesta- Experiences in Close
tion in behavior: Fifteen experience-sampling studies
and a meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Relationships Scales
Psychology, 97, 1097–1114.
Hektner, J. M., Schmidt, J. A., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. Giulio Cesare Zavattini and Alessandra Busonera
(2007). Experience sampling method: Measuring Department of Dynamic and Clinical
the quality of everyday life. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Hoppmann, C. A., & Riediger, M. (2009). Ambulatory Psychology, Sapienza, University of Rome,
assessment in lifespan psychology: An overview of Roma, RM, Italy
current status and new trends. European Psychologist,
14, 98–108.
Mehl, M. R., & Conner, T. (2012). Handbook of research
methods for studying daily life. New York: Guilford Synonyms
Press.
Miller, G. (2012). The smartphone psychology manifesto. Experience in Close Relationships (ECR); Expe-
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 221–237. riences in Close Relationships – Relationship
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612441215.
Riediger, M., & Rauers, A. (2014). Do everyday affective Structures (ECR-RS); Experiences in Close
experiences differ throughout adulthood? A review of Relationships – Revised (ECR-R)
ambulatory-assessment evidence. In P. Verhaeghen &
C. Hertzog (Eds.), Emotion, social cognition, and
everyday problem solving during adulthood
(pp. 61–79). Definition
Stone, A. A. (Ed.). (2007). The science of real-time data
capture: Self-reports in health research. New York:
Oxford University Press. The Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR)
Wrzus, C., & Mehl, M. R. (2015). Lab and/or field? Mea- and its revised version Experiences in Close
suring personality processes and their social conse- Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) are 36-item
quences. European Journal of Personality, 29,
questionnaires on adult romantic attachment
250–271. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1986.
Wrzus, C., Wagner, G. G., & Riediger, M. (2016). style, comprising two scales assessing attachment
Personality-situation-transactions from adolescence anxiety and avoidance.
to old age. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 110, 782–799. https://doi.org/10.1037/
pspp0000054.
Introduction

Attachment theory (Bowlby 1988) is currently

recognized as a dominant theoretical perspective
Experiences in Close on emotional development and close relationships
Relationships – Relationship across the life span. The introduction of self-
Structures (ECR-RS) report measures of adult attachment to the fields
of social and personality psychology gave a big
▶ Experiences in Close Relationships Scales boost to recognition of the value of attachment
theory in research on affective relationships
between adults. Numerous self-report question-
naires to measure adult attachment were published
during the 1990s, following on from Hazan and
Experiences in Close Shaver’s (1987) pioneering work. The availability
Relationships – Revised of so many tools produced a large amount of data
(ECR-R) and helped to improve understanding of adult
romantic attachment. However, the existence of
▶ Experiences in Close Relationships Scales a variety of instrument for assessing similar
Experiences in Close Relationships Scales
constructs has also contributed to uncertainty
about the utility of individual questionnaires.
ECR and ECR-R: Construction,
Psychometric Properties, and Use in
Psychological Research
Brennan et al. (1998) undertook an important
systematization project, the goal of which was to
develop a measure of adult attachment that would
preserve the best psychometric properties of
existing questionnaires and establish the common
dimensions underlying the various existing instru-
ments. They integrated all the adult attachment
scales available in the late 1990s and identified a
pool of 323 nonredundant items which they
administered to 1086 undergraduates. Explor-
atory factor analyses demonstrated that the adult
romantic attachment construct had a two-factor
structure. One factor, anxiety (or anxiety about
abandonment), related to fear of abandonment
by romantic partners, hypervigilance for signs of
rejection and anger about separations; whereas the
other, avoidance (or avoidance of closeness/inti-
macy), corresponded to feeling uncomfortable
with closeness and being reluctant to get close to
others. Based on their results Brennan and col-
leagues created two 18-item scales, one to mea-
sure attachment-related anxiety and one to
measure attachment-related avoidance, which
together made up the Experiences in Close Rela-
tionships (ECR) questionnaire; both scales had
high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha was
0.91 for the anxiety and 0.94 for the avoidance
scale). Example anxiety scale items are “I worry
about being rejected or abandoned,” “I need a lot
of reassurance that close relationship partners
really care about me,” and “I find that my partners
don’t want to get as close as I would like.” Exam-
ple avoidance scale items are “I prefer not to show
others how I feel deep down,” “Just when some-
one starts to get close to me I feel myself pulling
away,” and “I find it difficult to allow myself to
depend on close relationship partners.” Respon-
dents indicate their agreement with each item using
a seven-point Likert scale; high scores indicate
1487
higher levels of the relevant construct. The two
dimensions correspond conceptually to
Bartholomew’s model of self and model of other
dimensions (Bartholomew 1990; Bartholomew and
Horowitz 1991) which underlie Bartholomew’s
four types of attachment: secure, preoccupied,
fearful-avoidant, and dismissive-avoidant.
Since its introduction the ECR has been trans-
lated into many languages and validated in many
cultural contexts, including Italian, French, Span-
E
ish, German, Norwegian, Japanese, Chinese,
Chilean, Brazilian, and Iranian; all these studies
have confirmed the two-factor structure of the
questionnaire.
In an attempt to improve the ECR, mostly to
yield better discrimination at the lower ends of the
anxiety and avoidance scales, Fraley et al. (2000)
reanalyzed the dataset collected by Brennan et al.
(1998) using a combination of classical psycho-
metric techniques and statistical techniques
derived from item-response theory. On the basis
of their results Fraley et al. (2000) selected the
18 items with the highest discriminative capacity
for each scale; this meant replacing some of the
original ECR items with others drawn from Bren-
nan et al.’s (1998) item pool to produce a revised
scale, the 36-item Experiences in Close
Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) questionnaire.
The ECR-R retained 13 of the original 18 anxiety
items and 7 of the original 18 avoidance items and
had good reliability for both the scales
(Cronbach’s alpha values exceeding 0.90).
Subsequent studies confirmed the two-factor
structure of the ECR-R, and translated versions
in Turkish, Chinese, Greek, German, Thai, Dutch,
Serbian, Italian, Slovak, and French also demon-
strated adequate psychometric properties. Fraley’s
website (http://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/
~rcfraley/measures/ecrr.htm) shows the average
values of anxiety and avoidance of a sample of
more than 17,000 subjects (73% female) who
completed the ECR-R online.
The ECR and ECR-R have been used in hun-
dreds of studies worldwide and have always shown
good psychometric properties. This research has
revealed that attachment style as measured by
these questionnaires is related to many variables
1488
of psychological interest, for example, self-esteem,
coping style, Big Five personality traits, anxiety,
depression, body awareness, health-related quality
of life, substance dependence, support-seeking ten-
dencies and perceived social support, adult memo-
ries of parental caregiving, intimacy, commitment,
violence, and dyadic adjustment in couple relation-
ships (Mikulincer and Shaver 2007).
Both the ECR and ECR-R are viewed primar-
ily as measures of romantic attachment, although
the wording of items can be modified to assess
attachment in other relationships (e.g., with par-
ents, friends, or therapists). However, as Fraley
et al. (2011a) have noted, rewording items which
were designed to assess romantic relationships in
order to assess attachment in nonromantic rela-
tionships can be problematic. They introduced a
modified version of the ECR-R, the Experiences
in Close Relationships – Relationship Structures
(ECR-RS) questionnaire which is designed to
allow assessment of attachment-related anxiety
and avoidance in four main relationships: with
mother, father, romantic partner, and best friend.
The ECR-RS has promise as a self-report instru-
ment for assessing attachment across a variety of
relational domains, however, because it has only
recently been introduced there is little research on
it (Fraley et al. 2011a; Fraley et al. 2011b).
The Use of the Experience in Close
Relationships Scales in the Study of
Personality and Individual Differences
As already pointed out, since their introduction,
ECR, ECR-R, and ECR-RS questionnaires have
been widely used in research. There are currently
many evidence about the link between personality
and individual differences and attachment orien-
tations in terms of anxiety and avoidance as mea-
sured by these questionnaires. Below, we
summarize some relevant results obtained in this
field, without presumption of exhaustiveness.
Using a sample of 239 twin pairs, Crawford
et al. (2007) founded that twin correlation on the
ECR attachment anxiety scale was greater in
monozygotic (MZ) twins (0.44) than in dizygotic
(DZ) twins (0.24), but twin correlations on the
Experiences in Close Relationships Scales
ECR avoidance scale were similar for MZ (0.29)
and DZ twins (0.33). In addition, they founded
that genetic factors accounted for 40% of the
variance in attachment anxiety but had essentially
no influence on avoidant attachment, accounting
for less than 1% of the explained variance.
Many studies have investigated the relation-
ship that attachment anxiety and avoidance as
measured by the Experiences in Close Relation-
ships Scales have with crucial sociodemographic
variables such as gender, age, and relationship
status. Regarding the association between gender
and attachment style, some of the studies showed
higher anxiety scores in women than in men (e.g.,
Fraley et al. 2011b; Busonera et al. 2014) and
higher avoidance scores in men than in women
(e.g., Fraley et al. 2011b). However, most studies
found no gender differences in attachment scores
(e.g., Picardi et al. 2005; Tsagarakis et al. 2007;
Wongpakaran et al. 2011; Kooiman et al. 2013).
Regarding the association between age and
attachment style, some studies found higher levels
of anxiety and avoidance in younger than older
subjects (e.g., Noftle and Shaver 2006; Busonera
et al. 2014). The Experience in Close Relation-
ships Scales also seem to differentiate singles
from people involved in committed relationships.
Indeed, it has been found that people who were
not involved in a relationship were more avoidant
and anxious than those who were involved in a
relationship (e.g., Noftle and Shaver 2006;
Alonso-Arbiol et al. 2008; Busonera et al. 2014).
An interesting line of research is the one that
focuses on the five-factors model of personality
(Costa and McCrae 1992) investigating
attachment-related differences in Conscientious-
ness, Openness to experience, Extraversion, and
Agreeableness. Among the studies that used the
ECR to measure attachment anxiety and avoid-
ance, Picardi et al. (2005) found that both dimen-
sions were negatively associated with Openness
to experience, Extraversion, and Agreeableness as
measured by the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ;
Caprara et al. 1993). Noftle and Shaver (2006)
used the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John et al.
1991; John and Srivastava 1999) and founded
that each of the Big Five traits was significantly
correlated with each attachment dimension of the
Experiences in Close Relationships Scales
ECR, but the magnitude of the correlations varied.
Attachment anxiety was most strongly correlated
with Neuroticism (positive correlation), whereas
Avoidance was most strongly correlated with
Agreeableness (negative correlation). Both
attachment dimensions were negatively and mod-
erately correlated with Extraversion, Agreeable-
ness, and Conscientiousness, and both were only
modestly correlated with Openness. Using the
NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae 1992) and the
ECR, the same authors (Noftle and Shaver 2006)
founded that Neuroticism was strongly and posi-
tively correlated with anxiety and modestly and
positively correlated with avoidance. Extraver-
sion was correlated moderately negatively with
avoidance and slightly negatively with anxiety.
Openness was modestly correlated with Avoid-
ance but not significantly with anxiety. Neither
anxiety nor avoidance was correlated significantly
with Agreeableness. Finally, both anxiety and
avoidance correlated moderately negatively with
Conscientiousness.
Another interesting line of research is the one
that investigates the association between attach-
ment orientations and self-esteem. In this research
field, studies that used the Experience in Close
Relationships Scales founded that both anxiously
and avoidantly attached people tend to have a low
self-esteem (e.g., Cassidy et al. 2003; Gentzler
and Kerns 2004; Luke et al. 2004; Treboux et al.
2004; Favez et al. 2016). For people anxiously
attached, these findings were to be expected
because attachment anxiety is defined in terms of
fear of rejection and abandonment, and that kind
of fear could drive people to feel insecure and
doubtful about his/her own value. As for the
avoidantly attached people, these results can be
explained by the fact that, although they have a
defensive tendency to exclude from conscious-
ness thoughts of vulnerability and deficiency,
these defenses are not successful in preventing
self-doubts and mental pain.
Attachment-related differences in mental rep-
resentations of other people affect the perception
of others’ supportiveness. Studies that used the
Experience in Close Relationships Scales found
that insecure adults, both anxious and avoidant,
reported less available support and were less
1489
satisfied with the support they received (e.g.,
Anders and Tucker 2000; Collins and Feeney
2004; Mallinckrodt and Wei 2005; Vogel and
Wei 2005).
Finally, most of the studies that, using the ECR
scales, evaluated the association between individ-
ual differences in attachment style and satisfaction
in couple relationships have found negative asso-
ciations of both anxiety and avoidance dimen-
sions with relational satisfaction, both in dating
E
and married couples (e.g., DiFilippo and
Overholser 2002; Williams and Riskind 2004;
Treboux et al. 2004).
Conclusions
Brennan et al. (1998) demonstrated that there were
two factors, anxiety and avoidance, underlying
most measures of adult attachment style. The ECR
and ECR-R are self-report questionnaires which
assess adult attachment styles by tapping these
two basic dimensions. They have shown good psy-
chometric properties in numerous studies, in partic-
ular high internal consistencies and temporal
stability, and are considered among the most reli-
able dimensional measures of adult attachment.
They are currently among the most widely used
measures for assessing anxiety and avoidance in
close relationships. The ECR and ECR-R have
been translated into many languages and validated
in many cultural contexts which have helped to
expand research in the field of close adult relation-
ships, particularly cross-cultural comparisons. They
have also been shown to be useful in clinical con-
texts, for example, it was found that attachment
anxiety and avoidance as measured by the ECR
can predict various forms of hostility in patients
with borderline personality disorder (Critchfield
et al. 2008).
Several scholars do not agree that the ECR-R is
preferable to the ECR (Fraley et al. 2000;
Mikulincer and Shaver 2007). (Fraley et al.
2000) argued that although the two ECR-R scales
were an improvement on the ECR scales, they
shared the weakness of being much less precise
in assessing security (low anxiety and low avoid-
ance) than insecurity. Fraley and colleagues
1490
attributed this weakness to the limitations of the
item pool which formed the basis of both ques-
tionnaires, specifically a lack of items capable of
assessing relationship security as precisely as rela-
tionship insecurity. An important goal for future
research is to try to improve these scales by writ-
ing items that tap the low ends of the anxiety and
avoidance distributions more precisely. Fraley
and colleagues also argued that some ECR-R
items were conceptually redundant. For these rea-
sons, they argued that although the ECR-R repre-
sents a slight improvement on the previous
version, the ECR, it does not have substantially
different properties in practice and the two scales
can therefore be used interchangeably.
Cross-References
▶ Attachment Theory
▶ Avoidant Attachment Style
▶ Insecure Attachment
▶ Working Models of Self and Other
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S. C. (2016). Validation of the French version of the
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Attachment models of the self and others: Relations
with self-esteem, humanity-esteem, and parental treat- Sven Hilbert
ment. Personal Relationships, 11, 281–303. https://doi. Department of Psychology, Psychological
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Methods and Assessment, Münich, Germany
Mallinckrodt, B., & Wei, M. (2005). Attachment, social
competencies, social support, and psychological dis- Faculty of Psychology, Educational Science, and
tress. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52, Sport Science, University of Regensburg,
358–367. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.52.3.358. Regensburg, Germany
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2007). Measurement of
Psychological Methods and Assessment, LMU
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New York: Guilford Press.
Noftle, E. E., & Shaver, P. R. (2006). Attachment dimen-
sions and the Big Five personality traits: Associations
and comparative ability to predict relationship quality.
Definition
Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 179–208.
https://doi.org/10.1521/pedi.2009.23.3.258. In an experimental treatment study, the experi-
Picardi, A., Toni, A., & Caroppo, E. (2005). Stability of mental group is the group that receives the
alexithymia and its relationships with the “Big Five”
treatment.
factors, temperament, character, and attachment style.
Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 74, 371–378.
https://doi.org/10.1159/000087785.
Treboux, D., Crowell, J. A., & Waters, E. (2004). When Introduction
“new” meets “old”: Configurations of adult attachment
representations and their implications for marital func-
tioning. Developmental Psychology, 40, 295–314. Experimental treatment studies are designed to
https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.2.295. estimate the effect of a particular treatment on
Tsagarakis, M., Kafetsios, K., & Stalikas, A. (2007). Reli- one or more variables. Typically, the variables of
ability and validity of the Greek version of the revised
interest are observed before and after treatment to
experiences in close relationships measure of adult attach-
ment. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, detect changes that occurred in between. The two
23, 47–55. https://doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759.23.1.47. observations of the variables are called pretest and
Vogel, D. L., & Wei, M. (2005). Adult attachment and posttest to indicate their temporal position before
help-seeking intent: The mediating roles of psycholog-
and after the treatment. However, any differences
ical distress and perceived social support. Journal of
Counseling Psychology, 52, 347–357. https://doi.org/ between pre- and posttest need not be caused by
10.1037/0022-0167.52.3.347. the treatment. Therefore, experimental treatment
1492
studies use at least two groups: the experimental
group receives the treatment, while the control
group does not. The effect of the treatment can
be estimated by comparing the change observed in
the treatment group with the change observed in
the control group.
Treatment Groups as Independent
Variables in an Experiment
In an experimental treatment study, the variables
of interest are usually observed after the treatment.
However, without any comparison between dif-
ferent conditions, information about the effect of
the treatment cannot possibly be extracted. In
most cases, a pre- and a posttest are conducted in
order to estimate increase or decrease in relevant
variables between the two tests. Yet concerning
the effect of the treatment, the difference between
the pre- and the posttest does provide only slightly
more information than the posttest only. This is
because an increase or decrease can be caused by
an infinite number of different reasons, “retest
effects” residing among the most prominent
ones. If, for example, a reaction time task is
conducted prior to and after a reaction time train-
ing, the mean reaction time is expected to decrease
between pre- and posttest. Now, if such a decrease
is actually observed, it need not necessarily be
caused by the training. A possible cause for the
reaction time decrease is that the subjects just
became used to the tasks and know what to expect
without any change in the quickness of reaction to
stimuli in general. It could also be that an exper-
imental confound is responsible for the decrease,
such as the temperature. If the day of the pretest is
extraordinarily hot and all subjects are tested on
this day, the mean reaction time might be unnatu-
rally high due to concentration problems.
In order to avoid the influence of possible
experimental confounds and to make a straight-
forward interpretation of the results possible, at
least two groups have to be created: an experi-
mental group, receiving the treatment and a con-
trol group which – ideally – faces identical
conditions (i.e., time of testing, test order, etc.)
Experimental Group
to the experimental group except for the
treatment.
Usually, only one control group is created,
which is either passive or active, meaning that it
receives either no treatment at all or a placebo
treatment (a widely used synonym for “active
control group” is “comparison group”). The num-
ber of experimental groups, however, has no def-
inite upper limit – even though different cases
involving multiple experimental groups have to
be distinguished: in some cases, several experi-
mental groups are created to compare different
intensities. For example, a reaction time training
could be applied 1 h per day in one group, 2 h in
the next group, and 3 h in a third group. The effect
of treatment intensity could be compared between
the three groups and, in addition, to a control
group that would not receive reaction time train-
ing. A different case would be if three different
types of reaction time trainings were applied in
three different experimental groups and one con-
trol group served as baseline for estimating the
effects of the three different trainings. Since an
experiment is generally defined by the manipula-
tion of an independent variable (which is given by
the training type), one could argue that the latter
case actually involves three experiments, each of
which includes one experimental group which is
compared to the common control group.
Conclusion
Experimental treatment studies function in the
way that they involve different groups, one of
which serves as a control group to provide a
baseline for the estimation of the treatment effect.
The treatment therefore defines the group as inde-
pendent variable, which is manipulated and there-
fore makes the investigation an experiment. Even
though only one control group is usually involved
in an experimental treatment study, there may be
several experimental groups. A major distinction
can be made between experimental treatment
studies varying the intensity of a single treatment
between multiple experimental groups and exper-
imental treatment studies that apply different
Explanatory Style 1493

treatments in different groups, each of which is Introduction

compared to a control group serving as baseline.
Originally, Seligman (1975) posited in the model
of learned helplessness that exposure to uncon-
Cross-References trollable events led to learned helplessness;
however some individuals experienced helpless-
▶ Comparison Group ness after uncontrollable events while others did
▶ Confound (Experimental) not (Peterson 1991). Thus, in their reformulated
▶ Dependent Variable helplessness model, Abramson et al. (1978) deter-
▶ Experimental Group mined that the explanations individuals make
E
▶ Independent Variable about the causes of uncontrollable events affect
the extent to which situations lead to self-esteem
loss, feelings of helplessness, and depression.
These explanations were termed explanatory
styles and were deemed to be the missing
Experiment-Based component of the original helplessness model
Assessment (Abramson et al. 1978).
However, the current understanding of
▶ Behavioral and Performance Measures of explanatory styles did not stop there. The last
Personality iteration of the model, the hopelessness model
of depression, is a cognitive diathesis-stress
model which specified that negative events acti-
vate an individual’s explanatory styles which
Expertise
can contribute to the onset and maintenance of
depression (Abramson et al. 1989). With this
▶ Skills
model, a new subtype of depression called
hopelessness depression was identified
(Abramson et al. 1989). Hopelessness depres-
Explanatory Style sion is characterized by both feelings of help-
lessness about one’s ability to control the
Ashley Ann Marshall and Patrick Pössel outcome of an event and negative expectancies
College of Education and Human Development, about the event itself (Abramson et al. 1989).
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA Thus, in the hopelessness model, more attention
is paid to explanatory styles as they are now a
key component of hopelessness depression.
Synonyms Pessimistic explanatory styles (negative expla-
nations about the cause of events) are associ-
Attributional style; Cognitive style; Dispositional ated with depression, lowered expectancies,
style passivity in the face of challenge, low achieve-
ment, and poor health, whereas optimistic
explanatory styles (positive explanations about
Definition the cause of events) are a protective factor
against depression (Haeffel and Vargas 2011).
The characteristic pattern of inferences an Therefore, individuals with pessimistic explan-
individual makes about the causes of negative atory styles may be more at risk for negative
or positive events that occur in their lives outcomes than those with more optimistic
(Abramson et al. 1989). explanatory styles.
1494
Explanatory Style Types
Explanatory styles are the way in which an
individual attributes the causes of an event,
which can be categorized into three types: global
or specific, stable or unstable, and/or internal
or external (Abramson et al. 1989). With the
hopelessness model of depression, the importance
of internal explanations was reduced because
they do not contribute to all symptoms of hope-
lessness depression, but specifically to low self-
worth and dependency (Abramson et al. 1989).
Additionally, two so-called cognitive styles were
added to the model that describe the inferences
an individual makes about the consequences of
events and about the self, which contribute to
depressive symptoms (Abramson et al. 1989).
To illustrate the types of explanatory styles, ima-
gine a student who raises his hand repeatedly in
class while the teacher continually calls on his
classmates but not on him. In this example, not
being called on represents a stressful situation
for this student, which might activate a pessimistic
explanatory style. In the first type of explanatory
style, if the student attributes this situation to
a global cause, he might think, “The reason that
made my teacher not call on me will cause prob-
lems in other areas of my life,” whereas if he
attributes the situation to a specific cause, he
might think “The reason that made my teacher not
call on me was unique to this situation.” In the
second explanatory style type, if he attributes the
situation to a stable cause, he may assert, “The
reason that my teacher not call on me will cause
my teacher to not call on me in the future,” whereas
if he attributes the situation to a unstable cause, he
might assume, “The reason my teacher did not call
on me was caused by temporary circumstances.” In
the third explanatory style type, if he attributes the
situation to an internal cause, he may think, “The
reason my teacher did not call on me has something
to do with me,” whereas if he attributes the situation
to an external cause, he may assume “The reason
my teacher did not call on me has nothing to do
with me.” From this example, it can be seen that
global, stable, and internal attributions of negative
events represent a pessimistic explanatory style;
however specific, unstable, and external
Explanatory Style
attributions of negative events represent an optimis-
tic explanatory style.
It should also be noted that these same explan-
atory style types can be applied to positive events
as well. When it comes to positive events, a
pessimistic explanatory style includes attributions
that are specific, unstable, and external, while
an optimistic explanatory style includes attribu-
tions that are global, stable, and internal. For exam-
ple, think back to the student; however this time
imagine that he was called on by his teacher, which
he found to be a positive experience. If he utilized
the first explanatory style type and attributes being
called on to a global cause, he might think “The
reason that made my teacher call on me will serve
as an advantage for me in other areas of my life”;
however if he attributes the situation to a specific
cause, he might think, “The reason that made my
teacher called on me was unique to this situation.”
It can be seen that while a specific attribution for a
negative event might lead to a more positive emo-
tional response, a specific attribution to a positive
event might lead to a more negative emotional
response.
Empirical Support
There is a wealth of empirical support for explan-
atory style and its mental health outcomes
(Abramson et al. 2002; Alloy et al. 2004; Liu
et al. 2015). A systematic review revealed that a
pessimistic explanatory style is consistently pre-
dictive of hopelessness depression, self-injurious
thoughts, and self-injurious behaviors when
interacting with negative events and that optimis-
tic explanatory styles are consistently related to
hopefulness and resilience following negative
events (Liu et al. 2015). The research on the
development of pessimistic explanatory styles
is less extensive. However, factors that place
an individual at risk for a pessimistic explanatory
style include but are not limited to the experience
of childhood emotional abuse, relational victimi-
zation, maternal anger, and negative maternal
feedback (Liu et al. 2015).
There is also empirical support for inter-
ventions that undermine pessimistic explanatory
Exploitativeness
styles (Abramson et al. 1995). Therapies that
prompt individuals to consider the veracity and
helpfulness of their explanations can disrupt the
chain of cognitions that lead to and maintain
depression (Abramson et al. 1995). These inter-
ventions can take the form of social support,
whereby a member of an individual’s social net-
work helps to correct pessimistic attributions with
more optimistic ones in a process called inferen-
tial feedback. Such inferential feedback helps
to disrupt hopelessness following negative events,
and over time, the pessimistic explanatory style
will be replaced with a more optimistic explana-
tory style (Panzarella et al. 2006). So, even though
explanatory styles are often described as being
trait-like, there are empirically supported methods
for altering them.
Conclusion
Pessimistic explanatory styles, or causal attribu-
tions about the internality, stability, and globality,
of events, contribute to the onset and maintenance
of depressive symptoms. In accordance with
the stress-diathesis model proposed in the hope-
lessness model, a person’s pessimistic explana-
tory style is activated by an event and leads to
hopelessness depression and other negative out-
comes (Abramson et al. 2002; Alloy et al. 2004;
Liu et al. 2015). Therapeutic interventions that
undermine pessimistic explanatory styles are
effective in treating depression (Abramson et al.
1995; Panzarella et al. 2006).
Cross-References
▶ Attributional Styles
▶ Learned Helplessness
References
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D.
(1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and
reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87,
49–74.
1495
Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B. (1989).
Hopelessness depression: A theory-based subtype of
depression. Psychological Review, 96, 358–372.
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Metalsky, G. I. (1995).
Hopelessness depression. In G. M. Buchanan &
M. E. P. Seligman (Eds.), Explanatory style
(pp. 113–134). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers.
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., Hankin, B. L., Haeffel, G. J.,
MacCoon, D. G., & Gibb, B. E. (2002). Cognitive
vulnerability-stress models of depression in a self-
regulatory and psychobiological context. In I. H. Gotlib
& C. L. Hammen (Eds.), Handbook of depression E
(pp. 268–294). New York: Guilford.
Alloy, L. B., Abramson, L. Y., Gibb, B. E.,
Crossfield, A. G., Pieracci, A. M., Spasojevic, J., &
Steinberg, J. A. (2004). Developmental antecedents
of cognitive vulnerability to depression: Review
of findings from the cognitive vulnerability to
depression project. Journal of Cognitive
Psychotherapy, 18, 115–133. https://doi.org/10.1891/
jcop.18.2.115.65957.
Haeffel, G. J., & Vargas, I. (2011). Resilience to depressive
symptoms: The buffering effects of enhancing
cognitive style and positive life events. Journal of
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 42,
13–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.09.003.
Liu, R. T., Kleiman, E. M., Nestor, B. A., & Cheek, S. M.
(2015). The hopelessness theory of depression:
A quarter-century in review. Clinical Psychology:
Science and Practice, 22, 345–365. https://doi.org/
10.1111/cpsp.12125.
Panzarella, C., Alloy, L. B., & Whitehouse, W. G. (2006).
Expanded hopelessness theory of depression: On the
mechanisms by which social support protects against
depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30,
307–333. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-006-9048-3.
Peterson, C. (1991). The meaning and measurement of
explanatory style. Psychological Inquiry, 2, 1–10.
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On depression,
development, and death. San Francisco: Freeman.
Exploitativeness
Angela Book and Jordan Power
Department of Psychology, Brock University,
St. Catharines, ON, Canada
Definition
Exploitiveness, or exploitativeness, is defined as
“unfairly or cynically using another person or
group for profit or advantage” (Merriam-Webster).
1496
Introduction
Exploitiveness is considered to be a violation
of the norm of reciprocity (Brunell et al. 2013).
Each of the personalities in the Dark Triad
(psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism)
is associated with the tendency to be exploitive
(Jones and Paulhus 2010). Psychopathy re-
searchers often view psychopaths as “cheaters”
who exploit others (Book and Quinsey 2003)
and social predators (Hare 2001).
Measures
Exploitiveness can be measured using the
Exploitiveness and Entitlement subscales of the
Narcissist Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin and
Terry 1988). However, these subscales tend to
have low reliability and some researchers see
them as problematic as the items do not refer to
exploiting others or violating the norm of reci-
procity per say, but they more so measure manip-
ulativeness and deceitfulness (Brunell et al.
2013). Exploitiveness can also be measured
using the Interpersonal Exploitativeness Scale
(Brunell et al. 2013), which is based on the idea
that exploitiveness is in fact a violation of the
norm of reciprocity and involves taking advantage
of other people.
Research
Exploitiveness has been consistently related to
aggression and some research finds that it is
more strongly related to proactive than reactive
aggression, meaning that exploitive individuals
seem to be more likely to use aggression to
achieve their goals than they are to use aggression
in response to provocation (Ang et al. 2010).
Reidy et al. (2008) found that individuals scoring
high on exploitiveness were more likely to use
aggression in their day-to-day interactions and
this increase in frequency held true for direct
aggression, indirect aggression, physical aggres-
sion, and verbal aggression. It was also found that
the increase in aggression frequency among those
Exploitativeness
with high exploitiveness was accompanied by a
more severe level of aggression in each of the
interpersonal scenarios. Reidy et al. (2008) also
found that exploitiveness was one of two narcis-
sism subtraits (the other being entitlement) that
predicted the frequency of initial aggression,
meaning those who score high on exploitiveness
are more likely to act aggressively in a severe and
intense manner, and for a relatively long duration,
from the starting point of a given conflict. For a
typical layperson, conflicts tend to begin with a
low level of aggression and steadily increase as
the provocation escalates (Reidy et al. 2008). For
highly exploitive individuals, however, this
course of action does not seem to apply. Unsur-
prisingly, exploitiveness has been found to predict
bullying behavior, though this relationship seems
to be mediated through approval-of-aggression
beliefs (Ang et al. 2010). Thus, exploitive indi-
viduals are more likely to approve of the use of
aggression, a notion that corresponds with the
findings mentioned above, and this higher
approval of aggression is what predicts the bully-
ing behavior.
Interestingly, exploitiveness has been associ-
ated with a high capacity to accurately recognize
others’ emotions and this seems to be especially
true when the emotions in question are negative
(Konrath et al. 2014). This fairly sobering finding
suggests that exploitive people may be adapted to
recognizing negativity and vulnerability and
therefore may be able to specifically choose vic-
tims that are more easily taken advantage of.
Conclusion
Exploitiveness has been consistently associated
with a variety of negative outcomes and has
been associated with other potentially harmful
traits, including manipulativeness, irresponsibil-
ity, and callousness (Lessard et al. 2011). As
with any negative personality characteristic, it
would be very beneficial to determine how to
combat exploitiveness. This could be done
through discovering effective strategies for lay-
people to avoid being victimized by exploitive
individuals. Perhaps a more effective solution,
Exploratory Factor Analysis
however, would be to gain a better understanding
of the etiology of exploitiveness and attempt to
intervene in the development of the trait.
Cross-References
▶ Aggression
▶ Bullying
▶ Machiavellianism
▶ Narcissism
▶ Narcissistic Personality Inventory
▶ Psychopathy
References
Ang, R. P., Ong, E. Y., Lim, J. C., & Lim, E. W. (2010).
From narcissistic exploitativeness to bullying behavior:
The mediating role of approval-of-aggression beliefs.
Social Development, 19, 721–735.
Book, A. S., & Quinsey, V. L. (2003). Psychopaths:
cheaters or warrior-hawks? Personality and Individual
Differences, 36(1), 33–45.
Brunell, A. B., Davis, M., Schley, D. R., Eng, A. L.,
Dulmen, M., & Wester, K. L. (2013). A new measure
of interpersonal exploitiveness. Frontiers in Psychol-
ogy, 4, 299. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00299.
exploitive. 2016. In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved
March 25, 2016, from http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/exploitive
Hare, R. D. (2001). Psychopaths and their nature: Some
implications for understanding human predatory vio-
lence. In A. Raine & J. Sanmartin (Eds.), Violence and
psychopathy (pp. 5–34). New York: Kluwer.
Jonason, P. K., Li, N. P., Webster, G. D., & Schmitt, D. P.
(2009). The Dark Triad: Facilitating a short-term mat-
ing strategy in men. European Journal of Personality,
23, 5–18.
Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2010). Differentiating the
Dark Triad within the Interpersonal Circumplex. In
L. M. Horowitz & S. Strack (Eds.), Handbook of inter-
personal psychology: Theory, research, assessment,
and therapeutic interventions (pp. 249–268).
New York: Wiley.
Konrath, S., Corneille, O., Bushman, B. J., & Luminet,
O. (2014). The relationship between narcissistic
exploitiveness, dispositional empathy, and emotion
recognition abilities. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior,
38, 129–143.
Lessard, J., Greenberger, E., Chen, C., & Farruggia,
S. (2011). Are youths’ feelings of entitlement always
“bad”?: Evidence for a distinction between exploitive
and non-exploitive dimensions of entitlement. Journal
of Adolescence, 34, 521–529.
1497
Raskin, R., & Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components
analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and
further evidence of its construct validity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 890–902.
Reidy, D. E., Zeichner, A., Foster, J. D., & Martinez, M. A.
(2008). Effects of narcissistic entitlement and
exploitiveness on human physical aggression. Person-
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doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.10.015.
E
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Stella Bollmann
Universität Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland
The exploratory factor analysis is a statistical
method that is used to identify latent variables
that underlie a set of a larger number of manifest
variables. The term exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) stems from the need to differentiate from
the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Histori-
cally, EFA is older than CFA and functions a little
differently. What the two have in common is their
usage: They examine existing sets of variables to
determine their underlying factor model. The
difference is that with CFA, a hypothesized factor
model can be tested, while EFA develops
unknown factor models.
What Is a Factor Model?
The factor model that underlies all factor analytic
techniques is determined by some basic assump-
tions on psychometric measurements that were
later summarized under the term classical test
theory (Lord and Novick 1968). The main
assumption is that the responses to questionnaire
items are the result of an individual’s position on a
latent variable. The latent variable itself cannot be
observed but is measured through the items. For
an illustration, we use the example of a test that is
supposed to measure verbal intelligence. The
latent variable in this example is verbal intelli-
gence and the questionnaire consists of items
that are supposed to measure this and only this
latent trait.
1498
The response of one person on one item is caused
by the individual’s location on the latent trait. If, for
example, the person has a higher verbal intelligence
than others, he will on average also answer more
items correctly. However, there is also some random
influence that causes a very intelligent person to fail
on some items or vice versa. This random influence
is called residual. The latent trait plus the residual
results in the individual’s item response. This rela-
tionship is called the factor model.
In most presentations of the factor model, it is
also mentioned that the residual does not only
contain random influence (called error) but also
a unique part (called uniqueness) that is system-
atically measured but only by this item and not by
the others (e.g., Spearman 1904). In the example
of verbal intelligence, this could, for example, be
words of a specific context that some people are
more familiar with than others. These people
would thus systematically have higher results on
this item even though their general verbal intelli-
gence is equal to those of other people who are
less familiar with the context. In factor analysis in
general, it is not possible to separate the random
part from the uniqueness since we usually only
have one measurement per person. In the follow-
ing, we will only use the term residual since we
are referring to the whole part that is not explained
by the common factor.
Mathematical Representation of the
Factor Model
The factor model can be written mathematically:
xpi ¼ li xp þ ϵpi ð1Þ
xpi is the value of a given person p on the item i.
xp is the location of this person p on the latent
variable (in our example this would be the indi-
vidual’s level of verbal intelligence). ϵ pi stands for
the residual, i.e., the random deviation of the
individual’s value from its true latent location. li
is the factor loading of item i and expresses how
strongly the item is related to the factor, i.e., how
strong the location on the latent trait determines
the response on the item.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Sometimes also an intercept is included in the
model equation that describes the “easiness” of
the item. Here, we assume that items have been
centered beforehand, and thus the model equation
only describes the deviations from the mean of the
item. Later on, we will only be dealing with var-
iances and covariances anyway, which is why
only the deviations from the mean matter.
The assumption of the classical test theory
that the residual is entirely random is expressed
mathematically by setting ϵ pi to be normally dis-
tributed with expectation 0 and not allowing any
covariation between the ϵ pi of any two items:
Cov(Ei, Ej) = 0.
Main Purpose of EFA
The purpose of EFA is thus to examine in an
exploratory way whether the factor model is pre-
sent, i.e., if the previously mentioned assumptions
hold. Furthermore, the EFA allows to investigate
what the specific characteristics of the model are.
Depending on which measurement model is
assumed, it might be, for example, crucial whether
the residual variances (V ar(Ei)) are equal across
items or not. Another important question is
whether the factor loadings li of the items are all
equal. In case they are all equal, a tau equivalent
model is present. This means that all items “rep-
resent” the latent variable to the same amount. To
sum it up, the EFA examines:
1. Which item measures the same latent variable
2. How large the li are
3. How large the (V ar(Ei)) are
However, the main purpose of EFA is to rather
examine the parameters exploratory than to test
whether they are equal to zero or equal to each
other. The statistical testing is usually done by
means of CFA.
The above Eq. 1 refers to the individual’s item
responses. However, when conducting an EFA,
one is not interested in these single responses but
the item variances and covariances. Therefore, in
the following the idea of the factor model will be
explained in terms of variances and covariances.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Systematic and Unsystematic Variance
When all items measure the same trait, the indi-
vidual’s responses on these items partly only dif-
fer because the individuals have different
positions on the latent trait (different xp’s). These
differences are called systematic variance of the
items. However, two individuals having the exact
same location on the latent trait may have different
responses on the items. Two different persons
with the same verbal intelligence do, for example,
not always have the same score in an intelligence
test. This remaining variance of the items may
then (by assumption of the factor model) only be
caused by random variations (variation of Epi).
These random variations are called unsystematic
variance or residual variance. Let us take the
example of the verbal intelligence questionnaire
again: A large part of the individual’s different
performances on the test items will depend on
their verbal intelligence (systematic variance).
To a certain extent, however, they will also
depend on random influences (unsystematic
variance).
Extracting a Factor from a Correlation
Matrix
Since all items measure the same latent trait, the
systematic variance of one item is related to the
systematic variance of the other item: The items
correlate. The higher the two items correlate, the
higher the amount of systematic variance is. This
principle can be transferred to the case of all items:
The entire common variance of all items that
measure the same thing is attributed to the same
factor. What is meant by the common variance of
more than two items can best be described by
taking a look at the correlation matrix of the
items. In factor analysis the correlation matrix
(not the covariance matrix) is the basis of the
analysis. It contains the entire information that is
necessary to carry out a factor analysis (the infor-
mation on the individual’s responses on the items
is not considered). The fact that the correlation
matrix and not the covariance matrix is used
entails that the item variances are all standardized
1499
to be 1, and thus their original differences in size
do not matter. Factor analysis focuses on the cor-
relations (not the variances), and they are
displayed in the off-diagonals of the matrix.
By means of parameter estimation techniques
(see below), the factor can now be extracted. This
simply means to separate the common item vari-
ance, i.e., the systematic variance (the factor),
from the unsystematic part. This means the orig-
inal correlation matrix of the items is split up into
E
one matrix that reflects only the systematic part
and one that only reflects the unsystematic part.
Since these two add up to the original correlation
matrix with 1s in the diagonal, these two matrices
have values below 1 in their diagonals. Therefore,
these matrices cannot be called correlation matri-
ces anymore – they are covariance matrices. Their
diagonals display proportions of item variances.
The diagonal of the residual matrix, for example,
reflects the proportion of item variance that is
unsystematic. The diagonal of the systematic
covariance
 matrix  is one minus the residual vari-
2
ances 1
ϵpi . These values are called item
communalities. If the factor model is supposed
to hold, the residuals are not allowed to correlate
anymore. In the residual matrix consequently the
off-diagonals are zero or close to zero
(Theoretically, these values are all exactly zero,
but in reality they may lie a little above or below
because of random variations.) The entire amount
of correlations that was displayed in the original
correlation matrix should thus remain in the
matrix of the systematic part.
Multiple Factors
The EFA was originally developed by Spearman
(1904) for unidimensional measurements. How-
ever, the factor model can be generalized to the
case of multiple factors (Thurstone 1935). This
case applies when the questionnaire measures
more than one factor. Then, the item variance is
represented by a linear combination of weighted
factor values and a residual variable. One item can
possibly load on more than one factor, i.e., load-
ings of one item on more than one factor may be
1500
larger than zero. These loadings on other factors
are called cross loadings. However, in general
the aim is still to measure each factor
unidimensionally. One item should thus only
measure one factor. This means even though
these cross loadings are estimated and may thus
be higher than zero, this result is undesired
according to the model.
Estimation of Model Parameters
The factor extraction is equivalent to finding the
parameters for the model equation. Therefore, the
item correlation matrix has to be written in form of
systematic variances and covariances plus resid-
ual variances and covariances like in the follow-
ing equation:
S ¼ LFL0 þ E ð2Þ
S is the correlation matrix of the items, LFL
is the systematic part, and E is the residual
matrix. As can be seen, this mathematic repre-
sentation is very similar to the equation for the
factor model (1). It is in fact the same equation
written in matrix form. L is the matrix of load-
ings of each item on each factor, and F is the
factor covariance or correlation matrix. It dis-
plays the factor variances in the diagonals and
their covariances in the off-diagonals. The factor
Exploratory Factor Analysis
estimation techniques are available to find the
best fitting solution. The most popular ones are:
1. Maximum likelihood factor analysis
2. Principal axis factor analysis (PAF)
In both of these techniques, first a so-called
unrotated solution is estimated in which factors
are assumed to be uncorrelated and all items can
have loadings on all factors. Subsequently, a rotation
is performed that transforms loadings and factors in
a way that makes the solution better interpretable.
Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis In
general, the idea of maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation is to find model parameter estimates
that best reflect the data. Therefore, the difference
between the data and the model is minimized, i.e.,
the likelihood of the data is maximized. In the case
of EFA, this means that the difference between the
model correlation matrix S and the empirical cor-
relation matrix S has to be minimized.
The model correlation matrix S is entirely given
by the model parameters through the equation of the
factor model when written in matrix form (2). It
thus consists of the systematic part of the correlation
matrix that can be written in terms of loadings and
factor correlations plus the residual matrix that only
contains diagonals. The difference between the two
matrices is computed by the following equation:
variance is also called eigenvalue. When factor      
1  
variances are standardized, these diagonals are 1. E¼ tr S
1 S
ln S
1 S
q
The off-diagonals can only be unequal to zero 2
when factors are allowed to correlate (see
with q being the number of items. The term S
1S
below).
can be interpreted as dividing the empirical matrix
Note that S is the model correlation matrix. It
by the model matrix and quantifies the difference
is only equal to the empirical correlation matrix
between the two matrices. If the model fits the
when the assumptions of the model hold in reality,
data perfectly, then S equals S and S
1S equals
i.e., when the residuals do not correlate. To dis-
the identity matrix I. The trace of that identity
tinguish from the model correlation matrix, the
matrix will then be the number of items q and
empirical correlation matrix in the following will
the logarithm of |I| will be 0. Thus, the value of
be denoted by S. Extracting factors means finding
E is 0. The more S and S differ from each other,
parameter values for the loadings L, the factor
the higher E will be. The ML estimation thus aims
correlations F, and the residual variances E, so
at finding parameters that minimize E.
that S comes closest to the empirical correlation
matrix S. There is no single solution of how to
Principal Axis Factor Analysis The idea behind
solve the factor equation. Multiple different
the principal axes factor analysis (PAF) builds on
Exploratory Factor Analysis
the principal component analysis (PCA). While
PAF was specifically developed for the examina-
tion of latent variable models in psychometrics,
PCA is also used in other fields. PCA generally
attempts to reproduce the whole empirical covari-
ance matrix by means of an eigenvalue decompo-
sition. There is no assumed residual term, and
therefore the whole matrix could be reproduced
if as many components were extracted as there are
items. The idea thus of PCA is to reduce dimen-
sionality which means that the information on
many items is written in terms of fewer compo-
nents. These components are linear combinations
of the items. On the other hand, PAF models just
the common part of the matrix (see above). This
means all of the off-diagonal elements have to be
reproduced, while from the diagonals, there will
always remain an unexplained part, the residual.
In order to maintain the principal of an
unexplained residual, the idea of PAF is to carry
out a PCA with a reduced matrix that only con-
tains the common parts. The reduced matrix thus
contains all of the off-diagonal elements and the
common part of the diagonals (the communali-
ties). This is simply obtained by replacing the
diagonals of the correlation matrix with the com-
munalities of the items. By means of a PCA,
theoretically this entire matrix could be
reproduced as soon as enough factors were extra-
cted. Please note that PCA has a unique solution.
PAF on the other hand does not. This is caused by
the fact that the communalities are not known
beforehand and there are multiple ways of esti-
mating them. Usually, for the initial value a mul-
tiple regression is used, and then iteratively an
eigenvalue decomposition is done and the diago-
nals are replaced with 1
ϵ2pi . In each step a PCA
is carried out, and then the diagonals are replaced
by 1
ϵ2pi of that solution. This is repeated until
the change from one iteration to the next is suffi-
ciently small.
Rotation
The initial factor solution (that is obtained by one
of the estimation procedures previously men-
tioned) has the following property: Variance
1501
explained by factors is maximized and the vari-
ance accounted for by one factor decreases from
the first to the last factor. Although this optimiza-
tion criterion helps to best describe the data, it is
not necessarily the one that best reflects the under-
lying model. Therefore, the initial solution is
transformed afterwards in a way that makes it
easy to interpret. In this transformation another
optimization criterion comes into play: the simple
structure. It denotes the fact that each item loads
E
high on one factor and low on all the other factors
which is the basic requirement for unidimension-
ality. The name rotation comes from the graphical
interpretation of factor analysis in which factors
can be represented as coordinates in a multi-
dimensional space. Mathematically, it means that
the factor solution is multiplied by a matrix of
orthogonal vectors. The explained variance of
one item (communality) is preserved, and there-
fore the sum of the explained variances is also
preserved. However, the loadings change, and
therefore the explained variance of one factor
changes. Thus, the entire variance is redistributed
across factors. While, in the original solution, the
first factor accounts for the largest amount of
variance, after the rotation the variance is distrib-
uted more equally across factors and also the
solution is more easily interpretable since simple
structure is optimized.
It has to be distinguished between orthogonal
and oblique rotation. In the first, orthogonality of
factors is preserved, and in the latter factors are
allowed to correlate. Orthogonal methods are, for
example, varimax, quartimax, and equimax, and
commonly used oblique methods are direct
oblimin and promax.
Numbers of Factors
Before the extraction of factors can be performed,
the user has to know how many factors to extract.
There might be a theoretical assumption about the
number of factors (also called dimensionality).
But since EFA is exploratory in nature, it might
also be that the user does not know the number of
factors. Then, dimensionality has to be determined
in a preceding step. There are a number of methods
1502
available for determining dimensionality. Either
way it has to be noted that theoretical assumptions
about possible numbers of factors as well as the
interpretability of the results should always be con-
sidered. This is particularly important given that
there are multiple possible techniques available for
determining dimensionality and none of them is
considered to be the one and only gold standard.
As a result, most experts advise to carry out a few
of them and compare the results.
The most important and most recommendable
techniques for determining dimensionality are:
1. Parallel analysis (Horn 1965).
2. Change in model fit when fitting EFAs to data
with an increasing number of factors starting
with one factor. It is recommended to use
information criteria as AIC or BIC instead of
performing a w2 test since the test is very sen-
sitive to sample size.
3. Minimum average partial (MAP) criterion
(Velicer 1976).
For more detailed information, the reader is
referred to Dinno (2009) and Hayton et al.
(2004) for parallel analysis and to Velicer (1976)
and Velicer et al. (2000) for the MAP criterion.
Controversies
There is some controversy over the factor model,
and some statisticians do not accept it as legiti-
mate multivariate method (see Rencher and
Christensen 2012, p. 441). This is due to the
many known issues of the method. The first prob-
lem of EFA is that the number of factors is not
definite. As explained in the previous paragraph,
multiple methods exist to solve this problem. It
is important to mention though that these are all
methods that are processed independently of
the actual factor analysis. The EFA itself does
not indicate the right number of factors and will
detect an optimal solution for any given number
of factors. Theoretically, up to q
1 factors
are possible, and each of the corresponding
parameter estimations might result in very differ-
ent solutions.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Moreover, for all models that include more
than one factor, there is a rotation problem. This
means that several equivalent models that all lead
to the same reproduced correlation matrix can be
converted into each other. Although usually each
of the many different rotation techniques aims at
maximizing simple structure, there are still many
different ways to achieve that goal. And not all of
them result in the same solution. For a mathemat-
ical proof of this problem, see Anderson (1958,
p. 571).
Finally, another problem of EFA arises after all
model parameters have been estimated: the factor
indeterminacy. The estimation procedure only
produces estimates for variances and covariances
of the factors. If one wants to calculate the indi-
vidual’s location on the latent factor, there are still
an infinite number of solutions to solve that sys-
tem of equations.
References
Anderson, T. (1958). An introduction to multivariate sta-
tistical analysis. New York: Wiley.
Dinno, A. (2009). Exploring the sensitivity of horn’s par-
allel analysis to the distributional form of random data.
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 44(3), 362–388.
Hayton, J. C., Allen, D. G., & Scarpello, V. (2004). Factor
retention decisions in exploratory factor analysis:
A tutorial on parallel analysis. Organizational
Research Methods, 7(2), 191–205.
Horn, J. L. (1965). A rationale and test for the number of
factors in factor analysis. Psychometrika, 30(2),
179–185.
Lord, F. M., & Novick, M. R. (1968). Statistical theories of
mental test scores. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Rencher, A., & Christensen W. (2012). Methods of multi-
variate analysis. Wiley.
Spearman, C. (1904). General intelligence objectively
determined and measured. The American Journal of
Psychology, 15, 201–292.
Thurstone, L. (1935). The vectors of mind. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago.
Velicer, W. F. (1976). Determining the number of compo-
nents from the matrix of partial correlations.
Psychometrika, 41(3), 321–327.
Velicer, W. F., Eaton, C. A., & Fava, J. L. (2000). Construct
explication through factor or component analysis: A
review and evaluation of alternative procedures for
determining the number of factors or components.
In R. D. Goffin & E. Helmes (Eds.), Problems and
solutions in human assessment: Honoring Douglas N.
Jackson at seventy. (pp. 41–71). Boston: Kluwer
Extended Growth Versus Early Reproduction
Expression of Emotion
▶ Emotional Expressiveness
Expressive
▶ Assertiveness
Extended Growth Versus Early
Reproduction
J. Adam Randell
University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond,
OK, USA
Definition
People vary in their reproductive timing. That is,
reproductive capabilities develop earlier in life for
some, and some prioritize bearing offspring ear-
lier in life than do others. These variations are
related to early childhood experiences and person-
ality traits developed later in life. In the following,
we will explore these associations in the context
of the unifying theoretical context of life history
theory.
Introduction
Life history theory holds that organisms must
allocate a limited caloric energy budget among a
variety of activities (Kaplan and Gangestad 2005).
These allocations are reactions to environmental
conditions that elicit certain behavioral and repro-
ductive strategies. Further, life history theory
holds that the allocations organisms make reflect
one of several trade-offs organisms must make.
One of these trade-offs involves allocating
energy to either current reproduction or future
reproduction. Investing in current reproduction
involves capitalizing on reproductive opportunities
1503
sooner rather than later. This type of allocation is
reflected in the desire to have children earlier in life
(Griskevicius et al. 2011a) and, indeed, is associ-
ated with actually having children earlier
(Chisholm et al. 2005). That is, this focus on cur-
rent reproduction encourages earlier reproduction.
Investing in future reproduction, on the other hand,
involves delaying reproduction in order to invest
further in current somatic efforts (Kaplan and
Gangestad 2005). Somatic efforts refer to those
E
that build and improve upon one’s body or skill
set. Therefore, this investment in future reproduc-
tion leads to extended growth. If successful at
improving mate quality, this extended growth can
improve chances of future reproductive success. In
the last two decades, attention has turned to how
these variations in reproductive timing play out in
humans.
Childhood Environments and
Reproductive Timing
Whether a person prioritizes early reproduction or
extended growth is thought to be due, largely, to
whether children are exposed to harsh and
unpredictable environments in childhood
(Kaplan and Gangestad 2005; Griskevicius et al.
2011a; Chisholm et al. 2005; Mittal and
Griskevicius 2014; Simpson et al. 2012). Expo-
sure to these conditions is thought to initiate a
series of life strategies that are reproductively
advantageous in harsh environments. By priori-
tizing earlier reproduction in unpredictable envi-
ronments, there is less time, and therefore, fewer
opportunities, to fall prey to fatal environmental
hazards prior to successfully reproducing. How-
ever, by prioritizing extended growth in stable
environments, organisms can improve on a host
of characteristics potentially improving their
chances of successfully procuring higher-quality
mates and reproducing at a later time.
Several sources of childhood instability have
been explored. These include lack of parental invest-
ment (Hill et al. 1994), absence of an opposite-sex
parent (Chisholm et al. 2005), high mortality risk
(Ellis et al. 2009), and exposure to disease (Hill
et al. 2016a). In general, current reproduction
1504
tends to be prioritized over extended growth when
parental investment is low, mortality risk and dis-
ease exposure are high, and opposite-sex parents
are absent in early childhood. One factor, associ-
ated with harsh and unpredictable childhood envi-
ronments, which has received ample attention
in humans is that of an economic instability
(Griskevicius et al. 2011b; Mittal and Griskevicius
2014). Presumably, when financial resources are
low, the availability of resources becomes more
unpredictable. However, when financial resources
are high, or at least adequate, resource availability
may be consistent and, therefore, predictable.
Therefore, childhood income has been treated as a
proxy of the extent to which people prioritize cur-
rent reproduction over future reproduction, such
that as childhood income grows, priority shifts to
future reproduction.
Indeed, these harsh conditions are associated
with earlier reproductive timing. For example,
Griskevicius and colleagues (2011) found that
those from lower-income childhood homes were
more willing to forgo advancing their career and
education in favor of reproducing earlier when
made to think of their own mortality than were
those from higher-income childhood homes. More-
over, exposure to harsh childhood environments has
been associated with earlier first marriage, having
more children (Bereczkei and Csanaky 2001), hav-
ing children earlier, and, for women, even having an
earlier onset of menarche (Chilholm et al. 2005).
Life Strategies and Their Consequence
for Personality
Prioritizing early reproduction in unpredictable
environments reflects the adoption of a fast life
strategy, while prioritizing extended growth in
more stable environments reflects the adoption
of a slow life strategy (Kaplan and Gangestad
2005). Further, as fast life strategists treat the
environment and the availability of resources as
being unpredictable, they attempt to utilize those
resources currently available to them, immedi-
ately. On the other hand, as slow life strategists
treat the environment and resource availability as
predictable, they tend to be more willing to forgo
Extended Growth Versus Early Reproduction
using unnecessary, but immediately available,
resources until later. For example, Hill et al.
(2016b) found that slow life strategists ate less
when they were not hungry than they did when
they were hungry, thus only taking advantage of
necessary resources. However, fast life strategists
ate as much when they were not hungry as they
did when they were hungry, thus taking advantage
of resources that were currently available to them,
regardless of those resources’ necessity. These
variations in the extent to which people attempt
to capitalize on currently available resources have
consequences for personality.
Differences in fast and slow life strategists’ focus
on reproduction and resources may account for dif-
ferences among them in certain domains of person-
ality. Fast life strategists tend to be greater risk takers
(Ellis et al. 2012; Hill et al. 1997) who are higher in
sensation seeking (Copping et al. 2013) than are
slow life strategists. These differences play out
even in financial decisions. For example,
Griskevicius and colleagues (2011) showed partici-
pants a threatening stimulus or an unthreatening
stimulus before having them make a series of finan-
cial decisions. Each of the decisions required partic-
ipants to choose between a (1) risky option, in which
participants had a chance (25–85%) of getting a
larger payoff, and a (2) certain option, in which
they were certain to receive a smaller payoff. Threat-
ened fast life strategists preferred the risky options
more than did threatened slow life strategist.
Further, fast life strategists’ lack of confidence
in future opportunities may also be related to the
more undesirable personality traits they develop,
such as the dark triad of narcissism, psychopathy,
and Machiavellianism (Paulhus and Williams
2002). Specifically, as fast life strategists try to
increase their reproductive success sooner rather
than later, fast life strategists may develop aspects
of these dark triad traits that facilitate that goal.
One average, men tend to be more interested in
short-term mating than are women (Buss and
Schmitt 1993), and this sex difference is partially
due the extent to which men possess dark triad
traits (Jonason et al. 2009). Fast life strategists
appear to possess those specific aspects of the
dark triad traits that increase their chances of
successfully reproducing earlier. Specifically,
Extended Growth Versus Early Reproduction
fast life strategists possess the exploitative facet of
narcissism, the impulsivity of psychopathy, and
the promiscuity of Machiavellianism (McDonald
et al. 2012). Interestingly, both, men and women,
find these traits attractive in short-term partners
(Jauk et al. 2016).
Slow life strategists’ personality traits, on the
other hand, seem to reflect their trust of the avail-
ability of resources. Indeed, slow life strategists
tend to be more securely attached in their relation-
ships (Chisholm et al. 2005), and just as securely
attached infants are more likely to explore their
environments (Ainsworth 1979), slow life strate-
gists appear to develop personalities that facilitate
additional exploration. For example, slow life
strategists are more open to experience, and extra-
verted, but are lower in neuroticism (Gladden
et al. 2009). Even their more undesirable person-
ality traits appear to reflect a confidence in future
opportunities and success. Specifically, they
appear to possess more of the fearless dominance
aspects of psychopathy and the leadership and
confident self-presentation aspects of narcissism
(McDonald et al. 2012).
Conclusion
Whether people attempt to reproduce early or
extend their growth is associated with many fac-
tors including variations in the predictability of
their early childhood environments. In terms of
life history theory, those who experience harsh
and unpredictable environments adopt fast life
strategies and are inclined to reproduce earlier,
while those who experience stable and predictable
environments adopt slow life strategies and are
inclined to invest in extended growth. Further,
these differences in early or later reproduction
are associated with differences in personality.
Specifically, whereas fast life strategists tend to
have personalities that facilitate not only capital-
izing on immediate reproductive opportunities but
also other immediate opportunities (e.g., finan-
cial), slow life strategists’ personalities appear to
facilitate greater exploration and long-term tactics
for accomplishing their reproductive and non-
reproductive goals.
1505
Cross-References
▶ Evolutionary Perspective
▶ Evolutionary Psychology
References
Ainsworth, M. S. (1979). Infant–mother attachment. Amer-
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Bereczkei, T., & Csanaky, A. (2001). Stressful family E
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adults from unfavourable social circumstances. Inter-
national Journal of Behavioral Development, 25(6),
501–508.
Buss, D. M., & Schmitt, D. P. (1993). Sexual strategies
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Chisholm, J. S., Quinlivan, J. A., Petersen, R. W., & Coall,
D. A. (2005). Early stress predicts age at menarche and
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sivity, sensation seeking and reproductive behaviour:
A life history perspective. Personality and Individual
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Ellis, B. J., Figueredo, A. J., Brumbach, B. H., & Schlomer,
G. L. (2009). Fundamental dimensions of environmen-
tal risk. Human Nature, 20(2), 204–268.
Ellis, B. J., Del Giudice, M., Dishion, T. J., Figueredo,
A. J., Gray, P., Griskevicius, V., . . . Wilson, D. S.
(2012). The evolutionary basis of risky adolescent
behavior: Implications for science, policy, and practice.
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Gladden, P. R., Figueredo, A. J., & Jacobs, W. J. (2009).
Life history strategy, psychopathic attitudes, personal-
ity, and general intelligence. Personality and Individual
Differences, 46(3), 270–275.
Griskevicius, V., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., & Tybur,
J. M. (2011a). Environmental contingency in life
history strategies: The influence of mortality and socio-
economic status on reproductive timing. Journal of
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Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Delton, A. W., & Robertson,
T. E. (2011b). The influence of mortality and socioeco-
nomic status on risk and delayed rewards: A life history
theory approach. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 100(6), 1015–1026.
Hill, E. M., Young, J. P., & Nord, J. L. (1994). Childhood
adversity, attachment security, and adult relationships:
A preliminary study. Ethology and Sociobiology, 15
(5–6), 323–338.
Hill, E. M., Ross, L. T., & Low, B. S. (1997). The role of
future unpredictability in human risk-taking. Human
Nature, 8(4), 287–325.
Hill, S. E., Boehm, G. W., & Prokosch, M. L. (2016a).
Vulnerability to disease as a predictor of faster life
1506
history strategies. Adaptive Human Behavior and Phys-
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Hill, S. E., Prokosch, M. L., DelPriore, D. J., Griskevicius,
V., & Kramer, A. (2016b). Low childhood socioeco-
nomic status promotes eating in the absence of energy
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Jauk, E., Neubauer, A. C., Mairunteregger, T., Pemp, S.,
Sieber, K. P., & Rauthmann, J. F. (2016). How alluring
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Jonason, P. K., Li, N. P., Webster, G. D., & Schmitt, D. P.
(2009). The dark triad: Facilitating a short-term mating
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Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history
theory and evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss
(Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology
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McDonald, M. M., Donnellan, M. B., & Navarrete, C. D.
(2012). A life history approach to understanding the
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Collins, W. A. (2012). Evolution, stress, and sensitive
periods: The influence of unpredictability in early ver-
sus late childhood on sex and risky behavior. Develop-
mental Psychology, 48(3), 674–686.
External Motivator
▶ Introjected Regulation
External Validity
Christoph J. Kemper
University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette,
Belval, Luxembourg
Definition
External validity refers to the degree to which
conclusions from experimental scientific studies
External Motivator
can be generalized from the specific set of condi-
tions under which the study is conducted to other
populations, settings, treatments, measurements,
times, and experimenters.
Introduction
The ultimate goal of experimental scientific
studies is to advance our understanding of real-
life processes and phenomena. In research on
individual differences it is rarely feasible to design
experiments that involve thousands of partici-
pants and conditions that closely resemble the
real world. Researchers usually seek to study an
assumed cause-effect relationship without the
interference of myriads of extraneous variables
in real-life settings. To this purpose, they set up
an experimental situation which allows to focus
on the assumed cause-effect relationship and to
control potentially confounding effects of extra-
neous variables. As a result, an artificial situation
that differs from the real world is created. After the
cause-effect relationship is established, the
question arises whether and to what extent the
effect observed in the experiment generalizes to
other situations and populations.
Population Validity and Ecological
Validity
The main goal of a researcher who conducts an
experimental study is to examine an assumed
cause-effect relationship by establishing prece-
dence and by carefully controlling potential
extraneous variables (cf. ▶ internal validity) at
first, and to generalize the findings to populations
and conditions not included in the experiment
afterwards. There are two types of validity that
reflect the extent to which findings can be gener-
alized. The first type, population validity,
addresses the question of generalizability across
people: Is it reasonable to assume that study
results generalize to groups of persons that were
not included in the sample? In psychology
research, the use of convenience samples of
psychology undergraduates is widespread and
External Validity
research results are frequently, either implicitly or
explicitly, generalized to other populations or
even to the general population. Such a practice
needs thorough consideration of potential
threats to external validity (see below) which
have to be discussed and, if possible, refuted by
the researcher to support the claim of external
validity.
The second type, ecological validity, addresses
the question of generalizability across situations:
Is it reasonable to assume that study results
generalize to sets of conditions not included in
the experiment? When designing an experiment,
the researcher makes several decisions, for exam-
ple, who conducts the experiment, what materials
are used, which treatments are applied, in which
setting (lab, field, etc.) the experiment is
conducted, etc., thereby constructing a specific
set of conditions that differ from other sets of
conditions including real-life. Whether other sets
of conditions would yield the same or at least
highly similar results depends on the threats to
external validity that operate during the experi-
ment. These have to be carefully considered,
discussed, and if possible refuted.
Threats to External Validity
Threats to external validity occur whenever the
assumed cause in an experiment interacts with
background factors (i.e., subject or setting
factors). A “study lacks ‘external validity’ if one
is unable to distinguish effects of the treatment
variables from interactions of the treatments with
(supposedly irrelevant) background factors”
(Lynch 1982, p. 228). In the literature, a number
of threats to external validity were identified
(cf. e.g., Bracht and Glass 1968; Campbell and
Stanley 1963):
• Experimentally Accessible Population Versus
Target Population: A full sampling of the
targeted population is usually not feasible
in psychology research. Thus, researchers
routinely study a small number of study partic-
ipants (accessible population) and seek to
generalize their findings to the total population
1507
of persons they are interested in (target popu-
lation). Such generalizations are frequently
considered adequate, at least to some extent,
due to the assumption that basic cognitive and
affective processes do not substantially differ
across human populations (for a recent
criticism of this approach see Henrich
et al. 2010).
• Describing the Independent Variable
Explicitly: A detailed and complete description
E
of the experimental treatment is necessary to
judge the generalizability of a study’s results,
for example content, operations conducted,
intensity and length of the treatment, etc.
• Aptitude–Treatment Interaction: Characteristic
of participants in the sample (e.g., cognitive
ability) may interact with the treatment
variable (e.g., a psychoeducational interven-
tion) and, thus, limit generalizability of
findings.
• Hawthorne Effect: Study participants have
expectations concerning the aims of a study.
These expectations may affect their behavior in
a way that is different from their behavior in a
nonexperimental setting.
• Experimenter Effect: Experimenter behavior
may influence the administration of the treat-
ment and, thus, affect participant’s behavior.
For example, if an experimenter treats partici-
pants in the treatment and control conditions
differently, study results are biased and their
generalizability to non-experimental settings is
diminished.
• Pretest Sensitization: During a pretest, partici-
pants may be sensitized to the content of the
treatment. Results obtained with these study
participants may not generalize to similar
groups of persons who were not pretested.
• Post-test Sensitization: Treatment effects may
be latent or incomplete and appear only when
formally post-tested in the experimental
setting. In such a case, generalization of treat-
ment effects to natural settings is limited.
• Interaction of History and Treatment Effects:
Historical circumstances (e.g., wartime,
Zeitgeist) may affect the treatment and partic-
ipant behavior in a way that would not be
found during other periods of time.
1508
• Measurement of the Dependent Variable:
Concerning the dependent variable, resea-
rchers may choose among many instruments
differing in content (i.e., the construct to be
measured) and measurement method (e.g.,
self-report, objective test, behavior observa-
tion, etc.). Whether study results generalize to
other instruments depends on the psychometric
quality of the test scores these instruments
provide.
• Interaction of Time of Measurement and
Treatment Effects. Multiple-treatment interfer-
ence may occur when participants receive
more than one treatment (e.g., within-subjects
design) or participate in more than one exper-
iment within a short timeframe.
Ensuring External Validity
To ensure the external validity of an experiment,
replication is the key. The researcher may try to
safeguard against potential threats of external
validity by carefully designing and conducting
the experiment. However, it is usually difficult to
know whether these attempts were successful or
whether threats actually reduced the generaliz-
ability of findings. Repeating the experiment
over and over again with other participants and
different sets of conditions each time is a means
of supporting the validity argument. This
approach is called replication – a standard pro-
cedure in science – that is necessary to study the
variability associated with a cause-effect rela-
tionship. By repeating the experiment with dif-
ferent participants and conditions, potential
meaningful interactions between the treatment
variable and background factors can be detected.
Each successful replication supports the validity
argument for the findings obtained in the original
study.
However, it is not uncommon in science that
the results of replication studies vary. Some stud-
ies find evidence corroborating the findings from
the original study and some do not. In such a
situation, when conflicting results concerning a
cause-effect relationship accumulate, a statistical
External Validity
technique called meta-analysis can be applied to
study whether the effect of an independent
variable is reliable or not. In a meta-analysis,
results of primary studies are aggregated in a
quantitative manner allowing for the estimation
of the population effect. Moreover, potential
sources of heterogeneity can be identified, for
example, measurement instruments used, treat-
ments applied, populations sampled, or other
aspects of study design. These sources reflect
variations in the design of the study that first
established the cause-effect relationship. When
the population effect estimated in the meta-
analysis is significant despite the different sets of
conditions used in the primary studies, a strong
and convincing case can be made for the external
validity of the original study and the cause-effect
relationship established therein.
Conclusion
The value of research results rises and falls with
its impact on our understanding of real-life
processes and phenomena. When cause-effect
relationships established in an experimental
scientific study bear relevance only to the sample
of persons and conditions used in the experiment,
the value of such findings is marginal. External
validity is a useful concept to describe the degree
to which conclusions from experimental scientific
studies can be generalized from the specific
setting of the study to other populations, settings,
treatments, measurements, times, and experi-
menters. By considering potential threats and
carefully design and conduct experiments accord-
ingly or by replicating findings across a broad
range of populations and conditions, the
researcher may ensure a broader impact of the
findings obtained.
Cross-References
▶ Internal Validity
▶ Meta-analysis
Externalizing Behavior
References
Bracht, G. H., & Glass, G. V. (1968). The external validity
of experiments. American Educational Research
Journal, 5(4), 437–474.
Campbell, D., & Stanley, J. (1963). Experimental and
quasi-experimental designs for research. Chicago:
Rand-McNally.
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). Most
people are not WEIRD. Nature, 466(7302), 29–29.
Lynch, J. G. (1982). On the external validity of experi-
ments in consumer research. Journal of Consumer
Research, 9(3), 225–239.
Externalization
▶ Disinhibition
Externalizing Behavior
Rebecca Kauten1 and Christopher T. Barry2
1
University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg,
MS, USA
2
Washington State University, Pullman, WA,
USA
Synonyms
Antisocial behavior; Behavior problems; Conduct
problems; Delinquency; Disorderly conduct; Dis-
ruptive behavior
Definition
Externalizing behavior comprises any of a wide
variety of generally antisocial acts (i.e., acts that
violate social norms and/or are harmful to others).
These acts include those that are targeted at
another individual (e.g., aggression), as well as
acts that may be considered victimless (e.g., sub-
stance use). Disorders in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, 5th Edition (DSM-5), with
primarily externalizing features include
1509
oppositional defiant disorder, intermittent explo-
sive disorder, conduct disorder, and attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. However, external-
izing behaviors may also be present for individ-
uals experiencing other mental health difficulties.
Notably, externalizing behaviors frequently
co-occur with other disorders, including sub-
stance abuse disorders and internalizing problems
(e.g., depression, anxiety; American Psychiatric
Association 2013).
E
Introduction
According to the DSM-5, externalizing behavior
and disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct dis-
orders include behaviors that “violate the rights of
others or bring the individual into significant con-
flict with societal norms or authority figures”
(American Psychiatric Association 2013,
p. 461). Although these behaviors often emerge
and are most problematic in childhood, they may
also continue into adulthood during which time
they typically manifest through legal involvement
and serious interpersonal difficulties. Further-
more, these behaviors generally occur more
often in males (American Psychiatric Association
2013). Common childhood externalizing behav-
iors are marked by emotion dysregulation and
include defiance, tantrums, and aggression.
Other behaviors, such as destruction of property,
theft, and substance abuse, are more opportunistic
and appear more frequently in adolescence (see
Mash and Wolfe 2016). In general, problematic
behaviors do not typically emerge first as serious
offenses in that they initially appear as less severe
defiance, such as lying and arguing, and then build
to more dangerous offenses over time (American
Psychiatric Association 2013).
Etiology
There is no clear pathway to the development of
externalizing behavior, as it comprises such a
broad range of actions. However, several temper-
amental, environmental, and genetic factors have
1510
been implicated as influencing the emergence of
such conduct. For example, individuals who dem-
onstrate externalizing behavior problems often
have difficulty controlling and modulating their
emotions and tend to behave impulsively
(Eisenberg et al. 2001). Genetic and shared envi-
ronmental influences (e.g., divorce, parenting,
peer influences) have also been linked to the
development of externalizing behavior, and they
often interact to produce behavioral problems in
youth. However, some evidence suggests that the
genetic influence is somewhat more consistent
(Wichers et al. 2013).
Within disorders marked by externalizing
behaviors, more specific risk factors have been
delineated (see American Psychiatric Association
2013). Oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) is
frequently precipitated by increased emotional
reactivity, poor frustration tolerance, and harsh
or inconsistent parenting. Intermittent explosive
disorder is associated with early experience of
trauma, familial history of aggression, and abnor-
malities in serotonin uptake. Conduct disorder
(CD) is related, in childhood and adolescence, to
a difficult temperament, parental neglect, incon-
sistent parenting, delinquent peer affiliations, and
exposure to violence, among other risk factors.
Additionally, there appears to be a genetic com-
ponent to conduct disorder whereby children of
parents with mood disorders, schizophrenia,
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
conduct disorder, and substance use disorders
are more likely to develop conduct disorder. Fac-
tors related to ADHD include, but are not limited
to, deficits in behavioral inhibition, a propensity to
seek new and exciting experiences, smoking dur-
ing pregnancy, and a history of child abuse.
ADHD is also characterized by substantial herita-
bility and genetic risk.
Much of the time, externalizing behaviors tend
to decrease in frequency and intensity with age
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). For
example, hyperactive/impulsive symptoms of
ADHD generally diminish as the individual enters
adulthood, whereas difficulties with inattention
persist. Furthermore, in general, the earlier the
emergence of externalizing behaviors, the worse
the prognosis. Childhood-onset CD (i.e., prior to
Externalizing Behavior
age 10) represents the more severe and problem-
atic developmental trajectory of CD. This presen-
tation affects primarily males and is associated
with higher levels of aggression than adolescent-
onset CD. Youth with childhood-onset CD fre-
quently continue to engage in antisocial behaviors
as adults (American Psychiatric Association
2013). Alternately, when CD emerges during ado-
lescence, the prevalence is relatively equal in
males and females. This subtype is marked by
less aggression and rarely progresses into adult-
hood (American Psychiatric Association 2013).
Thus, adolescent-onset CD is often considered
time limited and may be tied to situation-specific
influences such as peers (Mash and Wolfe 2016)
during a time of identity formation and
individuation.
Risk and Protective Factors
The presentation of externalizing behaviors
depends largely on a variety of factors. One of
the most consistent risk factors for childhood
development of externalizing behavior is poor
parenting practices. Namely, both excessively
harsh and exceptionally lenient limit setting and
discipline, as well as inappropriate discipline
(e.g., corporal punishment), have been linked to
behavioral problems in youth (Heberle
et al. 2015). On the other hand, positive parenting
practices (e.g., warmth, attentiveness) in early
development may protect against the display of
externalizing behavior in childhood and adoles-
cence (Boeldt et al. 2012). Another risk factor
includes the combination of high stress levels
and inadequate or avoidant coping. This pattern
exacerbates the risk for impulsive aggression not
only in childhood but into young adulthood as
well (Aebi et al. 2014). Low socioeconomic status
also serves as a risk factor for externalizing or
delinquent behavior in many cultures (Aebi
et al. 2014; American Psychiatric Association
2013). Social support, both for the mother and
for the child, may serve as a mitigating factor
for the development of externalizing behavior
and often buffers against the influence of
co-occurring risk factors (Heberle et al. 2015).
Externalizing Behavior
Of note, this discussion is not exhaustive, as
research is continually aimed at uncovering a
full range of risk and protective factors for prob-
lematic behaviors.
Assessment and Intervention
Many of the disorders whose symptoms empha-
size externalizing behaviors require the behaviors
to be present in two or more settings and to be
functionally impairing for the child or adolescent
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). Fur-
thermore, a child’s behavioral problems may dif-
fer across settings, which provide potential
direction for intervention efforts. Thus, the use
of multiple informants in the assessment of these
behaviors becomes critical, as it is difficult for one
individual to report on the youth’s behavior across
all contexts. Psychologists should survey multiple
informants through clinical interviews and norm-
based rating scales to determine the breadth and
relative severity of a child’s conduct problems
(McMahon and Frick 2005). This approach
allows for a more comprehensive snapshot of the
child’s behaviors in multiple contexts.
The assessment of externalizing behaviors has
several challenges (McMahon and Frick 2005).
Because externalizing behaviors are heteroge-
neous in their clinical presentation, an assessment
should be designed to be comprehensive and
account for the varied forms of child and adoles-
cent behavioral problems. There are several
methods in obtaining information about these
behaviors, but no single method is without limi-
tations. For example, self-report behavior rating
scales are not considered to be reliable for children
under age 9 (McMahon and Frick 2005). Addi-
tionally, structured interviews and behavioral
observations are often time-consuming. Further-
more, many behavioral problems (e.g., lying,
stealing) are covert, and it is not guaranteed that
the child or adolescent will be forthright in his or
her reporting or that other informants will be
aware of such behaviors (McMahon and Frick
2005). With multimodal, multi-informant evalua-
tion, there is a greater chance to gain a compre-
hensive view of the child’s externalizing behavior
1511
and to identify the nature of the problems in a way
that will help drive intervention efforts.
Externalizing behavior is generally treated
using behavioral or cognitive-behavioral
methods. Perhaps, the most well-researched type
of treatment is parent management training (e.g.,
Forgatch and Patterson 2010; Zisser and Eyberg
2010). In this form of treatment, parenting skills
and parent-child interactions are often the target of
therapy, as these interactions provide one of the
E
most salient early social and teaching relation-
ships. Intervention typically includes dimensions
of skill building, providing positive attention for
desired behaviors, limit setting, parental monitor-
ing, and positive involvement in child activities.
Ultimately, the emphasis on positive reinforce-
ment and relationship building is expected to
translate to other relationships and to increase
compliance and prosocial behaviors. Addition-
ally, given that poor coping skills often serve as
a risk factor for antisocial behavior beyond ado-
lescence, equipping youth with adequate
problem-solving strategies may help them refrain
from relying on negative or inappropriate coping
skills in response to stress and thus mitigate fur-
ther antisocial behavior (Aebi et al. 2014).
Conclusion
Externalizing behavior consists of a wide range of
actions (e.g., physical assault, lying, defiance, tru-
ancy, substance abuse) that share the element of
being directed outward and being problematic or
unwanted. Furthermore, the behaviors themselves
violate social norms or standards. This group of
behaviors is generally most prevalent in adoles-
cence, although it is sometimes maintained into
adulthood (American Psychiatric Association
2013), and an earlier age of onset of conduct
problems is associated with more persistent
behavioral problems. Given that externalizing
behaviors encompass such heterogeneous presen-
tations, there is no single etiology or causal path-
way for its development. However, common
preceding variables include temperamental fac-
tors such as difficulty maintaining control and
disinhibition. Parenting practices are also often
1512 Extinction (Conditioning)

implicated in the development of specific exter-

nalizing problems; thus, they are targeted in sev- Extinction (Conditioning)
eral interventions. Given the detrimental effects of
these behaviors on society, via theft, injury, and Evan H. Dart and Kate Helbig
fiscal costs of youth involvement in the justice University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg,
system (McMahon and Frick 2005), it is prudent MS, USA
to identify and address these behaviors as early as
possible.
Synonyms

References Operant extinction

Aebi, M., Giger, J., Plattner, B., Metzke, C. W., &

Steinhausen, H. C. (2014). Problem coping skills, psy-
chosocial adversities and mental health problems in
Definition
children and adolescents as predictors of criminal out-
comes in young adulthood. European Child & Adoles- Extinction occurs when a response, which was
cent Psychiatry, 23, 283–293. previously reinforced within an operant condi-
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and
tioning paradigm, no longer produces reinforce-
statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Wash-
ington, DC: Author. ment; the result is a decrease in the frequency of
Boeldt, D. L., Rhee, S. H., DiLalla, L. F., Mullineaux, P. Y., the response.
Schulz-Heik, R. J., et al. (2012). The association
between positive parenting and externalizing behavior.
Infancy and Child Development, 21, 85–106.
Eisenberg, N., Cumberland, A., Spinrad, T. L., Fabes, Introduction
R. A., Shepard, S. A., Reiser, M., et al. (2001). The
relations of regulation and emotionality to children’s Extinction is an operant conditioning phenome-
externalizing and internalizing problem behavior. Child
non that can be purposefully used as a treatment to
Development, 72, 1112–1134.
Forgatch, M. S., & Patterson, G. R. (2010). Parent man- reduce and potentially eliminate undesirable
agement training – Oregon model: an intervention for behavior (Fischer et al. 2011). The purpose of
antisocial behavior in children and adolescents. In this entry is to specify two forms of extinction,
J. R. Weisz & A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), Evidence-based
describe three basic types of extinction proce-
psychotherapies for children and adolescents
(2nd ed., pp. 159–178). New York: The Guilford Press. dures, present information about side effects that
Heberle, A. E., Krill, S. C., Briggs-Gowan, M., & Carter, can result from the use of extinction procedures,
A. S. (2015). Predicting externalizing and internalizing and describe factors that can influence resistance
behavior in kindergarten: examining the buffering role
to extinction.
of early social support. Journal of Clinical Child and
Adolescent Psychology, 44, 640–654. Forms of extinction. There are two general
Mash, E. J., & Wolfe, D. A. (2016). Abnormal child psychol- approaches to extinction: procedural extinction
ogy (6th ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. and functional extinction. Procedural extinction
McMahon, R. J., & Frick, P. J. (2005). Evidence-based
refers to withholding any stimulus that could
assessment of conduct problems in children and ado-
lescents. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent potentially serve as reinforcement following the
Psychology, 34, 477–505. target response. Essentially, procedural extinction
Wichers, M., Gardner, C., Maes, H. H., Lichtenstein, P., involves ignoring the individual when the target
Larsson, H., & Kendler, K. S. (2013). Genetic innova-
response is exhibited. On the other hand, func-
tion and stability in externalizing problem behavior
across development: A multi-informant twin study. tional extinction requires that the function of the
Behavioral Genetics, 43, 191–201. target response be identified so that extinction
Zisser, A., & Eyberg, S. M. (2010). Parent-child interaction involves withholding the specific stimulus that
therapy and the treatment of disruptive behavior disor-
previously reinforced the behavior. For example,
ders. In J. R. Weisz & A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), Evidence-
based psychotherapies for children and adolescents if it was determined that self-injurious behavior
(2nd ed., pp. 179–193). New York: The Guilford Press. was reinforced by escape from an aversive task
Extinction (Conditioning)
demand (e.g., a math work sheet), functional
extinction would involve blocking escape from
the task demand. Thus, the specific reinforcement
(i.e., escape) is withheld. Generally, functional
extinction is the more effective approach because
the treatment is matched to the function of the
problem behavior (Cooper et al. 2007). In the
previous example, if procedural extinction was
implemented without regard to behavior function,
ignoring the individual may actually serve to fur-
ther reinforce self-injurious behavior, having the
opposite effect than what was intended.
Extinction procedures. The implementation
of a functional extinction procedure generally
takes one of three basic forms depending on the
function of the target response, positive reinforce-
ment, negative reinforcement, or automatic rein-
forcement. Extinction of behavior maintained by
positive reinforcement (e.g., adult attention dur-
ing a tantrum) is implemented by ensuring that the
individual does not receive access to the
reinforcing stimulus contingent upon the target
response. Extinction of behavior maintained by
negative reinforcement (e.g., escape from an aca-
demic task) is implemented by ensuring that the
aversive stimulus is not removed from the indi-
vidual’s environment contingent upon the target
response. Thus, another term that can be used for
extinction maintained by negative reinforcement
is escape extinction, as there is no longer an
escape from the aversive stimulus during the
extinction procedure (Everett et al. 2007). Extinc-
tion of behavior maintained by automatic rein-
forcement is a little more difficult. Typically,
automatic reinforcement is assumed to be sensory
in nature, meaning it is not a consequence that can
be easily withheld. This form of extinction would
require that the behavior no longer results in the
sensory stimulation that the individual finds
reinforcing. For illustrative purposes, imagine an
individual constantly turns the lights in a room on
and off, and it is determined that this behavior is
automatically reinforced (i.e., the individual finds
the sensory stimulation of the rapid lighting
changes pleasing). Extinction in this case may
involve disconnecting the light switch so that the
behavior no longer produces reinforcement. If this
were not possible, which is common when dealing
1513
with automatically reinforced behaviors, a differ-
ent treatment such as response blocking should be
used. Identification of the maintaining reinforcers
will indicate which type of extinction procedure
will be most effective for the specific behavior.
Side effects of extinction. Once a behavior has
been placed on extinction, there are a number of
side effects that are common. These effects
include extinction bursts, aggression, extinction-
induced variability, emotional responding, and
E
spontaneous recovery (Lerman et al. 1999).
Extinction bursts are defined as an immediate
increase in the target behavior once it has been
placed on extinction. Another effect that could
potentially occur is an increase in aggression
once the target behavior is no longer contacting
reinforcement. Extinction-induced variability is
also common and occurs when various novel
responses are exhibited by the individual as an
attempt to access reinforcement. Extinction-
induced emotional responding refers to an
increase in emotional responding (e.g., crying,
screaming, tantrumming) once responding is
placed on extinction. Finally, spontaneous recov-
ery occurs after extinction has been in place or
implemented consistently for a long period of
time and refers to the recovery of the already
extinguished response. Generally, these side
effects are all temporary so long as extinction is
implemented with a high degree of integrity.
Resistance to extinction. There are many fac-
tors that can influence how resistant a behavior is
to extinction (Lattal and Lattal 2012). Resistance
to extinction refers to the continued occurrence of
the behavior once the extinction procedure has
been implemented. The schedule of reinforcement
in which the previously reinforced behavior was
placed on can affect how resistant the behavior is
to extinction (Lerman and Iwata 1996). More
specifically, if the behavior was previously
contacting reinforcement on an intermittent
schedule, the behavior will be more resistant to
extinction, as it may be difficult for the individual
to discriminate between the intermittent schedule
and the extinction procedure. Another variable
that can increase the resistance to extinction is
the previous history of reinforcement, that is, the
longer the response had produced reinforcement
1514
for the individual, the more resistant the response
will be to extinction. Response effort is another
variable that can affect extinction; the greater the
effort to engage in the target behavior, the less
resistant that behavior will be to extinction.
Conclusion
In conclusion, extinction is an operant condition-
ing phenomenon that can be used to decrease
undesirable behavior. There are several steps
practitioners can take to increase the likelihood
that the extinction procedure is successful. First,
make sure to withhold the maintaining reinforcers
following every instance of the occurrence of the
behavior. Otherwise, the behavior may be resis-
tant to extinction. Second, providing instructions
or describing what is occurring during an extinc-
tion procedure can be effective for individuals
with adequate receptive language skills and may
serve to reduce some of the side effects tradition-
ally associated with extinction procedures. Third,
increasing the number of extinction trials can
influence the process to be more effective and
efficient. It is also important to consider pairing
extinction with other procedures and treatments,
therefore allowing the person to learn to discon-
tinue engaging in the behavior as well as poten-
tially learn an appropriate or alternative behaviors
to access an identical reinforcer.
Cross-References
▶ Behavioral Perspectives on Personality
▶ Operant Conditioning
▶ Reinforcement
References
Cooper, J. O., Heron, T. J., & Heward, W. L. (2007).
Applied behavior analysis (2nd ed.). Boston: Pearson.
Everett, G. E., Olmi, D. J., Edwards, R. P., Tingstrom,
D. H., Sterling-Turner, H. E., & Christ, T. J. (2007).
An empirical investigation of time-out with and with-
out escape extinction to treat escape-maintained non-
compliance. Behavior Modification, 31, 412–434.
Extra-Dyadic Behavior
Fischer, W. W., Piazza, C. C., & Roane, H. S. (2011).
Handbook of applied behavior analysis. New York:
The Guilford Press.
Lattal, K. M., & Lattal, K. A. (2012). Facets of Pavlovian
and operant extinction. Behavioural Processes, 40,
1–8.
Lerman, D. C., & Iwata, B. A. (1996). Developing
a technology for the use of operant extinction in
clinical settings: An examination of basic and applied
research. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 29,
345–382.
Lerman, D. C., Iwata, B. A., & Wallace, M. D. (1999). Side
effects of extinction: Prevalence of bursting and aggres-
sion during the treatment of self-injurious behavior.
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 32, 1–8.
Extra-Dyadic Behavior
▶ Infidelity
Extra-Role Behavior
▶ Organizational-Citizenship Behavior
Extraversion
Aaron W. Lukaszewski
California State University, Fullerton, CA, USA
Synonyms
Extroversion; Gregariousness; Introversion;
Sociability; Social attention; Social boldness;
Surgency
Definition
Extraversion is a higher-order dimension of per-
sonality variation encompassing individual differ-
ences in sociability, assertiveness, positive
emotionality, approach tendencies, and status
motivation.
Extraversion
Introduction
The extraversion continuum is one of several
basic higher-order dimensions of personality var-
iation (Wilt and Revelle 2008). In what follows,
the main research findings regarding extraversion
will be overviewed.
Phenotypic Description
The extraversion continuum is defined by corre-
lated variation in multiple psychological and
behavioral facets (Lucas et al. 2000; Wilt and
Revelle 2008). At the high end of the continuum,
extraverted behavior is defined by gregariousness,
boldness, assertiveness, approach tendencies,
positive emotionality, and status motivation.
Symmetrically, at the low end of the continuum,
introverted behavior is defined by shyness, incon-
spicuousness, submissiveness, avoidance tenden-
cies, and negative emotionality. These and other
selected facets of behavior falling on the extraver-
sion continuum are represented in Table 1.
History and Relationships with Other Aspects
of Personality
Historically, one of the major accomplishments of
personality psychology has been describing the
patterns of covariation among the behavioral
dimensions that comprise the human personality
landscape (John et al. 2008). This has primarily
been accomplished with factor-analytic techniques,
which can be used to reduce unwieldy catalogues
of individual behavioral descriptors to “higher-
order” dimensions that encompass multiple
intercorrelated phenotypic dimensions (Cattell
1957; John et al. 2008). Factor-analytic research
conducted over the past half century has attempted
Extraversion, Table 1 Selected behavioral facets of var-
iation encompassed by the extraversion continuum
Introversion Extraversion
Unsociable Gregarious
Socially inconspicuous Socially conspicuous
Submissive Assertive
Negative emotionality Positive emotionality
Passive/lethargic Active/energetic
Avoidance-oriented Approach oriented
Content with lower status Status oriented
1515
to develop putatively comprehensive taxonomies
of human personality variation, and there is now
widespread consensus that the covariation among
all known personality traits with representation in
natural languages can be captured by five or six
coherent higher-order dimensions: Within the five-
factor model, the “big five” dimensions are labeled
extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness
to experience, and conscientiousness (Goldberg
1990; McCrae and Costa 2008; John et al. 2008);
E
the alternative HEXACO model, on the other
hand, holds that human personality variation is
better described by six dimensions labeled
honesty-humility, emotionality, extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to
experience (Ashton and Lee 2007).
Although the five-factor and HEXACO
models exhibit certain structural differences, the
extraversion continuum is common to both. The
ubiquity of extraversion is not restricted to con-
temporary models or western civilizations; in fact,
extraversion has been a prominent feature of all
notable personality trait taxonomies that have
been proposed or empirically derived since the
beginning of recorded history. Indeed, in his
book The Characters, the Greek philosopher The-
ophrastus (c. 371–287 BC) proposed that humans
could be categorized into several characterologi-
cal types, including one marked by terms that
translate to talker, chatty, boastful, arrogant, and
garrulous (see Wilt and Revelle 2008) – which
display great overlap with the content of modern
extraversion factors identified by psychometric
scientists from Cattell and Eysenck through the
proponents of the modern big five and HEXACO
trait taxonomies (e.g., Ashton and Lee 2007;
Goldberg 1990; John et al. 2008; McCrae and
Costa 2008).
Cross-national studies have confirmed that
extraversion is universally observed as an inde-
pendent dimension of variation among literate
peoples in modern nation states: its phenotypic
content and approximately normal population-
level distribution replicate similarly in cultures
east and west, rich and poor, and industrialized
and developing (e.g., Ashton & Lee 2007;
McCrae & Teracciano (2005); Schmitt
et al. 2007). That being stated, recent evidence
1516
indicates that researchers should stop short of
calling the presence of an independent extraver-
sion dimension a human universal. There has been
very little research on personality structure within
small-scale societies (e.g., hunter gatherers) such
as those in which humans spent the great majority
of their evolutionary history. An exception to this
is a recent study that failed to replicate the five-
factor personality structure among the Tsimane’
forager-horticulturalists indigenous to the Boliv-
ian Amazon (Gurven et al. 2013). In this largely
illiterate small-scale society, rather than observing
five independent dimensions, Gurven et al. (2013)
found that personality was best described by two
broader dimensions containing heterogeneous
combinations of behavioral descriptors from the
big five traits. However, one of these two
Tsimane’-specific dimensions was heavily satu-
rated with items from the extraversion scale,
which formed a factor along with items describing
high agreeableness, high conscientiousness, and
low neuroticism. Thus, these findings could be
interpreted as evidence that, among the big five
dimensions, extraversion came closest to replicat-
ing in a small-scale society.
Cross Situational Consistency (Versus
Situational Specificity) of Extraversion
There has been a longstanding debate within
social-personality psychology regarding whether
variation in personality, including extraversion, is
best conceptualized as cross situationally consis-
tent behavioral tendencies or situation-specific
behavioral tendencies. According to core trait the-
orists (e.g., Ashton and Lee 2007; McCrae and
Costa 2008), individual differences in extraverted
behavior exhibit rank-order consistency across
situations because they reflect the individual’s
level of a trait called “extraversion.” In this view,
extraversion is a core trait in the sense that it exists
as an integrated neuropsychological construct that
is a universal, biologically specified component of
human nature that regulates behavior across many
situations. In contrast, situation-specific theorists
(e.g., Fleeson 2007; Mischel and Shoda 1995;
Wood and Roberts 2006) construe personality
variation as reflecting the dynamic interplay of a
large number of social-cognitive mechanisms that
Extraversion
interact with each other, and with situations, to
result in patterns of within-person behavioral
stability that are highly specific to situations –
situation-specific personality signatures. For
example, individuals A and B might have
situation-specific extraversion signatures wherein
A is consistently more extraverted than B in the
workplace, whereas B is consistently more extra-
verted than A in unstructured social settings. Still
other theorists define variation in extraversion
(and personality more generally) in a way that
actually incorporates situations. Denissen and
Penke (2008), for instance, construe extraversion
as a “reaction norm” that captures the tendency to
respond to social situations with active social
engagement.
Considerable disagreement remains between
core trait theorists and situation-specific theorists
(not to mention others) regarding the structure of
the psychological mechanisms that regulate
behavior falling on the extraverted continuum.
However, there is now broad agreement that var-
iation in extraversion exhibits both stable patterns
of cross situational consistency and situational
specificity. The relevant data have come largely
from “experience sampling” studies wherein indi-
viduals are tracked longitudinally and provide
regular self-reports on the situations they experi-
ence in their daily lives, as well as the behavior
they perceived themselves to exhibit in those sit-
uations (e.g., Fleeson 2007). Clearly, further
research that overcomes the inherent limitations
of self-reports on situations and behavior will be
necessary to conclusively quantify the manifest
degree of cross situational consistency and situa-
tional specificity in extraverted behavior. This is
important, as the very structure of human nature is
at stake.
Prediction of Life Outcomes
When measured by the psychometric question-
naire scales typically employed in personality
research, individual differences in extraversion
predict an impressively wide range of consequen-
tial life outcomes. For example, as would be
expected based on extraversion’s phenotypic con-
tent, people scoring high on extraversion scales,
relative to those scoring low, have larger social
Extraversion
networks and more social support (Lee
et al. 2008), more sexual partners (Nettle 2005),
higher status and emergent leadership in face-to-
face groups (Anderson et al. 2001; Campbell
et al. 2003), greater occupational success (Lund
et al. 2007), higher life satisfaction and associated
positive affect (Lee et al. 2008; Lucas et al. 2000),
better health (Gurven et al. 2014; Nettle 2005),
and lower mortality (Ploubidis and Grundy 2009).
Moreover, scores on extraversion scales are
consistent positive predictors of reproductive suc-
cess in human populations. As reviewed by
Lukaszewski and von Rueden (2015), male extra-
verts exhibit greater fertility within both small-
scale subsistence societies (e.g., Gurven
et al. 2014) and modern industrialized populations
(e.g., Berg et al. 2014). Among women, extraver-
sion has not predicted fertility in small-scale soci-
eties (e.g., Gurven et al. 2014) but has shown
positive association with reproduction in modern
societies (e.g., Berg et al. 2014).
In sum, when measured as a broad individual
difference construct, extraversion shows positive
association with many life outcomes that are sub-
jectively desirable or reproductively beneficial.
Evolutionary Maintenance of Variation
in Extraversion
From an evolutionary standpoint, extraversion’s
consistent positive association with reproductive
success (and related outcomes) poses a problem to
be solved. This is because natural selection, by
definition, tends to winnow genetic and pheno-
typic variation as the variants with the highest
fitness are selected for – and alternative variants
are selected against and discarded (Penke
et al. 2007; Tooby and Cosmides 1990). If higher
levels of extraversion are associated with greater
reproduction, therefore, the intergenerational per-
sistence in human populations of lower-than-
reproductively-optimal extraversion levels is a
mystery to be accounted for.
Multiple lines of evidence point to the validity
of the hypothesis that individual differences in
extraversion are maintained via cost-benefit
tradeoffs along extraversion’s continuum
(Ashton and Lee 2007; Lukaszewski and Roney
2011; Lukaszewski and von Rueden 2015; Nettle
1517
2005). As emphasized above, extraversion posi-
tively predicts reproduction and related outcomes
(e.g., mating success, social status). Not yet men-
tioned, however, is that greater levels of extraver-
sion also bring substantial costs. For instance,
extraverts are more likely than introverts to be
exposed to deleterious pathogens (Schaller and
Murray 2008), sustain serious illnesses and inju-
ries resulting in hospitalization (Nettle 2005),
experience antagonistic conflict in competing for
E
social position (Lund et al. 2007), and spend lim-
ited time and energy socializing that could be
invested in other fitness-enhancing outcomes
(Gurven et al. 2014). In sum, these sorts of cost-
benefit tradeoffs could maintain variation in extra-
version across generational time.
If variation in extraversion reflects the exis-
tence of cost-benefit tradeoffs along its contin-
uum, it follows that natural selection would have
favored psychological mechanisms designed to
facultatively calibrate extraverted strategies in
response to circumstances that predict the magni-
tudes of these costs and benefits. Lukaszewski and
Roney (2011), for example, hypothesized that
(i) physical attractiveness and physical strength
are two characteristics that would have increased
the likely benefits of highly extraverted strategies
(e.g., relationship formation) or decreased their
potential costs (e.g., reactive aggression from
others), and therefore (ii) extraversion levels are
facultatively calibrated in response to these phe-
notypic features. In support of this, multiple stud-
ies have now demonstrated that individual
differences in physical attractiveness and strength
positively predict extraversion levels among sub-
jects in modern industrialized populations (e.g.,
Lukaszewski 2013; Lukaszewski and Roney
2011) as well as people from small-scale societies
(von Rueden et al. 2015). According to similar
logic, Schaller and Murray (2008) predicted that
extraversion should be facultatively calibrated in
relation to local levels of pathogen prevalence.
This is because the local prevalence of pathogens
increases the risk of contracting an infectious
disease – which is one of the potential costs of
socializing widely with others. In support of this,
they reported evidence of a negative cross-
national correlation between average levels of
1518
extraversion and the prevalence of local
pathogens.
In addition to mechanisms of facultative cali-
bration, extraversion levels could also be adap-
tively patterned in relation to cost-benefit
tradeoffs via an evolutionary history of selection
for specific genotypes that influence the neural
substrates of extraverted behavior (Penke
et al. 2007; Verweij et al. 2012). This would
theoretically occur when the circumstances that
determine costs and benefits of extraverted strate-
gies (e.g., pathogen prevalence, social conflict)
vary across generational time or space. If there
exist specific genotypes that organize individuals
toward higher or lower levels of extraversion,
such socioecological variation would be expected
to select for genotypes that produce the behavioral
phenotype that is best matched to the prevailing
environmental circumstances. Casting doubt on
this possibility is the finding that, although extra-
version is substantially heritable, there appear to
be no individual genotypes that reliably explain
even a tiny fraction of the phenotypic variation in
extraversion (see Lukaszewski and von Rueden
2015; Verweij et al. 2012). Thus, the validity of
the hypothesis that adaptively patterned variation
in extraversion that reflects selection for specific
polymorphic genotypes rests upon possible future
discoveries regarding extraversion’s basis in spe-
cific genetic differences.
Conclusion
The extraversion continuum emerges consistently
as a salient higher-order dimension of behavioral
variation within human populations, which likely
explains its ubiquitous inclusion in personality
trait taxonomies going back to the prescientific
era. Extraversion levels correlate positively with
various subjectively desirable and reproductively
beneficial life outcomes, but highly extraverted
behavior also brings potential costs. Consistent
with the theory that extraversion’s evolutionary
persistence reflects these cost-benefit tradeoffs,
variation in extraversion levels is often adaptively
patterned in relation to circumstances that predict
the magnitudes of these costs and benefits (e.g.,
Extraversion
physical traits, socioecological conditions). The
mechanisms by which extraversion levels are
coordinated in functional ways with circum-
stances that predict these cost-benefit tradeoffs
are poorly understood; possibilities include the
existence of mechanisms of facultative calibration
and selection for specific polymorphic genotypes.
Also unclear is the extent to which extraversion is
best conceptualized in terms of stable patterns
cross situational consistency or situational speci-
ficity. Multiple of these outstanding mysteries
would be more soluble given a detailed under-
standing of the psychological mechanisms that
regulate behaviors falling on the extraversion
continuum.
Cross-References
▶ Continuum Models
▶ Cross-Situational Consistency
▶ If-Then Behavioral Contingencies
▶ Personality and Disease Susceptibility
▶ Personality and Mortality
▶ Personality and Physical Attractiveness
▶ Personality Stability
▶ Person-Situation Interactions
▶ Sex Differences in Personality Traits
▶ Situation-Behavior Signatures
▶ Situational Factors
▶ Sociability
▶ State/Trait Interactions
▶ Submissiveness
▶ Surgency
▶ Trait-Situation Interaction
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1520
Extraversion-Introversion
(Eysenck’s Theory)
Per Bech
University of Copenhagen, Hillerød, Denmark
Synonyms
EPI; EPQ; EPQ-R; MPI; Short-scale EPQ-R
Definition
Whereas the Eysenck neuroticism dimension is
based on the melancholic and choleric tempera-
ments (Bech 2017a), the introversion/extraver-
sion dimension is an integration of the
phlegmatic and sanguine temperaments. As a
personality trait, extraversion covers a
disposition-orientated tendency to react with
high sociability in certain situations. The neurot-
icism dimension and the extraversion dimension
are the two big personality factors in the Eysenck
personality traits included in Eysenck’s Maudsley
Personality Inventory (MPI) which he developed
in 1956. A short version of the MPI containing six
extraversion items was published by Eysenck
in 1958.
The Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI), in
which an extra subscale was included, was devel-
oped by Eysenck and Eysenck in 1959. This sub-
scale, the Lie subscale, measured the respondent’s
test-taking behavior, capturing the extent to which
the individual was “faking good.”
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ)
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1975) should be consid-
ered as the final version of the Eysenck personal-
ity trait measures for neuroticism and extraversion
as well as psychoticism (Bech 2017b). However,
Eysenck et al. (1985) ultimately published a
revised version (EPQ-R), in which one single
extra item of extraversion was added to the 1975
version: “Have people said that you sometimes act
too rashly?”, but this item measures impulsivity
rather than sociability and is not included in the
short-scale EPQ-R (Table 1).
Extraversion-Introversion (Eysenck’s Theory)
Introduction
Throughout the various versions of the neuroti-
cism scale, Eysenck worded the items in one
direction only so that the “Yes” response is related
to the severity of the neuroticism dimension
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1969). However, the extra-
version scale in both the Eysenck and Eysenck
(1975) and Eysenck et al. (1985) version actually
has 3 of the 21 items worded in the opposite
direction so that the “Yes” response indicates
introversion.
From a logical point of view, the 21-item EPQ
extraversion scale should be subdivided into an
18-item subscale where the “Yes” response indi-
cates extraversion severity and a 3-item subscale
with the remaining items where the “Yes”
response indicates introversion. However,
according to the Eysenck manuals, the three intro-
version items have to be part of the whole extra-
version scale (Bech 2016). Table 1 shows the
short scale from the EPQ-R (1985), in which ten
extraversion items are separately listed at the top
and the two introversion items are listed at the
bottom.
Psychometric Properties
The Validity of the Eysenck Extraversion Scale
by Factor Analysis
Whereas factor analysis of the EPI version identi-
fied two factors labelled sociability and impulsiv-
ity, the factor analysis of the EPQ version
identified one single factor measuring sociability
(Roger and Morris 1991). Originally it was the
factor analytic identification of extraversion in the
Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI) as being
uncorrelated to the neuroticism items that was the
background for considering extraversion and neu-
roticism as two big factors in the Eysenck person-
ality scales.
The Clinical Validity of the Eysenck
Extraversion Scale
Eysenck never evaluated the clinical validity
of his extraversion scale. In the Cattell perso-
nality questionnaire (Mortensen et al. 1996),
Extraversion-Introversion (Eysenck’s Theory) 1521

Extraversion-Introversion (Eysenck’s Theory), Table 1 The short-scale extraversion items and introversion items in
the EPQ-R (1985) with the corresponding item number in EPQ (1975) and the full EPQ-R (1985)
Item number The extraversion questions Answer
Short-scale EPQ EPQ-R
EPQ-R (1985) (1975) (1985) Yes = 1 No = 0
3 5 6 Are you a talkative person?

7 10 11 Are you rather lively?

11 17 20 Do you enjoy meeting new people?

15 14 16 Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy

yourself at a lively party? E
19 40 45 Do you usually take the initiative in making new
friends?
23 45 51 Can you easily get some life into a rather dull
party?
32 52 58 Do you like mixing with people?

36 82 90 Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement

around you?
44 86 94 Do other people think of you as being very lively?

48 70 78 Can you get a party going?

Item number The introversion questions Answer

Short-scale EPQ EPQ-R
EPQ-R (1985) (1975) (1985) Yes = 1 No = 0
27 21 24 Do you tend to keep in the background on
social occasions?
41 42 47 Are you mostly quiet when you are with other
people?
The key answer for each of the ten items is “Yes” = 1 and consequently “No” = 0
Higher scores (from 0 to 10) indicate a higher degree of extraversion

extraversion is associated with impulsivity, but in
the final EPQ-R short version, the extraversion
items are clinically related to sociability severity,
whereas the two introversion items are related to
nonsociability (Table 1).
The Validity of the EPQ Extraversion Scale by
Item Response Theory Analysis
A psychometric analysis of the 21-item EPQ
extraversion scale by use of the Mokken nonpara-
metric item response theory model obtained a
coefficient of homogeneity of 0.24, indicating a
lack of scalability in that no additive structure
of the items was found, i.e., their summed total
score is an insufficient measure of extraversion
(Bech et al. 2012). However, when focusing on
the ten items of extraversion (Table 1) covering
sociability, a coefficient of homogeneity of 0.42
was found, which indicates an acceptable
scalability.
The Predictive Validity of the Eysenck
Extraversion Scale
The dispositional nature of the Eysenck extraver-
sion scale implies that predictive validity is
inherently the most important element of its
validity. When predicting conversion to bipolar
disorders in patients in their very first episode of
major depressive disorder, a prospective 5-year
follow-up of these patients who at baseline had
completed the EPQ version showed that a higher
score on the full 21-item extraversion scale
increased the rate of conversion significantly
(P = 0.05) in contrast to the neuroticism scale
(Bukh et al. 2016). According to Eysenck and
Eysenck (1969), extraversion is associated with
1522
cyclothymia or bipolarity, whereas introversion
is associated with dysthymia.
Conclusion
When using the Eysenck extraversion scale, it is
important to indicate which version is being
tested. Thus, the EPI extraversion scale contains
two factors of impulsivity and sociability, but the
EPQ or EPQ-R short scale includes one single
dimension of sociability. The predictive validity
of the EPQ extraversion scale is without bipolar
affective disorder or cyclothymia. Extraversion
and neuroticism are Eysenck’s two big personality
traits.
References
Bech P. (2016) Measurement-based care in mental disor-
ders. New York: Springer
Bech, P. (2017a). Neuroticism (the Eysenck neuroticism
scale). In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.),
Encyclopedia of personality and individual differences.
Springer.
Bech, P. (2017b). Psychoticism (the psychoticism scale). In
V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclope-
dia of personality and individual differences. Springer.
Bech, P., Lunde, M., & Moller, S. B. (2012). Eysenck’s two
big personality factors and their relationship to depres-
sion in patients with chronic idiopathic pain disorder:
A clinimetric validation analysis. ISRN Psychiatry,
2012, 140458. https://doi.org/10.5402/2012/140458.
Bukh, J. D., Andersen, P. K., & Kessing, L. V. (2016).
Personality and the long-term outcome of first-episode
depression: A prospective 5-year follow-up study. The
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 77(6), e704–e710.
https://doi.org/10.4088/JCP.15m09823.
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1969). Personality
structure and measurement. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the
Eysenck personality questionnaire. London: Hodder
and Stoughton.
Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1985).
A revised version of the psychoticism scale. Personal-
ity and Individual Differences, 6(1), 21–29.
Mortensen, E. L., Reinisch, J. M., & Sanders, S. A. (1996).
Psychometric properties of the Danish 16PF and EPQ.
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 37(2), 221–225.
Roger, D., & Morris, J. (1991). The internal structure of the
EPQ scales. Personality and Individual Differences,
12(7), 759–764.
Extraversion-Introversion (Jung’s Theory)
Extraversion-Introversion
(Jung’s Theory)
John Beebe
C. G. Jung Institute of San Francisco, San
Francisco, CA, USA
Synonyms
Inner directed (introversion); Outer directed
(extraversion)
Definition
Jung defined the term “extraversion” in Psycho-
logical Types as an “outward-turning of libido”
and in the same book “introversion” as the
“inward-turning of libido” (1921, pp. 427, 452)
in both cases defining libido as he had already
done in Symbols of Transformation (1912/1956,
pp. 128–141) as “psychic energy,” a term that for
him meant “the intensity of a psychological pro-
cess, its psychological value” in the sense of “its
determining power” to produce “definite psychic
effects” (1921, pp. 455–456; c.f. also Jung “On
Psychic Energy,” 1928/1960, pp. 3–66). These
effects are nowhere more evident than in the
direction and distribution of consciousness,
which he defines, subjectively, as the relation of
psychic contents to the ego – that “complex of
ideas” that “constitutes the centre of my field of
consciousness and appears to possess a high
degree of continuity and identity” (1921, p. 425).
Introduction
The idea of extraversion/introversion as basic atti-
tudes of consciousness is one of the seminal con-
tributions of C. G. Jung to the analysis of human
personality and its potential for individuation into
a form of ego-consciousness that can aid a per-
son’s adaptation to inner and outer reality. The
prefixes “extra” and “intro,” taken from the
Latin, and meaning in themselves little more
Extraversion-Introversion (Jung’s Theory)
than outside and inside, refer in Jungian psychol-
ogy to the “version” or “turn” the personality
takes in the course of contemplating something
that has affected it. Extra implies the turning of the
personality’s attention outward from itself and
into the reality of the other in order to take the
full measure of the thing to be experienced,
defined, appraised, and gauged. “Intro” means
turning inward toward the personality’s private
experience of the object for almost the same
reason – to become as conscious as possible of
the import of the object in question.
Attitude and Reality Testing
Extraversion and introversion, according to Jung,
are the two primary forms of awareness itself. The
term extraversion implies that the personality has
turned outward (away from the self and toward the
object, the “other” that has engaged its attention)
in order to assess that other, which it treats as
entirely outside the self and only knowable if the
personality accepts it as its object of interest and
merges with it. The term introversion, on the other
hand, suggests that the personality has chosen not
to engage with the outer object so directly as to
merge with it, but rather to turn to its representa-
tion of the object on the inside of the self for its
information as to the character of the object; the
introverted way of reality testing is rather than
merger to see how well the object matches up
with its inner representation, which ultimately
engages the inward turning attention with the
archetypes of representation itself that Jung pos-
tulates as the norms of experience. These arche-
types are the ultimate arbiters of reality for the
introverted turn of mind.
This difference in the way reality is tested and
made known to persons, one type of person being
primarily extraverted in his manner of testing
reality where another is primarily introverted in
her way of knowing what is so, has been repeat-
edly confirmed by researchers to be a fundamental
psychological difference between personalities.
Nevertheless, Jung’s insight that this is a normal
difference between people constantly has been
challenged by those who wish to regard his
1523
introversion as a forerunner of the diagnosis of
schizoid personality and those (particularly psy-
chiatrists) who want either to normalize extraver-
sion as a standard for all personality or else (like
many psychoanalysts) see a one-sided extraver-
sion as a dangerous, hypomanic externalization of
a self that is refusing to know itself. Jung’s polar-
ity has thus more often been misinterpreted as
caricaturing personality extremes than as a natural
pair of movements of the psyche to be compared
E
with systole and diastole in the heart and inspira-
tion and expiration in the lungs. When, on the
other hand, the psychologist privileges neither
the extraverted nor the introverted standpoint as
being better capable of engaging with both self
and other, Jung’s typology of personality becomes
a flexible model of both adaptation and
individuation.
Dominant and Auxiliary Functions
of Consciousnesses
Central to the contemporary understanding of
Jung’s Psychological Types is Isabel Myers’ rec-
ognition that the dominant and auxiliary functions
of consciousness that, in combination, produce
the sixteen Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
personality types (Myers 1980, pp. 18–21) alter-
nate their attitudes, giving each of us a primarily
extraverted and a primarily introverted function to
deal with reality both by merger with outer objects
and by matching the object up with its archetypal
representation in the self (Shapiro and Alexander
1975). Thus it is important in understanding the
role of the “functions” of consciousness Jung
names in Psychological Types – sensation,
which tells us that something is; thinking, which
gives it a name; feeling, which tells us what it is
worth; and intuition, which sees where it is going
and what it therefore portends – to be aware of the
“attitude” (whether extraverted or introverted)
with which each of the different functions of the
person’s reality testing is being deployed, as this
will explain much to the educator, the personnel
manager, and the psychotherapist about the indi-
vidual difference that person has from other indi-
viduals in the way he or she relates to reality itself,
1524
and thus chooses to behave in the course of learn-
ing, working, and communicating with others.
The Combination of Attitude
and Function
The contribution of attitude to the presentation of
the functions as consciousnesses with distinct per-
sonalities cannot be logically derived from under-
standing the functions and the direction of the
attitude deploying them, whether away from the
self (centrifugal) when extraverted or toward the
self (centripetal) when introverted. Rather one
learns from empirical observation (Beebe 2016,
pp. 3–7) that extraverted sensation passes through
stages of engaging with, experiencing, and finally
making attempts at enjoying the object, whereas
introverted sensation concerns itself with
implementing, verifying, and accounting for the
object when it turns up as an inner fact that cannot
be denied – mental processes so different that the
individuals who use them can hardly understand
that both are forms of sensation.
The hostility that can be created between func-
tions used with attitudes that are opposed with
regard to extraversion and introversion is well
illustrated by the tension that regularly emerges
between people using dominant extraverted feel-
ing and dominant introverted feeling as their sig-
nature conscious orientation. Extraverted feeling
concerns itself with validating, affirming, and, in
this way, relating to the other—all interpersonal
activities which require a suspension of personal
judgment in favor of a radical acceptance of an
object of interest that is other than oneself,
whereas introverted feeling, attempting to match
the experience of the other against the way the self
is experiencing that other on the basis of a priori
expectations, will pass through stages of intense
judging, appraising, and finally establishing the
value of the other before it can achieve any kind of
objective relation to that other.
Similarly, extraverted thinking is used in a way
that is regulating, planning, and enforcing on the
basis of how it has already been educated to con-
ceptualize the category of person or thing in which
the other falls, whereas introverted thinking will
Extraversion-Introversion (Jung’s Theory)
concern itself with freshly naming, defining, and
understanding the object of thought from the
standpoint of a self that is willing to ignore extra-
verted education led by others. The introverted
thinking type is therefore forever deconstructing
the categories the extraverted thinking type has
accepted as the basis for rational engagement with
the object, which leads to much friction between
the two kinds of thinking.
Extraverted intuition starts by entertaining the
object, often literally through playful behavior,
then envisioning what can be done with him,
her, or it, and finally ends up, with surprising
empathy, given this manipulative beginning,
enabling the object to achieve its greatest poten-
tial. This is quite a different process from that
engaged in by introverted intuition, which steps
back from the object and contemplates it as if a
figure of fantasy, at first imagining the object’s
true identity and on that basis, sometimes with
uncanny accuracy, starts to know the object’s
innermost motivations and even to divine the
archetypal quality of the object’s very being, all
without regard for how that exercise in indepen-
dent perception might immediately sit with the
object.
Conclusion
These differences between introverted and extra-
verted ways of using the same function will either
please or disappoint other people depending upon
how they themselves prefer to use the function.
There is thus a regular war between introverted
and extraverted ways of doing things that can only
be resolved when the validity of more than one
attitude is finally recognized.
Cross-References
▶ Archetypes
▶ Individuation
▶ Jung, Carl
▶ Libido
▶ Myers Briggs
▶ Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task
▶ Psychological Types (Jung)
▶ Self (Jungian Archetype)
References
Beebe, J. (2016). Energies and patterns in psychological
type: The reservoir of consciousness. London/New
York: Routledge.
Jung, C. G. (1912/1956). Symbols of transformation (trans:
Hull, R. F. C.). Collected works of C. G. Jung, vol.
5. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1921/1971). Psychological types (trans:
Baynes, H. G. & Hull, R. F. C.). Collected works of
C. G. Jung, vol. 6. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Jung, C. G. (1928/1960). On psychic energy. In The struc-
ture and meaning of the psyche (trans: Hull, R. F. C.).
Collected works of C. G. Jung, vol. 8, pp. 3–66.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Myers, I. B. (with Myers, P. B.) (1980). Gifts differing:
Understanding personality type. Palo Alto: Consulting
Psychologists Press.
Shapiro, K. J., & Alexander, I. E. (1975). The experience of
introversion: An integration of phenomenological,
empirical, and Jungian approaches. Durham: Duke
University Press.
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task
Jan De Houwer
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Definition
The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST) is a
reaction time task that was designed to provide a
measure of implicit evaluations, that is, spontane-
ous likes and dislikes. Variants of the task have
also been used to capture other constructs such as
self-concept dimensions.
Introduction
Preferences play a vital role in regulating behav-
ior. Typically, preferences are measured using
self-report measures such as rating scales (e.g.,
“On a scale from 1 to 7, how much do you like
1525
beer?”). Such ratings are assumed to reflect
explicit evaluations, that is, nonautomatic, well-
reasoned evaluative responses. However, stimuli
can evoke evaluative responses very quickly, in
the absence of an intention to evaluate the stimuli,
or in the absence of awareness of the stimuli.
These automatic evaluations are referred to as
implicit evaluations (De Houwer 2009). It has
been argued that measuring implicit evaluations
can provide additional insight in human behavior
E
and thinking, over and above what can be
achieved using measures of explicit evaluations
(Nosek et al. 2011).
The EAST (De Houwer 2003) is one of the
tasks that was developed to capture implicit eval-
uations. It has been used primarily as a research
measure rather than as a tool in clinical practice. In
most EAST studies, on each trial, a word is pre-
sented in the middle of a computer screen. The
word is printed in white or in a color (e.g., blue or
green). If the word is printed in white, participants
have to select a left or right response on the basis
of the valence of the word (e.g., press left for
positive words and press right for negative
words). If the word is colored, the response has
to be selected on the basis of the color (e.g., press
left for green and right for blue). On the colored
trials, it is typically observed that the response
linked with positive valence (e.g., press the left
key) is emitted more quickly and accurately for
positive compared to negative words, whereas the
reverse is true for the response linked with nega-
tive valence (e.g., press the right key).
Based on these findings, the EAST has been
used as a measure of interindividual differences in
implicit evaluations. The basic idea is that the
more a participant likes a certain object (e.g.,
candy), the quicker and more accurate he/she
should be in selecting the positive compared to
the negative response when presented with stimuli
related to that object (e.g., the word candy).
Hence, the differences in speed and accuracy of
emitting the positive versus the negative response
should provide an index of how much someone
likes the object.
Variants of the EAST have been developed
in order to capture other constructs such as
self-concept dimensions. For instance, Teige
1526 Extrinsic Motivation

et al. (2004) presented white words that referred References

to the concepts “self” (e.g., the word ME) or
“others” (e.g., THEY) and colored words that
referred to personality traits (e.g., shyness).
They determined differences in speed and accu-
racy of emitting the self- versus other-related
response separately for each class of words
(e.g., all words related to shyness). This differ-
ence was assumed to provide an index of the
extent to which someone spontaneously associ-
ates the self (versus others) with a particular
personality trait (e.g., shyness).
Psychometric Properties
At the group level, EAST tasks with normatively
positive and negative stimuli produce moderate to
strong effects (e.g., De Houwer 2003). At the
individual level, however, EAST scores tend to
be unreliable. For instance, in the studies of De
Houwer and De Bruycker (2007), odd-even split-
half reliability ranged from below zero to 0.63
with an average of 0.33. In those studies, EAST
scores showed weak correlations with criterion
variables, ranging from below zero to 0.28 with
an average close to zero (De Houwer and De
Bruycker 2007). As a result, the EAST has only
rarely been used as a measure of interindividual
differences.
De Houwer, J. (2003). The extrinsic affective Simon task.
Experimental Psychology, 50, 77–85.
De Houwer, J. (2009). How do people evaluate objects?
A brief review. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass, 3, 36–48.
De Houwer, J., & De Bruycker, E. (2007). The implicit
association test outperforms the extrinsic affective
Simon task as a measure of interindividual differences
in attitudes. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46,
401–421.
Nosek, B. A., Hawkins, C. B., & Frazier, R. S. (2011).
Implicit social cognition: From measures to mecha-
nisms. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 152–159.
Teige, S., Schnabel, K., Banse, R., & Asendorpf, J. B.
(2004). Assessment of multiple implicit self-concept
dimensions using the extrinsic affective Simon task
(EAST). European Journal of Personality, 18,
495–520.
Extrinsic Motivation
▶ Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
▶ Introjected Regulation
Extroversion
▶ Extraversion

Conclusion

The EAST was developed to capture implicit

evaluations, that is, spontaneous evaluative Exuberance
responses to stimuli. Although the EAST task
provides a useful measure for studying implicit ▶ Shyness and Sociability
evaluation and related constructs at the group ▶ Surgency
level, it is less suited for capturing inter-
individual differences.

Eye Movement
Cross-References Desensitization

▶ Individual Differences ▶ Eye Movement Desensitization and

▶ Multidimensional Self-Concept Reprocessing (EMDR)
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR)
Eye Movement
Desensitization and
Reprocessing (EMDR)
Lawrence Patihis1, Cristobal S. Cruz1 and
Richard J. McNally2
1
University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg,
MS, USA
2
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Synonyms
EMD; Eye movement desensitization;
Reprocessing therapy
Introduction
Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing
(EMDR) is a therapy designed to treat post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It requires cli-
ents to retrieve a traumatic memory and to visu-
ally track the therapist’s finger as he or she moves
it back and forth in front of the client’s eyes. The
aim is to desensitize the client to traumatic mem-
ories such that their recollection ceases to pro-
voke intense emotional distress EMDR also
involves reprocessing and reappraising thoughts
related to the events. It resembles other
cognitive-behavioral therapies for PTSD, such
as prolonged imaginal exposure, except that
EMDR involves repeated, brief exposures to the
memory as well as induction of bilateral eye
movements hypothesized to facilitate emotional
processing and recovery. Controlled studies indi-
cate that EMDR is more efficacious for PTSD
than no treatment and similarly effective as some
exposure and cognitive therapies (Bisson et al.
2007; Watts et al. 2013).However, debate per-
sists regarding its mechanism of action. In this
entry, we describe EMDR in more detail, review
critiques of the method, summarize the evidence
from meta-analyses, and discuss the working
memory hypothesis regarding its mechanism of
action.
1527
EMDR Phases
EMDR has developed into a therapy with eight
phases (Shapiro 2001; see also Shapiro and
Forrest 2004). Typically, during the first phase,
the therapist evaluates the client’s history and
develops a plan for treatment. Phase 2 typically
involves the therapist teaching the client self-
calming techniques for use at the end of and
between therapy sessions. For example, one such
E
technique involves visualizing an image or mem-
ory that brings about feelings of well-being and a
positive view of self. Phase 3 involves identifying
a distressing memory and an associated negative
cognition and also identifying an alternative pos-
itive cognition. For example, a negative cognition
might be “I am helpless,” and the alternative pos-
itive cognition might be “I survived, and I am
strong.” In phase 4, desensitization, the client
focuses on a traumatic memory and negative cog-
nition, while his or her eyes follow the therapist’s
finger (or another object) as it is moved back and
forth in front of the client’s eyes. The therapist
repeats these steps until the client’s self-reported
distress associated with the memory has subsided.
In phase 5, the therapist asks the client to focus on
the previous positive cognition in association with
the traumatic memory. In phase 6, the client is
typically again asked to identify any remaining
uncomfortable feelings within his or her body, and
these may be dealt with by returning to an earlier
phase. In phase 7, the therapist guides the client in
applying the self-calming techniques to diminish
any residual distress. In phase 8, the therapist
typically evaluates the progress of the client and
considers whether the same or new target memo-
ries should be addressed in future sessions.
History
EMDR was an outgrowth of Francine Shapiro’s
doctoral dissertation research. Shapiro (1989)
reported that a single session produced lasting reduc-
tion in the distress associated with a target traumatic
memory in all 22 clients who had undergone the
procedure, as well as the elimination or improvement
of primary presenting problems in most clients.
1528
Criticisms
Shortly thereafter, Shapiro began to market
EMDR in training workshops. Claims made on
behalf of the power of bilateral eye movements for
hastening the processing of traumatic memories
struck many clinical scholars as premature. For
example, Herbert et al. (2000) criticized EMDR
proponents for their “pseudoscientific marketing
practices” (p. 946). The controversy incited by
EMDR motivated research into its comparative
efficacy for treating PTSD. Its distinctive
element – bilateral eye movement – did not appear
to enhance the efficacy of EMDR’s exposure ele-
ment, prompting McNally (1999) to conclude
“Therefore, what is effective in EMDR is not
new, and what is new is not effective” (p. 619).
Indeed some meta-analyses have indicated that
EMDR is beneficial for PTSD, but not more than
other exposure-based therapies and some cogni-
tive behavioral therapies (Davidson and Parker
2001; Bradley et al. 2005; Seidler and Wagner
2006; Watts et al. 2013).
Do Eye Movements Make a Difference?
However, a meta-analysis of randomized con-
trolled trials and laboratory studies specifically
tested the additive benefit of bilateral eye move-
ments and indicated that eye movements did pro-
duce statistically reliable clinical benefits (Lee
and Cuijpers 2013). In a critique of this meta-
analysis, Devilly et al. (2014) raised methodolog-
ical objections to which Lee and Cuijpers (2014)
replied. Several explanations have been put for-
ward to explain why bilateral eye movements may
confer therapeutic benefits when combined with
brief retrieval of traumatic memories. For exam-
ple, one hypothesis holds that eye movements
foster communication between the left and right
hemispheres, thereby hastening recovery from
traumatic memories. However, the neuropsycho-
logical basis for this claim is dubious (e.g., see
Samara et al. 2011). Devilly (2001) proposed that
eye movements distract attention away from the
traumatic mental images –essentially by splitting
attention and lessening the impact of the
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR)
exposure. Although distraction may result in
lower immediate self-reported anxiety, Devilly
(2001) warned that such initial gains may dissi-
pate over time, compared to exposure without
distraction (e.g., Macklin et al. 2000).
The Working Memory Hypothesis
An extension of the distraction hypothesis holds
that effortful bilateral eye movements tax working
memory as clients visualize their traumatic mem-
ory, thereby attenuating its vividness and conse-
quently its capacity to provoke distress (van den
Hout and Engelhard 2012; see also Gunter and
Bodner 2008; van den Hout et al. 2011; Andrade
et al. 1997). Based on their studies, including
findings that non-effortful bilateral auditory
beeps were relatively ineffective, van den Hout
and Engelhard suggest tasks that tax working
memory are preferred (such as tracking an object
with the eyes) – compared to passive tasks (such
as listening to bilateral auditory beeps). They
argue that a working memory explanation of
EMDR offers a demystification that allows for
better treatment decisions. For example, clients
with high-functioning working memory may
require more demanding tasks compared to those
with low working memory capabilities.
The working memory taxation hypothesis
dovetails with work on memory reconsolidation
(e.g., Kindt and Soeter 2013; Nader et al. 2000).
This research suggests that retrieval of memories
renders them labile and subject to modification.
Procedures, such as memory-taxing eye move-
ments, may attenuate features of the memory
(e.g., its vividness, emotionality) such that it is
reconsolidated in a less distress-evocative form.
Accordingly, when retrieved subsequently, it pro-
vokes less distress, although not invariably across
all measures of memory (Liu and McNally 2017).
Conclusion
In summary, EMDR is an empirically tested treat-
ment for PTSD that has some positive reports in
the research literature. Some researchers have
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR)
provided evidence that effortful eye movements
tax working memory during the recall of traumatic
experiences, thus dividing attention and reducing
vividness and distressing emotions. There is still
some concern about the long-term efficacy of eye
movements, but some meta-analyses have shown
that EMDR is more effective than waitlist controls
and often comparable in efficacy to some exposure
and cognitive behavioral therapies.
Cross-References
▶ Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
▶ Emotional Distraction
▶ Mental Imagery
▶ Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
▶ PTSD
▶ Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy
▶ Working Memory
References
Andrade, J., Kavanagh, D., & Baddeley, A. (1997). Eye-
movements and visual imagery: A working memory
approach to the treatment of post-traumatic stress dis-
order. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36,
209–223.
Bisson, J. I., Ehlers, A., Mathews, A., Pilling, S., Richards,
D., & Turner, S. (2007). Psychological treatments for
chronic post-traumatic stress disorder: Systematic
review and meta-analysis. British Journal of Psychia-
try, 190, 97–104.
Bradley, R., Greene, J., Russ, E., Dutra, L., & Westen,
D. (2005). A multidimensional meta-analysis of psy-
chotherapy for PTSD. American Journal of Psychiatry,
162, 214–227.
Davidson, P. R., & Parker, K. C. (2001). Eye movement
desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR): A meta-
analysis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychol-
ogy, 69, 305–316.
Devilly, G. J. (2001). The roles of popularised distraction
during exposure and researcher allegiance during out-
come trials. The Behavior Therapist, 24, 18–21.
Devilly, G. J., Ono, M., & Lohr, J. M. (2014). The use of
meta-analytic software to derive hypotheses for
EMDR. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimen-
tal Psychiatry, 45, 223–225.
Gunter, R. W., & Bodner, G. E. (2008). How eye move-
ments affect unpleasant memories: Support for a
working-memory account. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 46, 913–931.
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Herbert, J. D., Lilienfeld, S. O., Lohr, J. M., Montgomery,
R. W., O’Donohue, W. T., Rosen, G. M., & Tolin, D. F.
(2000). Science and pseudoscience in the development
of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing:
Implications for clinical psychology. Clinical Psychol-
ogy Review, 20, 945–971.
van den Hout, M. A., & Engelhard, I. M. (2012). How does
EMDR work? Journal of Experimental Psychopathol-
ogy, 3, 724–738.
van den Hout, M. A., Engelhard, I. M., Rijkeboer, M.,
Koekebakker, J., Hornsveld, H., Leer, A., et al.
(2011). EMDR: Eye movements superior to beeps in
taxing working memory and reducing vividness of E
recollections. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49,
92–98.
Kindt, M., & Soeter, M. (2013). Reconsolidation in a human
fear conditioning study: A test of extinction as updating
mechanism. Biological Psychology, 92, 43–50.
Lee, C. W., & Cuijpers, P. (2013). A meta-analysis of the
contribution of eye movements in processing emotional
memories. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experi-
mental Psychiatry, 44, 231–239.
Lee, C. W., & Cuijpers, P. (2014). What does [sic] the data
say about the importance of eye movement in EMDR?
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psy-
chiatry, 45, 226–228.
Liu, G., & McNally, R. J. (2017). Neutral mood induction
during reconsolidation reduces accuracy, but not vivid-
ness and anxiety of emotional episodic memories.
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psy-
chiatry, 54, 1–8.
Macklin, M. L., Metzger, L. J., Lasko, N. B., Berry, N. J.,
Orr, S. P., & Pitman, R. K. (2000). Five-year follow-up
study of eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing therapy for combat-related posttraumatic
stress disorder. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 41, 24–27.
McNally, R. J. (1999). On eye movements and animal
magnetism: A reply to Greenwald’s defense of
EMDR. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 13, 617–620.
Nader, K., Schafe, G. E., & LeDoux, J. E. (2000). Fear
memories require protein synthesis in the amygdala for
reconsolidation after retrieval. Nature, 406, 722–726.
Samara, Z., Elzinga, B. M., Slagter, H. A., & Nieuwenhuis,
S. (2011). Do horizontal saccadic eye movements
increase interhemispheric coherence? Investigation of
a hypothesized neural mechanism underlying EMDR.
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fpsyt.2011.00004.
Seidler, G. H., & Wagner, F. E. (2006). Comparing the
efficacy of EMDR and trauma-focused cognitive-
behavioral therapy in the treatment of PTSD: A meta-
analytic study. Psychological Medicine, 36,
1515–1522.
Shapiro, F. (1989). Efficacy of the eye movement desensi-
tization procedure in the treatment of traumatic memo-
ries. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 2, 199–223.
Shapiro, F. (2001). Eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing: Basic principles, protocols and proce-
dures (2nd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
1530
Shapiro, F., & Forrest, M. S. (2004). EMDR: The break-
through therapy for overcoming anxiety, stress, and
trauma. New York: Basic Books.
Watts, B. V., Schnurr, P. P., Mayo, L., Young-Xu, Y.,
Weeks, W. B., & Friedman, M. J. (2013). Meta-analysis
of the efficacy of treatments for posttraumatic stress
disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 74, 541–550.
Eyes Test
▶ “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET),
The
Eysenck Personality Profiler
Glenn D. Wilson
Consultant Psychologist, London, UK
Definition
The Eysenck Personality Profiler (EPP) is a per-
sonality test which measures an expansion of
Eysenck’s “giant three” system of personality
classification. It provides scores on 21 traits of
personality plus a lie scale, each containing
20 items (a total of 440 items). Response options
are “yes”, “no,” and “can’t decide.”
Introduction
Eysenck (1981) described three major dimensions
of personality: extraversion (vs introversion),
neuroticism (vs emotional stability), and
psychoticism (vs normality). Where nonclinical
samples are concerned, the neuroticism factor is
sometimes called emotionality, and psychoticism
is labeled tough minded or adventurous. These
three major factors are commonly measured by
the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ). In
the EPP, each of the three broad dimensions is
subdivided into seven subtypes, or facets, to pro-
vide a wider spectrum of 21 traits more reminis-
cent of the 16 “primary traits” identified in
Eyes Test
Cattell’s 16PF system (Eysenck et al. 1992).
Most personality theorists agree on the hierarchi-
cal system of classification but may disagree on
the level of description that is most useful.
Traits Measured
The 21 facets, or primary traits, measured in the
EPP are activity, sociability, assertiveness, expres-
siveness, ambition, dogmatism, and aggressiveness
(comprising the extraversion group); inferiority,
unhappiness, anxiety, dependence, hypochondria,
guilt, and obsessiveness (the neuroticism cluster);
and risk-taking, impulsivity, irresponsibility,
manipulation, sensation-seeking, tough-
mindedness, and practicality (the psychoticism
group). The lie scale, which assesses dissimulation
or social desirability responding in earlier Eysenck
tests, is retained in addition to the 21 personality
traits of the EPP, giving a total of 22 scores. If an
exceptionally high lie score is recorded, the profile
may be rejected from the sample as invalid, or a
correction may be applied to bring the profile into
line with what it would be presumed to be if dis-
simulation had not occurred.
Short Form and Individual Scales
Apart from the full 21 trait version of the EPP, a
short form consisting of nine selected traits is also
available (Petrides and Colleagues 2003). This
comprises the first three representatives of each
of the three major dimensions (extraversion, neu-
roticism, and psychoticism). It contains 200 items
(as against 440 in the full version) and takes about
20 min to complete. It is also possible to request
separates of each of the 21 traits, so that a
researcher or clinician can choose to measure
(say) sociability alone or just anxiety and impul-
siveness, depending on the aims of the study.
Psychometric Characteristics
The EPP is commercially published along with a
manual providing administration guidelines,
Eysenck Personality Profiler
norms, reliability, and validity information by
Cymeon Ltd, Sydney (Eysenck et al. 1999). Gen-
erally, females score higher on neuroticism scales,
while males score higher on psychoticism scales.
This pattern is consistent with a great deal of
previous research on personality. Scores may be
expressed relative to the gender mean if this
makes more sense within the context, or if con-
sidered meaningful, the sex differences may be
allowed to remain.
Correlations of EPP scores with various other
personality tests, including the “Big Five”
(NEO-PI), the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
(MBTI), and the Gray-Wilson Personality Ques-
tionnaire (GWPQ), have been reported (Furnham
and Colleagues 2001; Jackson 2002). Results
describe the convergent and discriminant validity
of the EPP.
Dutch, German, Spanish, Italian, Russian, Farsi,
and Indonesian versions of the EPP are available.
Confirmatory factor analyses have been conducted
in the Netherlands (Muris and Colleagues 2000) and
in Germany (Moosbrugger and Fischbach 2002).
The internal consistency of most EPP scales is sat-
isfactory and the expected factor structure generally
supported.
There is some argument as to whether the
hierarchical version of the Eysenck system as
measured by the EPP is more valid than the Big
Five (five-factor) classification of personality
(Costa and McCrae 1995). Both systems cite
supporting evidence, but factor analysis of the
short form of the EPP, in particular, favors a
three-factor solution (Jackson et al. 2010).
Applications
The EPP has found particular application within
industrial settings such as personnel selection,
placement, and job satisfaction (Furnham and
Colleagues 2002) but is used in clinical and
research contexts as well.
As an example of the recent use of the EPP
(short), Knyazev and Colleagues (2015) exam-
ined a “neural efficiency” theory of personality
which states that habitual behavior requires less
brain activity than uncharacteristic responses.
1531
Using a virtual social interaction task, it was pre-
dicted that extraverts would incline toward mak-
ing friends and neurotics would tend to avoid
people, whereas psychotics would find that
aggression and hostility came more naturally.
These expectations were supported both with
respect to behavioral choice and event-related
EEG activity in selected brain areas.
E
Conclusions
The EPP provides measurement of a full spectrum
of personality variables at two levels of generality
(primary and super factor) and has application in
research, clinical, and occupational contexts. Its
advantage over the Eysenck Personality Ques-
tionnaire (EPQ) is that it permits examination of
more specific facets of Eysenck’s “giant three”
dimensions, seven for each super factor, and
offers separate trait scales for each of 22 primary
traits, including a lie scale.
References
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1995). Primary traits of
Eysenck’s PEN system: Three and five-factor solutions.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,
308–317.
Eysenck, H. J. (1981). General features of the model. In
H. J. Eysenck (Ed.), A model for personality. New
York: Springer.
Eysenck, H. J., Barrett, P., Wilson, G. D., & Jackson, C. J.
(1992). Primary trait measurement of the 21 compo-
nents of the PEN system. European Journal of Psycho-
logical Assessment, 8, 109–117.
Eysenck, H. J., Wilson, G. D., & Jackson, C. J. (1999). The
Eysenck Personality Profiler. Sydney: Cymeon.
Furnham, A., Jackson, C. J., Forde, L., & Cotter, T. (2001).
Correlates of the Eysenck Personality Profiler. Person-
ality and Individual Differences, 30, 587–594.
Furnham, A., Petrides, K. V., Jackson, C. J., & Cotter, T.
(2002). Do personality factors predict job satisfaction?
Personality and Individual Differences, 33,
1325–1342.
Jackson, C. J. (2002). Mapping Gray’s model of
personality onto the Eysenck Personality Profiler
(EPP). Personality and Individual Differences, 32,
495–507.
Jackson, C. J., et al. (2010). The structure of the Eysenck
Personality Profiler. British Journal of Psychology, 91,
223–239.
1532
Knyazev, G. G., Pylkova, L. V., Slobodskoj-Plusnin, J. Y.,
Bocharov, A. V., & Ushakov, D. V. (2015). Personality
and neural efficiency theory. Personality and Individ-
ual Differences, 86, 67–72.
Moosbrugger, H., & Fischbach, A. (2002). Evaluating the
dimensionality of the Eysenck Personality Profiler –
German version (EPP-D). A contribution to the super
three vs Big Five discussion. Personality and Individ-
ual Differences, 33, 191–211.
Muris, P., Schmidt, H., Merckelbach, H., & Rassin,
E. (2000). Reliability, factor structure and validity of
the Dutch Eysenck Personality Profiler. Personality
and Individual Differences, 29, 857–868.
Petrides, K. V., Jackson, C. J., Furnham, A., & Levine,
S. Z. (2003). Exploring issues of personality
measurement and structure through the development
of a Short Form of the Eysenck Personality
Profiler. Journal of Personality Assessment, 81,
271–280.
Eysenck, Hans
Jaclyn Bowes and Nathan C. Weed
Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant,
MI, USA
Hans Eysenck (1916–1997) was a prominent
psychologist in the twentieth century who studied
a wide variety of phenomena. He is perhaps best
known for his dimensional model of personality,
his research on intelligence and genetics, and his
critique of the efficacy of psychotherapy.
Educational Background
Eysenck earned a Ph.D. in Psychology from the
University College in London in 1940 after mov-
ing to England from Germany because of his
Jewish ancestry and opposition to the Nazi party.
While earning his degree, he worked under Pro-
fessor Sir Cyril Burt, an early psychometrician
and behavior geneticist. Eysenck’s graduate
research focused on experimental aesthetics, cul-
minating in a Ph.D. thesis entitled, “An experi-
mental and statistical investigation of some
factors influencing aesthetic judgments.”
Eysenck, Hans
Professional Career
After obtaining his degree, Eysenck found
employment difficult as a German without British
citizenship, a wartime status with the official des-
ignation of “enemy alien.” He was eventually
employed in the Islington Air Raid Precautions
during World War II. In 1942, Aubrey Lewis
recruited Eysenck to work at the Mill Hill Emer-
gency Hospital to study mental illness. Eysenck
subsequently assumed the position of Professor of
Psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry at King’s
College London, a post he held from 1955 to
1983. There he contributed to the fields of person-
ality, intelligence, behavior therapy, and political
behavior. Eysenck was a prolific writer and editor
during the peak of his professional career, writing
about 80 books, over 1600 articles, and serving as
the founding editor of the scientific journal Per-
sonality and Individual Differences. In 1981, he
founded the World Cultural Council, an interna-
tional organization with the goals of promoting
cultural values and philanthropy and recognizing
preeminent scientists, artists, and educators for
their cultural contributions. A pioneer of behavior
therapy in the field of clinical psychology,
Eysenck challenged the theories and methods of
Freud and was critical of psychoanalysis. In the
late stages of his career, he explored the areas of
astrology and para-psychology.
Research Interests
Early Work at Hill Mill
At Hill Mill Eysenck worked with Desmond Fur-
neaux on experimental research into the applica-
tions of hypnosis with neurotic soldiers. Eysenck
studied the mechanisms of suggestibility experi-
mentally via the postural sway test and his own
press-release test method, differentiating between
“primary” and “secondary” suggestibility
(Eysenck and Furneaux 1945). Eysenck’s collab-
oration with Furneaux stimulated an interest in
paranormal phenomena and astrology, which
Eysenck would controversially revisit in his later
years. Furneaux’s research on student selection
also contributed to Eysenck’s thinking about
Eysenck, Hans
personality and intelligence. Eysenck’s 5 years at
Mill Hill saw the publication of at least 30 papers
on topics of suggestibility, neurosis, and person-
ality differences (Gibson 1981). The latter topic
eventually became Eysenck’s primary focus, ulti-
mately leading to the publication of the book,
Dimensions of Personality, written in collabora-
tion with Linford Rees and Hilde Himmelweit.
This book would prove to be foundational for
his later work on a dimensional theory of
personality.
Eysenck’s Theory of Personality, in Four
Phases
It can be argued that Eysenck’s most notable con-
tribution to psychology is his theory and operatio-
nalization of personality. His system was
developed over nearly three decades at the
Maudsley Hospital and King’s College London.
His biographer, Tony Gibson (Gibson 1981) char-
acterizes this research work in terms of four
phases.
Phase I. Eysenck’s conceptualization of per-
sonality was not substantially different from that
of other contemporaries in that he regarded per-
sonality as a product of heredity and the environ-
ment that is reflected in the sum of one’s behavior
patterns. However, he considered models that
expressed personality in terms of taxa
(categories) to be problematic. Inspired by his
mentor Burt’s psychometric approach to the mea-
surement of cognitive ability, Eysenck sought to
develop a dimensional approach to personality.
Using data collected from soldiers at Mill Hill
Hospital, Eysenck identified two dominant gen-
eral factors of personality: Neuroticism and
Introversion-Extraversion. He considered high
levels of Neuroticism to be reflected in his patients
as poorly organized personality, a history of
abnormal parenting, and an unsatisfactory home
environment. The dimension of Introversion-
Extraversion was thought to indicate the type of
disorder the patient exhibited, with those on the
introverted end of the spectrum showing more
symptoms of anxiety, depression, and autonomic
dysfunction, and those on the extraverted end
tending to express hysterical conversion, sexual
troubles, and hypochondriasis. Importantly, these
1533
two general factors were seen as interacting with
one another such that one could observe distinct
patterns distinguishing the neurotic extrovert,
neurotic introvert, nonneurotic extravert, and non-
neurotic introvert.
In The Scientific Study of Personality (Eysenck
1952b), Eysenck identified a third general factor,
psychoticism, which he proposed to distinguish
between individuals who were viewed as insane
and those who were not. Though Eysenck’s data
E
and theories derived from work with patients, his
model was meant also to apply to the average
person. Scores on these three dimensions could
be assigned via a test published to operationalize
his theory, the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
(EPQ; Eysenck and Eysenck 1975).
Phase II. The aforementioned conceptualiza-
tion represents the first phase in Eysenck’s study
of personality. The influence of Pavlov and Hull’s
work on conditioning represented the second
phase. Eysenck adapted techniques like eye-
blink conditioning to explore the relationship
between personality differences and Pavlovian
theory. For example, he found that introverts
were more easily conditioned and extraverts
lost interest in the task more quickly. Neuroticism
was not observed to have a strong effect either
way on excitatory or inhibitory potential (Gibson
1981).
Eysenck extended his observations about the
relationship between personality and conditioning
to criminogenic theory in his book Crime and
Personality. He proposed that criminal behavior
is the result of an undersocialized child insuffi-
ciently conditioned to behave in a socially
approved manner (Eysenck 1977). Under-
socialization was thought to be the result of two
causal factors: (1) whether a child has proper
emotional relationships with parents and adequate
conditioning in the presence of these relation-
ships, and (2) the child’s innate personality and
the ease of conditioning associated with those
characteristics. Because he associated extraver-
sion with poorer attention and conditionability,
and neuroticism with poorer self-control, Eysenck
postulated that prisons would therefore contain a
relatively high concentration of extroverts who
were also neurotic (Eysenck 1977). He later also
1534
added the dimension of psychoticism to his theory
on criminality as a causal agent.
Phase III. As experimental work of the 1960s
shifted away from Pavlovian theory, Eysenck
likewise began to conceptualize his work in
more directly physiological terms. The third
phase of Eysenck’s research program on person-
ality is represented by his book The Biological
Basis of Personality, in which the introversion-
extraversion dimension was related to inhibition
in areas of the brain such as the ascending reticular
activating system (ARAS), and neuroticism was
also explored in relation to the sympathetic part of
the autonomic nervous system (Eysenck 1967).
People high in neuroticism were hypothesized to
activate the alarm mechanisms of the sympathetic
system more readily.
Phase IV. Gibson (1981) characterizes the
fourth phase of Eysenck’s study of personality in
terms of a renewed interest in and clarification of
his third general factor, psychoticism, which had
been targeted by critics as the weakest personality
dimension on the EPQ. Eysenck elaborated on the
construct, relating psychoticism not only to
extreme levels of psychopathy, but also to tenden-
cies towards being solitary, troublesome, cruel,
hostile towards others, and lacking emotional
feelings.
Psychotherapy
Another frequently cited contribution of Eysenck
was his influential criticism of psychotherapy
(Eysenck 1952a). In this groundbreaking publica-
tion, Eysenck questioned the efficacy of psycho-
therapy by systematically reviewing 24 studies
involving 7,000 patients who received various
forms of psychotherapy, including psychoanalysis,
nondirective psychotherapy, treatment by general
practitioners, and eclectic psychotherapy (Kline
et al. 2005). His conclusion that therapeutic effects
were modest or non-existent was experienced as a
brutal indictment of contemporary practices in psy-
chotherapy; he found that patients were more likely
to get better due to spontaneous remission, a figure
Eysenck estimated to be as high as 66%. Included
Eysenck, Hans
among the inevitable pushback against Eysenck’s
methods and conclusions were substantial devel-
opments in the quantitative methods used to pro-
vide systematic review of an empirical research
literature, ultimately leading to the sophisticated
set of procedures known as meta-analysis. Modern
appraisals of the efficacy of treatment are much
more favorable.
Eysenck later revisited his position on the effi-
cacy of psychological treatment, carefully making
a distinction between psychotherapy and behavior
therapy. The latter he advocated and vigorously
promoted. To Eysenck, behavior therapy’s
strength lay in its roots in classical conditioning
and in its absence of reliance on complicated
assumptions about the psyche. Some criticized
Eysenck for being too staunchly invested in learn-
ing theory in his approach to treatment (Burns
1970). Nevertheless, Eysenck remained an avid
proponent of behavior therapy and encouraged the
application of work by behavioral researchers
such as Joseph Wolpe and Stanley Rachman.
Parapsychology
Eysenck’s determination that psychology should
be a science of behavior is seen by some as being
in direct opposition to his surprising interest in
parapsychology. Though he castigated propo-
nents of psychoanalysis, Eysenck defended legit-
imate investigation of clairvoyance and telepathy
in his book Sense and Nonsense in Psychology
(Eysenck 1957). Furneaux, who introduced hyp-
nosis to a young Eysenck at Hill Mill can likely be
credited with influencing Eysenck’s later consid-
eration of ESP and astrology. While Eysenck con-
sidered research into psychic phenomena as
having merit, he was not himself an uncritical
believer (Gibson 1981), and it is worth noting
that Eysenck was not alone among eminent
researchers in exploring nontraditional research
topics. For example, William James also made
serious attempts at systematic investigation of
supernatural phenomena including studies of
seances and so-called extra-human abilities
(Benjamin 1993).
Eysenck, Hans
Politics, Intelligence, and Controversy
Eysenck’s interest in social and political topics
emerged while he was a student at University
College, where he studied topics such as anti-
Semitism, stereotypes, voting, and social class
(Gibson 1981). His book, The Psychology of
Politics, was a synthesis of 12 papers he had
published over the span of 10 years (Eysenck
1954). Similar to his conceptualization of
personality, he advanced a structural model of
political opinion, with two factors contain-
ing opposing poles: “radicalism-conservativism”
and “toughmindedness-tendermindedness.” Like
many post-war authors and theorists, Eysenck
tried to make sense of the rise of fascism in
Europe. His book covered topics that linked polit-
ical attitudes with personality theory and Hullian
learning theory. The Psychology of Politics was,
however, not kindly received and was protested
by American social psychologists and the Com-
munist Party.
Eysenck relatedly came under public scrutiny
for some of his views on human intelligence, a
subject that has historically been fraught with
controversy. In 1973, he was physically attacked
at the London School of Economics where he was
invited to give a lecture on developments on intel-
ligence testing. He was called a fascist and racist
by dissenters and individuals aligned with the
Communist Party.
During the 1960s, there was considerable
reaction against the idea that genetic factors con-
tribute considerably to population variability in
intelligence. Eysenck ventured into the fray with
Race, Intelligence and Education (Eysenck
1971). In this book, he addressed the disparity of
average IQ scores between Blacks and Whites,
and discussed the implications of those findings.
In this book, Eysenck espoused “hatred for those
who suppress any sector of the community on the
grounds of race” and spoke out against segrega-
tion. However, he also concluded that educational
programs such as Headstart designed to remedy
racial disparities were failures; he opposed affir-
mative action policies, and he communicated
about racial group differences in a way that was
1535
understandably viewed as insulting and deroga-
tory. Eysenck speculated that racial disparities in
IQ scores were partly a legacy of the history of
slavery, arguing that more intelligent targets of
slavery fled successfully or fought to the death,
while less intelligent populations were captured
and survived.
His later studies of intelligence avoided
inflammatory topics. His research in the 1970s
and 1980s focused on linking intellectual ability
E
to electrical activity in the brain as captured by
averaged evoked potential (AEP), and on stud-
ies of twins, each of which are research pro-
grams that continue by other investigators to
this day.
Influence
While some of his contributions were controver-
sial, Eysenck has had an undoubtedly profound
impact on the field of psychology. It has been
argued that his personality theory provided a
model by which all future biological models of
personality will conform (Gibson 1981), and his
studies of the effectiveness of psychotherapy
and his promotion of behavioral therapy each
contributed significantly to the field of clinical
psychology. The Social Sciences Citation Index
offers evidence of his work’s significance, list-
ing him as one of the most cited British psy-
chologists, with over 5,000 citations. His
influence is also evidenced in the eminence
and contributions of his students and colleagues,
including personality theorist Jeffery Gray, who
extended and improved on his mentor’s work,
and his spouse, personality psychologist Sybil
Eysenck, with whom Eysenck often collabo-
rated, and who also served a term as editor-in-
chief of Personality and Individual Differences.
While Eysenck’s prolific output might lead one
to conclude that he was frequently shut away in
his office, those who knew Eysenck personally
have remarked on his avid tennis playing, and
Eysenck himself noted that he found plenty of
time for leisure activities. Eysenck died at the
age 81 in 1997.
1536
References
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