CHAPTER 6

PLANT SAFETY AND LAYOUT

6.0 HAZARD EVALUATION

Safety is the control of recognized hazards to achieve an acceptable level of risk. An

industrial safety system is a countermeasure in any hazardous plants. They are used to
protect human, industrial plant, and the environment. Moreover, it is important to identify
hazards and reduce the risk to keep the workplace safe and healthy.

According to Western Syndney University (2015), hazard identification is the

process of examining each work area and work task in order to identify all sources of
hazards. Hazard identification can be performed independent of risk assessment.
However, hazard identification and risk assessment are usually done together to obtain
the best result. Risk assessment is a process of assessing risk associated with each of the
hazard identified. Figure 6.1 shows the hazard identification and risk assessment
procedure.

From Figure 6.1, it shows that the first thing in hazard identification and risk
assessment is to describe the system. From the description of the process, the hazards are
identified. The questions that must be asked includes what are the hazards, what can go
wrong and how, what are the chances and what are the consequences (Crawl &.Louvar,
2011).

It is followed by scenario identification as well as study of accident probability

and accident consequences. Usually probability of accident is studied using Fault Tree
Analysis meanwhile for consequences, Event Tree Analysis is used. After that, risk
and/or hazard are determined. If the risk is unacceptable, some modifications need to be
done and the procedure is restarted. However, if the risk is acceptable, the process is
operated.

1
 System Description

Hazard Identification

Scenario Identification

Accident Probability Accident Consequence

Risk Determination

Modify:
-Process or Plant
No -Process Operation
Risk and/or
o -Emergency Response
Hazard
Acceptance -Other

Yes

Build and/or Operate System

Figure 6.1: Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. (Crawl &.Louvar, 2011)

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 Crawl &.Louvar (2011), had discussed some methods for hazard identification
and risk assessment, includes:

1. Process hazards checklist: This is a list of items and possible problems in the
process that must be checked.
2. Hazards Survey: This can be as simple as an inventory of hazardous materials.
3. Hazards and operability (HAZOP) studies: Various events are suggested for a
specific piece of equipment and procedures.
4. Safety review: Less formal type of HAZOP study which is highly dependent on
the experience and synergism of the group reviewing the process.

The descriptions of the process for the production of 10, 000 tonnes of octanol are
deeply discussed in Chapter 1. Ziegler process is chosen and the description includes the
pressure and temperature was available. The detail information on chemical and physical
properties of sources is one of the measurements that also can be considered to control
and minimize the risk. It is discussed clearly in Section 6.3.

There is no accident related to octanol plant are recorded. According to MSDS

sheet, octanol has no potential chronic health effects. The only potential acute health
effects recorded are; it very hazardous in case of eye contact (irritant), of ingestion and
hazardous in case of skin contact (irritant), of inhalation.

However, in an octanol plant, the opportunity for accident to be occurred is

relatively huge by neglecting the potential hazard accident. Any accident can occur by
neglecting the safety condition includes poor maintenance, permanent hazard, untrained
employees, insufficient first aid, carelessness and unrestricted area. Thus, HAZOP study
which is one of the methods that used for hazard identification and risk assessment are
applied for this plant.

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6.1 HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDIES

HAZOP study is a systematic, critical examination by a team of the engineering in order

to access the hazard potential and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole. It is
a formal way to carry out a safety review. HAZOPs are meetings with a distinct structure,
the structure imposing a certain organization.

The teams are generalized study technique, equally applicable to manufacture,

synthesis, plant operation or any process. According to Mckay (2017), the basic
minimum HAZOP Study team consists of The Study Leader (Chairman), Project
Engineer (Secretary), Process Engineer (Technical Experts), Instrument Engineer and
Operations or Commissioning Engineer. However, some may be added as the HAZOP
Study team includes Design Safety Engineer, Mechanical Engineer (specialist in rotating
equipment), Electrical Engineer, Vessel Engineer, Client‟s representative, Licensor‟s
representative and Equipment Supplier‟s Representative.

The main objectives of HAZOP are to identify hazards and resolve the hazards.
The design area and design equipment that have the probability of occurring an accident
must be recognized first. HAZOP is important to familiarize the study team with the
information available which provided a systematic study of a serious hazard potential
area. When applied to a process design or an operating plant, it indicates potential
hazards that may arise from the intended designs. Thus, a HAZOP study is very crucial
part for a design project especially for a chemical plant likes octanol plant.

The concept of a HAZOP study first appeared with the aim of identifying possible
hazards present in the facilities that manage highly hazardous materials. According to
Dunjo et al., (2010), HAZOP studies evolved from the Imperial Chemical Industries
technique formulated in the mid of 1960s. Then, one decade later HAZOP was published
formally as a discipline procedure. It is used to identify deviations from the design intent.

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According to Hoyland & Rausand (2009), there are four types of HAZOP which are;

Process HAZOP: The HAZOP technique was originally developed to assess

plants and process system.

Human HAZOP: A „family‟ of specialized HAZOPs.

It is more focused on human errors than technical failure.

Procedure HAZOP: Review of procedures or operational sequences.

Software HAZOP: Identification of possible errors in the development of the

software.

For a large process, HAZOP Study might take several months of biweekly meetings to
complete HAZOP study. Figure 6.2 shows the overall procedural steps in a HAZOP
study.

After the team meeting and project for the HAZOP study is identified, then the
Lead Process Engineer must be informed in order that he can plan for it. Thus, he or she
could have a very detail understanding of the process being reviewed. One individual
must be trained HAZOP Study Leader and serves as HAZOP Study Chairperson. In the
case of a new plant like this octanol plant, he should not have been involved in the design
of the plant and usually Consultant Engineer from outside is brought in for the duty.

In addition, the technical duties of a Study Leader are as follows:

Before the HAZOP study

Ask for the copies of the P and ID at least a week ahead of the study. The P and ID are
checked so that;

a. The person who are listed in the HAZOP schedule are the right members to attend
the HAZOP Study.
b. It is a continuous process. Additional documents and additional work for Study
Leader is needed to obtained for a batch process.
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 c. For a new project, the P and ID must be ready to be HAZOPed.
For an existing plant, P and ID must be up to date with an accurate representation
of the plant.
d. An understandable drawing so that the Leader gets a good overall grasp of the
overall process.
e. If there are non-standard symbols used on the P and ID, symbol is used for
reference.

Pre-Hazop Meeting

A copy of P and ID with the division into short sections can be prepared for the meeting.
Study Leader is encouraged to have a discussion regarding to P and ID that have divided
into short session with Process Engineer, to assure himself has a good grasp of what the
process is all about. Another copy of P and ID also must be prepared as a clean drawing.
It is also known as “HAZOP Master”

During the HAZOP Study

Study Leader who is the Chairman will start the three hours meeting by calling on
Process Engineer to give the overall description and the design intent for each P and ID.
The Study Leader then defines each of section to be studies in detail by reading out the
guide word. He also marks up the HAZOP Master in red when any change need to be
made.

After the HAZOP Study

Technical Secretary will fill the Report Form. The form and HAZOP Master will
be checked by the Study Leader to ensure the actions are clearly stated and the scope of
each section is completely defined. Sometimes, Study Leader may also act as Technical
Secretary.

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 Meeting of Company‟s Identify the Project Identify the Lead
Safety Team for the HAZOP Study Process Engineer

Select the
Define the purpose HAZOP Team
and scope of HAZOP Leader

Select the Team/

Defines Roles

Pre-HAZOP Meeting

- Lead Process Engineer and HAZOP Study

- Identify and Obtain Required Information
- Plan the Study Sequence
- Plan the schedule

Inform Everyone
Concerned

HAZOP Study Review

and Documenting the
Results

Preparing and submitting

the HAZOP Study Report

Taking the Actions, Close-out Meeting and

Signing Off

Figure 6.2: Overall Procedural Steps in a HAZOP Study (Mckay, 2017)

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In conducting the HAZOP Study, the guide words will be applied to the process
parameter to suggest possible deviations. Process parameters may generally be classified
into the following groups:

 Physical parameters related to input medium properties

 Physical parameters related to input medium conditions
 Physical parameters related to system dynamics
 Non-physical tangible parameters related to batch type processes
 Parameters related to system operations

Typical parameters: flow, temperature, pressure, level, composition, agitation and

sequence.

Additional parameter: Quantity, concentration, reaction, pH, services, separation,

corrosion and maintenance.

The common terms applied applied in HAZOP analysis are:

Study Nodes :The locations at which the process parameter is investigated.

(vessel, line, operating instruction).

Guide words :Simple words that are used to generate thought about the way
deviations from the intended operating conditions in HAZOP
study. 10 guides words recommended are given in Table 6.1.

Causes :The reasons why deviations occurred. (hardware failure, human

error, external disruption).

Consequences:The results of the deviations (release of toxic material).

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 Table 6.1: Guide Words Used for the HAZOP Procedure
Guide Words Meaning Comments
No, Not, None The complete negation of the No part of the design intention is
intention achieved, but nothing else happens.
More, Higher, Quantitative increase Applies to quantities such as flow rate
Greater and temperature and to the activities
such as heating and reaction.
Less, Lower Quantitative decrease Applies to quantities such as flow rate
and temperature and to the activities
such as heating and reaction.
As well as Qualitative increase All the design and operating intentions
are achieved along with some additional
activities, such as contamination of
process streams.
Part of Qualitative decrease Only some of the design intentions are
achieved, some are not.
Reverse The logical opposite of Most applicable to activities such as low
or chemical reaction. Also applicable to
substances , for example poison instead
of antidote.
Other than Complete substitution No part of the original intentions is
achieved-the original intention is
replaced by smething else.
Sooner than Too early or in the wrong Applies to process steps or actions.
order
Later than Too late or in the wrong Applies to process steps or actions.
order
Where else In additional locations Applies to process locations, or
locations in operating procedures.
(Crawl &.Louvar, 2011)

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For the production of 10, 000 tonnes of octanol, Process HAZOP type was chosen instead
of the other types of HAZOP. All of the concepts and knowledge in conducting HAZOP
were applied. The following HAZOP procedure has been followed and the HAZOP
Study is shown in Section 6.2.

1. Divide the system into sections

2. Choose study node
3. Describe the design intent of the study node
4. Select a process parameter
5. Apply a guide-word
6. Determine cause(s)
7. Evaluate consequences/problems
8. Recommended action
9. Record information
10. Repeat procedure (from step 2 until all study nodes have been considered for the
given section)

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6.2 HAZOP STUDY IN OCTANOL PLANT

6.2.1 Mixer M-100

Project Name: Production of 10,000 Tonnes of Octanol Per Year Date: 10/12/2017 Page 1 of 6
Part Considered: Mixer M-100 Drawing No: M-100
No Study Node Process Guide word Possible Causes Consequences Recommended Action
Parameter
1 Stream 1 Flow No  Pipe leakage  Incomplete  Install flow sensor
 Low pressure mixing  Install pump

More  No valve to  Flooding in  Install flow sensor

control the the mixer
flow
2 Stream 9 Flow No  Splitter  Incomplete  Backup splitter
malfunction mixing  Install flow sensor
 Pipe leakage

More  No valve to  Flooding in  Install flow sensor

control the the mixer
flow

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6.2.2 Heat Exchanger E-100

Project Name: Production of 10,000 Tonnes of Octanol Per Year Date: 10/12/2017 Page 2 of 6
Part Considered: Shell and tube heat exchanger Drawing No: E-100
No Study Node Process Guide word Possible Causes Consequences Recommended Action
Parameter
1 Tubes side Flow Less  Pipe blockage  Temperature of  High temperature
process fluid alarm
remains  Flow sensor
constant
more  Failure of inlet  Temperature for  Install temperature
cooling water the output indicator before
valve to close process will be and after process
too low and after process
fluid line.
 Flow sensor
Pressure high  Failure of  Bursting of tube  Install high
process fluid pressure alarm
valve

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6.2.3 Exothermic Reactor R-100

Project Name: Production of 10,000 Tonnes of Octanol Per Year Date: 10/12/2017 Page 3 of 6
Part Considered: Exothermic Reactor Drawing No: R-100
No Study Node Process Guide word Possible Causes Consequences Recommended Action
Parameter
1 Cooling coil Flow No  Failure of inlet  Process fluid  Install temperature
cooling water temperature is indicator before and
valve to open not lowered after the process
accordingly fluid line
more  Control valve  Too much  Instruct operators
failure cooling, on procedure
 operator fails to reactor cool
take action on
alarm
reverse  Failure of water  Less cooling  Install check valve
source resulting  possible
in backward runaway
reaction
2 Vessel Temperature High  Uncontrolled  Possible of  Temperature alarm

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 exothermixreacti explosion and
on rupture of
vessel

6.2.4 Distillation Column T-100

Project Name: Production of 10,000 Tonnes of Octanol Per Year Date: 10/12/2017 Page 4 of 6
Part Considered: Distillation Column Drawing No: T-100
No Study Node Process Guide word Possible Causes Consequences Recommended Action
Parameter
1 Distillation Flow Less  Pipe blockage  Column dry out  Install low level
column  Tube leakage  Possible alarm
and blocking dangerous  Check maintenance
concentration schedule
 No operation  Emergency plant
shut down
More  Flooding in  Install high level
column alarm
 Change in  Check maintenance

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 product quality schedule
Level High  Output pipe  Overpressure of  Install high level
blockage reflux drum drum
 Condensed  Scheduling
liquid flow back inspection
to distillation
low  Pipe partial  Back flow of  Install valve
clogged and material
leakage
Temperature High  Overheating  Off specification  Install temperature
product sensor

low  E-105  Low level inside  Install temperature

malfunction the boiler sensor
 Off specification
product

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6.2.5 Separator V-100

Project Name: Production of 10,000 Tonnes of Octanol Per Year Date: 10/12/2017 Page 6 of 6
Part Considered: Separator Drawing No: V-100
No Study Node Process Guide word Possible Causes Consequences Recommended Action
Parameter
1 Stream 27 Flow Less  Pipe leakage  Amount to be  Install flow sensor
separate is  Improve the
less material
 Low of construction of the
product pipe.
produced

2 Vessel Temperature High  E-103  Explosion  Temperature sensor

malfunction  Backup cooler

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6.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

Commonly, emergency is a process where situation that poses an immediate risk to

health, life, property, or environment. Urgent intervention are required most of the
emergencies in order to prevent the situation become worst, although in some situations,
mitigation may not be possible and agencies may only be able to offer palliative care for
the consequences. The main objective of emergency response plan is to reduce the effect
of any harm. Emergency response plan is the actions taken in the initial minutes of
an emergency. It is the reaction to both the need for improved safety and advances in the
scientific knowledge of hazards. Moreover, emergency response plan is a legal
requirement according to The Occupational Safety and Health (The Control of Industrial
Major Accident Hazards) Regulations, 1996, that need to be submit to the Department of
Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) (Mustapha & Zain, 2003).

Firstly, in order to develop ERP, risk assessment need to be handle to recognize

possible emergency situations. When the possible emergencies have been determined,
determination of resource necessities and plans development can be make up. It is
necessary for all facility to develop and execute an emergency plan in order to give
protection to employees, contractors, visitors, and person involve in the facility. If
emergencies happen, there are some of the emergency plan must consist such as building
evacuation, sheltering from severe weather, exterior airborne hazard such as chemical
release and lockdown. The first important part is safety of life when emergency occur.
Next is balancing or minimize of the incident. This need to apply in order to reduce
potential damage such as first aid and CPR by provide consultation to the employees,
also consult employees on how to use fire extinguishers for a small fire and prevention
from small chemical spill and building utilities supervision.

The performances goal of the programs need to study in order for ERP can be
develop. Then, the risk evaluation which involving recognized the hazard or threat
scenarios also need to be studied. It is compulsory to consider all the resources of
incident stabilization including people, equipment available as well as the system. Held
conversation with public emergency services in order to know the response time to the

17
facility in case of emergency happen. Rules or regulations need to determine if it is
required in order to apply plan emergency planning at the facility. Afterward, before
planning for hazard and threat-specific emergency procedure, protective actions for life
safety required to develop first. In order to stabilize incidents regarding to hazards at the
facility, public emergency services must be synchronized with emergency planning.
Employees need to well-trained to fulfill roles and responsibility throughout emergency
occurrence and finally, make easy exercise to practice ERP. Effect from the accident can
be reduce with appropriate responses during emergency occur and understanding of
hazard is truly required.

One of the initiatives in order to minimize loss of life and other damage property
during emergency is through the following items which are required at the control centre:

1. Current emergency plan copies.

2. Maps and diagrams of the area.
3. Names and address of key functional personnel.
4. Able to initiate alarm signals in the event of a power outage.
5. Communication devices (e.g., phones, radio, TV, and two-way radio).
6. Emergency generators and lights.
7. Evacuation routes mapped out on the area map.
8. Self-contained breathing equipment for potential use by the control Centre staff.
9. Procedures for employees who remain to execute or shut down critical plant
operations, to practice fire extinguishers, or other essential services which cannot
be shut down for every emergency alarm before evacuating.
10. Rescue and medical duties for any employees selected to execute them
11. Various furniture, including cots. Routinely make assessments of emergency
equipment such as fire trucks, alarms and other personal safety equipment. At
least audited the plan annually to guarantee that it is recent. Items to be updated
include the list of potential hazards and emergency procedures (adapted to any
newly developed technology).

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6.3.1 Hazard Identification

Table 6.2: Hazard Identification of Materials

Materials /properties Chemical Formula Hazard Identification

Hydrogen Gas H2  Eyes: Contact with

rapidly expanding gas
may cause burns or
frostbite.
 Skin: Contact with
rapidly expanding gas
may cause burns or
frostbite.
 Inhalation: At very high
concentrations, can
displace the normal air
and cause suffocation
from lack of oxygen.

Oxygen Gas O2  Non corrosive for skin

Nitrogen Gas N2  May explode if heated

 May displace oxygen and
cause rapid suffocation

Triethylaluminium C6H15Al  Highly flammable liquid

and vapour.
 Catches fire
spontaneously when
exposed to air

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  In contact with water
releases flammable gases
which may ignite
Spontaneously.
 Causes severe skin burns
and eye damage.

Aluminium Hydroxide Al(OH)3  Slightly hazardous in

case of skin contact
(irritant), of eye contact
(irritant), of ingestion, of
inhalation.

1-octanol C8H18O  Very hazardous in case of

eye contact (irritant), of
ingestion. Hazardous in
case of skin contact
(irritant), of inhalation.
 Inflammation of the eye
is characterized by
redness, watering, and
itching.

Water H2O  Non-hazardous to skin,

eye, respiratory tract and
ingestion

Ethylene C2H4  Extremely flammable gas

 Contains gas under
pressure; may explode if
heated

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  May cause drowsiness or
dizziness
 May displace oxygen and
cause rapid suffocation

Trioctylaluminium C24H51Al  Eye Contact: Will cause

immediate or delayed
severe burns to the eyes
 Skin contact: Will cause
irritation and burns.
 Inhalation: Direct
respiratory contact is
usually not possible, but
will cause burns.
Inhalation of combustion
products can cause
irritation

Table 6.3: Types of Hazards

Types of hazards Description Example

Safety Hazard Commonly occur in the  Electrical hazard
workplace. Safety hazards such as misuse
are situation where equipment or use
working conditions that electrical
dangerous which can cause equipment which
injury, illness and death they know to be
damaged
 Working for height
place like roof or
using ladder

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  Moving parts of
machinery such as
pinch
 Vehicles such as
forklifts
 Slips, trips and falls
at work such as at
uneven floor
surfaces

Chemical hazards Substances, mixtures and  Gases such as

articles used in the ethylene
workplace that can be a  Flammable
health or physicochemical components
hazard if not handled  Liquids like
properly or stored triethylaluminium
appropriately. and cleaning
Health hazards such as skin products
irritants, carcinogens or  Vapor and fume
respiratory sensitizers can
have an adverse effect on a
worker's health as a result
of direct contact with or
exposure to the chemical,
usually through inhalation,
skin contact or ingestion.

22
Fire Hazard Fire hazards take account  A simple source of
of all types of live flames, ignition can caused
due to sparks, hot objects, build-up waste to
and chemicals that are cause fire rapidly
possible for ignition, or  Due to the damaged
that can provoke a fire to electrical
become big and equipment are one
uncontrolled. It can kill or of the most
seriously injure employees common fire types
or visitors and can damage
or destroy buildings,
equipment and stock.

6.3.2 Possible Accident Scenarios

There are several possible accident scenarios in a chemical plant:

1. Fire
Fire is a hazard that can give threat to the lives or health and safety of relevant persons,
damage to or loss of property and severe interruption to normal business activities or
opportunities. Fires related to flammable liquids and gases are often related to chemical
plant and can be disastrous. Yet, this accident can be escaped by hazard identification,
proper storage of chemical liquids and control of all ignition sources. Personal protective
equipment must be used when handling chemicals.

23
 2. Explosion
An explosion is rapid increase in volume and release of energy in an extreme manner,
usually with the generation of high temperature and release of gases. In this plant
explosion due to ignition, it occur when open vigorous flame and spark of heat presence.
Other than that, the ignition of flammable liquids, rupturing of compressed gas cylinders,
maintenance and laboratory activities, dust, and terrorist activities are a few examples
that can cause explosion. An explosion is classified as low or high explosive according to
its rate of burn. Low explosive burn rapidly while high explosives are detonates.
Explosion can cause risk to health which are smoke inhalation, lung and hearing damage,
trauma and burns due to the force and heat of the blast. Structural damage to the facilities,
equipment damage and loss of process are other hazards of an explosion.

3. Chemical spill
A chemical spill is known as a hazardous chemical which are uncontrolled release either
as a solid, liquid or a gas. For reducing the potential for chemical spills, all worksites
need to implement methods and have a plan regarding to chemical spills, regardless of
the type or quantity of hazardous chemical involved (“Keck Graduate Institutes”, 2017).
Quickly respond and effectively managing a spill is very significant to be incorporated in
any safety program of a chemical plant. Workers and other property ought to be protected
as well as the environment from any chemical spill occurrence. For facilities and plants
that store great amounts of multiple chemicals on site or have infrequent or frequent leaks
from heavy equipment, the prevention very important. (“Premier Magnesia”, 2017).

4. Gas leak
This situation refers to the gaseous product leakage from a pipeline or other containment
into area which involve society or any other area which the gaseous product leakage
should not be exists. Flammable gases could be explode when in contact with flame or
sparks. Society or residential will have major impact due to this dangerous situation.

24
6.3.3 Emergency Response Procedures

Emergency response procedure in case of fire

I. Sound the alarm: Raise the alarm by operating the nearest fire alarm call point.
II. Alert others: Quickly tell others in the area of the fire. Calmly do this, firm
manner without cause any panic. Immediately identify and shut down any
processes which could contribute to or cause additional damage to the facility or
injury to firefighting personnel.
III. Fight the fire: If it is a small fire, the emergency team members should incipient
the fire by use of a portable (Type A,B,C,) fire extinguisher only. If possible two
employees should fight the fire together using two fire extinguishers
IV. Evacuate the area: If necessary. Whenever the fire alarm sounds, the entire plant
will evacuate by designated routes to predetermined assembly areas.

Emergency response procedure in case of explosion

I. Find any protection from flying glass or debris such as take cover under tables,
desks or other objects immediately.
II. If found wounded person, evacuate them. However, do not move seriously
wounded persons unless they are obviously in immediate danger.
III. Evacuate and avoid using elevators
IV. The building fire alarm system needs to be activated and call emergency line 999.
V. As soon as being outside, move to an area at least 300 feet from the affected area.
VI. Workers must be careful of further possible explosions and need to avoid from go
back into the building
VII. Access the damage straightaway and restore service when the area has been
identified to be safe.

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Emergency response procedure in case of chemical spill

1. Alert other people about the situation and quarantine the spill area

I. Identified the spill material and refer to the MSDS to define the potential hazard
associated with the material.

II. Wear protective equipment such as goggles, apron, laboratory coat, gloves, shoe
covers, or respirator.

III. Remove any ignition sources, use plastic or nonmetallic cleanup equipment.

IV. It is very necessary to avoid breathing vapors.

V. Provide ventilation to the outside if safe.

VI. Any spill chemicals need to prevent from going into the drain in order to evade
affecting environment.

Emergency response procedure in case of gas leak

I. Immediately sound the alarm when a leak is detected. Report to the person in
charge about the situation.
II. Leave the fuming hoof running and ventilate the affected area prior leaving the
area (if it safe to be done and only to the outside).

III. Evacuate to assembly point as soon as possible

IV. Provide information to emergency responders.

V. Turn off any ignition sources that can make situation become worst due to the gas
leak

VI. Use emergency gas masks for escapes purposes even though it only for short
periods of use.

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 6.4 EMERGENCY DEVICES

Table 6.4: Emergency Devices

Fire extinguishers  One of the most important safety

equipment that must be placed in
appropriate place and easy to be taken. It
also must be labeled to the kind of fire they
will be effective against.
 Comprise of a hand-held cylindrical
pressure vessel which have an agent that
can be discharged to extinguish a fire.

Fire Hose Reels  Consist of pipes, pumps, water supply and

hose reels which located strategically in a
building, guaranteeing proper coverage of
water to fight a fire.
 It is functioned manually and can be
triggered by opening a valve that ensure
the water to flow in the hose which is
commonly 30 meters away. The pressure
loss system will start the pump to enable
sufficient water flow and pressure to
provide a water jet.

Emergency alarm system
 Can detect and give warning to people with
visual and audio appliances when the
present of smoke, fire, carbon monoxide or
other emergencies.
 The detectors will sense smoke, heat and
will activated alarms automatically or also

27
 can be activated through manual fire alarm
activation devices such as manual call
points or pull stations.

Automatic sprinkler systems  An active fire protection method which

• • An active
includes water firesupply
protection
system, give
method, consisting
sufficient of a water
pressure supply to a water
and flowrate
system,distribution
providingpiping
adequate pressure
system, onto which fire
and flowrate to aare
sprinklers water distribution
connected.

Speakers & Speaker Strobe  Apliances which intended for emergency

Appliances case in order to keep safety life, provides
voice for evacuation process and mass
notification systems.

Fire hydrant systems  A connection point which helps firefighters

to tap into a water supply for fight against
fire.
 Designed to increase the firefighting
capacity of a building by enhancing the
pressure in the hydrant service when mains
is not enough, or when tank fed.

28
6.5 PLANT LAYOUT

The efficiency of an operation process will depend on how the plant and the equipment
are laid out. Apart of safety consideration, it also affect the costs, operation, maintenance,
plant expansion and modular construction. There are two schemes for determination of
plant layout. First, The flow-through layout or flow-line pattern and second one is
grouping similar plant (Ray & sneeby, 2000). For this octanol plant, the flow-line line
pattern was chosen where the plant items are arranged in order in which they appear on
the process flow sheet. Moreover, the second type pattern is often used for larger plants.

6.5.1 Objectives of Plant Layout

The objectives of the plant layout are;

a) Safety Consideration
The safety of worker, environment and the community must be considered. It is
the most important aspect in designing a plant layout.
b) Minimize the cost.
It includes the cost of construction of connecting pipe between the equipment and
the need of future construction work.
c) Easy access and efficiency of internal flow
Storage facilities will be located reasonable close to feed point and loading
station. The arrangement of plant area, warehouse, tank farm and treatment plant
are designed for an efficient internal flow.

6.5.2 Acceptable Plant Area and Zoning

Referring to the Site Location chapter, Tanjung Langsat Industrial Land, Johor has been
chosen as the site location for this Octanol Plant. Several factors such as raw material
supply, potential marketing area, logistics and transportation facilities, availability of
labor, availability of utilities, availability and price of land, environmental issue and local
community considerations had been compared to the other two industrial lands in
Malaysia.

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 Furthermore, the octanol plant is relatively small and should not occupy more
than 5 acres and this small area is sufficient for future expansion plan. Thus, site location
is an acceptable area for the plant layout. Figure 6.3 shows the octanol plant layout. The
octanol plant is divided into several zones as follows:

Amenities
It is necessary to separate canteen facilities and administration building. Proper fire-
protections are installed. The main entrance is located near to the administration building
so that the administrative officers and business visits can be directly access to the
building. Moreover, it is the safest zone in the plant. Essential activities such as
offloading supplies and the collecting waste are away as far as possible. This zone is
strategically located upwind.

Workshops and Stores

Welding torches and naked flames will be used inside the workshop, it is provided with
adequate and correct ventilation and extraction facilities. Flammable materials are not
stored close to workshop area. The security for both workshop and storage building are
important. Layout promoting good visibility of all store, windows, and roofs will help
security staff and management as well as discouraging intruders. Storage tanks of
materials are located 70m from site boundary. Visitors are not allowed to enter this zone.

Emergency Services
Octanol is not a toxic material but it is a flammable material. Fire water tank as well as
fire emergency department are positioned to give rapid vehicle access to all parts of the
site and closed to gate to enable external aid to be brought in. This plant layout consisted
of two exits and one entrance point. The main entrance is located at non-process area
which is near to administration building. The location of evacuation and assembly point
is near to the entrance. The distance between assembly point and plant area are
reasonably close so that it is possible for personnel to evacuate as fast as possible from
the plant area in case of emergency.

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Plant Area
The plant area is about half of the plant layout. It is the heart for the octanol plant and the
most hazardous area. All of safety precautions are strictly followed. Non-workers are not
encouraged to enter this zone. The control room is located adjacent to plant area in a safer
distance to the processing unit. The control room is located reasonably close the plant
area so that the plant area can be viewed clearly from the control room so that, any
suspicious incident can be detected as early as possible. Both control room and laboratory
is built with fire-proof material. Expansion area also is provided for the future plan.

The octanol plant layout followed these criteria;

a) Location of administration building away from the hazardous process and be
upwind of the plant
b) Location of processing unit away from chemical storage tanks and at prevailing
wind direction.
c) Access roads between building for the purpose of construction, operation and
maintenance.
d) Location of tank farm; easy access to road
e) Relevant distance between equipment; easy access and safety concern
f) Elevation of equipment
g) Availability of utilities supply
h) Minimizing plant piping system
i) Control room located adjacent to processing unit
j) Expansion area
k) More than one exit point
l) Emergency department
m) Evacuation and assembly point

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Figure 6.3: Plant Layout of Octanol Plant

32
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