REYES V. WONG | Case No.

16

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. NO. 547 January 29, 1975.]
EMERENCIANA V. REYES, petitioner, vs. FELIPE C. WONG, respondent
MAKASIAR, J p:

TOPIC: GROSSLY IMMORAL ACT

FACTS:

Felipe C. Wong, duly admitted in 1962 to the Bar, is sought to be disbarred for grave
immorality by Emerenciana V. Reyes, who filed her sworn complaint on October 26, 1962.

In his answer filed on December 17, 1962, respondent completely denied the charge, claiming
that he and petitioner were merely friends.

On January 21, 1963, petitioner filed her reply to the answer of respondent, attaching thereto
xerox copies of two letters written by respondent to her dated October 20, 1960 and December 14,
1960 (pp. 30-34, rec.) for comparison with the penmanship of the respondent in his answer sheets to
the Bar questions in 1961 to disprove respondent's claim that he never wrote letters to petitioner. The
aforesaid reply was forwarded to the Solicitor General, to whom the case was referred on December
28, 1962 for investigation, report and recommendation.

After the submission of petitioner's evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated July
31, 1963, contending that in the light of the ruling of this Court in Soberano vs. Villanueva (Dec. 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 891-896), the evidence presented by the petitioner does not make out a case against
him. Respondent likewise filed on August 1, 1963 a motion for the cancellation of all scheduled
hearings of the case until after the Court has resolved the said motion to dismiss.

Petitioner in turn filed an opposition dated August 17, 1963 to the motion to dismiss, arguing
that the Soberano ruling does not apply to her situation, because, unlike the complainant in said case
petitioner never doubted her marriage with respondent; and that respondent in fact wrote her
numerous letters and sent her telegrams, all addressing her either as "E.R. Wong" or "Emerenciana
R. Wong".

To this opposition, respondent filed a reply dated August 28, 1963, substantially reiterating the
same arguments contained in his motion to dismiss.

On June 9, 1972, then Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin, now CFI Judge, issued an
order resetting the case for hearing on June 20, 1972 (p. 58, rec.). The June 20, 1972 hearing was
however postponed, and it was only on September 6, 1972 that the hearing of the case was
continued but was again reset to October 18, 1972, upon motion of respondent so as to give him time
to file a motion with this Court in connection with his 1963 motion to dismiss.

On September 13, 1972, respondent thus filed with this Court a motion reiterating his still
unresolved 1963 motion to dismiss the case, adding that the Solicitor General had already reset the
case for hearing; that subsequent to the filing of the present administrative case, petitioner herein
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action against herein
 REYES V. WONG | Case No. 16

respondent, entitled "Emerenciana V. Reyes, plaintiff, versus Felipe C. Wong, defendant," For
Recognition of Natural Children and Support; and that in the compromise agreement dated October
28, 1966 submitted in said case, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two daughters
of petitioner and that he agreed to support these children, while petitioner in turn agreed to withdraw
this administrative case against respondent, which compromise agreement was approved by the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on November 14. 

On September 18, 1972, petitioner filed another pleading reiterating her opposition to the
motion to dismiss of respondent. Before the Solicitor General could resolve the motion to dismiss,
petitioner Emerenciana V. Reyes filed on November 21, 1972 an affidavit of desistance, requesting
permission to withdraw the administrative complaint against respondent. Her affidavit, which was
subscribed and sworn to before City Fiscal Manuel R. Maza of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, stated
that it would be for the good of her children that the administrative case against respondent be
dismissed and terminated.

Since withdrawal by a complainant in an administrative case does not ipso facto exonerate a
respondent (Co vs. Candoy) -especially so in this instant case where the withdrawal of the
complainant came after she had rested her case - the Solicitor General did not act upon petitioner's
motion to withdraw; but instead proceeded to take up respondent's motion to dismiss. 

In his report and recommendation, the Solicitor General recommended that the present
administrative case be dismissed in the light of the Soberano case.

ISSUE:
Whether in the light of the evidence presented by petitioner, there is a prima facie case
against respondent to warrant requiring respondent to present his evidence.

RULING:
No, the court sustained the said recommendation of the Solicitor General, on the force of the
Soberano ruling and on the fact that the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to disclose a case
against respondent warranting disciplinary action. 

Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid
marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must be
"grossly immoral" — "it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" (Section 27, Rule 138. New Rules of Court;
Soberano vs. Villanueva. And the same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing
a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power (Co vs.
Candoy). Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated (Co vs. Candoy, supra). The evidence adduced by petitioner lacks the quantity
and quality required by the foregoing criteria. 

All told, because of petitioner's active and voluntary participation in her illicit relationship with
respondent, the latter's acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible. For as We have
declared in Soberano: 
 REYES V. WONG | Case No. 16

Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, ... is neither so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action against the man as a member of the Bar. ." (p. 895)

It should be added that the decision of the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
embodied the compromise agreement between the parties herein under which respondent expressly
acknowledged their two children and committed himself to support them. 

Wherefore, this disbarment proceeding against respondent Felipe C. Wong is hereby dismissed.