The Philosophy of Abortion: A Pro-Choice Perspective1

The public debate on the moral permissibility of abortion turns (almost) exclusively on

the status of the following claim:

The typical human fetus (or unborn child) has the same right to life as a typical adult

human being

People who are opposed to abortion say the typical human fetus has a right to life; people who

support abortion say it does not have a right to life. Obviously, the two sides disagree on

whether the typical fetus has a right to life, but both sides seem to agree that if the fetus has a

right to life, then abortion is morally impermissible.

While the fetus having the right to life is the key issue in the public debate over

abortion, this debate seems to be interminable. One side says the fetus has a right to life; the

other side says no it doesn’t. It doesn’t look like both sides are going to come to an agreement

on this issue any time soon. It would be nice if there was an argument that could point to a

conclusion about the moral permissibility of abortion that didn’t first require having everyone

agree about whether the fetus has a right to life.

In fact, I think there is such an argument. So, for the sake of argument, I am going to

assume that the human fetus has the same right to life that you and I have. This assumption

raises the following question: If the human fetus has the same right to life that you and I have,

what (if anything) follows about the moral permissibility of abortion? You might think that this

only a question that a philosopher could ask because the answer seems so clear: obviously the

1
Adapted from David Boonin’s opening statement in his debate with Peter Kreeft found here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RobCjM0ZLA&t=3221s The relevant material comes from 25:35-
35:40
fetus is alive and abortion ends the fetus’ life, so if the fetus has a right to life, then abortion is

morally impermissible.

However, the issue is more complex than it might seem at first. It is complex because if

you really want to think carefully about what is implied by the claim that a human fetus has a

right to life, you first have to answer a more fundamental question: what is a right to life? If you

have a right to life, what precisely do you have a right to? In the public debate on abortion,

virtually no one on either side of the debate attempts to ask or answer these questions.

If you think dispassionately, carefully, and clearly about this more general philosophical

question “what is it to have a right to life?”, you will find that it has surprising implications for

resolving the abortion debate. In particular, it has the potential to demonstrate that abortion in

typical circumstances is morally permissible without one having to insist that the fetus is not a

person or lacks a right to life.

First, I’m going to make a claim about what is involved in having a right to life and give

an argument in defense of that claim. The argument attempts to justify the claim by appealing

to assumptions that virtually everyone accepts regardless of their view on abortion. Second, I

am going to explain how the claim can be used to resolve the abortion controversy.

Here is the claim: The right to life is not the same thing as the right to be kept alive by

using another person’s body. Here is a hypothetical scenario and argument to support that

claim. Suppose that I am dying; I have a rare disease and only a bone marrow transfusion will

save my life. Doctors have to find a person with compatible bone marrow and that person will

have to undergo a series of quite painful and invasive bone marrow extractions so my life can

be saved. After the doctors go through all of the medical records, it turns out that there is only
one person with suitable bone marrow, and that person is you! Morally speaking, would I have

the right to forcibly extract bone marrow from you over the next few months in order to save

my life? The answer is clearly ‘no’.

What is the point of the example? The example demonstrates that nearly everyone

(regardless of their view on abortion) agrees that the right to life does not include the right to

be kept alive by using another person’s body. Why does the example prove that? If the right to

life did include the right to be kept alive by using somebody else’s body, then my right to life

would include my right to use your bone marrow. But while I obviously have the right to life, it

is also clear that I do not have the right to use your bone marrow. Therefore, the right to life

does not include the right to be kept alive using someone else’s body.

How can this help to resolve the abortion debate? Let’s assume that the fetus is a

person with the same right to life that you and I have. The fetus’ right to life entitles it to

exactly what my right to life entitles me to. But it turns out that my right to life does not entitle

me to stay alive by making use of someone else’s body. Since the right to life does not entitle

me to use your body to keep on living, it follows that the fetus’ right to life does not entitle it to

use the body of the pregnant woman to keep on living.

The argument is intended to suggest that, contrary to the public debate, even if we

agree that the fetus is a person with the right to life, it does not follow that abortion is morally

impermissible.