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F (w0, U (w0), Uw (w0), Uww (w0) ) 0 or Uw (w0) Uww (w0) 0. in The Former Case, We U C U
F (w0, U (w0), Uw (w0), Uww (w0) ) 0 or Uw (w0) Uww (w0) 0. in The Former Case, We U C U
− e−εv(w
1−εu(w 0)
0) 1− , c/r ) with (π1 − π2)w(w0) ≤ 0, it follows from(4.6)that
e
uˆ w < 0 in (0, c/r ), it follows that Proof. For Lipschitz continuity, it suffices to show πw∗ is bounded,
∗ 2(c − r w) and because uˆ ∈ C ∞ [0, c/r ), it suffices to show(4.7). As in
0 < π (w) < , BayraktarandZhang(2015,Proposition 6.2), we use a general- ized
µ−r
l’Hôpital’s rule. Let ℓ := lim infw→c/r − πw∗ (w) and L :=
in (0, c/r ). In particular, lim supw→ −c/r πw∗ (w).
FromProposition 4.2, we deduce
π ∗ (c/r −) = 0,
rw− rw− c σ 2r (d− 1)
c ≥ = .
(4.4) π0(w) µ − r
−
π ∗(w)
for all 0 ≤ ε ≤ ∞.
The above inequality and(4.5)imply
µ−r Corollary 5.1shows us that the effective hazard rate λ∗ strictly
−ε uˆ increases with the reference hazard rate λ. Indeed, both λ and
π (w) ≥ m − rd + λe
∗
.
2 e−εψ increase with λ.
By letting w → c/r − in this inequality, we obtain Young(2004) showed that the optimal investment strategy in
the non-robust setting, namely π0, increases as λ decreases. As
µ−r m discussed above, if the individual is more likely to live longer, then
ℓ ≥ m − rd + λ = , (4.8) she will optimally invest more in the risky asset to avoid
2 1− d financial ruin. In the next proposition, we show that the same
in which the equality follows from direct computation. On the result holds for the optimal investment strategy in the robust
other hand, the generalized l’Hôpital’s rule fromTaylor(1952,The- problem.
orem II) applied to(4.5)leads to
µ−r µ−r r Proposition 5.2. For w (∈
0, c/r ), π ∗(w) strictly decreases with
L ≤ m − r + lim sup +λ respect to λ.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ λ < λ , and define π (·) := π ∗(· ; λ = λ )
2 w→c/r − σ 2
πw∗
1 2 i i
for i = 1, 2. To show π1 > π2 in (0, c /r ), we suppose, on the
µ−r r (w)
= m− r+ + λ. (4.9) contrary, that π1(w) ≤ π2(w) for some w ∈ (0, c/r ). Then, either
σ 2
ℓ (i) π2 − π1 attains a non-negative maximum at w0 ∈ [0, c/r )
Inequalities(4.8)and(4.9)imply with (π2 − π1)w(w0) ≤ 0; or (ii) π2 − π1 attains a non-negative
maximum at c/r −, and (i) does not hold.
m
mr
µ−r µ−r First, if π2 − π1 attains a non-negative maximum at w0 ∈
≤ ℓ≤ L≤ m− r+
1− d 2 2 µ−
r
2 [0, c/r ) with (π2 − π1)w(w0) ≤ 0, then it follows from(4.5)that
ℓ
m
µ − ((π2)w(w0) − (π1)w(w0))
+ λ ≤ m − r + r (1 − d) + λ = m − rd + λ = 0
r ≥
. 1
−d 2
2m µ−r
It follows that ℓ = L = =− . Q µ−r 0 π1(w0) − π2(w0)
(µ−r )(1−d) σ 2(d−1) = σ 2 (r w − c) π1(w0)π2(w0)
Thus, we have shown that u = uˆ 1[0,c /r ] , Π = π ∗ 1(0,c /r ) ,
+ λ2 e−εψ2 (w0 ) − λ1 e−εψ1 (w0 )
and
ˆ
Θ = e−εu 1(0,c /r ) satisfy the conditions of the verification
1 0 2 0
µ−
theorem, r π (w ) − π (w )
Theorem 4.1. (Here,ˆu refers to the solution of the boundary- > (r w0 − c) ≥ 0,
value problem(4.2).) We have, thus, provedTheorem 3.1. σ 2 π1(w0)π2(w0)
in which the second inequality follows from λ1 < λ2 and
1. Other properties of the value function and the optimal ψ1(w0) > ψ2(w0), and the third inequality follows from r w0
controls −c ≤ 0 and π2(w0) − π1(w0) ≥ 0. We have reached a
contradiction.
In the proof ofProposition 4.2, we showed that Second, suppose π2 − π1 attains a non-negative maximum at
ψ∗and π ∗
c/r −, and (i) does not hold, that is π2(c/r −) − π1(c/r −) is the
strictly increase with ε in (0, c/r ). In particular, π0 ≤ π ≤ π∞. global maximum of π2 − π1 on [0, c/r ], and π2 − π1 does not attain
Furthermore, inProposition 4.3, we showed that π∗ is tangent to this maximum at any other point in [0, c/r ]. Then, from(4.4), we
π0 as wealth approaches c/r . know that π1(c/r −) = 0 = π2(c/r −), from which it follows that
In this section, we prove additional properties of ψ , π ∗, and ϑ ,∗ π1 > π2 in (0, c/r ). Q
with the last’s properties following from those of ψ because ϑ ∗ =
Via a proof similar toProposition 5.1’s, one can show that
e−εψ . For example, we deduce that ϑ ∗ strictly decreases with ε in
(0, c/r ) because ψ strictly increases with ε. Thus, as the ψ strictly increases with respect to σ ; thereby, we deduce that
the effective hazard rate decreases with σ . Thus, as the financial
individual becomes more ambiguity averse, her ‘‘effective’’ hazard
market becomes more risky, the individual’s effective future
rate, λϑ ∗, decreases. This monotonicity makes sense because the
lifetime increases along with her (penalized) probability of lifetime
risk in our setting is the risk of outliving one’s wealth, and if the
ruin.
individual thinks that she will live longer (on average), then she
Young(2004) andBayraktarandZhang(2015) showed that
will invest accordingly by assuming more risk in the financial
optimally controlled wealth never reaches the safe level when
market (π ∗ increases with ε).
minimizing the (penalized) probability of lifetime ruin. The same
Young(2004) showed that the minimum probability of
result holds when we penalize the probability of lifetime ruin for
lifetime ruin in the non-robust setting, namely ψ0, increases as λ
ambiguous hazard rate.
decreases. If the individual is more likely to live longer, then she
has more time in which to ruin. In the next proposition, we show Proposition 5.3. Let 0 < w < c/r , and let W ∗ be the optimally
that the same result holds for the value function of the robust controlled wealth process starting at w . Let τc∗/r := inf{t ≥ 0 : Wt∗
problem.
≥ c /r }, and let τ0∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Wt∗ ≤ 0}. Then, P(τc∗/r < τ0∗ )
Proposition 5.1. For w ∈ (0, c/r ), ψ(w) strictly decreases with = 0.
respect to λ. Proof. To prove this statement, one uses Feller’s test for
Proof. Let 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2, and define ψi(·) := ψ(· ; λ = λi) and explosion; seeBayraktarandZhang(2015,Proposition 7.2) for
Fi(·) := F (· ; λ = λi) for i = 1, 2. We have more details.
The only thing we need to check is π ∗(w) ≤ K (c − r w), for some
−
F1(w, ψ2, (ψ2)w, (ψ 2)ww) = positive constant K , which holds byProposition 4.2. Q
λ1 1− 1 e−εψ2 < 0 −εψ
− λ Because λ = λϑ = λe
∗ ∗
and because ψ decreases with
e−εψ2 2 ε wealth, we know that the effective hazard rate λ∗ decreases as
ε
∞
= F1(w, ψ1, (ψ1)w, (ψ1)ww),
for all w ∈ (0, c/r ). Thus,Lemma 4.1implies ψ2 < ψ1 in
(0, c/r ). Q
Corollary 5.1. Define λ∗ by λ∗(w) := λϑ ∗(w) = λe−εψ(w). Then,
λ∗(w) strictly increases with respect to λ for w ∈ (0, c/r ).
wealth decreases toward ruin. Thus, as the individual becomes more poor, we expect the individual to invest as if her expected future
lifetime is larger. Specifically, we expect the individual to invest more in the risky asset as wealth decreases. This monotonicity is
clearly true for π0 and π , and the following proposition shows that it is true for all ε.
Proposition 5.4. π ∗
strictly decreases with respect to w in (0, c/r ).