CRIM CASES

ARTICLE 10

1. SANCHEZ V. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 179090]

2. PEOPLE V. ENRIQUEZ y ROSALES [G.R. NO. 99838]

ARTICLE 11

3. PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ [G.R. NO. L-33466-67]

4. PEOPLE V. RETUBADO [G.R. NO. 124058]
5. PEOPLE V. JAURIGUE [ 76 PHIL 174]
6. [51 PHIL 103]
7. PEOPLE V. ALCONGA [G.R. NO. L-162]
8. AGUILAR V. DOJ [G.R. NO. 197522]
9. ORIENTE V. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 155094]
10.PEOPLE V. DELIMA [G.R. NO. 138692]

ARTICLE 12

11. PEOPLE V. RAFANAN [G.R L-54135]

12.PEOPLE V. MARCOS [G.R NO. 83325]

ARTICLE 13

13. PEOPLE V. GENOSA [G.R No. 135981 Jan. 14, 2004]

14. PEOPLE V. TENORIO [G.R No. L-15478 March 30,1962]

GR 157201
GR 147231
 SANCHEZ V. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 179090]

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse. The accused, abused
physically one a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs.
These acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603
as amended;

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions emerged.

Version of the prosecution : The appellant went in their house and started to rid them away
from the house by destroying their house, MMM got angry and told appellant that he could not
just drive them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV,
went to look for a tanod but the tanod don’t want to interfere. When VVV saw that her brother
was beated, he pushed the appellant which resulted to her being beaten (3) times, twice on the
left thigh and once below her right buttocks.

Version of the appellant: The appellant and his wife decided to continue the lease of the
fishpond occupied by the respondent due to improper management and accounting by FFF.
Despite the demands, FFF still refuse to vacate.The tension rose when BBB struck the appellant
with a piece of wood, he got hold of the broken pieces of wood and throw it behind which injured
VVV in the shoulder. The appellant think that his throw wasn’t strong enough to injur VVV.

The RTC finds the appellant guilty which the CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him because of the pressure
he exerted against them to give up the fishpond. Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts
complained of are clearly constitutive of Slight Physical Injuries punishable under Article 266 32 of
the Revised Penal Code.

However, the OSG opines that In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 37 of P.D. No. 603
and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely
as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the
protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. 40 As defined in the law,
child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the act should be considered punishable under the special laws or of the RPC.

RULING:
This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed
against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child
and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.

PEOPLE V. ENRIQUEZ y ROSALES [G.R. NO. 99838]

FACTS:
Enriquez and Rosales were convicted for violating Section 4, Article II, of RA. No. 6425. According
to the prosecution, on 05 June 1990, Sgt. Pedro Cerrillo, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of the Intelligence
and Drug Law Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 2, of the Western Police District, was in the
vicinity of North Harbor routinely scouting for information from his civilian informants. "Danny,"
a porter and a member of the Anti-Drug Abuse Movement ("ADAM") informed Sgt. Cerrillo that
a freelance porter a.k.a. "Bulag," was looking for prospective buyers of marijuana. Having in
mind a buy-bust operation, Sgt. Cerrillo instructed Danny to tell "Bulag" that he (Danny) had
come across a buyer. The plan was broached to Patrolwoman Maramot. Using his own jeep, Sgt.
Cerrillo went to his house, procured 10 pieces of one hundred peso bills to be used in the
projected buy-bust operation and had them xeroxed showing their serial numbers. He handed
the buy-bust money to Pat. Maramot. Since there were no other operatives available, Sgt.
Cerrillo sought the assistance of ADAM members Mendoza, Betita and Trinidad. The group
proceeded to Pier 10 at North Harbor. Pat. Maramot and Mendoza, posing as a couple, waited
for "Danny" who fetched "Bulag" while the others pretended to be bystanders. Danny arrived
with accused Rosales alias "Bulag" who talked with the poseur-buyers. Then, they walked and
entered an alley until they reached a house. A man, later identiHed to be accused Enriquez,
asked Pat. Maramot if she has the money. Pat. Maramot showed the marked money to Enriquez
and they were allowed to enter the house. Sgt. Cerrillo followed the group and saw them exit
through the back door with Rosales who was carrying a plastic bag. Sgt. Cerrillo's group followed
them until Pat. Maramo announced that she was a policewoman. Sgt. Cerrillo held Rosales and
took the bag containing marijuana wrapped in plastic. Sgt. Cerrillo also "picked up" Enriquez for
investigation. The trial court, giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution, found both
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The Court held that it found no
justification for holding differently from the findings made by the trial court. he seeks to
capitalize on his being supposedly still in the subjective phase of the crime. Appellant Rosales
thus submits that, if found guilty, he should only be held accountable for attempted delivery of a
prohibited drug.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Rosales is an attempted delivery of dangerous drug?

RULING:
The subjective phase in the commission of a felony is that portion of its execution starting from
the point where the offender begins by overt acts to pursue the crime until he is prevented,
against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which would produce the
offense. If the subjective phase has not yet passed, then the crime is only attempted. If that
phase has been done but the felony is not produced, the crime is frustrated. The crime is
consummated if, following the subjective phase, the last of the elements of the felony meets to
concur. These rules are inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws.

Unfortunately for appellant, the crime with which he is being charged is penalized by a special
law. The incomplete delivery claimed by appellant Rosales, granting that it is true, is thus
inconsequential. The act of conveying prohibited drugs to an unknown destination has been
held to be punishable, and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination of the
prohibited drug is reached.
 PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ [G.R. NO. L-33466-67]

FACTS:
Two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, At
the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Narvaez. He heard that the walls
of his house were being chiselled, So he addressed the group, saying -'Pare, if possible you stop
destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over - what is good,' addressing the deceased
Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit,
proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a
gun on the jeep, appellant Hred at Rubia, likewise hitting him.

The appellant is among those who petitioned to Pres. Quezon for the distribution to the settlers
to the 2000 hectares. The deceased also filed a sales application of the said land but only 300
hectares were set aside for Sales application and the rest is subdivided of 5- 6 hectares each
among the setttlers.

It seems that appellant entered into a leased with the deceased and failed the payment thereof.
Hence, the start of the fencing of the land which affected the properties of the appellant and
have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant’s house and rice mill from the
highway.

Appellants questions the errors. That the court a quo and lower court erred in
convicting him although he acted in defense of his rights. He claimed that he should be exempt
from criminal liability under Art 11, par.1.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the acts of the appellant does not incur any criminal liability.

RULING:
First, It was found out that the deceased has no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant’s
house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway, hence, the assault on the appellant’s
property amounts to unlawful aggression. Second, When the appellant fired his shotgun from
his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was not reasonable to the attack. Although
there was no provocation at all, the act of the appellant was not justifiable, since not all the
elements of for justification are present, but he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense.
 PEOPLE V. RETUBADO [G.R. NO. 124058]

FACTS:
I started when someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant's younger brother who was
mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. The
appellant confronted the father of the one who played a joke on his brother. The appellant pulled a gun
and shot Emmanuel.

Appellant herein was charged and convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant asserted that he was merely
performing a lawful act of defending himself when he grabbed the victim's hand which held the gun,
which accidentally fired and hit the victim's forehead. He claimed that the accident was not his fault. He
asserted that when he wrestled with the victim for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending
himself. He contended that he had no intention of killing the victim as he merely wanted to talk to the
victim's son. Marcial Luciño corroborated the appellant’s testimony.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the trial court and found the appellant guilty of homicide
only and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison sentence. The Court found no basis to deviate
from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and
the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range. But, the Court agreed
with the appellant's contention that there was no treachery in the case to qualify the crime to murder.
The appellant was also entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of murder.
Whether or not the act in a state of necessity is justifying circumstance?

RULING:

We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present case to
qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a)
the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The
prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned
conditions. Thus, the appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The appellant submits, he did not commit any felony; hence, under paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, he is not criminally liable for the death of the victim. 10 In the alternative, the
appellant asserts that he should be convicted only of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery is wanting. He and the victim had a
heated exchange of words before they grappled for the possession of the gun. Such heated discussion
had already forewarned the victim and placed him on guard; thus, treachery cannot be legally
considered.

A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of necessity is
justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state
of necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not commit a crime in legal contemplation;
hence, is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil liability is borne by the person/persons benefited by the
act of the accused.
 PEOPLE V. JAURIGUE [ 76 PHIL 174]

FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina
Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide. The incidents before this was, the deceased suddenly
approached the appellant expressed his love which she refused and suddenly embraced and
kissed her, she slapped him and went home that prompted the appellant to arm herself with a
knife for protection. Two days after the deceased went to the appellant’s house while she was
sleeping. Her parents was awakened to which the deceased asked forgiveness. While Nicolas
and Avelina were inside a chapel, the deceased went on to them and sat beside them, where
the deceased out his hands on the upper part of her thigh using the knife.

ISSUES:
Whether or not
RULING:

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state
of legitimate defense, Under the circumstances of the incident, there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped since it was inside a chapel where 10 people including the
appellant’s father. And when she gave Amado Capiña a thrust at the base of the left side of his
neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 41/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments
later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and
under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. If she killed the person at the time she was entered inside her
room, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him.

In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased
Amado Capiña, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the
defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance
whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be
considered in her favor.

Not considered an exempting circumstance – defense of honor – the killing cannot be

considered a crime if it is the only means left for her to protect her honor from an outrage.
Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong actually committed. – merely wanted to punish
the offending hand
Mitigating Circumstance – Voluntary surrender obsfucation
Aggravating Circumstance – The killing done in a consecrated place cannot be legally considered
since there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart
when she entered the chapel.
 PEOPLE V. ALCONGA [G.R. NO. L-162]

FACTS:
The deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, with him is
the witness Raposo and the accused Alconga. The deceased appears to have
suffered losses in the game because of the team work between Maria de Raposo
and the accused Alconga. The deceased left the place and left an expression that
would seem signify an intent to inflict harm. While the accused was in a guard
house, performing his duty, the deceased came to him and fired to him but failed
as well as the second blow hitting the bench instead. While he’s about to perform
his third blow, the accused managed to fire at him first. Then a hand to hand fight
ensued which the deceased managed to ran away but was followed by the
accused and the time where the accused killed the deceased with a mortal bolo
blow.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a self-defense in killing a fleeing adversary and
provocation as mitigating circumstance.

RULING:
An accused was no longer acting in self-defense when he pursued and killed a
fleeing adversary, though originally the unlawful aggressor, there being then no
more aggression to defend against, the same having deceased from the moment
deceased took to his heels.

Provocation given by an adversary at the commencement an during the first stage

of a fight, cannot be considered as mitigating circumstance, where the appellant
pursued and killed the former while fleeing and the deceased, as in the case at
bar, from the moment he fled after the first stage of the fight to the moment he
died, did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue, much less further to
attack him.
 AGUILAR V. DOJ [G.R. NO. 197522]

FACTS:
Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
respondents who arrested his son, and inflicted injuries upon him resulting to his death. He was arrested
for the suspicion that he was a member of the CPPNPA. Despite his peaceful surrender, the deceased was
still maltreated and was gunned down by the respondents. In defense respondents posited that they were
engaged in an operation to entrap a suspected extortionist which apprehended the deceased which was
in the place. While they were in a jeep leaving the place, the deceased pulled a hand grenade, jumped out
of the jeep. Sensing that they were in danger, one of the respondents, Dangupon fired upon the
deceased, hitting him four times in the body. He was then brought to a hospital where he was pronounce
dead on arrival.

The CHR issued a final investigation report recommending that the case be closed for lack of sufficient
evidence. Which the PD of the PHQ of Mindoro argued that the respondents conducted a legitimate
operation and that the killing was made in self-defense and/or defense of a stranger.

The prosecutor dismissed the case of the petitioner. DOJ also affirmed with the prosecutor, hence this
petition

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondents are criminally responsible of the death of the deceased.

RULING:

At the outset, it is observed that the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling, as affirmed on appeal by the DOJ and,
in turn, upheld on certiorari by the CA, may be dissected into three separate disquisitions: first, the lack of
probable cause on the part of Dangupon, who despite having admitted killing the victim, was exculpated
of the murder charge against him on account of his interposition of the justifying circumstances of self-
defense/defense of a stranger and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right of an office under
Article 11 (5) of the RPC; second, the lack of probable cause on the part of Fortuno and Abordo who,
despite their presence during the killing of Tetet, were found to have no direct participation or have not
acted in conspiracy with Dangupon in Tetet's killing; and third, the lack of probable cause on the part of
Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol in view of their absence during the said incident.

HE NEEDS TO BE CHARGE BUT HE’S NOT CONSIDERED GUILTY

 ORIENTE V. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 155094]
FACTS:
Arnel Tanael was on his way to the house of Romulo Cariño y Vallo. He passed in front of the house of
[petitioner] Manuel Oriente and saw the latter and his companions having a drinking spree at the terrace
of the [petitioner's] house. Romula went out to buy cigar while Arnel while watching TV inside the house,
heard two gunshots. He checked outside and saw the Carino, Oriente and his companions arguing outside
the petitioners house.Marilou got a lead pipe which he gave to Paul and used it to hit Romulo. The
witness arnel got confused and went inside the house instead and then went outside and saw Romulo
moaning. At this point Paul was already poking a gun at Romulo and pulled the trigger twice but did not
fire. Arnel Shouted them , bought him inside the house and took him in the hospital which he passed
away. The Doctor declared that the caused of death was the traumatic head injury.

When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in finding two mitigating
circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party, so the court modified the penalty imposed by the R.T.C.

ISSUES:
1. DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS
REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR SELF-DEFENSE.

2. CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, DUE TO THE
PREMISE THAT THERE WAS LACK OF INTENT IN THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG AND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED?

RULING:
1. - No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the
killing is legally justified. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on
the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful aggression is condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being hit in the forehead by the
weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense makes their claim of self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that was alleged used by the
victim at them to have constituted the “unlawful aggression” an essential requirement for self-defense,
since the mere aiming of the gun and threat to kill merely constitute a threat or intimidating attitude
which does not amount to an actual and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof;

2. Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
- The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because the acts
employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the
victim
- Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is deemed sufficient if it is
adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, w/c must be proportionate in gravity
- The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Also, appellant failed to establish
by competent evidence that the deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner.

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 11 Par. 1 and ARTICLE 13 Par(s): 3 and 4 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE
 PEOPLE V. DE LIMA [G.R. NO. 138692]

FACTS:
Roberto Pilapil, together with his children, was inside their house watching over his wife, Vicenta Pilapil, who was about to give
birth. Appellant Oscar Areo and his co-accused, Danilo Delima, arrived to ask Roberto if they could have a drinking session
inside his house. Roberto agreed, so they drank beer and rhum. During the drinking spree, Oscar reminded Roberto about the
parcel of land in Sitio Naparikan which was being occupied by his (Roberto's) father. Oscar insisted that they (Areos) owned the
same, claiming that his mother had previously bought it. Roberto replied that his father owned the land and that he knew
nothing about the transaction being referred to by Oscar. They left the house and a few minutes later, de lima went to fetch
Roberto, when they reach Oscar’s house Roberto was hog tied and was hit by a bolo, Roberto’s mother who followed the,
shouted for help and the accused then ran away after seeing someone coming.

According to the defense, Roberto was shouting outside their house and went inside the house, Oscar quickly got a bamboo
pole and struck Roberto’s hands that was holding a bolo. When the bolo fell, Oscar picked it up and hacked Roberto, the latter
pleaded mercy but the appellant ignored his plea. Appellant’s co accused delima professed innocence which he said that he was
out in the mountain that day, went to the house with Oscar and went home nothing unusual happened. The following day,
danilo learned that Roberto was killed and later was arrested as one of the suspects.

the Trial court rendered OSCAR guilty of murder and acquitting delima for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of Self-defense attended in the commission of the Act
complained of.

RULING:
There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to speak of. Contrary to the claim of the
defense, the prosecution established through its eyewitness that the victim was lured to the appellant's
house and there hacked by the appellant. Appellant's effort to buttress his theory of self-defense can
only be described as desperate. The trial court in its decision found that unlawful aggression was not
proven. To successfully invoke self-defense, appellant must prove, by satisfactory evidence, the
concurrence of all the elements of self-defense, the most important of which is unlawful aggression by
the victim. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, and
conviction of appellant must follow.

Another factor that militates against the appellant's claim of self-defense is the physical evidence on
record, that is, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim.

The testimony of Roberto’s Mother, their acts constitute treachery. This constituted treachery which is
committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the nmeans, method and form of execution
employed give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that such
means, method and form of execution are deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without
danger to his person.

PEOPLE V. RAFANAN [G.R L-54135]

FACTS:
The prosecution's evidence shows that complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only
fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. One evening
the complainant was asked to help the accused in closing the door and he immediately
pulled the complainant and ask her for a sexual intercourse, to which the complainant
refused. She was threatened by the accused and forced her to lie in bed and started the
sexual intercourse. He cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or
anyone else otherwise he would kill her.

Somehow it was only 2 days after the incident where the complainant told her own mother
about the incident, who reported the incident to the police station.

The principal appellant claimed he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia. At the time of incident. The trial court suspended the trial and confined him at
the National Mental Hospital where he stayed for 1 ½ years. The defense presented a
psychiatrist who testified and confirmed that he is psychotic or insane. However, Dr.
Jovellano declared that he is not completely devoid of consciousness and was aware of
everything that he did during the incident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can used his imbecility to exempt him criminal liability.
RULING:

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; The allegation of
insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant
had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
PEOPLE V. MARCOS [G.R NO. 83325]
 PEOPLE V. GENOSA [G.R No. 135981 Jan. 14, 2004]

Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. Ben,
a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her down on the bed or
beat her. These incidents happened several times and Marivic would often run home to her parents. She
had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile.On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim
quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there was no
provocation on her part when she got home that night, and it was her husband who began the
provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure she would deliver
her baby safely, appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was then sleeping at the time, with the
use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts opined that Marivic fits the profile of a
battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her husband, her mental condition was that she
was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in
the past.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting self-
defense;

2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

RULING:

No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.

1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (b)
the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life; and (c) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances
could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.

Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly established. Here, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In fact,
she had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or even imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the
specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up
by the party attacked. Here, there is no showing that appellant intentionally chose a specific means of
successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might
make. It appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment
when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to
ensure its execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her favor.

PEOPLE V. TENORIO [G.R No. L-15478 March 30,1962]

FACTS:
Mariano Tenorio alias Magin, a 23-year old fisherman, stabbed once with a 10-inch pointed
bolo Attorney Maximino Bello, former governor of Ilocos Sur, inflicting a chest wound which
caused his death. On the same day, Leopoldo Pascua, the chief of police of Caoayan, filed in
the Justice of the Peace Court a complaint charging Mariano Tenorio alias Magin with the
crime of murder for the death of Attorney Maximino Bello. The accused waived in writing his
right to a preliminary investigation and would enter his plea in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur; whereupon, the Justice of the Peace Court of Caoayan forwarded the case to the
Court of First Instance. On 15 April 1959 the provincial fiscal Juvenal K. Guerrero filed an
information charging Mariano Tenorio alias Magin with the crime of murder attended by the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and two aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and two aggravating circumstances, namely, treachery and contempt of or
insult to public authorities. The court ruled that the accused is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of Voluntary Surrender.

RULING:
MURDER; INTENT TO SURRENDER VOLUNTARILY. — The Finding that the defendant
"did not surrender voluntarily," because "he was cornered inside the fenced tennis court by
two policeman one chasing him from behind and the other whom he met face to face," cannot
be sustained, because while running away from where he stabbed the deceased up to the
point near the bamboo fence where he met a patrolman, the defendant did not look or turn his
face back, so that he did know that another patrolman was chasing him. If the defendant
wanted to run away or escape, he would not have run to the municipal building among many
people who could easily have stopped and subdued him, but even instinctively he could have
run toward the opening of the fence, thereby avoiding the crowd of people then attending a
public peace rally. Also the fact that on seeing the patrolman who had not even drawn his gun
the defendant threw away his bolo, raised his two hands, and offered no resistance, is
indicative of his intent or desire to surrender voluntarily to the authorities.

COMMISSION OF OFFENSE IN CONTEMPT OF OR WITH INSULT TO

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES. — The crime at bar, having been committed in the presence
of public oAcials who were then attending a public peace rally going on at the public
plaza, was in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.