G.R. No.

126480      August 10, 2001

MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of appeals dated July 24, 1996, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 5, 1993, finding the
accused (now petitioner) Maria Tin @ "Maria Ty" @ "Maria Dy" guilty of estafa and sentencing
her to suffer imprisonment of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the private complainant, Dr. Francisca M.
Santiago, the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12 percent interest per annum from the filing of the
information and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Petitioner was charged in an Information which reads:

That, on or about February 8, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one FRANCISCA M.
SANTIAGO in the following manner, to wit: the accused received in trust from said
Francisca M. Santiago several pieces of jewelry with an estimated value of more than
P220,000.00 as collateral to the loan in the amount of P220,000.00 which the latter
obtained from the accused, under the express obligation of returning the said pieces of
jewelry to said Francisca M. Santiago immediately upon demand for redemption, but the
said accused once in possession of the said pieces of jewelry far from complying with her
aforesaid obligation, failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to do so despite
repeated demands made upon her to that effect and with intent to defraud the said
accused denied having received the said pieces of jewelry to the damage and prejudice of
the said Francisca M. Santiago.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago testified that on February 8, 1980, she
and Aurora Jose went to Mady's Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of jewelry.
She initially asked for P250,000.00 but petitioner offered only P220,000.00, P200,000.00 first
and then the P20,000.00 a week later. A list of the jewelries was typewritten by a helper of the
petitioner. This list was signed by petitioner as evidence of her receipt of the said jewelries.2 Dr.
Santiago also averred that from 1980 to 1982, she made 19 payments of various amounts totaling
P95,600.00.3 She said that the loan was under a "white-paper" system where there is no
maturity/expiration date and where the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided the interests
were paid.4
On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago said, she went to the pawnshop, with a certain Mrs. Dava and
a Mrs. Zuñiga to redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of P450,000.00 to settle
her loan. However, petitioner told her that the jewelries were already sold.5 This prompted Dr.
Santiago to consult Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote to Maria Tin6 asking her to allow Dr.
Santiago to redeem the pieces of jewelry. On March 2, 1984, petitioner replied through her
counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming that Dr. Santiago has an unsettled obligation of
P220,000.00 and demanding payment. The letter also stated that no jewelries were received as
collateral for the loan.7 In a handwritten letter dated March 7, 1984, Dr. Santiago pleaded for the
redemption of her jewelries.8 Maria Tin, also in a handwritten letter dated March 16, 1984,
replied that she merely acted as guarantor of the loan and since she was made to pay the loan she
now was demanding payment therefor.9 In said letter, Tin narrated the circumstances behind the
loan, and alleged that it was another person who gave the loan and received the jewelry as
collateral.

Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law,
Mia Chan. She merely introduced them to one another and it was Mia Chan who signed the
acknowledgment receipt and who actually received the pieces of jewelry.10

Mia Chan, for her part, corroborated the testimony of petitioner, her mother-in-law. She stated
that she was the one who extended the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she merely asked petitioner
to appraise the pieces of jewelry for her. She also requested petitioner to collect payments from
Dr. Santiago. According to Mia Chan, the loan was for a three-month term with 14 percent
interest per annum. She stated she signed the receipt upon request of Dr. Santiago.11

On May 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty. The dispositive
portion of the said decision reads:

From the foregoing, the court finds MARIA TIN; alias MARIA TY or MARIA DY, the
accused, GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA. Accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused is hereby ordered to pay Dr. Francisca M. Santiago the amount of P280,000.00
plus 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and P40,000.00 as
Attorney's Fees.

Dr. Francisca M. Santiago is required to pay the docket fees of the civil aspect of this
case.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. Her
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in:
 I. ... NOT FINDING THAT.THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS FULL OF
LOOPHOLES AND SELF-CONTRADICTIONS, APART FROM BEING
INHERENTLY INCREDIBLE, AND HENCE GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT FOR
CONVICTION.

II. ... RELYING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVED TO BE WEAKNESSES OF THE

DEFENSE RATHER ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE.

Ill. ... NOT UPHOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONTENTION (A) THAT

SANTIAGO LIED WHEN SHE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN SHE ARRIVED
AT MADY'S PAWNSHOP THAT SHE CAME TO KNOW FROM WHOM SHE WAS
GOING TO OBTAIN A LOAN AND THAT IT WAS SANTIAGO WHO TYPED AND
PREPARED EXH. "A" AND (B) THAT DRA. SANTIAGO HERSELF PREPARED
EXH. "A" AND WROTE THE NAME "MARIA TIN" AS THE LENDER.

Essentially, in our view, petitioner raises issues of fact by assailing the credibility of witnesses.
As a general rule, this Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will review only
errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over
again.13 However, there are certain exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts,14 In this case, the decisions of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are allegedly based on misapprehensions of vital facts, making their review
necessary.

A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts: (1) that accused was the one who
extended the loan; (2) that accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as collateral
for the loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was for an indefinite term. These factual
circumstances must relate directly to the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence
under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.15

Both trial and appellate courts held that it was petitioner who extended the loan and who actually
received the jewelries from Dr. Santiago. Their conclusion stemmed from the following
circumstances:

(1) In a letter she wrote to Fiscal Jumino, one Aurora Jose who had allegedly introduced
Dr. Santiago to Maria Tin and who was present when the transaction took place,
corroborated Dr. Santiago's testimony;

(2) The signature of appellant [petitioner] appears on the document16 acknowledging

receipt of the pieces of jewelry;

(3) Receipts evidencing payments made by Dr. Santiago and which appeared to be signed
by the petitioner were not denied by the latter;

(4) Petitioner did not deny that she sent a note (Exh. "M-2") to Dr. Santiago reminding
her to update her payments, or else she would auction the pieces of jewelry.
A careful review of the records, however, reveals that, first, it was erroneous for the Court of
Appeals to consider in evidence the letter which a certain Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal
Jumino.17 Aurora Jose was never presented to testify on the veracity of said letter, much less its
contents. A private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never
presented as a witness.18 The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora
Jose's alleged letter is obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of
lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value.19

Second, the signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit "A", apparently differs from the specimen
signatures provided by petitioner Maria Tin in open court.20 But it has striking and obvious
similarities to Mia Chan's specimen signatures.21 The differences and similarities are so obvious
to the eye. They could not be casually disregarded. Expert handwriting analysis is probably
useful here, but it is not indispensable.22 As said in People vs Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226:

When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in
evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also recognized
that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities and
dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for truth. Thus, it has
been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or
without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For, the handwriting
of a person is characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of
other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for
the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts.23

In the present case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the signature in Exhibit "A"
was the petitioner's, not Mia Chan's. This the prosecution did not do.

Third,  petitioner did not deny that she received payments and made demands for payment from
private complainant. They do not show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan
and accepted the jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan received certain payments from Dr.
Santiago, as shown by Exhibits "8", "8-A", "10" and "10-A". A certain "Viring" also received
payment from Dr. Santiago.24 These instances only prove that a person who received payments
from another is not necessarily the person who extended the loan.

Fourth, Exhibit "M-2"25 which the Court of Appeals considered proof that petitioner was in
possession of the jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not properly identified or
introduced as evidence at the trial. It was marked as an exhibit upon mere manifestation of
counsel.26 It was not touched upon during the testimony of the private complainant nor listed in
the list of exhibits for the prosecution,27 hence deemed inadmissible in evidence.28

Fifth, Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the
jewelries, deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored. That admission is one
against self-interest, amounting to an incriminatory statement, which the witness could not have
volunteered if not the truth.
Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But private complainant
averred that it was extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an indefinite
term. Petitioner presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for
a three-month period. Private complainant did not present evidence to substantiate her claim,
other than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied' on the acknowledgment receipt
allegedly, signed by petitioner in the presence of two witnesses; However, the prosecution did
not present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava
and Mrs. Zuñiga who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried to redeem her
jewelries. While non-presentation of certain witnesses is not a valid defense nor does it work
against the prosecution's cause,29 this holds true only if the evidence of the prosecution is
sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the prosecution
evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the prosecution to present evidence which
can help further its case, or explain why such evidence is not presented. When the sole testimony
of the complainant is met by an equally credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution
must present credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to present
corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why they were not produced, weakens the
testimony of the witness who named those corroborating witnesses in her testimony.30 In this
case, the prosecution's failure to present the corroborative witnesses, without any explanation for
their non-appearance, makes private complainant's testimony weak.

Further, since it was private complainant who asserted that the loan was for an indefinite term
under the so-called "white-paper system" of the pawnshop, she had the burden of proving that
fact as true. In this she failed, and her failure undermines the case for the prosecution.

Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where
the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.31 The equipoise rule finds application
if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction.32 Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime
charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14818,
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin is ACQUITTED of the charge
against her under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision*
of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to
the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.

The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been
clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for
the public respondent, thus:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did
not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another
problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to
purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner,
representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his
needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no
sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS
Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be
purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he
requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the
equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng
who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term
loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)

The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:

1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of

Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified
in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations.
 This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of
the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article.
(Ibid., p. 17)

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby
LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent
with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were
delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who,
unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured,
Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer
banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two
(2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were
the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held
momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient
funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859
dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43
and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the
garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng
was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon
Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks
were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-
petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:

. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of

violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one
year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to
complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)

Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this
Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by
the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the
"warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng
is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement
subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the
transaction.

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash
out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the
equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment
on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price.
As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for
the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed
to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and
just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust
"debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said
amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and
operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know
that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was
kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction
is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the
source of the "warranty deposit".

It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery,
gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the
supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or
lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately
need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances
victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of
the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing
equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim
off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal
sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full
harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective
of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.

This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the
refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the
contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should
be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit"
for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor
encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of
the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of
jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the
prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential
wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed
the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely
said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not
be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition,
Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon
that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.
This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon
a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an
external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the
amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note
also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual
and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks
were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account
or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere
issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the
"potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by
convicting the petitioner.

While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by
the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the
"warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:

Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to
complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement
— by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was
refundable to the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither
made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may
he assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these
allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and
established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on
account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may
be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with
respect to the element of said offense that the check should have been made and
 issued on account or for value — it is sufficient, all the other elements of the
offense being present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment
of an obligation.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of

the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued,
would have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the
prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was
such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that
appellant had not adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced
by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been
returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the
same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not
guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty
deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has
interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus,
even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue
collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".

That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the
warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:

And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated
BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala
prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not
being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for
reasons of public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal
intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)

The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-
terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the
more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:

a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain

facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . .
(Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)

A cross-reference to the following term shows:

Fitness for Particular Purpose: —

 Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless
excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)

b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the

performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may
constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.

To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping
or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.

The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and
regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the
depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and
generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits
payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not,
may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time.
(Ibid., pp. 394-395)

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the
very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up
the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the
transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been
different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the
lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby

ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

G.R. No. 166326             January 25, 2006

ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the Philippines. v. Esmeraldo
Rivera, et al.

On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained
a non-mortal injury on his head and on the different parts of his body, the accused thus
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other than their
own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic) away and the
timely response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April 1998 after
a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino by the
television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living as a
manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.

At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled
invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.

At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look for
his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two
brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo
and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position,
Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael
continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila! Awatin sila!"
Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back.
When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their
house.

Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr., signed a
medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal
area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions
on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.4 The doctor declared that the lacerated wound
in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days.5 The doctor
prescribed medicine for Ruben’s back pain, which he had to take for one month.6

Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house and
banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he went
out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each other. He
fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled
away and brought to their house.

For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but Ruben
grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went
home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.

Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front of
their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged
the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother
Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was. A fist fight ensued.
Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he
stood up, he pulled at Edgardo’s shirt and hair, and, in the process, Ruben’s head hit the lamp
post.7

On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years
of prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the
accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally, civil indemnity to the private
complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.8

The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their witnesses.
The accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004 affirming, with
modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is
MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9

The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the
CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they
had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners
aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in
the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if
petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they
should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.

On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners’ intent to kill
Ruben:

On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound inflicted
and the kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in his
testimony as follows:

Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?

A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow block
xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.

Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow block by
Dagol?

A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting, Sir.

As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block
directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered
away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each other maul the
defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them even
picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times;
and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist from their
concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is
correct, thus:

The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of innocence
raised by petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with petitioners as the perpetrators.
Their intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically declared
that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was suddenly boxed
by Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his two brothers Ismael
and Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, coming from St. Peter II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia
Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they saw Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera pick up a hollow
block and hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3) times. A careful review of their testimonies revealed
the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners. In this case, the victim did not
even have the slightest warning of the danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his three-year old
daughter. He was caught off-guard by the assault of Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera and the
simultaneous attack of the two other petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by
Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera, while he was lying on the ground and being mauled by the other
petitioners. Petitioners could have killed the victim had he not managed to escape and had the
police not promptly intervened.

Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was superficial
and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. The
Court of Appeals held:

As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block
directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered
away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers helped each other maul
the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them
picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times;
and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist from their
concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.11

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or

attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove
by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.

In People v. Delim,12 the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows.
Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit
Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting
in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.

That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if
Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance.13

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.14

The Court in People v. Lizada15 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense. The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of
cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being
equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the
overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.16
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling
the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the
middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

We reject petitioners’ contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission
of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was
walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no
chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the
three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the
victim.17 Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the
victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery.18 Obviously, petitioners assaulted
the victim because of the altercation between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before.
There being conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.19

The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be
reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph
2 of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision
mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the felony (other
than the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the
penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a
range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that
petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015

GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. ELPIDIO

MALICSE, SR. AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
 PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010 , of petitioners Gary
Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva assailing the Decision2 dated August 31, 2007
and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR.
No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners guilty
of attempted murder.

The following are the antecedents:

On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the
house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a
sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio
confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slap
the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol.

The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the
commotion was taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was
eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio
went back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way there, he
passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter to
accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed
alone.

Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus)
and her son-in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find
their parents. Titus and Gary responded, “putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas
ka, punyeta ka.”

In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and
saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a
rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced
the latter to bow his head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on
the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter
got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the
possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed
something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of
Salvador and to extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.

Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter
was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to
take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still
armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his arnis, including Titus, chased
him.

Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head
with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his
assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs,
legs and knees using the rattan stick. While he was simultaneously being beaten up
by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover his
face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between
the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees.
Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood
on the back of his shoulder.

Thereafter, a certain “Mang Gil” tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted
at him: “Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito” and the two continued to maul
Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted “maawa na kayo” but they
only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident.
Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors
approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH).

Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron,
Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao
and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime of murder
directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse,
Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and mauling
him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio
Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
They all pleaded “not guilty.” The defense, during trial, presented the following
version of the events that transpired:

Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house
when he heard his tenth son Winston crying while the latter was being castigated
by Elpidio. He went down and told Elpidio to come back the next day to settle. His
wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two blocks away. Barangay Chairman
Joseph Ramos and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to the house and Elpidio was
given warm water, but he showered his daughter and Winston with it. Elpidio was
brought to his house and the former told the Barangay Chairman that it was a
family problem. Elpidio went back to the house of Salvador where Titus was sitting
on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open the door until the former kicked the door
open. Titus escaped through the open door and Salvador went out of the house
because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall.
Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.

According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and
Titus when the incident occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out
when Elpidio hit the door. Elpidio had a reputation for hurting people when drunk
and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to the hospital because he was mauled
by the people.

During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court,
in a Decision dated March 31, 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and
Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico
and Rolando Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences
them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1)
day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum. They are also ordered to pay the
actual damages of P17,300.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00.

Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to
the CA, but the latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case
as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, we hereby

AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.

SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners stated the following arguments: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.

THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS
AND THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED
MURDER.

NOT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

THERE IS NO TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK

OF IN THIS CASE.

THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PRESENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT.

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE

DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO

ATTACKED HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.

CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal
by certiorari to this Court should only raise questions of law distinctly set forth in
the petition.5 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the present case, the issues and arguments presented by the petitioners involve
questions of facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for its
failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the
petition should only raise questions of law.

The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled. There
is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is
a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of
whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.6 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.

It is the contention of the petitioners that the Information filed against them was
defective because it did not state all the elements of the crime charged. However, a
close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The Information partly
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which
should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes
other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements
of the crime of attempted murder has been included.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to
commit a felony, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.7 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.8
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external
act, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to
be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act
or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for
the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should
have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need
not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that
the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.11
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in the
allegations in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase
means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a
state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e.,
acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered the following factors to
determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered
by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional
determinative factors.13 All of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say,
with or without the phrase, what is important is that all the elements of attempted
murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the
Information on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are
lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of section 3 of this Rule.
Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA
and the RTC, the same is not ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we held
that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the
commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving
evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.15 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of
the petitioners as the assailants, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?

A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of
the house, then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe.
Tonahawk with blade of ax was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the diameter
of one inch.

Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)

A. I also used that.

Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?

A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?

A. He is right in the kitchen.

Q. Then what happened?

A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the
kitchen door and holding a tomhack (sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my
right side and my head and I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want to
get hold of the tomhawk (sic).

Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?

A. No sir.16
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?

A. Rolly Villanueva.

Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from
behind?

A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.

Q. Who are they?

A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao,

Saligan Iguiron.

Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first
before you were hit?

A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic0, I saw him.

Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit
you, you mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?

A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.

Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw
him holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?

A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17

In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings
of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties as
well as its conclusion on its findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at
close range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as they
testify.18 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings
are sustained by the Court of Appeals.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the

medico-legal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident
Doctor of the Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the following: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?

A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings
supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions
of our Out Patient Department.

Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this
complainant?

A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw
the patient.

Q. Why does he has (sic) to make a follow up in your department?

A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated

casting. Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the
nature of his fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong
immobilization in a case.

PROSECUTOR TEVES:

Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained?

A. I think one of his leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a
blunt injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound
which was very much compatible with a hack at the leg area.20
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of
treachery or any other qualifying circumstance.

In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning
and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate;
and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.21 From
the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the
second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur
of the moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted
means to execute the crime committed. There is no treachery where the attack was
not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the
victim.22
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit
Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the
former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or
tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando “Rolly” Villanueva hit the victim on
the head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the
legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick
on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with
a piece of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. “D”), Medico Legal Certificate
and Leg Sketch (Exh. “D-2”) and the fracture sheet (Exh. “D-4”) all prove that the
victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple lacerations on his head. The injury
on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt instrument like a piece
of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered an
open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or axe. This was caused by
Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim. The multiple
lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was proven
that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no sufficient evidence that the other,
accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros
and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed Elpidio with
the tear gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither was the alleged blow by Titus, using
a piece of wood, on the victim's private organ sufficiently established as the medical
certificate did not show any injury on that part of the body of the victim.

The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister
Isabelita's house. When he kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of
the injuries is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the
victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick,
tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes
the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow
inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that
the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It
afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously
adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is
present in this case and must be considered an aggravating circumstance
against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico and Salvador Iguiron
were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with. There
is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.23 (Emphasis
supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of
by him in the commission of the crime."24 "The fact that there were two persons
who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim."25 The evidence must establish that the assailants
purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage.26 "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age,
size, and strength of the parties.28
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10)
years as maximum and ordered them to pay actual damages of P17,300.00 and
moral damages of P10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.

For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals
in an attempt to commit a felony.29 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of
the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence
should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium term, which has a
duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years; and that the
minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration of
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed
should have been imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2010 of

petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated January 7,
2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the petitioners are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also ORDERED to pay P17,300.00
as actual damages, as well as P10,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by
the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
 G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019

ISIDRO MIRANDA Y PARELASIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.:

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio (Miranda), seeking the reversal of the
Decision2 dated May 15, 2017, and Resolution3 dated September 13, 2017, rendered by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38523, which affirmed the trial court's ruling convicting
him of the crime of Frustrated Homicide.

The Antecedents

On September 28, 2011, an Information was filed against Miranda for the crime of frustrated
homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of August 2011 in Barangay Binonoan of Infanta, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, armed with [a] bolo, did then and there, willfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, assaulted and repeatedly hacked a certain WINARDO PILO Y MORTIZ, on the
different part[s] of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the parts of his
body, thus, performing all acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which nevertheless do not produce the same by reason of causes independent of
the will of the accused. To wit: the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the
complainant (minor) which prevented his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on December 6, 2011, Miranda pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During
the pre-trial, he interposed self-defense, which led to a reverse trial of case.5

The antecedent facts show that in the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Winardo Pilo (Pilo)
attended the party of his niece at Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon. After the party, he and
his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way home, they passed by the house of
Miranda and threw stones at the latter's home.6

While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking Pilo. He
hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with his
left arm.7

In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso grabbed
possession of the bolo.8
In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice, but claimed that his
acts were done in self-defense.9 He narrated that on August 14, 2011, at around 7:00p.m., while
he was at home with his wife and daughter, he suddenly heard a thud at their door, followed by
several other thuds and stones hurled at their house. Miranda peeped through the window and
saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that before he peeped through the door, he heard Pilo
challenge him to come out so that they could kill each other.10 Miranda asked Pilo if something
was wrong, but the latter ignored him and continued hurling stones.11 According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms
downwards to pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo's arm with his
bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo's oncoming attack. 12

At this instance, Damaso, arrived and grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the latter's bolo.
Because of this, Damaso likewise sustained injuries.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On January 7, 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision13 finding Miranda
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC held that Miranda's
claim of self-defense is biased, self-serving, inconsistent, illogical and contrary to the common
experience of man.14 The RTC further held that Miranda failed to prove that his act of hacking
Pilo was legally justified.15 The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered against [Miranda], finding
him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide, and there being [sic]
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this
Court hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of imprisonment which is the maximum
of prision correccional in its medium period which is Four (4) years and Two (2) months, as
minimum, up to the maximum of prision mayor in its medium period which is Ten (10) years, as
maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties, to pay private complainant [Pilo] the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as actual and/or temperate damages, Twenty Thousand
Pesos (Php20,000.00) as moral damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Miranda filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On May 15, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision17 affirming the conviction meted by the
trial court against Miranda. The CA ratiocinated that Miranda's claim of self-defense had no leg
to stand on, considering that the act of Pilo of hurling stones at the house of Miranda cannot be
regarded as an unlawful aggression that wan-anted the latter's act of hacking Pilo with a bolo.18

However, the CA held that although the act may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression, it
may nonetheless be appreciated as sufficient provocation on the part of Pilo, which mitigates
Miranda's liability. Pilo's act of throwing stones at the house of Miranda is sufficient provocation
to enrage him, or stir his anger and obfuscate his thinking, more so, when the lives of his wife
and children were placed in danger.19

However, the CA held that there was no voluntary surrender on Miranda's part considering that
he did not actually voluntarily surrender to the police authorities. Thus, the CA modified the
penalty meted by the RTC unto Miranda, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January
7, 2016 of the [RTC] of Infanta, Quezon, in Criminal Case No. 2011-150-I
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ISIDRO MIRANDA y
PARELASIO is found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to suffer imprisonment from
four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay WINARDO PILO the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (Php25,000.00) as temperate damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) as moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages is hereby ordered DELETED.

SO ORDERED.20

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the prosecution proved
the guilt of Miranda for frustrated homicide beyond reasonable doubt.

In Miranda's petition for review, he staunchly maintains that the CA erred in failing to exonerate
him, as he merely acted in self-defense.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that
the prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of Miranda beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG
maintains that Miranda may not claim self-defense in the absence of an unlawful aggression
from Pilo. Moreover, the OSG avers that Miranda's intent to kill Pilo was evident from the kind
of weapon he used and the number and nature of wounds the latter sustained.

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

It must be noted at the outset that in criminal cases, the factual findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as
when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will evaluate the
factual findings of the court below.21 Guided by this principle, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the RTC's factual findings, which were affirmed by the CA.

The Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that Miranda is Guilty of Frustrated
Homicide
Significantly, in cases of frustrated homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that: "(i) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (ii) the victim sustained [a] fatal or mortal wound but did not die because
of timely medical assistance; and (iii) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are present."22

It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to take his
victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the accused at the
time of the assault and immediately thereafter.23 Likewise, such homicidal intent may be inferred
from, among other things, the means the offender used, and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.24

In fact, in De Guzman, Jr. v. People,25 the Court, quoting Rivera v. People,26 enumerated the

factors that determine the presence of intent to kill, to wit:

(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained
by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing
of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives
of the accused.27

In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by Pilo. The records show that Miranda used a bolo measuring 1 ½ feet. The
hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch deep fracturing Pilo's skull in the parietal
area.28 Relentless in his attack, Miranda continuously made several thrusts against Pilo, while the
latter was already sprawled on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two additional wounds.
These deep gashes measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5 inch long by one-inch
deep in Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when Damaso arrived
and grappled with the weapon.29 Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the injuries sustained
show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these injuries cannot simply be brushed aside
as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of which, was an injury to the head of Pilo,
which may have caused the latter's untimely demise, if not for the timely medical assistance.

Miranda's Claim of Self-Defense is Unbelievable

In a bleak attempt to exonerate himself from the crime charged, Miranda claims that he merely
acted in self-defense.

The Court is not persuaded.

To begin with, when the accused invokes self-defense, in effect, he admits to the commission of
the acts for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would exculpate
him. As such, the burden of proving that his act was justified, shifts upon him.30 This means that
the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attack was accompanied by the
following circumstances: (i) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (ii) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (iii) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.31 The accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if the
prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted
his acts.32

It, likewise, bears stressing that the most important element of self-defense is unlawful
aggression. This is a condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense.33 Significantly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (i)
there must have been a physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the attack or assault must be unlawful.34 To be sure, the
accused must show that the aggression caused by the victim in fact put his life or personal safety
in real and grave peril. This danger must not be a mere imagined threat.

Equally important, imminent unlawful aggression means that the attack against the accused is
impending or at the point of happening. This scenario must be distinguished from a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong.35

Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, it becomes all too apparent that the evidence
on record does not support Miranda's contention that Pilo employed unlawful aggression against
him. It must be remembered that Pilo was merely throwing stones at the house of Miranda.
Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo did not throw stones at him, much less, utter
any invectives, or threatening words against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw merely hit
Miranda's roof and door.36

Equally telling is the fact that when Miranda asked Pilo why he was throwing stones, the latter
did not respond but simply remained mum, and threw a stone at Miranda's iron door. Miranda
even further narrated that after throwing stones, Pilo even approached him, which made him
believe that Pilo was trying to make peace with him.37 This certainly belies an impending threat
to Miranda's life. The following exchange proves the absence of an unlawful aggression, viz.:

ATTY. CAYANAN:

Q: What did you do after you heard the thug (sic thud) which you felt to be caused by stones that
was [sic] thrown to your door?
A: I looked at the window to find out where those thug (sic thud) coming from and I saw
Winardo Pilo throwing stones, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you saw the private complainant throwing stones at your door, what did you do next, if
there was any?
A: I asked him why he was throwing stones at my door while the door did not commit any
mistake, sir.
xxxx

Q: After the said private complainant still continued to throw stones at your door, what happened
next, if there was any?
A: I went out of the house and asked him again why he was throwing stones at my house, sir.

Q: What did the private complainant answer to you, if there was any?
A: He remained silent and then he approached me and I thought that he was going to make
peace with me, sir.38

It is all too apparent that Miranda's life was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed
against Miranda. More than this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with
him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself.

Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when the
latter was completely defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force beyond
what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant's attack—and is certainly
unjustified. Notably, in Espinosa v. People,39 which also involves the continuous hacking by the
accused even after the aggressor had been neutralized, the Court stressed that "the act of the
accused in repeatedly hacking the victim was in no way a reasonable and necessary means of
repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter."40

Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Pilo stooped down to the ground,
which Miranda perceived as a threat that Pilo was going to pick up a stone, there is absolutely
nothing life-threatening in such a situation. It must be emphasized that imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim.41 Undoubtedly, Pilo's act of
simply stooping down to the ground was in no way a threat to Miranda's life.

It, likewise, bears stressing that Miranda cannot seek exoneration on the simple pretext that the
attack was initiated by Pilo. Suffice to say, in the case of People v. Dulin,42 the Court held that
the fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto show that there was unlawful
aggression. The Court elucidated that although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he
ceased to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the accused
did thereafter is no longer self-defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him,
but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor.43 In the instant case, Miranda continued to hack Pilo even after the latter stopped
throwing stones. Plainly, Miranda's act constituted a retaliation against Pilo. Certainly at this
point, Miranda was no longer motivated by the lawful desire of defending himself, but of the evil
intent of retaliating and harming Pilo.

In addition to the fact that there was no unlawful aggression, the Court, likewise, notes that the
means employed by Miranda was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the
alleged attack, which he sought to avert. In Dela Cruz v. People, et al.,44 the Court emphasized
that, "the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. The means employed by a person
resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression."45 Here, the victim Pilo was armed with a stone, in contrast to the 1 ½-inch bolo that
Miranda was brandishing.

More so, as correctly observed by the CA, Miranda could have stayed hidden and protected at his
house. He himself even admitted that he hid among the banana shrubs before hitting Pilo. In fact,
he waited for Pilo to come out of his house, while he was hiding among the banana shrubs
outside of the yard of their house.46

Miranda is Entitled to the Mitigating Circumstance of Sufficient Provocation

Although Pilo's act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression, admittedly,
however, such deed was vexatious, improper and enough to incite Miranda into anger. The fact
that Miranda was stirred to rage was understandable considering that his wife and daughter were
at his home, and were peacefully having supper when Pilo threw the stones.

In Gotis v. People,47 the Court held that while an act cannot be considered an unlawful
aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act may be regarded as sufficient
provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime.48 "As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient
provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a
person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity."49 The victim must
have committed a prior act that incited or irritated the accused.50 Likewise, in order to be
mitigating, the provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.51

In fact, in a long line of cases, the Court considered that although there may have been no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, if the latter was nonetheless deemed to have given
sufficient provocation, then the accused's liability shall be mitigated. Such acts which were
deemed vexatious range from the victim's act of challenging the accused's family while armed
with a bolo;52 or thrusting a bolo at the accused while threatening to kill him with the lives of the
accused's wife and children placed in peril;53 and the victim attempting to hack the
accused.54 Certainly, Pilo's act of hurling stones while Miranda's family was peacefully enjoying
their supper falls within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in favor of Miranda the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

The Proper Penalty

Article 249 of the RPC states that the penalty for homicide shall be reclusion temporal.
Considering that the crime committed was frustrated homicide, then the penalty imposed shall be
one degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor in its minimum term, in view
of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence shall be

imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC properly imposed
after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed.55 Accordingly, the
CA correctly meted the penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven
(7) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

However, the Court shall modify the amount of damages awarded in order to conform with
current jurisprudence. Guided by the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,56 the amount of
damages imposed against Miranda shall be as follows: (i) Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (ii)
Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and (iii) Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages. These amounts
shall be subject to the legal rate of interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the
Court's ruling until full payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated May 15, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38523,
convicting petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification, in that Miranda is hereby ordered to pay victim
Winardo Pilo the following amounts of damages in line with People v. Jugueta: (i) Php
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (ii) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and (iii) Php 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The total amount due shall earn a legal rate of interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until the full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, Hernando, and Carandang,*JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 198400               October 7, 2013

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 from the Decision2 and Resolution3 dated October 26,
2010 and August 11, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
00336-MIN affirming with modifications the conviction4 by the Regional Trial Court RTC) of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39 of Fe Abella y Perpetua petitioner) for the
crime of frustrated homicide committed against his younger brother, Benigno Abella Benigno).
The RTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six 6) years and one 1)
day to eight 8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years and one 1) day to twelve 12)
years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay Benigno ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages,
₱10,000.00 for the medical expenses he incurred, plus the costs of suit.5 The CA concurred with
the RTC’s factual findings. However, the CA modified the penalty imposed to six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum. The CA also deleted the RTC’s
award in favor of Benigno of (a) ₱10,000.00 as actual damages corresponding to the medical
expenses allegedly incurred; and (b) ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages. In lieu of the
preceding, the CA ordered the petitioner to pay Benigno ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and
₱10,000.00 as temperate damages.6

Antecedent Facts

On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker and trisicad driver,
was charged with frustrated homicide in an Information7 which reads:

That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Sitio Puli,
Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with intent to kill, attack, assault, harm and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA
y PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck, thereby inflicting the injury
described below, to wit:

• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and

• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of some cause or causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the
timely and able intervention of the medical attendance rendered to the said victim.

Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8

After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002.9

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial
thus proceeded.

The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno;10 (b) Amelita Abella11 (Amelita),
Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and
(d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr. Ardiente), a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by
the petitioner.

The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno
was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to
pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the
petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to
convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they
dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing with him
two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away
and the latter two complied. The petitioner wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno
blocked his way and asked him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he
held in his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand
was used to hack the latter’s neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken
to the hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of
more than ₱10,000.00 for hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills.17 He further claimed
that after the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus deprived of
his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.18

Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral aspect neck 11
cm"; and (b) an "incised wound left hand dorsal aspect 4 cm".19 Benigno was initially confined in
the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on September 23, 1998.20 From Dr.
Ardiente’s recollection, since the scythe used in the hacking was not sterile, complications and
infections could have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by Benigno, but
fortunately did not.21

The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner;22 (b) Fernando Fernandez23 (Fernando),
a friend of the petitioner; and (c) Urbano Cabag24 (Urbano).

The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to
October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan,
Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away.
Fernando testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner gathering woods to make a
hut.25 Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner drinking tuba in the
store of Clarita Perpetua.26

The RTC Ruling

On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the
Judgment27 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficient to prove the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered
finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide as defined and penalized by Article 249 in relation to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as
minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum;
to indemnify offended-party complainant Benigno Abella the sum of Ten Thousand
([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND ([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.28
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No disinterested witnesses
were presented to corroborate the petitioner’s claim that he was nowhere at the scene of the
hacking incident on September 6, 1998. Fernando and Urbano’s testimonies were riddled with
inconsistencies. The RTC accorded more credence to the averments of the prosecution witnesses,
who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner, positively, categorically and
consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, medical records show
that Benigno sustained a wound in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the
trial.

The RTC awarded ₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical expenses he
incurred despite the prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as evidence. The petitioner was
likewise ordered to pay ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly
lay down the basis for the award.

The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the
prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of intent to kill which
accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the
hacking was merely accidental especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have
impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent to kill.

The CA Ruling

On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision30 affirming the petitioner’s
conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:

Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the
victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the
time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner attacked
Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was directed to the neck of
Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter
had no means, and no time, to defend himself.

Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate, testified that Benigno
suffered from a hack wound on the left neck, and an incised wound on the left hand palm. He
said that the wounds might have been caused by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument,
and may have resulted to death without proper medical attendance. Benigno was hospitalized for
about a month because of the injuries. The location of the wound (on the neck) shows the nature
and seriousness of the wound suffered by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not
been for the timely intervention of medical science.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum."32 The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of consummated
homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under
Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that
prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be
taken from the medium period of prision mayor . To determine the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, which is prision
correccional , with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum of
the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision correccional.33 (Citation
omitted)

The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and consequential damages as
there were no competent proofs to justify the awards. The CA instead ruled that Benigno is
entitled to ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages,34 the latter being
awarded when some pecuniary loss has been incurred, but the amount cannot be proven with
certainty.35

Issue

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of whether or not the
RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which are not in accordance with law and
applicable jurisprudence and which if not corrected, will cause grave injustice and irreparable
damage to the petitioner.37

In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate relevant facts,
which if considered, would justify either his acquittal or the downgrading of his conviction to
less serious physical injuries. The petitioner points out that after the single hacking blow was
delivered, he ran after Alejandro and Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent
to kill on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time, he had two
scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the hacking blow was sudden and
unexpected, providing Benigno with no opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw the
petitioner arriving with weapons on hand. Benigno could not have been unaware of the danger
facing him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno thus approached
the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit with the latter’s scythe.

The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People38 where this Court found the downgrading of a
conviction from attempted murder to physical injuries as proper considering that homicidal intent
was absent when the accused shot the victim once and did not hit a vital part of the latter’s
body.39

Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from Benigno’s hacking
wound in the neck and incised wound in the hand. Such being the case, death could not have
resulted. The neck wound was not "so extensive because it did not involve a big blood vessel on
its vital structure" while the incised wound in the hand, which only required cleansing and
suturing, merely left a slight scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for seventeen (17)
days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the nature of less serious ones.

In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal of the instant
petition. The OSG stresses that the petitioner raises factual issues, which call for a re-calibration
of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the petitioner’s argument that the development of infections or complications on the
wounds is a necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The petitioner’s
intent to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the extent of
injuries inflicted and the circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have died had there
been no timely medical assistance rendered to him.

If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able to chase
Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow, push, or the use of a less lethal weapon directed
against a non-vital part of the body would have been sufficient. However, the petitioner hacked
Benigno’s neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving behind a big, open and gaping wound.

This Court’s Ruling

The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a petition filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas42 is instructive anent what is the
subject of review in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on
pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions
of fact.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.43 (Citations omitted)

In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of the courts a quo that
the petitioner had a homicidal intent when he hacked Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the
wounds the latter sustained could have caused his death had there been no prompt medical
intervention. These questions are patently factual in nature requiring no less than a re-calibration
of the contending parties’ evidence.

It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua admits
of exceptions, among which is, "when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension
of facts or a failure to notice certain relevant facts that would otherwise justify a different
conclusion x x x."44 However, the factual backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant
petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.

Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual issues, still, the
instant petition is susceptible to denial.

To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any
justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of
parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
without medical intervention or attendance.45

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life.
The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt
regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the
means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his
victim.46

The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack, much less
kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that
homicidal intent is absent in a case where the accused shot the victim only once when there was
an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill
Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not leave right
after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.

The analogy is flawed.

In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. The
attending physician certified that the injury would require medical attendance for ten days, but
the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the hospital the following day.

In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm
long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr.
Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have complications resulting from these injuries because
the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is a
possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not a
sterile instrument contaminated with other things."48 No complications developed from
Benigno’s wounds which could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a
period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.

From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe
against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the hacking
blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in
the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead.
While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck and left
hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal
considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have
necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is negated
by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What
could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of.
Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention
provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.1âwphi1

All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s
conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.

The Court modifies the award of damages.

As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the payment of the
consequential damages awarded by the trial court in the absence of proof thereof. Where the
amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting receipts
but entitlement is shown by the facts of the case, temperate damages may be awarded.49 In the
instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and underwent
medical treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is prudent to award temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages.50

Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount of

₱25,000.00.51 There is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary human experience
and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on Benigno would naturally cause physical
suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.52

WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated October 26,
2010 and August 11 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED
TO PAY the offended party moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and temperate damages
in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for damages shall be subject to
interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) p r annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.53

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019

FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
 DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Subject to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court at the instance of petitioner Fernando N.
Fernandez (Fernandez) are the Decision1 dated February 15, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated
August 17, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR No. 38074, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for Frustrated Murder committed against private respondent Noel C. Garino (Garino)
under the Decision3 rendered on April 27, 2015 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 143, in Criminal Case No. 11-1667.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts as posited by Fernandez and Garino are summarized in the decision of the CA. In the
prosecution's narration of events, on January 21, 2011 at around 1:00 a.m., Garino and an
unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney which was parked in front of Fernandez's
house, when Garino saw someone go out of the gate.4 When they heard a gunshot, they
immediately alighted from the jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the person who fired
the shot was Fernandez, though he did not know the latter's name at the time. As the two ran
away, Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino on his right gluteal area, or
"buttocks" in layman's terms. Garino was then brought to the Ospital ng Makati and resultantly
underwent immediate surgery. He was confined for some two weeks and spent almost
P200,000.00 for his stay in the hospital.5

Garino presented his doctor, Dr. Teresita Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), as a witness, who testified that
Garino was near death when he was taken to the hospital, and had to undergo a second operation
because his large vessel, external iliac vein and intestines were injured.6

When questioned if he knew who his assailant was, Garino testified that he previously saw him
at the salon where he and a certain Me-Ann Barcenas (Barcenas) worked.7 He found out his
assailant's name only when Barcenas visited him at the hospital a few days after his surgery. Of
note, however, neither Barcenas nor Garino's companion during the night of the shooting was
presented as witness for the prosecution, as only Garino, his brother Albert, who had the incident
blottered at the police station, and Dr. Sanchez were presented to testify.8

For its version of the facts, the defense presented Fernandez himself, as well as his son Jayvee, to
testify as witnesses. Fernandez, a retired police officer, vehemently denied the prosecution's
version of the events and claimed that he was sleeping with his wife at the time of the incident
and was unaware of any unusual incident outside his house at the time.9 According to Fernandez,
he was not investigated by the police or by any barangay official on the alleged shooting, and
only learned of the charge for Frustrated Murder upon receipt of a subpoena from the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City.10

While Fernandez admitted owning the jeepney parked outside his house, he denied any
knowledge of Garino and said that he first laid eyes on the latter only during the trial proper. He
could likewise not think of any reason why Garino would file a case against him.11
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision12 on April 27, 2015 convicting Fernandez of the crime
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds [FERNANDEZ], guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, EIGHT (8) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as the minimum period to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS AND ONE
(1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum period.

Accused is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages
and the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The accused is also ordered to pay the Costs of
this Suit.

SO ORDERED.13
Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal on September 17, 2015 which was given due course by the
CA in an Order dated October 20, 2015.14 The CA, however, denied Fernandez's appeal for lack
of merit, and affirmed with modification Fernandez's conviction as meted out by the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. However, the Decision
dated 27 April 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that the dispositive portion of which shall read as follows:
xxxx

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Art.
248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, EIGHT
(8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as the minimum period to SIXTEEN (16)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum period.

Accused is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
the amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages, and the amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The accused is also ordered to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused is likewise ORDERED to pay legal interest on all damages awarded in this
case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until
fully paid.

xxxx
SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Fernandez's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, prompting recourse to the Supreme Court.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.16

The Issue of the Case and the Arguments of the Parties

The issue in the case is whether or not Fernandez is indeed guilty of the crime of Frustrated
Murder, for shooting Garino and failing to kill the latter despite inflicting a deep wound on the
victim.

In his Petition, Fernandez argues that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient
to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime charged in the Information.17 First, Fernandez
questions the veracity of his identification as the one who shot Garino, considering: a) Garino did
not know Fernandez prior to the incident; b) Garino only learned of Fernandez when he was
merely pointed to by Barcenas, who was not the companion of Garino at the time of the incident;
c) Barcenas was not presented to the witness stand to confirm the identity of Fernandez as the
person who shot Garino; and d) Garino could not have seen his perpetrator as he was allegedly
running when shot on his right gluteal area.18

The defense added that, as the incident took place during the wee hours of the morning, the
condition of visibility at the time of the alleged shooting would not be favorable to ascertaining
the perpetrator's identity, much less determining that Fernandez indeed was the culprit.19

Fernandez further contends that Garino merely assumed that the perpetrator was Fernandez
because the jeepney, where Garino stayed in with his unknown companion, was parked in front
of Fernandez's house. Barcenas only confirmed that Fernandez was the owner of the house, but
not that he was the one who shot Garino.20

Alleging the defense of alibi, Fernandez states that the lower courts erred in dismissing this as an
inherently weak defense. Fernandez cited the case of People v. Caverte,21 where it was held that
"[w]hile alibi is a weak defense and the rule is that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the
court, the said rule has never been intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases.
Otherwise, an absurd situation will arise wherein the accused is put in a more difficult position
where the prosecution evidence is vague and weak as in the present case."22

Finally, Fernandez argues that even hypothetically admitting that he was the person seen by
Garino, the evidence offered by the latter was insufficient if not altogether absent to show the
commission of Frustrated Murder. Fernandez states that the prosecution failed to prove that there
was intent to kill on his part, especially since Garino did not even testify that he actually saw
Fernandez point a gun towards him and fire the same.23 Anent the injury itself, Fernandez points
out that it was caused by a single gunshot wound in the gluteal area, which is clearly not a vital
part of Garino's body and thus cannot be considered as a fatal wound.24 Fernandez alleges that
the prosecution was unable to show intent, nor the presence of treachery in the commission of
the offense - vital elements of the crime he is being accused of. Even conceding but definitely
not admitting that Fernandez was the one who shot Garino, in the absence of clear proof of the
existence of treachery, the crime is only physical injuries, or at the most, frustrated or attempted
homicide, warranting a reduction of the penalty.25

In its Comment26 to the Petition, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), argues that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
crime charged. The facts accordingly show that Fernandez, with intent to kill, inflicted an injury
upon Garino that was sufficient to kill the latter, such act of inflicting injury being attended and
qualified to become Murder by treachery, however Garino did not die due to the timely medical
assistance given to him.27
The OSG counters that, while it is true that Garino did not know Fernandez's name at the time of
the attack, he was able to recognize him from the salon where he worked. The fact that he was
only informed as to Fernandez's name through his co-worker does not negate his positive
identification that Fernandez was the perpetrator of the crime.28 According to the transcript of
records, during the trial, Garino repeatedly testified in open court that he saw and identified
Fernandez when he alighted from the jeepney after the first shot.29 Said identification was not
only clear from the direct testimony, but also from Garino's cross-examination, wherein he said
on record that he knew who Fernandez was through his friend.30

The OSG points out that the physical evidence shows proof of Fernandez's intent to kill, as
Garino would have died from his wounds had he failed to timely undergo an operation at the
hospital. According to the findings, Fernandez was armed with a gun when he came out of his
house, and with this weapon, fired a shot. When the first shot missed, he then shot Garino, who
was running from the scene and was only one and a half arm's length away from Fernandez. The
act of firing another shot after the initial miss was an indication that Fernandez really intended to
kill Garino.31

Moreover, the OSG contends that this intent is manifest in how Fernandez deprived Garino of
any chance to defend himself due to the suddenness of the attack and as seen in the entry point of
the gunshot wound on Garino's right gluteal area.32

Ruling of the Court

The Court acquits Fernandez on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lower courts committed
grave abuse of discretion in hastily convicting Fernandez on the basis of questionable evidence.

It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual cannot be
convicted if there is reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime. Proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the accused must be acquitted,
even if, on face, he or she appears to be most suspicious or even if there is no other possible or
identifiable perpetrator in the records despite there having been a crime committed.

As aptly stated in People v. Claro:33

Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the
guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further
means that the courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process
the courts should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every
circumstance favoring his innocence should be fully taken into account. That is what we must be
[sic] do herein, for he is entitled to nothing less.

Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His acquittal should follow, for, as
we have emphatically reminded in Patula v. People:
[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove
each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for
that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further
prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the
weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises
from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must
then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence
in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential
in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in
establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the
malefactor responsible for it.34 (Citations omitted)
The RTC and the CA are one in their findings that Fernandez is the actual perpetrator of the
crime against Garino, based in major part on the latter's testimony, which was found as clear,
straightforward, and believable. As a general rule, the Court is obliged to rely on the
observations of the trial court, as the latter had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. It has since become imperative that the
evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect by the Court; for it
can be expected that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony
IS acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.35

Although it is entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
the witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had ample opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the declarants at the witness stand, this rule admits exceptions. The saving
instance is said to be when a fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked,
or its significance misconstrued by the trial court sufficient to harbor serious misgivings on its
conclusions.36

Even a casual observer can see that almost the entire case for the prosecution rests exclusively on
Garino, the victim, and his testimony. No other witness was presented to narrate the events of
that fateful night, even though Garino had a companion. A more nuanced glance at the
antecedent facts will unearth several glaring inconsistencies in Garino's testimony as well as the
evidence on record. While these inconsistencies on their own may not be enough to completely
decimate his testimony, taken together with the fact that the prosecution relied solely on the
alleged victim's narration of events, these more than show the presence of reasonable doubt
substantial enough to acquit the accused.

On the witness stand, Garino testified that he and his companion were sitting inside a jeepney
outside Fernandez's house a little after midnight. Garino then saw someone come out of the gate,
presumably Fernandez as he alleged he discovered later on. Garino and his companion then
heard a gunshot, which prompted them to flee the jeepney, and it was only then that Garino saw
that it was Fernandez with the gun. As the two ran away, Fernandez fired another shot which hit
Garino in the latter's right gluteal area, which caused his hospitalization and near-death.

Notably, the testimony is anchored on Garino's positive identification of Fernandez as the culprit
who shot him, even though he did not know his name at the time, and only zeroed in on
Fernandez after the incident as a result of Barcenas' own identification. In this regard, the Court
finds Garino's testimony to be highly suspect, and laden with several inconsistencies which
militate against Fernandez's culpability as a suspect.

First, the condition of visibility at the time was not specified to by Garino. The incident
happened after midnight, and there was no mention that the area was illuminated sufficiently in
that Garino would be able to take a good look at his assailant. The need to take a good look at his
assailant's features is indispensable and crucial, as Garino did not know who Fernandez was, and
only identified the latter based on how Garino's description of Fernandez was apparently in sync
with Barcenas' own identification. In this case, apart from Garino's own testimony, no other
competent nor corroborative proof was adduced by the prosecution that would answer the
question of visibility.

Despite this testimonial omission, Garino indirectly attempts to justify his positive identification
of Fernandez during the incident by pointing to the happenstance that he saw Fernandez clearly
due to the latter's closeness to him at the time of the first shot. This close distance was testified to
by Garino during his direct examination, to wit:
Prosecutor Paolo
Talban:
Q: Could you enlighten us, Mr. Witness, could you tell us your exact position at
the time you were fired upon by the accused?
A: My back was turned to the accused.
Q: Assume, Mr. Witness, the place where you are now seating as a point of
reference, could you tell us from what direction did the accused come from?
A: If this is the jeep, he came from the back portion of the jeep.
Q: And approximately, how far away were you from the accused when he
emerged from his house and fired at you?
A: One and a half arms[-]length, sir.37 (Emphasis omitted)
However, Garino's alluded justification only draws further attention to yet another questionable
facet in Garino's testimony, which was Fernandez's apparent point-blank miss even when he was
less than two meters away from Garino when he presumably shot the latter. The Court finds it
unlikely that Fernandez, or any other individual, would miss at almost point-blank range. This,
especially by Fernandez who is a former police officer and who would have considerable skill in
both aiming and shooting a firearm. The rapidity of the events unfolding would even go against
Garino's attestation that he was able to identify his assailant. Logically, Garino would not stick
around to take a closer look at his assailant with his life in danger, especially at that close a
distance. In fact, it is a strange assumption that Garino would even be able to run away at all,
considering the depth of the wound inflicted on him, by his own account. It is incredulous that, if
Fernandez intended to kill Garino, the former would allow Garino to stagger away instead of
finishing the job or even attempting to flee from the scene of the crime.

The foregoing makes it highly doubtful that Garino was able to identify Fernandez as the
perpetrator of the crime, While the Court does not question that Garino was indeed shot, the
Court has its misgivings that it was indeed Fernandez who shot him, especially if the only proof
adduced is Garino's testimony.
Second, the Court finds as a misstep on the part of the lower courts that they did not question the
circumstances or even the identity of Garino's alleged companion during the night of the
shooting. Even putting aside his non-presentation during trial as a witness, the Court finds it
baffling that Garino did not even know his name, or at least could not identify him. A survey of
the transcript of records will show this strange unfamiliarity, viz.:
TSN
04 July 2012
Witness: Noel Garino

Page 8

xxxx

PROS. TALBAN:
On that given time and date, what were you doing?

WITNESS:
I met a friend during that time and we were inside the jeep.

PROS. TALBAN:
And could you give is [sic] the name of that friend of yours? Page 9

WITNESS:
I don't know the name sir.38
There was no explanation as to why Garino could not identify his companion. The Court finds
that this omission without explanation casts doubt on the narration of events from the part of
Garino. To note, Garino also failed to explain why he and his "companion" were there in the
middle of the night, inside a jeepney, property of someone else, and, by Garino's own admission,
right outside another's property. The logical explanation then is that either Garino was doing
something worthy of suspicion to which he was trying to cover up the same, or his companion
did not exist, which would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.

Thus, the Court finds that Garino's testimony is tainted with inconsistencies and lack of
substantiation. Ultimately, it becomes a verbal tussle between Garino and Fernandez, and of
course both sides would be very much biased towards their version of the story. In a criminal
case however, it is the onus of the complainant, through the prosecution, to present a case laden
with surety and without the shadow of the doubt, and this is lacking in the case herein.

Third, the Court finds it puzzling that the prosecution only presented three witnesses: Garino
himself, his brother who was not present and who only assisted in filing the complaint, and Dr.
Sanchez, who testified as to Garino's severity of wounds. The latter two were not even directly
involved in the incident. While the Court is aware as to the jurisprudential pronouncement that it
is not in the realm of courts to decide the order or even the presentation of witnesses, with
Garino's testimony suffering. from infirmities, the Court finds that circumstantial evidence is
necessary in order to bolster his narration, corroborative testimony from either his unnamed
companion during the shooting, or even from Barcenas herself. The lack of this the Court finds
troubling especially as a second voice could and should have shed more light on the truth.

Fourth, it was not shown that Fernandez had any motive for shooting Garino. While motive is
generally immaterial when it comes to considering intent in a criminal case, it can help facilitate
the intrusion into the accused's mind especially when there is an issue as to the identity of the
latter. In People v. De Guzman,39 the Court explained, thus:
Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be
proven. Proof of the same, however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the
identity of the assailant is in question. In People v. Vidad, the Court said:
It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive for taking
the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the
commission of a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the
reason for its commission is unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most important
aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of
evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge in the criminal
act.40 (Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew each other beforehand,
and as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that Garino zeroed in on
Fernandez as the culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas. There was also no plausible
reason for Fernandez to risk his safety and life in shooting Garino, especially with a possible
witness in tow. If Fernandez wanted to end Garino's life, it would also be strange that he would
not run after Garino and finish the job, as Garino would certainly have been hobbled as a result
of the wound.

Fifth, the Court finds that the lower courts hastily brushed off Fernandez's defense of alibi, to the
latter's detriment. After all, considering the fact that the accused and the victim did not know
each other and had not heard about each other prior to the incident, with even Fernandez stating
that the first time he saw Garino was during the trial, it makes complete sense that Fernandez's
flat denial that he was a participant in the offense, and his whereabouts during that time would be
his only defenses.

In the case of Lejano v. People,41 the Court expanded on the alibi versus positive identification

conundrum, to wit:
The trial court and the [CA] are one in rejecting as weak Webb's alibi. Their reason is uniform:
Webb's alibi cannot stand against Alfaro's positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of
Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to
the lower courts, Webb's denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a
mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick
stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really
innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into
hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A
positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it.42
The tale of this case's tape is that the prosecution relied solely on Garino's testimony that
Fernandez was the one who shot him. Aside from his positive identification, which the Court
finds too unconvincing, no legitimate and convincing evidence was offered to prove the veracity
of the events as Garino alleges. With this, Fernandez's justification of alibi finds stronger ground,
and the Court is thus obliged to favor it while taking into absolute consideration the promise that
reasonable doubt is sufficient to acquit an accused individual of the crime.

In People v. Nuñez,43 the Court held, thus:

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not
require absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. It is the degree of proof that appeals to a
magistrate's conscience:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of
proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.44 (Emphasis
supplied)
Our laws proscribe the conviction of the accused if doubt taints the circumstances of the crime.
And, for good reason. A man's life and liberty are not aspects to be trifled with, which is why
only the most exacting standard is required in order to find a person criminally liable. In this
case, more than just reasonable doubt is attendant to the circumstances of the crime alleged.
While the Court does not deny that Garino indeed suffered a grievous injury, the Court does
heavily question if Fernandez was the one who inflicted it. This doubt is enough to sway the
mind of the Court and acquit Fernandez.

Henceforth, the Court is constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence
of lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
as quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Fernandez is entitled to an
acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
15, 2017 and the Resolution dated August 17, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
38074 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Fernando N. Fernandez is ACQUITTED of the charge of Frustrated Murder on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of
the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a
house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or
club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room
toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the
side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security,
had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room
there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due
to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly
at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon
the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded,
he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left
the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess
hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped
at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found
Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran
back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and
sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who
he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in
the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the
intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as
the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover
his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a
thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts
at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer,
and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption
of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's
Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7
Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the
crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or
offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be
held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the
actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under
one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But
while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the
definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in
the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability
resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he
intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than
real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a
disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the
other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same
proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm"
(Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form
or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

 Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,

even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts
that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and
that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly
set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in
itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be
the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law;
nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
 . . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a
necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of
the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of
the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a
less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence
or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case
the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing
lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily'
but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining
crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating
intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not
great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or
in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present
this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to
the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was
done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind.
So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment
is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on
this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus
me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;"
and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil.
So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention,
we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty
simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The
calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement,
when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down.
But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who
differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates
him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad
intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence
that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the
voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law,
superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds,
 that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine
of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat  ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain
acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will
not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose
need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg.
Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves
the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and
as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as
they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65;
P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him
at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances
might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise,
upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with
the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and
so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
 concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the
facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was
really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and
large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is
the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds
up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but
is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled
at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal
intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law"
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart,
Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as
he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in
his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of
the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real
design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal
that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such
doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop
and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the
essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no
danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at
bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the
man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion
on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick
with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving
the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was
his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and
who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the
blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with
his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in
self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal
aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity
for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the
Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty
and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the
following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been
proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife
who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and
when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown,
he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was
attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were
not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the
one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish,
and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed
rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article
8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice
of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake,
or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply,
 and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared
exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the
means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years
and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal
from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and
the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by
a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window
and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise
his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to
the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol
at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this
man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the
accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not
that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to
twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in
view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and
that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according
to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in
article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
(voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was,
however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that
the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in
attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable
motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused
should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer
the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of
the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of
the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a
house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or
club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room
toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the
side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security,
had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room
there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due
to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly
at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon
the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded,
he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left
the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess
hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped
at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found
Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran
back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and
sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who
he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in
the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the
intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as
the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover
his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a
thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts
at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer,
and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption
of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's
Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7
Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the
crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or
offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be
held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the
actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under
one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But
while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the
definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in
the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability
resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he
intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than
real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a
disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the
other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same
proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm"
(Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form
or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,

even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts
that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and
that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly
set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in
itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
 code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be
the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law;
nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a
necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of
the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of
the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a
less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence
or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case
the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing
lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily'
but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining
crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating
intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not
great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or
in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present
this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to
the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was
done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind.
So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment
is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on
this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus
me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;"
and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil.
So also —
 Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention,
we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty
simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The
calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement,
when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down.
But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who
differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates
him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad
intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence
that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the
voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law,
superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds,
that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine
of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat  ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain
acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will
not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose
need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg.
Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves
the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and
as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as
they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65;
P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him
at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances
might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise,
upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with
the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and
so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the
facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was
really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and
large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is
the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds
up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but
is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled
at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal
intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law"
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart,
Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as
he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in
his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of
the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real
design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal
that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such
doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop
and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the
essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no
danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at
bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the
man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion
on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick
with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving
the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was
his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and
who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the
blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with
his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in
self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal
aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity
for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the
Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty
and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the
following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been
proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife
who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and
when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown,
he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was
attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were
not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the
one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish,
and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed
rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article
8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice
of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake,
or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply,
and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared
exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the
means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years
and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal
from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and
the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by
a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window
and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise
his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to
the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol
at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this
man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the
accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not
that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to
twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
 incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in
view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and
that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according
to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in
article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
(voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was,
however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that
the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in
attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable
motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused
should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer
the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of
the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
 [G.R. NO. 152644 : February 10, 2006]

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.

HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated
14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed
against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners").
The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and
Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining
in the province of Marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At
the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears
that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel's end. On 24 March 1994, tailings
gushed out of or near the tunnel's end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions
of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),5 Section 86 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD
984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA
7942"),9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property.11

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations
which constitute legal excuse or justification.

The Ruling of the MTC

In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC12 initially deferred ruling on
petitioners' motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x."
The MTC scheduled petitioners' arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners' motion,
the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the
RPC. The MTC held:

[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings" which
were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the
Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent
pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition
required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1,
1990.

The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the
single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are
the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the
elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine
Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in
proving violations of the three (3) special laws.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking
into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the
three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining
Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law
(PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute
violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).

Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code;
and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x
are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for
[v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.

The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be
maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation
of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic]
damage to property.13

The MTC re-scheduled petitioners' arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May
1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be
arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained
the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners' manifestation, the MTC
proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for
violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. Petitioners' petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent's
appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent's motion, Branch 38 ordered public
respondent's appeal consolidated with petitioners' petition in Branch 94.

The Ruling of Branch 94

In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal but denied
petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch
94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:

After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no
absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are
separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same
with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the
pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the
accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction
that -

"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution
under the other. x x x."

xxxx

[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not although they stemmed from a single act.15

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted
with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984,
RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident
of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the
duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16 Petitioners
further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's ruling. The
appellate court held:

The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x

xxx

[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].

xxx

We now go to petitioners' claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the
doctrine laid down in People v. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple
prosecutions.

In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People's argument with respect to the variances in
the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the
case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under
Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same
section. x x x

xxx

[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since
the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws
which are national in character.

xxx

This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent's understanding that the laws by which the
petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each
crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x

xxx

[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to
any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court's quashal of the Informations against
the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the
trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.18

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution
of 14 March 2002.

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING

THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND
REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067)
AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942)
AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE
BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.

B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE

CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE v. RELOVA, 148
SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE
PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER
ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING
SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT

THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION,
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.]19

The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity
of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand; andcralawlibrary

(2) Whether Branch 94's ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
 The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense, as Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense.21

Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in
a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such
Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.23 Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one
offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only - Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property - because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from
and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru
dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the other charges since the element of "lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence" is common among them.

The contention has no merit.

As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the
same offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the
same act are not "the same"'

x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.28 However, for
the limited purpose of controverting petitioners' claim that they should be charged with one
offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94's comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA
7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were
charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:

In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping
of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit
from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for
violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the
absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental
Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent
damage to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused
must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or
lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there
was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had
done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It
does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution
Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate
is not an essential element of these laws.

On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not
required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings
without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or
neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the
offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.

On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony
(such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita
crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a
felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special
laws enacting them.

People v. Relova not in Point

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes
this Court's ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Court's statement in
Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common
set or overlapping sets of technical elements."

This contention is also without merit.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had
been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencia's right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the
offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges
was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against
multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:

"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as
theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information."

The above argument[] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the
express terms of the constitutional provision involved - which reads as follows:

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." x x x

and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it
must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners' claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single
act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the
Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall
under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the
same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.