ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS v. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, GR No.

L-28790, 1968-04-29
Facts:
Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of
Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151.
By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the... same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring
him to explain in writing... against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision,... consolidation and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess
of the areas covered by the original titles.
Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that... he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and... relative to his
case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 61
of the Judiciary
Act (R.Á. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary,... whereby... petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending
investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court,... claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of
discretion, and praying for restraining writs
Issues:
whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme
Court, in view of the conferment upon him by
Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance.
Ruling:
section 67 of the Judiciary Act... recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed
from office by the President of the
Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . .
petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or
removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same... right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately
conferred the same privileges
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean... placing upon the Supreme Court the
duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive,
and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the
President's power to discipline and remove... administrative officials who are presidential
appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and
control (Constitution, Art. VII), sec l0[l]):... if the Legislature had really intended to include in the
general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the
right to be investigated by the Supreme
Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such
grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory...
control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with
administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of
the Land Registration
Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not
upon other parties. This limitation[1] in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration
Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose... resolutions or orders bind his
subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that
they are not administrative:

Garcia vs. Macaraig Case Digest

Dishonesty0 Comments
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The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts: 

Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba
on June 29, 1970. When he was about to perform his duties as a Judge, it was discovered that
there was no space yet for him to facilitate his trials and no pieces of furniture and equipment
necessary for him to conduct his duties. The local officials offered to furnish him the necessary
place and facilities for his court but they failed to provide. Realizing that it would be sometime
before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave. The Secretary
of Justice, however, persuade him to forego his leave and instead assist at the DOJ (Macaraig
having served in the DOJ for 16 years), without being extended a formal detail, whenever he
was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

Garcia filed an administrative against Macaraig for dishonesty, violation of his oath as a judge,
and incomptence. He alleged that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as
required by law and that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that
he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member
of the judiciary is helping the DOJ, a department of the executive charge of prosecution of
cases.
Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of dishonesty

2. Whether respondent judge is required to submit reports of accomplishments and status of

cases in his sala

2. May judges be detailed to assist the DOJ Secretary in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts?

Held:

1. No. After taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a
perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not
perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any
good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the
Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever
way possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more
so, when, as in this case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the
necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to
provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to
personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and,
in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary,
what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being
dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered
some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to
perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part.

2. No. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars
apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and
making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his
oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply
made himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually
hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making.

3. No. This practice must be discontinued. The Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary
even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government
must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on
which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public
service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and
balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the
serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. (Garcia vs.
Macaraig, A.M. No. 198-J, May 31, 1971)

Case Digest: Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

 
ISSUE:  Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the
SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution  

FACTS:  After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI)
was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could
“appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body.
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman
Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.
Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for
intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said
10 shares. 

DECISION:  The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit
of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman

Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf
of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter
in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact”
that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed
before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is
more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of
the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter
under litigation. The Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as
counsel before an administrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition
contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.  

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Case Digest

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts: 

Judge Manzano was appointed by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos
Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Executive Order No. 856. Before
accepting the appointment, Judge Manzano wrote a letter to the SC requesting that he be
authorized to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties
attached to the said position.  He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in
any way amount to an abandonment to his position as Executive Judge and as a member of
judiciary.

Issues:

Should the petition be granted?

Held:

No. An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be
found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that the Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of
justice and quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution) (In Re: Rodolfo Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October
5, 1988)

HEIRS OF ELIZA Q. ZOLETA v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 205128, 2017-08-09

Facts:
Eliza), through Venancio Q. Zoleta, voluntarily offered for sale to the government, under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, a parcel of land
Landbank made a valuation of the land and determined that only 125.4704 hectares of the
property's 136 hectares were covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Eliza rejected Landbank's valuation. Thus, the matter was endorsed to the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
However, upon Eliza's manifestation that the amount involved was beyond the jurisdiction of
PARAD, the case was transferred to the Office of RARAD.[
Regional Adjudicator Miñas rendered a Decision
Not satisfied with the amount, Landbank filed a Petition for Just Compensation before the
Regional Trial Court
Eliza filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment
Regional Adjudicator Miñas granted Eliza's motion for execution and issued an order directing
the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution, however, was returned unsatisfied.
Thus, Regional Adjudicator Miñas issued an alias writ of execution
Landbank sought from the Special Agrarian Court the quashal of the alias writ of execution and,
in the interim, the issuance of a temporary restraining order against its implementation.
Landbank, on April 2, 2001, filed before DARAB a "petition for certiorari pursuant to  paragraph
2, Section 3, Rule VIII of the [1994] DARAB New Rules of Procedure.
It ascribed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
DARAB granted Land Bank's petition for certiorari
Petitioners[29] then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
Court of Appeals held that DARAB's actions were sustained by its general "supervisory
authority" and appellate jurisdiction over rulings of RARADs and PARADs.
Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Issues:
whether it was proper for respondent DARAB to issue

Ruling:
ARAB possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari.
DA
It noted that there was no law that vested DARAB with jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.
n general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions
of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-
judicial agency is not implied.
In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have
intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast
powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body,
whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the
absence of an express grant
As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate judicial power,
DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari. This is not merely a matter of
statutorily stipulated competence but a question that hearkens to the separation of
government's tripartite powers: executive, legislative, and judicial.
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of certiorari are settled: (a) the petition must be
directed against a tribunal, Board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, Board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The second and third requisites remain consistent with the original, Common Law conception
of certiorari as availing when "the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority,"
such that it "exceed[ed] its jurisdiction," and only when "no other remedy [is] available."
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as:By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of
jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also to
cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 should not be confused with a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The first is a mode of appeal; the latter is an extraordinary remedy
used to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is through the latter that a writ of certiorari is issued.
Precisely, for the writ to issue, there must be "no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy" available.[... uasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it.

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, GR No. 127685, 1998-07-23

Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to... legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for
the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as...
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Petitioner contends:
"A.     THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF
THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B.      THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS
TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C.      THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Respondents counter-argue:
A.      THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL
REVIEW;
B.      A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C.      THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D.      A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.[3]
Issues:
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system
of identification that is all-encompassing in... scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone.
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1)
of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
[34]
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to... be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
x                                      ... x                                       x.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as... may be
provided by law.
x                                      ... x                                       x.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Ruling:
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists,
etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive... branch of government which
by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will... fail to perceive the danger
that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Principles:
right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized... men
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is
"the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."[8] The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their... original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.[9] The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[10] The legislative body possesses plenary
power... for all purposes of civil government.[11] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[12] In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends
to matters of general concern or common interest.[13]
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.[14]
The executive power is vested in the President.[15] It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the... laws.[16] It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.[17]
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department.[18] He has control over the executive department,... bureaus and offices.
This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.[19] Corollary to
the power of control, the President also has the... duty of supervising the enforcement of laws
for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative
power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.[20]
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his... agents.[22] To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders.
It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative... policy
Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service CommissionGR NO.
47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner PangasinanTransportation
Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the
past twentyyears in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan
and Tarlac,Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public
ServiceCommission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC
granted theapplication with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply
also on their existingbusiness. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Public Service Commission.Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed
a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:-
- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation
of powers

HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutionalbecause it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, thecomplexities or multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation and the increaseddifficulty of
administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is
theadministrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the
NationalAssembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper
andsuitable manner.The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a
franchise nor contract, confers noproperty rights and is a mere license or
privilege, subject to governmental control for thegood of the public. PSC has the
power, upon notice and hearing, amend, modify, orrevoked at any time any
certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances sowarranted. The
limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSCfor
further proceedings.In addition, the Court ruled that, liberty and property
of the citizens should beprotected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play. Not only must the party be givenan opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rightsthat he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When privateproperty is
affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.
PANTRANCO vs. PSC, 70 Phil 229 (1940)
FACTS:
PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is
operate additional buses with thePublic Service Commission (PSC). The P
the application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s complian
ISSUE:
PANTRANCO is questioning whether PSC can impose said conditions. If s
this power of the PSC, as provided for under sec. 15, CA 146, constitute u
delegation of powers?
HELD:
SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to s
action at the same time forestall overaction which necessarily results fro
concentration of powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent depo
due to the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subje
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering law
a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers
legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the princip
“subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative func
involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assem
in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and sui
manner
G.R. No.: 109568                                                   Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez
Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Y. Gonzales,
as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay
 
G.R. No.: 113454                                             Date of Promulgation: August 8, 2002
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA
and Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay
 
FACTS:
       
        Presidential Decree No. 27 issued by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed the entire country
as a “Land Reform Area” and further decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil, transferring to them ownership of the land they till.
        Sigre was Gonzales’ tenant in Iloilo and previously paid Gonzales a lease rental of 32 cavans
per year which he stopped and instead started to remit lease rentals to LBP pursuant to DAR’s
memorandum circular which set the guidelines of lease rental payment by farmer-beneficiaries
under the land transfer program of PD 27.
Lilia Gonzales, acting in her capacity as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed a
petition for petitioner and Mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines from
accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBP to turn over to Gonzales the rentals
previously remitted to it by Sigre.
 
ISSUE:
       
        Is Presidential Decree No. 27 valid and constitutional?
 
LAW:
        Presidential Decree No. 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
proclaimed the entire country as a “land reform area” and decreed the emancipation of tenants
from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To
achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long-
recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and
corn lands that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to
qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was pursuant to said decree that
the DAR issued Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978.
 
RULING/RATIO:
 
        The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v.
Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they’re tilling. As noted, however,
in the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious
implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation.
The rationale for the Circular was explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated
that “The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the
tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. . . . The
circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to
landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land,
thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price.” Since the assailed Circular
essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being
the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect.

DIONISIO M. RABOR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, GR No. 111812, 1995-05-31

Facts:
this Court had ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the
Department of
Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him.  The Land
Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such
extension.  In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City Government did exercise... its
discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for
legitimate reasons.
The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow
petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service
to complete the fifteen-year service... so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11,
paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146.
only to permanent appointees in the career service
'Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not
be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention
shall not exceed six (6) months.'
Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and management in the Civil Service, are
aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service
Commission.

Issues:
Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission.

Ruling:
Principles:
The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but... has less than fifteen (15) years of
service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded
validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed
to be carried into effect... while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a... given legislation and effectuate its policies,
for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate
and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect.  All that is... required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.  The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act...
considered as a whole.
It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible
detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes
subordinate,... delegated rule?making by administrative agencies so important and
unavoidable.
All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or
enabling... statute.
that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective.  Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146... must,
accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27.
discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee...
who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of
government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the
provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.