A Critique of PsychoanalyticReason

H Y P NOSIS AS A SC IEN TIFIC PR OBL EM

F R OM L AVOISIER TO L AC AN

l6ox cHERToK & TsABELLE sTENGERS

Translatedfrom the French by Martha lVoel Euans

in collaboration with the author-s

ST AN FO R D U N I V E R S I TY PRESS S TA N FO R D , C A L I FO R N I A
A Critique of Aychoanalytic Reason:Hypnosu
a-ra Scientifc hoblemf'ctm lauoisier to Itcan
r.r'as
originally publishedin French in rg89 under the title
Lc cocur et la raison:L'hyPnoseen question
de Ltuoisicr d Ltcanby Etlitions Payot.
O I989 by E<litionsPayot.

Assistancefor the translationwas provided by

the FrenchMinistry of Culture

Stanford University Press,Stanford,California

O rggz by the tsoardofTiustees ofthe
I.elandSranfbrtlf unior Universirv
Printed in the United Statesof America
Prefaceto the American Edition vii
CIP data app€arat the end ofthe book Prefaceto the Original Edition xix

r. From Lauoisier to Freud I

I Y' ..-' Put to the Test 67
z. Psychoanalysis

t. On Someof Freuds Heirs r25

j
1. NarcissisticWounds 2oo
Conclusion 27o

iVotes 285
Ilibliography 3o7
Index 3r7
 Prefaceto the American Edition

Front 'Le Coeur et la raison' to 'A critique of psychoanalyticRcason,

The change of a book's title when it is translatedfrom one lan-

guage to another is always interesting.Is it changed becauseof a
languageproblem or becauseof a hesitatio. ,bout the best way
to
announcethe booklsmessage,the questionsit addressesloften,
as
here, both reasonsare knotted together.
In French, the associationof the worcrs"heart" (coeur)and "rea-
son" (raison)immediately evokes the famous distinction
proposed
bv Pascal in the seventeenthcentury. For pascal, heart and
reason
refer to two different ways of approachingthe truth,
two ways of
"knowing." Reasoncan demonstrate
what it k.ro*r; what the heart
feelsdoes not require demonstration-and bressed
are those,says
Pascal,to whom God has given religion through
the senrimentsof
the heart. Pascal'sdistinction b.tr"e.n thescio and
the ctcdo cannot
be separatedfrom his own struggle to defend faith
againstphilo_
sophic skepticism.The distinction he made has
.,.v.ith.l.r, ,,rr,
vived in popular wisdom in the well-known ,.The
phrase heart has
Its reasonsthat reasoncannot know," which emphasizes
the obstacre
the "heart's reasons"constitutefor reasonitseli.
This obstaclemav
have.meaning in personallif-e(f know thar I shouldn't,
Ur, ,.,fi . . .i
but it may also be related-i6'reasonas a collective
effort of knowl-
 viii Prefaceto the Anterican Edition
edge, that is, notably, to scientificor therapeuticreasonthat seeks
to unclerstandthe meaning of human choicesand attitudes.
As a result, the French reader woulcl immediately percei'e the
dilrerencebetween the two phrases"the heart and its reasons"and
"heart and reason."The 6rst expressionindicates ,.progress"
a in
knowledge, a discourseon the reasonsthat pascarassertedcould
not be the object of rational knowledge. A book with such a title
might be wrirten by a psychoanalysr, but also bv a cognitive psy_
chologist or by any orher represenrarive of a knowledge clairning
to have penetratedthe hearti "reasons,"the reasonsthat lead hu-
man beingsto act without being able to accounrplausiblyfor their
actions.
The second expression-"heart and reason,'-announces the
problem, the obsracle,thar the heart posesto the power of reason.
The object of such a book rvould not be ,.heart,,'but the many
eftbrts that have been made to decipher rationally the heart'srea-
sons.In other words, in this case,"heart" would refer to a problem
defining a history which is part of modern rational knowledge, a
history to which psychoanalysis and psvchologyborh belong.
The American title A Critique of psychoanalyticReason.*ph"-
sizes two points that the French title Lc Coeur et ra raison does not
make explicit. First, one thesisof this book is that psychoanalysis
has played :rn essenrialrole in the history of "hearf and reason";
psychoanalysis is thus central to our enterprise.Second,in our anal-
ysis,the imporrance of Freudian psychoanalysis lies not in its hav_
ing provided an answer to the question of heart ancl reason,but
rather in its having attempted to answer the question in a singu-
larly pertinenr way' and to haue
failed. Some faiiures reach ,r, noih-
ing. The greatnessof psychoanalysis resides,we believe,in the fact
that its failure forcesus ro poserhe problem of "reason"itself,
and,
more precisely,the problem of the model of rationality guiding
modern sciences.Thus our "critique of psychoanalytic.eason"
involvesa critique of scientificreason. "lsJ
Freud s creation of psychoanalysisis at the center of our book
becausewe believethat Freud truly confronted the questionof how
to construct a sciencein a domain apparently defined by the irra-
ti o n a l : i rra ti o n a l i ty o f a tti tu d e s,of compl ai nts,of desi res;i rrati o-
h"efaceto the American Edition ix
"ignorant of anatomy."The "psycho-
nality of somatic symptoms
analytic reason" invented by Freud-that is, the articulation
between psychoanalytic theory and practice-does not simply re-
procluce the model of other rational practices.The "heart" to which
itself is not conceived in such a way as to
psychoanalysis .addresses
(by
suaranteea scienceresembling other sciences contrast to the
iole "behavior" plays in experimental psychology,for example).
Freud's work remains unique becauseit operatedunder a double
imperative:first, to createa practicethat would render intelligible
the obstacleheart posesto the efforts of reason; and second,to
crearea practice that would not be limited to making "heart" an
obiect of sciencelike any other, only more complex. We explore
this theme in Chapter r.
Hypnosis
The critique of scientificreasonto which the failure of psycho-
analvsisleadsus in the secondchapter has as its correlatethe prob-
lem of hypnosis.The role played by hypnosisin our book may be
surprising to American readers.Indeed, hypnosisis not a subject
for scandalin the United States,where it is both used in therapy
ancl explored in scientific researchin a normal way. The same is
not true in France. Faced with this difference, one must ask
whether the French attitude shoulclbe considereda simple curios-
ity that might be studied as such, or whether it should be consid-
ered a symptom of a more general problem that might challenge,
but in a different way, American "normality." We believethat, in-
sofar as scientific research and psychotherapeuticpracticesand
theoriesare concerned,the French "scandal" with regard to hyp-
nosisshould be not simply an object of amused and indulgent cu-
riosity for American specialists,but rather a question to unsettle
the tranquillity of their norms.
llypnosis is an integral part of the history of heart and reasonin
the sensethat the phenomenonowes its very existenceto that his-
tory. At the end of the eighteenthcentury,what we now call hyp-
nosis was named "animal magnetism;' a term created by Franz
Anton Mesmer. In contralt-to French, the English language has
preserveda living memory of this origin in the word "mesmerize,"
x Prefaceto the American Edition Prefaceto the American Edition xi

meaning to hypnotize. Before Mesmer there existed a disparate
collectionof apparently unrelated phenomenaand practices-de -
monic possession, contagion of emotions and passions,mysterious
cures,etc.-that he proposedto understandas evidenceof the in-
fluence that living bodies exerciseon each other, an influence he
explained by a magnetic fluid. He invented the "baquet," which
r.l'assimultaneously a therapy and a demonstration device: the
cures the magnetic fluid produced by means of the baquet would
demonstratethe existenceof the lluid.
Animal magnetism is thus inseparablefiom the proiect of con-
stituting a science.Similarly, hypnosis. which succeededmagne-
tism, activated a relation purifed of any belief in a supernarural
causality;it had as its goal to explain what previouslyhad appeared
supernaturalin terms of scienti6cknowledge,to discoverthe scien-
tific truth beyond trances, ecsrasles,possessions, thaumaturgical
prodigies, etc. Nevertheless,both hypnosis and magnetism have
had troubled relations with scientificreason.The practical inven-
tion of the hypnotic relation, which endeavorsro submit "hearr" to
a rational reading. has had the effectof providing a privileged ter-
rain where "heart" and scientificreasonconfront each other, a ter-
rain where proclamationsof rational conquestalternate with ad-
missionsof defeat.
The title of our 6rst chapteq"From Lavoisierto Freud." empha-
sizesthe strangecontinuity of rhis history,which we take up again
in the fourth chapter,where we examine some contelnporaryre-
searchon hypnosis.The famous chemist Antoine de Lavoisierwas
a member of the commissioninstituted by Louis XVI to investigate
mesmerianpractices.This commissiondemonsrratedthat the mag-
netic fluid did not exist, and explained rhe mesmerian phenome-
non by the combined action of imitation, imagination, and touch.
The same kind of procedure now currenrly carried out in the lab-
oratory context of experimentalpsychologyhas led some specialists
to conclude once more that the hypnotic phenomenon does not
exist,that it is merely a form of role-playing.
'fhe investigationcarried our by the commissionof which La-
voisier was a member thus constitutesan important prologue to
its polemical characterdemonstratesthat
our stuclv.In particular.
".*p"ri-ental reason"the commissionersclaimed
ii. u.nirra, of
but neutral' This same reasonoperat-
to b. applyittg are anything
hypnosisis studied
,"" ,"a"v 1., th. pry.hology laboratorieswhere
phenomenon be purified of all uncontrollableele-
..iuir.r',t,^, rhe
As we shall see.to the
,r.,Jn,,,na be reproducibleexperimentally.
(principally in the United
J.gr.. that hypnosishas indeed become
research,the contro-
Stri.r) a phenomenonsubiectto experimental
u..ri., surrou.rdi.rg that research teach us less about hypnosisitself
ideal requires a phenomenon
than about rheprice the experimental
it is not a matter
to pav if it is to become an obiect of study.And
of that
of i,ypnoris being incapableof paying the price, but rather
the hypnotic relation not a scientific object but
pry-..,, making
the very ambition to submit it to
inrt."d a deceptivemirror where
scienceis rellected.In that resPect,we believethat the French atti-
tude toward hypnosis-the "irrational" characterthe French at-
tribute simultaneouslyto hypnosisand to interest in i1-un66vs15
a question left in the shadowsby the American attitude that hyp-
nori, i, "normal." Can rationality be defined by a standardpertain-
ing to the phenomenon to be studied and not to those who study
iti Crn the operation of purification, of creating the experimental
setting,be conceivedas "right" of reasonl
The particularity of the French artitude toward hypnosisis also
revealedby the veritableanathemaFrench psychoanalysts havecast
against any therapeutic use of hypnosis' In order to explain the
significanceof this anathema,it is useful to recall one of the traps
of Anglo-French translation.The term "d6cevoir" in French does
.,to
not lnean deceive,"as one might expect("deceive"is translated
in French by the verb "tromper"), but rather "to disappoint'"The
slippage from etymological roots in the two languages reveals not
only a difference in meaning, but also the relationship of those
different meanings in practical usage.If our hopes are "d6ques"
(past participle o[ "d6cevoir"),if we are disappointed,is it not be-
cause the thing that aroused our hopes deceiuedus in some wayi
Should this object not rhen be defined as deceptivel Hypnosis is
thus defined by the Frencffisychoanalystswho anathematize it not
 xii PreJaceto the American Edition
Prefaceto the American Edition xiii
only as a technique that "clisappointed"Freud, but also as
a decep-
tive technique par excellence.That is why in FranceFreud's marks, u,e believe, the failure of psychoanalysis
as a practice,and
aban- thereforeas a theorY'
donmenr of hypnotic technique has come to be iclentifiedwith
the
true birth of psychoanalysis.
If animal magnetism and then hypnosisseemedto offer After Freud
the pos_
s i b i l i tvo f fo u n d i n g a n e x p er i menrarsci ence.
at rhe begi nni ngoi hi , What are the capacitiesof reason in the context of our times
psychotherapeuric career,Freud consideredhypnosisas holding out
when the dominant type of rationality is scientilicl The usual re-
the promise of a psychotherapythat woulcl ar last be scienri6c.
In sponsesto this question will be quite different in Franceand in the
both cases,hypnosisarouseda hope only ro disappointit.
On what United States. The empirico-logical image of sciencehas been
or whom might the responsibilityfor this disappointment
resrr called into question in the United Statesbv notions such as that of
I)oes responsibilityresr,as claimed by the French who
considerthe the paradigm, introduced by Thomas Kuhn, and in a more general
rejection of hypnosisas rhe founding drama of psychoanalysis,
on way by the thesisthat every "fact" is theory-laden.A similar chal-
the hypnotic relationl or doesresponsibilitylie, as we
will p.opor., lengecould not take placein France.There, philosopherslike Gas-
with the very hopes hypnosisseemedto nourishl What
.an iyp_ ton Bachelardhave long afiirmed that scientificreasonis nor ar all
nosis, which has been condemned as a disappoi.,tingthe.rpeuiic
empirical but should be understood on the basisof the power of
instrument' teach us about the ideal guiding Freud
in the creation the "concepts"it creates."Concept,"in the French use of the term,
of psychoanalysisl
excludesicleology,professionalinterests,and individual psychology.
The import of this question is not only hisrorical,since
psycho_ For this reason,French epistemologycame to identify the creation
analysis, as a therapeutic technique, also disappointed
Fr"u.l,, of psychoanalysis with a rupture: the epistemologicalvalue of the
hopes.The problem posed by this disappointmentis
the focus of FreudianconcePtof the unconsciousis basedon its differencefrom
chapter z and, we believe,defineswhat r.vasat stake in
the famous the aggregateof knowledge preceding it. Psychoanalyticpractice
conllict berweenFreud and his most loyal pupil, Sandor
Ferenczi. was born when Freud abandonednot only hypnosis,but also other
What lessoncan be drawn from the th.r"p"uii. failure
of psycho_ techniquesinherited from the history of psychotherapv.
analysisl Should we quesrion-and this *", F...n.ri,s
thesis_the This dillerencebetweenFreud'sFrench and American "heirs" is
ideal pursued by psychoanalysis and retrace our steps,that is, re_ stutliedin Chapter 3. Among Freud'sAmerican heirs who are con-
habilitate hypnosisl or should we mainrain that ideal-and
this cerned with the empirical validation of psychoanalytictheory and
was the course Freud proposed in
ry37-and resign ourselvesto the status of metapsychology,we chose to focus on Heinz Kohut,
its practicallimitsl rhese questionsare still relevani
today.French who remains for the most part unknown to the original French
(Lacanian) psychoanalysisafrrms quite decisivelv
the oosition readersof this book. In our perspective,Kohut's work is truly sin-
taken bv Freud in 1917:it is preciselyinsofarus
psycho"nalyris gular becauseit createsa new representationof the relations be-
disappointsthe (false)hope of a cure that it h"s
an i^dirput"bl. tween "heart" and "reason."Through all its mutations,the psycho-
value. Like hypnosis,the hope of a cure is considered
to be a de_ analyticunconsciousis marked by one constant:it is alwayslinked
ceptive lure. But what would happen if, as Ferenczi with the theme of "truth," and more preciselywith "resistancero
wished, the
idealsof psychoanalysis were rhemselveschallenged?Our theris is truth," taking "rrurh" here ro refer to the painful but uniquely
that it would result in asking more, not less,of therapists, effectivepath toward a "cure." "Heart," in the senseof an obstacle
in ,rki^g
them not to renounce but to acceptthe "narcissistic refusing to submit to the rtsasonsof reason,is therefore central ro
wound"rth"I
 xiv Prefaceto the American Edition
the Freudian conceprion of the human psyche.But the relation
between "heart" and "reason" is no longer fbr Kohut this trac.li-
tional relation. According to him, reasonemergedft"om
heart,so to
speak. As we will show, however,"psychoanalyticreason,"which
allows Kohut the psychoanalystto speak about "heart" and ,,rea-
son," neverthelesspresen'esits traclitional prerogatives.The rela-
tions of "heart" and "reason" are indeed conceivedby Kohut in
such a way as to preservethe possibilityof atheoryof psychoanalytic
practice.
The specificitvof French psvchoanalysis is clearly illurnined by
the figure of facquesLacan. Even the French psychoanalysrs who
clo not adopt the Lacanian label are quite often more Lacanian
than they admit. In particular,the ideaspropagatedby Lacan that
the speci{icityof analytic techniquemust be undersroodmore in an
ethical than in a scientificsense,and the relatednotion that Freud
condemnedhypnosisas an anti-ethical,"barbarous"technique,are
widely acceptedin France. We will arrempr to show that Lacan\
"reading" of Freud in fact constituresa systematicconcealmentof
the technico-scientific tradition which, in our view, inspireclFreucj,
and furthermore that Lacan has prornoted in its place a more
French tradition in which the concept is king. This concealment
allows Lacan to preservethe statusof psychoanalysis as,in the final
analysis,a rational responseto the question of heart and reason
and to put it out of reach of the "vulgar" empirical quesrion of
the validation of theory by therapeuticsuccess. In Lacant work a
philosophico-anthropological conceptfounds the legitimacyof ana-
lytic practice."Psychoanalyticreason"is thus confusedwith a new
"ethico-philosophicalreason,"and the "rrurh" is correlatively
de-
tached from all theorizablecontent and becomesthe central ques,
tion of human existencein which the subject is constitutedby its
(non)relationto the rrurh.
Whatever autonomy psychoanalysts may claim for their practice,
the history of psychoanalysis cannot unfbld in a vacuum. It is our
positionthat the ethology of the infant will play a fundamental role
in the future of psychoanalysis. In Chapter 3 we examine Daniel
Stern's representationof the successivecreations of the infant\
Prefaceto the American Edition xv
the challenges
sensesof seli and we show how-independenr of
"sternian baby" will certainly encounter-that infant, because
rhe
gaze, s
facilitate a radical critique
it is the product of the ethologist's
of "psychoanalyticbabies,"whether created by Sigmund Freud,
Melanie Klein, or Heinz Kohut. By contrastwith thesebabies,the
"sternian baby" tuas not conceiuedin order to establi-;hpsychoanalytic
reason,nor to guaranteethe privilege of analytic technique over all
other techniques.On the contrary,the "Sternian baby" opens the
problem of the corPusof psychotherapeutictechniquesof which
pry.hoan"lysisis a singular,but not privileged,example.
In France also, fbr instance in the work of the psychiatrist-
ethologistBoris Cyrulnik, ethology is beginning to Proposea no-
rion of the human infant that posesa problem to psychoanalysts.
But other new critics have appearedon the French cultural scene
as r.'"'ell,especiallyamong philosophers,which is not surprising
given the role played in France by psychoanalyticthought. We re-
call here Lacan'sattempt to make psychoanalysis the heir to philos-
ophy in the double sensethat it would reexamine philosophical
problemsand also,at the same time, mark an end to the history of
philosophy.We examine the work of Michel Henry, Mikkel Borch-
facobsen,and FrangoisRoustang.The first two are philosophers,
the third a psychoanalyst. The trait they unexpectedlyshareis their
use of hvpnosisas a touchstonein their critique of psychoanalysis.
Hypnosis becomesfor all three the symptom o[ the problem that
neither Freud nor Lacan succeededin confronting. In his latest
6ook, Infiuence, FranEois Roustang links hypnosis with the "ani-
mality of man," which, according to him, might replaceto advan-
tage the Freudian unconscious.In addition, Roustangseeksto in-
troduce the ideaso[ Milton Erickson to his French readers.
It is still too early to predict the resultsof this new interest in
hypnosisin France two hundred yearsafter Mesmer and one hun-
dred years after Charcot. In the fourth chapter,however,we ask
the fbllowing questions:What price, in the form of a changein the
image we haveof scientificrationality,will be required in order for
hypnosisto ceasebeing a fascinatingand obstructivephenomenon,
an object both of fashionarl#of disappointmentl A symbol for two
 xvi Prefaceto the American Edition
centuriesof the obstacle"heart" posesto "reason,"what can hyp-
nosis teach us about "reason,"about its present limits, about the
new practicesit might risk in the futurel
Reasonand Pouer
One of the singular aspecrsof our approach to the question of
"heart and reason" and of our "critique of psychoanalytic
rea_
son"-and of experimental reason in its confrontation with hyp-
nosis-is to consider that what we call "reason" has a history,and
that this history is still evolving.
From a certain point of view, our work could be consideredan
attack upon the notion of theory as a rarional ideal at which every
sciencecan and should legitimately aim. In the scientificsenseof
the term, theory can, of course,havemultiple meanings.But in the
strong meaning developedby modern science,theory is linked to
an experimental practice, thar is, ro the mobilization of a potuer
Theoretico-experimentalsciencesare distinguishedby the practice
of making their version of "reason" depend on the power to ,.give
reasons"for or to explain phenomena.This of reasonthus
'ersion
presumesthe power of predicting outcomes, of controlling in order
to replicate,of purifying to insure the implication of a theory-the
power, in sum, to make a phenomenon "admit" its truth. In this
sense,the great successof evolutionary biology has been to free
itself, intellectuallyand practically,from this link between theory
and power. The same is beginning ro be true o[ ethology.]But it is
not true either for psychoanalysis or, in the main, for experimental
psychology.
It is not by chance that neither Daniel Stern nor Heinz Kohut
speaksof "suggestion."Like hypnosis,suggestionhas taken on a
predominantly peiorative meaning denoting an illegitimate in{lu-
ence'that is, an influencethe acceptance ofwhich cannot be ration-
ally justified by the one who acceptsit. Moreover,suggesrionhas
become a kind of obsessionfor the experimental psychologistas
well as for the Freudian therapist: for both, suggesrionpurs the
"truth" in question,that is, it problematizesthe possibility
of con_
structing a theory on the basisof experiment or experience.Sug-
Prefaceto the American Edition xvii
par excellence.Neverthe-
sesrionis impure; it is the uncontrollable
i.rr. we will show,the questionof suggestionalwaysariseswhen
"r
"heart" ancl "reason" are no longer conceivedas being in opposi-
obstacleto the
tion, when "heart" is no longer consideredas an
reason'For Stern, as
legitimate power of (theoretico-experimental)
"opposition"
f- Kohrr,, before the possibility of experiencingan
the
between heart and reason can have any sensefor the infant,
with its caretakersare already characterized by
infhnt's relations
what rve should recognizeas a form of suggestion. Mutual sugges-
rion. moreover,for Stern: the infant "suggests"that its caretakers
relateto it bY suggestion.
Perhapsthe creation of the new rational practiceswe argue for
here u,ill be signaledby the disappearanceof the dismissivephrase,
"lt is only suggestion!"The word "only" alr'r'aysmeans that the
speakeris assuminga posirionof power: it implies that the speaker
is the one who can judge, who can recognizethe appearance-
deceptiveor not-in the name of truth' who can recognize the
impure in the name of the power of purifying. A similar situation
is signaledin medical contextsby the phrase,"lt's only a placebo!"
As if we understoodwhat is thus condemned!
How can we turn what resistspurifrcationor what submits to it
only in a deceptivemanner into a positiveproblem posedto knowl-
edgei The readersof our book will not find any ready answers to
this question, nor will they find a ready-madetheory about hyp-
nosisor about what psychotherapyought to be. In all three cases,
we believe rhat the answer ro the question belongsto history and
ro the eventualcreationofdifferent rational practices,practicesthat
w'ill doubtlessbe even more exacting than those permitted by ex-
perimental reason.
We have called thesenew practices"transdisciplinary"'first,be-
causethe notion of dkciptine implies the power of cutting out or
shaping an object, of purifying it, ancl second,becauseinterdiscipli'
nary practices,at least up to the present'have too often resembied
a meeting among territorial representatives who are all respectful
of one anothers' power. Will hypnosis,which has been resistantto
clisciplinarydivisions,turn'out to be an organizing focus for such
transdrscipiinarypracticesfA first step in this direction was taken
xviii Prefaceto the American Edition

at a colloquium 'Around Hypnosis" presentedin the prestigious

French Cerisy seriesin September 1989.3Also as a resuh of this
meeting an associationunder the presidencyof L6on Chertok was
created:The International Associationfor TiansdisciplinaryStud- Prefaceto the Original Edition
ies of Hypnotic and Tiance Phenomena.
L. C .
I. S .

'Another book on psychoanalysis!" might well exclaim readersleaf-

ing through this book and seeingthe names of Freud and Lacan.
Hasn't everything about psychoanalysis already been statedand re-
statedad nauseaml Aren't libraries already buckling under rhe ac-
cumulated weight of books on the topicl Perhapssome curiosity
will be awakened,however,when readersrealize the apparent in-
congruity of the two authors collaboratingon rhis book. What in-
deed might one expectfrom the unexpectedallianceof a psychoan-
alyst specializingin hypnosisand psychosomaricdisorders,and a
philosopherventuring far from her field, the physicsof irreversi-
bi l it y?
This book is, in the technicalsenseof the term, aneuent,that is.
the simultaneouslylogical and improbableproduct of an encountet .
An event cannot be foreseen,cannot be planned. It scrambleseven
the most well-establishedcategories.It deals out new cards, as it
were; createsnew possibilities.A true encounteris alwaysan event
becauseit doesn'tassemblesimilar elements,nor doesit simply add
up a seriesofdifferencesbrought togetherby chance.An encounter
createsan unexpectedcloseness that enjoinseachofthe participants
to examine and explore a world that will never be his or hers but
that can no longer be ignored. The encounter of the two authors
of this book not only create)ffor each the possibilityand the desire
xx Prefaccto the Original lldition
of posing new questions,but also opened those questionsto new
horizons and unpredictableimplications.
"Heart" and "reason" are not the obiect of this book-we do
not have a theory that woulcl de6ne their meaning and relation-
ship-but its theme. Indeed the possibilityo[ our encounter was
createdby the questionsthat the associationof thesetwo words has
raisedsince Pascal.A priori, however,"heart" and "reason" had for
each of us very different meanings.
For L6on Chertok, heart and reason designated{irst and fore-
most the situation of the psychotherapistwho must confront the
double requirements Freudian psychoanalysis claims to reconcile.
The first requirement is that of "curing" the patient-whatever is
meant by that term today.The secondrequirement is not to "cure"
blindly but to cure because,in one way or another,the "reasons"
for suffering becomean object of knowledge even if, for some,this
knowledge eludesrepresentation,eludesall "act of cognizance."
For IsabelleStengers,heart and reasondesignatedfirst and fore-
most the strangecoexistenceof reasonand belief so often found in
scientific practice.To take an example she is familiar with, it is
hard not to be surprisedat the contrastbetweenthe rigorous criti-
cal mentality that led physiciststo reject one after another all efforts
at reconciling the reversibletime of dynamics and the irreversible
time of thermodynamics,and the quasi-mysticalcharacterof their
conclusion: irreversibility is "therefore" only an illusion deter-
mined by an approximative mode of description.This conclusion
also inciudes the unstated implication: our instruments,which all
presupposeirreversibilityand without which physicswould not ex-
ist, owe their meaning to approximation; and the sun, whose irre-
versiblecombustion is the condition of our existence,"only burns
by approximation." fudgments such as these, which deprive the
knowledge on which they are founded of its practical conditions,
derive from belief.'
As the reader will have noticed by now, "reason" has already
been used here in two different ways: in one, reasonis active,it can
know or not know; in the other, reason(or reasons)is an object of
knowledge, whether possible or impossible. The problem of
"heart" as defined by Pascaland also by Freud is also at the cross-
Prefaceto the Original Edition xxi
roads of two meanings: its definition denotes,on the one hand,
rvhat has historically been referred to as a rational practice,one
capableof accounting for itself; and, on the other, the type of "ac-
count" these practicesaim to render of their own subject.This is
the problem of he:rrt raisesthe question of what we call rea-
'r'hv
son--the pertinence of its judgments as well as the relevanceof its
caregoriesand ideals.Our book will not attempt to theorize heart,
l rut r at her t o put r er son int o quest ion.
This book combines two passionatelyheld requirements and
rrr,oversionsof disrespect.The authors' passionatelyheld require-
ment concernsreasonas actor, and the new turn the adventureof
rcasonhas taken since"modern science,"of rvhich physicsis a part,
has come into being. For Freud as well as for Lacan, as we shall
see,psychoanalysis would not haveany meaning without the chal-
lenge posed to psychotherapy by modern science.The authors'dis-
respecthas to do with professionalor scientificinstitutions,and in
particularwith the way they attribute respectabilityto the risks and
interestsof reason,transmute them into "rational norms," and hide
and deny what sciencedoesnot havethe meansto represent(in the
usual cognitivemeaning of the word, but also in the activesenseat
rvork in the phrase"to be the representativeof").
Most works that discuss"the heart'sreasons"-especiallyits psy-
choanalyticreasons-in the perspectiveof a "rational" examination
of them do so by adopting only one form of disrespect.Either they
found their examination of the "caseof psychoanalysis" on respecr
fbr the scientificinstitution and its norms (as in current American
"epistemologicalstudies"),2or they promote respectfor the histor-
ical event of "Freud's discoveryof the Unconscious."In the latter
case,the limits and presuppositionsof scientificreasonwill be de-
nounced,and psychoanalysis exempted from rendering an account
o[ itself.The double disrespectwe claim identifiesus, therefore,as
a minority, or even as heretics.
It is certainly a minority position when an analystconsidersthat
the psychoanalyticinstitution obscuresby all means possiblethe
fact that psychoanalysis, as Freud conceivedit, is a failure, not be-
causeit is inferior to other thErapeuticpracrices,but becauseir does
not explain any more than the others what produces a cure, why,
 Prefacero the Original Edition
xxii
sometimes,"something happens,"and why, at other times, things
"go in circles" fbr years at a time. )ust as pre-Keplerian astrono-
mers multiplied epicyclesto "save"the movementof planetsin the
sole languagethat seemeclworthy of it-the languageof circles-
so psychoanalysismultiplies its fascinatingconceptsto "save" the
descriptionofthe cure in the languagethat is supposedto elucidate
its course.that is, to save-in the usual sensethis time-the priv-
ilege claimed for psychoanalysis by Freud.
Also in the minority is the epistemologist who doesn'tbelieve
that we know-or even that we can know-what reasonmight be
capableof, and who seesin the epistemologicaldiscourseson the
singularity of modern sciencea futile effort to fbund on principle
what is clearly a historical fact: namely, that in certain fields and
under certain conditions humans have discovered a new and
history-producingway of rvorking together.This position opposes
her not only to other epistemologistsbut also to all scientistsand
critics of sciencewho feel the need of conferring an identity on
science.Usually this identity is intended to iustify-or condemn-
as inevitable the "price" scientific rationality would require us to
pay in the form of a split between the "purified" obiect' subiectto
intelligible categories,and what remains,which is only a subiective
appearance.That this split can bejustifed "in the name of science"
or "in the name of reason"and not eaaluatedin its risks and rele-
vanceis for her an indication of what remains to be invented:new
ways of working together,or what might be calledreason\senseof'
humor.
The encounter of these two minority, heretical positionsmade
each of us recognize in the other what we needed to afirm the
re l e v a n c eo f o u r v i e w s .
Today the psychoanalysts who shareFreud'sconvictionthat psy-
choanalysisis, or will become,a sciencesimilar to biology or phys-
ics are few and far between.Even so, this theme still haunts psy-
choanalysisif only to demonstratethat there is not, or cannot be,
anything beyond psychoanalysis, that its limitations and failures
constitute,on the contrarv,a heroic sign of its fidelity to the ration-
alist conviction that led to the Freudian foundation. In this view, it
Prefaceto the Original Edition xxiii
"scientificreason" to maintain its identity in order
is necessaryfbr
to d esignat eit s lim it s- which only t he psychoanalyst dar es con-
This is why even the "Lacanian" institution in Francecontin-
front.
"subiect of science."
ues to refer to a scientific model and to the
why any questioning of the status quo it imposesnecessi-
This is
rareshaving the necessaryinstruments to challengethis model.
Inversely,the instruments that make such a challengepossible
quickly reach their limits if they are basedon empty generalities.
The epistemologistthus needs "accomplices,"allies who can ac-
quaint her r,r,iththe particular stories in u'hich the question of
scientificrationality,its conditionsand its price.haveplayeda major
role. What <-rnemight call a betrayal is necessary,a betrayal of the
consensus that has travestiedthis history and transformedit into an
ediiying story commemorating the progressaccomplishedwhen
what needed to be interrogated had finally been purified of its
illusory appearance,its subiectivebeliefs, its lazy opinions. Such
"traitors" are rarer than one might think, if only because,in the
majority of cases,those u,ho might haveplayeclthis role, thosewho
have not acceptedthe purified evidence,either died without heirs
or choseother strategies:dissimulation,silent scorn,or the creation
of sectsthat transmuted the controversyinto a heroic combat be-
tween flouted truth and triumphant error. In the realm of knowl-
edge,what one might call true betrayalrequires the acceptanceof
perplexityand not the claim to possess a rival truth; and perplexity
doesnot survive easilyin the 6eld of "rational" practices.
Undoubtedly,for perplexity to survive, it must attach itself ob-
stinatelyto a questionand discoverhow thosewho supposedlyhave
the answer to that question often caricature it in order to get
around it. The question oI hypnosisplayedthis part for one of us,
ancl the enigma of its power (which must be distinguishedfrom
the "power" of the hypnotist)gave him the obstinatewill not to be
taken in by reassuringcaricatures,not to be impressedby accusa-
tions, not to recoil from the scorn implied in the derisivequestion:
'Are you still doing that?" Thus only one of us has had this direct
experiencewith hypnosis,but the other has become prodigiously
tnterested in and amusedtf'y the defensive batteries deployed
xxiv PreJaceto the Original Edition
againstit. We have witnessedindeed a superb caseof activedenial,
by all availablemeans,of a question that both resistsand insistsin
current debates,a question that Octave Mannoni had the courage
to recognizeas an issueof "revolutionary phenomenology,in the
sensethat it contradictsall theoreticaiknowledge."3
Few issueshave raised such diverse defensestructures.The sit-
uation recallsFreudt joke about the pot: This pot, which you ac-
cuse me of giving back to you with holes in it, you never lent to
me, but even so, when I gave it back, there was nothing wrong
with it, and moreover when you lent it to me, it was already dam-
aged. The enigma of hypnosis?There is no enigma, no problem,
they say,just a simple "case" authorized by Lacanian algebra: the
hypnotic subject yields to an object-the hypnotist-the place of
the ldeal Ego, and thus achievesa fantasyof omnipotencethrough
identificationwith a master whose slavethe subjectbecomes.a This
so-called"case,"they will add, is, moreover,more common than
one might think and could be statedin other terms: Who, indeed,
is zor hypnotizedl
Even so, say the detractors,the practiceof hypnosisis incompat-
ible with the ethics of psychoanalysis. It is a "fascistrite,"5 a bar-
baric abuseof power,nthat Freud himself expresslyexcluded from
psychoanalysis. And what's more, they continue, interest in hyp-
nosis is itself nothing but a manifestationof a more general "hyp-
notic" symptom revealinga crisisin psychoanalysis. The experience
of the unconscious,"when it is not articulatedwith the primacy of
a theory," always tips over toward this "originary place," and the
figure of the analyst becomesconflated with that of the inspired
leader,the shaman endowed with occult powers.TAnd in any case,
they conclude,the fact that the hypnotic relationshipeludesrepre-
sentabilityin psychoanalyticterms revealsthat it has nothing to do
with the psychoanalyticsubject who is the "subject of language
even befbre birth, the subject immediately re-presented; without
that, there is not a subject.In other words, there is no subjectother
than the subject representedby and for discourse."8
Hypnosis is, following the expression of fean-Marc L6vy-
Leblond, what we would call an intellectual"spoil-sport."eAnd in
Prefaceto the Original Edition xxv
this respect,it is all the tnore interesting for those who question
scientificreason,since it eludes the "reason" of experimentersas
well as that ofpsychoanalysts.Indeed,after decadesof researchand
thousandso[ articles,experimentation has not produced an under-
stan clingof hypnosis.What t t hasdone, r at her ,is encount erit s own
limits: hypnosisscramblesthe distinction betweenthe experimental
setring,which ensuresthe purity and verifiability of the phenome-
non, and the study of the purified and verifiablephenomenon.For
r$'o centuries,hypnosishas thus constituteda mafor ch:rllengeto
experimental reason,just as it has challengedpsychoanalysis ever
sinceFreud's recognition that no substitutecould be found for it.r0
A Critique of PsychoanalyticReasonis a responseto these chal-
lenges,but not in the sensethat it developsa theory or adumbrates
a new "vision" of humanity that might at last integrate hypnosis
into the closedcircle of knowledge. Rather,we proposetopropagate
the question of hypnosis.This does not mean that we will show
that hypnosisis "everywhere,"but that we will attempt to reveal,
preciselywhere disciplineshaveclosedthe circle of their iudgments
(a circle expressedby Kant thus: "The categoriesof a disciplineare
also and at the same time the principles of its object"), a common
"unknowing" whose most noticeablesymptom is the question of
hypnosis.
This book constitutesan experimental adventure that we have
attem pt edt o push t o it s lim ir s. I t usesr he pasr , r lwhile seekingt o
bring about a future that will liberateus from this past,a future in
which we might laugh at the naivet6of what we still call "reason."
Undoubtedly,this laughter will not come from the members of a
discipline who would at last hold the answer to the "riddle" of
hypnosis.Reason,which collides with the obstacleof heart, and
heart, which resiststhe claims of reason,are two sidesof the same
coin, of the same ideal: the ideal of a knowledge that would at last
cliscoverthe meansof judging; the ideal of the possessors of such a
knowledge who could at last silence their adversariesand iudge
them in the name of the illusory appearancestheir questionsad-
dress.The "solution" to the question of heart and reasonis, as we
will try to show, not theorelital but practical.It emergesfrom a
xxvi Prefaceto the Original Edition
practicalchangein the consrraintsand idealson the basisof which
thosewho pursue the adventureof reasontomorrow will be linked
together in a collaborative"we."
We would like to take this opporruniry to thank Claude Veil for
A Critique of PsychoanalyticReason
reading our manuscript with a critical eye,as well as facquespalaci
and Agnds Oppenheimer for their judicious remarks on our rreat-
ment of American psychoanalysis.
L. C .
I. S .
 C H A P TE R I

Le coeur a sesraisonsque la raison ne connait pas.

The heart has ix ou,n rcasonsthat reasondoesnot frnotu. From Lauoisier to Freud
-Blaise Pascal
(r623-62)

Reasonand thc Baquct

On March rz, 1784,Louis XVI appointed an investigativecom-

missioncomposedof four doctorsfrom the medical faculty of Paris
ancl fir'e members of the Royal Academy of Sciences"to examine
antl report on animal magnetism as practicedby Monsieur Deslon."
On April 5 of the same year, Baron Brereuil, acting on the kingt
orders. charged a second commission with the same task. This
commissionwas made up of five members from the Royal Society
of Medicine.
The naming of thesetwo commissionsconstitutesonly one epi-
sode in the history of animal magnerism, introduced inro France
bv Franz Anton Mesmer.It representsthe attempt to subrnit to the
order of sciencea practicethat seemedthreateningto political and
to socialorder. The VienneseMesmer had, in a manner of speak-
ing, brought the plague to Paris,an "epidemic which spreadto all
of France"' and which Lafbyette,in r784, propagatedwith equal
success in the United States.The lluid by which Mesmer explained
animal magnetism was universal, and thereby demonstratedthe
essent ial equalit yof m ankind beyondt he dist inct ionsof socialcon-
ventions:such was the lessonthat the "radical mesmerists,"Nicolas
Bergasseand facques,PierrtsBrissot, drew from their mastert theo-
rtes. Moreover, not only the existencebut also the action of this
z From Lauoisier to Freud
lluid revealedin an immerliate and powerful way the collapseof
social distinctions. Around Mesmer's baquet wolnen oI the best
society-even the queen, according to some pamphleteer5-1s51
c o n tro l , b ro k e o u t i n " h y s teri cal "l aughter,fai nted, had convul -
sions.Mesmer'sbaquet transformedan organizedgroup into a cha-
otic collectivity.The effectsof the fluid on each individual rein-
forced its power in others: the first giggle unleashedcascadesof
l a u g h te r;th e l i rs t s p a s ma c tedas an i rresi sti bl ecatal ystfor a chai n
re a c ti o no f c o n v u l s i v ec ri s e s .
From the point of vieu' of "heart" and "reason."the naming of
the two commissionsconstitutesthe inaugural sceneof a story that
was to continue for tw<-rcenturies.The comrnissionerswere to test
the frrst rational explanation of rvhat appearedto be irrationality
itself. The description written bv Jean Bailly, in a secretreport to
be read only by the king, leavesno doubt about this irrationality.
Mesrner'sl1uid purported to be a "reason"fbr theseunbridled pow-
e rs o [ th e " h e a rt."
In his report,r which was confidentialbecauseit concerned"pub-
lic morals,"Baillv describedthe total disorder of the sensesand the
magnetisti power over the patient created by the magnetic crisis.
"Patient" lle maladelought to be put in the f-emininehere lla ma-
ladelbecarse,as Bailly observed,
the crisisoccursmore frequentlyin u'omenthan in men.'I-hisdifference
hasas its first causethe differentorganizations of the trvo sexes.Women
have,as a rule,more rnobilenerves:their imaginationis more livelv,and
mo re e a s i l ye x c i te di:t i s re a c l i l yi mpressed
and arousecl ....In touchi ng
any givenpart,it rnaybe saiclthat they are touchedall overthe bocly....
It has beenobservedthat women are like musicalstrinflsstretchedin
perfectunison:when one is moved.all the othersare instantlyaffected.
Thus the Commissioners hal'erepeatedly observed that when the crisis
o ccu r s in o n e wo n la n . it o ccu r s al mcj st at once i n others.l
The description of the crisis itself spared Bailly the necessitv of
naming r.l'hat he observed:
When this kind of crisis is rpproaching, the countenancebecomesgrad-
ually inflamecl,the eye brightens, antl this is the sign of natural desire. . . .
The crisis continlres.horvever.and the eye is obscurecl,an unequivocal
sign of the complete disorder of the senses.This disorder may be wholly
From Lauoi-tierto Freud
by the wornan w'ho experiencesit, but it cannot escapethe
unperceivc.l
eve of the phvsician.As soon as this sign has been displaved,
"tr.rring
ii"'"r"fii, t..,r,-,-,.moist, respiration is short and interrupterl, the chest
convulsionsset in, and either the limbs or the rvhole body
f,irr.l. r"p,aty;
by sutlden rnovements.In lively and sensitivewomen this Iast
i;;ui;",.i
the sweetestemotion, is o{ten a convulsion;to this
,r*?, *ni.n-,e rminates
the re succee.llanguor, prostration,antl a sort o[ slumber of the
..,i,iirir"
which is a repose necessaryafter strong agitation'*
sens"s,
to the event itself :
But the effects of the crisis are nor lirnited
but, on the contrary,the
There is nothing disagreeablein the recollection,
s u hj e ctsfe e l th e b e tte r l b r i t. a n .l h a ve n o r e p u g n a n cel o e n te r a n e w l n to
they experience are the gerrns of the
,f-r.'ra,r,.stlte. Since the emotions
and inclinations, we can understand why the magnetistinspires
affections
such attachment,:rn attachment likely to be stronger and more marked
in women than in men, so long as men are entrusted with the task of
magnetism.Undoubtedlv many women havenot experiencedtheseeffects,
aniothers have understood the causeof the effectsthev experienced;the
more modesr rhey are, the lessthey would be likely to susPectit. But it is
said that severalhave perceivedthe truth, and have q'ithdrar.r'nfrom the
magnetic treatment, and those who have not perceived it ought to be
deterrecl fron-rits pursuit. . . . A condition into which a \&'omanenters in
public,amid other women who apparentlyhavethe sameexperience'does
not ,..* to offer any danger; she continues in it. she returns to it, and
discoversher peril when it is too late. Strong women llee from this danger
when they lincl themselvesexposedto it; the morals and health of the
weak may be impaired.'
Bailly and the other members of the commission-among them
Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, Beniamin Franklin, and foseph Guil-
lotin-lr'ho signed the only public report, appealed to the king and
to the authorities to confront the threat to morals posed by animal
magnetisrn: the sexual feelings provoked by the magnetist who
might abuse this attachment, this habit. . . . It was up to the king
to make a decision, to act with the means that were his-the law,
the police. They themselves, men of science, had done what they
were charged to do. They had carried out a rational investigation
and concluded-and this is the subiect of the public report-that
no agent studied by science, no "fluid" with predictable and repro-
ducible effects, could explailr-+he mesmerian crisis. The crisis could
not claim, therefore, to present new material for scientific investi-
d From Lauoisier to Freud
gation. Mesmerism was not an obiectof sciencebut rather a matter
for the law. The men of scienceyieldedto thosewho were respon-
sible for moral and socialorder.
The two commissions were charged with investigating the
double claim of Mesmer and his disciples:first, that animal mag-
netism could be explained by the existenceof a universal lluid
whose effects were felt by the body: and, second,that these effects
were of a curative nature. Accordingto Mesmer,whose words are
repeated in the report, "animal mtgnetism can bring about the
immediate cure of nervousmaladies.and the cure of others over a
longer period of time; it complementsthe action of medicines;it
provokes and directs salutary crises,which one can master'' . .
Through animal magnetism Nature offersus a universalmeansof
curing and protecting mankind."6
Why did the authorities decide that the commissionsought to
addressnot the work of Mesmer himselfbut that of Charles Des-
lon, his former disciple and, at this time, his rivall Apparently
becauseDeslon, a respecteddoctor,physician-regentof the Paris
Faculty of Medicine and first physicianto the Count of Artois, was
prepared to share with the investigators, his peers,the totality of
his knowledge and experience,while Mesmer claimed to be the
retainer of a secretdoctrine that he would revealonly to the sub-
scribing members of the "society of Harmony" who had promised
to keep the secret.But that is part of the history of mesmerism'
What interestsus here is the confrontationbetween the men of
scienceand the mesmerian crisis,and the manner in which the
former excluded the latter from the domain of reason whose
boundariesthey thereby defined.
After describing the object of the inquiry and the contract
agreed upon with Deslon-"Monsieur Deslon agreed with the
commissioners(r) to establishthe eristenceof animal magnetism;
(z) to communicatehis knowledgeconcerningthis discovery;(3) to
prove the utility of this discoveryand of animal magnetism in the
treatment of illness"T-the report oi the first commissionpresents
a "naturalist" descriptionof what theyobservedwhen they "went,
each one of them severaltimes, to the treatment sessionsof Mon-
sieur Deslon."8They describethe baquetas a circular casemade
From Lauoisier to Freud 5
out of oak with holes in the top, from which emerged bent and
movable iron bars. The patientsare placed in severalrows around
the baquet and linked to one another with a cord. Each patient is
in touch with the baquet through his or her iron bar, which could
be placeddirectly on the diseasedpart of the body.Music is played,
and sometimes songs. The magnetists are armed with an iron
wand ten or twelve inches long. Deslon'sfirst explanations feature
the words "concentration"and "communication": the baguet con-
centratesthe magnetic fluid, as do the ends of the wands; the cord,
the iron bars, the music communicatethe fluid. But the patients are
also magnetizedlry the gaze of the magnetist,by the applicationof
his hands or by the pressureof his fingers on the abdomen some-
times continued over the spaceof severalhours.
What is this fiuid concentratedin the baquet and transmittedby
the wands, the gaze, the cord, the fingers? It has nothing to do
with electricity or mineral magnetism. The commissionersestab-
lished this with an electrometerand an unmagnetizediron needle.
Even so, "one cannot help recognizing... agreatPowel that excites
and controls the patients and of which the magnetist seemsto be
the depository."eThis power may also be communicated:
The leastlittle noisecausestrembling,and we noticedthat a changeof
tone or beat in the music playedon the piano causedthe patientsto be
agitatedby more active movementsand occasioneda renewalof their
convulsions. They may appearto be
. . . All are subjectto the magnetist.
exhausted,but a word, a look, a sign from him revivesthem.. . . The
Commissioners observedthat in the numbersof patientshavingcrises,
there were alwaysmany women and only a few men; it requiredone or
two hoursto initiatethe crisis;and assoonasonepersonhad a crisis,the
otherssoonbeganin succession to havethem too.l0
But the commissionerscome to the end of their "general re-
marks." They had observedthe spectacleof the crisesbecause,as
they comment, "if one has not seena crisis,it is impossibleto imag-
ine it." They now must go on to deline their method of rational
inquiry. At this point, they must make a choice.Only one of them,
the naturalist Antoine Laurent de fussieu,member of the second
commission,botanist and professorat the fardin du Roi, decided
to continue studying the effectsof magnetism as they were pro-
6 From Lauoisierto Freud
duced around the baquet. "Was it not necessary," he pleadsin the
counter-reporthe appended to that of his colleagues,"to establish
a p ri ma ry :;i te o f o b s e rv a t i oni n treatment rooms w here many pa-
tients are brought together,where one can seemuch, learn succes-
sively all the detailsof the procedures,seize all the nuancesand
contradictory sensationsand their results,in a word, note all the
effectsthat deserreto be methodically verifiedf"rr We will return
later to fussieui report. For the rroment, let us listen to the argu-
m e n tso f th e o th e rc o mmi ssi oners:
The Commissioners soon judged that the public treatmentscould not
The multiplicityof the effectsis a
becomethe siteof their experiments.
first obstacle; one seestoo many thingsat onceto be ableto seewell any
one in particular.Besides, the distinguishedpatientswho comefor treat-
mentmight be annoyed by the questions;the needto observethernmight
embarrass or displease them: the Commissioners themselves woulclbe
hinderedby the needfor discretion.Thus they decidedthat sincetheir
continuedpresence was not necessary for the treatment,it would be suf-
of them attendedfrom time to time in orderto confirm
ficientthat several
their first generalobservations, to make new ones,if there wereany,and
to reportbackto thewholeCommission.rr
From the beginning,two procedures,or more precisely,two con-
ceptionsof reason,were put into opposition:the reasonof the "nat-
uralist" and the reasonof the "experimenter."For the naturalist,it
is exactly becauseone can "see a great many things" at the public
treatment sessions that one ought to concentrateon them, to learn
to observe,to seizenuances,to note what might escapean unedu-
cated gaze. For the experimenter,the multiplicity of effectsis an
obstacle:in order to isolatethe phenomenon,to sort out causes,to
seek proof, first of the existence,then of the effectiveness of the
"fluid," one must be free to intervene,to observeactively,to manip-
ulate the differentparameters of the situation.In short and in mod-
ern terms, it was necessaryto substitutefor the public setting fre-
quented by "distinguished patients" an experimental setting in
which the man of sciencecould determine the questions to be
asked,the experimentsto be undertaken, the proofs and counter-
proofs to which the object of study was to be subiected.From this
necessityemergesthe seconclobstacleoutlined by the commission-
From Lauoisier to Freud 7
ers: rvouldn't Deslon'spatientsbe embarrassedby being treated as
objectslHow might the commissionersthemselvesacceptsubiect-
ing people of their own station to the kind of treatment required
to produce an object of sciencei As we will see,at one step of the
inquiry this obstacle was overcome. Magnetism was tested on
people from "society" but not on Deslon'spatients:on cultivated
peoplewho never asked for a magnetic cure but consentedto the
experiencefor the sake of science.
Kant's definition of the "Copernican revolution," that is, the
transformationo[ the "balanceof power" between reasonand the
diversity of natural phenomena that is the hallmark of any valid
science,is well known: "Reason. . . must approachnature in order
to be taught by it. It must not, horvever,do so in the characterof a
pupil who listensto everything that the teacherchoosesto say,but
of an appointed judge who compelsthe witnessesto answer ques-
tions which he has himself formulated."ri Three yearsbefore Kant
wrote the preface to the second edition of The Critique of Pure
Reason,the kings commissionersclrew their own practicalconclu-
sion from this prescription.fussieu,who wanted to learn, could go
on observing if he wished. They, as men of science and therefore
as judges, could not addressthemselvesto Deslon'spatients,their
equals.
Creating a Fact
How might one prove the existenceof a magneticanimal fluic'll
What proofs would satisfy "enlightened physicians"i Deslon in-
sistedthat proofbe sought in the curativeeffectsofthe hypothetical
fluid. Howevet as he himself recountsin his "Observationson the
Two Reportsby His Majesty'sCommissioners,"his hopeswere dis-
appointed. The commissionersfirst refused to examine patients,
the oneswho were already in treatment as well as thosethey them-
selveshad brought. The commissionersexplained:"Nature alone,
without any treatment, cures a great number of patients.If mag-
netism had no effect,the patientssubjectedto its procedureswould
be, in effect,abandonedto Nature. In order to prove the existence
of this agent, it would be absurclto choosea method that, in attrib-
8 From Lauoisier to Freud
uting to the agent all the cures effectedby Nature, would tend to
prove that it had a useful and curative action when, in reality, it
had none."raHas not one seen.in effect,men "apparentlyattacked
by the same illness who are cured while following contrary re-
gimes: in this case,Nature is powerful enough to support life in
spite of a bad diet, and sometimesto triumph over diseaseand
remedy both."r5 In his counter-report Deslon expressesjustifiable
surprise:"l leaveone to draw onei own conclusionsabout Medicine
and the medicamentsit dispensesso profusely,if the Commission-
ers can advance this argument."16But he was obliged to see the
commissionersdecide on another procedure.They electedto study
the observable,transitory,and purely physical changescausedin
living bodies by the hypotheticalfluid. This study,as the commis-
sionersspecified,was to be accomplishedby "sifting out from these
effectsall the illusions that might be intermixed with them, and by
assuringthat theseeffectscan be due to no other causethan animal
magnetism."lT
"Reason"as it was defined by the commissionstudying the phe-
nomenon of mesmerism has as its primary attribute the ability to
identify parasiticaleffects,to purify an experimentalsetting such as
Deslon'sbaquet, encumbered with uncontrollable elements.The
commissionersdid not know what principles might be mobilized
by the hypothetical"fluid" invoked by Mesmer and Deslon ro ex-
plain the crises.Indeed, they made no effort to discoverthem, but
sought, rather, to test the relation between the hypotheticalfluid
and its observableeffects.
It would be difficult not to recognize here a faithful replication
of the method by which Lavoisier,also a member of the commis-
sion, had undertaken at this same period to revolutionizechemis-
try. In 1783,shortlv before the king had named him to the com-
mission investigatinganimal magnetism, Lavoisier had published
his Refections on Phlogiston, which began with the following
words: "I ask my readers,as they begin this dissertation,to castoff
their prejudicesas far as that is possible;to seein facts only what
they present,to banish from them all that reasoningmay havesup-
posedabout them."r8Five yearsafter the inquiry, he published his
From Lauoisier to Freud g
in which he also asks his rearlersto cast off
Elementsof ChemisU'y,
they know, to createa tabula rasa and allow them-
all they believe
be guided solely by facts'
selvesto
Of course, this method requires that facts be susceptibleto un-
why "casting off" in Lavoisier! vo-
ambiguousdecoding. That is
cabulary,always designatesa double operation including both the
observerand the observed.A scientistis scientificonly insofar as he
has succeedecl in overcoming "imagination, the confidencein our-
selvesso intimately connectedwith our pride, which continually
tendsto carry us beyond what is true."reA fact is a fact only if it is
also freed from the "illusions that might be intermixed with it,"
only if it is purified in such a way as to establisha demonstrable
and univocal relationship between the terms involved. Thus, the
achievementof the tabula rasa Lavoisier imposes on his readers
applies not onlv to the interpretation of facts, but to the "facts"
establishedby chemistry as well. Lavoisierattempts to show that
no previous chemist had sufficiently controlled his experiments:
none had been able to demonstratethat he had let nothing escape
from or penetratesurreptitiouslyinto the experimentalsetting. A
fact is therefore not what we can observe,nor even what can be
reproduced.It exists only relative to a closedspacethat has been
purified of all parasiticelements.Only in those conditionscan the
fact dictate its own interpretationin an immediate and atheoretical
manner,and then only when the interpreter'smind is not clouded
by prejuclice.
We havealready alluded to "reason"as a judicial procedure,that
ls, to reasonas defining what Kant called the Copernican revolu,
tion. In what measuredoes Lavoisier'smethod fit this definitionl
At first glance,the two methods appear contradictory.Indeed, La-
voisier'smethod includesletring nature dictatean adequatedescrip-
tron to the chemist. The chemist, for his part, is required "to sup-
press,or at least simplify as much as possible,the reasoningthat
comesfrom us and that alone is capableof leading us astray; he
must continually put this reasoningto the test and conserveonly
the tacts that are truths given by nature and rhat cannot lead us
into error."l')For Kant. on\he other hand. the scientistmust not
 ro From Lauoisier to Freud
play the role of submissivestudenr, but rather the role of master
a n d j u d g e : h e i s th e o n e w ho di ctatesi ts pri nci pl esro narure,rhe
ru l e sb y w h i c h n a tu re i s to respondto hi s quesri ons.
Rather than describingthesetwo viewpointsas contradictory,rve
will speakin terms of tensionbetweentwo elementsof an identical
theoretico-experimentalmethod. Kant and Lavoisierboth charac-
terize the rights and duties of reason in such a way as to exclude
the same tvpe of methodology-precisely the methodology pro-
moted by Jussieu.They both establisha conrrasrberweenthe scien-
tist who seeksto learn how to see,how to learn, and the one who
claims to possessthe means of guaranteeinga priori that what he
seeswill lead to a rational identificationof a phenomenon.
Lavoisier'smethod is rooted in the activity of the experimenter
who defineshis system.Becauseprevious chemistsobserveclwith-
out first isolatinga phenomenon,without defining it in such a way
as to exclude the possibilityof ambiguous or false inrerpretations,
they strayedinto the labyrinth of appearanceand illusion. In Kant's
svstem, the "means" are constitutive of understanding itself. In
other words, Kant and Lavoisier both describethe production of
objectsof scienceas an actiuity.For Kant, the activity is situatedon
the level of the perceptual"presentation"of the objectand doesnor
itself need to be the objectof consciouscontrol, while, for Lavoisier,
the activity is a consciousand organized work of purification and
i s o l a ti o n .
How ought one to interpret this differenceberweenKant's and
Lavoisier'ssystemsl Kant endeavoredto make senseof a science
that already existed,one that he conccivedas following the model
of rational mechanicsestablishedby Galileo. But at the time he
vvrote,Kant was already far rernovedfrom the era when Galileo
had confrontecladversarieswho challengedhis effort of puri6ca-
tion, who contested,for exarnple,that the phenomenonof falling
bodiescould be perceivedindependentlyof the presenceof air, that
it could be conceivedon the basisof the ideal fall, in a vacuum, in
the absenceof all friction. At the end of the eighteenrhcenrury,
w h e n Ka n t w ro te . th e c o n troversi es surroundi ng mechani csw ere
a l re a d ys e ttl e d ,a n d th e a rg umentso[ i ts cri ti cscoul d be seen onl y
as based on :r denial of the evidence.The questionsraised by a
From Lauoisier to Freud Ir
t he laws a falling object obeys,the distinction
bo dy in m ovem ent '
"oblect ivef act s" and illusion appear ,t hen, as t he expr es-
bet ween
"neut r al" r eason'n,hat ought to be eviclentto any man of
si o nof a
good sense.lr is on t his founclation that Kant codified the cate-
of understanding'
!ories
'
For Lav.risier.however,no similar previously acquired knowl-
edge applied. Indeed, Lavoisier was attempting to found a new
,.i!n.. precisely by uprooting the accumulated evidence of the
oast. Lavoisiercould no more claim to know the laws governing
chemical reactionsthan the commissionerscould claim to under-
standthe principlesof the hypothetical"fluid." The objectof chem-
istry could not, therefore,be defined by intrinsic laws in the same
rvay as falling bodies or the earth turning around the sun. The
object of the new chemical sciencewould neeclto be defined by
operationalboundary conditions,which would guarantee that noth-
ing placedin the experimentalenclosurewould escapeit, and that
everythingremaining after a reactionwas the product only of that
react10n.
But how were these boundary conditions to be defined in the
caseof mesmerisml How might one eliminate all parasitesfrom
the study of a "fluid" that supposedlyinfluenced bodiesl Scales,
which allowed Lavoisier to guaranteethe identity of weight in a
chemicalsystembefore and after a reaction,were of no use when
it came to the mesmerian lluid. An adequatetest of the lluid de-
manded assurancethat the bodies hypothetically subjected to it
would be reliable witnesses,that they would not lie, that they had
no illusions about the effects they experienced.Curiously, while
Lavoisier'smethod implied, on the one hand, that the mind would
be rid of its prejudices,and, on the other, that the phenomenon
could be purified of fallaciousappearances,the two conditionscon-
vergein the caseof Mesmer's lluid. Bodies themselves,the obiects
of experimentation,ought not be affectedby prejudices,illusions,
and imagination,which Lavoisierhad defined preciselyas obstacles
rn his new method. That is why the researchon animal magnetism
undertakenby the commissionershad as its main theme the effort
to separateimagination froaq the action of the "lluid." In order to
tulfill their purposes,the commissionershad to construct abstract
 12 From Lauoisierto Freud
bodiesstripped of the means rhar ordinarily allow living bodiesto
give a meaning to what they experience.If thar were plssible, the
magneticsubjectscould then becomereliablewitnessesof an actiorr
they experiencedin total passivity.
Thus the commissionersperformed their first experimentson
themselves.They were careful to establishthe criteria accordingto
which they could claim to be witnesses.The reporr makes clear
that they constitutedgood,faith witnesses,even heroic ones.They
were going to submit themselvesto the lluid and, in order ro prove
its possibleexistence,were ready to undergo its effects,which in
their casewere more likely to be disagreeablethan curative since
the commissionerswere in good health. "Tney were very eager to
recognize,by their own sensations,the announced effectsof the
agent. They therefore submitted themselvesto its effects,and with
such resolution that rhey would not have been sorry to experience
accidentsor a disturbanceoftheir health that, recognizedas a cer-
tain effectof magnetism, would haveallowed them immediarelyto
resolve,and by their own testimony,this important question."2l
However, things were not so simple: "There is no individual, even
in the best state of health, who, if he wishes to listen atrenrivelv.
does not feel within him an infinity of movementsand variations,
be it inlinitely slight pain or heat in different parts of the body.":z
The commissionerstook care then "not to pay too closeattention
to what was happening in them. If magnetism is a real and pow-
erful cause,there is no need for the subjectsto think about it for it
to act and becomemanifest; it ought, in a manner of speaking,to
force, to fix their attention, and to make itself noticed even bv a
mind that is purposelydistracted."2r
The Price of the Fact
Too often epistemologicaldiscussionsleaveone problem unad-
dressed.Their usual model is a situation in which the experimental
setting supposedto produce facts has already been recognizedas
legitimate.In that case,the price of rhe setting-what it has elim,
inated and the questionsit precludes-is concealed.It is deemed
proper, in such a setting,to haveeliminated certain elementssince
From Lauoisier to Freud 13
seenas extraneousto the phenomenonunder study.
they are rightly
courage required to understandthem as extraneousis
Ind.ed, the
recognized in works cited as models. Whether
one of the qualities
discussionsthereforeaddressii-
it is statedor not, epistemological
As in the caseof rational mechanics in the line of
turical examples.
who are interested in what the experimental
Kanr'sCritique, those
producedany
serringhas elirninated no longer exist; nor havethey
scientificdescendantswho might protest' Is this the casewith Des-
lon'sargumentswhen he denouncedthe commissioners'"error" in
establishinga setting that eliminated preciselywhat they aimed to
study? As we will see,nothing is less sure, and that is why the
inquirv of the commissionconcerns us today.
Discussingthe first series of experiments,Deslon emphasizes
how significantit was that, in spite of the accumulationof unfavor-
able circumstances(the brevity and wide spacing of sessions,the
inattention required of the participants),three commissionersun-
deniably felt something. The commissioners'report, however,in-
terpretsthesesensationsas the "background noise" normal in any
experience:"These little accidentsare the result of the perpetual
and ordinary variationsof the stateof health,and are consequently
foreign to magnetism,or they result from pressurein the stomach
region."2a What is essentialfor the commissionersis that their set-
ting efiectivelyeliminate what, in the public treatments, had so
i mpr essedt hem :
The calm and silencein the one (individualtreatmentwith the baquet),
the movementand agitationin the other (the public treatment):there,
multipleeffects,violentcrises,the habitualstateof the body and mind
rnterrupted and troubled,narureexaked;here,the bodywithoutpain,the
mind untroubled,nature conservingits equilibrium and its ordinary
course,in a word, the absence one no longerfindsthis great
ofall effects:
powerthat astonishes in the publictreatment;magnetism, withoutenergy!
apPears strippedofany perceivable action.?5
From this point of view, the commissionersobtained a negative
proof. It remains to be seen however,whether this negativeproof
ts relevant. In a more general way, one might ask whether the
search for purely physicate$4cts determined by the momcntary ac-
tton of magnetism acting on anyoneis relevant.
 14 From Lauoisier to Freud
Deslon deniesthat it is. According to him, magnetism produces
momentary and perceivableeffectsonly on a small number of ill
people, and their impressionsvary conrinually,indeed, infinitely.
On the other hand, many ill people,he wrires, were cured without
feeling anything; some entered into the mesmerian crisis sponra-
neously without being touched, without being near the baquet;
others were treated, touched, seatedat the baquet, sometimesfor
hours or days,without feeling anything. Since the phenomenonis
infinitely variable depending on the sensibilitiesof the individuals
involved,the reasoningof the commissioners-if they feel no sen-
sation,magnetism does not syi51-i5 not, for Deslon, relevant.
In his minority report, Jussieusharesthis point of view:
Followingthem [the partisans
of magnetism], the influenceof this agent
is not manifestedindifferentlyon everyperson;it is more perceivable in
certainindividualswho are sick or delicate.As a result.experiments on
very healthypeopleand eventhosesupposedly carriedout on just a few
ill peoplewill not decidethe question,if noneof themfelt any sensarions.
Thesenegativeproofsare admissiblewhen no contraryfact is opposedto
them; but observedeffectsought to be attackedby other means.26
What is a factl According to Lavoisier'smethod, somerhingbe-
comesa fact only when it has been obtained in perfectlycontrolled
experimental conditions. Thus, similar to chemistry before Lavoi-
sier,animal magnetism cannot presume to establishany facts.For
fussieu, on the contrary, a fact is positiue in the sensethat it poses,
and imposes,a problem. It cannot be acceptedas it is, but must be
examined in the conditionsthat produceit.We seehere two opposing
programs concerning facts,two usesof reason.For some,a fact is
only what resistspvification, isolation, experimental preparation.
For others, a fact is what requireselucidation. In both casesfacts
imply a critical approach. In the first, the critical demand is ad-
dressedto the phenomenon: in order to become a fact, it must
permit purification and control (if the l1uid exists,ir must act s;mi-
larly in every living body). In the second,the demand is addressed
to the observer.Critical elucidation cannor be dissociatedfrom an
apprenticeshipthat will enable this observerto produce relevanr
distinctions,to specify,to fix clearly,in shorr, to elaboratethe lan-
guage appropriateto fact.
From Lauoisier to Freud 15
We will not review in detail the predictableoutcomeof the com-
"self-experiments,"the commis-
mission'sinquiry. After their first
sioners tested magnetism on sick people, condescendingto test
Deslon'sviews according to which the fluid had litde effect on
healthybodies.In a rather amusing way,the commissionerssucces-
sivelyaddressedsick people chosenfrom "the lower classes"'then
"populace"
from "society."Indeed, out of sevenpatients from the
magnetizedby Deslon in the presenceof the commissioners,three
had felt the action of magnetism to the extent that the commission-
ers recognized the need for a scrupulousexamination. But they
refusedto accept these subiectsas reliable witnesses.On the con-
trary, the commissionerssuddenly expressedthe desire to address
patients "who could not be suspectedof any interest and whose
intelligencemade them capableof discussingtheir own sensations
and to make an accountof them."27One might submit poor people
ro testsinconceivablefor peopleof good society,but at the price of
their dependence.People of the lower classescan be made to be-
lieve anything, and they might try to speculateon their interestin
satisfying their interrogators. "Let us consider the position of a
man of the people,and thereforeignorant, struck by an illnessand
wishing to be cured, who is led with great pomp before an as-
sembly composed in part of physicians,where an entirely new
treatment is administeredto him, which he is convincedwill pro-
duce prodigies.Add to this that his compliancehas been remuner-
ated and that he believeshe will satisfyus by sayingthat he expe-
riences effects and we will have natural causesto explain these
effects;we will have,at the least,legitimate reasonsto doubt that
their true causewas magnetism."28
Good witnesseswould therefore be cultivated people whose in-
differenceand incredulity made them worthy of confidence(how
could one ask an impressionableman of the peoplenot to "pay too
much attention" to what was happening to himl). However, here
again, the results were not perfectly clear. The commissioners
thereforesettledon a new researchstrategybasedthis time on the
explicit hypothesisthat the effectsof magnetismare determined by
anticipatedpersuasion.Thq recruited another magnetist,and un-
dertook to test their hypothesison subjectssusceptibleto magne-
 r8 From Lauoisier to Freud From Lauoisier to Freud 19
the con-rmissioners to relativize the value of their poor subjects' pruelizilg acrivity.In physics,iI one '"vishes t. defineit, the
.-.eercooce
testimony.The laundresstolcl Deslon before wirnessesthat when *".-";n.,io, may be said to be the fluid which collectsin us and which
she was magnetized without knowing it, she had a fit of laughter, us m()re(,r less actively,depending on the force of the inter-
.;.;;.r fronr
l,t-i, ."r.rn"l resisrence ir encounters. Under r,r'hichof eithero[ these
an attack of madness,that she rubbed her hands together,and so
Commissioners consicler the powerwhich theyattrib-
on. Deslon comments: "Sinceone has gone so far as to supposethat ,io ,,p..,, tlid the i7
in my treatmentsi
there are patientswho, even when they don't feel anyrhing,uish to u,. ,o ,n. irnagin:rtion
satisfy their Doctors by saving that theyfeel certain efects, this witness Indeed, the con-rmissioners did not give a precisede{inition of
will not be believed. Nevertheless,her declaration is strikingly the "pou,er of the imagination." The questionsposed by Deslon
plausible.She rvas in a srrangehouse, in the presenceof a Lady persistfor us today. Although we no longer believe in Mesmer's
whom she had never seen,to whom she had been introduced to huid, we st ill pose quest ionsabout t he nat ur e of suggest ion.The
obtain work-yet, according to the reporr itself, she conversed commissioners'method could not lead them to this interrogation
gaily. This gaiety appearsro be nor dissimilar ro rhar which ordi_ sincethe irnagination played for them the role that the "placebo"
narily begins her crises."ra plays in r-nedicinetoday. Medical experimentation endeavorsto
As for the three causesinvoked by the commissioners-imagi- prove that the therapeuticeffect of a drug is superior to that of a
nation, touch, imitation-Deslon derides rhem. Touchl ,,Experi- placebogiven to a seriesof sick persons.The membersof the com-
ence provesthat their entire theory of physicalcontacris foreign to missionconstructedthe hypothesisand demonstrated-at leastrel-
animal magnetism. If these genrlemen had deigned to follow my ariveto the experimentalconditionsthey had establishecl-that the
operationsfrom time to time, they would have convinced them- fluid did not resist a test of this sort. In both cases,imagination
sel'es that often it is not the patient I touch who feelsthe effectsso {iguresas a "parasite"phenomenon,that is, a phenomenoncapable
much as anorher whom I do not rouch."rsImitationl At best, it either of scrambling or of simulating the effect whose existenceis
only reinforcesthe effect of the fluid. The counrerproof is in the to be demonstratedor disproved.Whether imagination is actively
diversity of effects in the various individuals participating in excludeclfrom the experimental setting (magnetizing rvithout the
the samecrisis: "The cough of one parienris supposedto make the subjectbeing aware of it) or whether it is activated in isolation
otherscoughi Imitating one who sleeps,all the othersare supposed (persuadingthe subjectthat he is being magnetized),its effectsare
to go to sleep?And the profound reposeof one would make all not studiedas such but as what has to be separatedfrom thosethat
are t he ohiecto[ invest igat ion.
my patientslethargic! That cannor be what thesegentlemenmean,
since in describingmy treatmentselsewhere,they say that someof
Should WeListen to lussieu?
my patients cough, other-cspit, others sleep,and yet others are agitated
and tormented."36 Does irnaginationcornbinewith rnagnetismor doesit act alone?
It is imagination, however,that arousesDeslon'smost ferocious The commissionersansweredthis question,as we have seen,with
irony. Is imagination suppposedto explain rhe curarive effectsof a cer t aln num ber of t est sdem onst r at ingt hat im aginat ion act ing
the crisesand convulsionsl Why do ordinary spontaneousconvul- a.loneis powerful but magnetism acting alone is not. This proce-
sionsnot produce the sameeflectsl What is imaginationl clureenabledthem to concludethat imagination can act alone,but
it didn't exclude the other alternative.To exclude that, they took
To make imagination,which is an attributeof our souls,a principle literally the hypothesisthat the fluid acts physically
.of on bocliesas
activein the realdiseases
rvhichI rreatand in rheequallyrealcureswhich
doesthe Newtonian force which Mesmer himself in-
I perforrn,the commissioners areobligedto communicate their ideasand {atrracrion,
their principles.In metaphysicsthe imaginationis generallyviewedas a voked as an example; if mlnetism is
a real cause,it should not
20 From l-auoisier to Freud
need the concurrenceof attention or imagination to work. fussieu's
procedure is the opposite of this one. fussieu is less interestedin
knowing whether a fluid "causes"crises-and thus in subjecting
the crisesto circumstancesthat would allow him to define a uni-
vocalrelationshipof causeand effect-than in understandingwhat
the crisescan teach us. Therefore, evaluatingthe same type of ob-
servationas his fellow commissioners,fussieudraws a slightly dif-
ferent conclusion:"One may conclude that the imagination, fore-
stalled, nullified, or excited by various causes,acts with enough
force on man to produce great effectsin him without the help of
an external agent."18However, these facts against magnetism are
not sufrcient: "One positive fact clearly demonstrating the exis-
tence of an external agent would destroy all the negative facts,
which attest only its nonaction."reThis is a typical Popperian po-
sition:40wishing to demonstratethat there is no externalagent,that
a uniuersalstatement is possible,the commissionerswere at the
mercy of any one fact that would refute this statement.By contrast,
fussieu, who was attempting to establish only an existential state-
ment by showing that such an agent might occasionallyoperate,
had to demonstratethe "evidence"of that fact.
fussieu describesfacts that are "not numerous and not varied
becauseI could cite only those that were verified and about which
I had no doubts."lrNone of thesefacts was produced by action on
subjectswho knew they were being observed.fussieu proceeded
with a discreetkind of testing that did not interfere with the nor-
mal course of patient treatment. A woman whose eyes were dis-
easedand who "appeared more concerned with the rod from a
baquet directed toward her eyesthan with the conversationof the
other patients"a:became agitated and upset :rfter Jussieu,from a
distanceof six feet, directed the wand toward her stomach,which
he knew was very sensitive.Others, while in crisis,appearedto be
curiously sensitiveto movementsthey could not observeeither be-
causetheir eyeswere closedor becausethe movementwas made be-
hind their backs or after a pausethat precluded their anticipation.
What did fussieu conclude from these "facts"l Does he take
sides with the partisansof magnetism? On the contrary, he de-
nouncestheir imprudence and sendsthem packing with thosewho
From l-auoisier to Freud 2r
have probably unjustly censured them. The partisans of magne-
tism, he notes,
tried to make this treatment more interesting by propping it up ,tuith a
grand theory, by involving all of Nature in its effects,by making claims
lor a fluid that acted at considerable distances,by proving its existence
with curious and extraordinary tests,by ascribingto it a universalefrcacy,
by reducing all illnessesto one, and by establishinga regular practiceon
a new and insuficiently demonstratedsystem.What was the result? To
the enthusiasm of some was opposed the reasonabledoubt of others. An
attempt was made to examine before lending credence.. . . The lack of
uniformity in the causesand in the results imposed the conclusion that
the lluid did not exist, that the effectswere illusory or depended uniquely
on the imagination; and the refectionof the ill-proved doctrine enveloped
the whole treatment in the same condemnation.as
For fussieu, the "agent" responsible for magnetism is perhaps no
more mysterious than life itself; it might indeed be the "active
principle" that generates movement in living bodies. Such a prop-
osition may seem vacuous to us, but we need to remember that, for
Lavoisier himself, heat was a weightless fluid that could, like the
"animal heat" fussieu was attempting to characterize, fix itself in
bodies, escape from them, penetrate them. We must remember also
that another member of the commission, Benjamin Franklin, de-
scribed electricity in the same way. Indeed, |ussieu advances the
hypothesis that electric fluid and animal heat might be a unique
principle, a congruence that would explain "the marked correspon-
dence between atmospheric variations and the state of our or-
g a ns :
SinceNature is always simple in its principles,we will admit a new mod-
ification more easily than a new principle. Matter introduced into an an-
imal body and transformed into substancechanges its nature, so to speak,
when it becomesorganic; in the same way, the active principle, which in
air is purely electrical, when it is received in the animal body and is
modified by its union with matter and by organic impression,takes on
there another form and diversesecondarypropertieswhile still remaining
subject to its primitive laws.as
For jussieu, the principal law is that of equilibrium: heat spreads
in a uniform manner; elect{city escapesimpetuously from the bod-
res in which it has accumulated to leao toward the bodies in which
 22 From Lauoisier to Freud
i t i s l a c k i n g . S i mi l a rl y , i f o ne admi ts rhar the proporti onsof the
activeprinciple may vary in living beingsand even in the organsof
one individual, then one can understand that it might be "pushed
outsicleby some, and attracted or avidly sucked in by others."a,'
And the power of irnaginationitself could be explainedby the way
in which it "torments the principle subject to irs power, drives it
rapidly in all the parrs of the body, pushesit outside or atrractsir
inside with an equal vivacity,and by thesethree diversemovemenrs
... produces all the effects attributed to its action."aTIn orher
words, the "active principle" is not, for ]ussieu,a wav of explaining
away "moral causality,"but rather of understandingit. It enables
h i m. i n p a rti c u l a r,to u n d erstand how i n vari ous ci rcurnstances
purely physicalcausesand purely mental causescan havethe same
type of sff661-'ffhgn the subject is not consciousthat a "magne-
tized" wand is directed roward him, or when he falselybelieveshe
is rnagnetized-and how they might nullify or reinforce each
other.
fussieu'shypothesisarrempts to rransform the ambiguity that
had causedthe commissionto condemn the mesmerianohenome-
n o n i n to a p o s i ti v ed e s c ri p ti o n:
Thesesimpleideas,which were not communicated
to me but which I
believeare not new, might prol'idegroundsfor a larger development.
Presented in an abridgedform, theywill suffice,
perhaps, to explainsome
of the phenomena of animaleconomyobserved eitherin the ;eatmenrs,
calledmagnetic,or in other circunrstances. We will be lesssurprisedbv
this influenceof one bodyon anothelby this corresponden.., .u*eti-.,
quite noticeable, betweenthe actionof one individualand rhe sensarion
of another,or betweentwo organsof the sameindividual;we will tend
lessto confusethe actiorsof the souland the imaginationwith an action
that is purelyanimal;we will distinguishthe deterrnining causeand the
executingagent;we will be ableto positthat the activepiinciple,always
actingaloneand immediatelyon our organs,is excitedsometimes by the
imaginationand the will, as superior and internal causes,
sometimes by a
portionof itselfemanatingfrom surroundingbodies,and sometimes
by
the combinedactionsof thesecauses.48
Even though the notions of equilibrium, accumulation,and dis,
charge have continued up to our day to haunt phenomenological
models and descriptionsof subjectiveexperience,and even though
From Laaoisier to Freud 23
u'e have never resolvedthe question of multiple causes,Jussieu's
hypothesesneverthelessstrike us as old-fashioned,while rhe com-
mission'sexperimentalmethod has not lost its current interest.The
inevitable divergencebetween our ways of reading the two rexts
thereforepresentsus with a double obstacle.
This divergencemight almosr automaticallvlead us to privilege
the exper im ent alm et hod, what everit s int r insiclim it s, and in spit e
of the fact that it does not explain the "power of the imaginarion"
on bodies.To the extent that we cannor even today claim to under-
stand this power, we "knor.r"'that the commissiondid not havethe
meansto elucidateit. At the very leasr,the commissiondefinitively
clearedimportant ground for us, made the progressof knowledge
possiblepreciselyby denving the exisrenceof a universalfluid sup-
posedto explain and to cure everything.
We can also becomelost in the twists and turns of the history of
ideas.We would then try to reestablishan equilibrium berweenrhe
commissioners'and fussieu'spositionsby using the historicalcon-
text and the omnipresenceof the notion of fluid at the end of the
eighteenth century in order to "excuse" |ussieu,and demonstrate
that his position,at the time, was as rational as that of his adversar-
ies. In both cases,in fact, we would take advantageof the senseof
superiority that a distanceof two centuriesis supposedto confer
upon us, whether we highlight the play of resemblances berween
us and the commissioners(we don't believein the mesmerianfluid,
therefore the commissionerswere right), or choose the path of
understanding(in fussieut place,we also might have invoked "an-
imal heat").
The lessonto be learned perhapslies elsewhere-in the conse-
quencesfussieu drew from his hypothesis.For him, the "physical
influence of one man on another" must be admitted on the same
grounds as physicalinfluencedue to contactor to touch. The first,
which explains that animal heat could be communicated without
direct contact,is rarer, but both seem to havethe same tonic effect.
Like all tonic remedies,they both produce resulrsthat may be sal-
utary or harmful according to circumstances."Treatment by
touch," remarks fussieu,"fre{ been practicedsincethe beginning of
time and in all Nations; but consigned to rhose not suitable to
 24 From Lauoisier to Freud
manageit, administeredwithout method, and relegatedto popular
and particular practices,it has always languished in obscurity."re
What is needed, therefore, writes fussieu, is to saveit from this
obscurity,to improve our understanding of the simultaneousor
alternating or even opposedaction of mental and physicalcauses,
to experiment methodically,to reflect,to publish,and to draw away
from spectacularphenomenasuch as the "grand crises,"whose ef-
fectivenesswas not proved but which were "seductivebecausethey
produced perceptibleeffectsand seemedto prove the existenceof
an agent."50What was needed,in short, was to avoid mystery,spec-
ulations,and experimentsdue to pure curiosity "which turn mag-
netism into Magic," but to perfect and to find solid ground for this
"treatment by touch, so useful in certain cases,and which promises
to be even more so when it is better known."sl
Here, fussieu no longer needs any excuse;rather, the familiar
character of the strategy of the commissionersand its apparent
timelinessshift ground and becomefor us more disquieting. Has
the situation really changed very much in the pasr two hundred
yearsl Aren't we still stuck between,on the one hand, spectacular
and mysterious cures rejected by oficial medicine, and, on the
other hand, medical practicesbasedon experimentationthat take
the placeboeffect inro accounronly as a parasireto be eliminated
in the rational evaluation of the effectiveness of medicationsl In
view of this, it is not surprising that trearmenrby touch and other
unofficiai techniquescontinue to be practiced on the margins of
officialmedicine,that they continue to advanceclaims that are both
fascinatingand unverified.Ofrcial medicine today still cannor de-
fine what fussieu wishfully called for: a methodical technique of
investigationwhose aim would be to take as a positiveobject what
apparently escapesthe rational relationshipof causeand effect as
we conceiveit. The controversyamong Deslon, fussieu,and the
other commissionerswould belong, then, less to the history of
"ideas" than to the still-current history of what we define as .,ra-
tional practices."This controversyconcernsthe price we are or are
not willing to pay to maintain a clear distinctionberween"rarional"
practicesand those we suspectofproceeding not from "reason"but
from the power of the "heart," practicesinherited nor from scien-
tists but from sorcerers,magicians,and other miracle workers.
From Lauoisier to Freud 25
In any case, Jussieuwas not heard. After the publication of
two reports denying the existenceof the mes-
lio,ooocopiesof the
condemning the practiceof mesmerism,the Fac-
merian fluid and
ulty of Medicine required its members who were initiated into
magnetismto sign an act of abiuration by which they promised to
renouncenot only their practiceof mesmerism but their belief in
it as well. Of the zr members of the Faculty who had received
instructionfrom Deslon, I7 signed the act. Indignant that Deslon
had revealedhis secretsto the commission,on the one hand, and
denying,on the other,that Deslon had ever really known his secrets
and, therefore,that the verdict of the commissioncould have any
validity,Mesmer left France in r785 after a quarrel with the mem-
bers of his own society.He died 30 years later in Switzerland on
the banks of Lake Constanceafter a sereneold age.
The brutal institutional consequences of the commissions'two
reports furnished ample ground for reflection. The reports ne-
gated-in the name of science,in the name 6f 1625qn-1he expla-
nation that had been given for a phenomenon that, in itself, did
not correspondto the norms of experimentalreason;this negation
furnishedthe ground for its condemnation.However,if we look to
the history of hypnosis,in which mesmerismplaysan integral part,
such negations are common. Mesmer's doctrine itself emerged
from a negation.Mesmer realized that magnetism was n61-xs 16
and many others had first believed-linked to the unusual prop-
ertiesof magnets(mineral magnetism).Hadn't he seenthe exorcist
fohann Caspar Gassnerprovoke criseswith a wooden cross?Ani,
mal magnetism represents,then, the elimination of a nonnecessary
tactor:crisescould be provoked without magnets.
The same processof negation did operateon Mesmer'sconcep-
tionsevenbefore his death.s2At the sametime that the commission
was investigatingmesmerianpractices,Armand de Puys6gur,a pu-
pil of Mesmer!, expresseddoubt about whether the crisis, which
Mesmer had promoted as the primary manifestationof magnerism,
was anything other rhan a parasiticalelement.After the heydayof
the collectivecrisis, then, came "magnetic somnambulism," and
many defendersof mesmerr\rrrcriticized the membersof the com-
rnissionbecause
they had not examined its most interesting as-
Pect.-no, the crises, but casesof somnambulism, which James
 26 From Lauoisier to Freud
Bra i d w a s to re n a me h y p n o ti sm i n r843. S i mi l arl y,i n r8r3, A bb6
Faria affirmed that no specificforce, fluid or other,emanatedfrom
the magnetist. Everything occurred in the mind of the subject.
From mineral magnetism to hypnotism, this history led to the
elimination of the magnetic fluid-and indeed to the elimination
of all "causes"that might unilaterally produce effectsin the sub-
ject-and to a focus on rhe problem of "imagination" and how it
enablessubjects to affect each other, or indeed, themselves.But
while the reduction, in the name of science,of animal magnetism
to imagination,touch, and imitation was meant by the commissions
to excludemagnetism from the domain of legitimate pracrices,this
history has produced the particularizationof the problem of hyp-
nosis, the determination of inappropriate solutions,in short, the
specificationof the challenge hypnosisconsrirurestoday,as it did
two centuriesago, for all rational exploration of the capacitiesof
living bodies.
We will return to certain aspectsof this history in the last secrion
of this book. Here, the commissioners'inquiry and its resultshave
servedas a prologue, as a first, almost emblematic,clash between
the capacitiesof the body (or hearr or imagination)and of "reason,"
or more precisely,a particular kind of reason,armed with the ex-
perimental methods of purilication and isolation,and directed to-
warcl the search for "reasons,"that is, reproducible relations be-
tween causes(what the experimentercan manipulate and control)
and effects(what the observercan observeaccording to an estab,
lished protocol). We will now take a leap of a hundred years,and
describethe opening of a secondhistory that is in many respectsan
exactly reversedversion of the first, for the commission'sconclu-
sion-"lt's only imagination"-will be turned upside down and
will be regarded not as a causefor rejection but as a foundation.
The history of the relationsberweenFreud and hypnosis,like the
history we have just described,pur two quesrionsinto play: What
can hypnosisdo? and What is science,or what ought it to bel
Freud at the Salp€triire
This story beginsat the Salpdtriire in Paris,the renowned cenrer
of fean-Martin Charcott experimenrswith hypnosis.It rakesplace
From Lauoisier to Freud 27
during the period of triumphant positivism.Hypnosis could return
to rhe domain of scienceat this point only becauseit was srripped
of its resistantsingularity and embedded in an inrerprerationthat
guaranteedthe possibility of univocal facts. Only the somaric as-
pect sof hypnosiswer e int er est ingr o Char cot and his st udent s.I n-
deecl,theseaspectsalone guaranteedthe absenceof simulation and
permitted the separationof hypnosis,strictly speaking,from "par-
asitic" factors such as the patient's imagination and the experi-
menter's pow,erof suggestion.By contrast,Hippolyte Bernheim's
rival school at Nancy retained suggesrion,which they delined as
"an idea conceivedby the operarot seizedby the subiect,and ac-
ceptedby his mind," as the explanatoryfactor in hypnosis.5r
Charcot'sinterestin hypnosiswas inseparablefrom the anatorn-
ical clinical method by which he identified physiologicaldefects
capableof explaining organic nervousdiseases. His perspectivewas
more experimental than therapeutic.Indeed, as Freud implies, in
this setting a patient is more interestingdead than alive:
Yearsof patientwaiting were often necessary beforethe presence of or-
ganic changecould be provedin thosechronicillnesses which are not
directlyfatal;andonly in a hospitalfbr incurableslike the Salp€tridrewas
it possible
to keepthe patientsunderobservation for suchlong periodsof
time. Charcotrnadehis first demonsrrarion of this kind befbrehe hatl
chargeof a department.While he was still a studenthe happenetlr<r
engagea maid-servant who sufferedfrom a peculiartremor and could
not find a situationon accountof her clumsiness. . . . Charcotkept this
interestingservant,althoughin the courseof theyearsshecosthim a small
lortunein dishesand plates.When at lasrshecliedhe wasableto dem-
onstratefrom her caseth^tparalysiechory'tformr
wasthe clinicalexpression
of multiplecerebro-spinal sclerosis.sa
Ber nheim , on t he ot her hand, r vasr he pupil of Am br oise Au-
guste Li6beault, who did not think of himself as a docror bur as a
healer.Bernheim was therefore immediately confronted with the
question of the therapeutic effecrcof hypnosis. Indeed, he was re-
sponsiblefor diverting Li6beault from his belief in the virtues of
a magnetic fluid. Li6beault had used magnetized water ro cure
young children suffering from diarrhea,vomiting, anorexia,and so
fbrth. tsut Bernheim propdsqd using orclinary rvarerlwhich Li6-
beault then told the morher was magnerized-and the cure still
occurred.55 It was therefore through theseeffects,obviouslv related
28 From Lauoisier to Freud
to the charisma of Li6beault and the confidencehe inspired in the
mother,that Bernheim approachedthe problem of hypnosis.Trans-
posed into the scientificcontext, the affectiverelation was defined
as "suggestion,"a unilateral link betweenthe experimenterand the
patient.Classifiedin thesepsychophysiological terms, suggestion-
the transferenceof an idea conceivedby the experimenter to the
mind of the hypnotic subject-does not constitutean explanation,
but it does give hypnosisthe appearanceof being a phenomenon
reducibleto "the laws of biology and psychology."
However, even at the Salp€tridre,where patients'reactionswere
registeredas if they were purely somaticor mechanical,it was im-
possiblenot to acknowledgethe phenomenaof "electivesensibility"
that had so impressedthe commissionersand had led them to keep
part of their report secret,for the king's eyesalone. It was recog-
nized that "patients in a state of somnambulism often manifest a
kind of attraction for the operator who has put them to sleep."56
Assuredly,one is tempted to explain these manifestly erotic reac-
tions,which occasionallyresultedin orgasmin certainsubiects(hyp-
notized or not), by the direct stimulation of erogenouszones.But
the situation is not that simple: "The excitation of an erofaenous
zone is effectiveonly if it resultsfrom pressureexertedby a person
of the other sex; if the pressure is exerted by another woman,
or by an inert object, it only producesa disagreeablesensation."57
This was the situation when Freud arrived in Paris in October
r885, to attend Charcot'slecturesand work in his iaboratory.What
motives could have causedFreud to undertake this voyagel What
kind of previous training did this young man havel Freud had
worked in Vienna for six years in the physiologicallaboratory of
his teacherErnst Wilhelm von Ilriicke. Having left Brtjrcketo es-
tablish himself as a neuropathologistand wishing to acquire clin-
ical experience.in rti83 Freud entered the psychiatricdepartment
directed by Theodor Meynert at Vienna's Allgemeines Kranken-
haus. There Freud did laboratory work on the histology of the
nervoussystem,and eventually moved to the department of neu-
rology, where he treated patients with the physical methods then
in use-massage, electrotherapy,hydrotherapy,and so on. He re-
m a i n e d th e re u n ti l r8 8 q .
From Lauoisier to Freud 29
There was nothing unusual about Freud's training. It was in
accord with the contemporary organicist conceptionof neuropa-
thology.However, Freud's interest had been awakenedby another
dimensionof mental illness.We refer,of course,to the caseof Anna
O. and her treatment by Dr. JosephBreuer, a friend of Freud s.
After the death of her father, Anna O' had presentedvarious hys-
tericalsymptoms,including paralysisof her arms and legs,contrac-
rures,and visual and languagedisturbances.In addition, she devel-
oped a dual personality.The passagefrom one personalityto the
other coincided with a stateof autohypnosisduring which she re-
vealednumerous details of her life. It was in this way that Anna
O. happenedone day to relate the origin of one of her symptoms.
Upon her emergencefrom the hypnotic state,the symptom disap-
peared.Afterwards, other symptoms disappearedin the same way.
Observingthis process,and even though he was opposedto the use
ofhypnosis,Breuer undertook to hypnotize his patient during their
therapy sessions.Prior to any theoreticalinterpretation,then, the
catharticmethod was Dorn.
This episodewas to be particularly valuablefor Freud. He saw
in it proof that the therapeuticaction of hypnosisought to be dis-
tinguished from suggestion:Didn't Anna O. experiencethese ef-
fectswithout their being anticipatedeither by her or by her doctor?
W hen one discusses hypnot ict r eat m ent s,
[ilt is plausibleto supposethat it is a questionhereof unconscious sug-
gestions: the patientexpectsto be relievedofhis sufferingsby this proce-
dure,and it is this expectation, and not the verbalutterance,which is the
operativefactor.This, however,is not so.The first caseof this kind that
cameunder observation datesback to the year r88r, that is to sayto the
"pre-suggestion" era.A highly complicated caseof hysteriawasanalysed
in this way,and the symptoms,which sprangfrom separatecauses,werc
separately removed.This observation was made possible by spontaneous
auto-hypnoses on the part of the patient,and cameas a greatsurpriseto
the observer.58
Freud learned of this casein r88z from Breuer.who. disturbed
by the feelings he had inspired in his patient, had already put an
end to the treatment. The tqro problems Freud discoveredon this
666x516n-[ypnosisand hysteria-never ceasedto preoccupyhim.
 From Lauoisier to Freud
30
Much has been said about Freud's stay in Paris,and one of the
presentauthors has alreadygiven a detailedaccountof it.5eWe will
trace here only its principal phases.While working in the cerebral
anatomy laboratory,Freud also attendedCharcott famous lectures.
He was deeply impressed.On November z4 he wrote to his fianc6e:
" C h a rc o t ... s i m p l y d e mo l i shesmy vi ew s and ai ms." 60N everthe-
less,at the beginning of December,Freud announcedhis intention
of leaving Paris. He did not execute his intention, however,but
remained in Paris until the termination of his scholarship.One
might surmise,then, that Freud experienceda crisis whose causes
w o u l d a ro u s eo u r c u ri o s i ty .
The Salp€tridrewas undoubtedly the place where Freudt train-
ing as a specialistin the physiologyof the nervoussystemdevoted
to treating chronic, even incurable,patientsconvergedand was ar-
ticulated with his experienceswith hysteriaand hypnosis.Indeed,
it was from Charcot that Freud learned to distinguish between
organic illness,linked to organic nervousdysfunction,and hysteri-
cal disturbances.
In r893, the year of Charcot'sdeath, Freud publishedthe results
of his research,inspired by the master,on organic and hysterical
paralyses(accidentaland personalcauses,he wrote, had prevented
him from following up on Charcott inspiration until then).6'As
Freud explains it, Charcot not only taught him to distinguish be-
tween the organic and hystericalforms of paralysisbut also con-
vinced him that hystericalparalysiscould not be explained by an
organic cause.Indeed, doesn'thystericalparalysisdissociatesymp-
toms that in organic paralysisalways occur together becausethey
depend on the same nervousfunctionsl Doesn'thystericalparalysis
also produce global symptoms that make no sensefrom a func-
tional point of viewl In an article published in r893, Freud evokes
the shock he experiencedwhen he made this discovery:
On one occasionthere was a small group of us, all studentsfrom abroad,
who, broughtup on Germanacademic physiology,weretrying his {Char-
cot'slpatiencewith our doubtsabout his clinicalinnovations. "But that
can't be true," one of us objected;"it contradictsthe Young-Helmholtz
theory."He did not reply "So much the worsefor the theory,clinicalfacts
From Lauoisier to Freud 3r
somethinfJwhich made
come 6rst" or words to that effect;but he did say
"Iz thy'orie,c'est bon, mais ga n'emPechepas d'ex-
a great impression on us:
Lttel'. --
Hysterical paralysesdo exist,then, in spiteof theory,and in spite
of the dificulty of linking their symptoms with organic causes.
They are "obiective": {irst, in the sensethat they are not "only"
simulation,and, second,in the sensethat the researcherhas chosen
a respectableobiect ofstudy unhindered by "the blind fear ofbeing
mystifiedby his poor patients."In his article dedicatedto the mem-
ory of Charcot, Freud renderseloquent homage to his master:
for the evaluationof
This, the most enigmaticof all nervousdiseases,
which medicinehad not yet found a serviceable angleof approach, had
just then fallen into thoroughdiscredit;and this discreditextendednot
who concerned
only to the patientsbut to the physicians themselves with
rhe neurosis. It was held that in hysteriaanythingwas possible' and no
credence wasgivento a hysteric aboutanything.The firstthing thatChar-
cott work did wasto restoreits dignityto the topic.Little by little,people
gaveup the scornfulsmilewith which the patientcouldat that time feel
certainof being met. She was no longer necessarily a malingerer,for
Charcothad thrown the wholeweightof his authorityon the sideof the
genuineness and objectivityof hystericalphenomena. Charcothad re-
peatedon a small scalethe act of liberationin memoryof which Pinel's
portraithung in the lecturehall of the Salp€triire.6i
Charcott authority not only freed hystericsfrom scorn; it also,
perhaps more importantly, freed those who were studying them.
Charcot'sauthority thus gave Freud the intellectual freedom that
fussieu,confronting the irony of the majority of his colleagues,had
vainly claimed. Moreover,it liberatedFreud from another fear,the
fear that had caused Breuer to flee the relationship between him
and his patient. Undoubtedly the eroticismof the sightsat the Sal-
p€tridrewas difrcult to endure for a man who had led a chastelife,
and must have inspired in him some of the same feelingsas Pari-
sian life: 'Am I then influenced by this magical city which is at-
tractiveand repulsiveat the same timel"6a If Freud finally decided
to remain at the Salp€tridre,it was perhapsbecauseCharcot pro-
vided him with the meansof soothing his malaise, of masteringhis
ambivalent feelings towar(hypnosis and hysteria. Not only had
 32 From Lauoisier to Freud
Charcot made of hysteriaa nervousailment among others,but his
clinical studies had also permittecl the discovery-which caused
generalsurprise-that hysteria was nor the privilege of women. By
breaking the ancient biologicaland etymologicallink berweenthe
uterus and hysteria,Charcot had desexualizedhysteriaand made
it possiblefor the physicianto rhink of himself as a docror like any
other and not as the potential prey of the unconrrollablesexuality.
Provided with this soothing conception,Freud left Paris for Vi-
enna. In his report on the trip he emphasizesthat Charcot had
undertaken to "reduc[e] the connection of the neurosiswith the
genital systemto its correct proportions by demonstratingthe un,
suspectedfrequency of casesof male hysteria."utAnd two years
later,in r888, he wrote in his article on hysteriafor Villarett Hand-
tudrterbuchthat "the importanceof sexualityin the developmenrof
hysteriahas generallybeen overestimated."66
Freud held to this explanationof hysteriafor a long time. It was
only in t894-gS that he advancedhis hypothesisofthe sexualetiol-
ogy of the neuroses.Not that he had previouslybeen wirhour sus-
picions on this point: he recalled later thar he had overheard his
two masters,Charcot and Breuer, speak privately in terms that
suggestedthe sexual narure of hysteria. And Rudolf Chrobak, a
Viennesegynecologist,had told him as much. But he had blanked
out theseremarks and undoubtedly others in the same vein. Freud
would recognize their inlluence later: "But at the time I heard
them I did not understand what these authoririesmeant; indeed
they had told me more than they knew themselvesor were pre-
pared to defend.What I heard from them lay dormant and inactive
within me, until the chanceof my catharticexperimentsbrought it
out as an apparentlyoriginal discovery."67
We will return later to this "bringinfJ our." In r893 Freud cele-
brated Charcot flor having made hysteriaand hypnosis"objective"
phenomena that it was both rational and respectableto study. In
other words, Charcot gaveFreud what the commissioners'reports
had stripped from the magnerisrs.He acquired rhe means to cir-
cumvent the double condemnationpronounceda century earlier in
both the secret and public reporrs. Charcot provided as well the
seed of the etiological hypothesisrhar, after r889, would enable
From Lauoisier to Freud 33
method under hypnosis,inaugurated
Freud to define the cathartic
therapeuticinstrumentappropriatefor
involuntarilyby Breuer,as a
hysteria't'3
A New Order of Causation
"M. Charcot was the first to teach us that to explain the hysteri-
cal neurosiswe must apply to psychology."6e Charcot'steachingas-
sociatedhypnosis and hysteria in an immediate and operational
way.Indeed, Charcot had recourseto hypnosisto demonstratethat
hystericalparalysesare not determined by an organic lesion:
While he was engagedin the study of hystericalparalyses arising after
he had the ideaof artificiallyreproducing thoseparalyses,which
rraurnas,
he hadearlierdifferentiatedwith carefrom organicones.For thispurpose
he madeuseof hyste rical patientswhom he put into a stateof somnam-
bulismby hypnotizingthem. He succeeded in proving,by an unbroken
chainof argument,that theseparalyse s were the resultof ideaswhich had
dominateclthe patient'sbrainat momentsof a specialdisposition.To
Charcot knew that "in the matter of suggestion,what one has
done can be undone."7'He did not, however,envisageusing hyp-
nosisin a therapeuticcontext to try to "undo" symptoms he had
artificially provoked. According to Freud'sown accountwritten 4o
years later, Charcot, moreovel had reservationsabout the project
of a comparativestudy between psychicand organic paralyses,the
study that would eventuallylead Freud to attribute to the former a
specificallypsychiccause:"He [Charcot] agreedwith this vieq but
lt was easyto seethat in reality he took no specialinterestin pen-
etrating more deeply into the psychologyof the neuroses."72
That hysteria was a "dynamic functional lesion,"that hypnosis
rnadeit possibleto createhystericalsymptomsartificially and then
to make them disappeaqremained aproblem in Charcott neuroan-
atomicalperspective,a problem whose "objective"characterhe had
demonstratedinsofar as he had shown the impossibility of elimi-
nating it by an appeal to the usual psychologicalcaregories.As
Deslon had respondedto the commissioners,if imagination, imi-
tatron,or simulation can e\plain the mesmeriancrises-or hence-
fc-rrthhypnosis-how is one ro define thesefacultiesl This problem
34 From Lauoisier to Freud
left Charcot perplexed.What is a "dynamic" lesion,sinemateria,if
not an admissionthat the categorieswe apply to the mind are only
partially suitable,an admission that we ought to abandon, in the
caseof hysteria,the ideal of a simple correspondence betweenan-
atomical lesion and symptom? From this point of view, hypnosis
was a way for Charcot of dramatizing and propagatinllhis perplex-
ity, a way of convincing his auditors that the problem could be
solved neither in its anatomical version (all paralysesderive from
an anatomical lesion discoverableafter the death of the patient),
nor in its subjectiveversion(hystericsand simulators).For his part,
Freud would establishas his point of departurethe abandonment of
an explanatorycorrespondencebetweensymptom and anatomy.
In his comparativestudy of organic and hystericalmotor paraly-
ses,Freud remarks that the formula Charcot developed-"It is a
cortical lesion, but one that is purely dynamic or functionalT3-
has two facets.Negatively,it signifies the uselessness of awaiting
the death of the hysteric his brain uill tell us nothing. Many readers
of Charcot, notes Freud, stop there, concluding that the lesion is
dynamic in the senseof light, transitory,fleeting. "1, on the con-
trary, assert that the lesion in hysterical paralysesmust be com-
pletely independentof the anatomy of the nervoussystem,sincein
ix paralysesand other manifestationshysteria behauesas though anat-
omy did not existor as though it had no rtnouledgeof it."7a
What was an obstaclefrom the point of view of the ideal ana-
tomical explanation promoted, in spite of everything,by Charcot
thus became for Freud a pathway, a first positive approach to hys-
teria. Charcot enabledFreud to confront the sametype of problem
the commissionershad faced with respectto the mesmeriancrisis:
undeniable "effects"with no apparent relationshipto a legitimate
rational cause.The lesion no more exists than did the magnetic
Iluid. Freud's greatnesslies in his acceptingthis definition of the
problem, in his refusing to retreat before the implied break with
anatomicalcausality,and in his not using "psychologicalcauses,"as
the commissionersdid, as a pretext for emptying the phenomenon
of all interest.If "psychologicalcauses"must be invoked to explain
hystericalparalysis,then the notion of "psychologicalcause" must
From Lauoisier to Freud
The study of hysteriamust not only break with ana-
be reclefine.l.
I^-i.rt causalitybut also invent a new order of psychiccausality.
'"--Hvsreria
has no knowleclgeof anatomy": with Freud, Charcot's
discorrery changesmeaning. It is no longer a symbol of the limit of
but rather a sign that another type of understand-
our knowl.dge,
Hysteria doesnot know how nervesare distributed,
ing is required.
in the ordinary,popular senseof the names
b"; "tt| taftesthe organs
asfar up as its insertion into the hip."i5 That
rheybear: the leg is the leg
is why the hysteric drags his leg along like a dead weight while the
ordinary hemiplegic is capable of circumduction movementswith
the hip. Hysteria has no knowledge of the relationshipsamong
physiologicalfunctions that are not expressedin ordinary linguistic
iepr.rent"tions. The reasonsfor the symptom must therefore not
be sought in the brain but in the experienceimplied by our repre-
sentations, which involvenot the leg or the arm in the organic sense
but rather the ordinary concePtionue haue of theseorgans'."The le-
sion in hysterical paralysiswill therefore be an alteration of the
76
concePtion,the idea, of the arm, for instance."
The axiom cessantecausa,cessatefectus is false in the case of
hysteria,wrote Freud and Breuer in their "Preliminary Commu-
nication": "Hystericssffir mainly from reminiscences."TT Freud and
Breuer thus extended to the totality of hysterical symptoms the
interpretationCharcot had proposed for traumatic paralyses.Just
as Charcot had shown that in such paralysesit was not the psychic
shock but rather fear that caused the disturbance, Freud and
Breuer reasonedthat in all casesthe "lesion" was to be interpreted
asthe result of a subconscious associationof the affectedorgan with
the memory of an event,a trauma.
The notion of "quota of affect,"introduced by Freud to clarify
.
the way a past associationaffectsthe hysteric'snonconsciouscon-
cep.tlonof an organ, has no more real explanatoryforce than Char-
cots slmultaneously"dynamic" and "functional" lesion. It never-
thelesssituates the hysterical symptom in the perspectiveof a
possibleaction: "If ttre
conception of the arm is involved in an
association with a large quora of affect,it will be inaccessible
to the
tree play of
other associarions.The arm uilt be paralysedin propor-
36 From l-auoisier to Freud
tion to the persistenceof this quota of afect or to its diminution by
a?ProPriatepsychicalmeans."78A new type of relationship between
causeand effect is introduced here, a relationshipconnectedfirst
and foremost to the means we have at our disposal for acting on
the cause. "lllt can be shoun that the arm is liberated as soon as this
quota is tuipedout)'Freud asserts,and one can then understand"the
reason for the persistenceof these symptoms and show why they
can be cured by a specialprocedure of hypnotic psychotherapy."Te
Indeed, it is the possibilityof curing hystericalsymptomsby a "spe-
cial procedureof hypnotic psychotherapy"that allows one to inter-
pret thesesymptoms in terms of affectivequota and to deducefrom
this interpretation the role o[ the procedure.Freud's definition is
operational.
Freud and Hypnosis
The texts we have just quoted date from 1893.In them Freud
establishesa clear continuity betweenwhat he learned from Char-
cot in Parisand his own current theories.However, this story is not
as simple as it might first appear.Freud did not adopt the hypnotic
method immediately after his return to Vienna, nor could he get
his colleaguesto acceptCharcot! conclusionsabout hysteria.More-
over,when Freud becamea practitionerof hypnosisin r887, he did
not use the cathartic method but rather hypnotic suggestionas it
was practicedby Bernheim in Nancy.
In an article of r89o devoted to hypnotic suggestion,Freud em-
phasizesthat "[h]ypnosis endows the physician with an authority
such as was probably never possessed by the priest or the miracle-
man, since it concentratesall the subject'sinterestupon the figure
of the physician."80He does not hesitateto advise all physicians,
including family doctors, to use this form of therapy,which, he
says,should be classedwith all other therapeuticprocedures"and
not be considered as a last resort."sr Hypnotic suggestionis a
weapon to combat illness,a weapon that otherwisemight fall into
lessexperiencedhands or, at any rate, be used by nonspecialists.
Might one supposethat when he returned to Vienna, Freud was
more interestedin the power of hypnosisseemedto confer on the
From Lauoisierto Freud 37
phvsicianthan he was in the new order of causalityhe later in-
uokedi In any case,when he later criticized hypnotic suggestion'
da Vinci be-
Freud took up the contrastformulated by Leonardo
tween painting and sculpture. Sculpture, like analysis, works per
uia di leuare, "since it takes away from the block ofstone all that
hides the surface of the statuecontained within it"; painting pro-
ceeds per uia di porre, by the application of a substance' iust as
suggestionis applied to symptomswithout being "concernedwith
the origin, strength and meaning of the morbid symptoms."82
It should be noted that this contrastPresupposes the pertinenceof
thc "Bernheimian" hypnotist's of
re7resentation his relationship uith his
patient.The suggestedidea is here assimilated to a "substance" that,
as such,can be "applied,"or, in Bernheim'swords, "transferred" to
the mind of another. This means that suggestionis indeed what
the Bernheimian manner of its use implies: it is a pure instrument
of action, a kind of unilateral dynamic force that "impresses"a
foreign "idea-substance" on the mind of the patient.This represen-
tation leavesout, however,the questionof what makes the patient
yielclto or resistthe orders given him.
Our observation of this omissiondoes not necessarilyconstitute
a criticism. It highlights, rather,the originality of Freud's method
and his concern with what a techniquemay imply or presuppose.
If the hypnotist uses suggestionas a procedure acting per uia di
Porre,it is becausehe does not, in effect,trouble himself about the
origin and meaning of the symptom; he useshypnosisnot as an
instrument of investigation,but purely as a mode of action whose
ell-ectiveness he doesnot understand.The factorsthe therapistdoes
not understanddetermine perhapsthe effectsof suggestion,but his
very use of the technique will prevent him from approachingthat
problem. Freud is not a "naturalist" like fussieu.His instrumental
clescriptionof suggestionis that of a technician,and brings out how
much the use of a tool inuoltlff the one who employs it, situates
him in a particular position with respectto what he works on.
Frorn the point of view of the one who usesit as a tool, suggestion
doesnot pose a problem in and of itself. Understanding its effects
is lessimportant than learnilg in what measurethoseeffectsmake
suggestiona useful therapeutii'instrument.
40 From Lauoisier to Freud
around r89r or 1892, that Freud links to his "discovery" of the
sexualnature of hysteria.One of his patients,upon awaking frorn
the hypnotic state,threw her arms around his neck. If one could
confrrm that Anna von Lieben was indeed that woman, one would
thereby establishher as the source of one of the basic notions of
psychoanalysis, namely, the notion of transference.Let us review
Freud'sinterpretationof the incident: "I was modestenough not to
attribute the event to my own irresistiblepersonalattraction,and I
felt that I had now graspedthe nature of the mysteriouselement
that was at work behind hypnotism. In order to excludeit, or at all
eventsto isolateit, it was necessaryto abandonhypnotism."8q From
the moment he excluded the possibilitythat his patient'sconduct
might be explained by his "irresistible personalattraction,"Freud
was struck by the idea that the feelingsshe manifestedtoward him
were in fact addressedto someoneelse,a "third figure" between
him and her.
Three themesare closelyintertwined in this memory.First is the
brutal (re)discoveryof what had impressedthe commissionersand
had motivated their secretreport: the connectionbetweenthe hyp,
notist and the subfectis not at all neutral, and indeed may be dan-
gerously similar to an amorous relationship.Secondis Freud'sex-
planatory hypothesisthat this love was not addressedto him but to
someoneelse.eO Third is the conclusionthat the "exclusion,"or at
leastthe "isolation,"of the mysteriouselement in hypnosis,whose
true nature Freud had just hit upon, required the abandonmenrof
hypnosis. Freud did abandon it immediately with this parient,
though he merely restrictedits use in other casesuntil r896, when
he ceasedthe practiceof hypnosisexcept in "a few specialexperi-
ments."9l
But Freud's refusal to consider as "true" the affectivetie estab-
lished by hypnosis was to be paralleled by an even more radical
questioning of another truth: the truth hypnosiswas supposedto
call or raise up. At this point, Freud was obliged to reexaminerhe
use of hypnosisnot only as an instrument of suggestion but also as
an instrument of investigationand recollection.Putting into ques-
tion hypnosis as a uia di lcuarealso implied a new interprerarionof
all the other methods (Drucrtmethodcand free associarron)Freud
had used as effectiveand more practicalsubstitutesfor hypnosis.
From Lauoisier to Freud 4r
"seductiontheory" of hysteria'His
In rlJgTFreud abandonedhis
he decided,sufferedsexualtraumasin their child-
Drrienrshad not.
they then remembered during their treatment. One
|,ooJ, **'hi.h
was rle:rling rather with f'antasies,proiected onto an adult, that
the chlld's oun
acred as defensesagainst the danger aroused by
As a result of this shift in theory, the whole interpretation
drives.
was transformed: if pathology is not caused by a
6f pathology
is connected no longer to a "pathologi-
,.^u-", an actual event, it
cal" history characterizedby specific occurrences,but rather to
traits intrinsic to all human history' The "reminiscences"from
which until then only hystericswere supposedto suffer were re-
the "return
placeclby a phenomenonfiom which no onecan escape:
of the repressed"in the form of symptoms, dreams, parapraxes,
and all the material produced by the techniqueof free association,
which now becamecentral to psychoanalytictreatment. The truth
Freud sought was pertinent for any human being, sick or not.
Treatmentwould becomea processof investigationinto the history
of hum an childhood.
From that point on, the principles that had guided Freud
changec'lmeaning. His former conceptionof truth, as well as his
notion of the cure, had to be modified. Hypnosis, once privileged
becauseit facilitated the patient'srecollectionand reliving of trau-
matlc events,was now doubly condemned.It was condemned,first,
becauseit arousesa dangerousand uncontrollableaffectivetrans-
ferenceonto the person of the analyst, and, second,becausethe
very meaning of recollection and of the therapeutic setting had
changed:as early and as chargedwith affectas it might be, a mem-
orv rnight still be a "iie." Treatment can no longer haveas its pur-
poseto reactivatethe memory of a real event in order to discharge
its quota of affect; it must, rather, lead the patient to insight about
the psvchic conflicts that explain preciselythe possibility of such
memories.Memory is only a pathway toward a truth hypnosiscan-
not produce, a truth that only the analysisof the psychicconflicts
mobilized by the analytic process,as they are mobilized in the
whole life of the patient,could bring to light.
The tact that the hypnotiqrelation seemedat one time a "pure"
instrument of recollectionthat enabled the techniqueof treatment
to unite with the ideal of a laboratory technique now becomesthe
 From Lauoisier to Freud 43
42 From Lauoisier to Freud
the analysisof the pa-
sign of its inadequacy.The analogy it establishedbetweenthe ther- g'1'.t shortcoming: it blocks
of analysis,' the very
apist and the laboratorytechnicianrestedon an illusion. Construed . ^.'" rtpcistattcd. N'loreprecisely'hvpnosisis unable to fight
t' €o t : '- ''- - ' .t nat
' : r egular ly ar isesin t he cour seof t he t r eat -
as an instrument of recollection,hypnosis leads the therapist to ki nd ot ' r esist ance common to most hu-
believehe is a simple observeror manipulator,and to considerthe *--. the usuat sort of "transference"'
mcr r L'u,hen
"'
- ' t o all t her apieswher e it t akest he f or m of a
therapeuticsetting as a "neutral" locus of the struggle againstfor- man rel'rtionth-lt""1: negativeor
getfulness.This is why hypnosisdoesnot provide the therapistwith iOlo.f"t beliei,' suddenly takes the form of a violent
the means of understanding and treating what acts as an obstacle positiveemotlon:
to his own action, and, especially,the affectivedimension of the of a mild and un-
his treatmentunder the auspices
relation hypnosis itself creates.Freud later recognized that the If the patientstarts
^.nn otl fl C edpos l tl v etrans |erenc ei tmak es i tpos s i bl eatfi rs t|orhi mto
other techniqueshe used also establishedthis relation. Whatever i.*ori., iust as he would under hypnosis'and during this
:l:ffi;l;
themselvesare quiescent'.But if-' as the
his technique,the therapistmust be aware that he will be involved :;; hi5 pathologicalsyrnptoms
:::;".;;";;;.edithe ti'n'fttt"" becomeshostileor unduly intenseand
in a situation in which the fantasiesand conflicts he sets out to
reme mbering at once gives way to actrng
understand will be repeatedwith respectto him. th.r:i;;i in need of repression'
,n.n on*rr.l rhe resistancesclerermine the sequenceof the
:;:.';;;,"
When Freud reconsideredhypnotic technique in r9r4, he high- *ftl.h is to be repeated' The patient.bringsout of the armoury
.""ri"i
lighted not the distinction between suglJestionand analysis,but he defendshimself againstthe prog-
oi,n. p.r, the weaponswith which
rather the contrastbetweenthe tranquil simplicity of the therapeu- which we must wrest from him one
..,, of the treatment-weapons
tic setting,as he conceivedit during the period of hypnosis,and the by one.e5
risk-filled complexity of his later technique:during treatment not up his symptoms-
Even the love that may cause a patient to give
onlv memoriesbut repetitionsas well are produced.This treatment recognized as a manifestation of
or declare himself cured must be
consists,then, not in raising up a past truth, but in confronting a
resistancesince it impedes treatment:
problem that becomespresentand real in the therapeuticsetting:
"Remembering, as it was induced in hypnosis.could not but give one rvill havelong sincenoticed in rhe patient the signsof an afi-ectionate
the impressionof an experiment carried out in the laboratory.Re- transfercnce, and o,re will have been able to feel certain that her docility'
her acceptance of the analytic explanations,her remarkable comprehen-
peating, as it is induced in analytic treatment according to the
sion and the high degree of- int.lliger,.. she showed we re to be attributecl
n e w e r te c h n i q u e ,o n th e other hand, i mpl i es coni uri ng up a pi ece to this attitud" to*"id, her doctor. Now all this is swept away' She has
of real life; and for that reason it cannot always be harmlessand becomequite without insight and seemsto be swallorvedup in her love.
unobjectionable."e2 C)r again: "We must still be grateful to the old Mo.eouer,this change quiie regularly occurs preciselyat a.point of time
hypnotic technique for having brought before us single psychical when one is having-to try to bring her to admit or remember some Par-
ticularly<listressin!and heavily repressedpieceof her life-history.She has
processesof analysis in an isolated or schematicform. Only this
been in love, therefore,for a iorrg tittt.; but now the resistanceis begin-
could have given us the courage ourselvesto create more compli- ning to make use of her love in orde. to hinder the continuation of the
cated situations in the analytic treatment and to keep them clear treatment,to dellect all her interest from the work and to Put the analyst
before us."e3 tn an awkward position.er'
As a first step in his reconsiderationof hypnosis,Freud charac-
If the analyst does not have the means of "wresting" her weapons,
terized in negative terms the complexity it concealed:"[f]or the
that is, her love or her hate. from the patient, conflict triumphs in
ideal remembering of what has been forgotten which occurs in
t h e a n a l vti c se tti n g . a n d th {q n a l yr t, tr .n .fo r r n e d i n to a n a cto r . b e -
hypnosiscorrespondsto a state in which resistancehas been put
comes powerless.
completelyon one side."eaWhereas direct suggestionand analysis
But the theme of "resistance" is not only negative. Indeed' it
pursue oppositeaims, hvpnosisonly sufFe rs, from the point of view
44 From Lauoisier to Freud
marks the real beginning of the history of psychoanalysis,properly
speaking.It is not our purpose here to trace the theoreticaldevel-
opment of resistance,nor to document the transformation that
leads from the explanationof hysterical symptoms by causessepa-
rately remembered and eliminated to the notion of a parhogenic
comPlex,nor to describe the evolution of the notion of the confict
of drives,nor yet to comment on the two topographies.Rather, we
will pursue the particular issuewe have thus far highlighted: ana-
lytic technique,and the principlesand resultson which, by Freud's
own admission,psychoanalytictheory as a whole depends.In fact,
from the perspectivewe havechosento emphasize-that of "heart"
and "reason"-the content of Freudian theory,its rationality,even
its scientificity,are not the question; the question is rather the def-
inition of the rational meanscapable of authorizing such a theory.
The abandonmentof hypnosis,equatedby Freud with the birth of
psychoanalysis, from this perspectiveconstitutesa decisiveepisode
since it establishesthe oppositionbetween "heart" and "reason" that,
for Freud, was to particularizethe analytic situation.
"Heart," whether explosivelove or sudden hostility,hinders the
rational course of therapy,and blocks elucidation of the causesof
the symptom. This "complexity" of the therapeuticsituation was
an obstaclefor Freud as long as he wished to use hypnosisand his
other subsequenttechniquesas pure instruments of recollection.
But this "resistance"was later to be convertedinto a new opera,
tional possibility.fust as hysteria had been defined from the per-
spectiveof the effectiveness of our action upon it-insofar as hys-
terical symptomscan be eliminated by the processof remembering,
by the resurgenceof the trauma in statu nascendi-so the hostile or
amorous relationship will be understood,from the analytic point
of view, insofar as it constitutesprecisely an obstacle to analysis, to
recollection, to recovery.It will therefore be understoodrationally as
resistance,and its interPretationas a manifestation of the pathogenic
complex at the origin of the mental disturbancewill become an
e s s e n ti apl i v o t o f a n a l y s i s .
The "new" situation is indeed complex, even de facto danger-
ous-Freud does not hide this from his followersin "Observations
on Tiansference-Love"-but, in principle, heart can and ought to
From Lauoisier to Freud 45
be understoodin the courseof an analysisfrom the perspectiveof
reason.The analyst must know that what hinders him is there
oreciselyas an obstacle.Reasonhas triumphed over the reasonsthe
commissionershad advancedin their secretreport againstmagne-
tism: in the name of rational investigationthe analystmust accept
his rechniqueas incurring and provoking emotionsthat, in another
context,might be consideredas an offenseto morals.
Strategiesof Foundation
How might one characterizeFreudt intellectualstrategyat the
moment he abandonedhypnosisand becamethe "founder of psy-
choanalysis"lPerhapsat this point it would be relevant to return
to Lavoisier,not as a member of the commissionthat fled the prob-
lem embraced by Freud, but rather as the "founder" of chemical
analysis.
Chemistry "before" Lavoisierwas not, as has too often been said,
a field scarcelyemerging from the mists of alchemy."Chemists"
had alreadyexistedfor a long time, and they had alreadyposedthe
question of the scientific character-yet to be recognized or estab-
lished-of their discipline.In order to understandbetter the prob-
lem of chemists"before" Lavoisier,let us listen to Gabriel Venel,
the author of the article about chemistry in the Encyclopediaof
Diderot and d'Alembert.eTVenel'sarticle is "committed": in it Ve-
nel attempts to defend the specificityof the practiceof chemists,
and in particular to defend it againstthe Cartesiansand Newtoni-
ans who wished to reduce it to explanatoryprinciples,to the rela-
tions of causeand effectrecognizedin mechanics:
Chemistsdo not claim iustificationthrough any mechanicalagent,and
theyevenconsiderit very singularthat the solecircumstances of being
distantfrom the unknown causeby only one degreecould renderme-
chanicalprinciplessodearto somanyphilosophers, and couldmakethem
rejectall theoriesfoundedon hidden causes, as if truth were nothing
otherthan intelligibility, mechanical
or as if a supposed principleinter-
posedbetweenan effectand its unknown causereassuredthem against
the horror of rheunintelligible....Whateverthe casemay be,it is not so
much through a contrarytastb-€ran affectedcouragethat chemistswill
not admit mechanicalcauses. but ratherbecause no known mechanical
 From Lauoisier to Freud
46 From Lauoisier to Freud 47

causes intervenein their operations;

nor is it because theyclaimthat their that they are able to guesswhat courseshe is likely
^frcn aoJ so closely
a€Jents are exempt from mechanics, but rather because this mechanics that wirh a degree of accuracy,even should they take it
i"'r.f... rn.l ,fair
remainsasyet unknown.Chemistsarealsounjustlyreproached with cul- heads to provoke her with the most outlandish of experime nts.
ll,. ,n.i.
tivatingobscurity;in order for this imputationto be reasonable, evident S. that rhe mosr important service they can render to those they are ini-
and certain principleswould haveto be demonstratedto them: for they philosophy is not nearly so much to teach them
I;.,lng ln,o experime.ntal
cannotbe blamedfor preferringobscurityto error; and if thereis some- and results as to pass on to them that spirit ofdivination
,r,ori pro..dures
thing ridiculousin this manner of philosophizing, they will resolutely iu rn."n,r of which it is possible to smell out' so ro speak,methods that are
sharethisqualitywith Aristotle,Newton, and that throngof ancientphi- ," U. discore red' ne w experiments, unknown results'ee
,,,itt
losophers whom M. de Buffoncharacterized in his naturalhistoryashav-
ing the leastlimited geniusand the broadestphilosophy; they were less Likewise Venel:
astonished than we by factsthey could not explain;they sawnarureas it
is.. . . Thesemen knew that naturecreates It is evident that the most enlightened, the best educated chemist will
its effectsby unknownmeans;
that we cannotenumerateits resources; establish,reform, perfect the art of chemistry in proportion to the advan-
and that the realabsurditywould
tase given him by his general knowledge; on the condition nevertheless
be to wish to limit natureby reducingit to a certainnumberof principles
thrt.on..tning the particular obiect of this art, he will haveacquired that
of action and modesof operation;it was sufficientfor them to havere- "good eye" by
faculty of judging by the senseswhich is called having a
markeda certainnumberof relativeeffectsof the sameorderto constitute which they owe to the habit of manipulating their
manual workers, and
a cause.Do chemistsoperateany differentlyie8
o b je cts.... It l th e n e ce ssi tyo f b e co m i n g fa m i l i a r w i th a l l th e p r o ce d u r e s,
Venels position,which he comparesto that of the naturalistBuf- operations,and maneuversof chemical artl appearsto us absolutelyindis-
pensablefor the chemist who aspiresto embracehis art with any breadth;
fon, presentsanalogieswith fussieu'sas well. fussieu also empha-
becauseit is not only a very curious, very philosophicalspectacleto ex-
sized that it was sufficient to identify some undeniable effectsin amine how various and complex chemical means are in their application
order to justify making mafJnetism,certainly not a principle of to particular uses,and to seein what form genius is manifestedin workers
explanation,but the object of an investigationposing the problem in whom it is called common senseibut also the lessonsof this common
of its "cause."He pleaded with his colleaguesto "learn ro see" sense,and the industry, ease,and experienceof the worker, which are
advantagesthat should not be neglected.In a word, one must be an artist,
nature as it isl to learn to see. and not to seek to reduce it to
an experiencedartist.loo
recognized but inadequate causal relationships(and present-day
chemistsknow that these relationshipswere inadequatefor chem- The taste for chemistry might well, in this context, be character-
istry, since they had to wait for quantum mechanicsto provide ized as an "insane passion," Venel admits, but this passion expresses
them with a theory that accountedat least for the chemical"bond" the singularity of its matter, the apparent strangeness of chemical
i f n o t fo r c h e m i c a lre a c ti ons. behaviors, their multiplicity, their lack of reproducibility for the
Learning to seeis a recurrent theme in Venel'swork. He is not inexperienced chemist. The passion Venel talks about is really a
waiting for a "miracle" to bring recognition to his science,a feat passion of the body, an "apprenticeship-passion" that turns the
similar to the Newtonian foundation of celestialmechanics,the body of the chemist into an instrument: "The artist we spoke about
discovery of a simple principle that would explain and organize would never think of estimating the degrees of heat he uses with a
everything all at once. Chemistry is, and would remain, an art of thermometer, or the successionof drops in a distillation by a clock;
apprenticeship. he would have, as workers very sensibly say,his thermometer in his
In his essay"On the Interpretation of Nature," written at the fingertips and his clock in his head."r0'
sametime as Venel'sarticle. Denis Diderot wrltes: Too many things to observe, too many circumstances that inter-
fere with and prohibit the.g:producibility of a procedure: that is
The habitualpracticeof making experiments producesevenin the most
what, for Venel as for Diderot, makes of chemistry a science irre-
unrefinedof workersinvolvedwith physicalprocessesan intuitionthat is
akin to inspiration.
. . . They havewatchedthe operationsof narureso ducible to the model of mechanics. The chemist's judgment does
4u From Lauoisier to Freud
not originate in a priori principlesbut rather in an art ofthe senses:
"Smell out, guess,intuit." Like fussieu facing the multiplicity of
magnetic phenomenaaround Deslon'sbaquet,Venelasks for time.
Only a life of work and observationand experiencecan create a
chemist, can make of him, heart-or body-and reason,a being
equal to his subject.
Too many things to observe.One must isolate,limit, purify, sim-
plify: such was the reaction of the commissionersto Deslon'sba-
quet. And such was Lavoisier'sline of conduct when he constituted
himself as the founder of chemistry.
Lavoisierdid not found chemistryon an explanationof chemical
reactions."Chemical affinity" will perhapsbe understoodone day,
he wrote, in a tone similar to Freud's when he evoked the possible
coniunction of psychoanalysis and biology.But chemistry need not
wait for the creation of such a tie with physics.It must create its
own reproducible,univocal facts.It must define chemicalreactions
from the perspectiveof the chemist! operations,and, at the same
time, redefinethe latter in such a way as to guaranteethe univocal,
reproduciblecharacterof chemical "facts."
Whereas Venel describedchemistry as an art of experienceim-
plicating the body as well as knowledge-because only training of
the sensescan make the chemist equal to the multiplicity and var-
iability of chemical activity and enable him to integrate multiple
indices,to understandwithout the help oi generalrules-Lavoisie r
will define it as an experimentaltechnique.The chemist is no longer
defined by his attention, his experience,but, as we have already
said, by his action, specificallythe action of constituting the exper-
imental setting, isolating it so that it will be totally subject to his
control. Nothing is to penetratethe chemical field without being
identified; nothing is to escapefrom it surreptitiously.Also, no
theory,no leap of the imagination, is to block the neutral reading
of the evidenceby which we induce nature to dictate its truth to
us. The chemistt mind, unsullied by presuppositions,is to be a
reflectionof the chemical languageLavoisierattemptsto construct:
nomenclature."The perfection of chemical nomenclature. . . con-
sistsin rendering ideas and facts in their exact truth without sup-
pressing,and especiallywithout adding to, anything they present;
From Lauoisier to Freud 49
norl e nclat ur em ust beaf ait hf ulm ir r or of what Nat ur epr esent st o
us."l "l
that Lavoisier'snomenclaturewas not in fact
The demonstration
hypotheses(the role of oxygen' the
,.,.u,r"1,that it presupposed
of chemistry.
l_i,",rou, role of heat), we leave to the historians
of the implicationsand
lu"'iu.r,,on we would like to poseis that
..fbundation''of chemistry by Lavoisier,or, in
the
*n,.ou.n..s of
oit.. *orar, his redefinition of chemistry as a scientifictechnique.
""if,. of
answers"dictated" by nature to Lavoisier'schemist are,
setting.For this reason,[-avoi-
course,related to the experimental
with "defending" chemistryagainstthe
,i., i, no longer concerned
with dramatizing the ignorance,
causalityof the mechanists,nor
and unlink-
claimedby Venel,about the mechanismof the linking
i ngof cher nicals, Wecanident if yt her eact ant sweisolat eint he
will be ver-
closecllield, and the products of the reaction. Isolation
products of the reaction havethe
ifredby scales,by the fact that the
,rme *.ight as the original reactants'What, then, is a chemical
But
reactionl A new compound of elementsor simple substances.
rvhat is a sirnple substancel Precisely what no instrument, no
chemicaloperation can decompose.Water, consideredan element
or principle sincethe Greeks, is, as Lavoisierdemonstrated,a com-
po.rnd. Bv contrast, hydrogen or oxygen cannot be decomposed'
and if they constitute part of a reactant (if the reactant can be
decomposedin producing oxygen or hydrogen),they are also pres-
ent in at leastone product of the reaction.we havehere a balance
sheet:reactionsrecombine the bonds between elementsbut don't
createor destroy them. This balance sheet de6nes the obiect of
chernistrvas dependent on the operationsof the chemist since it
derivesfrom the logic of the chemist'sactions,from the isolation
anclthe mode of identificationthat ensureverifiabilityand the pos-
sibility of interpretation.
The question posed by the history of chemistry is less one of
knowing whether Lavoisier "really" founded chemistry than of
understinding why chemistry did, indeed,becomethe operational
scienceLavoisierenvisaged.The chemist,Venel wrote, will use nei-
ther thermometer nor clocklthey will be in his fingers and his
heacl.Bv contrast.the history of chemistry in the nineteenthcen-
50 From Lauoisier to Freud
tury cannot be dissociatedfrom the history of its instruments.The
chemist'scraft, Venelasserted,should be the fruit of a long appren-
ticeship,of an intimate and passionareconracrwith the infinitely
variable labyrinth of the chemical phenomena he musr decipher.
With the foundation of the School of Giessenby Liebig in 1824,
German chemistswould be literally mass-producedin a four-year
training program. According to Venel, it is only the experienceof
the practicedchemist that enableshim to obtain cerrain products
in a reproduciblemanner. During the nineteenthcentury the mul-
tiplication of standard protocols authorized any chemist, even a
beginner,to carry out analysesand syntheses;all he needed were
th e re a c ta n tsa n d a d e q u a tei nstruments.
This last condition helpsexplain the transformationof chemistry
from a scienceof experience into a scienceof experimentation.Ve-
nel's chemist was concerned with raw materials, the nineteenth-
century chemist with "pure" 1s2612n15-industrialor academic
laboratory products. The term "purity" does not, and will never,
refer in our book to an absolute.We will take "purity," in the chem-
ists'sense,as alwaysrelativeto the protocolsand instrumentsdefin-
ing the "pure product." The de6nition of purity is thereforehistor-
ical and, by the same token, operational: when a new operation
revealsthe need for a distinction where a "pure" product was ex-
pected,the "pure" product must be redefined.Nineteenth-century
chemistryis indeed Lavoisier'sheir insofaras he atremptedto break
with the past, annul the history of his science,for chemistry and
chemical industries developedby efectiuelybreaking with the old
artisanalchemistry and the materials it worked with. "Chemistry
createsits object,"wrote Berthelot.His statementis correct.Chem-
istry became strictly coextensivewith the laboratorieswhere the
conditionsof its operations-instruments, protocols,and standard-
ized products-were created.
Neither Lavoisier nor Berthelot knew why a particular reaction
took place,why a particular compound was possible,why a partic-
ular reagent decomposedit. Similarly, Pasreurdid not know how
bacteriacausediseasenor how vaccinesprotect againstthem. The
"Pasteurian bacterium" is also defined by laboratory operarions.
While hygienistshad to pay arrenrion to all sorts of facrors,accu-
From Lauoisier to Freud 5r
multiply problems because they were concerned
mulate facts. and
"te rrain," that is, with the in{inite conditions favoring the
*i,h ,h.
of disease' Pasteur redefined disease by what could be
Dropcgation
in his laboratory. According to Latour:
u.rih.d end controlled
pasteurian"applications" we re "diffused,"as we say,only iI it was previ-
.uslv possrhleto create in sin rhe conditions of a laboratory.The pastu-
,ir-rii,rn of heer or milk, hermetically concealedlstrl containers,filters,
serums, diagnostickits-all theseserved as proof, were demon-
'accines,
srrarivean<l elficacious,only in the laboratory.If these applicationswere
to spreacl,the operating room, the hospital,the physician'sofrce, the wine
srowers winery, had to be endowed with a laboratory.Of course, the
entire laboratory in the Rue d'Ulm [the location of Pasteurt laboratoryl
did not have to be moved or reproduced' lu$ certain of its elements' cer-
tain gestures,certain procedures,which were practiced only there and
were inclispensable to maintaining in existencethe phenomenon in ques-
t i o n .l o l
It is interesting in this respect to recall the contrast Freud estab-
lished in r9o5 for his medical colleagues between ancient, primitive
medical methods, which all belong to psychotherapy insofar as they
bring into play the "hopeful belief" of the patient, and the scientific
psychotherapy he proposed:
A factor dependenton the psychicaldispositionofthe patient contributes,
without any intention on our part, to the effectof every therapeuticpro-
cessinitiated by a physician; most frequently it is favorable to recovery,
but often it acts as an inhibition. We have learned to use the word "sug-
gestion"for this phenomenon,and Mcibius has taught us that the unreli-
abilitv which we deplore in so many of our therapeutic measuresmay be
traced back to the disturbing influence of this very powerful factor. All
physicians,therefore, yourselvesincluded, are continually practisingpsy-
chotherapy,even when you have no intention of doing so and are not
aware of it; it is a disadvantage, however, to leave the mental factor in
your treatment so completely in the patient'shands.Thus it is impossible
to keep a check on it, to administer it in dosesor to intensify it. Is it not
then a justifiable endeavouron the part of a physician to seek to obtain
command of this factor, to use it with a purpose, and to direct and
strengthenitl This and nothing elseis what scientificpsychotherapypro-
pclses.l,,a
The difference between qi-gnce and nonscience does not inhere
for Freud in a theory that would explain the action of the "hopeful
52 From l-auoisier to Freud
belief" at the basisof all therapy.It inheresrather in the possibili-
ties of control: of controlling suggestion,the "hopeful belief." of
dosing it out, of "directing" it, in other words, of manipulating it
just as Pasteurmanipulatesthe action of his bacteriaor as a chemist
manipulatesa reactionby heat or cold. Perhapswe of the twentieth
century, with our ideal of scientific "rel'olution" as a theoretico-
experimental upheavalsimilar to the discoveryof DNA or quan-
tum phenomena,havelost the memory o[ the triumph in the nine-
teenth century of chemistry and Pasteurism,which were agnostic
sciencessincethey did not know what they were manipulating but
were glorious in the effectiveness of their manipulation. Charcot's
"laboratory" experiments,in which he createdand then abolished
paralyses,derive from this same ideal of actiuerationality in which
reasondoes not refer to the comprehensionof mechanismsbut to
their control, in which the "horror of the unintelligible,"as Venel
called it, is appeasedby the possibilityof subjectingit to control.
Similarly inscribed in thrs ideal is Freud's hope of acting by hyp-
nosis on memory and eliminating the quota of affect determined
by the past trauma, and so rs his definition of analytic technique
centeredaround resistanceand transference.
The Freudian Laboratory
It was with a certain nostalgia, as we have seen, that Freud
evoked in t9t4 the simplicity of the old hypnotic technique in
which the eliciting of memories gave "the impressionof a labora-
tory experiment."Then, hypnosisseemedto confer on the therapist
a power similar to that conferred, for example,on the chemist by
heat. l{ypnosis does away with the "autocratic power of the pa-
tientt mind,"r05wrote Freud in r89o, and we can only remember
that, in the chemist'shands, heat does away with the "autocratic
power" of a chemicalcompound, and makes its elementsaccessible
to new combinations.Although Freud later rejectedhypnosis,he
did not reject this referenceto the laboratory.In r9r8 he even ex-
plicitly establishedan analogy betweenhis techniqueand chemical
analysis.which he describesmuch as Lavoisierdid:
Why "analysis"-which meansbreakingup or separating out, and sug-
gestsan analogywith the work carriedout by chemistson substances
From l-auoisier to Freud j3
which they find in natureand bring into their laboratorieslBecause in
3n importantrespectthere really is an analogybetweenthe two. The
patienti symptomsand pathological manifestations,like all his rnental
are of a highly composite
activities, kind; the elements of this compounc
areat bottommotives,instinctualimpulses.But the patientknowsnoth-
ing of theseelementarymotivesor not nearlyenough.We teachhim to
understand the way in which thesehighlycomplicated mentalformarions
arecompounded; we tracethe symptomsbackto the instinctualimpulses
rvhichmotivatethem; we point out to the patienttheseinstinctualmo-
tives,which are presentin his symptomsand of which he has hitherto
beenunaware,-fust asa chemistisolates the fundamental substance.the
chemical"element,"out of the salt in which it had been combinedwith
otherelementsand in which it was unrecognizable. In the sameway,as
regardsthoseof the patient'smentalmanifestations that were not consid-
ered pathological,we show him that he was only ro a certarnextentcon-
sciousof their motivation-that other insrinctualimpulsesof which he
haclremainedin ignorancehad cooperated in producingthem.r06
It is striking that even the limits Freud artemptsto placeon rhis
analogvare precarious.Respondingto critics who reproachanalysis
for not being also a synthesisor a pedagogicalenterprise,the re-
constitutionof a new and better compound, Freud answersat first
that, unlike chemical analysis,the psychoanalyst's work is also and
inevitably synthetic: "Whenever we succeedin analysinga symp-
tom into its elements,in freeing an instinctual impulse from one
nexus,it cioesnot remain in isolation,but immediately entersinto
a new one."r07But in a note, he reestablishes the analogy: "Simul-
taneouslywith the isolationof the variouselementsinduced by the
chemist,syntheseswhich are no part of his intention come about,
owing to he liberation of the electiveafinities of the subsrances
concerned."rOs And, in effect,the chemist himself does not master
what he manipulates.He cannor analyzewithout synthesizingat
the same time. He can never isolate"elements,"but only the simple
substances (e.g.,the "substance"oxygen,that is, molecules)that are
themselvesthe products of a synthesis.In order to manipularesub,
stances,the chemist must submit to the predeterminedaffinitieshe
utilizes without having the power ro creareor avoid them.
In spite of the power of the analogy betweenthe analystand the
chemist,the direct analogy.!,e.tween psychotherapyand a "labora-
tory experiment" was part of the past sinceit had been dependent
on the use of the old hypnotic "technique."Chemistry as a scientific
54 From Ltuoisier to Freud
techniquesucceeded in creating the reliable actorsit needed.Their
reproduciblereactionsmade them capableof confirming proposed
diagnosesabouttheir identity and the rules of their compositions
and decompositions. By contrast,hystericalsymptomsresistedhyp-
notic technique.Freud's patientswho were hypnotizeddid not nec-
essarilybecone, as he himself recognized,reliable witnesseswho
verified by their recovery the explanation given for their illness.
Hypnosisis nota reliable technique.
What mightone do thenl The alternativesare simple.
On the onehand, one might forgo the analogy,regarding it as
completelybrokendown. The analytic setting cannot be purified
like a chemicalfreld, and the therapist therefore cannot construct
technicallyinformed"facts." He cannot affirm that his facts have
been"dictate,l"by the obiect at hand sincewhat he is dealing with
escapes his control,since he himself is implicated tn an unuerifable
way in the situationhe is analyzing. In this case,Freud is in a
situationsimilarto that of Jussieuor Venel faced with a labyrinth
of infinitely variable "effects." Similar, but worse, since Freud
henceforthftnotusthat the sexual factor is decisive.He inherits the
ouestionthat.sincefussieu,medicine has left unanswered:how is
one to concer{ea rational investigation of effectsthat one does not
masrel hovvto triumph over the "horror of the unintelligible"l
Simultaneously he inherits the fear expressedin the commissioners'
secretreport:the therapist'sposition is dangerousfrom the point
of view of moralsand social iudgments. To circumvent theseob-
stacleseachtherapistwould have to acquire that senseof "craft,"
education of the sensesVenel spoke of, an edu-
that noncodiriable
cation that r.ould make him capable of smelling out, guessing,
interpretingsigns'This training would endow him as well with
prudenceandllnenessof touch, what is called "tact." In short, one
would haver0renounceanalysisas a professionthat could claim its
respectable characteramong the other technico-scientificprofes-
sions,and adopta role that, by the type of "genius" and experience
it presupposes, is analogousrather to the role of shamans,magi-
cians,and othertraditional miracle-workers'
On the otherhand, one might reestablishthe analogywith scien-
tific techniqueon another level.This is the alternativeFreud chose.
From Lauoisier to Freud 55
,,psvcho-analysis provides these definite technical rules to replace
the indefinable'medical tact' which is looked upon as some special
tos
sift." Freud indeed characterizesthe crucial differencebetween
modern technique and ancient crafts by the possibilityof codifying
an activity and clarifying its rules in such a way that anyone,a
priori, might learn and use them. It is true that in rgro when Freud
wrote these lines, the essay"Methodology of Psycho-Analysis"he
announcedelsewhererr0 did not yet exist (in fact, he would never
write it): "This technique cannot yet be learnt from books, and it
certainly cannot be discoveredindependentlywithout great sacri-
ficesof time , Iabour and success. Like other medical techniques,it
is to be learnt from those who are already proficient in it."lll But
the possibilityof enunciating rules is essentialsinceit enablesanal-
ysis to define the ideal interchangeabilityof its practitioners, and
thereby guaranteesthe objectivity of their results,just as Liebig's
chemistsbecame interchangeablewith respectto their protocols,
their reactants,and their instruments,and could thus produce ac-
ceptableand reproducible"facts" in any well-equippedlaboratory.
How did Freud reestablishthe analogyl Freud'sstroke of genius
was to make resistanceand transference,which had been obstacles
in the "old" technique basedon laboratory methods, into generating
principlesof the new technique,principlesthat would, by their very
application,transformpatients into purified, reliable subjects-the
very condition of all scientific technique. The patient repeatstuith
his analystwhat the analystasks him to remember.
l'he main instrument,however,for curbingthe patient'scompulsionto
repeatand for turning it into a motivefor remembering liesin the han-
dling of the transference. We renderthe pulsionharmless,and indeed
useful,by giving it the right to asse
rt itself in a definitefield. We admit it
into the transference as a playgroundin which it is allowedto expandin
almostcompletefreedomand in which it is expectedto displayto us
everything in the way of pathogenic instinctsthat is hiddenin the patient's
mind. Providedonly that the patientshowscompliance enoughro respecr
the necessary conditionsof the analysis, we regularlysucceed in givingall
the symptomsof the illnessa new transfe rencemeaningand in replacing
his ordinary neurosisby a "transference-neurosis" of which he can be
cured by the therapeuticwork*The transference thus createsan inter-
mediateregionbetweenillnessand reallife throughwhich the transition
56 From Lauoisier to Freud From l-auoisier to Freud 57
from the one to the other is made.The new conditionhastakenoverall rei.' p| : "-"T:?i : :-:::' ; :.:l':of T, : l:.,.i'"l:
rherransFe
" l l3

the featuresof the illness;but it representsan artificialillnesswhich is at

;"
lll,,;;o" 1','
?*1::'jl-'.:::
::::':"i::.i:. -':.
Ylj :: : :",i,
::.
L',1;'"",h.d'Ti::::T::: l^".*
everypoint accessible to our intervention.It is a pieceof realexperience,
but one which hasbeenmadepossibleby especially favourableconditions. T::,::ffi':'^:,,i:i"
orknowred 11";
geand
and it is of a provisionalnature.From the repetitivereactions
exhibitedin the transference
which are
we are led along the familiar pathsto the
i;,1:'';'*t.'.l
'rinor. ""' 1,1i:,1
.ii.t"
ii-{:Ti ::j|: ffil'*
and measurable:
are calculable
awakeningof the memories,which appearwithout difrculty,as it were, canbe tracedback
you will understand too..fromthe factthat suggestion
afterthe resistance hasbeenovercome.lll "ir"nrf.r.n.e. the capriciousness which struck us in hypnotictherapy,
,
remainscalculablewithin its limits. In using
This text speaksfor itself: it makes Freud'sstrategyexplicit.The l,Jniii,r"fy,i. treatment
w. ar. d.pende nt on the stateof the patient'scapacityfor trans-
;r;;;r
analytic setting has becomea laboratory in the sensethat an ordi- without being ableto inlluenceit itself.. . . In psycho-analysis we
f;;;..
nary, uncontrollable neurosis is to be rePlacedthere by the analyz- the transference itself,resolvewhat opposes it, adiustthe instru-
,.,,O"r
makeour impact.Thus it becomes possible
able transferenceneurosis."Morbid symptoms,"the raw material n].n, *itt, which we wish to
an entirely fresh advantage from the power ofsuggestion;
of the old technique,are themselvestransformedand given mean- io, ur,o derive
ing as transference.Similar to the nineteenth-centurychemist,who wegetit into our hands'rr'
did not take his object from the natural world but "created" it and But the transference-which the closureof the analytic setting
who thus no longer studied the unpurified raw materialsthat the inducesthe patient to focus solely on the person of the analyst,
artisan transformed, the analyst "initiates a state that has all the without the need of any explicit suggestionfrom the physician-
featuresof an artificial illness."To the degree that this illnesshas transformsthe rolesof both the doctor and the patient.The doctor
for its sole arena the "delinite field" of the analytic setting, it be- becomesa kind of "catalyst" who activatesthe therapeuticprocess
comes accessibleto intervention.Repetition is therefore no longer without, however,becoming a reactant in it, without adding per-
an obstacleto the therapist becausehe can analyzeit; indeed, the sonal elementsto the truth that is sought (let us recall that, by
resourcesactivatedby the patient to impede analysishavebeen re- definition,a catalystdoes not enter into a chemicalreaction,but is
defined by being enclosedin the "playground" of the transference. recoveredin the same quantity after the reaction).But the doctor
For the psychoanalyst the production and the analysis of the needsthe collaborationof the patient's ego. While the revelation to
transferenceare combined in the sameprocess,while for the chem- the patient of his own unconsciousleft him unchanged and was
ist the analogous activities are separatesince he may obtain the powerlessto undo repression,now the possibility of revealingto
purified, standardizedreactantshe needsfrom commercial sources him the resistancethat maintains repression,that is, the defensive
"anticathexis"
or from other laboratories.The production and analysis of the he deploys,ought to be convincing to the patient's
transferencethus carry on simultaneouslythe processof purifying, ego."Thus we now do the same thing that we tried to do to begin
of eliminating whatever posesan obstacleto analysis,but also the with: interpret,discoverand communicate;but now we are doing
tt at the right place. The anticathexisor the resistancedoes not
process of analysis ttself. The transferencetherefore enablesFreud to
Iorm part of the unconsciousbut of the ego, which is our collabo-
substitutefor an ordinary illness, uhich inaoluesthe analyst as uell as
rator,and is so even if it is not conscious."rr5
In contrastto hypnotic
other personsin the patient's real hfe, a laboratory illnessplaced in thc
suggestion, the analvsisof resistances
seruice of ftnowledge. is henceforthaddressedto the
rntelligenceof
ln t9rz. Freud readily admitted "that the resultsof psychoanaly- the patient,to his desireto get well, to his rationality.
t nc analyst\ reason
sis rest upon suggestion,"insofar as he himself and SandorFerenczi needsto be allied with that of the patient in
order to triumph
had defined suggestionas "the inlluencing of a personby meansof over the potft.., of the "heart."
<8 From Lauoisier to Freud
The processof purification, the transformation of the compul-
sion to repeatinto a "motive for remembering"r16is not, let us note,
an easy thing. Resistances are not dissolvedby the simple act of
recognition. Not surprisingly, it is in "Remembering, Repeating
and Working-Through" that Freud allows himself at last to pay
homage to the "old hypnotic technique,"that is, he no longer as-
similates it to direct suggestion(uia di pone), a procedure whose
indifferenceto the causesof symptoms he once contrastedwith the
activesearchingfor causesinvolvedin analysis.In fact, the contrast
now inheres in the notion of uorft carried out by the analyst in
collaboration uith the patient, as opposed to the "easy and agree-
able" processof healing effectedby the hypnotist,who worked oa
the patient. "Working-through" is labor,and implies the combined
efforts of the analyst and the analysand.For the analyst, who
"knows" but must wait, must "let things take their course,"it is a
"trial of patience,"and for the analysandit is an "arduous task."l17
The analyst must therefore leave to time and to work the realiza-
tion of the analytic aim-the effectiveand affectivesubordination
of the patient'sresistances, which he opposesto knowledge, to the
service of knowledge. About working-through Freud concludes
that, in spiteof its arduous character,"it is a part of the work which
effectsthe greatestchangesin the patient.... From a theoretical
point of view one may correlateit with the 'abreacting'of the quo-
tas of affect strangulated by repression-an abreaction without
which hypnotic treatment remained ineffective."tl8 "Old hypnosis"
is thus buried with honors.
The Imperatiue of Neutrality
Undoubtedly, work on the transferenceis a dangerous tech-
nique, as dangerousas the relation between the hypnotist and his
patient. The collaborationwith the patient is precariousand end-
lesslyendangeredby resistances. But, from this point on, the dan-
ger is respectablesince it is indispensableto the triumph of knowl-
edge. As a hypnotist, Freud might haveproduced violent reacrions
in his patients like an apprentice sorcerer or an ignorant child.
From Lauoisier to Freud 59
changes,since the analyst is aware of the danger
Now everything
can't be avoided:"The psycho-analyst
and knows why it knows that
working with highly explosive forces and that he needs to
he is
with as much caution and conscientiousness as a chemist.
oroceed
chemists ever been forbidden, because of the dan-
but *h.n have
ser, from handling explosivesubstances, which are indispensable,
of their ) " I le
effects
on
"..oun,
However,unlike the chemist,the psychoanalystmust take "pre-
caurions"involving all his attitudes,reactions,and expressions. In-
deed, in order for the analytic setting to be progressivelycircum-
scribedand purified of its links with the outside world, in order
for it to revolve solely around the resistances to analysisand thus
around the person of the analyst, in order for the compulsion to
repeatand thus to serveas a motive for remembering,the analyst
cannot resemblea person in real life. Hence the fundamental rule
of abstinence . The analyst may elucidatethe transference,dissolve
ir, "transfer his knowledge," that is, render it effective,only to the
extent that he has not, in any way, become affectively involved in
the transferencerelation or allowed himself to be drawn into the
affectivetrap the patient has (unconsciously)laid for him to block
the progressof the treatment. It is only under theseconditionsthat
the analystcan demonstrateto the patient the illusory,phantasmic
nature of the role the latter makes him play. It is only in these
conditionsthat the analyst can bring to consciousness "the uncon-
scious,repressedimpulsesexisting in him [the patient]"120 so that
memoriesawaken and come forth as if by themselvesin a way that
endlesslyreproducesthe simplicity of the old technique without
actuallyrecoveringit.
In addition to the chemist, the surgeon will becomea model as
well: "l cannot advise my colleaguestoo urfJentlyto model them-
selvesduring psycho-analytictreatment on the surfJeon,who puts
asideall his feelings,even his human sympathy,and concentrates
his mental forceson the single aim of performing the operationas
skilfully as possible."r2rfussieuhad seenthe effectsof "animal heat"
tn magnetism, but this heat, which leads us in real life to help
others, is not appropriate for s[e analyst.It might draw him into
6o From Lauoisier to Freud
relationshipsthat simultaneouslyendanger his respectabilityas a
technicianand open the asepticanalytic setting to the uncontroll-
able aspectsof real life. "The justification for requiring this emo-
tional coldnessin the analyst is that it createsthe most advanta-
geous conditions for both parties: for the doctor a desirable
protectionfor his own emotional life and for the patient the largest
amount of help that we can give him to-day."r22
However, emotional coldness,which might after all be just a
show,is not in itself suficient. It must be an expressionof the purity
of the analyst,of his capacitynot to introduce the bacteriaof real
life into the analytic setting. The chemist and the surgeon must
both ensure the cleanlinessof their instruments; they must both
eliminate anything that might intervenein their work in an uncon-
trollable way.The analyst,for his part, is himself the instrument of
analysis,and cannot allow his own judgments, his own ideas and
knowledge, at present too limited, "to cut Ihim] off from the pos-
sibility of testing what we havealreadylearnt and of extending our
knowledge furtherJ' |2r
To put it in a formula:he mustturn his own unconscious like a receptive
o.g"n to*"rds the transmittingunconscious of the patient.He musi ad-
iust himselfto the patientasa telephonereceiveris adjustedto the trans-
mitting microphone.lust as the receiverconvertsback into soundwaves
the electricoscillationsin the telephone line which weresetup by sound
waves!so the doctor'sunconscious is able,from the derivatives of the un-
conscious which are communicated to him, to reconstruct that uncon-
scious,which has determinedthe patient'sfree associations. But if the
doctor is to be in a positionto use his unconscious in this way as an
instrumentin the analysis, he must himselffulfil one psychological con-
dition to a high degree.He may not tolerateany resistances in himself
which hold back from his consciousness what hasbeenperceived by his
unconscious; otherwisehe would introduceinto the analysis a new species
of selectionand distortionwhich would be far moredetrimentalthanthat
resultingfrom concentration of conscious attention.lt is not enoughfor
this that he himselfshouldbe an approximately normalperson.It maybe
insisted,rathel that he shouldhaveundergonea psycho-analytic purifi-
cationand havebecomeawareof thosecomolexes of his own which would
be apt to interfere with his graspof what the patienttellshim.r2a
Curiously, the recommendationsFreud gave to physiciansin
rqrz recall certain themes in Venel. The analyst must be able to
From Lauoisier to Freud 6t
as an instrument iust as the chemist was to
use the unconscious
his thermometer in his fingertips and his clock in his head.
have
ideas and consciousattention are obstaclesonly in-
Undoubtedly,
do not possess "all the knowledge (or at leastthe essen-
solaras we
tial knowledge)about the psychologyof the unconsciousand about
the structureof the neuroses."l25 Their role is thus only provision-
Ily contrast, the necessity of the analysts purifying
ally clamaging.
himself of unconscious f udgments, that is, the necessityof a didac-
tic analysisthat aims at identifying and eliminating the analyst's
countertransference, cannot be eliminated. Like an "experienced"
chemist,the practicinganalystmust haveundergonean apprentice-
ship that will transform his mode of perceptionand enablehim to
learn and to decipher.But the analogy stopsthere. Venels chemist
becamea singular being who was inhabited and nourished by his
memory; the pathos of his apprenticeshipwas expressedin his ac-
tivity, in his "insane passion."The pathosof didactic analysisaims
at purifrcation, the transformation of the analyst tnto a technical
instrumentthat would be interchangeable, if not standardized,and
capableof registering without interference"the derivativesof the
unconsciouswhich are communicated to him." The final purpose
of apprenticeship,accordingto Venel, was to make the chemistinto
a being asconcreteas chemicalactivity.The final purposeof a train-
ing analysisis to make the analyst into an "abstract"being, just as
the analytic setting is abstractedfrom real life. The analyst will
then be able, like Lavoisier'schemist,to hear the material through
which nature, or the patient'sunconscious,dictatesits truth to him.
Of course,the situation is more complex than we have repre,
sented,and discussionsstill continue about how much Freud's in-
terpretationsowe to his "artistry," that is, to the concreteman, in-
habited by memory and passions.We will rerurn ro that quesrion
in the following chapter.Our obiect here is the ideal situarion as
Freud himself describesit. His description succeeds,in fact, in
combining technique and sciencein a new way. Knowledge-the
lnterpretationof resistancesby the analyst,the remembering and
working-through by the patient of what he repeatedin the trans-
rs16n6s-i5 in the serviceof teghniquesinceit permits the obstacles
to the effectiveness of technique to be overcome.And techniaue is
6z From Lauoisier to Freud
in the serviceof knowledge since the purified setting of analysis
makes it possibleto understand,beyondthe morbid and apparently
isolatedsymptoms, the complex that explains them and that is to
be decomposed.
The truth of this combination depends on the effectiveness of
the procedureitself, and, on this score,Freud speaksin triumphant
tones.In r9ro, when he spoke at the SecondPsychoanalyticCon-
gress,he exhorted his followers in theseterms: "when we rtnou all
that we now only suspectand when we have carried out all the
improvements in technique to which deeper observationsof our
patients is bound to lead us, our medical procedureswill reach a
degree of precision and certainty of successwhich is not to be
found in every specializedfield of medicine."r26This successwould
enable them even to achievepower over the general mass of neu-
rotics without subjecting them to the analytic laboratory because
psychoanalysis will becomecoextensivewith society,with real life:
The success which the treatmentcanhavewith the individualmustoccur
equallywith the community.Sick peoplewill not be able to let their
variousneuroses becomeknown-the ir anxiousover-tenderness which is
meant to concealtheir hatred,their agoraphobia which tells of disap-
pointedambition, their obsessive actionswhich representself-reproaches
for evil intentionsand precautions againstthem-if all their relativesand
every strangerfiom whom they wish to concealtheir mental processes
know the generalmeaningof such symptoms,and if they themselves
know that in the manifestations of their illnesstheyare producingnoth-
ing that other peoplecannotinstantlyinterpret.The effect,however, will
not be limited to the concealmentof the symptoms-which, incidentally,
it is often impossibleto carry out; for the necessityfor concealmentde-
stroysthe useof being ill. Disclosureof the secretwill haveattacked,at
its most sensitivepoint, the "aetiologicalequation"from which neuroses
ssi5s-11will havemadethe gain from the illnessillusory.r2T
Analytic reason and the light it sheds on the reasonsof morbid
processesnot only would unravel the "aetiologicalequation" be-
tween causeand effectsand eliminate the advantagesof illness and
the possibility of hiding hatred, disappointed ambition, and evil
intentions from oneselfand others, but could even exercisea pro-
phylacticaction leading to the "change-overto a more realisticand
creditableattitude on the part of society."r28
From Lauoisier to Freud 63
Admittedly, Freud's optimism would be short-lived. Not only
did the cultural diffusion of psychoanalysisnot have the desired
effecrs,but also,and perhaps more importantly,patients'resisrances
provedmore invincible than Freud had foreseen.It is all the more
itriking, then, that analytic techniquehas essentiallysanctionedthe
rules by which Freud defined it in his triumphant period. After
World War I when the Fifth PsychoanalyticCongresswas held irl
Budapest,Freud announced:"Now that we are met together once
more after the long and difrcult years of separationthat we have
lived through, I feel drawn to review the positionof our therapeutic
procedure."l2e But this review,as we will see,doespresupposes not
an interrogation of the problem analytic technique was supposed
to have resolved,but rather a reflectionon practicalarrangements
deriving from the divergencebetween the real and the ideal pa-
ti ent .
Ideal Cases.Real Cases
Is the analysisof the transferencesuficientl Freud askedhimself
in r9r8. In certain cases,isn't it necessaryfor analysisto be sup-
ported by the "activity" of the analystlrr0This recourseto activity
is necessary, Freud explains,becauseone cannot alwaysleaveto the
patient the task of abandoning his resistances; one cannot always
count on the stimulus created by the transference.It is therefore
"natural," Freud says,to support the patient "by putting him into
the mental situation most favourableto the solution of the conllict
w hi ch is our aim . "lr lFr eud adm it s t hat sincet he pat ient 'sact ions
depend on external circumstances,it may sometimes be fitting,
rvhen it appearsbeneficialto do so, for the analyst to interveneto
al te r t hesecir cum st ances:"l t hink acr ivir yof such a kind on t he
part of the analysingphysicianis unobiectionableand entirely jus-
rifiedJ'r32
Freud goes on to develop his ideas from these general recom-
mendations.In the course of treatment, he recalls,symptoms dis-
appearlitde by little. But thesesymptoms are satisfactionsthat the
patient substitutesfor the fr.qtstrationcausing his illness.The pa-
trcnt is therefore tempted to find other satisfactionsof the same
6a From Lauoisier to Frcud
order in all kinds of pleasuresand interests,but this time without
the feature of suffering. But in so doing, the patient losessome-
thing of the instinctual forcesimpelling him towarcl recovery."lt is
the analyst'stask to detectthesedivergent pathsand to require him
every time to abandon them, however harmlessthe activity which
l e a d sto s a ti s fa c ti o n
m a y b e i n i tsel f." rr3
The anal ystmust mai ntai n
the sufferingof the patient up to a certain point, Freud admits, and
adds that otherwise one would run the risk of obtaining only a
temporary lmprovement.
Called upon to renouncesatisfactionsderived from external ac-
tivities, the patient will seek compensationin the treatment itself,
in the transferenceon the person of the analyst.But the analyst
must be wary because"[alny analyst who out of the fullnessof his
heart, perhaps,and his readinessto help, extendsto the patient all
that one human being may hope to receivefrom another,commits
the sameeconomicerror as that of which our non-analyticinstitu-
tions for nervous patients are guilty. . . . In analytic treatment all
such spoiling must be avoided."r34
As we can see,the "acivity" recommendedhere by Freud essen,
tially involves preventing the patient from engaging in activities
that might hinder his real recovery,and, at times, helping him to
make decisionsfavorableto that end, decisionsthat the parienr,by
himself, would be incapableof making. Interventionsby the ana-
lyst are all the more permissible,Freud asserts,becausehe is deal-
ing with people with frail temperaments:"We cannot avoid taking
some patients for treatment who are so helplessand incapableof
ordinary life that for them one has to combine analytic with edu-
cative influences;and even with the majority, occasionsnow and
then arise in which the physicianis bound to take up the position
of teacherand mentor."r15But the analyst is never justified in in-
culcating his own ideas:"For I have been able to help people with
whom I had nothing in common-nsi1h61 race,education,social
position nor outlook upon life in general."116
Freud indicates,however,that the analyst is obliged to exercise
"another quite different kind of activity"rrTwith cerrain categories
of patients. Severe phobics, for instance,must be encouragedto
From Laaoisier to Freud 65
confront the situation that most frightens them, that is, going out
alone. By the same token, it is necessaryto encourageobsession-
als--who havethe tendencyto prolong treatment indefinitely-to
abandon their passivity.In this case,it is appropriate to assigna
limit to the analysis.Freud himself had tried this with the Wolf
Man, whom he told, after he had been a patient lor three years,
that the treatment could not extend beyond four years(let us recall
that in r9o4 Freud had fixed the length of analytic treatment at six
months to three Years)'
It is clear that the "activity" recommendedin certain casesby
Freud does not constitute for him a fundamental innovation but
rather an adjustment that in no way contravened,as far as Freud
was concerned,the fundamental rule of neutrality. Nevertheless,
the necessityof this activity on the part of the analyst signals a
departure from the ideal of therapy presupposedby its quasi-
spontaneousextensionto the massesand its eventual prophylactic
inlluence.The analystcannot abstracthimself totally from real life.
In fact, he appealsto it for help in the analysiswheneverhe warns,
prohibits, makes recommendations.Analysis and insight are not
suflicientto undo the relation betweencauseand effect.The causal
link has to be weakenedby depriving the patient of certain advan-
ragesin real life that he derives from his pathological manif-esta-
tions "Analytic treatment should be carried through, asfar as is pos-
sible, under priuation-in a state of abstinence."rr8Nor can the
analystalwayspassivelywait for material to be analyzedas he could
with hysterics."[T]he various forms of diseasetreated by us cannot
all be dealt with by the same technique."rre
When, at the end of the paper,Freud takes up the problem of
the extension of the benefits of psychoanalysis to the masses,he
fbreseesthe eventual adaptationof analytic technique to "the new
condit ions":
We shallprobablydiscoverthat the poor are evenlessreadyto part with
theirneuroses than the rich,because the hard life that awaitsthem ifthey
recoveroffersthem no attraction,and illnessgivesthem one more claim
to socialhelp.Often,perhaps, we may only be ableto achieve anythingby
combiningmentalassistance rlqth somematerialsupport,in the manner
66 From Lauoisier to Freud
of the EmperorJoseph. It is veryprobable,too,rharthe large-scale
appli-
cationof our therapy will compelus to alloy the pure gold of analysis
freelywith the copperof directsuggesrion.r40
And, he adds, "hypnotic inlluence, roo, might lind a place in it
again,as it has in the treatment of war neuroses."ral One of Freud's
pupils, Ernest Simmel, had, in fact, successfullyused the cathartic
method in his treatment of German soldiersduring rhe war.
The problems marking the end of the golden age of psycho-
analysisas a scientifictechnique were brought into focus in Buda-
pest.In spite of Freud's affirmation that "whatever form this psy-
chotherapyfor the people may take, whatever the elementsout of
which it is compounded, its most effectiveand most important in-
gredients will assuredly remain rhose borrowed fiom strict and
untendentiouspsycho-analysis,"rrr the questionof eftbctiveness had
changed meaning. Effectivenesswas no longer the principle that
elicited more and more rigorous technicaland theoreticalrequire-
ments from Freud. It was no longer the proof adduced to affirm
and particularize the scientific standing of analysisamong orher
practices.On the contrary,effectiveness makes explicit, by the ad-
justments it imposes,the problem of the divergencebetween the
"ideal" patient, for whom "pure' analytic techniquewould be suit-
able,and the real patient,who, again,escapes, at leastin part, tech-
nical scientific redefinition. The substitution of the rransference
neurosisfor ordinary neurosis,which was supposedto put illness
i n th e s e rv i c eo f' k n o w l e d g e and make i t accessi blto
e anal yti ci n-
tervention,is not all-powerful. We enter here a new chapter:hence-
forth techniqueposesthe problem it was supposedto resolvs-1hx1
of its application.
2
C H A P TE R
Put to the Tbst
Psychoanalysis
From Inuention to Mobilization
Up to this point we have heard Freud addressinghimself to a
public who consideredhim a pioneer,the only authorized repre-
sentativeof psychoanalysis. What Freud defined as a given reality
was, in fact, a program assertingit had achievedits goals.But the
testing of this assertiondrd not depend on Freud alone. It de-
pendedalso on a history that of necessityescapedFreud, at leastin
part. This history is the story of the group that gathered around
Freud and used his instruments. It is also the story of the way in
which Freud's propositionswould be read, interpreted,criticized,
c.rradopted bv those who did not define themselvesas Freudians.
The many disagreementsand challengesthat marked the history
of psychoanalysis during Freud's lifetime have been the subjectof
numerous studies.We will not take up here the theoreticalelabo-
rations that successively identrfied psychoanalysis
as anthropologi-
cal, philosophical, ethico-historical,or cultural. We will restrict
ourselves,rather, to the problem outlined in the first chapter,that
rs, to the technical solution introduced by Freud. Now, however,we
will examine it from the angle of its capacityto mobilize.For this
reason,of all the conflicts opposing Freud to his followers, who
soon became rivals, we wil(<lncentrate on the conflict between
Freud and Sandor Ferenczi.Indeed. the stakesin this conllict con-
68 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
cern the possibleor prohibited renewal of preciselythe questions
that had led to Freud'screationof psychoanalysis.
In apologetichistoriesof psychoanalysis it is traditional to class
"the Ferenczi case" in a category that is highly relevant to our
study.According to them, Ferenczi is supposedto be the one who
let himself be dominated by "heart," 6y a furor sanandi,a passion
for curing, a desire to "save" his patients. Supposedly,in a fatal
regression,heart drew him "outside" of psychoanalysis. We would
like to determine on uhat basis such a fudgment can be pro-
nounced. To put it in other terms, is this not a repetition of the
scene that opened our 6rst chapteri Isn't this a repetition of
the commissioners'condemnation of mesmerism in the name of
the norms of reason,in the name of sciencel Is Ferenczi'sposition
a regressionor, in fact, a new confrontationbetweentwo of reason's
functions: one, to judge, and the othet to require that we find a
meaning for what judgment definesas contingent deviationsfrom
the ideal (deviationsthat may well escapethe schemeof intelligi-
bility this judgment is promoting, but that are unable to call the
legitimacy of this judgment into question)l
However, before setting out to resolvethis question, we will il-
lustrate with the particular caseof suggestion,more precisely,sug-
gestionin its possiblelink with telepathy,the new postureFreudian
technique took when mobilized against challengesconcerning irs
relevance.In this case,techniquetook the form lessof an inventive
solution than of the foundation of a right.
Tbchn iq ue as Mob i I ization
Determining whether the analyst is an archaeologistor a novel-
ist, whether he revivesthe ruins of a buried past or composeswith
his patient a novel convincing to both of them-this is a question
that would henceforth become a classic of analytic discussions,
treated sometimeswith humor, sometimeswith irony by present-
day psychoanalysts. Today such discussionsno longer pur rhe exis-
tence of psychoanalyticpractice into question but tend, rather, to
demonstrateits vitality. Those who dare to point our rhe role of
liction in analysis,the numerous critics of the naivet6of "the scien-
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test 69
the singularity of analysis,its unique character.
tisticFreud." affirm
psychoanalysis, henceforth,exists.lts existenceis not
in ,ny case,
but is carried rather to a new degreeof intensity by
endangered,
"only an analyst can take," specifically,the risks of
the risks that
describingthe infinite play of transferenceand countertransference,
of speakingof t he im passable m eaningof t he danger sof a delir ium
shared by analyst and analysand, of denouncingan ideal of knowl-
edge that would deny the other, or as Lacan put it, of describing
psychoanalysis as a passion revealing the "incurable" nature of
being human'
Such was evidently not the caseat the beginning. The question
raisedby Freud's claims was lesscomplex: Can the distinction be-
rweensufJgestion and the psychoanalyticcure be maintainedi The
contrast between a method per uia di porre and per uia di leuare,
which Freud used in I9o5 to found the identity of psychoanalysis,
might indeed appearluminous as a principle.On the practicallevel,
however,it posesa thorny problem. How can one be sure that, even
without intending it and without knowing it, the analyst has not
in fact acted by suggestionf How can one be sure that his convic-
tions,hypotheses,and theorieshavenot intervenedas uncontrolled
ingredientsin the analytic settingl How can one be sure that the
setting is pure, "aseptic,"and that the memories and associations
that arise there really belong to the patient and are not responses
to the analystt expectationsl
The problem as applied to psychoanalysisis obviously much
more dificult than it was for chemistry when Lavoisierconsigned
"old" chemistry-the chemistry defendedby Venel-to prehistory.
To be sure, Venel'schemist had to learn to read, to decipher signs;
he had to learn what l)iderot likened ro rhe "arr of divination." But
he did not have to fear that his art would influence the object of
his study. Chemical acriviry was not in any way supposedto be
sensitiveto the artirudesor beliefsof the chemist.The definition of
the chemists position vis-)-vis his own activity was related only to
knowledgeand rationality,to the operationaldefinition of the phe-
nomenon,without concerning what was defined. Even if the pas-
sageof artisanalchemistry,w-hichdealt with "raw" marerials,into
industrial chemistry, whi.h )drtt *itn "pure" proclucrs,trans-
70 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
formed the object of chemistry,it did not "inlluence" it. Uncon-
trolled ingredients are eliminated per uia di leuare and not per uia di
Porre.
We will not discusshere the texts, already amply glossed,in
which Freud affirms that analysisleadsto the elucidationof symp-
toms, to a truth that not only is acceptedby the patient but may
also,objectively,be said to be his. These argumentsare alreadywell
known: it is not the "yes" of the patient that counts,but the indirect
confirmations,the production of new memories "which complete
and extend the construction,"or an association"which contains
somethingsimilar or analogousto the contentof the construction."l
We will limit ourselveshere to pointing out that Freud's answers
all lead to the same distinction. It is true that the effectsof the
transferenceare difficult to dissociatefrom suggestioninsofar as
Freud himself defined suggestionon the basisof transference.It is
true that the patient may allow himself to be drawn into accepting
intellectuallyan erroneoustheoreticalinterpretationand even into
embracingthe error of his physician.But, like hypnosis,suggestion
will have only precarious, transitory effects.It is the dynamicsof rhe
analysisas such, the manner in which the patient is changed in
sff661-2ncl in affect-in the course of the working-through when
his conflicts are elucidated and his resistancesovercome,which
alone guarantee the difference between suggestionand analytic
work. In other words, from Freud'spoint of view, the analytic pro-
cessitself and not any given individual interpretation determines
the differencebetweenanalytic interpretationand suggestion.Only
a pertinent interpretation that strikes at the effective"reasons"for
the patient'ssuffering will produce dynamic effects.
This way of posing the problem is freighted with presupposi-
tions. We will return to them in the following chapterswhen we
attempt to determine whether the possibilitiesof suggestionhave
been ignored, reduced to the role of a foil by Freud. And we will,
in turn, open the Pandora'sbox constitutedby the following ques-
tion: What if the heart's "reasons"were to be produced and not
discoveredl For the moment, let us point out, rather,that we have
just met one of the foundations of the political role, as mobilizing
force,that Freudian techniquewould henceforthplay.To the extent
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test 7r
can establishits particularity by the requirements
that the cure
ooverningits process and not by any given local success,analytic
"politics of truth." The definition of Freud-
i..hniqu. mobilizes a
ian rrurh derives from the conditions of the production of that
rrurh and therefore is capableof declaring insignificant,
"outside
of psychoanalysis," any "fact" not guaranteed by the submission to
these conditions of the person who proposes that fact. What is es-
sentialis respectof the protocol and the neutrality prescribedfor
the analyst.The analyst must not seekthe approvalof the patient;
he must not allow himself to be influenced by the patient'scriti-
cismsor incredulity, nor must he allow himself to share the emo-
tions of an unexpectedlocal success.All affectiveinvolvementof
the analystwill not only createan obstacleto the dynamics of the
analyticprocess,but also reduce to zero the distinction particular-
izing analysisas a science.
This is the context in which we approachFreud'sconfrontation
with the questionof telepathy.In r9zr, first in a talk to his disciples
gatheredat Badgasteinand then in two articles,zFreud addressed
the problem posed by thought-transferenceboth in a general way
and specificallyin its relation to psychoanalysrs.
One might assumea priori that in addressingsuch a question
Freud was facing the worst of difficulties:the possibilityof an in-
gredient that would obliterate his ideal. Indeed, if thoughts could
be transferredin a direct way,then how could suggestionand anal-
ysis be told apartl How might one avoid the interferenceof the
analvst'sthoughts in what he sought to interpretl How might one
hopethat the knowledge produced was nor in effect"coproduced,"
not only in the sensethat it would be relativeto the analytic situa-
tion, but also in the sensethat it would be literally created?
The relationship betweenthe art of guessingor divining and the
art of divination is ambiguous, as the common etymology of the
two terms demonstrates.Like Venel,Freud decipherssigns,divines
their meanings, interprets them. But for Venel, the capacity for
divining has nothing disquieting about it: it quite simply marks
the di{Ierencebetween the apprentice and the practiced chemist
who thereby becomes compEqnt to confront the complex variety
or processes he works on. For the analyst,on the other hand, the
72 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
capacity for divining posesthe problem of knowing whether he
has not, in effect,read the desire hidden in the mind of his patient
in the way a diviner vr.'ould.In this case,how might one avoid the
problem of reciprocal readingl Had not Freud himself compared
the communication between the unconsciousof the analysandand
that of the analystto a telephonetransmissionl How might one be
s u re o fa u n i l a te ra lc o n necti onbetw eensenderand recei verl
However, this is apparently not what Freud fears. We know
from Ernest fones'sbiography that Freud\ fleelingsabout occultism
were ambivalent and that he had receivedoffers of an "alliance"
through an invitation in rgzr to becomecoeditor of three periodi-
calsdevotedto occultism.The threat was more a questionof "pol-
icy" than of determining the "truth" of telepathy.Freud addressed
his comments, then, to settling the relationship between psycho-
analysisand occultism on that level.
As Freud portrays it, the context is one o[ a potentially danger-
ous rivalry between the scienceof psychoanalysis on the one hand
and the occult and fascinatingcharacterof telepathyon the other.
The danger comesspecificallyfrom the possibilitythat the interest
not only of the patient and the public but of the analyst as well
might be diverted from psychoanalysisonto occult phenomena.
Citing the case of a reader who told him by letter of a dream
announcing an event that simultaneously occurred elsewhere,
Freud reactsthus: "It is easyto guesswhat my answer to this letter
was. I rvassorry to find that my correspondent's interestin analysis
had been so completely killed by his interest in telepathy.I there-
fore avoided his direct question, and, remarking that the dream
contained a good deal besidesits connectionwith the birth of the
twins, I asked him to give me any information or ideas that oc-
curred to him which could give me a clue to the meaning of the
dream."J
Freud's solution is operational and professional.As Franqois
Roustang has pointed out, Freud's strategyis to demonstratethat
analysis has nothing to fear from telepathy,since only analysiscan
bestotuscientifc status on u,hat aPPear to be occult phenomena. ln
other worcls,as Roustangseesit, Freud emphasizesthat "telepathy
is too frail ever to succeedin raising itself to the level of a science
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test 73
needsthe assistance of psychoanalysis which is well-
and therefore
as a science."aIn Freud's view, the phenomenon of
established
put psychoanalytictechnique into
thought-transferencedoes not
On the contrary, it is preciselythis technique that is ca-
cuestion.
,able of elucidating the phenomenon in a rational way even if it
..nno, explain preciselyhow thoughts are transferred.The task of
is, on the one hand, to avoid being fascinatedby
nsvchoanalysis
on the other, to elucidatethe materialsof thought-
i.i.pr,hy and.
transferenceiust as it elucidatesfantasies,ordinary dreams, and
other subiectiveProductions:
The analysthashis own provinceof work which he must not abandon:
the unconscious elementof mentallife. If in the courseof his work he
$,ereto be on the watchfor occultphenomena, he would be in dangerof
overlookingevervthingthat more nearlyconcernedhim. He would be
surrendering the impartiality,the lack of preiudicesand prepossessions,
which haveformed an essential part of his analyticarmour and equip-
ment.If occultphenomenaforcethemselves on him in the sameway in
s'hichothersdo, he will evadethem no more than he evades the others.s
The essentialdifferencebetween the diviner, the soothsayer, the
fortune-teller,and the analyst does not depend so much on the
materialthey deal with as on the subjectiveattitude of the analyst.
The diviner makes the phenomenon of thought-transferencethe
end and raisond'6tre of his activity.He seizesupon it as the proof
of his supernaturalpowers. By contrast,the analyst will welcome
this phenomenon as one ingredient among others of the analytic
setting.While the soothsayeris flascinatedby the event and thus
fascinates others, the analyst treats it in the same way and on the
same grounds as he treats the dreams and thought-associations
rvhich arise in the courseof every analysis.He is not interestedin
the phenomenon itself but in what this phenomenon, like any
other, can reveal about the secret desires buried in the patient's
mtnd. Of course the analvstdiuinesiust like the soothsaveror the
fortune- t ellerbut
, f or him t he f act of divining or guessingcor r ecr ly
is not an end in itself but an instrument servinganother purpose-
the purpose of elucidation, of arriving at the moment when the
patlent'ssecretclesireswill nor.only be expressedin dreams,symp-
toms, free associations, even in thought-transference,but will be
74 PsychoanalysisPut to the Te-ct
consciouslyrecognizedand accepted.Like all the other ingredients
coming from real life that the patient introducesinto the analytic
setting,thought-transferencecan and must be subjectedto the con-
ditions which insure the closureand the progressivepurification of
that setting.
Two elementsare particularly striking in Freud's confrontarion
with the question of telepathy.First is that the distinction between
the art of the diviner and that of the analystmarks off and repro-
duces the distinction between Venelian chemistry and chemistry
according to Lavoisier.The capacity to guess,to divine, was an
essentialingredient in the art of the Venelian chemist.This capacity
is for the modern chemist an active but unthematized condition:
there are "good" chemistsand those who fail in spite of the proto-
col that is supposedto direct their operations.Everyoneknows this
but no one discussesit. It is simply understoodthat those who fail
will be eliminated in the courseof their educationor that they will
be directed "toward theory."While the protocol implies that anyone
can be a successfulexperimenter,the capacityto apply the protocol
successfullyis an unexamined part of the selectionprocessdeter-
mining who will become an experimenter.Similarly. the capacity
to divine or guessthat plays a role in analysismay remain unex-
plained-it may even be attributed to thought-transference. What
is essentialis that this capacitybe subjectedto technique,that the
analyst not treat it as evidencefor the truth of his interpretarions.
The analyst should be interestedonly in the effectsof his capacity
for divining, in the possibilityit createsof provoking new associa-
tions and new resistanccs.
Second,Freud is no longer a solitary researcherwho can simply
afibrd to take the risks he judges worthwhile. Henceforth he must
bear the responsibilitiesof the flounderof a school.In this respect,
his followers and colleagueswere dismayedthat their master was
putting the respectabilityof psychoanalysis in danger by crediting
the possibleexistenceof telepathic phenomena.fones'sbiography
recountsthe fear, the indignation, the stupor Freud! followers felt
when they saw him "flirting" with occultism and thereby risking
the reputation of their profession.Undoubtedly,the barrier Freud
raisedbetween analysisand occultism seemedto them precarious.
Psl,cltoonotutis
Put to the Test 75
been better, fones states,to adopt another policy-
It woulcl have
silence.In response,Freud assertedhis right as a pri-
the policy of
vate individual to state his conviction without taking into account
the reactions the outside world. His articleshad, with just cause
of
ancl to his own satisfactionat least,dissociatedthe future of psy-
choanalysis lrom that of telepathicphenomena.His personalopin-
ion about telepathv was no business,then, of his followers.
Bur, at the same time. Freucl charged his followers with the re-
spo nsibilit v oi m aint ainingand m aking explicitt he gr oundsf or t he
iistinction between psychoanalytictreatment, telepathy,and sug-
gesrion.Freucl'sdemonstrationthat analysisis not jeopardizedby
telepathypresupposesthat the analytic protocol representsthe ef-
fectiveconvergenceof the interestsof psychoanalyticreason,the
conditions of science,and the interests of the patient. In other
words,it implies that the particularity of psychoanalysis restson its
singulareffectiveness.
The question of effectiveness, which we will return to, is still a
subiectof controversytoday.Indeed, many psychoanalysts contest
any cr it er ion com par ing t he out com e of analyt ict her apy and t he
resultsof other therapeutictechniques.But the question cannot be
posedin the same way as in the rgzos. The responseof current
analystspresupposesthe existenceof psychoanalysis as a singular,
unique discipline. But in the rgzos, Freud's followers were strug-
gling preciselyfor the recognition of their technique,and on that
front they had to struggle alone.Fiom r9z4 onwards,rhey were in
the front line with patientswhose cure was to prove the effective-
nessof psychoanalysis while Freud was behind the lines devoting
himself to theoreticaland speculativework that was to assurethe
cultural diffusion of psychoanalysis.
The Que-;tionof Euoluing Technique
After r924, then, Freud stated that he was "no longer treating
patlentsbut only analytic candidates."6In r93o in a letter to Fer-
enczi he declared that as far as the therapeuticeffectsof psycho-
analysiswere concerned,he-was "fed up."; Indeed, if we are to
believeFerenczi'sClinical Diary, Freud expressedhimself in even
 78 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
and supposeothers have also"rs inspired plans for a book, whicn
was published in r9z4 under the nrle Entruic\lungziele der psy_
choanalyse(The Deuelopmentof Psycho-Analysk).This book, which
we will soon examine, had as its subtitle Zur wechselbeziehung uon
Theorie und Praxi-t (on the Interdependenceof rheory and practice).
This subtitle suggesrsthat the book was related to the theme of a
competition, with a prize of 2o,ooomarks, proposedby Freud also
in r922: "Relations Between Psychoanalytic Technique and
Theory." The jury, composedof Freud, Karl Abraham, and Eitin-
gon, posed the following question ro the evenrualcandidates:,,In
what measurehas technique in{luencedtheory and to what degree
are they presentlyin accord or in contradictionl"re
O f c o u rs e th e p ri m a r y purposeof such a competi ri onw as to
reinforce the bonds between analystsand to encouragethem to
take up a type of researchthat Freud himself was abandoning at
that time. Nevertheless,the way the questionis statedis surprising.
It posesas a problem what Freud had alwaysasserted was resorved,
what he had defined as the motive force of his thought, rhe raison
d'6treof the "foundation" of psychoanalysis. A competition usually
proposesto its participants a quesrion that, even if it resiststhe
usual approaches,has meaning only within a given scientifictra-
dition. It is much lessusual fbr a question of this sorr ro challenge
the very ground uniting its potential respondents.
Ferenczi and Rank's 6ook, The Deuelopmentof psycho-Analysis, ts
inscribed in this register. It constitutesa real reappraisalof the
problem that concerns us and that Freud considered1656lyscl-1hs
problem of heart and reason.Ferenczi and Rank cite evidencethat
the issueis far from resolved:"lOlne cannor deny that in the last
ten years,a state of increasingconfusion,particularly in respectto
the practical problems, has been gaining ground among psycho_
analysts.In contrast to the rapid growth of the psycho-analytical
theory, the technical and therapeuricfacor which was originally
the heart of the matter and the actual stimulus to every important
advancein the theory has been strikingly neglected,in the ritera-
ture, as well as in practice."20
This statementprovides an excellentsummary of what we pre-
sented in the first chapter. The authors go on ro point our that
kychoanalysis Put to the Tb,rt 79
had not published anything further on this subject
Freud himself
in the preceding ten years even though, by his own account,pre-
scriptionsregarding technique were incomplete and neededto be
Freud had underlined the need for internal adjustments:
moclifiecl.
announced, for instance,that the treatment of obsessional
he had
neuroses,which raised seriousunresolvedproblems,would neces-
sitatemodifications in technique. But F'reud never published the
GeneralMethodologyof Psycho-Analysisthat he had announced in
rgro.rr Ferenczi and Rank could therefore feel justified in taking
up the subject,in seeking-as Freud had always done, beginning
w'ith the enigma of the "functional dynamic lesion" inherited from
Charcot-to transform the dificulties confronted by the physician
into technicaland conceptualinnovations.
In spite of the optimistic statisticsreported for Berlin, one of
these dificulties pertained to the lengthening of analyses.What
Ferencziand Rank sayabout this subjectwill not trouble any mod-
ern reader.They speak of an "intellectualist"deviation,"the accu-
mulation of explanations"given to the patient in order to "conquer
his resistances," that is, to convincehim: "There was a phase,in the
developmentof psycho-analysis, in which the goal of the analytic
treatmentconsistedin filling the gaps in the memory of the parient
vvithknowledge."z:But thesegaps indicateresisrances that instruc-
tion does not succeeclin overcoming."lnterruption of the correct
analysisby formal coursesof instruction may satisfyboth rhe ana-
lyst and the patient, but cannot effect any change in the libido-
attitude of the sick person."rj
Up to this point, there is indeed nothing disquieting in Ferenczi
arrd Rank's presentation.Their critique of the "fanaticismof inter-
pretation" follows the mainstream of Freudian technique. For
Freud himself, the interpretation of etiology is significant only
when it contributes to the processof purification and affective
transformation,and it can become shared knowledge only when
a<ldressed to a "purified" patient, that is, in a situation where the
technico-scientificideal of the convergenceof theory and practice
has been achieved.Up to that point, the patient-like the raw ma-
terialsof the old chemistry-js not capableof verifying theory,of
c<.rrroborating its relevanceby his recovery.Interpretation has the
8o PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
status not of an explanation but rather of an instrument whose
significanceis relative to the transformation o[ the patient's"libi-
dinal attitude."
But Ferenczi and Rank do not stop with the method proposed
by Freud. To the "too great knowledge of the analyst" they oppose
Erleben,activelived experience.Through this method, "the patient
should, during the cure, repeata large part of his processof devel-
opment, but also as experiencehas shown, it is a matter of just
thoseportions which cannot be really experiencedfrom memory."2a
This technical novelty made up part of what Ferenczi and Rank
were currently practicing under the name "active method." It
might lead to excesses, they recognize,but they still recommend a
moderateactivity that consistsin "the analyst taking on, and, to a
certain extent, really carrying out those r6les which the uncon-
sciousof the patient and his tendencyto l1ight prescribe."25Beyond
the need for marking off and analyzing, the therapist must also
fauor the tendency to repeat, "naturally, with the goal of finally
overcoming this tendency by revealingits content."26And the au-
thors add: "When this repetition takes place spontaneously,it is
superfluousto provoke it, and the analystcan simply call forth the
transformationof the resistanceinto remembering (or plausiblere-
construction)." 27
Here the divergenceis manifest.While Ferencziand Rank make
clear that "the ultimate goal is remembering," they nevertheless
plead for an active attitude in the analystthat would provoke rep-
etition if it didnt occur spontaneously.They go so far as to propose
that the physician actually accept playins the role assignedto him
by the patient. Freudian technique forbade the therapist to enter
into the processof repetition in any way whatsoever;that is, it
prohibited him from participating in its actualization.Repetition
was to remain uirtual, Iimited to intentions, in statu nascendi:"lf
the attachment through transferencehas grown into somethingat
all serviceable,the treatment is able to prevent the patient from
executingany of the more important repetitiveactionsand to uti-
Iize his intention to do so in statu nascendias material for the thera-
peutic work." 28
This divergenceis not superficial;it involvesthe very srarusof
Put to the Test
Psychoanalysis 8r
in the play of repe-
technique.Indeed, if the analystacceptsa role
himself and
tition, by rhe same token he acceptsthe risk, both for
parienr,of a confusion between "real life" and the analytic
for the
serting.This means accepting that, similar to all the protagonists
in the patient'slife, the therapist will allow himself to be manipu-
lateclto a certain degree,even that he will provoke this manipula-
tion by introducing into the analytic setting the uncontrollablein-
sredientsof his own personality.The active method thus breaks
*i,h ,h" technico-scientificideal of substituting for the ordinary
neurosisan "artificial neurosis" that is accessibleto intervention
preciselyto the degree that the analyst has not participatedin it'
Only this abstentionenablesthe analystto make a clear distinction
between his role and the one the patient wishes him to play. In
addition, the activemethod givesfree rein to the patient'saffectivity
and can thus no longer guaranteethat the therapist will be shel-
tered from "undesirableaccidents"of the kind Freud himself ex-
periencedin the famous scenewhen his patient threw her arms
around his neck. In this light, the commissioners'secret report
takeson dangerousnew relevance.
Ferencziand
There is more, and worse. In their sixth chapter,2e
Rank take up the decision Freud had presented 25 61116i21-1hs
abandonmentof all use of hypnosisin analytic treatment:
In hypnosis,for example,the physiciangenerallyobtainedmerelytem-
poraryand not radicalresults,because coveredoverall the
its application
vital psychicmotives.This was why FreudgaveuP hypnosisand usedthe
methodof free association which gaveus our first insight into the play of
mentalforces.However, one must admit with Freudthat hypnosisowes
its undeniablesuccesses to the completeeliminationof the intellectual
(ethical.esthetic,
etc.)resistances. It one could,for example,combinethe
with the advantage of
inestimable advantage of the techniqueof hypnosis
the analyticability to free the hypnoticaffectsituation,a tremendousad-
vancein our therapeuticability would be achieved. Psycho-analysis has
alreadyshedenoughlight on this problem to enableus to recognizethe
C)edipus situationas the nucleusof the hypnoticaffectrelation.But it has
not yet beenableto give us the deepestunderstanding of what is really
specificto the hypnoticstate.When we havefully understoodthe nature
of the hypnoticattachment to the physician, which hasnot yet beenreally
clearedup by the recognitionql-the nature of the transference, it is pos-
siblethat we may cometo a point when the analystcan usehypnosis asa
8z Psychoanalysis Put to the Test
part of his technique, without being obliged to fear that he may not be
able in the end to loosen the affective umbilical cord which attaches the
patient to him. This possibilityof readmitting hypnosis,or other sugges-
tive methods,into our analytic therapy would perhapsbe the culmination
of the simplification of the analytic technique, toward which, according
to our interpretation, we should be and are actually tending. The final
goal of psycho-analysis is to substitute,by means of the technique,affec-
tive factors of experiencefor intellectual processes.It is well known that
this is iust what is achieved in an extreme way in hypnosis,in which
consciousmaterial is called forth or eliminated accordingto need.30
The "omission" of this singularly rich text from the French ver-
sion of the Oeuures complites of Ferenczi is evidently not innocent.
In it, the whole system of meanings assigned by Freud is put up
for reexamination.
Specifically, Ferenczi and Rank accept the broad outlines of
Freud's interpretation of hypnosis in Group Psychology and the Anal'
ysis of the Ego lgzt):
lTlhe hypnotist has steppedinto the place of the ego ideal. It is only that
everything is even clearer and more intense in hypnosis,so that it would
be more to the point to explain being in love by means of hypnosisthan
the other way round. The hypnotist is the sole obiect,and no attention is
paid to any but him. The fact that the ego experiencesin a dream-like
way whatever he may request or assert reminds us that we omitted to
mention among the functions of the ego ideal the businessof testing the
reality of things. . . . The hypnotic relation is the unlimited devotion of
someone in love, but with sexual satisfactionexcluded; whereas in the
actual caseof being in love this kind of satisfactionis only temporarily
kept back, and remains in the background as a possibleaim at some later
time.3l
Ferenczi and Rank insist, howeve t on the insufficiency of this in-
terpretation, an insuficiency recognized by Freud himself, but
whose implications they dramatize: we do not understand the spe'
cifc character of the hypnotic state (iust as, we might add, following
Freud, we do not understand the specific character of thought-
transference). Since he never stopped posing questions about the
nature of the hypnotic relation, Freud would certainly have ac-
cepted this observation; but he certainly would not have accepted
the judgment Ferenczi and Rank derive from it since it implicates
analytic technique. The purpose of analytic technique is to reduce
Put to the Tbst
Psychoanalysis 83
hypnosisto one ingredient among others in the analytic setting.
F-ortheir part, Ferenczi and Rank proposeto try to understandthe
hvpnotic relation and the possibilitiesof dissolving it so that the
analystmight put it to use.
In other words, Ferenczi and Rank took literally Freud's re-
marks on the unfinished characterof analytic technique,a char-
acter laying it open to further improvements.They respectfully
presenthim with nothing lessthan a new descriptionof the foun-
dation of this technique, which simultaneouslyimplies a possible
new history of psychoanalysis. In the light of their work, Freud's
exclusion of hypnosis in favor of the analysisof the transference
becomesprovisional.According to Ferenczi and Rank, the instru-
ment of hypnosispresentedan unparalleledpotential for achieving
the substitutionof a lived experienceof affect for intellectualpro-
cesses-that is, the same purpose psychoanalysisaccomplishes
through the painful and complex labor of working-through, a la-
bor often sidetracked by intellectualized "formal explanations."
The readoptionof hypnosiswould also enableanalyststo combine
the two techniquesthat were testedin succession by Freud.
As in the caseof the actualizationof the transferentialattach-
ment that Freud wished to utilized only in statu nascendi,we are
dealing here with a new ideal of the therapeuticsituation. In this
new version,the therapist is able simultaneouslyto constitutehim-
self as az actiueingredient,a partlcipant in whatever happens to the
patient, and to disengagehimself from that role. The neutrality
recommended by Freud-the analyst's nonparticipation in the
transformationhe or she initiates-is no longer an ideal but rather
a sign of the insufficiencyof technique.Technique had, in effect,
sacrificedone of its most powerful instruments simply becauseit
tl i dn't know how t o useit .
Liberty Under Surueillance
In a letter to Ferenczi of fanuary 22, rg24, Freud wrote: "l do
not agree with everything in your common production although
there is a good deal in it that. I appreciate."12
This reticent judg-
ment, which Freud does not explain, causedenormous distressto
84 kychoanalysis Put to the Test
Ferenczi.His responseto Freud dated fanuary 3o began with the
following words: "Your letter upset me not a little. For the first
time in our acquainl3n6'6-1[21 you soon elevated to a fiiend-
ship-l hear words of dissatisfactionfrom you."r'r
Ferenczi thought he had a right to be astonished.Hadn't Freud
closelyfollor.vedthe elaborationof their workl Hadn't he and Rank
corrected the passagesFreud had criticizedl Hadn't Freud given
th e m ma n y s i g n so f a p p r oval ,i ncl udi ng hi s encourageme nt to par-
ticipatein the competition announcedin rgzz (they had not. in fact,
submitted their work, judging it to be imperfect)l "We also inter-
preted as approval your friendly encouragementto enter the essay
for the competition announceclshortly afterwards,as well as your
view, held until recently,that the rvork should havebeen submitted
and n'on the prize."ra
Ferenczi indulges next in a feverish speculationabout the rea-
sonsfor Freud's dissatisfaction, first suggestingthis one: "There is
aboveall the hint of a possibilitythat one day psycho-analysis could
be merged rvith suggestion(hypnosis).It is self-evidentthat we
spoke of this possibility onlv in the most hypotheticalform. not
unlike the rvay in which vou, Professor,mentioned it in your Bu-
dapest lecture. We stressed,in addition, that this combination
would only be permissiblefor practical (healing)purposesand not
for scientificones."15The distortion is quite clear: in his paper at
Budapest,Freud had envisagec{ the recourseto hypnosisonly as a
last resort in the situation r,r'herethe successof analysiswould ne-
cessitatecreating a "popular" form of technique,one that rvould
facilitatea broad application.By contrast,Ferencziand Rank make
the restorationof hypnotic therapy the terminal point or the key-
stoneof the evolution of technique.
Ferenczi then addressesa secondreasonfor Freud'sdissatisfac-
ti o n , th i s ti me a n o b i e c ti onthat he admi ts Freud had al readymade:
The only objectionwe heardfrom you then,wasyour apprehension that
we gavetoo much weight to the experi6nll2[f26161-andtoo little to
remembering. In the little book however, we particularlytried to empha-
sizethe view,that corresponcls fullv with your own understanding, that
analvsisshoulclnot be allowedro Fzzleout in "experiences." We do not
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Tbst 85
ceasero point out the absolutenecessityfor a conscious anchoring(mem-
.rv) astheonly prophylactic agent.It is of coursetrue that rverecommend
a more extensive exploitationof the tendencyto repeatthan has been
usualup till nowibut this is, as it rvere,only a quantitativedifference,
on
further expe rience must decide.i6
which
In his responsedated February 4, rgz4, Freud did nor raise rhe
problem of hypnosis.How are we to understandthis silence,which
ntusrbe particularly surprising to thoseof our contemporaries'*'ho
considerhypnosisas the anti-analytic practicepar excellence I As-
suredly,in his letter of fanuary 3o, Ferenczi had made it clear thar
the alliance between analysis and hypnosis had only a pracrical
(healing)aim and not a scientificone. But that alone could not have
beensatisfyingto Freud. Perhapsit was the programmariccharac,
ter of the perspectiveopened by Ferenczi and Rank that reassurecl
him. Their line of approach to hypnosiswas, in facr, an extension
of Freud's: they closely linked "practical" and "scientific" consid-
erations.Understanding rhe hypnotic srareand controlling it are
fbr them, as for Freud, indivisible. In the future imagined by his
fbllowers.the use of hypnosiswould be conditional on the elimi-
nation of its disquieting power. Hypnosis could therefore be ad-
mitted in the present on a hypothetical basis. One can always
dream. It is not unrealistic to supposethat this dream was not
altogetherdispleasingto Freud, who, of course,at that time, could
not foreseethe anathema that would later be cast on hvpnosisby
som eof his heir s.
By contrast, putting acrive reperition to use was an immediate
possibility.Freud did not hide his worries on rhar score,and conrin-
ued to repeat his warnings. In his letter of February 4, after assur-
ing Ferenczi that he was sorry he was so upser,Freud goes on to
explain his attitude about the recenrbook: "The fact remains,rhar
it no longer appeals ro me as much as it did in the beginning.
before I had gained a detachedview of it. I would now judge it as
not having overcome its birth defect suficiently: 'experience'is
used like a catchword, its resolution not stressedenough. I was
probablyseducedat first by the correctionyou made in view of my
earlier caution about 'acting €ut."'17
86 kychoanalysis Put to the Test
A "catchword": this criticism recallsFreudt attitude toward te-
lepathy,his fear that such a startling experience-like thought-
transferenceor intuitions of the future-would capturethe interest
of analystsand lead them to forget their true vocation.The search
for "lived experiences"threatens,then, to become an obstacleto
analytic uorft, which can be long and painflul.[t also threatensto
tilt the analyst back into the role of a sorcerer'sapprentice who
would provoke an explosiveactive repetition without being able to
control it. The "defect" Freud denouncesdenotesthe risk of re-
turning to the cathartic method. How could one favor the "libera-
tion" of affectswithout renouncing, at the same time, the conver-
gence of the questionsof truth and recovery,without renouncing
as well the weapons provided by the analytic protocol againstthe
risks of an uncontrolled transferencel
Even so, in the letter dated February 15, r924, circulated to the
close associateshe called the "committee" with the purpose of
soothingthe feelingsarousedby Ferencziand Rank'sbook and also
by another book that had appeared simultaneously,Rank's Tle
Traumaof Birth, Freud retreatssomewhat from his former position:
"l value the ioint work as a correctionof my conceptionof the part
playedby repetition or acting-out in the analysis.I used to be ap-
prehensiveof them, and used to regard these events-'experiences'
you call them nowadays-as undesirablemishaps.Rank and F-er-
enczi have called attention to the fact that these'experiences'can-
not be avoidedand can be made good use of."r8
Freud's spirit of conciliation can also be seen in his refusal to
condemn Ferenczi and Rank: "l hnd the experiment of the two
authors entirely justified. We shall see what comes of it. In any
event we must guard againstcondemning such an undertaking at
the outset as heretical."re
This letter was on the whole well receivedby the members of
the committee-Eitingon, Ferenczi,fones,Rank, and Sachs.There
\r'asone notable exception-Abraham.*"
In a letter to Freud on February zr, Abraham declaresthat he is
very upset. He has, he says,over a period of weeks "examined his
conscience"on the subjectof Ferenczit and Rank's books,and ar-
rived at this observation:"l see the presagesof a fatal evolution
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Tbst 87
which is for psychoanalysisa question of lifb and death." Freud
respondedon February 25, saying that he does not seethe danger
Abraham speaksof. In a letter dated the following day, Abraham
sraresthat he recognizesin the books under discussion"the expres,
sion of a scientific regression.""Two of our best elementsare in
clangero[ straying from the path of psychoanalysisand of thus
being lost to psychoanalysis." He also recallsto his master that he
had warned him about fung after the First Congressat Salzburg
in r9o8. Now that another congresswould be taking place in the
samecity, Abraham renews his warnings. But this congressnever
took place since,on Rank s initiative ten days previously,the com-
mi t t eehad beendissolved.
What are we to think of Freud'satrempr ro make peacel It ap-
pearsthat it was, in fact, full of hesitancy.In his letter of February
4, 1924,to Ferenczi he admits: 'At present,however,I really cannor
saywhat I disagreewith." And then he adds: "l havealready told
Rank and Sachsof my impressionthat the path opened up could
learl atuayfrom psychoanaly-ei,s."atIf Freud speaks here of an "im-
pression,"it is doubtless becausehe was still unsure about how
Ferencziwould succeedin the future in maintaining the already
shaky equilibrium between his desire ro cure and his desire to
unclerstand.Can the path Freud himself crearedbe extended,or is
everyonewho risks doing so doomed to abandonthe requirements
and constraintsthat from then on conferred its identity on Freud,
tan psychotherapyi
Irerenczit researchesand therapeuticinnovationswould con6rm
Freud\ fears.The method promoted by Ferencziand Rank favor,
ing activerepetition without guaranreeof control was only a begin-
ning. Hypnosis, equally uncontrollable,would also becomean in-
gredient in Ferenczi's"new technique,"an ingredient that was, it
shouldbe noted, acceptedbur never systematicallyexercised.Faith-
ful to the condition he himself had posed-that the mvsterv of
hvpnosis be unveiled-Ferenczi deliberately avoided the ur. of
hypnosis.Nor did he ever claim that he had artainedthe "terminal
point" in the evolution of his techniquethat he had foreseeninThe
Deuelopmentof Psycho-Anatystt,Itut he did experience rhe increas-
tngly radical divergencebetween rhe inreresrsof the patient and
88 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
thoseofthe psychoanalyst, protectedby his protocol,and eventually
favored the former over the lafter. Furor sanandi, his critics would
say;regressionfrom psychoanalysis. However,though Ferenczihad
abandonedthe guaranteesof professionalrespectabilityensuredby
the analytic protocol, nobody rvasable to claim that he lvas,for all
that, lessgood as a therapist;on the contrary.
Ferenczi'ssolitary adventure brings us face to face with a ques-
tion we posed in the first chapter,specifically,the question of the
price paid for the production of respectable"facts" capableof har-
monizing the interestsof reasonand those of a professionor dis-
cipline. Ferenczi became convinced that it was the patients who
paid the price; but he was incapable,or as we will show,was made
incapable,of proposing,as he had first hoped, the conditionsof an
effective reconciliation between the interests of the professional
therapistand those of patients.
But let us return to the regime of "liberty under surveillance"
accordedby implication to Ferenczi in Freudt February r5 letter
to the committee.C)n this scoreit will be interestingro situatemore
precisely the breaking point of Ferenczi'shope of being under-
stood, the point where the patient'sinterests,as Ferenczi under-
stood them. entered into an insurmountableconflict with those of
the profession.
In r9z8 Ferenczi published his article on "The Elasticity of
Psycho-AnalyticTechnique."He speaksat great length there about
the notion of tact, which he definesas "the capacityfor empathy
lEinftihlungl."{2This de6nition of "tact" revealsFerenczit distance
from the "activemethod" defined by Freud in r9r8 at the Budapest
Congress.At that time, Freud stated that the therapist could, by
his prohibitions, prolong or re-createthe patient'sstate of frustra-
tion, and thus prevent the attenuationof the suffering that spurred
him on toward recovery.According to Michael Balint, this method,
which Freud associatedin rgr8 with the narne of Ferenczi, had
enabled Ferenczi to achieve"undeniable therapeuticsuccesses" as
well as "a good number of equally undeniablefailures."arFerenczi
progressivelyabandonedthis forrn of the "activemethod." "lnstead
of orders and prohibitions,"writes tsalint,"he began to give advice
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Tbst ttg
and suggestions."aa His next step was to give up this "soft" form of
activeintervention in favor of concentratingon what the patient
seernedto expect o[ the analyst. Ferenczi'sintention then was to
make his technique sufficientlyllexible to avoid uselesslyfrustrat-
ing the patient'sexpectations.Like "empathy,"which we will ex,
amine in the next chapter, "tact," according to Ferenczi, has a
double meaning: it designatesnot only the faculty of "understand-
ing," but also the capacityof creating "a climate of cornprehension,"
which is not the same thing.
Clearly Ferencziunderstoodwhat this "return o[ tact" must have
meant for Freud. Wasn't it the casethat in psychoanalysis, "definite
technicalrules . . . replace the indefinable 'medical tact' which is
looked upon as some specialgift"lt; Wasn't it preciselyrhesestrict
rul es t hat m ade it possiblet o dist inguishanalysisas a scient if ic
technique fron-r other forms of thaumaturgical or medical "arts"
alsofbunded on transferencefFerencziadmitted that psychoanaly-
sis approachedthis ideal. He also envisagedthe "rransformarion
into a kind of craft of the art of understandinghuman nature."4('
Alreacly for Ferenczi the rules of psychoanalytictechnique, and
especiallythe "secondfundamental rule," that is, the obligation of
everyfuture analystto undergo analysis,had considerablyreduced
the importance of the personal equarion in analytic work. What
remainsis without danger and can even be put to use for the pa-
tient if, precisely,the physicianpossesses tact. This faculty will re,
rnain valuable as long as psychoanalyticknowledge is not well
enough developedto make it useless.The return of tact thus sig^
nifiesfor Ferenczi that, while psychoanalysis is clearlyan improved
art, a craft, it had still not becomea technique.
Freud learned about Ferenczi'sarticle just before its publication.
anclin a letter dated /anuary 4, t928, he sent praisesto the author.
Specifically,he congratulateshim for having prornored in psycho-
analyticpracticecertain positiveinitiativesthat he himself had not
emphasized."I thought it most imporrant,"Freud writes, "to stress
what one should not do, to point out the temptations that run
counter to analysis.Almost everything one should do in a positive
sense,I left to the 'tact' that vJrqhal'eintroduced.What I achievecl
90 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
thereby was that the Obedient submitted to theseadmonitionsas if
they were taboosand did not notice their elasticity."4T
He expresses
one reservationin cauda:
Although what you sayabout "tact" is very true, it seemsto me that a
in this form is just asquestionable
. All thosewithout tactwill
concession
seethereina justification i.e.for the subjective
for arbitrariness, factor,i.e.
for the influenceof personalcomplexesthat have not been overcome.
What we do in fact,-in a manner remainingmostlyPrecon5gi6u5-i5 16
considerthe variousreactions we expectfrom our interventions,and what
mattersespecially is a quantitativeestimateof the dynamicfactorsin the
situation.There are naturallyno rulesfor this appraisal, the analyst's
ex-
perienceand normality will be decisive.For beginnerscertainlyone
shouldstrip "tact" of its mysticalfmystisch,
mysterious]character.a8
Here, again,Freud is conciliatory.The statushe proposesto con-
fer on tact, and, by the same stroke, on the positiveinterventions
suggestedby tact, would make tact an approximate equivalentof
the savoirfaire of the experimental chemist, which is not codified
by protocols(there are no explicit rules for tact but rather a "pre-
conscious"estimate,Freud writes) but which neverthelessdistin-
guishesthe "good experimenter" from the one who will have to
find another job. As for chemistry,the essentialfor analysisis that
protocol come "first," that protocol guide the beginner and explain
his successes, while failures can be attributed to a lack of "tact."
Before submitting his article for publication,Ferenczi was care-
ful to add a responseto the criticism "of a colleague"to whom he
had shown it. Ferenczi agreesthat what he saysabout tact might
provide ground for false interpretations and abuses.Numerous
practitioners,"not only among beginners,but also among those
who havea tendencyto exaggerate,"will undoubtedly misconstrue
his remarks on the importance of "empathy" as recommendations
to put "the principal accenton the subjectivefactor" in treatment.
If they do read his remarks this way, they will "disregard what I
stated to be the all-important factor, the consciousassessment of
In
the dynamic situation."ae other words, he recognizes the primacy
of interpretationand makes a professionof orthodoxy as a disciple
who is careful not to placehimself "outside of analysis."
It is dificult, however,to find Ferenczi'sassurances entirely con-
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test gr
vilcing and to considerFreud's worries as totally unfounded. Fer-
enczim^y make distinctionsabout subiectivity,but it is still clear
that, in practice,he placesit aboverespectfor the analytic protocol.
Ferenczitook a significantstep in r9z9 when he presentedto the
InternationalCongressof Psychoanalysis at Oxford a report titled
"Progressin Psycho-AnalyticTechnique,"published the following
vear as "The Principle of Relaxationand Neocatharsis."In this re-
port he takesup in an explicit and afirmative way the interrogation
of the "edifying" history of psychoanalysisthat had already ap-
peareilin the book he wrote with Rank. Here he directly questions
the irreversibility of the choicesupon which Freud founded psy-
cho analvsis.
In the introduction to his paper, Ferenczi warns that he will
probablygive the impressionof taking a step backward. But then
he adds that "even a retrogrademovement,if it be in the direction
of an earlier tradition, undeservedlyabandoned,may advancethe
truth."50"Earlier tradition" here refers to the cathartic treatment
of hysteria,which Ferenczicallsa communal discoveryby "a genial
patient and her understandingphysician."5rFerenczi then renders
an enthusiastichomage to Breuer: "not only did he pursue the
method indicated by the patient, but he had faith in rhe reality of
the memories which emerged."52
Abandoned by Freud, Ferencziexplains,cathartictreatment was
replacedby psychoanalysis. Thanks to this substitution hysterical
fantasiescould be studied and better understood."Naturally the
techniqueof psycho-analysis was coloured by these successive ad-
vances,"announcesFerenczi.5rAs his following discussionshows,
Ferenczi means by this that intellectual gain is accompaniedby
certain inconveniencesin the therapeutic domain: "The highly
emotionalrelation betweenphysicianand patient,which resembled
that in hypnotic suggestion,gradually cooled down to a kind of
unending association-experiment; the processbecamemainly intel-
lectual."5aFerenczi has naturally carried out the same change in
method as his master. But he makes this observation:"with the
deepeningof my psychologicalknowledge as I followed thesetech-
nical rules, there was a steacly.decrease in the striking and rapid
results I achieved. The earlier, cathartic therapy was gradually
92 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
transformed into a kind of analytical re-educationof the patient,
which demancledmore anci more tirne."55
In the face of this situation Ferenczi wonders whether it would
not be better to transgresssomewhat the principle of frustration
and adopt toward the patient an attitude of "friendly goodwill
lFreundlich uohluollendel"56 without abandoning the analysis of
the transferentialmaterial. It rvas with this aim that Ferenczi ex-
perimented rvith what he calls a technique of rclaxation Thus, he
goeson to sav,"after we had succeededin a somewhatdeeperman-
ner than before in creating an atmosphereof confidencebetween
physician and patient and in securing a fuller freedom of affect,
hystericalphysical symptoms would suddenly rnake their appear-
ance,often for the first time in an analysisextending over years."5;
These symptoms could be utilized as physical memory symbols to
support the reconstructions;lreviously introduced.58 But, Ferenczi
emphasizes,"there was a difference-this time, the reconstructed
past had much more of a feeling of reality and concretenrss about it
than heretofore,approximatedrnuch more closelyto an actualrrc-
ollection,whereastill then the patientshad spokenonly of possrbil-
ities or, at rnost,of varying degreesof probability and had yearned
in vain for memories."se
In his descriptionof hystericalattacks,Ferenczideclaresthat in
certain casesthey took on the "characterof trances,in which frag-
m e n ts o f th e p a s t w e re r el i ved." 60In summati on, he conti nues,
" Wi th o u t a n y s u c h i n te n t i on on my part and w i thout my maki ng
the least atternpt to induce :r condition of this sort, unusual states
of consciousnessmanifested themselves,which might also be
termed autohypnotic.Willy-nilly, one was forced to compare them
with the phenomena of the Breuer-Freudcatharsis."6l But having
arrived at this conclusion,Ferenczi foreseesthat an objection will
necessarilyarise in the minds of his auditors, a question that he
also posed to himself: "Was it really worth while to make that
enormous detour of analysisof associations ancl resistances,to un-
ravel the ro:'azeof the elements of ego-psychology,and even to tra-
versethe whole metapsychologyin order to arrive at the good old
'friendly attitude' to the patient and the method oI catharsis.long
believedto havebeendiscardecll"62 Ferenczi'sanswermight appear
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Tbst 93
reassuring,but rvhat it confirms, above all, is that. as an experi-
enced therapist, he obtained better results than did Freud and
Breuer,who were at the tirne beginners:"There is all the difference
in the world between this cathartic termination to a long psycho-
analysisand the fragmentaryeruptionsof emotion and recollection
rvhich the primitive catharsiscould provoke and which had only a
n3
terrporary effect."
Throughout his praperFerenczi takes great care to emphasize
that if he has modified analytic practicein certain ways,he has not
abandoned its governing principles as enunciated by Freud. His
own initiativesare meant only to completeand consolidatethe re-
sultsof the classicalmethod, and not to break with it. He reminds
his audiencethat "so far, no single advancehas been made in anal-
ysis which has had to be entirely discardedas useless,and that we
must constantlybe preparedto 6nd new veinsof gold in temporar-
ily abandonedworkings."6aNevertheless,this time the divergence
is hard to ignore: the "progress"announcedby Ferencziindicts the
Freudian "policy of truth." Psychoanalysis is no longer a conquest
rvhoseglory ancl claims can be founded on rhe abanclonmentof
certain "veins" censuredas illusory. Moreover.the convergenceof
the interestsof reasonand therapy is denouncedby Ferenczi.The
rnore Ferenczit knowledge increased,the lesseffectivehe became
as a therapist.Reason,work, and recoveryno longer rhyme. "Rea,
5u11"-1hs diversion of associations and resistances through analy-
sis-must, according to Ferenczi, be pur in the service of an
svsnl-1fis cathartic trance-rhat directly afi'ectsthe "heart."
Assuredly,Freud had never afrrmed that insight, in the cogni-
tive sense,acted alone; on the contrary.But with Ferenczithe order
of importance is reversed:the affectivetransformationis no longer
the r esult of wor k car r ied out in t he nam e of a r r ur h whose only
lnstrument is the asceticrequirement of that truth; control is no
longer an ideal. Rather, the analytic work has as its purpose to
evoke what is uncontrollable,to lead to the expressionof some-
thing that is not measurable.To draw an analogy with contempo-
rarv mathematics, and more precisely with the theory of Ren6
Thom, u'ork undoubtedly clqfinesa controlled, conrinuousspace,
but it does not conrain irs own end within it: that end is achieved
94 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
only with the "catastrophe,"a discontinuousevent,which occursin
a spacethat exceedsthe control space.
A Misnrten Tbchnique
It is difficult to believethat rupture was avoidedin 1929,yet in
[a c t i t w a s tw o m o re y e a rsi n comi ng.
In his r93r lecture "Child-Analysis in the Analysis of Adults,"
given in Vienna in honor of Freud'sseventy-fifthbirthday,Ferenczi
takes up again, in spite of the severecriticism he admits they in-
curred, the propositionshe had advancedat the Oxford Congress
with the view of modifying psychoanalyticpractice:"In the cases
which appearedto have 'dried up,' and in which for long periods
of time analysisbrought neither fresh insight nor therapeuticprog-
ress,I had the feeling that what we call free associationwas still
too much of the nature of a consciousselectionof thoughts,and so
I urged the patient to deeperrelaxationand more completesurren-
der to the impressions,tendencies,and emotionswhich quite spon-
taneouslyarosein him."65Ferenczi was able to understandthe ele,
ment in this technique that shocked his colleagues,but insteadof
avoiding the problem, he posesit quite clearly: "I refer to the prob-
lem of how far my method with my parientsmay be calledhypnosis
or suggestion."66 These two aspectsof the problem will be exam-
i n e d i n tu rn .
As for suggestion,Ferenczi states:"[Tlhe suggestion,which is
legitimate even in analysis,should be of the nature of general en-
couragement rather than special direction."67Clearly there is no
question here of direct suggestion;instead,the suggestionat issue
"is really only a reinforcementof what in analysiswe cannor help
asking the patient to do: 'Now lie down and let your thoughts run
freely and tell me everything that comes into your mind."'68Fer-
enczi is not explicit about what lies behind the term "reinforce-
ment"; that is, he does not clarify whether for him the analyst's
i n i u n c ti o n i ts e l f re fe rsto suggesti on.
As for hypnosis,Ferenczi believesit is undeniablypresentin the
relation between children and adults: "Their [children's]suggesti-
bility and their tendency,when thev feel themselveshelpless,to
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test 95
on a 'gr own- up'( t hat is t o sayan ele-
16xn,wit hout any r esist ance,
n.rentof hypnotism in the relation betweenchildren and adults) is
an undeniablefact, with which we haveto reckon."6eBut Ferenczi
hasalso encounteredhypnosisin his relationswith his patients:"ln
lll free associationthere is necessarilyan element of self-forgetful
ahstraction.It is true that, when the patient is called upon to go
further and deeper in this direction, it sometimeshappens-with
me, let me frankly confess,very frequently-that a more profound
abstractiondevelops.Where this takes a quasi-hallucinatoryform,
peoplecan call it auto-hypnosisif they like; my patientsoften call
it a trance-state."70
Ferenczi characterizesas follows the proper use of suggestion
and hypnosisin analysis:"Putting it in a somewhat inelegantway,
rve might say that in analysisit is not legitimate to suggestor hyp-
notize things into the patient, but it is not only right but advisabie
to suggest them out."7l
Even if Ferenczi'sformulation had been more elegant, it still
'"vould not have been more agreeableto his listeners to hear Fer-
enczi affirm that even though he did not deliberatelyengage in
suggestionand hypnosis,he neverthelessleft things in free play
when they did occur and, in addition, that they often did occur
even when he used the analytic instrument par excellence,free as-
sociation.Even Freud had recognizedon occasion,as we will see
in the fourth chapter,that the analytic settingcould be hypnogenic,
and other analystswill also dare to admit it. But Ferenczi insists
that this impurity of the analytic instrument is useful; he puts to
good use the uncontrollableingredientsthat ought by rights to be
excluded from the analytic setting. By so doing, Ferenczi actively
erasesthe rigid frontier Freud had so often traced between hyp-
notic suggestionand psychoanalyticpractice.Indeed, though Fer-
enczi is careful once again to declarehimself in accord with Freud
on the principles of psychoanalysis, he strikes at the principle of
interpretation.Interpretation,for him, is no longer independentof
the affectiverelation created,in the form of a "trance,"betweenthe
analystand t he pat ient .
But Ferenczi went even fu!!her. He risked establishinga relation
between his technical innovation and the theory of etiology: "l
96 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
would put forward the conjecture that the friendly affectiveatti-
tu d e s o f c h i l c l re n -e s p eci al l yrvhere they are al so l i bi di nal -are
originally derived from the tender relation between mother and
child, and that their naughtiness,fits of passion,and uncontrolled
perversionsare generallya later result of tactlesstreatmentby those
around them."72Not only does Ferenczi emphasizethe dual rela-
tionship of mother and chilcl to the detriment of the triangular
oedipal relation, not only does he placeat the center of the analysis
the "tact" that was lacking in the patients childhood environment
and is now required of the analyst, but he also insists that the
traumatic memories Freud had attributed in 1897to fantasyhavea
dimension of reality.Ferenczi thereby puts into question the very
basisof the "analytic setting,' which was constructed,as we have
seen, on the proposition that these memories were phantasmic,
their only truth being to provide a pathwaytoward the "true cause,"
toward the conflictsof drives from which they were to protect the
patient'sego.
Ferenczilater returned to this interrogationof the decisiveturn-
ing point in Freudian thought-the abandonmentof the seduction
theory.But the consequences of his r93r position are already radi-
cal. It is no longer a question for him of announcing the enc'lof a
"detour" that has been justifiableand useful for theory,but rather
the end of an error. In fact, the very principle of Freudian tech-
nique-the replacement of a real neurosisby the transferenceneu-
rosis, u'hich enablesthe therapist to convince his patient. on the
basisof pure and demonstrablepoints, of the existenceof mecha-
nisms that protect him from his unconsciousconflicts-only makes
senseif the patient can be viewed first and foremost as a victim of
these conflicts,that is, if the responsibilityof "real life" could, at
leastin a first approximation, be denied. In other words, the ana-
lytic setting is the sceneof a conflict that is knowingly provoked by
the analyst,and this can happen becauseanalvtictheory affirms the
determinativecharacterof the unconsciousconllict. If the trauma
is real, the closure of the analytic setting around and by means of
the transferenceneurosisdoes not constitutea legitimate operation
permitting the isolation and purification of the real problern; it
constitutes,rather, a traumatic negation of this problem. In that
Put to the Test 97
Psychoanalysis
conliguration of the relationsof heart and reasonbe-
cise, a new
At times and against the analytic protocol, the
cornesnecessary'
let his "heart" speak becausethe patient has good
analvstmust
,,reason"to complain.
Ferenczi'spoint of view would be taken up and developedafter
the SecondWorld War in England and the United Statesin various
fbrms, which we will examine in the following chapter.In these
p6r,r,r'iews, as in Ferenczi's,the modification of therapeutictech-
nique and the interrogationof Freudian etiology will once more be
linked together."Empathy" or tact will be justified theoretically,
and systematicfrustration of the patient will be condemned pre-
ciselyto the degree that the frustration of the needsof the young
child with respectto its mother is icientifiedas the source of the
problem.And in this case,even transfbrencechangesits therapeutic
status.It needs lessto be elucidatedthan encouragedsince it can,
in and of itself, "repair" the early trauma (or "nourish" or "restore,"
according to the theoretical model). Howeveq the supportersof
empathy will not follow Ferenczi on one point: they will not at-
tempt to reduce the length of treatment. They will not say,as Fer-
enczi did, that "a ten-yearanalysiswould in practicebe equivalent
to a failure."Tr
We have seen how, in r928, Freud lavishedpraiseon Ferenczi's
"Elasticityof Psycho-AnalyticTechnique,"even though that praise
was accompaniedby some reservationsthat the author had ac-
cepted,apparently in good grace.The first sign of a changein the
relationshipbetweenthe two men came in a well-known letter that
Freud addressedto Ferenczi on December r3, r93r, on the subject
of the "kissing technique."Freud had learnedthat Ferencziallowed
himself to kiss his patients and to be kissed by them in return.
Under coverof paternal remonstrance.Freud expresses on this sub-
ject lively reproachesand ironic considerationsabout what r.r'ould
occurif one wer e t o acceptsuch a pr act ice:
A numberof independentthinkersin mattersof techniquewill sayto
themselves:*hy ,iop at a kiss? Certainlyone gets fu.tir.. when one
a(lopts"pawin51"
as well, which after all doesn'tmake a baby.And then
bolderoneswill comealong urbowill go further to peepingand show-
ing-and soon we shall haveacceptedin the techniqueof analysisthe
98 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
whole repertoireof demiviergerieand petting parries,resultingin an
enormousincrease of interestin psychoanalysis
amongboth analysts and
patients.The new adherent,however,will easilyclaim too much of this
interestfor himself,the youngerof our colleagues
will find it hard to stop
at the point theyoriginallyintended,and God the FatherFerenczigazing
at the livelyscenehe hascreatedwill perhapssayto himself:maybeafter
all I should havehalted in my techniqueof motherly affectionbeforerhe
Klss-
Ferenczi waited some time before respondingto this wounding
letter, "lt is perhaps the first time that our relation has been miti-
gated by moments of incomprehension."Ferenczi recallsnext hoq
after a period when he multiplied prohibitions and frustrationsfor
his patientsand for himself, he becamecapableof "creating a dis-
passionateand benevolentatmosphere capable of bringing forth
what hitherto had remained hidden." However, he promises his
mastet "as I fear the dangersas much as you, I must, as in the past,
keep in mind your warnings and remonstrances." Ferenczi was ev-
idently making here a show of goodwill in order to avoid a break.
The following sentence,however, reveals that Ferenczi was not
going to abandon the path he had begun to explore: "But I would
have bypassedsomething important, had I wanted to bury that
productivelayer which is beginning to take shapebefore me."75
The oppositionbetweenFreud and Ferenczitook a more critical
turn on the occasionof the Wiesbaden Congress in September
r932. Eitingon'ssuccessor
as presidentof the International Psycho-
analytic Associationwas to be elected.The favored candidatewas
Ferenczi,and Freud himself had expressedsupport for his candi-
dacy. But in a letter written to Freud on May r, 1932,Ferenczi
expresseddoubts about his capacityto take on such a heavyrespon-
sibility.In his responsedated May rz, Freud said that he regrerted
Ferenczit attitude, and sought to change his mind with an argu-
ment that was heavywith implications for a man who had lived in
isolation for severalyears:the presidencyof the associationwould
have the effect of a "forced cure" (Gewaltftur). ln the guise of pleas-
antry, Freud thus insinuated that there was something unhealthy
about Ferenczi'sattitude, and that the responsibilityof directing
the analytic community would cure him of the symptom of heter-
odoxy.Ferenczi was not taken in. Writing to Freud on May r9, he
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Tbst gg
diagnosis:"So I can't really seethe presidency
refusesthe master's
for a diseasewhich I cannot acknowledgereally to
asa lbrced cure
be ilne. I honestly believethat I am doing something not entirely
uselessby continuing with my present work."76In any case,Fer-
enczi implies that he will perhapsacceptelection if he can be as-
sisteclin the exerciseof his functions in order to continue his per-
sonalwork'
Three rnonths later, Ferenczi made his decisionabout standing
for election,and it was a refusal' In his letter of August 2r, rg32'
addressedto Freud, he retraces his research itinerary: "I have
drifted into critical and self-critical channels which in some re-
spectsseem to require not merely additions but also correctionsto
our practical and in part also to our theoreticalviews." In these
conditions,he did not feel it was appropriatefor him to acceptthe
role of president since the president'schief concern was aboveall
ro assure "the conservationand consolidation of gains already
made."77
But it was not only around the question of the presidencythat
the Wiesbaden Congressbrought out the discord between Freud
and Ferenczi. Their disagreementsbecameespeciallypatent with
respectto the paper that Ferenczi was to present,"Confusion of
TonguesBetween Adults and the Child:' Freud knew about the
;laper before the congresssince Ferenczi had given him a copy of
it when he visited him on August 3o. Freud iudged the paper un-
clesirableand asked Ferenczi to withdraw it. Freud's opinion was
sharedby the members of the committee,and, accordingto fones,
Eitingon declared that such a scandalouscommunication ought to
be forbidden. But fones adds that he himself thought it ought to
be authorized, both becausethe paper appearedto him too vague
to producea lyeat impressionone way or another,and also because
one ought not affront a man like Ferenczi. fones'spoint of view
carried the day, and the paper was indeed presentedon Septem-
Der
-1.
In spite of Jones'spredictions, the paper caused a great stir
amonll the auditors, amonfawhom were Anna Freud, Marie Bo-
naparte,Franz Alexander,Jone.s, Balint, Raymondde Saussure , and
other well-known analysts.The situation was indeed so upsetting
 Ioo Psy,choanalysis
Put to the Test
that lones found it necessaryto senclFreud, who had been too ill
to attend the congress,a comforting letter. But what were the
c a u s e so f th i s s c a n d a l ?Most of the commentatorsexpl ai n i t by the
fact that in his paper Ferenczi ernphasizeclthat the neuroses6f
many patientswere linked to childhood sexualtraumas,sometimes
perpetratec'l by near relatives.This is the point of view maintained
by Jeffrev Masson in his book, The Assaulton Truth.
There is no doubt that Ferenczi attracted vast criticism by re-
opening this theory.But it is also true that the congressparticipants
could havediscovered,or more precisely,rediscovered, in Ferenczi's
paper other motives for scanclal.fones'sdescriptionof his own re-
action to the paper is noteworthy on this score: "To Eitingon it
came as a shock of surprise,to you probably lessso. To me not at
all, for I have followed Ferenczi'sevolution (including the patho-
logical side) closely for manv years,and knew it could only be a
question of time before this d6nouementarrived. Abraham and I
drew him forcibly back from the precipiceat the Rank time."78It
is not a questionhere,or in any other part of the letter,of Ferenczi's
ideas on seduction.The "schism" goes back, rather, to the book
Ferenczi had published with Rank, Tle Deuelopmentof Psycho-
Analysis,in which they hoped to renew psychoanalytictechnique.
That Ferenczi was being reproacheclfor his errors on technique
becomesclear in the letter Freud wrote to him on October 2, rg32,
in n'hich he explains rvhy he had asked him not to publish any-
thing in the coming year: "I did not wanr ro give up the hope that
you would yourself come to recognizein further work the technical
incorrectness of your results."7e
It is true that technicalconsiderationswere not given much em-
phasis in the Wiesbaden lecture. But, as we have seen,Ferenczi!
technicalinnovationsand the very definition of the analytic serring
and of repetition were at stake in his thesisthat the chrld had really
suffereda trauma. Ferenczi'stheseson techniquehad already been
widely circulated the preceding year in Vienna. fones (and many
others)must havethought at that time that Ferenczihad fallen over
the "precipice" toward which he had been moving since r924. Be-
fore Wiesbaden the cup of grievanceswas full. Only one more
Put to the Test
Psychoanalysis IoI
from orthodoxy on Ferenczi'spart was required flor the
deviation
cup to run over'
-- there was no
Fro,.,lthat moment, the break appearscomplete;
polemic with Ferenczi, who from then on was con-
rnoredoctrinal
man who had lost his intellectualgifts. That was
,id...d a sick
In a letter to |ones on September rz, 1932,nine
Freud'sopinion.
r Ferenczi's paper, he gives his diagnosisof the presenter:
daysafte
,'For the last three yearsI havebeen observinghis increasingalien-
ation, his inaccessibility to warnings about the incorrectness of his
. . Unfortunately the regressive intellectualand affective
rcchnique..
seemsto havehad, in his case,a background of phys-
cleveloprnent
But only later, in a letter to fones on May 29, 1933,
icaf decline."80
four days after Ferenczi'sdeath, did Freud expand on the organic
and mental illnessFerenczi had suffered:
[F]oryearsFerencziwasnot with us,in fact,not evenwith himself.One
moreeasilygetsan overviewnow of the slow process of destructionto
whichhe l'ellvictim. His organicsymPtomsin the lasttwo yearswerea
oerniciousanemia which soon resultedin severemotor disturbances.
Liter therapyimprovedhis blood but had no influenceon the other.In
the last few weekshe could no longerwalk or standup. At the center
wasthe convictionthat I did not lovehim enough,that I did not want to
recognize his works,and alsothat I had badlyanalyzedhim.8r
However, in the same period, Freud wrote an obituary of Fer-
enczi fbr the Internationale Zeit-rchr'rft-fii, Psychoanalysepredicting
that the history of psychoanalysis would never forget him. These
fluctuationsin Freud's judgment can perhapsbe explained by the
mastert own oscillationsabout the gravequestionshis brilliant and
some t im esim pr udent disciplehad r aised.
The Ferenczi "Case"
For a very long timt, and up until recently,iudgments on Fer-
enczi'spracticaland theoreticalwork restedon the following point
of view: this work was the product of a man who, after a brilliant
beginning, had been rapidly undermined by physicaland mental
illness.A good example of this type of reasoningis furnished by
ro2 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
Bela Grunberger.s2In his long study devoted to what he calls the
"Ferenczian deviation," Grunberger ranks Ferenczi among the
great dissic{entsof psychoanalysis,aiong rvith }ung, Adler, and
Reich. There is, according to Grunberger,a common trait linking
all dissidenttheories: they constitute "maternal, that is, regressive
systems."83 This trait is clearly evident in Ferenczi:he himself rec-
ommended in his Vienna paper "a regressionin technique and, in
a certain measure,in the theory of neuroses."Ea
Grunberger returned to the attack ten years later in a lecture
presentedto the Paris PsychoanalyticSociety (fanuary ry, g84),
titled "On Purity."85In this paper,Ferenczi is still treated as a dis-
sident since his return to a hypothesisof trauma suffered by the
young child challengesanalytic practiceand threatensthe very ex-
istenceof psychoanalysis. His dissidenceis "explained" as a regres-
sion expressinga searchfor purity and a proiectionof anality.
This analysisof the Ferenczi case,basedon a type of argument
used by many other authors, requiressome comment. First, it pos-
tulatesthat Ferenczi'smost contestedinnovationscoincidewith the
time when he was "impaired in his very essence," as Grunberger
says.86 This point of view is not universallyshared.The same au-
thor recognizes,moreover,that according to certain of Ferenczi's
analysands,such as Balint and Lorand, Ferencziremainedperfectly
sane until his death. That is also the opinion of another of his
disciples,Imre Hermann.ETAfter all, would Freud have insisted
that Ferenczi becomepresidentof the International Associationif
he thought he was really crazy?
But the most impeachableelement in Grunberger's "explana-
tion" is his linking of Ferenczit ideas and the state of his health.
Grunberger merely discreditsFerenczi'sideasby appealto the real
or supposedf-actthat he was ill when he developedthem, and does
not make the effort to evaluatethem on their own merits. Let us
examine in particular Grunberger'scriticismsof Ferenczi's"active
technique."Grunberger opines that Ferenczi'sdevelopmentof this
techniquemarked the beginning of the impairment of his scientific
acrivity.88 He seesthis impairment as a regressivephenomenonco-
i n c i d i n g w i th a th y ro toxi cosi sthat Ferenczidevel opedi n r9I7. In
our opinion, Grunberger'sassertionis an illegitimateuseof psycho-
kychoanalysis Put to the Test r03
biography.Psychobiographycan properly attempt ro connecr rhe
gepesisand developmentof an author's ideasto the circumstances
of trlr llf.-ttis era, his environment, his friendships,his beliefs,his
health problems,and so on. But it absolutelydoes nor authorize a
judgment on the value of an idea as a function of these circum-
srances. The possibilityof a psychobiographical interpretationdoes
nor in itself confer superiority on the one who risks making it.
In a more general way, Grunberger's judgment is shapedby hrs
very use of the notion of "dissidence"rhar he applies ro Ferenczi.
This notion obviously does not belong to the vocabularyof science
but to that of politics or religion, and it carrieswith it an implicit
judgment: it is the dissidentwho will be calledupon ro accounrfor
hirnselfand not the svstemhe is conresting.Undoubtedly,this is a
rnocleof judgment singularly common amon!{ analysts.The notion
o[ "dissidence"allows them ro enhance the value of the radical,
heroicdimension of the Freudian method and, by the same token,
to explain professionaldisagreemenras a normal and predictable
consequenceof unanalyzed resistances. Freud himself was not a
stranger to the transformation of what was at issuein the analytic
setting int o a m et adiscour seconcer ning analysisand it s cr it ics.
Sucha strategicuseofresistancesand repressionswas hard to resist
for a man whose "long and roundabout journey" through therapy
had finally led to the possibilityof metadiscourses in the domain of
anthropology,the study of myths and civilizatron.
tseginning in the r98os, and particularly in France, a raclical
changein attitude toward Ferenczi'swork took place.One voice,
however,had spoken out 25 yearsearlier to give Ferenczi his due.
In r958 Wladimir Granoff gave a lecture, later republished,titled
"Ferenczi: False Problem or Real Misunderstanding.""Ferenczi,"
Granoff statesin the introducrion, "has always and will always be
the main character in psychoanalysis."8e And also: "lf Freucl in-
ventedpsychoanalysis, Ferenczi clid psychoanalysis.And more . . .
he did analysis insofar as it is a living pulsation."e0Further on,
(]ranoff emphasizesthe desire to
cure, which animated Ferenczi:
"His desire to cure
conditioned his practicalexperience.His prac-
tice led him to technical researches.This is rvhat his theory vin-
clicates."erFerenczi's
furor sananli, as Freud called it, was ac-
rc,4 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
companied by a rare effectiveness:"We have learned from hi
contemporariesthat Ferencz-iwas consideredto be an incompa-
rable therapist.He rescuedothers'failures; he was the specialistIn
borderline cases."e2 (iranoff concludes with a statement that
praisesFerencziand, at the same time, judgescurrent practitioners
of psychoanalysis: "Ferenczi invited tomorroui analysts,that is,
thoseof today,to risk becoming hystericsin their analyses,because
it is possibleto recover from hysteria.Perhapsthey becameobsession-
ak instead,and they haue not recouered)''rDoes analysis derive its
"purity" from the obsessionalcharacterof its practiceI If so, then
behind the "living pulsation" standsthe challengeto a centralclaim
of psychoanalysisthat Ferenczi undertook at his own risk and
peril: the claim that psychoanalysis, by definition, conioins the in-
terestof the patient and the interest that leadsthe analyst toward
the conquestof a scientificstatus.
"We don't have enough information on Ferenczi."eaThis sen-
tence,which opened Granoff's lecture,was indeed accurateat the
time Granoff spoke. In r958 only a few works by Ferenczi were
available.f'he version of Ferenczi presentedby Jonesin the third
volume of his biography of Freud, which had appeared in r953,
was availableas well, a presentationthat had unleasheda polemic
between Jonesand the executor of Ferenczi\ will, Balint. Balint
protestedthat fones had spokenof Ferencziin a highly partial way,
and in order to provide a truer image of his master,he decidedto\
issuetvi'o highly important publications:Ferenczi'sDiary (lanuary-
October rgjz) and the Freud-Ferenczi Correspondence.
Balint's English edition of the Diary was ready for publication in
r969-the translationwas finished and the introduction was writ-
ten. However, for reasonsthat have never been revealed,the pub-l
lication did not take place.e5The Freud-FerencziConespondence was
not published either, although Balint thought it ought to appear at
the same time as the Diary.
While we await the publication of the correspondence, which is
at presentin preparation,the most important of Ferenczi'stexts at
our disposalfor evaluatinghis placein the history of psychoanalysis
is without any doubt his Diary.e6The first note in the Diary is dated
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test ro5
shor t ly af t er t he day ( Decem berr 3, r 93r ) when
trn uar y 7, r g32.
Ferenczi the letter severelvchastisinghim for his "kiss-
[."u; ,.nt
lt appear st hat af t er t his let t er Fer enczino longer
,." ,. . nnique. "
his constantlyoccurring and always original ideas
.'ol.,runi.r,.tl
master, whose lack of understanding he had already mea-
ro his
From then on, Ferenczi kept his ideasto himself. Or rather,
sured.
he confinedthem to his Diary, from which thereforeconstitutesan
invaluabledocument for understanding Ferenczi'sthought in the
lastperiod of his life. We havehere evidenceof the most direct, the
mosr authentic kind, without the verbal constraints that often
marked the explanationsFerenczigaveto Freud.
What first strikes one upon reading the Diary is the amazing
varietVofsubiectsthat are treated.From paranoiato schizophrenia,
from hysteriato homosexuality,Ferenczicommentson all the great
problemsthat an analyst might question himself about, while al-
waysemphasizing,however,a point that seemedto him of major
importance-the reality of childhood trauma.
What is equally remarkable is that, for Ferenczi.theoreticalcon-
siderationsalways take their point of departure in current analytic
work. In other words, we find evidencehere of the effort to ally
theorv and practice rhar was already evident not only in The De-
uelopmentof Psycho-Analyskbut in all FerencziS larer work. This
allianceis totally governed,however,by the desire to cure, not by
the desireto establisha respecrableprofessionaltechnique.Indeed,
rhe Diary takes up in a more incisive way rhan his published pa-
pers the criticisms Ferenczi directed on this score at the analytic
apparatusas it was codified by Freud. It is not by chancethat the
first line of the Diary criticizes the "lnsensitiuityof the analyst(man-
neredform of greeting,formal requestto 'tell everything,'so-called
free-floatingattention,which ultimately amounrsro no attention ar
all, and which is certainly inadequateto the highly emorionalchar-
acter of the analysand'scommunications,often brought out only
with the greatesrdifficulty)."e7The patient, Ferenczi believes,un-
consciouslyperceivesall the negarivefeelingsbehind the rigid at-
trtu de of t he analyst :his bor edom , his ir r it at ion, som et im eseven
his hatred upon hearing soo,ething that has irritated him. From
r06 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
this idea Ferenczi derives the Catalogueof the Sinsof Psychoanalysis,
the list of reproachesthat he attributes to the patient. He defends
the justiceof thesereproachesemphatically:
a goodopPortunityto carryout unconscrous, purely
The analysis Provides
self-seeking,ruthless,immoral,indeedso to speakcriminalactionsand
similarbehaviorguiltlessly(without a senseof guilt), suchas a senseof
powerovera succession devotedpatients,who admirehim
of helplessly
without reservation.Sadisticpleasurein their sufferingand their helpless-
ness.Unconcernregardingthe lengthofthe analysis, indeedthe tendency
to prolongit for purelyfinancialreasons: if one u'antsto, one turns the
patientsinto taxpayers for life.es
Far from showing a strict neutrality and acting uniquely by "in-
tellectual"means,the analyst,according to Ferenczi, ought to sur-
round his patient with true affection.For "no analysiscan succeed
if we do not succeedin really loving the patient."eeThis is what
Ferenczi himself strovefor in all his activitiesas a therapist.As for
the attitude of neutrality,it is exactly the one, as we have shown,
that Freud underscored,asserting not only that he was not de-
voured by the desireto cure. but that his coldnesson that scorewas
an advantagefbr him and for his patients.For a long time Ferenczi
had tried to minimize the disagreementsopposinghim to his mas-
ter. But henceforth theseprecautionsno longer hold; the criticism
is radical. It centerson the scorn Freud-at least from a certain
point in his career-professed toward his patients("this rabble"),
as well as on his lack of concern for curing them, his "therapeutic
nihilism."r00It was after he discoveredthat hystericswere lying to
him that Freud, according to Ferenczi,"returned to the love of his
well-ordered and cultivated superego,"that he became"pedagogi-
cal" and his method "more and more impersonal,"and that he
choseto "levitatle] like some kind of divinity above the poor pa-
r0'
tient, reduced to the statusof a child."
It is tempting to relate thesecriticismsto thoseFreud expressed
at severalpoints about his disciple, and especiallyin the letter of
May 29, I933, to fones.which we havealready quoted.r02 Ferenczi
clicfreproach Freud for not having analyzedhim completely,and
he wished to give his own patients what he himself had been de-
prived of. But theseconsiderations,whatever their biographicalin-
Put to the Test
Psychoanalysis ro7
the most important issue,which is that Fer-
rcresr,cennot decide
und.ttcored a decisivemoment in Freudian thought-the
"l.ri
when Freud, "discovering that hysterics lied to him,"
"ror.n, this painful discoveryinto the point of departure for a
,rrnrfor..d
that, in effect,systematizesthe consequences of that
new methocl
Ferenczi was not unreasonable to cluestion
discovery.Therefore
whether the new method, founded on an 4 priori knowleclge that
primarily as a shield
lving rvas taking place, was not functioning
th. therapist, a protection against the dangers of trying to learn
tto1-
However, if the analystis the "master of
from unreliablewitnesses.
facts" in the analytic setting, to what degree can he be said to
"learn" anythingl This question is all the more seriousbec:ruse, in
contrast to the other descendants of Lavoisier who are practitioners
oi experimental science,the psychoanalystdoes not need to fear
that a colleaguewill proPosea rival reading of the facts he ad-
vances.The multiple commentaries in Freud's case histories are
only rhetorical exercises:Freud remains,and for good reason,the
masterof their possibilities.Everyone is obliged to refer to the same
unique source.
In his attempt to learn. Ferenczi did not retreat from anything.
His most audaciousinnovation,according tohis Diary, was mutual
analvsis.The idea that, in the courseof treatment, the analystand
the patient ought periodicallvto exchangerolesundoubtedlyseems
pure folly. But it expressesFtrenczi's intention to reversethe tra-
ditional image of the analyst who seeksto appear imperturbable,
omniscient,all-powerful in the eyesof his patients,who, neverthe-
less,sensebehind this mask his frailties and his hypocrisy,and re-
proachhim for it. Attempted after many other effortshad left him
clissatished,mutual analysiswas the ultimate therapeuticexperi-
ment designed to avoid this situation endangering the successof
the cure. Ferenczi did not, however,presentmutual analYsisas a
panacea.In his Diary he statesthat in certain casesit was of great
benefit to the patient, but in others it had no effect.Ferenczi also
observesthat the application of this method raisesalmost insur-
mountable dificulties since,if one pursuesall its consequences, it
leads to reciprocal analysis.betweena phvsician and his various
patientsand also betweenthe patientsthemselves.One might well
r08 kychoanalysis Put to the Test
wonder who, apart from Ferenczi with his exceptionaltherapeutic
vocation,would undertake, even on condition of being convinced
of its effectiveness, a practiceas dilficult and trying as this one.
The final impressionleft by Ferenczit Diary is of an unllagging
searchinspired by the idea that scienti{icduty, as Ferenczi puts it
in a letter to Freud, "consistsin saying everything, even what is
risky, if it is the truth, in the hope that the truth can in any case
produce only good."lorFerenczi'squest could even be called heroic
in view of the attacks it brought down on him, and also in view of
Ferenczit own sensethat he was leaving behind the path he had
followed for so many yearsin Freud'swake and with the protection
of this "father substitute."The pathos of the situation is expressed
in a note written on October 2, 1932,when Ferenczi was experi-
encing a crisis in his physical condition linked to the Biermer's
anemia that would soon causehis death: 'And now, iust as I must
build new red corpuscles,must I (if I can) createa new basisfor
my personality,if I haveto abandonas falseand untrustworthy the
one I have had up to nowi Is the choice here one between dying
and 'rearrangingmyself,'-and this at the age of fifty-ninel"r0a
Ferenczi died still searching.He pushed "scientificduty" to the
point of sacrificebut did not succeedin leading psychoanalysis to
that terminal point (Schlusstein) he had envisagedin 1924.Ferenczi
indeed did reintroducehypnosisand suggestion;we saw that in his
new method of catharsis.We may see it also in mutual analysis,
which, accordingto Ferenczi,"is actuallyan extensionof relaxation
to include the analystas well. Analyst and analysandrelax in alter-
nation."lO5In this situation we have "two people falling into a
trance simultaneously and then senselesslytalking at cross-
purposes,that is free-associating and also giving vent to their feel-
ings."t'roThis is an example of a "dialogue betweenunconsciouses."
But Ferenczi used hypnosisin an empirical way, apparently with-
out trying to deepen his knowledge of the method he employed.
One can measure here the distance separatingthe author of the
Diary from the young researcherwho, in r9o9, in Introjerttion und
Ubertragung, endeavored to theorize about suggestion and pro-
posed the thesis that, as we have noted, Freud acceptedin "The
Put to the Test
Psychoanalysis r09
"suggestion,however,we must under-
Dynamicsof Tiansference":
srandas Ferenczi (r9o9) does,the inlluencing of a personby means
l'r7
of the transferencephenomena which are possiblein his case."
We can also measure the distance separatingthe Ferenczi of the
Drary from the Ferenczi who, in r9z4 expecteddecisiveprogress
fur analytictechnique from an understandingof the hypnotic state.
The author of the Diary deliberatelyand extensivelybrought affec-
tivity into his practiceand could only try to manipulate it with all
the "tact" he could muster.
One may, however,wonder whether the fact that Ferenczi,dar-
ing to step "outside of psychoanalysis," finally linked up with an
adventurousempiricism-open to all sortsof risks and stripped of
all guaranteeof transmissibilityexceptthrough the communication
of an "insane passion"-justified Freud'sconvictionthat there was
no salvationoutside of analysis,only regression.To make of Fer-
enczi'sexperience,of his "passion,"a proof of this thesiswould be
to commit an error common in the apologetichistory of science.
The path followed by a "dissident," that is, a researcherwhose
questionshave led to his isolation,takes on the function of an ar-
gument legitimizing a posteriorithe defeatthat determined his iso-
lation. But it is a baselessargument since it leavesout preciselythe
efFects that defeat and the resulting isolationhaveon the dissident.
This a posterioriarfJument thus seemingly iustifies the dissident's
exclusionby a circular logic based on the very singularity of the
path that the exclusionitself produced, the very singularity of the
work of someone who has to consider himself a hero or even a
martyr.
|udging from the telegramsent by Jonesto Eitingon on May 29,
I933, one can doubt that the problem posed by Ferenczii dissi-
dence was unimportant: "The only consolationis the bitter truth
that an event is no longer in danger of provoking an explosionin
the international movement itself."r08After quoting this telegram,
Pierre Sabourin assertsthat although such an explosion did not
take place "a kind of implosion continues to survive these unre-
solvedconflicts."roeIndeed the problems raised by Ferenczi were
cluitereal and they were ne1lquelledby his death. We submit that
r ro Put to the Tbst
Psychoanalysis
the questionof the articulation betweentheory and practice,which
was the subjectof the prize competition in r9zz, has still not been
resolved.
That this articulation is not as transparentas Freud claimed, at
leastfor a time, has becometoday an open secret.As a result,it has
becomecommon to recognizethe contrastbetweenthe note of al-
most triumphant optimism sounded by Freud's first writings and
the disillusionmenthe later experiencedwith respectto the thera-
peutic effectiveness of his technique. It is also common to under-
score,in a parallel way, the tensionbetweenthe "intrinsic," immor-
tal Freud-the genius of interpretationwho listenedto his patients
and heard in what they said a truth that irreversiblytransformed
our culture-and the "historic" Freud, influenced by "scientistic"
ideals,who claimed to give his interpretationsthe statusof scien-
tific theories. This distinction between the Freud to whom it is
legitimate to refer and whose work is being pursued today,and the
contingent Freud to whom we can adopt a position of tranquil
superiority,has the effect of rendering Freudt disillusionmentless
dramatic. Indeed, triumphant optimism links us to the scientistic
Freud, while the immortal Freud is supposed to have willed to
analyststhe heroic task he himself called in his I937 essay,'Analysis
Terminable and Interminable,"an "impossibleprofession." 1r0
As we have already stated, our intention is not to discussthe
content of Freudian theory or the reasonsand implications of its
cultural diffusion. But we have attempted to show how insufficient
the representationof a "contingent scientistic"Freud is; that is, we
have tried to demonstrateto what degree the pejorativeadjective
"scientistic"concealsFreud's creation of a singularly original re-
sponseto the question that is also ours-the questionof heart and
reason.Assuredly, our analysis does not erase the reality of the
tensionbetweenFreud the "artist-interpreter"and Freud the "tech-
nician"-a tension that, moreover,can be representedin terms of
a contradiction only by a misreading of what all technicalactivity
implies. Our analysisdoes,however,restorethe weight of meaning
to Freud's"scientistic"claims,and enablesus to avoid drowning in
the psychologyof the relationsbetween master and disciple in the
Freud-Ferenczi conflict. Ferenczi put into question the answer
Put to the Test
Psychoanalysis III
"heart and reason"issue,and, as we shall see,
Freud createdfor the
,Analysis Terminable and Interminable" can be considered as
Freudt responseto Ferenczi,at last made explicit; it constituteshis
own analysisof the problem that had separatedthem. The problem
is none other than that of the legitimacy of understanding,that is,
of iudging the real patient with referenceto the "ideal patient"
presupposedby the constitution of the analytic setting. Does the
increasinglyllagrant divergencebetweenthe two put into question
a technique whose reasonsare addressedto the ideal, or do these
reasonsallow us, on the contrary,to understand,to describe,and to
acceptas inevitablethe differencebetweena real cure and an ideal
cureI
The Obstacleof the Quantitatiue
According to Jones,Ferenczi, is presentfrom the beginning of
'AnalysisTerminable and Interminable" sincehe was probably the
"man, who had himself practisedanalysiswith great success,"rrr
but who reproachedFreud, his analyst,for not having completed
his analysis,for not having activated the negative transference,
which, Freud remarks, nothing at the time of the analysispermit-
ted him to perceive.The name of Ferenczi appearsexplicitly in
three passagesof 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable,"in each
caseat crucial moments of the essay'sdevelopment.When Freud
remarks that the power of analysisis limited, and that the final
result depends "on the relative strength of the psychicalagencies
which are struggling with one another,"he invokes the eventual
meansof increasingthe auxiliary forcesanalysisbrings to the ego,
then concludes:"Hypnotic influenceseemedto be an excellentin-
strument for our purposes;but the reasonsfor our having to aban-
don it are well known. No substitute for hypnosis has yet been
found. From this point of view we can understand how such a
master of analysisas Ferenczi came to devote the last yearsof his
life to therapeutic experiments, which, unhappily, proved to be
vain."r12When Freud evokesthe repeatedfailures he met when he
tried "to persuadea woman to.abandonher wish for a penison the
ground of its being unrealizable,"or "to convince a man that a
 r12 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test r r3
passiveattitude to men does not always signify castration,"rrrhs preceding years, Freud has taken on only training
inrmeJiately
signals that it was preciselyFerenczi'srequirement, his criterion and severallong-term patients for whom, he recognizes,
analyses
fbr successin analysis,that these two cornplexesbe mastered.Fi- ,,1[etherapeuticaim was no longer the same,""n and for whom,
nally, when he cites Ferenczi'sarticle "The Problem of the Termi-
therefore,rapid cure was not at issue.But he nevertheless had ma-
nation of the Analysis,"rraFreud recognizeshow decisiveis "the fbr reflection furnished by a large number of former cures.
terial
analyst'shaving learnt suficiently from his own 'errors and mis- he had considered durable, but which had later ended in a
which
takes' and having got the better of 'the weak points in his own of the old trouble. Also, he expresses his regrets that his
recurrence
personality.'. . . Among the factors which inlluence the prospects pupils have not made any progressin the question: "In this field
of analytic treatment and add to its difrculties in the same manner ih. in,...t, of analysts seems to me to be quite wrongly directed.
as the resistances,must be reckoned not only the nature of the Instead of an enquiry into how a cure by analysis comes about.(a
patient'sego but the individuality of the analyst."rr5 marrer which I think has been sufficiently elucidated) the question
Of course,Freud does not lay down his arms. In the three cases, should be asked of what are the obstaclesthat stand in the way of
the homage he pays to Ferenczi is tempered.Ferenczi'sefforts are sucha cur e. "ll7
describedas futile, and his criterion for analytic successis charac- "We know that the first step towards attaining intellectualmas-
terized as "ambitious" (read: too ambitious).At no time doesFreud tery of our environment is to discovergeneralizations,rules and
concedethe possibility that lrerenczi's"own personality" and his laws which bring order into chaos.In doing this we simplify the
heterodoxmethods could havesucceededin certain caseswhere he world of phenomena;but we cannot avoid falsifying it, especially
himself had failed. And the idea advancedby Ferenczithat a com- if we are dealing with processes of developmentand change.What
petent and patient analyst ought to be able to carry an analysisto \1'eAre concernedwith is discerninga qualitatiuealteration,and as
"its natural conclusion"is turned aside:Freud'semphasisis not on a rule in doing so we neglect,at any rate to being with, a quantita-
"shortening" analysis,but rattrer on "deepening"it. tiue factorl'rr8 This epistemologicalreflection constitutes,in our
Beyond these occasionalexplicit citations, the very theme of opinion, the point of articulation between Freud's early optimism
'Analysis Terminable and Interminable" marks it as Freud's re- concerningtechnique and the "disillusionment" that followed, al
sponseto the problem that isolated Ferenczi and made him the any rate as he refectedon it in'Analysis Terminable and Intermina-
o b j e c to f d e ri s i o n . ble." Psychoanalysis may have succeedecl in elucidating,in master-
As we have seen,the starting point of psychoanalysis included ing intellectually,the qualitativechangethat constitutesa cure, that
an original redefinition of a therapeuticpracticethat aimed at in- is, the "liberation of a human being from his neurotic symptoms,
stituting, where only unmasterablesymptomsexisted,an "artificial inhibitions and character anomalies,"but psychoanalysis has also
neurosis,"accessible to the intellectualand practicalmastery of the "at leastat its beginning" "falsified" reality by leaving in the shad-
analyst.But even if on the intellectuallevel this method proved to ows what it couldn't master, the "quantitative factor." Now, as
be fruitful, even if Freud could consider that his patients had Freud will demonstratethroughout this article, it is the quantita-
taught him what he knew about the human psyche,nonethelesson tive,"economic" factor that will determine the outcomeof analysis.
the practical level, that is, the therapeuticlevel, the situation was, "Quantities," that is, the strength of the instincts at work, are
as we have pointed out, quite different. As it turned out, analytic thereforeput in the foreground along with the limits of the ana-
technique proved to be better as a technique of investigationthan lyst'smeansof action and of his theorization."Let us start from the
as a technique of intervention. That was what Ferenczi declared. assurnptionthat what ana[sis achievesfor neurotics is nothing
And that is the problem Freud turns to in rgj7. Assuredly,in the r.rtherthan what normal peoplebring about for themselveswithout
 rr4 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
its help,"rreremarks Freud. But this point of departure,he knows,
situatesthe problem in the domain of "witch metapsychology." "It
is impossibleto define health," Freud states,"except in metapsy-
chologicalterms: i.e. by referenceto the dynamic relationsberween
the agenciesof the mental apparatus which have been recog-
nized-or (if that is preferred)inferred or conjectured-by us."tzo
The reasonsfor the successor the failure of an analysis cannot
then-unlike the interpretation of the conflict or rhe qualitative
descriptionof its transfo16s1i6n5-fe related only to the mode of
theoretico-scientificconceptualizationof the cure. These reasons
also refer to a quantitative "ratio," the ratio betweenthe quantities
mobilized by the different mental agencies;as a resuk rhe reasons
for success or failure must be linked to speculation.It is remarkable
that, here again, the situationoffersa curious similarity with chem-
ical analysis.In that caseas well, the chemist mobilizes reactants
whose "force," in the context of his practice,he is unable to theo-
rize. Like the "strength of instincts,""chemical forces"or afinities
were, until the advent of quantum chemistry,a purely empirical
matter. For Lavoisier,these forces or afinities referred back to a
"transcendent"chemistry,probably a Newtonian chemistry,since
Newtonian physicsplayedthen with respectto chemistry rhe same
role that biology played with respectto Freudian psychoanalysis.
However, the resemblancebetween psychoanalysis and chemis-
try quite quickly reachesits limits. The affinities of the purified
products of analytic chemistry qualify rhem as insrruments: rhey
presideover the chemist'schoiceof reactantin such a way that the
"dynamic relations" he establisheswill be adequareto his aims. By
contrast,the analytic setting as the locus of a dynamic relation re-
vealsto the analystnot only the truth but his powerlessness as well:
"analysiscan only draw upon definite and limited amounrs of en-
ergy which have to be measuredagainst the hostile forces.And it
seemsas if victory is in fact as a rule on the side of the big battal,
io n si' 1 2 1
From this perspective,Freud's article constitutesa new setting
for the combat between reason and "heart." This combat is no
longer a struggle for knowledge but for "victory," so rhar, in rhe
end, "the instinct is brought completely into the harmony of the
kychoanalysis Put to the Test r r5
sgo,becomesaccessibleto all the influencesof the other trends in
the ego and no longer seeksto go its independentway to satisfac-
"battalions" that the "heart" can
rion."rrrAnd in this combat, the
call up against reason are indeed impressivein their number and
weight. "[A]nalysis . . . is alwaysright in theory but not alwaysright
in Practice'"1:'t
First of all, the analyst is powerlessin the face of an instinctual
conilict that is not currently active. Here Freud brings up by im-
olicationFerenczi's"experimental" technique.Experiments in ac-
lualizing conflict in order to treat it are precluded not only by
socialstrictures,and not only because"the subjectofour therapeu-
tic experiment would certainly refuse to co-operatein it": if, by
hvpothesis,cooperationdid occur, a "new conllict" would be pro-
duced from which the patient would have no distance,and "[i]n
sratesof acute crisis analysis is to all intents and purposesun-
usable."l2aIn the end, there is nothing in analysissimilar to a vac-
cine; the analyst can talk, warn, inform, but the knowledge he
offerswill not "stimulate" his patient.
In other words, the long-term outcome of analysisdependson
circumstances. The analystcannot, accordingto Freud, protect the
patient against future instinctual conllicts that new circumstances
of his biological,affective,or social life might arouse.Knowledge
is powerlessif it is not rooted in the suffering linked to a present
conflict.The insufrciencyof the decisionto seek the truth as such,
which forms the basisof the therapeuticalliance,had alreadybeen
revealedby the betrayalof the patient who, satisfiedwith a super-
licial improvement, relaxeshis effort. This insufiiciencyhad justi-
fied the "activity of the analyst" in maintaining frustration. But it
rs expressedhere by a limit Freud definesas impassable.
However,there is somethingeven more serious,namely,the "re-
sistanceagainst the uncovering of resistances,"r25 linked by Freud
to ego defensemechanisms,that is, to the "alteration,"to the devia-
tron from the "fiction of a normal ego" that the action of these
mechanismscreates.r26 These mechanisms,constructedto protect
againstdangers that threatened the patientt ego in the past, are
preciselywhat the analyst lnust deal with in the course of treat-
ment. They appear in the form of resistancesthat, thanks to the
 r r6 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
transference.have become rhe true obiect of analysis.But this q[_
i e c t i s i ts e l f re s i s ta n t:
If the analvstrriesro explainro rhe parienroneof the distortions
madebv
him for the purposesof defence,and ro correctit, he finds him r.rn.orn'-
prehendingand inaccessible to soundarguments. Thus we seethat there
ri a resistance againstthe uncoveringof resistances, and the defensive
mechanisms reallydo deservethe name which we gavethem originallv.
beforethey had beenmore closelyexamined.Thev are ,.rir,rn."., nJi
only to the rnakingconscious of the contentsof the id, but alsoto the
analysisasa whole,and thusto recovery.l2T
Here again, everything depends on what escapesanalysis,..on
the strength and on the depth ofroor ofthese resisrances that bring
about an alteration of the ego."r:s The question of the alterationof
the ego by the crearionof def-ense mechanismsbrings into the pic_
ture decisiveoriginary choicesthat escapeanalysissince they pre-
cede and themselvescrearerhe object of analysis.Here Freud in-
vokes the possibility that the as-yer-nonexistenrego will be
assignedthrough heredity "the lines of developmenr,trends and
reactionswhich it will later exhibit."r2eOtherwise how might one
explain "Itlhe psychologicalpeculiaritiesof families, racesand na-
tions, even in their attitude to analysis"lrr0
Freud next describesanother type of resistance, one that depends
either on the excessiveplasticityof libido, on irs too great mobility,
or on the exhaustionof its plasticity,its aptirude for change. Here
also, a typology is possible,but not an explanation or perspective
on change,since it is an optimal plasticity (neither too much nor
too little) that determinesrhe possibilityof fixing the libido on the
transferencesor of detaching it at the end of analysis.Finally, we
reach the most formidable, the most profound obstacleto the ana-
lyst's efforts, one that transcendsthe very distinction among the
topographical agencies:
No strongerimpressionarisesfiom the resistances during the work of
analysisthan of there being a force which is del'endingitselfby every
possible meansagainsrrecovery and which is absolutely resolvedto hord
on to illnessand suffering.one portionof this forcehasbeenrecognized
by us,undoubtedlywirh iustice,as rhesense of guilt and needfor punish-
ment,and hasbeenlocalizedbv us in the ego'srelationto the super-ego.
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Tbst rr7
But this is only the portionof it which is,asit were, psychicallyboundby
lfre super-ego and thus becomes recognizable ; other quotasof the same
fbrce.whether bound or free, may be at work in other. unspecified
pl ac es. lll
This force, which is unknowable except in the casewhere it is
psychicallybound to an agency-in51in61of aggressionor destruc-
tion-is, according to Freud, derived from "the original death in-
srinct of living matter." It therefore transcendsbiology itself, as a
science of living beings,by putting into play the differencebetween
life and nonlife, the tendency of life to return to the inanimate.
What is involved,in this sense,is a principle that is presupposedby
e\,erydifferentiatedbeing but that no being, as such, can explain.
It is a principle that transcends,then, the method of the positive
sciences. With respectto it, Freud invokesa pre-Socraticdoctrine,
namely, Empedocles' doctrine of the rival and complementary
powersof love and hate.
The obstaclescited by Freud go from circumstancesto biological
heredity,then to principles that transcendall sciencein the sense
that each sciencecan decipher their expressionin its domain but
cannot constitutethem as an obiect.There is one last obstacle,one
that comesnot fiom the patient but from the analyst.Freud recalls
here the essentialdifferencebetween the chemist or the physician
and the analyst: "a doctor suffering from diseaseof the lungs or
heart is not handicappedeither in diagnosingor trearing internal
complaints;whereasthe specialconditionsof analytic work do ac-
tually causethe analyst'sown defectsto interfere with his making
a correctassessme nt of the stateof things in his patient and reacting
to them in a useful way."rr2The time is past when Freud appealed
to the requirement of the "purified" analyst who is merely a re-
ceiver.He is dealing, rather,with a community of concreteanalysts
whose recruitment was carried out on a basishe is familiar with,
that is, after a training analysis,as he writes, brief enough to bring
about in the apprenticeonly the firm convictionof the existenceof
the unconscious,the experienceof the emergenceof repressedma-
terial, and the technical prescriptionsnecessaryto analytic work.
He knows also that a number of analvststurn awav f rom the con-
sequences and the ..q.ri..-.iis of th"t this response
"n"lyrir, ".rd
r r8 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
is all the more predictablewhen they are exposed,by their unceas-
ing commerce with repressedmaterial, to the awakening of their
own instinctual claims. Freudt solution is that analysts should
undergo, perhapsevery five years,a true analysis-a strangeecho
of the mutual analysisthat Ferenczi risked practicing since it im-
plies a periodical return (but not with a patient) of the analyst to
the position of patient.
Analysis is an "impossibleprofession,"and it is the assuranceof
his "sinceresympathy" that Freud bequeathsin ry37 to the com-
munity he created.Indeed, all resemblanceto the professionof the
chemist or the modern surgeon has disappeared.As incompleteas
it might be, theory is a given, but techniquehas becomean art once
more, or an artisanal technique,in the sensethat it can no longer
claim, even as a right, even ideally,to control what it dealswith.
We will see in the following chapter what happenedto Freudt
legacy.For the moment, we would like to advancesome ahistorical
remarks iustified by the interpretation we have attempted to give
of the Freudian method.
Questionsof Legitimacy
We would like to emphasize,first of all, that, contrary to the
majority of those who contestthe scientificstatusof psychoanalytic
theory, we do not wish to challenge the principle of Freud's
method, but only to elucidate the consequences of this method,
and, in particular,the divergence,as he commentedon it, between
the ideal patient presupposedby Freudian technique and the real
patientsthat psychoanalysts encounter.
Let us start by noting that all technique,like all theory,reposes
on a certain idealization.This idealizationresults,on the one hand,
in the necessityof a purification of materials and, on the other
hand, in the necessityof "connoisseurs," of techniciansand experi-
menters capableof taking into account and of interpreting the di-
vergencefrom the ideal when they encounter it. But the obstacles
Freud describesin r937 are ofanother order. It is lessa questionof
recognizingan eventualdivergencefrom the ideal than of describ-
ing the powerlessness of theory and techniqueto account for what
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test r 19
their successand their actual pertinencedepend on. Assuredly,the
,'witch metapsychology"makes it possible,as we have seen,to ia-
terpret this powerlessness,but the role played here by what Freud
does not hesitateto call metapsychological"speculation"is heavy
with consequences. Usually a metadiscourse-like atomist descrip-
tions in nineteenth-century chemistryor speculationson the nature
of physical forces-is linked to the possibility of an action, of the
srarementof a relation or a prediction (including theprecisepredic-
tion of aleatory phenomena).Metadiscourseusesthis possibilityto
articulate one or severaldomains, identified by their autonomous
practices,with another domain that is meant to explain them.
However, the role played by Freudian metapsychologytakes on, at
any rate in t9j7, quite a different sense:it explainswhy the practice
of analysiscannotdefne ixelf in an autonomousfashion, why it meets
obstaclesit cannot control. The distinction Freud introduces be-
tween qualitative, theorizable change and the quantitative factor,
which refers back to the metapsychological, therefore ratifies the
irreducible differencebetween "knowledge," in the analytic sense,
and power, a difference Freud describeswith great eloquencewhen
he evokeshis patientswho display a "resistanceagainstthe uncov-
I ] '"
eri ng oI r esist ances.
One might proposethat, even if it marks the end of the conver-
genceof researchand therapy that constitutesthe specificityofpsy-
choanalysis,the essentialpowerlessness of the knowledge brought
to light by the analytic setting presentsan impassable,ultimate
lesson(this setting would be the place where the limits of what we
call "knowledge" are revealedin all their truth). This is, as we will
see,one of the lessonsthat Lacanian psychoanalysis derived from
Freud when it basedits argumentation on the essentialdifference
betweena "theory of the unconscious"and any theory belongingto
a positivisticscience.It is also what is affirmed more or lessimplic-
itly by those who maintain that psychoanalysis, like all science,is
equipped with its own epistemology,and that thereforeit does not
haveany accountsto render or receive(a strange"epistemological"
maneuver,which transforms the controversialquestion of the re-
lationsamong scientistsintoE-principle of autarchy that no science
has yet claimed).
r20 PsychoanalysisPut to the Test
However, this argument neglects one aspect of the situation,
namely,the history of the constitution of this setting and the aims
it was meant to pursue.Here again, the "forgetting" of this hrstory,
its retelling in terms of the retrospectivecontrastbetweenthe em-
pirical, "artistic" Freud, who knew how to listen to his patients,
and the historic,contingently scientisticFreud, has a clear strategic
interest. The constitution o[ the analytic setting would be, in this
light, a work of genius,and, as such, something one could not go
beyond, while the scientifico-technical "reasons" advanced by
Freud to justify this constitutionwould be seenas dependingon an
outmoded scientisticideology.But if we choosenot to forget these
reasons,not to establishthis distinction a posteriori,the definition
by Freud of the analytic setting,that is to say,its closure,beginsto
appearproblematic.
Specifically,Freud excluded hypnosisand active suggesrionbe-
causethey could be neither dosed out nor controlled.The impos-
sibility of measure and control he explained by the fact that they
concealedwhat analysisis really dealing with-the resisrances of
the patient. But analytic technique ends up defining resisranceas
equally uncontrollable,and, correlatively,"recovery"as precarious,
not only defacto, but also dejure. What becomes,then, of what has
been excludedl
Of course,analysishas provided an interpretation of hypnosis
and suggestionthat ratifies their exclusion.It is generally recog,
nized that the hypnotic relation constitutesa "group of two." r14The
hypnotist incarnatesfor the subject the "ego ideal" on which he
relies for the definition of reality,just as the believer,in the name
of God, relieson the church, just as the soldier,in the name of the
fatherland, relies on the army, and the fanatic crowd on its
leader-or, as those who challengeFreudian techniquewill say,as
the patient, in the name of Freud, relieson the analyst.We will not
pursue this debatehere.r35 What we would like to emphasize,how-
ever,is the metapsychologicalnature of this interpretation,which
appeals-like the commissioners,Le Bon, and so many others-
to common knowledge of the phenomena of crowds and fanati-
cism, as well as, in the caseof Freud, to the myth of the archaic
father and to the phylogeneticinheritancethat this myth supposes.
Psychoanalysis
Put to the Test r2r
Metapsychology-more magician here than vli1sh-3116garesro
itself the capacity to define in positiveterms whar has been ex,
cluded from the setting that is the sourceof its authority. It also
defrnesthe problem in terms that automaticallyresolveit: analytic
therapy and hypnosis are contradictory."Curing," whatever the
meaning given to this term by the different heirs of Freud, can
obviously havenothing to do with the wish Freudiansdecipher in
the hypnotic relation, the wish of denying reality by relianceon
another.
We do not understandthe specificityof the hypnoricsrare,main-
tained Ferenczi, and, even in the context o[a claim ro a specific
psychoanalyticepistemology,this affirmation is entirely justified.
The metapsychologicalinterpretation,becauseof its very status,
can only havethe effectof ratifying the exclusionof hypnosis,since
this exclusiondefinesthe very approachsustainingthat interpreta-
tion. But it is preciselyhere that the power of metapsychologybe-
comes more than suspect.As we havealready said, its use in the
interpretation, not of psychoanalyticpractice,but of the relative
powerlessness of this practice,was alreadyquite astonishing.How-
ever,the epistemologicalparticularityclaimedby psychoanalysis in
its metapsychologicalinterpretationsof the obstaclesto the thera-
peutic effectiveness of its knowledge can still be justified to the
degreethat analytic techniqueitself revealssuch obstacles. On the
other hand, no "epistemoiogical"justification is possible when
Freudian metapsychologyattemptsto understand,in order to ratify
its exclusion,what Freudian practiceauoids,what it conceals(if the
phenomenonnevertheless occurs),or what it attributesto error on
the part of the analyst.Some u'ill point out that Freud himself was
experiencedwith hypnosis.Of course.But one must recall here
that, far fiom presentinghis interpretationof hypnosisas satisfac-
tory, he remarked in Group Psychology and the Analysisof the Ego:
"There is still a great deal in it whrch we must recognizeas unex-
plained and mysterious, r16We haveseen,moreover, that the rea-
sons he gave for excluding hypnosiswere purely technical.And
when, in r937, Freud refers to Ferenczi'sattempt to find a "substi-
tute for hypnosis,"he does ngt considerit an effort condemnedin
advance,but .athe. on. "*hi[, unhappily,proved to be vain."r17
r22 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
Perhaps precisely becausehe was familiar with hypnosis,Freud
stood back from the "obviousness"some are apt to claim today in
his name.
The reading we are proposingof the end of Freud'stherapeutic
adventure in ryj7 is, like all epistemologicalreadings,assuredly
abstract.It ignores theprofessionalproblem posedto analysts.There
is all the difference in the world-as Ferenczit example demon-
strates-between the practice of an impossibleprofession,whose
impossibility expressesand dramatizesthe truth of the psychoanal-
ytical answer to the questionof "heart and reason,"and the practice
of a specificprofessionalstrategydefined by the instruments it ac-
ceptsor rejects.The impossibilityof the psychoanalyticprofession
constitutes-and it is thus that Freud presentedit when he com-
pared the analyst'sproblem to the problems of those who wish to
educateor to govern-an immortal, impassablelessonthat situates
the professionalsin a heroic, ne Plus uhra posirion. The definition
of analysisby its instrumentssituatesthem in a specifichistory with
its fruitful as well as its contingent dimensions.
Another problem, to which we havealreadyalluded, also arises.
This problem, essentiallycultural in nature, is that of the "defense
mechanism" put in place by certain Freudians to defend the irre-
versibility of Freud's creation without having any longer to defend
its scientific character.Freud! work is characterizedas "subver-
sive,"as something so new that it is almost unsustainablein the
face of common sense.In France, Bachelardianepistemologyhas
been put to work here sinceit identifiesthe institution of a science
with the "no" addressedto opinion.rr8As a result, every challenge
to the Freudian "no" can be describedas a "return to opinion," as
a regression.
This is what happens in Colette Soler's review of Ferenczi's
Diary.t3eShe pausesover this phrase of the author-"Only sym-
pathy cures"-and glossesit in these terms: "Here is the foolish-
ness-after all, not even new-that the midwife Ferenczi delivers
from the Freudian subversion."For Soler,when Ferenczi returned
to hypnosisand suggestionhe "chose Breuer over Freud," that is,
"changed discourse."Such a return is, in Soler'seyes,inexcusable,
and there is not even room for wondering if Ferenczi was guided
Put to the Test
Psychoanalysis r23
by a concern for curing: "That it was in the name of good thera-
oeutic intentions is no excuse,"she says.And then she attacksthose
who, like Pierre Sabourin,dare to createthe image of "a subversive
Ferenczt.. . unrecognizedprecursorof the greatestpsychoanalysts
. . . Lacan himself, if one looked into it."
Let us take up the expression"after all, not even new," which is
the signatureof Bachelardianepistemology:opinion is alwaysold,
and all "return to opinion" indicatesa return to what, before the
"no," had interestedpeople. We would also like to point out that
the question of Ferenczi is attributed to "his good intentions,"and
that this attribution is, from the Lacanian point of view and, as we
shall see,its systematizat;onof the "coldness"required by Freud,
the equivalentof a condemnation without any other form of trial.
tsehindthis expressionlurks the often-brandishedmenaceof a re-
turn to "humanism," which, for Lacanians,it was Freud'sglory to
have subverted, perhaps without knowing it. Let us point out,
lastly,that Soler chose her phrase well: "Only sympathy cures."
What is in danger of returning is, in fact, anterior to humanism,
u'hich is essentiallymodern: it is the question posedby the magne-
tists and, beyond them, the problem of ancient magical and sha-
manistic practiceswith which Freud attempted to break. Psycho-
analysis can no more tell us what hypnosis is than modern
humanism-which is allied, not with fussieut position,but rather
with that of Lavoisier and his colleagues-can tell us what "sym-
pathy" is.
We will end thls chapter with one last remark. It is fortunate
that the partisansof drug therapy have not seizedupon 'Analysis
Grminable and Interminable." They would have found there all
the arguments necessaryfor justifying their practice.To the degree
that certain of the obstaclesin the way of analysis-the force of
instincts,the "plasticity" or the "versatility" of libido, and so on-
are derived from the domain of biology,one could ask why these
obstaclescould not be reducedby the use of medication.Insofar as
the "quantitative factor" escapesanalysis,does it not open the door
wide to other types of interventionl
That is without doubt on. of the reasonsfor our interrogation,
for our taking the risk of putting into question the rational limits
r24 PsychoanalysisPut to the Tbst
analysisset for its action. In the long term, the presentstatusquo
puts analystsin a position of great vulnerability,and, through thern,
given the role they play today,all thosewho claim descentfrom the
Freudian creation.This vulnerability tends,in a rather paradoxical
way, to place psychoanalysisin a position of solidarity with the
"humanist" valuesit is supposedto subvert,tends to constitutepsy-
choanalysisnot as a path of active and strenuousresearchbut as a
symbol and a rampart for the defenseof the "meaning" of human
life against its "pharmaceutical"negation, against the temptation
to soothesuffering artificially insteadof listening to it. At the pres-
ent time, the outcome of this defensivestrategy with respectto
active, inventive pharmacologicalresearchis predictable,and this
outcome, equally predictably,will permit the denunciation of a
new misdeed of "technoscience," a new advanceof the fatal reduc-
tion of human beingsinto calculableobiects.
We do not intend here to "defend" what is called technoscience
or to proposethat its harms are imaginary,but rather to show cer-
tain of the mainspringsof its triumph, what conferson its advances
the appearanceofan irresistibledestiny.Technoscience is not a des-
tiny. It triumphs only through the social,economic,political, and
intellectualweaknessof what it denies.The current quasi-paranoid
fear of so many analystswith respectto biology,which Freud him-
self did not fear, is the symptom of such a weakness.
C H A P TE R 3
On Someof Freud'sHeirs
After Freud
When dealing with psychoanalysis after Freud, one facesa veri-
table jungle of interpretationsand theoretical,technical,and meta-
psychologicaldevelopments.fust as we did not attempt to study
Freud'sdevelopmentof clinical theory and metapsychology, we will
not now examine theoreticalcontent as such, nor will we review
the many more or lessdivergent thesesabout the processof treat-
ment itself. That review alone would lead to an unlimited expan-
sion of our study.
Indeed, far from entering into the period of stagnation that
might have been predicted by the somber picture traced in ry37 by
its founder, after the Second World War psychoanalysis met with
an extraordinary cultural success. Its extensionwas not only quan-
titative, in terms of the number of treatmentsundertaken and an-
alyststrained, but also qualitative,with respectto the typesof path-
ologiestreated.For Freud, indicationsfor treatment were limited:
hysteria,obsessionalneurosis,depression,sexualdisturbances,and
certain character neuroses.Such was not the case for many of
Freud'sheirs, and if we were to follow the manner in which each
one of them redefinedthe etiology of the psychoses and borderline
casesthey treated,along wit\_ghe reasonsthey gaveto explain why
theseillnessesare treatablebv analvsis.and the modificationsana-
e6 On Some of Freudi Heirs
lytic technique must undergo in order to treat them, we would
indeed be swept into the meandersof controversialpositionsthat
s ti l l c o n ti n u eto p ro l i fe ra t e.
The processof redefinition is such that certainanalysts,and even
a member of the extremely "orthodox" school of ego psychology
like facob Arloq recognize that theory no longer need appeal to
the authority of Freud. Isn't that in itself, remarks Arlow, the sign
of the scientificityof psychoanalysislrDophysicistsstill read Gali-
leoi Like every founder of a science,Freud must be surpassed,
certain of his preoccupationsforgotten (along with, notably for the
members of this school,everything related to biology and also the
"death instinct"),and other interestsdevelopedbeyond what Freud
himself could haveforeseen.
However, a science is not based only on the forgetting of its
fathers. In a very general way, we would say that the existenceof a
sciencein a given field expressesa historicallydetermined stateof
fact. With respect to certain phenomena considered as representa-
tive in a given domain, what happensis that a community discov-
ers, for better or for worse, the means of working together,and of
being recognizedas a community. By whom must this community
be recognizedl There is no simple answer to such a question since
any such answer produces controversy.Might one say,for example,
that parapsychologyis a scienceby virtue of the fact that certain
universitiessponsor researchcenters in the fieldl Certainly not,
sincethe existenceof such centersis in itself an "event" considered
scandalousby the majority of scientists.How, on the other hand,
might one define the "means" of working togetherl We would say
in the most general way that the means involved make it possible
to discuss (with) phenomena, that is, to transfona the phenomena
under study into effectiveprotagonistsin a discussion.More pre-
cisely,those means aim at making decidable,through controversies
and tests,who is the true spokesmanfor such phenomena.Scien-
tific controversiestypically involve the testing of the claims of a
"spokesman"by other spokesmen.In the first chapter we saw that
the definition of new criteria and new requirementsfor thesetests
constitutesa most important event for a science.The materialsma-
nipulated by eighteenth-centurychemistscertainly lent themselves
On Some of Freud's Heirs n7
to cliscussion,
but a chemist like Venel demonstrated clearly how
easily they could betray
the one who believed he was their repre-
sentative: the play of circumstances
as well as the chemist's savoir
faire could not be eliminated from the discussion' On the other
hand, the
"pure" products-products that were reliable relative to
chemists' operations-of nineteenth-century chemistry could be
proragonists in further well-defrned discussions: if the protocol was
.or...,, then others must be able to reproduce what one chemist
succeeded in doing.
Now, it is exactly on this last point that analysis appears to differ
from many other sciences. As the American psychoanalyst Morris
Eagle puts it:
Beginning with the Marienbad conference in r934, debatehas raged as to
the relativecurative roles of insight, introjection, and other factors with-
out any seeming recognition that in order to study curative factors,one
must first reliably demonstratethat a cure (or its equivalent)has occurred.
It is as if the debate stops at the question-and here one observesan
exampleof a confounding of therapeutic and researchin1s1s515-6fv/hs1
would be or should be the curativefactors,accordingto this or that theory,
r.vithouta concern for the empirical issueof whether or not cure occurs.
This focus is scholasticto the point of being medieval.It reminds one of
the illustrative stories (told by Francis Baconl) of monks arguing, on
purely theoreticalgrounds, about the number of teeth in a horsei mouth.
When a novice suggeststhat they look in the horse'smouth, he is thrashed
soundly for his blatant disrespect.2
Eagle concludes:
Broadly speaking, what is most important for psychoanalysis as a thera-
peutic situation is the development of a coherent theory of thcrapy which
rests, not merely on the psychoanalytic theory of personality or psycho-
pathology, but also on reliable empirical data identifying the interactions
and interventions that are effective for particular goals, and the processes
accounting for whatever effectivenessis achieved. Whatever the accom-
panying theory of personality and conception of human nature, one!
psychotherapeuticapproach must stand or fall on its pragmatic accom-
plishments.. . . And, most importantly,data from the therapeuticsituation
can make a primary contribution, not to an etiologicaltheory of psycho-
pathology or to a theory of personality development, but to a theory of
therapy, that is, an understanding of the relationship between certain
kinds of operations and interventions and the occurrenceor failure of
 On Someof Freud'sHeirs r2g
r28 On Some of Freuds Heirs
Freud himself as funda-
occurrenceof certainkindsof specificchanges.It seemsto me ironicthat ,lvsrs are the two hypothesesdefined by
writers attemptto emplovclinicaldatafor iustaboutevery and resistance (these two hypothesesthem-
psychoanalytic n,','.nrrt,transference
p,rrpor.but the one for which theyare mostappropriate-anevaluatioq of the unconscious,psychicconflict'
,.tr.t i-ptying the concepts
and understanding of therapeuticchange.'
and defense)'
The problem posedbv Eagle is the same one Freud bequeathed wallerstein was attempting to resolvea thorny question.Given
analytic theories,ought one
to the community of analysts-expressing surprise in I937 that the current multiplicity of competing
ro concludethat psychoanalysis is indeed splinteringl Is there one
they had not adequately confronted it-when he turned aside
psychoanalysis or manyf There is no point, respondsWallerstein'
from the problem of therapy toward what, by his own admission,
theoretical reconciliationamong the
was of much greater interestto him. And Eagle'saccusation-the in'r..king or in hoping for a
Bionians' Lacani-
debatesare truly scholastic:they addresswhat treatment, ideally, interpretationsof ego psychologists,Kleinians,
in trying to rec-
should accomplish according to this or that theory; they refer to ans,Kohutians, and so on. Nor is there any point
if each one
the texts of Authorities, even if they eventuallvtreat those Author- oncile them in spite of themselvesbv treating them as
to a certain type of patient' since
ities the way medieval scholarstreated Aristotle-takes on its full were linked in a privileged way
providing under-
meaning in the perspectivewe have fiamed. There is no longer eachintends to establisha theoreticalframework
And yet'
here a problem of "heart" and "reason," but only a confrontation of standing of all patientsaccessibleto analytic treatment'
all
pry.hoa'alysis is o.re: beyond their theoretical differences'
several"reasons,"none of which, as Eagle points out' definesthe "built
pry.ho".r"lyrts employ the same interactional techniques,
meansof transforming "clinical evidence" into protagonistsin this
,.or.rd the dynamic of rhe transferenceancl the countertransfer-
confrontation.Each debaterspeaksin the name of a rational ideal jifferenr psychoanalytictheories should therefore be
ence."aThe
prescribingthe manner in which, according to theory,what it de-
acceptedin their diversity metaphoricconstructions'Any explan-
fines as "reason" will be produced.None has the meansof making ^s
th.o.y, according to wallerstein, derivesits statussolely flrom
what he rs dealing with "speak" in such a way that others will be ^tory
its capacityto engender a common language between analyst and
constrainedto hear it or put his veracityas spokesmanto the test.
patient, i".rgu"g. that the patient learns to accePtand to under-
Does this mean that one ought to abandon all debateabout the "
"reasons"that psychoanalysts give for their practicef That is ap- st".,d, and that will give meaning and coherenceto the therapeutic
relation. The metaphor is neither rrue nor falsebut should be ef-
parently the conclusionthat Robert Wallerstein,then presidentof
f-ective;that is, it ought to be experiencedas adequateby the patient
the International PsychoanalyticAssociation,attempted to impress
from a cognitive and affective point of view'
on his colleaguesin the speechhe made on the hftieth anniversary
If we were indeed to follow Wallerstein,our work would stop
of Freud's'Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (r 937-87)at the
here. Moreover, this is undoubtedly the result he aimed at in his
Thirty-fifth International PsychoanalyticCongress in Montreal'
primarilv political speech'In fact, psychoanalysiswould be'by def-
According to Wallersteint reading of the contemporary situation be defined in
inition. ouiside of the domain of discussion.It would
of psychoanalysis, psychoanalyticpracticeought ideally to be the
strictly operationalterms, and the operationsin questionwould not
subjectofa consensusthat divergencesoftheory would not disrupt'
justtfy any thesis and would not establishany psychoanalystas a
Indeed those divergencesonly refer to the metaphoric part of the
,pol.r-^., whose legitimacy could be subiectto discussion'
treatment.Psychoanalyticpracticecan, in fact, be nourishedby pro- "only operational"
Interestingly,in order to define analysisin
foundly different metaphors, metaphors that' strictly speaking'
terms, wallerstein refers to 3 Freudian text that is also eminently
concernonly the patient and the analyst.According to Wallerstein,
political.Confronting the thei-reticalchallengesof Adler and f ung,
the common trait-both necessaryand suficient-linking all an-
 r3o On Some of Freudi Heirs
Freud had attempted to de6ne the boundariesbeyond which no
therapist could call himself a psychoanalyst.5 However, if, in the
event, Freud did not exclude the possibility of being an analyst
while disagreeingwith him, neither did he afirm that analytic
practice was by its nature incapableof distinguishing among di-
verseopposingpositions.Quite to the contrary,the points of agree-
ment he deemednecessarywere so preciselybecausethey constitute
the common basis-the shared language,25 i1 vyg16-that makes
a discussion,and thereforeprogress,possible.
The position of Wallerstein,who, like Freud, spoke as someone
responsiblefor the global future of psychoanalysis, thus characrer-
izes a profound change in the perspectivesopen to this practice.
Wallerstein'sposition ratifieswhat Eagle criticized.It proposesthat
psychoanalysts who are not in agreementshould no longer seek to
work "together,"but should carry on with their craft the best they
can with the means,that is, the metaphors,that suit them best.
Stopping there is dificult, however,especiallysince psychoana-
lysts-at least the ones whose work we will study-don't stop at
that point either.There is even lessreasonto rest contenrwith this
position in that Wallerstein,while appearing to yield a grear deal,
leavesmany questionsunexamined. It is indeed dificult to accept
his soothing vision of a "metaphor" nourishing a therapeuticrela-
tion that itself would be the subject of a consensus.One cannot
help calling to mind the more troubling questions posed by a
Thomas Szasz,for instance.about the unilateral characterof the
therapeutic relation. In the caseof a conflict of opinion between
patient and doctor, Szasz stated, the conflict "is not resolvedby
examinationof the merits of the rwo views, but rather by the phy-
sician'sautocraticjudgment: his view is correct,and is considered
'reality'; the patient'sview is incorrect,and is considered'transfer-
ence."'6The same position was mainrained recently by Serge Vi-
derman in the journal Psychanalystes: "In the analytic chessgame,
there is no truth possibleoutside of the analyst. The fat of his
interpretationshas the characterof a performative utterance."TIn
other words, if they are left in an isolated state, the themes of
transferenceand resistancecan become the instruments of the
strangestand most uncontrollableof professions.Even if they pro-
On Someof Freud\ Heirs 13r
r,okeopposition among analysts,analytic theoriesat least serveas
the occasionfor analyststo render an account of their practice,
therebvopening it for discussion.The day has still not come when
s1,61ypatient entering analysis is ofiicially warned that what is
being proposed is a metaphoric adventure for two; he is not told
that he will learn to experiencehis life according to the favorite
metaphoricschemeof the person treatinll him. As long as this day
has not come,8the operation attempted by Wallerstein should be
ascribed,not even to the registerof politics,but solely to the man-
agementof the international psychoanalyticmovement. Psychoan-
alvstsshould be taken as what they claim to be-holde rs of theo-
nes.
As we havealready stated,we do not wish to join the protesting
chorus of epistemologistswhose challengeto the "scientificity"of
psvchoanalytictheories amounts simply to a reproach to analysts
for not acting like "scientis15"-25 if goodwill could, in this case,
be sufiicient.Nor is the idea that it would be "sufrcient" for ana-
lyststo give their clinical evidencea form permitting confrontation
and comparison a fruitful one. That would amount to allowing
Lavoisierand his colleaguesinto the closedspacethat the analytic
setting constitutes;it would mean ignoring the singularity of that
setting.
Indeed, euen if Freud was totally correct in his analysisof the
processof treatment,this would not mean that the process,in itself,
could engender "objective"evidencein the senserequired by epis-
temologistswhose ideal is the experimentalsciences. To think that
would be to forget the conditions under which this type of science
producesits evidence:it supposesthe existenceof "purified," reli-
able actors capableof verifying, by their reaction,the meaning of
an action or an intervention, and capable,therefore,of being in- il
voked as reliable witnessesin discussionsamong psychoanalysts. If i
one of the functions of the analytic setting,according to Freud, is
to substitutefor the "real" neurosisa transferenceneurosiswhose
analysiscan achieve the identification and elimination of resis-
tances,this is preciselybecausethese resistances opposethe verifi-
cation of the analyst'sinterprqtation by means of the patient'sre-
covery.The very processof anilysis supposesat the outset that its
r32 On Some of Freudi Heirs
actorsare not "reliable,"that they rebel againstthe knowledge that
would make them the subiectsof theory. Strictly speaking,"p1-
tients" would, like the purified products manipulated by chemists,
ideally be capableof 6guring in theoreticalcontroversies only after
the "liquidation of the transference,"that is, whe n the analysishas
arrived at its "natural conclusion"-a possibilityFreud himself put
in doubt in r937.e
As for analyststhemselves,still accordingto Freud, they are not
able to give a systematicaccount of their interventions.Didnt
Freud warn analystsin rgrz against taking notes on what the pa-
tient said becausethis consciousattention could interfere with un-
consciousmemoryl If an analyst knows that his interventionsare
to be recordedand evaluated,won't the risk of interl-erence be even
greaterl Can one be an analyst under Lavoisier'swatchful gaze,
virtual though it might bel
It might be relevant,however,to recall on this point the condi-
tions of the "therapeuticalliance" between the analyst and the pa-
tientt "ego," which, according to Freud, the analystis to regard as
"intact and rational,"at any rate for the purposeof inauguratingan
analysis.Isn't this "therapeutic alliance,"insofar as it is, as Freud
said, basedon the love of truth, also an "alliance for knowledge,"
and can't the patient's "ego" also be the reliable witness of the
changestaking place in himi We must remember.however,that
when Freud spoke in 1937of the "normal ego" that guaranteesthe
unshakableloyalty of an allyl0 in the analysis,he was demonstrat-
ing its purely fictional nature. This characterizationappearsat the
end of his descriptionof how the alliancecan be broken during the
analysisby the disengagementof the patient's"ego" from the con-
tract on which the situation depends,so that the patient can no
longer sustain the effort to "bring id into the light of day." The
ideal "witness" cannot then, by rights, be dissociatedfrom the re-
sistancethat disqualifieshim as a witness.He cannot be dissociated
lrom the processof treatment, even if this processintegrateshis
supposedexistence.
Let us leaveFreudt theseshere to recall what few analystsdare
to challenge:the material furnished by a patient is not likely to
force an analyst to becomeinterestedin a theory that he has so far
On Someof Freuds Heirs I33
Eagle recallsfudd Mar-
,eiecretl.To rhe contrary.On this subiect,
that patients treated by analystsfrom different
,iors' .on.lusion
not only appear profoundlv convinced by the interpreta-
,.honl,
them, but also produce material tending precisely
,ion, p.opot.d to
interpretationsand the theory they are basedon.
ro confirm those
how inextricably tangled the
Eagle relatesan anecdote showing
is: suggestion "works" even when the patient knows that
,ituation
it is involuntary and knows in what mode it has been produced.A
psychoanalyst treating a patient who had been a Republicanfbr his
whole life realizesthat the patient is trying to becomemore liberal
in orclerto conform to the analyst'spolitical positions.How did the
Darientlearn o[ these opinions? "He then told me," reports the
psychoanalyst, "that whenever he said anything favorableabout a
Republicanpolitician, I alwaysasked for associations. On the other
hand, whenever he said anything hostile about a Republican,I re-
mained silent, as though in agreement.Whenever he had a kincl
word for Roosevelt,I said nothing. Whenever he attacked Roose-
velt. I would ask who did Rooseveltremind him of, as though I
was out to prove that hating Rooseveltwas infantile."rr Inversely,
what patient or "analysand"doesn'tlearn, over time, how to inter-
est his analyst,how to make him reactl
We do not mean to claim that if, in spite o[ Freudt intentions,
some measure of uncontrolled suggestionis at work in analysis,
and if the attempt to give an "obiective" account of treatment is
futile. then any cure achievedby treatment would only amount to
a placeboeffect.This conclusionis no more iustified than the rea-
soning that the failure to produce obiectiveevidencecan be attrib-
uted to ill will on the part of analysts.This lack of obiectiveevi-
dencedoes not erasethe interest and the meaning of the analytic
processin and of itself. As we have alreadyemphasized,the terms
"suggestion"and "placebo effect" refer, above all, to our own ig-
norance. This ignorance does not prevent us from using these
terms to criticize a method or reasoningthat claims "oblectivity"
while failing to take them into account. But this critical usage
should not, in turn, concealthe fact that we don't know what-in
the name of obiectivity,of the necessarypurification over parasitical
effects-ought to be taken into-iccount and eliminated'
 r34 On Someof Freuds Heirs
All the same,the questionof "analytic objectivity" has,as a mat_
ter of fact, changed profoundly.For instance,an essentialtechnical
modification-the abandonmentof "abstinence"-has come about
notably as a resuk of the rreatmenr of borderline casesand psy_
choses,although "abstinence"was preciselyone of the guarantees
on which Freud built his argument about the objectivity of anal_
vsis.
A Neu Ingredient: Empathy
While in Freudian theory neurosesderived from intrapsychic
conllicts arising in the oedipal phase, borderline conditions and
psvchoses are rooted in the pre-oedipalperiod. For Freud himself,,
this put into question the relevanceof thesecasesfor classicalana-
lytical techniques-free association,inrerpretation,and especially
the possibility of transference.Beyond their differences,analysts
such as Balint, Bowlby,Fairbairn, Guntrip, Kernberg, Kohut, Mah-
ler, Khan, Searles,and Winnicott, who extendedpsychoanalysis to
those caseswhere Freud discouragedit, all were led to make cer-
tain essentialchanges-practical as well as theoretical-in Freud-
ian analysis.Without giving up interpretation,they came to privi-
lege the affectiverelation that, dependingon the theoreticalmodel,
will be called "fusional,""holding," "empathic."This lasr term in-
cludes,as we will see,an ambiguous multiplicity of meanings,and
even constitutes,according to certain psychoanalysts, the essential
condition of every analysis.
Empathy calls up the same kind of situation we describedwith
respectto "tact;'as Ferencziintroduced it. Freud had admitted that
"of course" tact was indispensable,rhar is defined the savoir faire
of every analyst; but he admitted tact with reservationsand on
condition of its identification with a "preconscious"knowledge,
subjectedby right to analyriccategories.It is thus that Kohut, who,
as we will see,went the furthest in the theoretico-practicaltrans-
formation of the analytic setting, at first presenrsempathy.Along
with transference,empathy defines the scientificfield of observa-
tion proper to psychoanalysis. What is required-and how might
On Some of Freud'sHeirs r35
one deny the necessity?-is that the analystunderstandthe other's
experiencefrom the other'ssubjectivepoint of view.
[Jut here again, the term "understand" is ambiguous: it may
pean "explain" or "put oneselfin the placeof." Ferenczihad main-
tained that one ought not only "understand" but also "make it
understoodthat one understood.""Only sympathycures,"he dared
s6u'rite. Kohut, taking care not to identify emparhywith the mag-
ical desireto cure by the sole meansof "a loving understanding."rz
will neverthelessafrrm the necessityof an understanding,which
means not only being able to make senseof, but alsoaccepting,tn
an empathic mode. the actions and reactionsof the patient, and
succeedingin communicating this positive acceptationto the pa-
tient. Briefly, what is required is the creationof an "empathic am-
biance."
The question of the role of empathy is paralleledin most of the
authors,as it was in Ferenczi himself-,by a heterodox reexamina-
tion of the relations of parents and children. Ferenczi linked his
criticism of "frustration" to the hypothesisthat the trauma the pa-
tient complained of was, in most cases,real. Similarly,empathy in
the "active" sensecorrespondsto a conceptionof analysiscentered
lesson conflict and its repetirionsrhan on the lack that is supposed
to havecharacterizedthe early relation betweenmorher and child.
This focus on the early mother-child relation cenrersanalysison
the intrapsychicconsequences of a fact that, referring ineluctably
to real life, transforms both the statusof real life and the role of
interpretationin the analytic setting.
In a recent study, JohannesCremerius has stressedthe absence
of referencesto Ferenczi by the orher analyric theoreticianswho
refocusthe processof the cure around the mother,child relation:
"Ferenczi'scareerbecamefor many the sourceof materialsfor their
'nerv' edifices, often without indication of the source
of their
6nd-which is shameful for the celebratedprobity of Science."rr
(lremerius goes so far as to wonder whether there were not two
opposing psychoanalytictechniques: one, derived from Freud,
basedon classicinterpretation; and the other, derived from Fer,
enczi,basedon affectiveexperience.Classictherapy would propose
 I-16 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
to regulate the oedipal crisis, while therapy utilizing maternal
" h o l d i n g " w o u l d c o n c erni tsel f w i th pre-oedi palstagesof devel oo-
ment and would arrempr to repair de{icienciesroored in that pe_
ri o d .
As Cremerius nores, afiliation with Ferenczi is not clairxsd.
however; in fact, quite the reverse.Only Balint. Ferenczis form.,
pupil, paystribute to him and regrersthat Freud, in his own work.
"neither recognizednor appreciatedthe possibilitiesof a new
and
important developmentof our techniqueas well as of our theory."r+
Balint attachesrhe norion of "basic fault" to the dual mother-child
relation analyzed by Ferenczi.He also refers ro Ftrenczi when he
wonders whether, insteadof using words from conventionaladult
language,it would not be bette( with "an extremely disturbed pa_
tient, under the pressureof intenseemotions or in a stateof pro_
found regression,""to resort to simple gestures,for example,hold-
i n g th e p a ti e n t' sh a n d ." r 5
But the absenceof direct ref-erence to Ferenczi revealslessa lack
of probity than the confusionof the situation.The two supposedly
"opposing techniques" are often not presented, are not
even
thought of, as such. Very often elementsin one techniquehavebeen
borrorvedfrom the other. For instance,certain upholderso[ classic
treatment don't reject "holding" and other fbrms of affectiveex-
change when they are judged useful. This mixing also occurs
when, without purring Freudian orthodoxy in question,classican-
alysts take "borderline" parienrs.With respectto such siruarions,
Raymond Cahn, for example, assertsthat the psychoanalystmust
"leave off his interpretive function, but especiallymust make the
patient feel the quality of his presence,of his participarion,and of
the manner in which he accompaniesand understandsthe emo-
tional manifestationsexpressedin the patient'sbehavior as having
value and rneaning in itself, by a kind of primary identification."16
And, speakingof patientswho lack an identilicationwith a marer-
nal figure, foyce McDougall declaresthat with them "a big doseof
patience,"of "holding" is necessary.rT
The introduction of emparhy has nor, in itself, causedan olficial
crisisamong Freud'sheirs in spite of its divergencefrorn the Freud-
On Some of Freud'sHeirs r37
ian clefinition of the analytic seming.The measureof this diver-
gence,horvever,is provided by the testimony of certain analysts.
The affectiverelationsthey describeare of such intensity that thev
irrrplicatethe analyst,body and soul, and leavenothing of that mir-
rorlike impenetrability Freud required the analyst ro preserve.Ler
us listen,for instance,to Masud Khant accountof an incident that
occurredduring a sessionwith a suicidalpatient: "She beganto cry
quietly, with her whole body. Her pain, this reaiity, I felt them
inside.. . . It is hard to translatethis feeling into words. . . . For in
my countertransferentialexperience,I registeredthis feeling with
my rvhole body and mind. It was during this phasethat I had to
learn to rely on my body, to use it as a means of perceptionwithin
the contextof the aqalysis."The aurhor adds: "lf I wasn'tconsranrly
there, with all my bodily arrention, she registered it instanta-
neouslv.. . . At no time during the treatment was there physical
contactbetween her and me. What she required was a manner of
bei ng. . . . When m y bodily at t enr ionf lagged,she awakenedin an
artificialmental stareand becameaparheric."rs Similarly,the Amer-
ican psychotherapistElizabeth Hansen, who worked with border-
line patients,vividly describeswhat she calls her "countertransfer-
enti:rlpsychosis":"Certainly I was participatingin the sponraneous
regressioninitiated by parient.I coulclfeel tearspushing against
the back of my eyeballs, -y at times sensingsomerhinglike
object loss
rn a preview of her completion as a personand termination of our
relationship.. . . Her sessionswere vital intervalsin my week, pro-
viding me a senseof challengeand masrerv,demand and fulfill-
ment."reLet us recall linally, in the same regisrer,that Donald W
W i nnicot t m ade t he f ollowing af ir m at ion , bout analysiswit h a
psychotic:"I have therefore had a unique experience "n
even for an
analyst.I cannor help being different from what I was before this
analvsisstarted."2t,
The public demarcarion is therefore nor between those who
rnake an active use, in whatever "dosage,"of empathy,holding,
or
the countertransference, and those who abstain iro^ ,rring til.-.
It is rather between those who maintain that such ingredients
are
and ought to remain auxilQries-the purpose and principle of
r38 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
change remaining interpretation-and those who challengethat
hierarchy.
This differenceis, however,largely rhetorical.Indeed,the sooth-
ing and conciliatory position of those who wish to keep both
Freudian orthodoxy and empathy,writing, for instance,that em-
pathy clears the path for the mutative effect of interpretation, or
that empathy facilitatesthe transference,appearsas a rather shaky
compromisesolution. Is it possibleto truly reconcileFreud'sthesis,
which saysthat only worft on the resistancesinstigated by a correct
interpretation can have mutative effects,and the afrrmations of
thoseof his heirs who saythat other ingredientsare necessary, spe-
cifically those ingredientsthat put into play the personof the ana-
lyst and the creation with him of a ueritable affective tiel In this
context, speaking about transference, or countertransference,
makes little difference.Didn't Freud himself in r9r5 give up the
distinction between "transference-love"and "real love"l2r What is
essentialis that the countertransference no longer appearas an ob-
stacleand that, concomitantly,"real life," for which a transference
neurosis in the service of knowledge was substituted,become a
necessaryauxiliary. The divergencefrom the ideal appears,then,
not only inevitablebut useful, which is quite different.
It might be said that this divergencefrom the ideal is not at all
surprising. Thus, any specialistof mechanicalapparatuswill state
that, fortunately,real machinesdo not conform to the ideal of me-
chanicallaws: no apparatuscan function without friction, which is
overlookedin these laws. The situation in psychoanalysis is, how-
ever,quite different: techniciansknow how to introduce into their
equationseffectsdue to the existenceof friction. But how might
one go about integrating the utility of impurity into a technique
that is founded on a link betweenpurification and effectivenessl
In spite of its mainly rhetorical character,the differencebetween
those who explicitly challenge the primacy of interpretation and
those who attempt to conserveinterpretation'sorthodox role does
have a consequence.The former are obliged to mobilize the shift
in the relations between "heart" and "reason" that their challenge
implies.This is notably the casewith Kohut, whose self psychology
has been the object of vigorous attacks from orthodox psychoana-
On Some of Freuds Heirs r3g
lvstseven though, remarkably,Kohut has not, like Ferenczi,been
rejected,decreed"outside of psychoanalysis."
The Analytic Setting According to Kohut
It is significantthat in his theoreticalwriting Kohut risked reex-
amining the exclusion of hypnosis,which no one else, not even
I3alint,who was the only one to invoke the example of Ferenczi,
dared to do.22
Irr his last book, Hou Does Analysis Cure?, Kohut assertsthat
"the decisivestep toward analysiswas not the replacementof hyp-
nosiswith a different therapeutic'technique,but a pivotal change
in the understandingof the psychopathologythat was to be cured
via hypnosis."23 He thus distinguishesa nonanalytichypnosisfrom
a "psychoanalytic"hypnosis;the latter, according to Kohut, inter-
pretsthe psychein depth while the former doesnot:24"The prean-
alytic hypnotist ordered the hypnotized patient to get rid of his
svmptoms;the analytic hypnotist ordered the patient to producean
accountof the dynamic (and, later,genetic)background,that is, to
produce the data that illuminated the endopsychiccausesof his
symptoms."25Kohut's statement indicates that he associatesthe
birth of psychoanalysis not with the abandonmentof hypnosisbut
rather with the abandonment of the Bernheimian type of direct
suggestlon.
Kohut had even lessmotive for refusing to recognizethe thera-
peutic interestof hypnosissince he was in the processof challeng-
ing all the concepts defining the Freudian analytic setting that
emerged with Freudt reiection of hypnosis.ln ry77, after many
hesitations,Kohut resolved,he tells us, no longer to put new wine
into old wineskins.He also resolvedto reformulate the description
of treatment by eliminating, most notably,the central role of the
analysisof resistances.26As we will see,beyondKohut's avowedfear
of being seenas a miracle-worker relying on the magical power of
"sympathy," self psychology undertakes to bestow a rational legiti'
macy upon a therapy of the heart by the heart and no longer by
reason,that is, a legitimacy on a redefinition of the relations
[rsed
bet weenhear t and r eason.
r4o On Some of Freud'sHeirs On Someof Freudi Heirs 14r

For Kohut, the analytic setting is the locus of a repetition of the for a rich and meaningfullife, in which,amongother things,ambitions
processofconstructing the self,a processwhose defectivecharacter arepursued,self-esteem is adequately regulated,and idealsand valuesare
cleveloped, all quite independentof whether or not progress hasoccurred
during childhood is the origin of the adult patientt illness.Follow-
in the realmof psychose xual development or conflictsassociated with that
ing Kohut, the original processof construction,like its repetition
realm.This is, of course,anotherway of sayingthat as far as leadinga
in analysis,does not necessitatesome kind of triumph of reason rich,meaningful,and pleasurable life is concerned,issuesof psychosexual
over heart as was the casewith the Freudian notion of conllict. We development and conflicts around sexualityand aggression arg reallyir-
no longer hear about the "ego" conquering the id, the harmonious relevantand all that mattersis the achievement of self-cohesivenessand
the successful movefrom pathological to "healthynarcissism."More spe-
integration of instinctual drives, or a break with the narcissistic
cilicallyand concretely, what Kohut seemsto be sayingby implicationis
illusion of early childhood. In other words, the etiology of the dis-
rhat one can lead a full and satisfyinglife without havingadequately
turbance no longer operatesto justify the typically Freudian con- resolvedsuch issuesas obiectlove and hate and the capacityfor inti-
vergencebetweenrecovery and the patient'sinsight into the reasons macy-as long as one hasachieved self-cohesivenessand "healthynarcis-
for his illness. The conflicts that are the obiect of interpretation sism."27
and insight are, for Kohut, relativeand subordinateto a more fun-
We have not discussedthe content of Freud\ theseson "health"
damental question: the "cohesion"of the self and its relationswith
and "normality," nor will we discussKohut! theseson this score
its "selfobjects."
either. Underscoring Kohut's fascination with the "great man,"
Brielly summarized, Kohut's thesisrepresentsan infant experi-
Eagle himself queries,"[tlo what extent, one wonders,was the de-
encing a feeling of "absoluteperfection" that should be nourished
velopment of Kohut's self psychologynecessitatedby the clinical
by the mother or other caretakingadults. This first narcissisticex-
phenomena of disorders of the self and to what extent is it an
periencepresumablydoes not enter into conflict with reality but is
expressionof his own values,in particular his belief that the full
transformedinto a "narcissisticequilibrium." In this statethe infant
life is the one that in its achievementof 'healthy narcissism'most
will at first develop a grandiose,exhibitionist self while yielding
approachesthe life of the genius and herol"28 Undoubtedly,Ko-
the feeling of absoluteperfection to an admired and all-powerful
hutian analysisengendersa reading of the history of civilization,
selfobject,an idealized image of the caretakingadult. The infant's
of mankind, and of their ideals and values quite different from
feeling of power, plenitude, and security dependson the relation
Freud's,since Kohut substitutesfor the figure of the Guilty Man
between the self and its selfobjects,that is, on the child s capacity
the figure of the Tragic Man whose life is stripped of meaning,
for maintaining an idealized image of its parents.The global "self
ideals,and goals.Likewise, Kohutian analysissubstitutesthe anx-
and selfobjects"will, in the later courseof development,be trans-
iety linked to the feeling of disintegrationand dehumanizationfor
formed, still without break or conl1ict,into a cohesiveself endowed
the anxiety linked to physicaldanger.But what is most important
with ambition, values,and ideals,by contrast with the powerless
for us here is that his reading engendersa quite different idea of
"fragmented" self, devoid of ideals and ambitions,that Kohut di-
relationsbetween "heart" and "reason,"notably in the analytic set-
agnosesin his patients.
ting.
As Eagle notes,Kohut's thesisdivergesmuch more widely from
The Kohutian child has a vital need to feel valued, esteemed,
the Freudian reading of treatment, and also of "health" or "nor-
admired by its caretakers,and it is this feeling of being understood,
mality," than Kohut wished to recognize:
recognized,and appreciatedthat the analystshould transmit to the
The former {i.e.,Kohut'sthesislimplies,in contradictionto the latter suffering adult. In our opinion, Kohut is speaking here about sug-
[Freud'sthesisl,that therapeuticgrowth in the dimensionof narcissism gestion.We obviously do no\{nean direct suggestion,"pedagogi-
alone(i.e.,the movefrom pathologicalto "healthynarcissism")
can make cal" or arbitrary influence,or a deliberateproiect of persuasion-
 r42 ()n Some oJ Freud\ Heirs
all those "conceprs"of suggestionrefer aboveall to the opposirion
defined by Freud berweenthe type of "truth" sought in the analytii
setting and the obstaclesto that 11u1h-gu1 the kind of ,rgg.rtion
that arisesas a problem as soon as the Freudian setting of truth
is
put in question. Freud made of suggestion,or more preciselythe
faculty of suggestibility,an originary,irreducible,fundamentalphe_
nomenon in the psychiclife of mankind.zeKohut goeseven farther
sincc "suggestion"(or what we risk recognizingas such) is not for
him just a fact; it respondsro the mosr fundamentalpsychichuman
need and constitutesan authentic condition of ontogeny.Concomi_
tantly, the analytic serring is no longer the place where suggestion
and conflictual truth confront each other, where conflicts are re_ r
peated in the service of recollectionand insight. The analyst no
longer addresseshimself to the patient's"ego," which he supposes
to be intact, nor does he seek to have the patient discoverthe de-
fensemechanismsrevealedby his reacrions.Fbr Kohut, the analytic
setting is the locus of a repetition of the original processof sugges_
tion' The analyst should thereforeacceprbecominga selfobjectfor
the patient while abstaining from any commenr on the operation
and even, should the occasionarise, avoiding interpretations he
thinks rvill be traumarizing. The selfobjectthe analyst agreesro
becomeis an object that is not separatefrom the patient, but is an
intrinsic part of the self. Transferenceis not in the service of
knowledge, but in the service of the patient'snarcissism,which
must be reinforced until it becomes,6nally, capableof "transmu-
tations" that will rransform it into adult narcissism.The analyst,s
playing the role of mother, his sustaining the function of the selfob-
ject' is in no senseillusory.It is rather an effectivetool in the process
of rehabilitation,of restorarion,of the self.
"Reason,"for Kohut, is nothing other than the product of the
maturational development of what we might call "heart," since
what is involved in this developmentare narcissisticillusions,the
child's megalomaniacconviction of omnipotenceover his objects,
all that which, according to classicanalysis,should be eliminated
in order for the subiect to accedeto the rational mastery of drives
by the ego. Similarly, recoveryresults from a processthat, even if
the analyst explains,inrerprets,and enlightensrhe patient on the
On Someof Frcudi Heirs r43
illness,is essentiallysituatedon the level of his col-
reasonsfor his
narcissismhe nourishesand reha-
laborattonwith the self whose
bi l i tat es'
When Kohutian analysismoves from the first phaseof "under-
"explanation,"the goal changesfrom that
sranding"to the phaseof
of sim ply giving t he pat ient new evidenceof t he analyst 'sunder -
srandingto that of making the archaic,empathic bond evolve to-
ward a more "adult" level of experience.However, this evolution
constitutesnot a break but rather a progressivedevelopment:
Fonnerly, the analysthad simplysharedwith the patienthisgraspof what
the prtient experienced. Norv,in moving toward the greaterobiectivitv
in his explanations, however,the analystprovidesthe patient
emboclied
u,iththe opportunity to become more objective abouthimselfwhile con-
tinuing to accept himself,just as the analystcontinues to accepthim in
olleringthe dynamicand geneticexplanations. The movementtoward
greaterobiectivityduring the analysisshouldthereforebe seenas a sign
of developmental progress.It parallelsthe replacement of one selfobiect
of an archaicselfobiect
experience with another, namely,the replacement
experience by a matureone, the replacement of a merger experiencewith
the selfobiect by the experience of empathicresonance from the sideof
theselfobject.so
As Kohut describesit, the development of the self has as its
condition a veritable processof suggestionthat implies that the
child feels appreciatedand admired by its parents,or that the pa-
tient feels recognized,esteemed,acceptedin an empathic mode by
the analyst. And this processis not expectedto be "superseded,"
either in the normal processo[development or in the courseof the
analysis,by a more rational constructionin the usualsensein which
reasonshould, in one way or another,enter into conllict with heart.
The analyst'sinterpretations,the explanationshe gives,do not have
a statusessentiallydifferent from that of the "optimal frustration"
determined by the inevitable insufrcienciesof the mother in the
normal developmentof the child. They instigatea processof "in-
teriorization of the selfobjects"and lead to a lessvulnerableadult
self, but not to an independent individual who has acceptedthe
lossconstituted,accordingto Freud, by the recognitionof othersas
such. Indeed, Kohut even coqlparesthis processof interiorization
to a processof digestionby which proteins are decomposedand then
 r44 On Some of Freuds Heirs
recomposedinto new proteins essentiallysirnilar to rhe original
o n es .J l
Independenceand autonomy are therefore,for Kohut, ways of
ta l k i n g a b o u t " h e a l th yn a rc i ssi sm."
( )w i ng ro i nteri ori zari on.every-
thing proceedsas if the individual with a cohesiveself were auron-
omous, while in fact he is called upon ro live forever in a matrix of
selfobiects.Relegatingthe ambitions of classicanalysisro the care-
gorv of illusion, Kohut afiirms: "Self psychologyholds that self,
selfbbjectrelationshipsfbrm the essenceof psychologicallife from
birth to death, rhar a move from dependence(symbiosis)to inde-
pendence(autonomy) in the psychologicalsphereis no more pos-
sible, let alone clesirable,than a correspondingmove fiorn a life
dependenton oxygen to a life inclependentof it in the biological
sphere."12 The self can no more dispensewith its objectsthan living
beingscan do r.l,ithoutoxygen.
In this interpretive contexr, the roie of cognition is, therefore,
much more limited even rhan for the Freud of r9j7, and whatt
more, its limits are of a different nature. The analystdoes not en-
counter "resistances"that would be, in and of themselves,the sign
o i th e c o n tl i c tu a le fl e c ti v eness proper ro perri nenr i nrerpretati on.
The analyst is engaged in a processthat he can, of course, de-
scribe-and Kohut does not deprive himself on thar 56e1s-gu1 11
integrateshim and assignshim a function lacking all specificau-
tonomy. The ambiguity of relations berween knowledge and sug-
gestionthat we have already had occasionto point out is here put
to good use. Just as those Freudian patients who recognize the
mechanismsof suggestionstill undergo its effects,so Kohut's pa-
tients can learn about the role of selfobjectswirhout, for all that,
casting them off. The relation between eluciclationand recovery,
lvhich made the Freuc{iananalystan experimenter-that is, a cat,
alyst that, ideally at least,did not becomea reacranr-is thus dis-
rupted. The Kohutian analyst finds himself in the srrangerole of
being a reactant,knowing and willing himself as such, a reactant
who knows and can even transmit to this parient his knowledge of
the nature of the reaction,bur without this knowledge being able,
in ancl of itself. to make any difference.
Iireud'scomplaint about the powerlessness of the bestarguments
On Someof Freuds Heirs r45
has here becomethe rule. The knowledge the analysttransmitsto
the pat ient is, like t he ver y aut onom y of t he hum an individual, in
the "as if" mode of metaphor: its utterancesilencesthe fact that,
fhr from opposing the power of suggestion,it supposesit, just as
the entire psychic life of mankind supposesit. And the eventual
enunciationoI what the statementof knowledge silenceswould not
changethe situation. Thus it is with suggestion,with this kind of
reasonthat reasondoes not acknowledge.It is not in conflict with
knorvledge in such a way that knowledge could triumph over it.
Suggestionis capableof integrating knowledge, but, at the same
time, suggestionstrips knowledge of the power it claims of delin-
ing a radical oppositionbetween reasonand illusion.
Theoretical Children
Whatever status it assigns[o reason,Kohut's theorv still claims
to be "rational." Kohut claims a basisin obiectiveclinical facts,in
the classicsenseof the term, and he assignsto his thesesthe same
statusof truth to which Freud'sthesesaspired.This meansthat the
analystcan still claim his patients to be reliable witnesses.He can
extract from the empathic relation he has establishedwith them a
theory of human developrnentand a rational knowledge of the
nature and role in this developmentof what we, for our part, do
not hesitateto call suggestion.This knowledge can be said to be
true, and can enter as such into conflict with the errors and illu-
sionsof classictheorv.In contrastto Milton Erickson, for example,
who relieson the "wisdom" of the unconsciousand confers on the
therapeuticrelation the unique role of liberatrngthe power of this
unconsciousto resolvethe patientt complaint, Kohut can, iust like
the Freudian analyst,understandon a theoreticalbasisthe effectof
his interventionson the patient whose specificneedshe haslearned,
through empathy,to understand.
Just as we did not concernourselveswith the abstractepistemo-
logical arguments putting the scientificcharacterof analysisinto
question,we will not attempt to submit Kohut to a reversalargu-
men t t hat is equally abst r acland im pover ished:if suggest ionis
subordinateto knowledge, whlt becomesof the claims of knowl-
 146 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
edge with respectto suggestion?On the other hand, it is interest-
i n g to n o te th a t-l i k e a l l a nal yti cthesesthat. on the basi so[ ana-
lytic experience,reconstruct the distant causesof pathology and,
beyond these.the "normal" or pathogenichistory of childhood de-
velopment-Kohutt theseshenceforth encounter a new type of
problem. Psychoanalysis is not, as it was for a long time, the only
discipline to speculateon what the subjectiveexperienceof the
child might be. Its speculationsare thereforesubject,if not to being
tested,at leastto being challengedby specialists who are concerned
with other actors-not the adult or the adolescent,but the child
itself.
For many years,psychoanalysts playeda good game of denounc-
i n g a n d d i s q u a l i fy i n gth e i r ri val s i n thi s 6el d. Indeed,i t w as easy
to show that specialists,like Piaget fbr example, who were inter-
ested in the intellectual or psychomotordevelopmentof the child,
judged the child from a perspectivethat does not concern it. They
demarcateda faculty or a performancewhosedevelopmentis to be
evaluatedaccording to an ideal that is the ideal of"objective" adult
activity,and they lefi aside the subjectivemeaning these different
behaviorstake on for the child. Ilowever, in the last few years,this
samecriticism has been taken up by other researchers coming from
a very different direction-ethology.
The history of ethology is inseparablefrom the critique of the
"objective" sciencesof behavior. Like the naturalist fussieu, the
ethologist ernphasizesthe necessityof learning to observe, to
understand a living being in its environment, to avoid describing
its activity on the sole basisof conceptsthat would guaranteethe
reproducibility of questions and answers,or that would permit
iudgment of this activity according to functional norms. The im-
perativeof obiectivitv.in the senseof the experimentalpurification
of anything that might put the reliability of the obiectt testimony
in question, is therefore replaced by the imperative of relevance,
the imperative to discoverthe questionsand modes of description
th a t m a k e e x p l i c i t th e me ani ng i ts acti vi ty and i ts envi ronment
h a v efo r th e a n i m a l .
The researchersof the new domain of "infant ethology" have
On Someof Freuds Heirs r47
thus addr essedt hem selvest o lear ning f r om t he child t he m eaning
of i t s exper ience.I nsof ar as t his disciplineconcer nschildr en be-
trr'eenthe agesof zero ant] tu'o vears who have not vet learned or
irre iust learning to talk, ancl thereflorecannot, strictly speaking,
discusstheir experiences,it is sirnilar to animal ethology.Here also
the ethologist risks "speaking," putting words to, an experience
thet , by it s nat ur e, not only cannot be "said" but also cannot lack
l ang uagein a sim plv cont ingent m anner .The inf ant is evident ly
not "mute." The description <-rfits experiencecannot, except by
rcl i nquishingall int er est ,r ef er t o quest ions,t o pr oblem s,t o t est s
rhat presupposelanguage. Ethologists cannot, therefore. claim a
greater "objectivity" than psychoanalysts,since ethologists,like
l.tsvchoanalysts, proceed by hypothesesand thought experiments.
l ' he division of u'or k t hat som e,such as Andr 6 ( ) r een, r rhavepr o-
posed between "psychology" and psychoanalysis-the former de-
voted to observing in a purely ernpirical,neutral manner, and the
latter subiect to the risk of hypothesesand meaning-is mis-
pl ac ed. r Il n bot h cases,a child is clear ly"cr eat ed. "
Thus t he t her apistand et hologistDaniel St er n35 can speakof a
"tlialogue" to be establishedbenveenthe "observedchilcl" and the
"clinical child," between the child created by the ethologist,who
has learned to observedthe child, and the child reconstructedby
the analyst,who has learned to listen to the adult patient.36
We will not enter here into the details of what Stern and other
specialistsin infant ethology have proposed,nor, obviously,do we
considerit as proven.We will, however,sketchout this proposition,
which constitutes a third settingof the relationsoI heart and reason
becauseit is less well known to the maiority of readersthan the
cloctrinesderiveclfrom Freud. But preliminarily,we will show how
the v er y r equir em ent sof t he disciplineof et hologylead t o a cr it ical
assessment of the two opposingernblematicfigures of the relations
of heart and reasonas they characterizethe analvticsettingaccord-
rng to Freud and according to Kohut.
The Freudian child, in the broad sense(we will not enter into
clebatesabout various schools),must in one way or another begin
rn a st ageclom inat edby t he "qleasur epr inciple. "Whet her it ent ails
r48 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
" p ri ma ry n a rc i s s i s m ;' s y mbi osiwsi th the mother,or pri mary obj ect
love, this stage, which entails experience of a fantasmic nature, is
describedby Freudians in a way that implies the necessityfor the
infant, when tested by reality, to experiencethe loss of the undi-
v i d e d k i n g d o m o f h i s f-a n tasi es.
Thi s pri mordi al experi enceof re-
nunciation-crucial from the ontogenetic point of view-is the
one that is to be replaved in the analytic setting. In this sense,
Freudian terms repeat the classicidea that reason is defined ozer
und againstillusion, over and againsta distorted conceptionof self
and others that cannot endure the test of reality.For Kohut, too,
the child begins in a fantasmic pleasure-principlestage;however,
:rs we have seen,development out of this stageis a processnot of
abandonment,of renunciation,but rather of maturation. Reasonis
not defined by Kohut as a combat againstillusion; reasonis instead
a stabilized, socialized,less vulnerable fbrm of illusion. Ulysses
does not need to tear himseli away fiom the arms of Circe; Adam
does not need to leavethe primordial paraclise. The feelingsof love
and admiration that nourish the child don't need to be unveiledas
illusions. The feeling of co-belonging between the child and its
objectswill not abandon him, but on the contrary will enablehim
to creategoals,ideals,self-esteem.
Nolv Stern maintains that it is clifrcult to accepta primordial
stagedominated by the pleasureprinciple insofar as this principle
is said to opposeor ignore reality.We will return later to the rea-
sonsStern presentsin support of his position sincerve are centering
here on the confrontation of the Freudian, Kohutian. and Sternian
child. At this point we will simply saythat accordingro Stern,from
birth the infant appearsto the one who observesand "questions"it
to be an excellent "reality tester."rTDescribing the experienceof
this infant in terms of fantasiesseerns,then, methodologicallyin-
appropriate.Furthermore, whether thesefantasiesare describedin
terms of fusion, splitting, paranoia.omnipotence,or an undiffer-
entiated matrix of "selfobiects,"they all presupposecapacitiesthat
can, accordingto Stern,be attributeclto the infant only when it has
attained a "verbal" senseof self. Even the experienceof undiffer-
6n1ix1i6n-snd the negativecharacterof the expressionis signifi-
cant-implies the possibllity of conceiuingdifferentiation:
tu
On Someof Freud'sFleirs t4g
Only an observer who hasenoughperspective to know the futurecourse
of thingscanevenimaginean undifferentiatedstate.Infantscannotknow
shat theydo not know,northattheydo not know.'I'hetraditionalnotions
of clinicaltheoristshavetakenthe observer's knowledgeof infants-that
is, relativeundifferentiation compareclwith the differentiatecl view of
olderchildren-reified it, antl givenit back,or attributedit, to infantsas
their own dominantsubiective senseof things.If, on the otherhand,one
doesnot reify undifferentiation as an attributeof the infant'.ssubjecrive
experience, the picturelooksquite different.Many separate experiences
exist,with what for the infantmay be exquisiteclarityand vividness. T'he
lackof relatedness betu,een theseexperiencesis not noticed.s8
Even if the fantasiesand, therefore, the conflictsbetween fantasy
and reality cannot be attributed to the inf-ant.even if the fusion
refers to the complex experienceof a child who has learnedto talk,
or to the mother who nurses,rather than to the infuns,Stern does
not propose,for all that, the rival notion of a "deficit" or "lack"
inherited from Ferenczi.The infant can no more experiencea fan-
tasy or a conflict than it cansubjcctiuelyexperiencea "lack." Specif-
ically, the loving and admiring g ze of the mother fixed on the
Kohutian child should acquire meaning for it onlv when it is c:r-
pable of intersubjectiverelationswith an other (rvhich clearly does
not mean that an absenceof affectivecontactwith the adult is with-
out consequencein the creation of the inf-ant'ssenseof self-on
the contrary).
One dime nsion o[ the ethologist'swork is therefore semantic.It
involvesevaluating the words we use to characterizea subjective
experienceand evaluatingthe type of interpersonal16l21isn5-ns6-
essarily,the subiectiveexperienceof self xnd 611615-these words
presuppose.This is an essentiallycritical dimension. It purpose is
to attempt to "purify" the description of the child's experienceof
what is rooted for instancein the analyst'sor the patient'sa poster-
iori, subjective,complex reconstruction,that is, a reconstructionby
two beingswho sharewhat the inlant doesnot possess, the capacity
of speech.And the result o[ this critique is radical: the very dis-
tinction betrveen"heart" and "reason" constituting our problem
would not haveany meaning for the infant.
That the Kohutian child .whose conceptionsignified the ab-
senceof conllict between heart and reason,the genesisof'what rve
r5o On Some of Freud'sHeirs
call reasonby maturation without conflict or break-can be criti-
cized on the same basisas the Freudian child, provides a measure
of the new perspectiveintroduced by the gaze of the ethologist.
This new perspectivemakes it possible,in particular,to clarify how
Kohutt conceptionof "heart" was still an implicit tributary of the
traditional conception of the conllict between heart and reason,
which it oficially proposedto transcend.
As we have already emphasized,the relation between the Ko-
hutian child and its caretaker5s2n-2|1[sugh Kohut doesn'tsay
so-be assimilatedto a form of suggestion.However, this is a uni,
lateral, very specilic kind of suggestion.It isn't by chance that, as
we have seen,Kohut speakshere of "food," and that he compares
the processof maturation to "digestion."Even psychicfood has as
its primary attribute a lack of specificity:one has enough, and of
an acceptablequality, or one doesn't,but one learnsnothingfrom it.
The adequacy or inadequacy of food can be judged only as a func-
tion of the needsof the organism. Not only are the requisitequan-
tity and quality of food a function, at least ideally,of metabolism,
but so also and especiallyare the usesof the food absorbed:metab-
olism assimilatesand unilaterally subjectsthe nutriment to its own
ends.Similarly,Kohutian "selfobiects"haveno autonomy-in con-
trast to "Freudian" obiects,which can supposedlybe evaluatedfor
what they are. "Selfobjects"do not relate to the "self" as an origin
of initiative, as a subject confronting objects,but to the emotional
experienceof the "self" whose stability they ensure,to its needs,
which they may or may not fill.
We find here again in the Kohutian analytic setting the limited
and ambiguous role played by interpretation,and, therefore,in a
generalway,languagein its cognitivedimension.The first phaseof
analysis "not only broadens and deepens the patient's own
empathic-acceptinggrasp of himself, but strengthensthe patient's
trust in the reality and reliability of the empathicbond that is being
establishedbetween himself and his analyst by putting him in
touch with the full depth and breadth of the analysti understand-
ing of him."re In the secondphase,one must lead the "self" of the
patient to maturity, one must teachhim a certain distanceimplying
the interiorization of the "selfobiects"and their relative indepen-
On Someof Freuds Heirs 15r
dence rvith respectto effectiveinteractionswith a real individual.
But in neither phase does interpretation have any specificaction.
"Heart" has its reasons:like metabolism,it has its specilicmode of
development with respect to which individual history can be
judged. The absenceof specificaction is thus not a failure of theory
but the theoretical consequenceof the Kohutian conception of
child development.The Kohutian analyst ftnows that his knowl-
edge,his interpretations,will not havea specificeffect,but also that
they will be integrated in a processof developmentthat is essen-
tially autonomous. In other words, he ftnous that in analysisthe
pure gold of (indirect) suggestionwill be mixed, in considerable
quantities,with the brassof interpretation.
The fact that Kohutian treatment can, like Freud's,claim a theo-
retical status-the analystcan define his role in theory,define how
the "ingredient" he henceforth constitutesdeliberatelyintervenes
in the therapeuticprocess-reveals the dependenceof Kohut's con-
ception of "heart" on the traditional conception.Kohut deniesthe
essentialcharacterof conflictsthat tradition links with reality test-
ing, but he reservesto "heart" its traditional indifferenceto "real-
ity," which is given the status of psychic nourishment, deficient
or no.
From this perspective,it is interesting that Stern concludeshis
study with a definition of the cognitiveproblem of the therapistin
terms of a researchstrategyand not in terms of potentially discov-
erable answers to theoretically predetermined questions.Whatt
more, while Freud, in his great moments of optimism, had foreseen
that generalizedknowledge of the etiology of neurosescould have
a prophylacticeffect,Stern foreseesthe reverse.On the same basis
as Freudian theory itself, the new gaze ethologistslearn to cast on
children, a gaze that can then become a source of "information"
for parents,will lead in some degree to the creation of new types
of history, that is, to different kinds of adults who will in turn
impose new researchstrategies."fust as infants must develop,so
must our theoriesabout what they experienceand who they are."40
This is the last sentencein Stern'sbook. Theory can no longer
claim an ideal of knowledgeaimilar to that of analytic chemistry,
which identifies,beyond particular reactions,the invariable truth
r52 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
explaining thesereactions.Theory dependson learning how to see
and to listen,skills that, not only in fact but in principle,cannot be
transmuted into judgment, cannot authorize the therapist to iden-
ttfy his patient and the wav the explanatorytheory can be applied
to him. This is the reasonwhy no knowledge can claim a prophy-
lactic value that supposesthe sharing of a truth. The diffusion of
knowledge about infants u,ill intervenein individual histories,and
will eventuallyproduce ns11'problems that the therapistmust then
learn to recognize.
This conception of knowledge as exploration, as opposed to
knowledge as judgment-which we associatedin the first chapter
with the Kantian ideal (the scientistmust addresshis object like a
j u d g e a rme d w i th h i s p ri n c i pl es,and not l i ke a pupi l w ho l earns)-
is linked to a renewed conceptionof the relationsof the child with
his world. It also refers to a renewed conceptionof suggestion,a
term that doesnot 6gure explicitly in Stern, as it did not in Kohut,
but that constitutesa palpable problem in Stern'sdescription,just
as it is cliscerniblein descriptionsof subiectiveexperiencervhenever
they involve the heartb "reasons."
A Pragmatics of Reality
Stern'sdescriptiontakes as its point of departure the revolution-
ary but now rather well known discoveryof the prodigiousactivity
of an infant who had traditionally been judged in terms of needs
and unbound affects.Undoubtedly,the infant has no sensorimotor
control. It is, for instance,incapableof voluntarily touching what
it looks at. But it can look, closeits eyes,or turn its head away.Soon
it will be able to smile and vocalize.In other n'ords. the infant is
not "lacking" in means fbr taking the initiative in contactswith
adults, for regulating them or for avoiding them. Moreover,from
birth the infant appearsextraordinarilv sensitiveand attentive not
only to anything resemblinga face but also to the expressivequal-
ities of human behavior.Further, it seemsthat the infant's percep-
tions are amodal.The perception,for instance,that lips seenmoving
producesoundsis not the result ofan a Posterioriconstruction.From
birth infants appear to have the capacity to translate into other
On SomeoJ'Freuds Heirs r 53
perceptualregistersan exclusivelvvisual, auditory, or tactile per-
ception, or, literally,to seeand to feel what they hear anclvice vers:r.
1'hey appear to live in that world of "perceptualunity" that poetry
and other art forms attempt to create.They are also more sensitive
ro abstractqualities (forms, intensities,temporal rhythms) than to
visual or auditory content. But especially,according to Stern'shy-
pothesis,they live intensely the organizationalprocessof their diller-
ent experiences.
T'hus, what would make sense ftor an infant o[ under two
months of age would be lessthe pleasureof sucking its thumb, that
is, to havefinally succeededin putting its thumb in its mouth, than
the slow and painful processduring which the movement of the
hand toward the mouth takes shape.For Stern, it is hypothetically
such experiencesof integration that would constitutethe first sub-
jective senseof a self the infant can have, the experienceof an
"ernerging selfl' The newborn's subiective world. but also the
world of all creativehuman experience,would be a world where
organization comesinto ex$tence.
This first hypothetical description enablesus to elucidate the
constraintsStern imposeson himself. First, the "self" to which the
different orders of experiencetaking on meaning betr.r,een the ages
of zero and two yearswill refer must be describedin such a way as
to avoid the presuppositionof a senseof intentional,affective,cor-
poral identity whose genesisis, precisely,what is to be described.
Next, what is to be describedis not a succession of stages,each of
rvhich must be surpassed,and rvhich could eventuallybe rediscov-
ered through regression,but orders of experiencespersistingand
coexistingthroughout the whole of human life. Thus, the experi-
ence of the emerging self is not the privilege of the newborn, and
artistic creation is a witnessto the fact that amodal perceptioncon-
ti nue st o haunt hum an exper ience.
For Stern, the strictly speaking"social" interactionsof the new-
born begin very early.The "kitchy-kitchy-koo" and other tickling
games,the repetitiveand accented"infantile" vocalizations,in sum,
the different ways a parent interactswith a very young child have,
for Stern, neither the statuso[symbiotic participation nor that of
an expressionof a feeling of love or admiration that would nourish
r54 On Some of Freuds Heirs
the infant. What is involved here is neither truth nor illusion, but
creation,the production of affectiveexperiencesthat imply what
Stern calls a "core self." This core self designatesthe experienceof
a self that is the author-or nonauthor-of actions,the experience
of having the "same body," in movement or not, of having affective
experiencesand a "history," a senseof existentialcontinuity. What
we are dealing with here is the creation of inuarianlr concerning,
6rst of all, affectiveexperience,not knowledge. And this creation
implies a relation with an adult who initiates the interaction,reg-
ulatesit, interrupts it, but who also respondsto the infantt "invi- t understood,rather, in terms of a processthat changesthe meaning
,,:i
tations" and "refusals"(turning asideof the head,etc.).The infant's l,
experienceof self is therefore also the experienceof the other, the .,1
,i
experienceof a world where the effectscausedby self and those
caused by others arc by defnition diferentiated.
Similarly,after the ageof sevenmonths, when theseinteractions
change quality and the parents begin in a systemaricmanner to
i:.
attribute intentions, affective experiences,and projects to their
i11,
child and accompanyor provoke them by voice,gesture,or posrure,
.1
the child's experienceof a "subiectiveself," separatefrom others,
takes on meaning. But, according to Stern, the child does not dis-
cover that it is a "subjective sel[" separatefrom orhers. On the
contrary,the very first experienceof its subiectivelife is the expe-
rience of this life as shared,and, therefore,as shareablewith the
other. While Cartesian philosophersaffirm thar the subjectiveex-
perienceof self is primary and indefectible,and then go on ro pose
questionsabout what proof we havethat others also havesuch ex-
periences,Stern, for his part, proposesconsideringthe two experi- ,,,11
ences-that of self and that 6f e1[615-2s essenriallysolidary,as
ti
produced by interactions in which the adult, tuithout alouaysbeing ji
au,ore of ri, suggeststo the child that they live the same affective t infant'ssenseof an omniscientparent.The passions,
experience. Il
Stern gives the name "attunement" to this interaction, which rl
j;'
createsthe senseof living an affectiveexperience"together."And,
t{,
in a way that is significant for our argument, he is very careful to {
1l
distinguishattunement from imitation, from echo or mirror rellec- ,:11
tions, and from empathy. These modes of description suggesta $
df.
fi
On Someof Freuds Heirs r 55
sratic situation rooted in an experiencereproducedor cognitively
understoodby the adult. The categoriesof truth and error, correct-
nessand misprision, are thereforealmost invincibly called upon to
characterize them, with the result that attention is eventually
rurned from the relationscharacterizedin the original descriptions
to the divergencebetween what the child feels and the parents'
untlerstandingof it. According to Stern, theselatter terms are pre-
matu r e: t hey im ply language,t he possibilit yt hat ver baland inr er -
subjective experience may enter into conflict. Sharing must be
of the experience,that createsthe senseof a shareableexperience.
",A,ttunement" cannot be conflictual,but it is selectiue.Itdesignates
for each child both the types of experiencethat will or will not
later be shareablein the intersubjectivemode and the mode of
sharing theseexperiences. l
I Stern maintains the samethesisconcerningthe emergenceof the
r
"r'erbal self," which he describesfirst of all in terms of mutual
negotiations,a creation of meanings shared by the adult and the
chi l d. I ndeed, St er n cr it icizest he idea t hat t he child "believes"in
the omnipotenceor the omniscienceof the adult. The description
of the experienceof the child who, in order to ask for something,
repeatsa word its parents do not understand does not refer to a
belief on the child's part that the adult knows what it has in its
mi nd :
The mother'smisunderstanding servesto teachthe child that the chilcl's
specificmeaningis only a subsetof her possible
meanings. [t is in thisway
that mutual meaningsget negotiated. In suchcases, we areobserving the
infant and mother strugglingtogetherwith the peculiarnarureof lan-
guageand meaning.We are not observingrupturesand repairsin the
pleasure, and frus-
trationsseemto come more from the success and failureof mentalto-
gethernessat the levels of sharedmeaning,which the infant is motivated
toward,not from anxietyat the lossof delegatedomnipotence and/or
from the goodfeelingof securitywhen omnipotence is re-established.ar
The emergenceof the "verbal self" is also expressecl by a rear-
ticulation, and therefore a mqdification, of the totality of experi-
156 On Some of Freuds Heirs
ences, the distribution in distinct registers of amodal perception,
the possibility of conflicts between intersubjective communication
and verbal communication. With the emergence of language,
infants become estrangedliom direct contract with their own personal
experience.Language forces a spacebetween interpersonalexperienceas
lived and as represented.And it is exactly acrossthis spacethat the con-
nectionsand associationsthat constituteneurotic behaviormay form. But
also with language, infants for the first time can share their personal
experienceof the world with others, including "being with" others in
intimacy, isolation,loneliness,fear,awe, and love.Finally, with the advent
of languageand symbolic thinking, children now havethe tools to distort
and transcend reality.They can createexpectationscontrary to that expe-
rience.They can elaboratea wish contrary to presentfact.4r
The relations of the infant with adults, according to Stern, have
to do neither with empathy nor with misunderstanding:
Sometimesparentsfail to appreciatethat socialinteractionsare happening
when they so realisticallyhavetheir eye on the goal ofthe activity,such as
soothing the baby; the ends seem all important, and the means to those
enils go unnoticed as moments of interpersonal relatedness.At other
times, parents do focus on the socialinteraction and act, from the begin-
ning, as though the infant had a sense of self. Parentsimmediately attrib-
ute their infants with intentions ("Oh, you want to see that"), motives
("You're doing that so Mommy will hurry up with the bottle"), and au-
thorship of action ("You threw that one away on purpose, huhl"). It is
almost impossible to conduct social interaction with infants without at-
tributing these human qualities to them. These qualities make human
behavior understandable,and parents invariably treat their infants as
understandablebeings,that is, as the peoplethey are about to become,by
working in the infant's zone of proximal development.ai
And Stern notes here, citing Lawrence Friedman, that therapists
utilize the same technique, addressing "the patient as though he
were roughly the person he is about to become. The patient will
explore being treated that way, and fill in the personal details."aa
Stern's fJeneral description brings out the relation between his
hypotheses, which we have summarized briefly, and our problem.
The genesis of the child's experience, which is the indissociable
experience of self and others, can be read in the register of sugges-
On Someof Freuds Heirc r57
tion. In the beginning was suggestion.But this registercannor be
characterizedin terms of relationsbetween "heart" and "reason"1
on the contrary,it conditions these relations.Etymologically,"rea-
son" is linked to what we can "render an account" of: one gives
reasons,one explains,one iustifies.By opposition,"heart" would be
what has "reasons" we are incapable of accounting for. Now in
Stern'sdescription,a problematicsof this sort has no meaning be-
fore the advent of language.The registerof suggestionis the reg-
ister of becoming.k is neither "food" metabolizedby the child, nor
the translationof a fantasmic relation with the other, but rarher a
provocation,an interaction bringing about a new type of experi-
ence.
What we will thereforecall "suggestion"only works, according
to Stern, insofar as the parents operatein the zone of the infant's
proximal development. They deal with the infant according ro
what he is effectivelycapableof becoming. But while doing this,
they also respond to what the infant's activity-its expression,its
reactions-suggests to them. The interaction thus supposesan
asymmetry,but an asymmetry that is relative,not unilateral.What
the parents "suggest" to the infant was suggestedto them by the
infant. In addition, it seemsthat most of the interactionsdescribed
by Stern as "attunement" are not carried out by the parents in a
deliberate,"rational" manner. The only reasonthey are often ca-
pable of giving a posteriorifor having accompaniedthe child by
certain gesturesand certain tonesof voicedoes not haveto do with
the choice of means but, rather, with a general purpose. They
hadn't formed a consciousrepresentationof the infant's affective
experience;they wanted to be "with him."
In other words, suggestionhere is in no way opposed to the
experience of "reality," but, on the contrary, opens the field of a
specificreality that is given meaning for the child by the experience
of self and others. Reality takes on, then, an essentiallypragmatic
meanin[J,valid, moreover-we will return to this point-not only
for the newborn but also for the scholar: reality is uhat ue deal
uith,that is, "what" we interrogateand use as a basisfor the reg-
ulation of our conduct. Whilel.Sternchallengedthe priority given
r58 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
by Freud to the pleasureprinciple in relation to the reality prin-
ciple, by the same token, he erasedthe possibilityof opposingas a
matter of principle suggestionand relation to reality.
Furthermore, Stern believeshis descriptionof child development
is capableof resolving the question that led Freud to speak of cul-
tural, racial,and family traits in terms of ancestralinheritance.In-
deed, insofar as the interactionsbetween children and adults con-
stitute a real apprenticeship,and not nourishment, they engender
not a generalizedhuman being but a child who belongsto a specific
family, to a given culture. Cultural or family traits do not need to
wait for language to be transmitted, nor must they be passedby
unconscious"messages"subjecting the child to a riddle.a5Those
traits that the individual is not readily able to accountfor could be
explainedby the selectiveand largely nonconsciouscharacterofthe
processesof "attunement" that preside over the emergenceof the
"subjectiveself." They would create an immediate, nonreflective
distinction for the child betweenexperiencesthat are shareableand
those that are not, that is, between the experiencesthat the adult,
often without realizing it, sharesin an intensemanner and those
the adult is not aware o[, represses,or turns aside.In this way a
style of corporal and intersubjectiverelations escapingnarration
and recollectionwould be transmitted without the parents neces-
sarily being able to account for it.
How might one then represent what happens in the anaiytic
settingl Stern himself stresses the fact that the abandonmentof the
notion of stagesputs into question the notion of an "origin" of
psychic disturbances.The various experiencesof self continue to
evolveduring the courseof life, to be changed,to be rearticulated
with eachother. Even if the therapistthinks the patientbcomplaint
is relatedspecificallyto one modality or anotherof the senseof self,
he still cannot conclude that the "cause" goes back to the corre-
sponding "stage" of the child's life. In other words, infancy can no
longer be conceivedin such a way as to explain the pathologiesof
the adult. By the same token, regressionto experiencesactually
sustainedin the period of infancy cannot occur in analysis.Fusion,
symbiosis,rupture all presupposedlanguage.No experienceunder-
gone by an adult can eliminate a verbal senseof self, even if this
On Someof Freudi Heirs ry9
experienceis engaged-during what is commonly called regres-
sion, or, by the same token, in poetic experience,for example-in
registersof the production of meaning other than thoseof the usual
adult experience.a6
The Challenge of Pragmatics
The pragmatic definition of reality goesback before Srern ro an
original philosophictradition, a tradition often conflusedby its ad-
versarieswith a flat utilitarianism insofar as it does not acceptthe
"transcendence"of reasonin relation to the interestsengagingthe
heart. Now, in what measureis this pragmatic definition currently
held by some psychoanalystsl
Among the heirs of Freud who attempredto go beyondthe men-
acing alternative he confronted-if he wasn't an analyst-
archaeologistdigging up the factsof the pastas they were lived, he
was only a convincing-analyst, constructingfor and with his patient
the {iction of a past that would provide the reason for the latter's
illness-"narrativists" haveproposedthat narration, the possibility
of putting certain experiencesinto words, ought to be iudged nei-
ther in the register of factual truth nor in that of fiction, but in the
register of production. To be able to say somerhing, and say it to
another, to be able to create coherence,to perceiveand expressa
causallink betweenthe past and the present,is, accordingto rhem,
the agencyof the "mutation" treatment attempts to bring about.
A rather similar interpretation has at different times been pro-
posedas a solution to the epistemologicalproblem of psychoanaly-
sis.According to this view, psychoanalysis should claim not the title
of positivescience,but rather the statusof a hermeneuticscienceof
a historical type. To the degree that the "narrarive solution"aTis
electedas a sourceof scientificlegitimacy,however,it acts more to
displaceproblems than to solvethem. Indeed,what will the criteria
of a correct,true, adequatenarration bef How will the rolesof the
two coauthol5-1hs analystand the patient-be articulatedl Does
the fact that the "narrative straregy"i1a function of the theoretical
schoolof the analyst,and that the possiblemodesof narrarion must
therefore be recognizeda priori as multiple, mean that narration
I60 On Someof Freuds Heirs
will be arbitrarvi By contrastwith historicalsciences, psychoanaly-
s i s d o e s n o t i n v o l v e a c o m m uni ty of hi stori answ ho rni ght enter
into discussion,nor does it involve a corpus of texts that would be
the common referenceof those discussions.It involvesan analyst
and a patient who is simultaneouslythe narrative"corpus" and, by
the changeshe mav or may not undergo, the criterion of truth.
Freud's decision to focus analysison the interpretati<lnof resis-
tancestook into account the singularity of analysis:rs experimen-
tation. The interpretation of analvsisas a "hermeneutic" historical
s c i e n c ec a n o n l y re fo rm u l a tethi s si ngul ari tyli t cannotannul i t.
It is thus that a "radical" narrativist, Daniel Spence,came to
define in a purely pragmatic register the "becoming true" of nar-
ration that should be produced in treatment: "Once a given con-
struction has acquired narrativetruth, it becomesjust as real as any
other kind of truth; this nerv reality becomesa significant part of
the psychoanalyticcure."a8From this point of view, the "becoming
true" is an euent that no longer authorizes a distinction between
"truth" and "suggestion,"ancJ,to that degree,we find here a per-
spectivecongruent with Stern's.A child's learning to talk opens a
new register of events that implies but does not explain all other
orders of experienceand, more importantly, does not cancelthem.
Language is a creation of a new type of reality (in the pragmatic
sense)for the one who learns it, and the categoriesof "true" and
"f-alse,""objective" and "subjective,"ref'erring to the contents of
utterances,are relative to this reality and thus do not permit us to
define it.a'
Nevertheless,it is hard to borrow a pragmatic perspectiveand to
stop there rvhile attempting to conservethe privilegespsychoanaly-
sis claims in relation to other forms of therapeutictechniques.The
pragmatic position adopted by the most radical narrativistsopens
the door to questions concerning preciselythese privileges. The
"becoming true," the assentthat is produced, may indeed refer to a
singular order oI psychicevent. But one can claim with equal le-
gitimacy that an Ericksonian type of treatment,for example,which
does not seek to interpret, and which makes a metaphoric rather
than a narrative use of language.also provokesevents,perhapsof
another type. It is hard to seehow to extend a pragmaticargument
On Someof Freud'sHeirs 16r
beyondthe respectivespecificitiesof thesetypes of evenrsroward a
privilege attributable to one or rhe orher.50
In a general way, the total spectrum of therapeuticpracrices,in-
cluding thaumaturgicalpractices,are put on an equal footing from
the pragmatic point of vieq or more precisely are made equally
problematicinsofar as thev all posethe questionof the type of event
they incur. That is the real price of the pragrnatic version o[ the
relationsof "heart" and "reason."As we have seen,for Stern, the
therapist'stask is to explore a problem whose terms are a priori
undetermined, not to apply a theory that determinesa priori rhe
.a,t'
typesof possibleetiologicalexplanation.Bur, beyondrhar,one musr
{ learn to explore the different stylesof becoming in which each rype
of therapy seeksto engagethe patient. And, as we have seen,iust
{'
as the inf'ant'sapprenticeshipengagesit in relations marked by a
familial, social,and cultural specificitybeyond what languageand
":,, reasoncan justify, make explicit, or foresee,similarly the experi-
lf ence of different types of treatment should be conceivedas the
lr
transmission-creation of a specificcultural relation to oneselfand
to others,that is, as an initiation to a specificreality.
That every treatment whoseprimary purposeis a psychicchange
can be consideredan initiation is not, in itself, an answer but a
heuristic hypothesis bringing to light rhe problems that Freud at-
tempted to resolve,ancl that, today,should be recognizedas situat,
ing psychoanalysis rather than as being resolvedby it.
We will treat at grearer length the questionsof suggestionand
hypnosisin the fourth chapterof this book. At this point, it is clear
that thesequestionsconstitutea challengenot only to psychoanaly-
sis but also to a large part o{,philosophicaltradition and the en-
semble of "commonsense"positionsthis tradition expresses or in-
spires. The problem of suggestion is, in effect, what "common
sense"wishes to avoid when it assignswhat we live and feel to
either of two classesof experience.The hrst is a "rational" attitude
in which we submit ourselvesto the constraintsand imperativesof
"reality," either material or cognitive, and in which whar we are
dealing with can, with just cause,be seenas capableof explaining
and iustifying the way we trear it. The secondis an irrational atti-
tude in which, in one way or anothe( we turn our back on the test
162 On Somc of Freuds Heirs
of this constrainingand imperative reality.Suggestionis, then, not
a problem but a typical caseof irrationality: it separatesus from
reality and makes us into marionettes subject to the will of an
other. Undoubtedly,Freud complicated"common sense"by accept-
ing the use of suggestionin transference,but this use was to take
on legitimacy in its serviceto knowledge whose instrument sug-
gestion was.
The pragmatic perspectivesubstitutesthe question of the pro-
duction of reality fbr the opposition between suggestionand ra-
tional knowledge. The production of reality comes, then, before
reality as linked to the problems of truth and illusion, o[ test, of
submissionor denial. It is what all thoseproblemspresuppose,and
they arise in a new and specificway each time a new and specifrc
reality is produced. Production of reality may be a collectiveevent,
as exemplified by the history of science.It may be an "ontogenetic"
event, in the case of child development. It probably refers to a
crucial dimension of the change that therapy is meant to provoke
but also to the riddle of hypnosis,to the "reality" that the hypnotist
brings into being in a precarious and ambiguous way without
knowing how to explain or justify his "power" in the matter.
But the inability of hypnosisto render an accountof itself is only
the most dramatic example of the general problem of all therapy.
Every treatment, if it isfounded in theory-authorized by a theory
and aiming, correlatively,at makinfl the patient a reliable witness
of that theory-presupposes the ideal of a masteryof the multiple
parameters of treatment. Obviously every therapist knows that
such a mastery is never achieved,but theory neverthelessdefines
the actual treatment by its divergencefrom the ideal and supposes
that the therapist should know how the inevitableparasiticingre-
dients of the analytic settinghaveinfluencedthe treatment.Indeed,
every theory presupposesthe possibilityof an abstraction,the pos-
sibility of detachingthe theoreticallyprivileged experiencein a way
that not only allows the experienceto be representedby the theory
but allows what it produces to be a witness to the truth of this
representation.
The pragmatic question of the production of reality implies the
abandonmentof this rational ideal. that is. the abandonmentof the
On Someof Freudi Heirs 163
possibilityof judging the actual treatment by its divergencefrom
rhe ideal. In other words, the abstractionrhat the therapeuticset-
ting puts into operation and that the theory seeminglyiustifiesas a
oath toward truth should be undersroodnot in rerms of purifica-
iion b.rt in terms of a singular reality-producingdevice. Abstrac-
tion would have irreductbly concreteeffects,effectsthat cannot be
nrasteredby the theory authorizing it. Thking up once more the
F-reudiananalogy between chemical and therapeuticanalyses,one
could say that, whatever his technique,the therapist enters into a
reaction,into a production of reality in which his theoriespartici-
pate. Bur they participate in a mode that the theoriesthemselves
.rn.ro, explain, any more than the protocol of hypnosiscan explain
hypno sis.
However, the analogy does not stop there, insofar as the totality
of therapeutic proceduresconsrirutes,at least potentially,a corpus
bv the same rirle as rhe roraliry of chemical reactions.5rFreud fo-
cusedon the proiect of hnding a privileged operationaltechnique
that could, at the same time, constitutea means of truly scientific
theorization.The abandonmentof the questionof truth-whethe r
objectiveor hermeneutic-for the praglnatic question of the pro-
cluctionof reality might open onto an interrogation that chemists
had alreadyaddressedwell before Lavoisier: "what is a body if not
the totality of reactionalevenrsof which it is capablef" what is the
human psyche if not the totality of reality-producing events of
rvhi ch it is capable?t 2
The fact that psychoanalysis would be part of a corpus that it
would not be able to interpret or iudge certainly does not imply
the abandonmenrof what allow+-rhe psychoanalystto operate.But
it cloes imply that "witch metapsychology"must abandon the
claims that enabled it, as if by miracle, to describethe identity of
the psychein such a way rhar the operationsof psychoanalysis were
privileged while other techniqueswere put into iudgment'
Before acceptingthe consequenceof this abandonmentof a "sci-
ence of the unconscious"for a study of the corpus of "techniques
the unconscious,"we wish to subiectour proposalto a test that
<_rf
the secondpart of this chapter will examine.Indeed, among those
u,ho have made Freud the founder of the "scienceof the uncon-
 t64 On Some of Freuds Heirs
s c i o u s .'a F re n c h p s y c h oanal yst. f acquesLacan. i s promi nent not
only becauseof the radical nature of his claims, but also and espe-
c i a l l y b e c a u s eth e " s c i e nceof the unconsci ous"as he defi nei i t
seemsto be fashionedparticularly to resistmost of the arguments
we have advanced up to this point. Isn't one of the leitmotivs of
Lacan'swork the notion that analytic "truth" is not of a positive
order, that it does not entail a relation of adequacywith a "reality,"
whatever meanings one may attribute to thesetermsl Isn't Lacan
the one who emphasizedthat the "subjectof psychoanalysis" is not
"man," but the subject of science,and is, as such, inseparablefrom
our era when scienceis held to be the depositoryof answersto the
questionsmen formerly addressedto other agenciesl Was he not
the most violent critic of the practicesof theoreticalindoctrination
denounced by Ferenczi, while he simultaneouslyavoided "empa-
thy" as the solution that would permit the rediscoveryof a "shared"
truthl On the contrary, didn't he adopt and radicalize "nonshar-
ing," the fact that the analyst cannot "put himself in the place" of
the patienti Wasn't he the one who succeededin describingin all
its singularity the strangeconfrontation the analytic setting consti-
tutesi
Tbmptations
Approaching Lacan'swork is a formidable test of our study.We
will not in Lacan'scase,as we did not with Freud himself or Kohut,
undertake an "internal critique." Nor will we addressthe question
of whether Lacan'sreading of Freud's rexrsis faithful or rreacher-
ous, or whether Lacan'sadoption of Freudian conceptslike sexual-
ity, drive, even the unconscious,is fruitful or forced. But the choice
guiding us up to this point-that of privileging the definition of
the analytic setting over metapsychological quesrions-will not be
much help to us here sinceLacant thought opposesdistinctionsof
this nature. In other words, the real problem is that Lacant work
can be seenas an anstuerto the interrogationguiding our inquiry.
It would not, in fact, be an exaggerationto saythat Lacan'swork
pivots around the post-r937definition of Freudian trearmenr,and
that the question of "heart" and "reason,"of the possibility,the
On Someof Freud'sHeirs 165
conditions,and the nature of knowledge about what seemsto es-
capeour reasons,is in fact a leitmotiv of his work. Furthermore, it
is undeniablethat Lacan used this questionwith extremevirulence.
He made it the instrument of a pitilesscritique of all those whom
he could accuseof thinking of the unconsciousas an object of pos-
itive knowledge, all those who confusedthe analytic setting with a
place where the patient would be iudged in the name of this
knowledge, and where the lack of effectiveness of interpretations
held to be obiectively "true" could be identi{ied as "resistances."
The temptation is therefore strong to allow ourselvesto be fasci-
nated by Lacan'scritical, subversivedimension,and to forget that,
to the very degreehe providesanswerswhere we wish to activatea
problem, his critique announcesand preparesclaims that need pre-
ciselyto be understood.
Another temptation would be to seekwaysof "accommodating"
diverse points of view, of seeking, for example, to show in what
measureKohut's conceptions,or those of Stern, could "complete,"
"correct;' or "reformulate" certain positionsof Lacan, or vice versa.
This temptation is easierto avoid becauseit would reduce the very
singularity of Lacant work. No psychoanalyticwork is as little
subjectto eclecticcompromisesas his, becauseno other has been as
careful to deny the legitimacy of the questions,points of view, and
propositionsit refusedto take into consideration.No other psycho-
analytic work ridicules with the same assurancethose who would
forget that psychoanalysis-like a Kantian judge who acceptsonly
the questionsthat he has himself f61mul21scl-cannot acceptbeing
informed by other sciences, cannot acceptbeing modified or "com-
pleted" by elementsof knowledge or problemsthat it has not itself
produced.
A last temptation to avoid is that of trying to elucidateour prob-
lem with the aid of stories surrounding Lacan's personality,the
contingenciesof his careet and the history of his successive schools.
We made a study of this sort with respectto Ferenczi since many
others had previously used his biography to deny the worth of his
thought. But, in Lacan'scase,this problem doesnot exist,or at least
not yet. We will therefore leaveto others who, in one way or an-
other,shared his history or sufferedits effects,the task of multiply-
66 On Some of Freudi Heirs
ing accounts,analyses,gossip,attacks,and defenses53 that will per-
haps one day enable historians to set to work. In an even firmer
manner than with Kohut or Freud, then, we will take Lacan here
strictly by the letter he proposesto us without attempting to under-
stand what, outside of his texts,he "really" was.
The reader will havenoticed that we havegiven only one "de6-
nition" of sciencesince the beginning of this book, while our real
hero is neither "heart" nor "reason" but rather scientific reason.
which, after philosophy and theology,attempts to organize their
relations.This definition linked scienceto thefact that a human
community had, for better or worse, mobilized means of working
together on a phenomenal field. The condition of this "working
together" was that no "idea," "thesis,"or "deduction"-all notions
referring in principle to the knowledge that an isolableindividual
can possess-could claim the right of directing the courseof that
work, the specificdemand of sciencebeing that the phenomena
themselveswould be constitutedas actorsin the discussion.
"For better or worse." While our approachmakes it possibleto
understand the meaning of certain classicdefinitions, like Karl
Popper's,for example, based on the criterion of falsiliability,it is
distinguished from them by its agnostic character.On the one
hand, sciencehere does not purely and simply rhyme with prog-
ress: the constitution of phenomena as "actors" is an operation
whose costly character must be posed as a problem and not can-
celed in the name of a distinction between the rational and the
illusory.Under the pretext that both correspondto the same defi-
nition of science,one should not, specifically,relinquish the means
of differentiating between fields like physicsand behavioristpsy-
chology.On the other hand, the very notion of the phenomenonas
actor should not lead to a simple identificationof sciencewith ex-
perimental science.Certainly, experimentationis today the domi-
nant model since the actors it constitutescan be interpreted as re-
liable uitnessessimultaneously controllable and capableof weighing
in a discussionin a crucial way. But historicalor classificatorysci-
ences also produce actors whose testimony can be invoked, and
"natural" scienceslike ethology,which must "learn to see" more
than they "make visible,"are also engagedin the inventiveproduc-
On Someof Freud'sHeirs 167
tion of ways of confronting what they learn. Problems, risks,
rhythms of researchare distributed in thesedifferent typesof fields
in different modes, but not according to a hierarchy of "scienti-
licitv."
What does Lacan want to dol What does he want us to acceptl
How does he attempt to settlethe question of psychoanalysis with
respectto sciencel As we will see,Lacan proposesan answer that
defineswhich fields may claim the title of science,the reasonswhy
psychoanalysis is one o[ those fields,and also the reasonswhy psy-
choanalysistranscendsthis definition as it is able to judge such a
claim.5aThe fact that scientificreasonrefersfor us to an open prob-
lem whose answer doesnot depend on epistemologicallygrounded
claims but on a history including many diverse strategies-those
leading to the invention of phenomenaas witnessesbut also those
aiming at imposing the authority of such wi1ns55s5-will enable
us to try to understand-not in the register of the true and the
false,the legitimate and the deceptive,but in the registerof strat-
egy-the answer Lacan seemsto proposeto oar questions.
Another motive impels us to avoid the registersof truth and
falsity,legitimacy and illusion. This motive is not related to the
generaldefinition of our problem but to the pragmatic perspective
we introduced on the basisof the hypothesesof Daniel Stern. In
this perspective,the practiceof Lacanian treatment should not be
understood in terms of the application of a theory, legitimate or
not, but in terms of the production of subiectivereality.Two prag-
matic approachesthus intersecthere: one that leadsus to consider
every proposition aiming at the "foundation of a science"in terms
of a strategysimultaneouslyassigningroles to men, meaning, and
conditions of testimony to phenomena;and another that leads us
to define the psychoanalyticcure, whatever theory underlies it, in
terms of an event producing reality,and not in terms of the discov-
ery of a "preexisting truth;' whatever meaning one attributes to
this last expressioninsofar as it retains the function it had for
Freud-the function of founding the privilege of the psychoana-
lytical cure.
It goes without saying that our approach claims to follow only
one thread in the labyrinth of Lacan'swork, and thereforedoesnot
r 68 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
constitute a judgment against it. The strategicquestion we will
pursue has less to do with the ingenious inventivenessof Lacant
thought than with the manner in which he puts this inventiveness
to work for psychoanalysis as a collectivepracticeneeding to define
its relationswith the other practicesand institutionsof knowledge.
From Personalityto the Subject
In order to summarize the "pragmatic" perspectiveon treat-
ment, we employed a statementof a Spinozian type: "What is the
human psyche if not the totality of reality-producing events of
which it is capablel" This Spinozian echo is not new. In his book
on the practicalphilosophyof Spinoza,Gilles Deleuze wrote:
that is, a degreeof power.
An individualis first of all a singularessence,
To this essence corresponds a certainpower of beingaffected. ... Thus
animalsare definedlessby abstractnotionsof genusand species than by
a power of being affected,by the affectionsthey are "capable"of, by the
stimuli to which they reactwithin the limits of their power.The consid-
erationof genusand specie s still impliesa "moral,"while the Ethicsis an
ethology which, for men and for animals,considers in eachcaseonly the
power of beingaffected.5s
On the other hand, Bertrand Ogilvie, in his interesting book on
Lacan,56has demonstratedthe central role of the referenceto Spi-
noza in Lacan'sdoctoral thesis.sTMoreover according to Ogilvie,
Lacan'sabandonment of this referenceto Spinoza marked his en-
trance into the psychoanalyticscene.During the same period in
which Lacan defended his thesis(tg3z), began the "analysis"that
would be interrupted (r938),and was named titular member of the
ParisPsychoanalyticSociety(t933),he also followed Alexandre Ko-
jtve's courseson Hegel. According to Ogilvie, one ought to read
Lacan'sshift from psychiatry to psychoanalysis under the sign of
Hegel as interpreted by Kojdve.
Insofar as Lacan becameinvolvedin psychoanalysis after his doc-
toral thesis,which had a founding ambition in psychiatry,it is pos-
sible to maintain that he never had the proiect of becoming just
one analystamong others.Like Ogilvie, we will examinethe Lacan
of r93z in order to take the measureof his ambitions and, in par-
On Someof Freuds Heirs 169
ticular, to evaluatethe meaning of the apparently common refer-
enceto Spinoza we have just noted. Indeed, we haveused Spinoza
as an example of the pragmaticexploration of eventsof which the
psycheis capable,that is, as a problematizationof any theory claim-
ing to found the privilege of analytic techniquein relation to other
modesof exploration.Lacan'suse of this samereferencewill enable
us to avoid the trap we have already pointed out, namely,the trap
of reading Lacan to find an answer to the question we are investi-
gating. Lacan's"Spinoza" will teach us how to measure the price
that must be paid for the type of answer Lacan proposesto our
question.
In his doctoral thesis,Lacan attempts to think through "person-
ality."Specihcally,he usesthe referenceto Spinozato give meaning
to a type of causalitythat neither leads to the ideal of an explana-
tion of each psychicphenomenonby a somaticprocessnor defines
psychosisas a catalogueof symptoms,but ttrat rather presentsthe
psychoticpersonality as a totality: "ln other words, personalityis
not parallel to neuralgic processes.nor even to the global somatic
processesof the individual: it is parallel to the totality constitutedby
the indiuidual and his oun milieu. Such a conception of 'parallelism'
must, moreover,be recognizedas the only one worthy of this name,
if one doesn'tforget that it correspondsto its original formulation,
and that this conception was first expressedby Spinozian doc-
trine."58In other words, not only must personalitybe conceivedas
a totality, like the individual in his milieu, but in addition, these
two totalitiesare not arranged in a hierarchicalrelation: the first is
not explained by the second,but both must be conceivedas "par-
allel expressions"of one and the same substancedesignatedby dis-
tinct attributes.Like Spinoza,for whom all individual essenceis a
"singular case"that can be understoodneither in terms of lack nor
in terms of defect but as the "potential of being affected,"and also
like Freud, when he abandoned his "seduction theory," that is, a
"traumatic" explanation of psychic disturbance,Lacan refusesto
make "pathologicalpersonality"a deviation from a norm, a devia-
tion that psychiatry would need to explain. The psychiatricstudy
of pathologicalpersonalitywill therefore need to be founded on a
generalconceptof personality.
r7o On Some of Freudi Heirs
It seemsclear that, at the time of his thesis,Lacan thought ef
psychiatricresearchon a model closer to ethologicalobservation
than to psychoanalysis. It is specificallysignificantthat, throughout
his thesis,Lacan makes very few allusionsto the relationshe might
haveestablishedas a therapistwith those he studied; he systemati-
cally puts hirr-rselfin the position of observer.Undoubtedly,in the
caseof his principal patient, Aim6e, he regretsnot having beenable
to carry out an analysis,5n but he expresses this regret in the tone of
a physiciandeploring the lack of such and such an instrument that
would have permitted him to enlargeor to make more precisethe
{reld of his observations.In another case,he doesn't hesitateto
write: "We maneuveredthe patient at great length, and the abso-
lutely prevalent character of this (punitive) intention became pa-
tently evident."60Moreover, Lacan uses the ethologist facob von
Uexkull's definition of "milieu": the milieu forms with the individ-
ual a totality supposedlyparallel to personality,exceptthat the hu-
man milieu would be par excellencesocial.6l
The scienceof personality Lacan intends to found, the "genetic
study of intentionalfunctions in which human relationsof a social
order are integrated,"6rdoes not adopt the program of an active,
Freudian type of "purification," but rather the observationof the
"real life" Freud wanted to exclude from the analytic setting.It is
from this real life, implying family relationships,difi-erentforms of
education. and the totality of social relations as the indiuidual liued
them that (icleally)personality can be deduced.
We will not discusshere the extent to which ethology can play
the role Lacan assignsto it as the model for an "objectivepsychia-
try." We wili limit ourselvesto pointing out that not only did eth-
ology not take that route, but also,thanks to ethologists,we know
much more than we previouslydid about the reasonsopposingthe
kind of scientific,operational mobilization of the parallelism in-
voked by Lacan. We would like to shou' that, in any case,the in-
vocationof Spinoza'sparallelismfor the foundation of a science-
insofar as what speciliesa scienceis having an object, as Lacan
never cease(lrepeating6r-66n51i1u1es an abuse that is extremely
revealingwith respectto Lacant method.
To point out such an abuseis a frrst step toward the characteri-
On Someof Freuds Hehs r7r
za6on of the Lacanian strategy.All foundation strategy implies
5uch abuses,and we will discussLacant use of Spinoza not r o
criricizehim but to identify the originality of his strategy,and
therefore of the way he turns into strategic instruments the ex-
amples,models, and analogieshe had at his disposal.We will at-
tempt to show that r.vhenhe wrote his doctoral thesis,Lacan de-
rived enterprisemuch more from Kant than fiom Spinoza.Lacan's
method was that of a "Kant" who wished to produce the categories
of fussieu'sdomain, categoriesguaranteeingthe rational intelligi-
u'e call "heart."
bility of what, phenornenologically,
It is important to recall that the thesisof parallelismas Spinoza
presentsit doesnot fbund any possibleright to a general,shareable,
transmissibleknowledge of individual essences. The Ethics,where
this thesisis affirmed, definesthe logic of an lgclividual path where
all knowledge would come to be recognized by the indiuidual him-
self not as the acquisitionof a rightful possession but as the expres-
sion of his own cause, the power to knoq and of God as what this
causeexPresses.
Lacan doubt lessenvisionst he conceptof per sonalit vr hat m ight
found a scientificdisciplineas the expressionof our power to know
He conceivesit, furthermore, as determined by the relations of
understanding that particularize human relationships,that is, by
the fact that the development of a personalityappearseminently
comprehensible to the observer.But Lacan also has the ambition of
regulatingthis power in order to constitutethe individual essence
as an object of science.Having an object amounts to claiming 6y
right the power of independently judging against circumsrances
and appearances. In the scientificsenseLacan aims at, a conceptis
inseparablefrom a potuer,preciselythe power of the Kantian iudge
who knows a priori what questions to ask becausehe addresses
himself to an object whose categorieshe detainsby right. Far from
expressingtheir own causesas productions,object and subiectare
equally,but in dillbrent modes,-cubject to a rule. It is this common
subjection that authorizesa methodicalunderstanding of the object
by the subject.
This contrast between power ancl rnethod is also found in rela-
tion to liberty and determinism. For Spinoza, both liberty and
r72 On Some of Freuds Heirs
truth are conceivedas "ultimate products,arising at the end," "like
the result of a long activity by which we produce adequateideas,
escapingthe seriesof an external necessity."6a Two notions of lib-
erty therefbre coexist:an illusory notion of a liberty in spiteof ex-
ternal causes,of a free will capableof self-determinationagainstall
reason;and an adequatenotion produced by the personwho knows
he is determined by his own power, which is itself an explanation
of the power of God. For Lacan, the question of liberty is irreduc-
ibly presupposedby the phenomenonthe conceptof personalityis
to account for, since the development of personalityimplies and
integratesthe history lived by the subject,the concept he has of
himself, and the "representativevalue he feelsaffectedby vis-i-vis
others."65But scientific knowledge obliges the foundation of this
phenomenon, that is, it requires the definition of the methodical
pathway leading to the conceptionof the same "personality" phe-
nomenon as determined:
Assuredly, one cannotdeduceliom any "immediateevidence"the obiec-
tiveexistence of the voluntaryactand of the actof moralliberty.Further-
more, as soon as scientificknowledgeis involved,determinismis an a
priori condition,and makesany such obiectiveexistencecontradictoryto
its study.But one still must explainthe phenomenological existenceof
theseintentionalfunctions:notably,for example,that the subiectcan say
"1,"that he can believehe canact,promiseand affrrm.66
The scientistwill thus aim to understand personalityas afunc-
tion obeyingan ensembleof determinationsthat are not conscious,
but that can become the object of science.This aim is, for Lacan,
the very condition of his science.Speaking of the hypothesisac-
cording to which the order defined in phenomenaby relationsof
comprehensibilityis deterministic,Lacan writes: "This hypothesis
merits the title of postulate;undemonstrable,and requiring an ar-
bitrary assent,it is homologousin all points with postulatesthat in
principle found all scienceand which define for each its object,its
method and its autonomy."67Similarly, Lacan praisesthe Freudian
libido because,supposedlyremaining constant,it respondsto the a
priori conditions of all science: "The relative imprecision of the
concept of libido constitutesfor us its value. This concept has, in
effect, the same fJeneralimport as the conceptsof energyor matter
On Someof Freud'sHeirs r73
in physics.On this scoreit representsthe first notion that permits
us ro envision the introduction into psychologyof laus of constancy
of energy,the basesof all science."6E
In fact, one might therefore say that psychiatricdeterminism,
like the constancyof the psychoanalyticlibido, refers,beyond eth-
ology,to the model of mathematicalphysics,a model we will return
to later. In both cases,the question of operationalrelevanceis not
addressed. It is even implicitly denied insofar as Lacan presentsthe
conservationof energy as an a priori, as deriving from a principle
and not as a stateof fact historicallyinstituted,that is, as a fact that
dependson the recognizedexistenceof experimental relationsthat
it subsumesbut that, at the same time, ensureits richness.In both
cases,"Lacanian" scienceappearsas linked to an "arbitrary assent,"
an act of faith in the right of defining an object, that is, in the power
to judge a phenomenon.
This "arbitrary assent,"necessaryfor the foundation of a science,
if it were to take its meaning from Spinoza,would refer not to the
Ethics but rather to the Theological-Political Ti-eatisesince, for Spi-
noza, no right can found a power, whether political or scienti{ic.
Right, i(e Potuer, refers to the order of facts to be taken into ac-
count and analyzed,and not to the order of rationality that is to be
founded. In the Treatke,each individual is, in effect,conceivedas
having a "sovereignright to do all that he can," the right of each
extending "to the utmost limits of his power as it has been condi-
tioned."6eIn Spinozian terms, the foundation Lacan aims at is a
political operation, and only facts will answer the question of
whether Lacan had the power to carry it out. As for the conceptual
knowledge he attempts to fouqrd,it would be perhapsthat kind of
knowledge dreamed of by sovereignsand priests whose power is
analyzed in Spinoza's Tieatise,but it is not the knowledge of the
Spinozian sagewho is capableof thinfting of the production of ideas
and of things as parallel only to the preciseextent that he himself
is free of all arbitrary assent.
One might dream about what this "scienceof personality"de-
sired by Lacan might have become.One might dream about the
changeshe might perhaps have made to the notions of law, deter-
minism, and intelligibility in order to confer on them a pragmatic
r74 On Some of Freuds Heirs
relevance.One might drearn about the distinctionsthat the study
o[ "personalities" less immediately objectifiable than "paranoid
psychotics"rnight have led him to institute between the possible
modes of knowledge of normality and pathology.It is possibleto
think that the Lacan of rg3z would have arrived at the critical
question of the possibledifferencesand articulationsbetween,on
the one hand. experimental sciences,which define their object and
which have,by that token, a method, and, on the other hand, sci-
encessuch as ethology,which cannot today anymore than previ-
ously eliminate the risftof an apprenticeship,caseby case,situation
by situation, with respect to the relations of meaning they deal
with. One might dream, then, of a Lacan who took oar route. But
this is only a dream, and the change in Lacan'spath will, on the
contrary as we will see,accentuatethe crucial characterof the no-
tion of method for Lacan, that is, his Kantian (or neo-Kantian)
filiation. More precisely,the changein Lacan'spath will accentuate
the strategic stakes of method insofar as method acts simulta-
neously as a central thread and as a guarantee.It is a central thread
in that it enablesthe person who adheresto it to avoid the risks of
illusion, of appearance,of the ill-posed question. [t is a guarantee
in that it definesas illusion, appearance,ill-posedquestion what it
will not risk. From this point of view, method is at once a pathway
and a iudgment, a pathway that inventedthe means of claiming to
be the only rational one.
Before examining this change in Lacan'spath-the psychiatrist
becoming a psychoanalyst-let us note that this change is clearly
subjectto an invariant, namely,Lacant scorn for every thesischar-
acterized by a contrast between the "richness"of experienceand
what languageis able to transmit of that experience.In his doctoral
thesis, Lacan already denounces "the Bergsonizing phalanx."70
Later, he will utilize the analogy of dogs snifing each other to
comment on the interest of certain of his colleaguesfor "affective
lived experience."Tr It could be said that Lacan engagedin psycho-
analysisonly insofar as he could find the meansof arming it against
all "menace"coming from lived experience,insofaras he could find
the means of defining language as the ne plus ultra, as the only
instrument the analyst can claim to rvield, if not with full knowl-
On Some of Freud'sHeirs r75
edge,at least in his own right. That amounts to sayingthat Lacan
.,vill follow the Freudian traiectory only insofar as he is able to
changethe conceptionand the iustificationof this traiectory.
As we havedescribedit, Freudian psychoanalysis is, in effect,an
operationalscience, a science whose concepts-conflict, resistance,
unconscious, and so on-refer to possibleoPerations on the basisof
which therapy and researchought to converge.Such a reading, as
we haveseen,enablesus to understandthe distinction Freud intro-
duceclbetweenpsychoanalysis and what he called the "witch meta-
psychology."As if by enchantment.the metapsychological descrip-
tion takes as its object what the analyst dealsu'ith, thus effacing the
ref-erence of conceptsto the operationsgiving them meaning. The
witch thus also permits, but in a risky manner, the clarifrcationnot
only of the aims of analysis[u1 3l5s-2nd this was Freud's major
concern in ryj7-of the reasonslor the precariousqualitv of re-
covery,fbr the impenetrablecharacterof certain resistances. Meta-
psychology notably allows one to speak of the {bmous "quantitative
factor" of drives the analyst does not control. thus opening the
possibilit yof under st andingt he lim it s of t he analyt icinst r um ent ,
but also opening the question o[ rvhat escapesanalysis-or what it
can integrateonly by "empathy,"which is dangerouslyclose,as we
haveseen,to an ineffable"lived experience."
An operationaldefinition of analvsiscould not suit Lacan. While
it undoubtedly codifiesa method, it doesn'tguaranteeexclusivity.
Independentlyeven of the limits recognizedin ry37,an operational
definition does not furnish in principle any \4reaponagainst those
who would say: "real" experienceoverflowsthe "transferenceneu-
rosis" that analysissubstitutes,forit and that puts it in the service
of knowledge. The operational character of Freudian method
makes it possibleto ask the question of its price-what it must
neglect,what it cannot interrogate through the operationsof cap-
ture and fbcalizationit dependson.
It is here that we are able to seizethe strategicmeaning of La-
can's change of philosophical reference,underlined by Ogilvie,
from Spinoza to Hegel (or Kojdve). According to Ogilvie, what is
at stake in this changeofreference is nothing other than the "nega-
tivity" making it possiblefor Lacan to readopt the Freudian death
t76 On Some of Freuds Heis
ins t inc t in it s det er m inat ion o f t h e l i v i n g b e i n g w h i l e r i d d i n g t h i s
notion of all naturalistic or bioloeical connotations. As Oeilvie
states it:
Lacan abandonsa continuist and summative conception(education,his-
tory would add determinations)lbr a cliscontinuistconceptionof the re-
lation between the subiect and its environment; out of the reflection on
the formation of the individual as a complex of physiologicaland psycho-
logical elementscomes a rellection on the subjectas an agencyof the "1"
which is constitutedas the negativeof this other formation, i.e.,the inser-
tion of the individual in a system of social behaviors.. . . Not Freud but
Spinoza would then be right if the psychicorder continued the physical
orclerwith other means.Ilut if a contradictionappearsbetweena primor-
dial state of indetermination and the preciseforms which later structure
it-and by the same token, cleny it-the physiologicalactivity of the
subjectbecomesprey to a paradoxicalmovement carrying it toward what
simultaneouslyachievesand denies it. But, for lack of having conceived
the relation between the biological and the psychicalas a non-relation,
Freud, under pressure from clinical evidence,attributed to nature this
contradiction which was of another order. "Now, the tendency toward
death which specifiesthe human psychecan be explainedin a satisfactory
manner by the conception we develop here, namely that the complex,
which is the functional unity of this psyche,does not correspondto vital
functions but to the congenitalinsuficiency o[these functions."72
The quotation closing the text we have just cited comes from the
first "analytic" text of Lacan, published in r938, "Family Com-
plexes in the Formation of the Individual." A reference to infant
ethology is here substituted for von Uexkull and for the study of
the living being in its environment. Lacan states in this article:
"One should not hesitate to recognize in infancy a positive biolog-
ical deficiency, and to consider man as an animal born prema-
turely."73 Here Lacan borrows the theses of fames Baldwin (rgrr)
and L. Bolk ( r 926) .
It would of course be possible to underline the dated character
of these theses, to recall the recent discovery of the amazing capac-
ities of infants. But that would engage us in a sterile controversy:
opposed to the "authority" of contemporary ethology would be the
authority of clinical evidence supposedly establishing that, in fact,
any human relation, upon analysis, is revealed as a nonrelation.
That is not the question. The question is, for us, that the Hegelian
On Someof Freud\ Heirs r77
"negativity" referenceand the referenceto the prematurity of the
infant deline, as we will see,the conditions in which Lacan could
accepteffectingthe convergenceof his ambitions with the causeof
psychoanalysis. The fact that the thesisappearingin diverseforms
throughout Lacan'slater career-the thesis that it is in terms of
instinctuallacft and the supplementingof this lack that the intro-
cluctionof the human infant to the world of adults must be under-
stood-refers to positive studies on newborns is less important
here than the strategic role Lacan will give to this thesis in his
singular "reading" of Freud.
l{othing Eke
The first theoretical text Lacan devoted to Freudian method
dates from r936: "Au-del) du 'Principe de r6alit6"' ("Beyond the
'RealityPrinciple"').toI.r this article Lacan proposes(but this "pur-
pose" will not be achieved,sincethe announcedsecondpart of the
article was never published)to criticize the Freudian "reality prin-
ciple." As he attempts to demonstratein this text, it is upon the
acceptance or nonacceptance of this principle that the statusof psy-
choanalysisand its method depends.In effect,in Freud the "reality
principle" carries with it a notion of adaptation,of recognition,or
of conflict, thus designatinga "reality" capable,by vocation,of be-
coming a matter of agreementfor humans. If this principle did not
havea "beyond" on the basisof which psychoanalysis could situate
and iudge "reality" as implied by this principle, analytic method
would have an account to render to other specialistsof this reality,
the vocation of which is to begomethe subjectof common agree-
ment. Psychoanalysis would have to acknowledgethat it is depen-
dent on the instrumentsby which it learns,on the instrumentsthat
define both what it confronts and what it eliminares.
The subtitle of "Beyond the 'Reality Principle,'" that is, the title
of the first and only published part ("Le psychologiese constitue
comme sciencequand le relativit6de son objet par Freud est pos6e,
encoreque restreinteaux faits du d6sir"), afrrms that psychology
becomesa science"when the relativity of its object is posed by
Freud, although it is still restrictedto the factsof desire."FranEois
r78 On Some of Freudi Heirc
RoustangT5 has rightly emphasized the signi6cant characterof the
allusion to Einsteini restricted relativity,and the crucial role of the
referenceto mathematical physicsfiom which this sciencederives
in Lacan'stext. The model of mathematicalphysicspervades"Be-
yond the 'Reality Principle"' as it pervadedLacant doctoral thesis,
with the exception that, as we will see, here the model itself is
iudged. While the observationof a physicalor ethologicalreality is
abandonedfor analytic work, the "arbitrary assent"Lacan defined
in his doctoral thesisas the necessarybasisfor all positivescience
will henceforth make it possibleto define the privilege of psycho-
analysis.This privilege inheres preciselyin its possibilityof inter-
rogating this basis.
Lacan proceedsat first in a somewhatindirect manner. Thus, in
concluding his phenomenologicaldescription of the dynamics of
the transferenceand its interpretation in analytictechnique,Lacan,
under the rhetorical guise of presenting a difficulty, resorts to
expressionsevoking the debates on relativity and quantum me-
chanics:
But rvewill be told that this is an illusorywork, a simpletechnique, and
as an experience, the leastfavorableto scientificobservationbecauseit is
foundedon conditionsthat are the mostcontraryto obiectivity.For haven't
we just described this experience as a constanrinteraction
betweenobser-
vationand object:it is, in effect,in the very movementthe subjectcom-
rnunicatedto him throughhis intentionthat the observer is informedof
this intention,we haveevenemphasized the primordialcharacterof this
means;inverselv, by the assimilation the observerfavorsbetweenhimself
and the image.he subverts, from the beginning,the functionof the image
in the subiectirnoreover, he identifiesthe imageonly in the veryprogress
of this subversion, and we havenot veiledeitherthe constitutive character
o[ this process. This absenceof fixed referencein the observedsystem,
this use,for observation,of the subjective movementitself,which every-
whereelseis eliminatedas a sourceof error, are as many challenges, it
seems, to a healthymethod.76
It goes without saying that the possibilityof eliminating a fixed
referencedefinesEinsteinian relativity as the crown of mathemat-
ical physics,and that the interaction between observerand object
was discoveredby quantum mechanicsas the condition of the con-
()n Someof Freud\ Heirs r7g
srirurionof this obiect. This referenceto twentieth-century;rhvsics
will havea double use in Lacan'stext.
On t he one hand, t he subver siono[ "r ealist " physicsby quant um
mechanicsand Einsteinian relativity does not define thesesciences
as dependent on instruments that would prevent their accessto
"true reality,"existing in and of itself.On the contrary,it de6nesall
conceptionof a reality "in and of itself" as relative to intuitive
categoriesthat these sciencesreveal as illusory. In this optics, the
relativecharacterof psychoanalysis thereforedefinesit, in line with
the example of physics, as escaping the realist illusion of attaining
"realitv" through knowleclge,and conferson it concomitantlvthe
stme tvpe of autonomy physicscan claim.
On the other hand, the abandonment of these intuitive cate-
gories-on which the "nonscientific"psychologiesas criticized by
Lacan rely insofar as they would be a "function of reality"-makes
it possibleto confer a quite unusual position on psychoanalysis.
(luided by Emile Meyerson,TT Lacan seesphysicsas "subject in all
its processesto the form of mental identifcation," a form that the
aba ndonm entof it s int uit ive alibis r ender seven m or e r em ar kable.
Here identificationrefers directlv to the "arbitrary assent"invoked
in Lacan'sr93z doctoral thesis.The role of determinist intelligibil-
ity and o[ the principles of conservationare, for Meverson, the
privileged scienti{icexpressionof the tendencyof the human mind
to "identify." But isn't it the role of psychoanalysis to study the
mechanicsof t his ident if icat ionl
Mln in effectmaintainswith naturerelationssoecified. on the one hand.
hv the propertiesof an identifcatory thc,ught.and.on the other hantl.by
the useof artificialinstruments & tools.His relationsrvith his lellowrnan
proceedby more direct means:we do not referhereto language, nor to
elementarysocialinstitutionsr.vhose structure,whatevertheir origin, is
markedby artificialism;we referto that affective communication, essen-
tial to socialgrouping,that is quite immediatelymanifestedin these
fx615-1[21it is his fellowman whom man exploits,that it is in him that
he recognizes himself,that it is to him that is attachedby the indelible
psychicbond perpetuatingthe vital, truly specific,miseryof his early
years.Theserelationscan be opposedto thosethat constitute, in the nar-
row sense.knorvledge,as relationsoJ-conaturalness: by this term, rve wish
r 80 On Some of Freudi Heirc
to evoketheir homologywith the mostimmetliate. mosrglobal.and most
adaptedforms that characterize in their totalitythe psychicrelationsof
theanimalwith its naturalenvironment and the distinctionbetu,eenthese
relationsand the samerelationswhen humanbeingsareconcerned. . . . It
is possibleto guessthe basisof the ideathat the hu-rn beingrvouldbe
unitedto the world by a harmoniousrelationin the anthropomorphism
of the myth of nature;as the effort animatingthis idea reaches its aim,
the realityof this basisis revealedin this alwaysmore vastsubve rsionof
natureconstitutedby rhe humanifcationof the planet:the "nature"of
man is his relationto man.;3
Here we find, at a strategic point, the description of the vital
misery specificto the early yearsof human infants. It is a strategic
point becauseit makes possiblethe articulation of "identificatory"
thought, which specifiesthe "relations" man mythically maintains
with nature. with the processof identification Freud discovered
when he discoveredtransference.In the beginning is identification:
the functionally fragmented infant discoversin the image of the
other the unity he lacks and the image of what he cannor be be-
causeof his prematurity. And the illusory,imaginary characterof
this identificationwith an image, the "capture" of the infant by the
image of the other, forms the point of departureof a history that is
nothing more than a tragicomicplaying of roles,a history inhabited
by "imagesto which the subjectidentifieshimself by turns in order
to play,as the unique actor!the drama of their conflicts."Te
From that point, there is indeed a "beyond the reality principle,"
a "bevond" that physicsrnust ignore even when the subversionit
accomplishedconstitutesan expressionof it. The premaruriry of
the human infant, the fact that, in contrastto animals, this infant
has no other "natural world" than that of his relations with his
fellow hurnans,enablesLacan to forget the proiect of his thesis,the
foundation of a "scienceof personality."Bolk authorizes the for-
getting of von Uexkull.
Ogilvie has succinctlyexpressedthe thesisthat Lacan will hence-
forth maintain: "the human being is not only, in essence,a social
being, but a social being to the degree that he is nothing else."80
The fact that the human being is nothing e/semakes it possibleto
define the statusof psychoanalysis.Psychoanalysis cannot be a "sci-
enceof personality"insofar as such a science,which makes person-
On Someof Freuds Heirs r8I
ality a "function," implies the reality of what it is a function of (the
specifrcallyhuman "environment")' As a result' "method" must
"real-
changemeaning. It can no longer codify the reading of the
ity" that constitutesa personality.On the contrary' it must "'de-
code" in order to propel "beyond the reality principle" everything
that, in human experience,can be read as a function of a reality.
(loncomitantly,it will be possibleto escapethe model of an opera-
tional sciencelike chemistry.and to escapethe necessityof concep-
tualizing the analyticoperationin relation to the "reality" on which
it operatesin terms of metapsychology.Lacanian psychoanalysis
will haveno need of "metapsychology." It will define as an ill-posed
problem the questionof the relation betweenthe "intellectual" and
the "affective,"that is. the question oi the relation between what
the analyst who interprets addresseshimself to. and what he is
dealing with. The "concept" of the psychoanalyticsetting by right
lets nothing of what can be said about human subiectivityescape.
Thus Lacan has formulated a new definition of the meaning of
the operationFreud describedas a double Process:the substitution
of the "transference"neurosisfor the real neurosis,and the eluci-
dation of the transferenceneurosis.For Freud, the "real life" that
was to be excluded from the analytic setting had to be excluded
becauseit was uncontrollable.But for Lacan, there is no "substi-
tution," and the transferenceneurosis is not an "artificial illness."
"Real life" is by right nothing else than what analytic experience
revealsabout it-playing of roles, dialectic of identifications,and
later,division betweenutteranceand enunciation,relation of inver-
sion betweenthe messagesent and the responsethe subjectreceives
from the Other. The operatiol of purification does not refer back
to Lavoisier since it doesn'teliminate anything that can by rights
posea problem, but refers,rather,to Kant or to mathematicalphys-
ics: the operation of purification is authorized by the very cate-
gories through which the human subiect must be understood.8r
The analyst "createshis obiect" only becausethe obiect, in essence
is "norhing else" but such a oeatioa. And it is the experienceof this
"nothing else,"of this "subiectivedestitution,"that constitutesone
of the essentialdimensionsof the end (and aim) of analysis.
Lacanian psychoanalysis thus substitutedthe "theory" of a sub-
 r82 On Some of Freudi Heirs
ject for the scienceof a personalityhe had envisioned.The Lacan-
ian subiect is, it is true, rather strange since it is stripped of the
totality of rights and duties that, in classicalphilosophiesof the
subiect,operated as identity. It is neverthelessa subiect in that it
can be conceptualizedin the mode, not of a construction,but of a
creation,of a "6at" that transportsus beyond all sciencebecauseit
is "beyond the reality principle."
Beyond the reality principle: rvhile the critique of this principle
in Freud had not, in r936, as we havepointed ourj gone beyond the
stage of a project, the stakes are neverthelessclear. Not only is
psychoanalysis, like quantum mechanicsand Einsteinianrelativity,
relative in the unique and honorable sensethat it subvertsthe in-
tuition of a reality that would have ro be conceived"in and of
itself,"but also the subjectdefined by the analytic setringdoes not,
in principle, let anything escape,and has no accountsto render to
anyone.Not only is the analytic setting-here defined by the play
of successiveidentifications of the transference-1slx1iys to the
truth of the subiect beyond the illusions of his "real life," beyond
his belonging to a natural and social world, but psychoanalysis, in
addition, "beatsout" the other sciences.It can, in effect-and this
is a thesisthat Lacan will continue ro mainrain-reach the "subject
of science,"and decodethe misconstructionsthat permit the scien-
tist to believehis "objectivity" can be defined independentlyof the
agency of his subjectivity,which constitutesrhe field of psycho-
analysis.The "ego" that the adult, and especiallythe scientist,takes
pride in, the ego that believesit maintains a rational relation to a
reality,believesit possesses the reasonof its choices,believesit is
the unitary center of decisionand initiative,the ego that, according
to Freud, derived its organizarion from the reality principle, de-
scends-like this reality itself-from the "orthopedic comple-
m e n t;' a n i m a g e p ro v i d e d fo r the human i nfant.
For every reader of Lacan, the r936 text we have extensively
quoted is dated, notably concerninglanguage,which Lacan desig-
natesas a structure marked by "artificialism."There will come the
time when the Otheq which makes it possiblero speak of the un-
consciousas "structured like a language,"will be substitutedfor
the other of identification. But the principle of "nothing else" will
On Someof Freud'sHeirs r 83
be maintained, and with it, a certain number of typical character-
isticsdefining Lacan'slong-term strategy.
One of thesetraits is the particular meaning bestowedon philo-
sophical references.lust as the Spinoza referencefunctioned as a
witness in favor of the ambition of a "scienceof personality,"the
referenceto the Hegel of Kojdve, illumined by Ogilvie, functions
as a testimony to the illusions of the ego that believesit is master
anclposse ssorof its certitudes and pleasures,as well as to the alien-
ation of which this belief is a sign. After Spinoza,Hegel therefore
"serves"Lacan: servesto mobilize desire as "desire of the other,"
that is, to subject the human being by right to what analysiswill
rnake of him. Similarly, Meyerson becomesa witness concerning
the lessonto be drawn from physics,a testimony that is paralleled
by the historicalevidenceconstituredby the "humanificationof the
planet."
Of course,the witnesseswill vary later. Thus, when the "other"
is succeededby the "Other," Alexandre Koyrd will replaceEmile
Meyerson on the "subject of science,"and the small letters of the
syrnbolic order will replace identification. But the somewhar
strangeexpressioncurrent today-"Lacan summons philosophers"
(Lacan conuoquelesphilosophes)-is correct. In iuridical terms, one
doesindeed "summon" witnesses.The philosophers,but also,later,
the scientists"summoned" by Lacan have the status of "reliable
u'itnesses,"but Lacan is the only master of the meaning he will
confer on their testirnony.
The role of "witness" Lacan has philosophersand scientistsplay,
as well as the manner in which he interrogatesthem, is, it must be
made clear,perfectlycoherentrlith the redefinitionof the Freudian
traiectory he undertook. We have seenFreud haunted by a problem
on which the scientific character of his practice depended: the
problem of constituting his patients as reliable witnessesof their
own casein such a way that recoveryand researchwould converge.
For his part, Lacan links sciencenot to a problem butto aprinciple,
and it is on this score that he summons his witnesses.It is on the
levelof right that he intends to resolvethe questionFreud posedon
the operationallevel. And it is on the level of right that Lacan can
lean on L6vi-Straussas well as on Koyr6, sinceeach one of them.
t84 ()n Some of Freuds Heirs
for hrs own reasons,was intereslr/ in assinrilatingthe question of
the fbunclationof a scienceto the affirmation of the principle au-
thorizing it; that is, each wirs interestedin making such a founda-
tion a unilateral event,decided by the scientist.
Furthermore, Lacan was never to examine the questionof inter-
est; he never rvonderedabout what engagedhis "witness" or about
the problem the rvitnesswas trying, on his orvn account,to resolve.
Lacan'sstrategy requires that he maintain silenceon the strategic
characterof the testimony he usesas a support. He will never,fbr
example, pose the question of whether the anthropology of L6vi-
Straussor the linguistics of Saussuremight not owe something to
the same problem he poses:what is a sciencel He will never ask
himself if their founding definitions ("Science is nothing else than
. . .") might not constitutestrategicresponses("and thereforeI cre-
ate a science. . .") to the problem he himself wished to resolve.The
witnessmust be "neutralized."and the risk he took concealed.
Lacan will say later that, contrary to psychoanalysis, positivesci-
ences presuppose that what they deal with does not lie. But his
personalprocedure implies that the scientistsand philosophershe
has summoned "don't lie" either, that they don't pursue their own
strategies,and that they can, therefore,be interrogatedon the hu-
man condition in the same way the scientistinterrogatesphenom-
ena. And, like the Kantian scientist,Lacan is the master of the
me a n i n go f th i s i n te rro g a ti on.
Thus, not only is the risk consciouslytaken by Meyerson con-
cealed-the risk of making identity an ideal of scientificexplana-
tion that would not be historicaland local,yet "natural" and intrin-
sic to human understanding-but Lacan will not iudge it useful
either to listen to Meyersont testimony on the distinction between
what is "plausible,"what is recognizedas "scientificallyvalidated,"
and what is "true." The "Meversonian" scientist will always be
tcmPtedto accepta possibilityof reducing the diverseto the iden-
tical, and he will therefore tend to admit asplausibleany proposi-
tion going in this direction. But for Meyerson even if they have
attained the statusof scienti{icprinciple, identity and conservation
still do not have-as Lacan continuesto maintain in "Beyond the
'Reality Principle' " with respectto the "conservation of libido"-
()n Someof Freud\ Heirs r 85
rhe statusof a priori conditions fbr the symbolic identificationand
rational order "rvithout which no sciencecan be constituted."8lFor
Meyerson, efectiue "identification" is an euent that irreversibly
rnarks a scienceas the encounterbetweena tendencyof the human
rrrind and the quasi-unhoped-forpossibilityof satisfyingthat ten-
clencv.Identification is neither a right nor a condition of scientif-
icity. Meyerson thus combines rvhat Lacan wishes to separate:on
rhe one hand, the propertiesof rdentificatorythought that would
put scientificthought under the yoke ofpsychoanalysis, and, on the
other,the use of "artificial instrumentsor tools" without which the
N{eyersoniandistinction between the plausibledream of identifi-
cation and occasionaleffectiveidentificationscould not be made.
J' heseinst r um ent sand t oolscoulcl.if illum inat ed.m ake visibiet he
risrtsof science,and could lead to a questioningof psychoanalysis on
this point. Meyersonwill not be given a voicein this area.
However, the founders' science,in the Copernican sensethat
Kant gives to this term, the scienceof thosewho define themselves
as judgesand do not recognizein what thev interrogatethe power
of putting their categoriesat risk. often is paralleledby a specula-
tive foundation. The right of the scientistis paralleled,in fact, by a
thesisabout the absenceof right on the part of what the scientist
claims as his object. Galileo, at any rate the Galileo of Koyr6,8ris a
Platonist; he believesthat the book of the world is written in the
small letters of mathematics.The symbolic order of L6vi-Strauss
expressesa break betrveennature and culture. The human infant
of Lacan is nothing elsethan what psychoanalysis can comprehend
about him. And for this "subject," Lacan needs Meyerson'stesti-
mony, but also the testimonyo{ Hegel, Koyr6, and L6vi-Strauss,as
well as that of Saint Augustine, Descartes,and Heidegger.
P,ry'c
hoana lysis and Con uer; io n
We havelingered over Lacan'sstrategybecauseit seemsto orga-
nize his whole reconsiderationof psychoanalysis, but also.and in-
separablefrom that, his reconsiderationof the question of "heart"
ancl "reason" as it is posedby all interpretationof the analytic set-
ting. It is evident, for exarnple,that everything linked in Freud to
r 86 On Some of Freudi Heirs
a reality that human beings collide with, that their desiresconflict
with, that they have to learn how to take into account, will be
subjectto profound moc{ificationsin Lacan. The fact that he cannot
invoke the "reality principle" (anymore than Kohut can) as the ba-
sis for psychicconllicts implies that for Lacan the analyst can no
longer conceivehis action in terms of an alliancewith the suppos-
edly intact "ego" of the patient. Concomitantly, the outcome of
treatment cannot be thought of in terms of "knowledge" or any
other notion implying the consciousacceptanceof a state of fact.
ln ry37 Freud had emphasizedthat, in certain cases,the patient
remainsuncomprehending,"inaccessible to the bestarguments,"as
if the "ego" resistedthe elucidation of its own resistances. For La-
can, the interpretation of "resistance,"
to the degree that it implies
the ego and is founded on a referenceto a reality positedas com-
mon and accessibleto knowledge, cannot be valid in the analytic
setting. The dificulties Freud was obliged to admit in 1937 not
only do not touch Lacan, then, but also can be presentedby him as
testimoniesto the misconstructionat the basisof any analysisthat
recognizesthe "ego" as a valid interlocutor.
Like Kohut, the Lacanian analyst refusesthe role accordedby
orthodox psychoanalysisto interpretation. in that interpretation
ought, at leastfictively,to be addressedto a "supposedlyintact ego."
Unlike Kohut, however.the Lacanian analystwill not "nourish" or
restore.The Kohutian infant was destinedto developmore or less
harmoniously,and the analyst was there to attempt to repair a de-
fectivedevelopment,to give his patient what he lacked.The "lack"
affecting the Lacanian subiect cannot be compensated,and there-
fore one must not attempt such a compensation.The Lacanian
"premature" infant is no more called upon to "develop" than he is
to maintain true relationswith nature or the world. Concomitantly,
the Lacanian analyst does not "bene6t" from any theory about
what a "successful"developmentwould be: the truth of the human
subiectis relative to the experience of analytic treatment and can-
not be put in question by any external agency,by any nonanalytic
knowledge, by any common criterion relative to a "cure." On the
contrary,since they presupposethat the subject is "curable,"such
knowledge, agencies,and criteria revealtheir own inadequacy,re-
On Someof Freud'sHeirs 187
veal their dependenceon the notion of a "natural" man, "naturally
adapted" to his environment. The Lacanian subject,created by a
"hat" that tearshim away from all "natural" relation to himself and
to others,is, by de{inition, incurable.
Lacani reading of Freud, that is, Lacanian theory,will be deter-
rrrinedby the following imperative:no Freudian conceptcan imply
that any trait of human subjectivity escapesby right the field of
analytic practice.Drives will enter Lacan'sreading only when he
6nds the means of detaching them lrom the field of biology and
instinct,of linking them to the "object a," which takeson meaning
only in its relation to the Other. Similarly, only when Lacan con-
nectsthe riddle of fantasyto the puzzle of the "desireof the Other"
lvill he recognizeFreud's hesitationswith respectto fantasy,hesi-
tations determined by the fact that fantasyseemsto resistanalytic
'"vork.At that point, Lacan will abandon the thesis according to
which fantasyreferspurely and simply to the imaginary.Then, and
only then, the aim of analysiswill ceaseto be to abandonfantasy-
the secretscenario"permitting the subject to think he can escape
from the supremacyof the signifier"8{and "to defineTbuissance 6y
giving it its matrix."st The arm will rather be for him to "traverse"
his fantasy: to abandon the illusion of autonomy that the fantasy
procur ed( m e, m y secr etand inexplicableTbui. r sance.and
. . ) t o no
longer "ignore what he is 'to be nothing other than the desire of
the Other."'86The definition of this traversalof the fantasyis thus
nothing other than the renewed definition of the successof the
analvsis:the analysandhenceforth knows "something" about the
articulation between his fantasyand the "desire of the Other"; he
connectsthe riddle he thought.was his to the puzzle of the desire
of the analyst.
The definition may be renewed, but it is invariablein its prin-
ciple. As we have seen,with the invention of the transferenceneu-
rosis,Freud found the means of transposingto the interior of the
analytic setting what constitutesthe preliminary condition of La-
voisier's"experimental setting"-the purification of its actors.For
his part, Lacan transposesinto the analyticsettingwhat, as we have
also seen, constitutes the preliminary condition of the Kantian
readingof the "Copernican revolution": the principlesof the object
r88 On Some of Freud'sHeirs
are also the categoriesof interrogation.we have proposedthat the
plausibilityof the Kantian reading, which makes the obiect of sci-
ence not the result of an activeand selectivework, but the discov-
ered truth of our only possiblerational relationswith phenomena,
supposed the plausibility of the coincidence between physico-
mathematical description and the evidence of "common sense"'
The Kantian versionentailsas a "natural" presuppositionthe read-
ing of the physico-mathemarical {ield as it wasactiuelyconstructed
during the eighteenth century by mathematical physicists'When
this constructionrvas accomplishecl'at the time of Kant, the ques-
tions of mathematical physics,assembledin axioms, might indeed
haveappearedas the pure expressionof rational common sense'
Lacan'stranspositionmakes each "successful"treatment the rep-
etition of this work carried on in the eighteenth century' At the
outset,just as Galileo and Newton thought they were deciphering
a reality that, becauseit was created and willed by God, might
therefore have been different from what it is, the analysandmay
believehimself rhe possessor and product of a singular history.In
the end. nature has been convinced not to have principles other
than thosecorrespondingto the universalcategoriesof reason,and
the analysandhas experiencedthe dispossession ofwhat he thought
was his. He has realized, for instance' that his unconsciousis
"structured like a language,'and that it doesn't"say" anythingeke'
The aim of a successfulpsychoanalyticcure can thus be seenas the
transposition of the story leading fiom Galileo's knowledge to
Kantls transcendentalfounclation.Furthermore the achievementof
this transpositionqualifies the analysandas an analyst,even des-
tines him to becomeone. How, indeed.exceptby living henceforth
in the mode of dissimulalien-61 in the mode of a discretionex-
p re s s i n gth e i mp a l p a b l e d i stanceseparati ngone from others-
might o.,. after su.h an achievementreioin the common world of
h u ma n p ra c ti c e s l
The strategycreatedby l-acan affirms that psychoanalysis is ca-
pable of talking about what scienceis, and that it has no accounts
to render to any other lieltl of knowledge becauseit posesthe tlues-
tion of common reality to which these fields of knowledge ref-er'
This strategycannot be dissociated,then' frorn the change Lacan
On Some of Freudi Heirs r89
proposesin the setting for the relationsbetween"heart" and "rea-
son." "Reason"-on the basisof which the analytic setting is still
conceivedsince it is fbunded conceptually-must break its tradi-
tional relationswith a \nouledge for which it must account,whose
rvitnessesmust be defined. 'Analytic reason" is defined in contra-
position to a misconstructionthat knowledge, as such, cannot re-
lnove but can only reduplicate.
When Lacan writes, "the real is the impossible,"he affirms the
contradictionbetweenthe conceptof reality as an obiectfor knowl-
eclgeand the concept of reality as what manifestsitseif in an "en-
counter,"always essentiallymissed,traumatic, as what knowledge
functions to protect us from. The causeof the subject,in the La-
canian sense,cannot therefore becomean object; it can only func-
tion to escapeknowledge since knowledge derives from illusions
of mastery of a "reality."One can no more learn to know the real
than one can adapt to it. And the psychoanalystcan certainly not
testify in terms of the knowledge of rvhat made him capableof
practicingthis "scienceof the real,"which is psychoanalysis.
But the analytic experiencemust neverthelessleave the analv-
sand "insured" with some kind of "savoir,"and this "savoir" must
be capableof being clefinedin such a way as to f{uaranteethe ca-
pacity of the analysand to become a psychoanalyst.Even if he
cloesn'tneed to render an account to any holder of knowledge, the
analytic candidate must be able to testify to this capacityto those
rvho are qualified to receive this testimony.This is the problem
upon which, as we will see,Lacan'sellbrt was to founder. It is a
renewal of the problem of the definition of witnessesthat shadows
the question of heart and reaso\n:even clisengagedfrom the ideals
of knowledge, reason must define the procedures according to
which it can make senseof something,lest it becomeconfusedwith
what it is supposedto decipher-the reasonsof the heart.
The problem is all the more seriousbecausethe analyst cannot
witnessto what he has learned.The Lacanian analystcannot,in the
manner proposedby Stern, attempt to cxPlore,to learn about the
Patienthe is dealing with in treatment. The notion of exploration
ref-ersto the idea of an effectivehistory of the analysand,a history
that can challengethe relevanceof the categorieswe possess, and
r9o On Some of Freud'sHeirs
thus leadsto an inevitablerisk. Not only would the analystthen be
obliged to recognize this history as "reality," but he would lose the
privilege analysisis supposedto sharewith the mathematicalphys-
ics of Meyerson or Koyr6, the anthropology of L6vi-Strauss,the
linguistics of Saussure.Undoubtedly, Lacanian analysis reserves
some "surprises";it is not a determinist protocol programmed in
advance.But these surprisesdon't make it vulnerableto questions
other than its own: they only affect the analyst's"ego" insofar as it
is not master in its own house.The analyst's"savoir,"which defines
the difference between the analytic setting and every other place
where the illusions of ego reign, is, on the other hand, sheltered
from surprises:the categoriesof this "savoir" are indeed identical
to the principlesto which its subjectresponds.
We will return later to the thorny question of testimony and
witnesses.Let us first emphasizethe major importance of the cir-
cular relation between the "savoir" of the analystand the truth of
the subjectthat is imposed by Lacant strategy.Without any doubt,
it is always as the result of a particular history that the analysand
takes his place on the analyst'scouch, but this history does not, by
rights, have any role to play in the analysisexcept as an obstacle
that must be surmounted, as a belief on the part of the analysand
that he possesses a singular drama necessitatinga singular unveil-
ing. By rights, every human being is "called" to the couch.s7 Freud,
with his thesis of the hereditary transmissionof fantasiesand of
oedipal anxiety,then with the death instinct, had already come to
identify man with Freudian man, that is, to transform treatment
into a placewhere an anthropologicaltruth was revealed.88 But this
revelation took place on the level of knowledge, from the point of
view of psychoanalysis. For Freud, "healthy ego" could exist with-
out psychoanalysis.For Lacan, treatment is the place where his
"truth" can be encounteredby the analysand, in the sensenot of
getting to know what he is, but of ceasingto flee from one illusion
of identity to another.Treatment thereforehas a universalpractical
vocation. It distinguishesbetween those who "know something"
about what it means "to be human," and those who live in their
illusionsof mastery,of self-identity,of "psychological"understand-
ing of others.
On Someof Freud'sHeirs r9r
The definition of treatment as the place where the subject,far
from being led to awarenessof a singular truth that would restore
his power to be an actor in his own history,must rid himself of the
totality of his particular scenariosin order to encountera universal
anthropologicaltruth, expressesthe fact that Lacanian psychoanaly-
sis has succeededin defining the relations between "heart" and
"reason" in such a way as to capture simultaneouslyand indissoci-
ably the traits that endow apparentlyantitheticalforms of rational
practice with their specifrc particularity, that is, professional,scien-
ttfc, and p hi losophical practices.
Lacanian analysisinherits common claims from philosophy,and
especiallyfrom those philosopherswho, in one way or another,call
man to conversion.Since Plato, every man, insofar as he is human,
has been called to "leavethe cavern,"the domain of beguiling shad-
ows. Among the promulgators of "secular" knowledge, only the
philosopherof conversioncan, if he so wishes,define all "nonphi-
losophers"as not yet having encounteredphilosophy; that is, the
philosopherof conversionthen defineshimself as clearing the path
to the human practicepar excellence,which other forms of activity
lacft.
However, if philosophicalinterrogation can have as its primary
aim to createphilosophers,to call men to their only true vocation,
it does n61-in contrast to scientific practice-create an "object"
that verifies its claims, and it does not confer on its categoriesan
"indisputable" authority. But that is the casewith Lacanian analy-
sis. Treatment as such-and we know that for Lacan the only
"pure" analysis is training analysis-creates what gives its own
practiceauthority. It will create$is "obiect" out of the analysand
who experiencesthe "destitution of the subject,"who will learn
that nothing he thought belongedto him can escapefrom the field
defined by the practiceof analysis.In other words, while the phi-
losopher,inspiring a philosophicalvocation,cannot by rights claim
to have transmitted anything other than a question,and while he
must even hope that this question will invent its own channels,the
analysandconfirms the merits of the techniquethat produced him.
Lacanian psychoanalysis furthermore possesses a singularity that
is linked neither to mathematical physicsnor to philosophy.As a
rg2 On Some of Freudi Heirs
productiono[ that which authorizes it, treatment is also the repro-
ductiottof those who practiceit. I-acan emphasizedthis singularity
when he showed that the requirement for the results of positive
scienceto be "verifiable by everyone"must be transposedby pry-
choanalysisinto a requirement of transmissibility"by recurrence."
"But this experience, constituted between two subjects one of
whom plays in the dialogue the role of ideal impersonality. . . m:ly,
once it is completed,and providing it fulfills the conditionsof efii-
ciencythat may be required of any specialresearch,be resumedby
th e o th e r s u b j e c tw i th a th i rd subj ect." se
l n tg64,Lacan w rote w i th
more brutal frankness: 'At present, psychoanalysishas nothing
surer to validateits credit than the production of psychoanalysts."uo
The credit is not negligible: all production of analystsis valuable
(or should be valuable)as a repeatedtestimony verifying that the
categoriesof analysiscan indeed becomethe principlesof the anal-
ysand. It increasesthe number of those who are to be capableof
proceedingto such a verification.It also increasesthe number of
those who are entitled to know the meaning of this verification.
The reproduction of psvchoanalysts, as mernbersof a profession,
testifiesin itself to the validity of the claims of psychoanalysis as a
science.
Freud had, for a moment, dreamed of a generalizationof psy-
choanaiyticknowiedge that would havehad, in itself, a prophylac-
tic value,and that would haveled to the extinction of the neuroses
iust as the creation of a vaccineled to the extinction of smallpox.
The situation createdbv the Lacanian conjunction o[ the claims of
science,philosophy,and the professionimplies a much stranger
dream, expressedby the notion of transmissionby recurrence.or
Such a transmissionhas no other limit than the exhaustionof the
elementsof the ensernbleto u'hich it can be applied, that is, the
ensembleof humans. Recurrencethereforedefineseverv human as
a potential psychoanalyst.
A Question of Tricrtery
Of course,this is only a dream-and here the effectivehistory
of the Lacanian movement might intervene,along with the ques-
On Someof Freud'sHeirs ry3
tion of the production <lf analystsit attempted to resolve.This is
incleeda key question.On this issue-the possibilityof transmit-
ting psychoanalysis-the whole Lacanian constructiondependsas
well as the solution Lacan proposesfor our problem of heart and
reason.For Freud, this key was to be sought in the "cure" of pa-
tients,insolar as this cure constitutedthem as reliable witnessesof
analysis.For Lacan, there is no possiblecure for the subiect: the
sublect will never coincide wittr himself; he will always be
"barred"; he will never be other than "incurable."The "witnesses"
Lacanianpsychoanalysis can produceare identicalto thosewho can
rransmit it, and the register of this testimonv,what it says,only
concernsthe latter. No cloubt this is the reasonvi'hy we don't pos-
sessany "report" published by Lacan on any of his cases.Wouldn't
such a report imply the possibility of transmitting to everyone a
testimonythat, strictly speaking,is valid only for two, and that can
be establishedonly by recurrencel
Nevertheless,it is on the possibilityof transmitting a testimony
that psychoanalysis depends,both as a scienceand as a profession.
It is on the possibilityof transmissionthat the distinction between
analytic experienceand an "ineffable" type of experiencealso de-
pends.Since,as we have seen,this last type of experienceis what
Lacan rejected from the beginning of his career,it is crucial that
the "subiect presumed to know" whom the analysandaddresses
must be recognizedby psychoanalysts as "knowing something,"at
least as knowing enough to actualize,during the course of treat-
ment, the distinction between this "savoir" and that which is at-
tributed to him or expectedfrom him by the analysand.And the
problem cannot be resolvedbnthe production of "mathemes,"ap-
parently algebraicformulas, and other topologicalcreationsLacan
becameattachedto at the end of his life. The matheme is certainly
intended to define a priori what every analyst deals with, to for-
malize the categoriesof analysis,which are, at the same time, the
principlesof the analyticsetting. But, if it cloesn'tshift analysisback
to the order of a universally shareableknowledge, the matheme
has meaning only for the analyst,and this mcaning, in turn, poses
the question of the insurancethe analyst might himself bring to
the "savoir" he feelsinsureshim.
rg4 On Some of Freudi Heirs
We will not linger here over the difrculties and paradoxesraised
by the Lacanian procedurecalled "the pass."We will limit ourselves
to quoting the comment Lacan risked communicatingto his pupils
in ry79. To the question of knorving what establishes the statusof
analysthe replied:
I must saythat in the pass,nothingtestifiesto the point that the subiect
knows how to cure a neurosis.I am still waiting for somethingto en-
lighten me on that.I wouldlike to know fiom someone who might testify
to it in the passthat a subject-sinceit is the subjectthat is involved-is
capableof doing somethingmore than what I will call ordinarychatter-
ing; because that is what is involved.If the analystonly chatters,
onecan
be assuredthat he hasmissedthe point.e2
We might have cited other texts that revealLacan'sderisiveatti-
tude toward his pupils at the end of his life. This derision is not
anecdotal,and the text we quoted is, in its concision,worthy of
taking its place beside 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable."
Like Freud, Lacan signed, two years before his death, the death
sentenceof his enterprise,not in the sociologicalsense,but in prin-
ciple and by virtue of the same type of reasons.Freudian psycho-
analysisdied two yearsbefore Freud when he recognizedthat the
analytic setting was not, by rights, capableof putting neurosis"in
the serviceof knowledge," in the sensethat knowledge, as Freud
understoodit, also signified the possibilityof acting, that is, of cur-
ing. Tieatment does not have the power of creating witnessesca-
pable of verifying its ciaims. Lacanian psychoanalysis, as Lacan
officially recognized in ryJ), does not have witnesseseither. Testi-
mony is lacking about the decisivedistinction betweentheoretically
informed "chattering," whose transmissionposesno problem (the
irnpressivenumber of Lacanian analystsis a witness to that), and
what the analyst should "do." Analysts formed by Lacan are no
more reliable witnessesof what a "true analysis" is than Freudt
patientswere guaranteedas "really cured." How are people cured
of their neurosis"by the operationof the signifier"l "In spite of all
I havesaid about it on occasion,"Lacan finally announces,"l don't
know anything about it. It is a question of trickery."e3The psy-
choanaiystis supposedto know sornethingabout "the trick," the
way one recoversfrom a neurosis,but this trick, in contrastto the
On Someof Freuds Heirs r95
illusionist's,cannot be transmitted. at any rate not in a reliable
manner.Here there are no illusionists,only perplexedspectators-
the anaiyst as rvell as the analvsand.Each psychoanalyst, saysLa-
can, must reinvent "the way psychoanalysis can endure."
Undoubtedly,many of Lacan'spupils must have heard this dis-
coursein the heroic mode, and apparentlynothing is more beauti-
ful than a history that endures onlv by successilereinvenrions.
llorvever,the beauty in question should not mask the fhct that this
cliscoursecancelsall of Lacan'sprecedingclaims. It also revivesthe
clangerhe had sought to reduce, preciselythe danger of shifting
analytic experienceback to the register of the ineffable.Analytic
practicehas rules,it is a rule-bound deciphering.But rhe rules are
not sufficientto establishthe distinction between this practiceand
"ordinary chattering." Furthermore, this distincrion cannot be the
object of any testimony, even testimony audible ro rhe initiates
alone. The heart has its reasonsthat reason does not rtnou.. for
l-acan, that is a given. But what he linally announced is that no
proceduremakes it possibleto substitutefor this knowledge a tes-
ti mon y claim ing t hat a "savoir " t akes place wher e hear t is. The
c<-rnjunction createdby Lacan betweenphilosophy,science,and the
professiontherefbrecomesundone: at the end of analysis,the sub-
iect can undoubtedly claim to be "insured by a knowledge," but
this insurance,which cannot be verified, which no institutional
procedurecan warrant, refers to the certitudesof the heart. There
is, in effect,a trick.
It should not be surprising that this reading has not led to a
discussionof Lacanian themessuch as the chain of signifiers,math-
emes,or Borromean knots. A\hough none of these themes is au,
tonomous in relation to Lacan! stratefJy,the very choice of the
"strategic"approach rve haveadopted
has evidently led us to priv-
ilege the onlv dimension of Lacan'swork in which he ,.arms" his
followersagainst all demands for an accountingthat would, from
his point of viewi lead "outside the field of psychoanalysis." This
arming occurs to the detriment of questions that might, while
"leading nowhere," neverthelessraise new perplexities,require-
rrents, and possibilit iesof t hought . This being said, we will not
take the tone of venomoushornagein recognizingLacan'svaluat'rle
 ()n Some of Freud'sHeirs
ry6
work on language and on cultural references.Such an homage
would be well cleserved,indeed, but it would repeata cleavageas
common as it is impoverishedbetween"science"and "culture." In-
sofar as one could say that, according to us, Lacan did not succeed
in "founding" a science,his work would then belong entirely to
the domain of "culture."
The situation is more complex than that. As we have empha-
sized from the beginning, we have avoided the registersof truth
and falsehood,legitimacy and illusion, not only becausetheseop-
positions belong to the strategicenterpriseswe are attempting to
describe,but also becausethe question of treatment seemsto us to
be posedin terms of the production of reality (in this case,if rhere
is a "cure," it producesa reality that should be more "livable" than
the one that motivated the patient'soriginal complaint).Now, from
this point of view, it is incontestablethat Lacanian rrearmentcon-
stitutesnot only a singular production, but a production that Lacan
himself described in relevant phenomenologicalterms.
We will take up Lacanian treatment again, but from a perspec-
tive we have not yet examined: the fact that it belongsto the mod-
ern era, which is polarized by the question of science.Freud had
alreadyemphasizedthat a common love of truth was necessaryfor
the establishmentof a therapeuticpact betweenthe analystand the
patient. But Lacan, for whom truth cannot be an object of l<lve,
gives a more pragmatic, more historically situated description of
the same circumstance.To the very degreethat he addressesa psy-
choanalystpresumed to be the holder of a knowledge, the analy-
sand defines himself as "a subject of science."He relies on the
"Other" to decipher the secretof his own being, to discoverthe key
or the formula of his suffering. He thinks of himself in the same
terms physics uses to define the appearancesof phenomena: as
what must be supersededfor the object of scienceto come inro
being. Of course, for Lacan. this is a "misunderstanding,"but a
founding misunderstanding:if the analyst takes himself to be the
one who is in possessionof the analysand'sanswers,he is not an
analyst;but if the analysanddoesnot presumepossession of knowl-
edge on the part of the analvst,he will not be "analyzable."The
end of analysisis to be marked by the disappearanceof the lure
On Someof Freud'sHeirs rg7
constitutedby the analyst'spresumed knowledge. This processis
the Lacanian equivalent of the dissolutionof the transference,ex-
cepr that for Lacan things are clearly much more complicated.As
Roustanghas emphasized,there is, for Lacan, no true dissolution
of the transference.ea This alone is, by the way,sufiicientto predict
the fact that, for Lacan, pure analysisis a training analysisand not
an analysis aiming-let us put this in deliberately atheoretical
rerms-to releaseinto societyan adult who is reasonablyautono-
mous and at peacewith himself.
We will not enter here into the theoreticalquestion of the ter-
rnination of analysis.We will stick to the descriptionof the initial
situation insofar as it conditions the Lacanian experience.For La-
can, psychoanalysis thus belongsto the modern "scientific"era not
only in virtue of its own ciaims but also for a pragmatic reason.
The personwho addresseshimself to the psychoanalyst must, from
the beginning, define himself as a subiect of science, even though
he may later come to realize that psychoanalysis is not a science
like the others. This aspectof psychoanalysis is certainly not suffi-
cient to upset the senseof our precedingcomments becauseLacan
never sticks to a pragmatic position. For example, when Lacan
evokesthe psychoanalyticprinciple accordingto which "a solesub-
ject is receivedthere [in analysis]as such,the subjectwho can make
it Ipsychoanalysis]scientific,"e5he evidently does not intend to
make psychoanalysis into a technique answering the demand for
scienceon the part of those who come to it; that is, he does not
intend to think of it as historically situated in the same way as
shamanistor thaumaturgical practices.On this point, and follow-
ing L6vi-Strauss, Lacan denqunces the "archaic illusion" into
which those who wish to study "man" or "the child" are bound to
fall, and who therefore inevitably end up describingas "primitive"
or "underdeveloped"what differentiatesthem from the "subjectof
science."Method is thus at stakehere: the pathwayaiming at avoid-
ing an illusion whose denunciation transcendshistory.And, as we
have seen, when "the truth of what happens in childhood as
originary"e6 is invoked, Lacan's argument is still different since
rvhateveris "originary" (henceforthwritten as the "division of the
subject" in the very operation in which the signifier,produced in
r98 On Some of Freud'sHeirs On Someof Freud\ Heirs ryg

the placeof the Other, gives rise to the subject)is what founds, not experience-inasmuch as it succeeds, for better or worse,in giving
pragmaticallyor methodologically,but in truth, the fact that psy- in a reproducible manner a subiective meaning to what derived
choanalysiscan deal only with a subject capable of "making it until then from a highly particular experience(note Lacan'snu-
scientific."However, if one stayswith the pragmatic position,one merousreferencesto mystics),or to what a philosophicalsearchfor
can read in the descriptionsof Lacanian treatment the characte ri- foundationshad set forth-suffices to indicate that, when sugges-
zation of a border experience: a testimony of our era, when ques- tion is involved,the most ridiculous expressionis: "lt is only sug-
tions are addressedto scientificknowledge and when the individ- eestion."
ual can think of himself on the model of a phenomenon,as a tissue
of appearancesdestined to become intelligible on the basis o[ a
knowledge that allows these appearancesto be judged, iust as tra-
ditional therapiescan testify to other historicallysituatedcultures.
As we said before,what is the psycheif not the totality of reality-
producing events of which it is capablel In the hypotheticalper-
spective that we have adopted following Stern, the figure of the
"great Other," for example-insofar as it comesto inhabit the ex-
perience of l-acanian analysands,to polarize the experienceof
themselvesand of others that they produce while on ths 6en6h-
should not be criticized as illegitimate, partial, or insuficient; it
should be recognizedas an event.It can then teachus what we had
ignored up to now: what languageis capableof becoming as pro-
ducer of reality for the one who entersinto Lacaniananalysis,that
is, who entersinto an intenserelation as much with an analystwho
defines this relation as a nonrelation, as with a specificcultural
tradition (the analysandis asked to acquaint himself with the texts
of the Lacanian School and the texts by which this school autho-
rizes itself, and therefore to learn specificallyto link himself to the
thinkers who are taken as the privileged witnessesof the "subject
of science").The possibilitythat a Lacaniananalysandmight come
to live the truth of his unconscious"structured like a language" is
a remarkablediscoveryof what the psycheis capableof, and, there-
fore, of what it is. Here is, indeed,a very interestingtrick.
We will not conceal it: in our perspective,the great Other has
common ground, like all sub!ectiveproductions,with what Freud-
ian or Lacanian psychoanalysis denouncesas suggestion.The ex-
perienceof self the Lacanian analysandarrivesat can even be con-
sideredas the example par excellenceof the power of the relations
of suggestionproduced by human experience.But the Lacanian

c HAPTER 4 he believed.Let each therapist "do his homework," Kubie urged,
I)/arcissisticWounds
In Ttuenty-fue Years?
On May 9, 196o,there was a joint meeting of the American
PsychiatricAssociationand the American PsychoanalyticAssocia-
tion. The subject of the meeting was hypnosis.History was, in
some ways, repeating itself. Already during the First World War
hypnosishad been used to treat war neuroses.As we haveseen,rhis
renewed interest in the technique had led Freud to admit that a
place could perhaps be reservedfor it in the future. The same
situation 21e5g-1hi5 time in the United 912165-sf1srthe Second
World War, when the use of hypnosis by psychoanalysts did not
meet any major institutional obstacle.The participantsin the r96o
meeting listened calmly and without indignation to the psychoan-
alyst Lawrence Kubie, who had begun researchon hypnosis in
r934, as he termed hypnosis"a field of choicefor psychophysiolog-
ical and psychoanalyticinvestigations."IHis program rhus resur-
rectedthe work proposedin r9z4 by Ferencziand Rank. Was this
program finally going to be acceptedby the psychoanalyticand
psychiatric communitiesl Undoubtedly that was Kubiet hope
r.r,henhe stated at the end of the meeting rhar, given the present
stateof research,this was not the time to make any definitivestate-
ments about the problem of the practical modalitiesof the use of
hypnosisin the therapeuticcontext. The quesrion was premature'
I{arcissisticWounds 2or
and in 25 yearsthey would meet again to discussthe results.
T'he z5 years Kubie requ€stedhave now gone by, and Kubie is
dead. But we might imagine that, today once more, he would have
asked each of us to "do our homework." In Kubie's testamentary
rext on the subject in r97z,z he emphasizedmore than anything
elsethe uncertaintiesregarding hypnosisthat still remained.
ll'hroughout this chapter we will try to understand rvhy, since
Freud, the relation between psychoanalysis and hypnosishas re-
mained largely unexplored. This interrogation implies as well an
attempt to understand why specialistsin hypnosis-and they are
now numerous, especially in the United $1s1ss-h3y6 not suc-
ceededin making this subjectinterestingenough to attract the at-
rention ofpsychoanalysts. From this perspective, the situationoffers
a strangecontrast with infant ethology.Even though infant ethol-
ogy is a young science,psychoanalysts know they cannot ignore it
for long; they are busy identifying the potential points of agree-
ment, alliance,and conflict.rWhy isn't hypnosistreatedin the same
$'ay?
ln another connection in the preceding chapter, we used the
theme of suggestionin a problematic mode, that is, as a wav of
problematizing the texts we were reading. At that point, we did
not concern ourselveswith the question of whether or how the
authorsof thesetexts referred to suggestionin an explicit manner.
In particular, in the caseof Kohut, we did not mention the fact
that for him "suggestion"and "suggestibility"relate to direct sug-
gestion-in the senseof "administering suggeslien5"-xnd th61s-
lore appear for the most par( when Kohut discusseswhether an
rnterpretationproposed by the psychoanalystto the patient could
be acceptedand be effectiveeven ifthe interprerationwas incorrecr.
Insofar as Kohut claims to found his thought on a generictheory,
it is evident that he will use all the argumenrs at his disposalto
reiect this possibility.As fbr Stern, who does nor need to defend
hirnselfon that point, we restrictedourselvesto recognizing in his
cl escr ipt ions
of ear ly int er act ionsst r uct ur ingt he child'sown r ealit y
anclthat of others an initial approachto the questionof suggestion
that was f lr eeof all pejor at iveconnot ar ions.
 2e2 NarcissisticWounds
NarcissisticWounds 2o3
We musr now pose the question of why we had to proceed
this manner. why has the situation remainedessenriallyunchanged
ix to imagine how hypnosiscould be absent from traditional thera-
sinceFreud, by his own admission,insteadof excluding the inst"ru_ oies. This doesn't mean, however, that hypnosis woulcl explain
ih.m, but that it would make it possibleto pose the problem of
ment of suggestion,transformed it in such a way as to focus
it thesetherapiesin a way that does not simply representthem as
exclusivelyon the person of the analyst (thus creating, in St".nl
"erroneous"with respectto our knowledge, or "effective"through
terminology, the "reality" of the analytic setting)l Why has
the an empirical use of something we now understand theoretically.
situation remained essentiallyunchanged since Freud excluded
On rhe other hand, the therapeuticeffectsof hypnosisin the more
hypnosis,only ro recognize the deficienciesof the instrument
he verifiablecontext of modern therapiesare undeniable,5although,
substitutedfor it? Why hasn'tpsychoanalysis-which made a spe_
as Freud stressed,neither the production nor the maintenanceof
cific fonn of suggestion its privileged instrument-liberated
us theseeffectsis assured.Here again, hypnosis-like the placeboef-
from the Manichaeanpresuppositionsstill weighing on this terml
f'ect-imposes a question,not an answer: What can a "pure" affec-
why hasn'tthe questionof hypnosis,strippedof the illusionsFreud
tive relation "do," where "pure" indicatesa relation in which the
criticized,been taken up by the heirs of rhe masrerwho continueci
hypnotized subject does not nccessarilyexpect from the hypnotist
to proclaim its puzzling characterl
any particular responseto his complaints(as is the casewith "dry"
our guiding hypothesiswill be rhat the principal obstacleto the
hvpnosis,when, after the induction, there is only silence)l
question of hypnosis residesprecisely in the reasonssome of its
This affectiverelation opensa much more generaldebate.Since
devoreeshavegiven for their predictionsof its brilliant future. we
the {irst experimentsof Father Kircher on chickensthree centuries
have already cited Ferenczi'stheseson this subject.we will now
ago, "animal hypnosis"6constitutesa recognizedbut problematic
take up the quotationsGguring as an epigraph to a book by one of
phenomenon.Is there a misleading resemblanceor a common trair
the present aurhors, Hypnosis,athe first from Charcot (rggr), the
between man and other animal speciesl The hypnotic relation
secondfrom Kubie (r96r):
ought thus to be defined also as one of the points where the ques-
tion of "becoming human" is localized,that is, the questionof what
Hypnosisopens a path of experimentationbetwee n the regularfunction-
ing.ofthe organismand the spontaneous the human psychehas in common with other animals as well as of
disturbancesof illness.The hyp_
noticstateis nothingotherthan an artilicialor experiment"l,reruou,,iate which changes in meaning this "common fund" has undergone.
. - ' whosediversemanipulations appearor disappearat the will of the Finally, it seems that the hypnotic relation cannot be abstracted
observer accordingto the needsofhis observations.... consideredin this from its s<lcialand cultural environment. Thus, specialistsagree
mannel hypnotismbecomesa preciousmine to be exploitedby the phys-
that the profoundly hypnotizable subjectscalled "somnambulists"
iologistand psychologisras well as by the physician.
are, in moclern industrializedsocieties, lesscommon than formerly.
Hypnosisis the crossroads for all levelsofphysiological These same specialistsare unable to determine, however,if other
and psychological
organization,and . . . the phenomenonwhich we call hvp.,oiir,,, ,rIh.n relations(movies,televisionl) now "saturate"this field of possible
more fully undersroodwill be one of our mosr impo.tani toolsfor the relationsor if this diminution of somnambulistsrelatesro a modi-
studyof normal sleep,normal alertness, and of the continuousinterplay fication of cultural and social factors implied in the hypnotic rela-
amongnormal,neurotic,and psychotic processes. ti on .
The conclusion that hypnosis seemsto be an irreducibly bio-
For charcot as weli as for Kubie, hypnosis is a kind of crossroads psycho-sociologicalphenomenon sounds like a truism. What hu-
prctblem.We could multiply further the paths leading ro or away
man trait would not be included in such a characterizationlThe
from the crossroadsconstitutedby hypnosis.For instance,it is hard specificityof hypnosis-in contrast to language,memory, illness,
 2o4 l{arcissistic Wounds
aging, value and estheticjudgments, for instance-lies in the fact
that it has, until noq successfullyeluded the "partition" of disci-
plines.Neither biology nor psychologynor sociologyhas succeeded,
as we will see,in spite of many efforts, in submitting hypnosisto
its categories,that is, in ignoring "in a first approximation" the
remainder overflowing these categories.J'he puzzle of hypnosis is
thus linked, as we will attempt to show, rc rhe challengethat the
notion of transdisciplinarityconstitutes today,and to the creation of
new Practicalregimesof rationality implied by that norion.
The challenge posed by transdisciplinarity is that of getting
scientiststo tuorft together who, by definition, adhere to different
norms, criteria of relevance,mannercof discussingand testing the
testimonythey demand of their "actors."The difficulty here resides
in the fact that this "working together" has as its aim nor the har-
monious articulation of the ensembleof approaches(which was rhe
casewith "interdisciplinary" research),but rather rheir problemati,
zation. Tiansdisciplinaritytherefore supposesthat the various dis-
ciplinesexplicitly accepttheir role as creatorsof meaning and not
as authorized representatives of a field that would be naturally de-
marcated.It supposesalso that the variousdisciplinesrecognizethe
subject of their interrogation as a kind of knot where thesemul-
tiple and divergent meanings meer in a way rhat was specifically
neglectedin the creation of separatedisciplines.
Finally, hypnosis is, according to Charcot, an experimentalstate,
that is, it is subjectedto the control of the experimenter who can
vary it "at will." Hypnosis may become,accordingto the more pru-
dent Kubie, a tool. It offers,therefore,a unique problematicconlig-
uration: it constitutes a transdisciplinarycrossroads,and at the
same time presents,at least apparently,the possibility of experi-
mental study. In fact, as we will see,rhis singularity has up to the
presentconstitutedan obstacle.When we follow the adventuresof
"experimental reason"struggling with the phenomenonof hypno-
sis,we will discoverprimarily the limits of this reason.The exper-
imental history of hypnosisrecounts the discoveryof the snaresof
oblectification,rhar is, rhe uncontrollableimplication of the condi-
tions that presumably insure objectivity in the very consrirurionof
the phenomenonunder study.It is not only when one askssubjects
lttrarcksisticWounds 2o5
under hypnosis to become witnessesof their memories that they
can become false witnesses,but also when one attempts to consti-
tute them as univocal witnessesof the nature of hypnosis.
However, this history cannot be called futile. It could, to a cer-
tain extent, be seen as a continuanceof the method the commis-
sionersused in t784. ln fact, though, it is not a continuancepre-
cisely becauseit is a history.Creating a history is the essenceof
experimentation when it is seen in the long term and not as a
function of the sometimes caricatural presuppositionspresiding
over a particular experimental setting. Undoubtedly,each experi-
mentation supposesa certain "representation"of the phenomenon
under study,but, reciprocally,eachparticular representationcan. as
such, be put to the test. This testing can be carried out thanks to
the invention of a new representationof what the preceding one
presupposed,which creates,in turn, a new generationof critical
experiments.This is why the experimental history of hypnosisis
not a simple continuanceof the commissioners'inquiry. It is also
the invention of the experimentalmeansof criticizing that inquiry,
that is, of problematizing experimental reason as it approaches
hypnosis.
Twenty-fiveyearsafter Kubie's diagnosis,the situation is at once
hardened and, in a lessobvious way, unstable.The obstacleshave
becomemore obvious, and the choicesto be made can no longer
be hidden. In the future, perhapswe will be able at last to classify
the controversyamong Deslon, fussieu,and the other commission-
ers as belonging to the past. Today, we are still engaged in that
history, in the discovery of the price paid by "reason" for its escape
from the malaiseof perplexitn
A Problemfor the Therapist
As we havealready stated,the possibilityof a history openedup
by the r96o meeting between psychiatristsand psychoanalysts was
not realized;on the contrary.Beginning in r96o, work on hypnosis
by psychoanalystsbecame rare, especlallyamong "card-carrying"
membersof the American PsychoanalyticAssociation.How might
one explain this fact? We will addressourselvesfirst to two "card-
 206 l{arcissisticWounds
NarcissisticWounds 2o7
carrying" analysts,Merton Gill and Margaret Brenman, authors
of Gill and Brenman emphasizethat hypnosisdoes not createfor
Hypnosis and Rclated statcs; psychoanarytical studics in Rcgression.
the patient a situation essenriallydifferent from the one createdby
The explanation they give at the end of their book for th.-un."s,-
standard psychoanalv5i5-1hganalytic relation being one "where
nessof the analystusing hypnosisis renderedevenmore interesting
we ask the patient to lie down while we sit up, where we arrogate
by the fact that they themselveslater abandonedrhe use of
hvu- to ourselvesthe privilege of respondingor not as we seefit, where
nosis.
we ask the patient to let us see him completelythough he cannot
The book had as its generalpurpose,however,the establishment
see us, and finally where from time to time we tell him what is
of hypnosisas a techniquecompatibrewith analyticalrybaseclther-
'really'going on."8 However, at the end of their book, they remark
apy. The authors presenrhypnosisas a possibleinterestingsupple_
that the same is not true for the psychoanalyst.
ment to therapy, useful through its lowering of defense,
i,, The situation of the therapist who useshypnosisin the context
liberation of intense affecrsin caseswhere crassicanarytic "J
therapy of an analytic therapy is, according to Gill and Brenman, qualita-
might be powerlessto produce such effects.But above
all, they tively different from that of the classicanalysr,with respectto both
show that hypnosisdoes nor bestowomniporenceon the
hypnorist, the transferencerelation establishedwith the patienr.and the ther-
that the patient does not simply submit to the analyst,
tt"ihe be_ apist'srelationshipwith himself as therapist.
comesneither a robot nor an automaton,and that he is capable,
for
instance,of maintaining his capacityto make choices.Not We know in generalthat when a "transference interpretation"is made,it
o.,lv i,
the patient capable,according to the nature of affective shouldin lact be an interpreration which shorvsrhe patientthat his re-
.u..rtr, of sponseis not appropriately
modifying the "depth" of the trance-escaping somerimes gearedto the actualbehaviorof the therapist,
by spon_ but is in lact an expression of somethingancienrin himselfwhich has
taneouslyawakening,or sometimes,on the contrary,by
deep..,ing beenbrought to the situation.We must now ask ourselves what is our
the trance 51a1s-b'1 he may also,during the courseof positionin this connectionif we inrroducea technique(hypnosis)
treatmeni, which
evaluateand discussthe usefulnessof hypnosis.The authors
also inrplicitlystates,"By dint of what I am doing vou will find yourselfable
demonsrrarethat hypnosis is not the domain of hysterics. to do thingsyou otherwisecannorand unableto do thingsyou other-
Thev
characterizethe "good subject"as motivated by desirefo. w'isecan."e
..q.",-
"
sion (an unconsciousneed ro be passiveor aggressivery cremanding) The real problem posedby rhe useof hypnosisin analysisis thus,
that he denies and against which he reacrs,giving oft"., th. according to Gill and Brenman, on the sideof the therapist.Certainly,
rmpression of being independent, auronomous,and -ortattentive to they go on to explain, every technique has its own disadvantages.
others.T Certain experiencedanalysrs,capableof competently treating the
Gill and Brenman interpret the hypnotic relation as a rransfer_ manifbstationsof an intense
{ransferencein the ordinary situation,
ence relation, and in order to account for the autonomy becomeanxious in face-to-facetherapy,and vice versa.But
of the
hypnotized subject, they explain the hypnotic state by
tfre some,
what paradoxicalnotion of "regressionin the serviceof [a] therapywhich useshypnosiscarriesw,ith it irs own specialhazards
the ego.,, which stemdirectlyfrom the natureof wharwe havecalled"the hypnotic
According to rhem, the ego keeps control of the situation
fnd relationship". . . thereis someevidencethat the therapistwho electsto
maintains a "normal" transferencerelation with the hypnotist. usehypnosis
At is frequentlya personwho is in parreagerio ,rru-. the role
the same time, the ego, while remaining .,calmly" in o[an omnipotentparent,a parentwho will encourage the regressive
long-
the back-
ground, permits the hypnotist to take conrrol of thoseof .,sub_ ings of his child (patient).We haveseenmoreoverthat he is frequently
its
systems"that are in charge of relating to the environment, alsoa personwho hasthe more deeplydefendedimpulseto satisfysuch
includ- longingsin himselfvia an identification
ing the socialenvironmenr. with his patient.Again,asbefbre,
we must emphasize that we do not feelthis constellationqualitatively
sers
2o8 I,'larcissisticWounds NarcissisticWounds 2og

the hypnotist-therapist apart from other therapists. . . . We do feel,how- settingas uniust and distorted.It is important to emphasize,never-
ever.that thesedynamicsemergemore sharplyin the hypnoticrelation, at leasrin its classicform inventedby
rheless,that psychoanalysis,
shippartlybecause the procedures ofhypnosisaresoovertand,in a sense,
lackingin subtlety. It is our impression alsothat precisely because of this Freud, is a great examPle a psychotherapyconceivedin the in-
of
overtcharacter. the hypnoticrelationship is potentiallya sourceofgreater terest of the practitioner at least as well as in the interest of the
conscious anxiety(at leastto analytically trainedtherapists) thanthe more Darienr.Freud himself stressedthis when' admitting to not being
"coolness"rvas
accepted techniques ofpsychotherapy. In fact,it is quiteusualthat a ther- devouredby thefuror tanandi,he remarked that his
apistwill giveup hypnosis entirelyashe progresses with hisanalytictrain- a technicaladvantage. If "scientific" medicine establishesbetween
ing. It is our impression that oftenthis is because he beginsto feelmore of scientificauthority,of
the physicianand the parienrthe distance
conscious anxiety aboutthe infantileaspects of his wish to hypnotize , but
that equallvofien it represents his growingrvishto ceasebeinga deviant the capital investedin any drug, an! technique,the psychoanalyst
rebeland to foin the respectable ranksofhis analystand his teachers.r0 makes this distance,this unilateral characterof analyst-patientre-
lations (the "countertransference"must be treated elsewhere)into
We have quoted this lengthy passagefrom Gill and Brenman an essentialrule ofprotocol. Independentlyofany questionofpro-
becauseof the diverseelementstheir analysisbrings into play.On fessionalconscience,one might say that' as a technique, psycho-
the one hand, in the last part, their analysisintroducesa reference analysisprotectsits practitionersfrom all demand for an account-
to an element common to all sciences.It is well known that even ing as well as oficial medicine does (and perhaps better than it
rvithin "pure" sciences-that is, sciencesthat are supposedto fol- does,if one thinks of the United States).
low only the intrinsic interest of the problems they study-the Now, the same does not hold true when hypnosisentersthe pic-
"overt,"
eff-ectsof fashion on the choiceof subjectsto be studied are intense. ture. It is becausethe procedures of hypnotization are
When the historian retrospectivelyaskshimself why such and such "lacking in subtlety,"say Gill and Brenman, that they arouse the
a question or problem was not addressedearlier,the answer lying therapist'sanxiety.In other words, the therapist interjectshimself
beyond all subtle circumlocutionsoften comes down to: "Because personallyinro the scene.He takes the initiative in an interaction
it was not interesting to anyone,or to only a few." Thus, to take that not only is effectivebut that he must also recognizeas essen-
only one example,Barbara McClintock carried out her researchon rtallyneu for the patient, an interactionwhose effectsthe therapist
the geneticsof corn for decadesin the most extremesolitude.llHer musr inrerpret without being able to eliminate himself from them.
work was finally crowned by the Nobel Prize in r982, when the He cannot, at least not easily,escapethe questionsthat might be
community of geneticistscame to recognizethe interestof the dif- asked of him, or that he might ask himself, about his role in an
ferencesbetween a multicellular organism like corn and the bac- interactionthat cannot be totally reducedto the order of repetition.
teria that had held all their attention until then. But for most of Gill and Brenmant descr{ption thus emphasizesthe fact that
her career,McClintock was treated as a "crazy old woman" by her although, as they have shown, analytic treatment using hypnosis
colleagues.f'he desire for "respectability"discussedby Giil and offers sure advantagesfbr many patients,its weak point is that it
Ilrenman, the desire to ceasebeing "deviant rebels,"is, then, not necessitares the redefinition of the therapistt role and of the way
just an anecdotein the history of science. the therapist experienceshis craft. But they also introduce-with-
The other causeGill and Brenman offer to explain the abandon- out emphasizing it too much-a further problem' The questions
rnent of hypnosisby the few analystswho were trained in its use- rhat the therapist using hypnosismay ask himself have to do with
the trying character of its uselfor the therapkt-sends us back spe- traits that are nor specificto him as using hypnosis.what is specilic
cifically to Freud! invention of psychoanalysis. Certain psychoana- is that he is led to ask thesequestions.to experiencein a consctous
lvstsmight considerthe authors'descriptionof the classicanalytical way their anxious insistence.whar must then be asked is whether
2ro NarcissisticWounds
the particular quality of classicanalytic techniqueis not, from this
point of view, preciselyto hide from the therapistwhat the use of
hypnosisineluctably revealsto him.
Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis?
Beginning in rg5o, the analyst Ida Macalpine emphasizedthe
relationship between the analytic transferenceand hypnosis.She
proposedthat, contrary to common opinion, the analyst,as well as
the analytic setting,plays an actiue role in the establishmentof the
transference.She concluded that "analytic transferencemanifesta-
tions are a slow motion picture of hypnotic transferencemanifes-
tations; they take some time to develop,unfold slowly and gradu,
ally, and not all at once as in hypnosis."12
In r95r, Herman Nunberg wrote, following in the same direc-
ti o n :
The analystpromise s the patienthelpasif he werein possession of magic
powers-and the latteroverestimates and believeshim. He is tabooto the
patientas the primal fatheris to the primitiveindividual.The analystis
freeand hashis own will, while the patienthasto submitto the psycho-
analyticruleslaid down by the analyst.The analystsitsupright,while the
patientlies passivelyon a couch.The analystis silentmost of the time,
whilethe patienttellshim everything, giveshim hisunconscious material,
as if performinga sacrificial
act.The analystis omnipotent,he is fearless
and can look at the patient,while the patientis afraidof him and is not
permittedto seehim, like the primitiveman who dare not look in the
faceof the primal father.rl
Nunberg's description refers directly to Freud's hypotheseson
the phylogenetic origin of hypnosis advanced in Group Psychology
and the Analysisof the Ego.taWhy, Freud asks, is hypnosis induced
by the hypnotist's looft, if not because the sight of the tribal chief
was for primitive men dangerous and unsustainable,iust as the
sight of God was later for mortals. It is thus the fearsomepower of
the primitive chief or of God that the hypnotist claims to have; or
rather,he awakensthe archaicinheritanceof the subjectin the face
of a dangerousand superpowerfulpersonality.Certainly,Freud re-
marked, different induction proceduresexist.However,all of them
have the same purpose: the hypnotist asks the patient to stare at a
I,{arcissisticWounds 2rr
shiny object or to listen to a monotonoussound,and then "says"to
the subject,"Pay attention only to me, the rest has no interest."But
he saysit to him without telling him, that is, without arousingcon-
sciousopposition on the subject'spart. The hypnotic induction fo-
cusesthe subject'sattention on the personof the therapist:nothing
elseexists,as perhapsnothing outsideof the tribal chief existedfor
the fascinatedprimitive man, as doubtlessnothing outside of the
psychoanalystexists for the patient. Furthermore, Freud lJoeson
immediately to refer to transference:"The hypnotist avoidsdirect-
ing the subjectt consciousthoughts towards his own intentions,
and makes the person upon whom he is experimenting sink into
an activity in which the world is bound to seem uninterestingto
him; but at the same time the subject is in reality unconsciously
concentratinghis whole attention upon the hypnotist, and is get-
ting into an attitude of rapport,of transferenceon to him."r5 The
hypnotist has no more need of explicitly suggestinghis "powers"
than does the psychoanalyst:how could the "archaic inheritance"
that is awakened not be the samel In a note on the same pafJe,
Freud specihes,moreover,that at leastonce in the courseof every
standardanalysisthe patient will affirm that nothing, really noth-
ing, comes to mind. Then he will admit that he is thinking about
what he can seeout the window, about the wallpaper,or the lamp
hanging from the ceiling. This consciouspreoccupationwith mo-
notonous and uninteresting perceptionsis, for Freud, the surest
sign that the patient "has gone off into the transferenceand that he
is engagedupon what are still unconsciousthoughts relating to the
physician."
For Freud, undoubtedly t\e hypnotic statewas basedon a trans-
ference lslslien-which confirms the thesis we advancedin the
first chapter with referenceto the relationsbetweensuggestionand
transference,that psychoanalysis operatesin the same register as
hypnosis,from which it broke off, and is deemed only to operate
there in a different manner. But he also admits that a type of hyp-
notic state may occur during analysis.Nunberg and Macalpinego
further: there are not endlessways of instituting a transference
relation,of focusing the patient'sattention on the analyst,of mak-
ing him lose all interestin "real life." The conditionsby which the
2r2 NarcissisticWounds
Freudian analystsubstitutesa transferenceneurosis.focusedon the
p e rs o no f th e a n a l y s t.fo r th e real neurosi s,l i nked to " real l i fe" -
that is, the very conditions of psychoanalysis as a scientific tech-
nique-are preciselythose that most surely can induce a hypnotic
type of relation, "over the long term," as Roustangputs it'r'' or in
"slow motion," following Macalpine'sexpression.
Might not the uneasiness of the psychoanalyst who useshypnosis
be preciselythe uneasinessof seeing his own activity, implicit in
the Freudian protocol, openly revealed,that is, the uneasinessof
recognizing that the transference,the condition of therapy,is ac-
tively created by the analytic setting?ri But the question does not
stop there. The uneasinessfelt by the therapistwhen he takes up a
somewhat"magical" role ("You will find yourselfable to do things
you otherwisecannot, and unable to clo things you otherwisecan")
refers back, in effect,to the question of the patient'sexpectation.
From Techniqueto Ethics
Speaking about the transference,Lacan notes that it resiclesin
the "magic" power of scientificknowledge the patient in analysis
tends to attribute to his therapist,and that it is in the name of this
knowledge that the patient daressacrificehis thoughts (the subject
in analysisis defined as "the subiect of science").Freud had de-
scribed the same situation in a positive("believing") way when he
spoke about the common love of truth which, at whatever price,
was to condition the therapeuticpact. The Lacanian analyst does
not "believe" in the power of knowledge and the end of Lacanian
analysiscan even be identified with the removal of this belief. La-
can will thus not speakof truth in terms of love,but rather in terms
of horror ("I, the truth, speak").r8Nevertheless. the removal sought
by Lacanian analysiscan, in its turn, be identihed with a triumph
of reason,sincethe subiect,who has becotnecapableof "thinking"
himself at once as produced and as barred' has given up what be-
longs to the order of illusion: mastery,self-identity,harmonious
relation with the world and with others,and so forth.
In any case,Freud and Lacan would agree that itis professionally
Narcissistic Wounds 213
necessaryfor psychoanalysts to mainrain the public's belief in the
power of psychoanalyticreasonbecauseir is what inuoluesthe pa-
tient in the risks and passionsof analysis.The convergencedesirecl
by Freud between the production of knowledge and the therapeu-
tic processis. therefore,independentlyof its vicissitudes,an integral
part of psychoanalysis. The hopeful belief in the powers of science
roots psvchoanalysisin our culture, just as the exorcist'spractices
were at once rooted in and confirmed belief in demonic possession.
Thus, the question of the afinities between hypnosisand psy-
choanalysis-not to speak of the deliberateuse of hypnosisby a
psychoanalyst-posesfor the psychoanalvsta difiicult problem ex-
actly insofar as it arousesdoubt about the place of psychoanalysis
in the "modern era," when faith in (scientific)truth has been sub,
stituted for belief in possessionor magic. This problem is also
raised,explicitly this time, by |ean-Luc Donner writing about the
relations between psychoanalysis and suggestion:"One might say
that the analytic cure is only the mobilization of the scientificcon-
ditions of time and spacenecessaryto make suggestioneffectivein
our cu lt ur e. "le
One might thus say that Freud did not abandon suggestionand
hypnosisfor another, more effective,technique,but that he ren-
dered them more effective(or at least more "livable" for the thera-
pist) by conferring on rhem anorhertechnicalform. The hypothesis
of such a reversalof causaliry,however,u'ould risk destroying the
operation it comments on. It is suficient to recall here the silence
that recentlymet FranEoisRoustang'scomments,judged iconoclas-
tic, when he dared to show that Freud did not succeedin establish-
ing in principle any real distincqionberweenanalytictreatmenrand
a processof "suggestionover the iong term."20The private reaction
to Roustang revealedtwo srrandsof feeling: his thesishurt those
who, experiencing their technique as the outcome of a decisive
break with old therapeuticpracrices,could seein it only a danger
of regression;others reproachedhim for "sawing off the branch he
was sitting on," that is, for undermining the real foundation of
psychoanalysis-patients'belief in this decisivebreak.
However, our analysisis not complete. It neglectsa third posi-
214 Narcissistic Wounds
tion commonly sharedby French analystswho, directly or not' can
be consideredas descendingfrom Lacan' This position substitutes
an ethical argument for Freud'stechnicalargument.
The substitution in question came as a resPonseto an urgent
strategicproblem. The relativistcomparisonof cultureshas its lim-
its. The culture psychoanalysis belongsto is characterizednot only
by "belief" in the powers of reason, but also by an endlesslyre-
nerved challenge to the modalities, limits, and constraintsof that
sinceFreud is
power.For this reason,the history of psychoanalysis
under tension, a tension between the image, already propagated by
Freud, of psychoanalysis as a wound infficted once and for all on
human narcissism-an image that bestowson psychoanalysis the
heroic glory of Copernican and Darwinian sciences-and the re-
iteratedchallengesagainstknowledge that psychoanalysts claim to
haveconquered, as the descendants of Copernicus and Darwin, in
exchangefor this wound. Lacani strategyis a symptomatic witness
of this tension. He succeededin maintaining the thesis that the
future of psychoanalysis belongsonly to the readersof Freud while,
as we have seen, he stripped Freud'sconceptiono[scientific ration-
ality of its operational and problematic dimension' Lacan also ef-
fectively scuttled the claim to rational legitimacy of any effort to
problematize retrospectively the contrast proposed by Freud be-
tween his technique and the techniqueshe reiected.Lacan did this
by suppressingthe questionthat, to our minds, guided Freud when
he inventedthe analytic setting-the questionof the production of
reliable witnesses capable of legitimizing the knowledge con-
structedabout them.
In r953 Lacan himself repeatedin the most solemn tones that
the identity of psychoanalysisdepended on the exclusionof hyp-
nosis.At that time, the "subiect" in whose name he spoke was to
assume"his history as it is constitutedby speechaddressedto the
o th e r" :
In this analysisof the meaningof his method,I do not deny,any more
discontinuitymanifested
thanFreudhimselfdid, the psycho-physiological
bv the in
states which the hyste
rical symptomappears,nor do I denvthat
this symptommay be treatedby rnethods-hypnosisor evennarcosis-
that reproducethe discontinuityof thesestates.I simply repudiateany
I\trarcissisticWounds 2r5
relianceon thesestates-and as deliberately as Freud forbadehimself
recourse to them after a certaintime-whether to explainthe symptom
or to cure it. For if the originalityof the analyticmethoddependson
meansthat it must forego,it is because the meansthat it reservesto itself
areenoughto constitutea domainwhoselimits definethe relativityof its
operations. Its meansare thoseof speech,in so far as speechconfersa
meaningon the functionsof the individual;its domainis that of concrete
tiiscourse,in so far as this is the field of the transindividualrealityof the
subject;its operations are thoseof history,in so far as historyconstitutes
the emergence of truth in the real.rl
Later this interdiction would no doubt have been reformulated in
new terms if Lacan had felt the need to repeat it. But the reasons
he adduces are clear and probably would have remained un-
changed.
For Lacan, the psychoanalystis a psychoanalyst only ifhe forbids
himself certain means, no matter hou efectiue they are (which now
leadssome of his disciplesto speak of the "trap of effectiveness").
Hypnosis is no longer, as it was for Freud, a deficient instrument
capableof concealingfrom the user the role his patient makes him
play in uncontrollablemeasure.It is no longer judged as a mislead-
ing path to knowledge. It is proscribedin the name of the unbear-
able truth, beyond all knowledfJe,that treatment is to bring into
being. Undoubtedly,the subiect who addresseshimself to the ana-
lyst is the subiect of modern science searchingfor positiveknowl-
edge,and he attributesto the other the power of discovery.But this
illusion, which is constitutiveof the analytic setting,cannot be re-
inforced by practicesthat would "fulfill" the subiect'sexpectation,
that would allow him actually to identify himself with the phan-
tasmic omnipotence of a mqgician-analyst.22 The point of analysis
is not to send the subject back to practicesthat deny him as a
subject,but to lead him to that same subversiveposition which, we
haveseen,definesfor Lacan the position of psychoanalysis in rela-
tion to the sciences.
Lacan was shrewder than the majority of those who followed
his path toward the anthropologico-ethicalfoundation of psycho-
analysis.The theme of science actsas a welcomeobstaclein Lacan's
thought to the overly rapid movement of psvchoanalysistoward
ethics.Thus, in the text we have iust quoted, he emphasizesthat,
216 NarcissisticWounds
although psychoanalysis deprivesitself of certain means,the onesit
does use enable it preciselyto measureitself againstthe most pres-
tigious sciences("are enough to constitutea domain whose limits
de6ne the relativity of its operations").Nevertheless,Lacan is the
very one who launched the movement, cleared a path of mutual
rediscovery,between psychoanalysis and the themes-renewed for
the occasion-of the quite traditional philosophieswe character-
ized in the preceding chapter as "philosophiesof conversion"(phi-
losophies presenting themselvesas a diagnosis of the illusions
separatingman from his true vocation,and turning the call to phi-
losophy into a call, addressedby rights to every man, to rediscover
this vocation).
In order to show to what extent this ethical definition of the
analytic setting may take different forms, we have chosen,out of
many, two disparate works, neither of which is "Lacanian": The
Neu Foundationsof Psychoanalysis, by fean Laplanche, to which we
have already alluded, and The Forbidden Sacrifce, by Marie Bal-
mary.
In his l/eaa Foundations,Laplanche introduces a theory of the
original seductionof the infant by the enigmatic messagerelayed
in parental care. This theory makes it possibleto provide new
foundations for the analytic setting,which then becomesthe rein-
statementof the locus of original seduction:
Seductioninstitutesan originary relation to a puzzle as well as to the
bearerof the puzzle,who is "presumedto know,"accordingto the expres-
sion used,i[ not developed, by Lacan.What is essential to the ethicsoi
psychoanalysis is situatedhere,in what is calledthe countertransference.
One speaksabout the masteryof the countertransference, aboutthe use
ofthe countertransference; onespeaks ofthe countertransference asaffect,
participation, implication,etc.But what is essential is perhapsnot there:
what is essential is that the analyst-if he is to be in the positionof the
one "presumedto know"-must assuredly refuseknowing,but alsoand
especially, he must refuseit for himself.. . . This is the generatingforce;
it is eventhe sourceof neu enerfJy, the energythat drivesthe cure.It is
the raceto knowledgethat both subiugates and propelsthe analysand,
lust as it propelledthe infant.2l
Laplanche can then with approval cite Ida Macalpine'sthesisthat
transferenceis actively produced by the analytic setting: the trans-
NarcissisticWounds 2r7
ferenceis not a symptom that the analysandwould be responsible
fbr; not only does analysis"produce transference,"but also "if the
situationreinstatesan originary situation,it rs,by that token, trans-
ference."2aWhat is essentialis that the transferenceput the original
puzzle into play again. If this is the case,it goes without saying
that any use of a techniquelike hypnosisor suggestion,which "fills
up" the hollow created by the enigmatic seduction messagerhe
rreatment is meant to reinstate,is not only professionallybut also
ethicallyexcluded.For this originary situation that founds psycho-
analysisis also the one that launchesthe human infant in the story
that ruill mafte him a human being. One might recall here, a little
nostalgically,the modesty of Freud's phylogenetic hypotheses,
which are today so roundly criticized. At least they referred to
positivehypothetical"facts,"at least they attempted to found psy-
choanalytic interpretations on a history that, certainly,was sup-
posedto determine human destiny,but that was incapableas such
of transforming this destiny into a vocation.With the "new foun-
dations," things proceed otherwise. The ethics of psychoanalysis
(that is, respectfor the technicalrules outlines by Freud) coincides
with respect for the everlastingly enigmatic question that createsa
human being. Consequentlypsychoanalysis is founded-as was al-
ready the casewith Lacan-on what makes it impossiblefor the
human to "adapt" to his world, but also on what makes him "au-
tohypothetical,""autoconjectural,""autotheorizing,"that is, in fact,
a thinking being. It may be worth emphasizingthat such a "foun-
dation" claims, in fact, to think what makes it possiblefor us to
think, claims to identify the foundationsof psychoanalysis with the
event that forces humans taabandon the (theoreticallypostulated)
paradiseof adaptation.
For her part, Marie Balmary explicitly links the analytic setting
to the Bible. Freud'sabandonmentof hypnosisis, here again,trans-
muted into an "interdiction" homologouswith the "forbidden sac-
rifice" that, according to the curious interpretation Balmary pro-
poses,Abraham believedGod required of him: 'Abraham gavehis
son. But the Divine did not take him. He did not make him Hisl
Isaacis no longer possessed."2s Similarly, Freud does not take the
one who offers himself to him: "receiving the one who, becauseof
 2r8 NarcissisticWounds
his suffering,is ready to abandonto anorherthe awakeningin him_
self of his consciousness and his sovereignty,Freud renouncesthis
offer, this power, thus depriving himself of the spectacularmeans
of treating without awakening; of curing without allowing the
other to grow He refusesto 'govern through the other' . . . ; he
does not wish to immolate the thinking being to the good, even to
its own good."26
Forbid onesell,renounce,deprive oneselfof. These terms, which
Balmary usesafter Lacan ro describeFreudt abandonmentof hyp-
nosis,refer to the same strategictransformation of the history of
psychoanalysis.It would appear that Freud, heroically choosing
ethics over pragmatics,gave up the use of an effectiveinstrument,
a "spectacularmeans of treating," as Balmary puts it. It would ap-
pear that the Freudian break with hypnosiswas linked to erhics
and not to technicalconsiderations.
The ethical parhs raken by psychoanalysis are, without doubt,
rather specificallyFrench.often in Franceprofessionalpoliticsthus
seeksin the celestialsphereof ideas the means of rransforming its
choices into necessaryrights. But sometimes also, the "celestial
sphere of ideas" rebels.The responseof French philosophershas
recently brought about an unexpectedrenewal of interest in hyp-
nosis,an interest that might make of France,two hundred years
after Mesmer and one hundred years after Charcot, the place
where the history of hypnosisis launched once more.
Afect or Mimesis?
It is in the United Statesthat philosophersmosr often ask the
question"ls psychoanalysis a sciencel"2Tand undertake to confront
texts and pracriceswith one theory or another having to do with
the rights and duties of science.Psychoanalysts, in turn, use other
epistemologicaltexts, such as Thomas Kuhn's,28to extend the do-
main of rights and diminish rhar of duties. And sometimes,some
of them undertake to "verify" the objectivity of psychoanalyticin-
terpretationsby, for instance,submitting recordingsof a sessionto
various other psychoanalysts. Such a situation revealsthe fact that
in the United Statesthe notion of scienceis a sourceof legitimacy,
NarcissisticWounds 2rg
and that the philosophersof scienceconstitute,therefore,importanr
interlocutorsand critics.2e
The situation is not the same in France.In that country the very
idea of a "human science"arousesan uncontrollablenervousness
on the part of most philosophers,and perhaps one of the mosr
effectivesourcesof Lacan'sseductiveness was his criticism of the
notion of'"human science."French philosopherssustainmore easily
the "death of man," the "end of the subjecr"-which only a philos-
opher, evidently, can proclaim-than the possibility of a science
of man.
We will nor comment on the grand period of French ,.Freudian_
structuralist-Marxism."We will only note that it is not really sur-
prising thar, once the first momenr of fascinationor disquiet at the
discoveryof the strange parrner Lacan proposedthat they find in
Freud had passed,some philosophersrecognizedin Lacan'sthesis
the transpositionof fairly traditional philosophicalthemes,and un-
dertook to analyze the operation on philosophy that he had at-
tempted.r0But others,and we will cite especiallyMichel Henry and
N'likkel Borch-facobsen,haverecentlygone on the offensive.
Michel Henryt study of Freud takes up the Lacanian challenge,
rvhich often used expressionshaving to do with dogs sni.frngeach
other to refer to interest in "affective lived experience,"and at-
tempts to demonstrate the internal contradictions in Freudian
thought on this point.srAccording to Henry, although Freud was
never free from a metaphysicsof representation-the Freudian un-
consciousis conceivedin terms of repressedrepresentations-he
nevertheless conferred a decisiverole on affectand loudly afirmed
that no interpretation,and e{en no insight, no memory, is effective
i[ it does not lead ro rhe resurrectionof the affect that was origi-
nally linked to its object.Henry thus concludesthar, if one pursues
the real originality of Freud's work, one can see that the uncon-
scious,to the degree that it remains linked to representation,does
not exist,rl of more precisely,that the conceptof the unconscious
masks what cannot, in itself, be the object of representarion-
"life," that is, affectivity.Concomitantly, affect cannot be repre-
sented but can only experienceitself in a processof immanent
s1 autoaffection.
22o l{arcissisticWounds
The "self-feeling,"which was an obiect of derisionand scorn for
Lacan, belongs,for Henry, to the register of the onrological:it is
not linked to any "oneself" who might be said to be its subjector
substratum.It would be interesting to compare Henry and Stern
on this point, since Stern was equally careful to avoid relating the
affect of the inf'ant to a subiect capableof represenration,thar is,
capableof language.From this perspective,it is significanrthar one
of the examplesillustrating for Henry the possibilityof an affective
communication that does not passthrough representationis none
other than the relation betlveenthe mother and her infant. Henry
and Stern seek to solve the same problem by different paths, rhe
problem of breaking through the apparent evidenceaccording to
which '*'e cannot invoke any other reality than the one belonging
to the order of representation.The differenceberweenthe philos-
opher and the ethologistis that Henry holds to a philosophicaltype
of articulation between the ontological (life) and the ontic (repre-
sentation),while Stern attempts to give meaning to affectiveexpe-
riencesthat lead, without presupposingit, to the creation of a ca-
pacity fbr, among other things, representation.
The fact that affect is not summoned to representationevidently
implies a rereading of analytic tre:rtment that makes transference
no longer the condition of analysis(insofar as the analysisof the
transf-erence would make it possibleto overcomeresistanceto the
emergenceof repressedrepresentations),but rarher its active in-
strument, an instrument for the communication of affect without
the intermediary of representation.Freudian "resistance"would
then reveal,in fact, the solidarity of Freudt thought with a philos-
ophy of representation:there can be "resisrance"only if one con-
ceivesof a preexisting representationthat cannot, becauseof this
re s i s ta n c ec,o me to c o n s ci ousness.
The linkage of affect and representationin the syrnptom is, as
we haveseen,a very olcl idea of Freud's.Hysterical paralysisrefers
to speech,to the representationof the leg or rhe arm, and not to its
anatomicalreality.This idea was originally operational:abreacrion,
which liberatesaffect, abolishesboth the link and the symptom.
But the link establishedbetween affect and represenrarionwas, at
l,larcissisticWounds 22r
the time, consideredto be traumatic in origin, that is, relatedto an
6r,ent.When the new operationaltechnique of free associationor
u'ork on c{reamswas perfectecl,the ideal of a cathartic unbinding
was replacedby the ideal of insight into repressedrepresentations,
rr substitutionthat consequentlyput in place the generalapparatus
linking the unconscious,conflict, and resistance.The question of
then faded into the backgrouncl.It didni disappear'for sure:
rrll-ect
but, as Freud noted in ryj7, psychoanalytictheory (alsoits practice)
le:rvesin the shadows the"quantitative," "economic" factor on
which the successor failure of the cure nevertheless depends.Let
us recall that it was in this context that Freud finally recognized
that, in the economic or quantitative balance o[ powers institutecl
bv analysis(whatever the quantitative correctnessof the analyst's
interpretations),"one has not found up to the presentany substitute
lbr hypnosis."
In Henry's analysis,by contrast,the transference is no longer a
condition of analysis,but an immediately affectivecommunication.
'fhe ensembleof analytic techniques(free association,analysisof
clreams)has meaning only rvith respectto this affect. Following
hypnosis,free associationbecomes(Ferenczi was the first among
the analyststo dare sufJgestit) the primary meansof instituting this
communication. The situation analyzedby Freud in ry37
all-ective
is thus reversed.The distinction between the quantitative and the
qualitative cannot be made since it derives from the fact that an
interpretation concerning a repressedrepresentationcan be "cor-
rect but ineffective."There would then be nothing beyond the bal-
anceof powers (in the ontological,and not in a socialor psycholog-
ical, sense)at the center of lnalysis.
Concerning this strangebalanceof powers, Roustang.in an ar-
ticle devoted to Michel Henry's book, recallsthe text where Freud
afrrms that the therapistought to use his unconsciousas a receiv-
i ng m echanism :
T'hepsychoanalyst ought to usehis unconscious,let us saynow his affec-
tivity,as an instrumentcapableof receivingthe impressions coming to
him from the patientsaffectivity them into words.The
and of translating
interpretation would not thenbe a supercoding(asoccursoftenin Freud'.s
222 NarcissisticWounds
own work), but a pure transposition of what hasbeenfelt. Interpreting
meansputting into speechthe analyst'saffects,which are supposedto $
thoseof the analysand. But sincethe purificationof the analyst,dreamed
by Freud, who stroveto be a pure mirror, will never be achieved,the
interpretationwill only be a provisionalapproximationhaving no other
aim than the progressiveapprenticeship ofthe correctexpression ofaffect
by the analysand.33
This putting into speechdissolvesthe oppositionbetweencorrect
interpretation and suggestion-since what is said did not preexist
the processof speechand since correctnesshas as its only witness
affectiveevents and cannot claim any adequacywith respectto a
preexistingcontent-but it is by itself insufrcient. Roustangpro-
posesthat the aim ofanalysis is not to enunciatethe affect,to invent
endlesslynew representationsfor the unrepresentable:
The modificationof affectivity,that is, the changeexpectedfrom analysis, i,ti
doesnot resideonly,and perhapsnot first of all, in enunciation, but di-
rectly in the modificationof the confrontationof powers.The intense
affective relationappearsfirst,at the beginningofan analysis, at the rep-
etition of the forms of affectiverelationsknown by the analysand.Now, it
is theseaffectiverelationsthat characterize his neurosis.The analystis
thereforeput in the position that permits the patient to affect and be
affectedin his habitualway.. . . But therecomesa time when the relation
is suficiently strong for the analystto play with, to displace,that is, to
refuseto sustainany furtherthis repetition.sa
Roustangtakes his inspiration from Henry when he proposesa
conceptionand a practiceof treatment that is not exhaustedin the
attempt to represent affects,but aims to restore to them the possi-
bility of bein g experiencedassuch, that is,as liberatedfrom the anxious
and hopeful exPectation-which is in any case endless-of their
transformation into representations for others (what some would call
an endlessprocessof autosymbolizationor reconstructionby the
subjectof his own history).r5Reasonhere is no longer elucidation,
interpretation,or explanation.It is, rather,pragmatic,the position-
ing and modification of dynamic relations,that is, of affects.
By contrast,Mikkel Borch-facobsendoes not attempt to "leave
representation,"but rather to constitute it as an endlesslabyrinth
without any "real" origin. In an essayin Hypnoseet psychanalyse.t6
Borch-facobsenanalyzesthe differencebetweentransferentialrep-
I{arcksisticWounds 223
etition, which Freud designatesas resistanceto analysis,and rec-
ollection,which would mark the end of analysis.At first glance,
the stakes in Borch-facobsen's presentationare close to those in
Henry's critique, since Borch-lacobsen finds arguments in Freud's
texts which assert that repetition exhibits what it repeats"in the
unconscious, in a kind of absenceto the self exclusiveof all repre-
sentation,of all recollection,"rTwhile the purposeof analysisis rec-
ollection,the passageinto representation,into story.But in fact the
srakesare different in that Borch-facobsendoes not challengethe
"subiectof representation"in the name of an affect that is imma,
nent in itself, but rather in the name of mimesis.Of Derridian
ancestry,mimesis links all supposedself-identityof a subject to a
play of identification,of roles, which are basicallywithout origin.
This play is what brings into existencethe one with whom, it will
then be said, "he identifies.""It is because'l am the breast,'accord-
ing to Freud's famous expression,becauseI am nothing before this
primitive identification and becausesuch is my birth, that there is
affect-that is, affection by an alterity that is my identity or my
selfnessto myself."38
Thus, the repetition constituted by transferencecould not be
conceivedas "resistance"to recollection,but it would be essentially
analogousto the hypnotic relation (and also to the trancescharac-
teristic of rites of passagein traditional societies).The famous
founding "break" of psychoanalysis would, in fact, be the discovery
that hypnosi5-a5 ths repetition of the "affectivelink to others"
that is a radical self-forgetting,a not being addressedto anyonebut
speaking through an other, a playing of a role whose shape the
other proposes-is not an e\ceptional statebut is, rather, the very
puzzle of the unconsciousas relation to others. In hypnosis,as in
the transference,a sceneis "played,"a drama is acted,mimed, and
not narrated to another as a memory or a story; thus transference
does not make possibleany more than hypnosisdoes (and Borch-
|acobsentakes up here an expressionof Lacant) the "assumption
by the subjectof his history insofar as it is addressedto an other."
Freud's error would then have been not to have recognized the
amnesia of the unconsciousin the amnesia characteristicof hyp-
nosis and transference.He forgot the meaning of his first discov-
224 Narcissktic Wounds
s1is5-1hs elimination of symptoms under hypnosiswithout con-
sciousrecollectionaddressedto an other-and identified recovery
with the possibilityof constructinga story,and the end of analysis
with the "dissolution of the transference ," which dissolutionwas a
futile task since this "relation without relation to the other . . . is
constitutiveof the 'subject' and is, as such, unrecallable,unnarra-
table,unrepresentable-indissoluble."3o
ln Hypnosk and Psychoanalysis, where Borch-facobsen'sthesesare
discussedby analystsand philosophers,the powerful effectiveness
of "mimesis" with respectto the traditional defensesagainst hyp-
nosisis revealed.a0 A certain number of the critics (H. Schulz-Keil.
L. Israel,D. Sibony)attempt the "ethics stunt": accordingto them,
the hypnotist causesharm in wishing the good of the subject;he
respondsto the "desire of hypnosis,"the desire to be possessed,
fullilled, to become the object fulfilling the desire of the Other.
Hypnosis would thus be the "extinction of desire,"the "reclosing
of the Other on itself by means of the subject who is engulfed in
it": it is the "brilliant successof love," the "perfect successof the
transference."The ethicsof the psychoanalystmust rise up against
hypnosis:the subject "must not" . . . For a philosopherof mimesis,
this "ethical" censure was not very impressive:"Let them stop
changing those who havethe frailty of being interestedin hypnosis
into champions of boundlessjouissanceand pure self-presence!I
know there is alwaysa need to find someonemore naive than one-
self, but all the same . . ."arAs Borch-facobsenrecalls,hypnosisis
not-all the testimony agrees6n 1[i5-566e kind of perfection.It
is, "by its very definition, transitory,fugitive, evanescent.There is
no'fulfillment in it."'a2Isn't there some philosophicalbad faith in
"attributing to hypnosisan inordinate power so that one can, after-
wards, deny that power to it"ia3 Bad faith, we would also add, in
forgetting that Freud did not "deprive" himself of hypnosisas one
might deprive oneself of what fulfills the desire of omnipotence
becausethis desireought not be fulfilled. Rather,he abandonedhyp-
nosis becausehe believed he had found a more powerful instru-
ment thanks to which suggestionwould become "docile in the
hands of the analyst,"and would no longer be uncontrollable,un-
measurable.
Narcissistic Wounds 225
What if, Borch-facobsenasks, the"cures" hypnosismight pro-
duce were the only onesany therapy could claimf
on which hypnosis
In the traditionaltherapies is modeled,it is a question
not of abolishingthe illnessthe patientsuffersfrom (hisabsence of iden-
tity,his mimeticmadness),but of attestingto it at the end of its dramatic,
ritual aggravation.We offer heresomesimple,and thereforebasicallysim-
plifying,examples. Once the evil spirit that possessed him is exorcised,
the Thonga[an Africantribe]"madmano[God" becomes the "madman"
r ]eannedesAnges,who wasfirst posse
of a beneficentspirit.Siste ssedby
the "demon"UrbainGrandier,becamea kind of professional mystic.Gil-
berteRochette, ex-"neurotic," becamethe high pri.rt.r, of the magnetist
Lodge of Lyon. Ilertha von Pappenheim,ex-caseof "doublepersonality,"
becameBreuer'sprophetess. (Do we needto add: analysands, at the end
of the transferential"pass,"becomeanalystsl...) Ar a result,it doesn't
matter whetherthe so-called"symptom"disappears or not. What does
matteris that it is taken under care,awakened, "cultivated,"by the so-
called"therapy."aa
The confrontation causedby the arrival of Borch-facobsen(and
his colleaguesEric Michaud and fean-Luc Nancy) on the psycho-
analytic scene revealsthe unstable characterof the "anthropolo-
gico-ethical"defensesof the analytic setting againstwhat this set-
ting had excluded.These philosophersknow Lacan well. They also
easily recognizedthe philosophicalheritage whose return to fash-
ion was facilitated,if not accomplished,by Lacan: the philosophies
we have called "conversion"philosophies.Most of all, they recog-
nized at work the legacy of Plato, who condemned "mimesis"
(tragedy,rhetoric, all the arts that lead their "victims" to identify
with others, that actualizetheir opennessto "suggestion")because
it subverted,in its actual effeqts,the possibilityof distinguishingthe
"real" from the imitation, thi fictional, the facsimile.The philoso-
phers of mimesis thus becameinterestedin hypnosisinsofar as its
"ethical" condemnation repeatsthe Platonic condemnation,mak-
ing it possibleto identify,in its new Lacanian clothes,the good old
philosophicalsubject,who is himself the distant heir of Plato'scon-
demnation: "That this 'subject' is . . . essentiallymediated ('split,'
'divided') by the Other does not change anything in its nature as
, r,!
subfect:at least it escapesdangerous,imaginary undifferentiation
(madness),by no longer confusing itself with others and by acced-
226 NarcissisticWounds
ing to a symbolic order whose members recognizeeach other in
their mutual differencesof place."a5
"l am the breast,"saysBorch-Jacobsen, echoing Freud. For his
part, Henry writes; "The child no more perceiveshimself as a child
than he perceiveshis mother as his mother. This is becausethe
horizon where he might perceivehimself as the child of his mother
has not yet risen."a6It would be foolish to try to identify or recon-
cile thesetwo statementsphilosophically.Their only point of con-
vergenceis their challengeto the subjectof representation,to the
subfect who must be conceivedas capableof representingitself in
order to be conceived,and the "philosophical rehabilitation" of
hypnosis which derives from that. "Let us at last take seriously
what somnambulistsand the possessed, prophets and mediums,
havenever ceasedrepeating:'I am not myself, I am an other.'And
let us try to rethink everything on that basis,which is not a foun-
dation (not a subject),"47 Borch-facobsenproposes.Henry writes:
"Whatever uncertaintiessurround this strange phenomenon, the
only sure thesisone can formulate about it is the following: neither
the hypnotist nor the hypnotized is for the ls11s1-[662useneither
one nor the other appearsin a world-a phenomenonin the Greek
senseof the word. Nor yet does the 'hypnotized' form a represen-
tation of the other or himself, becausehe doesn'trepresentanything
to himself, becausethere where he is, in life, there is no represen-
tation."as
These two modes of rehabilitation, remarkable both by their
suggestivepower and their divergence,do not, however,constitute
for us a final solution to the "puzzle" that troubled Freud. To say
they do would be to confer on "philosophicalreasons"a power they
never had and that they would be wrong to claim. This is not to
assertthat philosophicaldiscoursemust defer to the discourseof
scienceas sole source of certainty or as the only one equipped to
constructreasons.The important point is to refusethe temptation
to concludethat becausehypnosisputs the subjectof representation
in question philosophically,it is by its nature "outside of science."
Sciencesdo not dependon the possibility of representation;they ia-
uent possibilitiesof representation. And these possibilities do not
deny the unrepresentable.They make explicit the ruay scientists
NarcissisticWounds 227
have succeededin working together in whatever field, that is, in
constitutingthe phenomena defr,nedas representativeof those fields
(tsactorsin a discussioz.Divided between the perspectivesof Henry
and Borch-facobsen,the human infant cannot,as such, becomean
actor of this sort (any more than hypnosiscan). It could, though,
accordingto the work of Stern and those like him. This does not
mean. however.that the mimetic child or the affectivechild who
experienceshimself would be, by that token, "out-of-date."On the
contrary,they will doubtlesscontinue to haunt our observationsof
infants, continue to create tensions,divergent meanings, among
which no "fact" can, as such, decide.But those infants will never-
theless be hktoricized, just as mathematics historicized the notion
of the infinite, physicsthat of the atom, the theory of biological
evolution that of the species-without suppressingthe philosophi-
cal questionsthesethemesinvolved.
Certainly, neither Borch-facobsennor Henry has, as philoso-
phers,any alliance with scientificpractices;far from it. Neverthe-
less,one could afirm that their intervention in the field of psycho-
analysisreveals-and derivesfrom-the dynamicscharacteristic of
that sameculture in which Freud attemptedto invent psychoanaly-
sis as a science.They are part of the same history that enabled
Freud to invent a representationof the unconsciouscorresponding
to the manner in which, he hoped, the analytic setting could con-
stitute the human psycheas a reliable witness,an actor in scientific
discussions. They derive from it and witnessto it by taking as their
starting point the real originality and the failure of that attempt.
The fact that the transferencecannot be "dissolved" revives the
relevanceof mimesis denouqced by Plato. The fact that patients
victoriously "resist" the interpretations that should lead to con-
sciousinsight into repressedrepresentationsmakes psychoanalysis
a privileged field where the differencein nature betweenaffect,in
the ontological realm, and representation,in the ontic realm, can
be demonstrated. If the analytic scenehad realizedFreud's hopes-
for neither Platonic mimesis nor the differencebetween the onto-
logical and the ontic authorizesus a priori to exclude this eventu-
ality-then other questionswould certainly have been asked,and ir
the philosophicalcritique of the role of representationat the heart
 228 NarcissisticWound-c
of the Freudian "representative"conception of the unconscious
would certainly not have been precluded.But the psychoanalytical
critique should have accommodatedthe existenceof a history ea-
genderedbut not explainedby this conception, as it musr accommo-
date the history of physicsor biology.It could nor havelimited itself
to a critical reading of Freud's works any more than the philoso-
pher can limit hirnself-,today,to a denunciationof the philosophical
prejudicesof Galileo. I)escartes,and Newton in order to under-
stand physics.
In the history of hypnosis,as a site of confrontation between
scientificreasonand what we have called "heart," the intervention
of philosopherswill perhapsconstitutea sourceof new questions,
of newly invented representations.Indeed, this confrontation
comes at a time when, as we announced at the beginning of this
chapter and as we will now see,the history of experimentalreason
in the face of hypnosisclearly leadsus to the necessityof inventing
new researchpractices,that is, to the discoveryof a phenomenon
as "ethically" scandalousfor the experimenter,with his ethic of
purification and control, as it is for the analystswho are the heirs
of Plato.
In the Name of a Defnition That Would at Lnst Be Scientifc
It is difficult to understandthe experimental history of hypnosis
without recalling the challenge that this hisrory had to take up.
When Freud spoke of the "puzzle" of hypnosis,he invoked the
puzzle of a disquieting past, freighted with what our cuhure de-
fines as "evil." In spite of the efforts of Mesmer and all thoseafter
him who became interestedin 'lanimal magnetism,"and then in
hypnosis,the latter remains undeniablyassociated with ancientim-
agesof diabolic possession. The fact that the experienceof posses-
sion, of "not being oneself," was itself associatedwith the devil in
th e C h ri s ti a n w o rl d c l e arl y reveal sthe si ngul ari tyof C hnsti ani ty
(the reluctanceof the Catholic Church to acceptthar rrance srares
might be due to a relation with God and not the influenceof the
devil is well known). And this singular response,which, according
to Borch-facobsen,one might assimilateto a repetition of Platot
NarcissisticWounds 22g
condemnationof mimesis,is still visible in the oppositionbetween
the medical conceptionof the "normal" subject,that is, conscious
xnd responsible,and of the subject "under influence."As we have
seen,even psychoanalysts, who haveevery reasonto complicatethe
icleau'e have of consciousness and respotrsibility,neverthelesspre-
serr'€d,or rather,recreated,the image of hypnosisas a foil for what
ought to be avoidedif man is to arrive at his truth. It doesn'tmatter
that the readingsof this "truth" diverge.They all sharea common
trait: the oppositionbetween their idea of what the therapist,who
has the responsibility of helping this truth to come into being,
ought to be, and their notion of what the hypnotistand his subject
supp osedlyt ake pleasur ein.
It is equally clear t hat , as Jussieuhad alr eadynot ed,hypnot ist s,
through fascinationor a taste for the dramatic, succeededin rein-
fbrcing the cultural judgment that equatesinterestin hypnosiswith
the attraction of magic and the irrational. One might say that
Freud, like the others,experiencedthis attraction.Didn't he at first
espousethe belief that the subiectunder hypnosis"told the truth"?
Indeed, since the time of Puys6gur,hypnotized subiectshave been
attri b ut ed wit h ext r aor dinar y capacit ies,including hyper m nesia,
extraocularvision, clairvoyance(especiallythe possibilityof know-
ing what they sufferedfrom and what treatment they ought to be
given).Jean-RochLaurence and Campbell Perry have recentlyde-
scribedthe dangerousrole played in judicial debatesby this repu-
tation of hypnosisas it is transmitted by music-hall entertainersor
bv novelsand films. There hypnosisis commonly representedas a
passagebetween the ordinary world ancl a level of reality where
the distinction between the possible and the impossiblecrurnbles
(seelosephBalsamo,by Alexandre Dumas).an
This situation is undoubtedly one of the causesof the long his-
tory of troubled relationsbetweeninstitutionsand the defendersof
hvpnosisstarting with the r7ti4 commissioners'report. Laurence
and Perry show,with respectto two successive French committees
of i nq uir y on hypnosis.in r 8z5 and r 83r , t he pr eor dainedhost ilit y
of academiccirclestoward hypnosis.50 It is worth recallingthat the
surgicaloperation carried out under "magnetic anesthesia"by Clo-
quet in r8z9 causedan extremely violent reaction in the medical
zao l{arcis-;isticWounds
profession(at a time, one must recall,when no anesthetictechnique
existed).Ilut one can also seehow much the partisanso[ rnagnetism
rveakenedtheir position ("shot themselvesin the foot")5rby seeking
a total victory, that is, by linking the destiny of hypnosiswith its
mo s t s e n s a ti o n apl ro p erti es.
'I'his is the reasonu'hy the sole significanceof the readoptionof
hypnosisby Charcot, Bernheim, and their pupils was not its posi-
tion as a preparatory phasein the history oI the future founder of
psychoanalysis. A century ago-and also a century after the explo-
sion of mesmerism in lrrance-hypnosis lvas for the first time con-
stituted as a scientifcproblem ancl not only as an obiect of descrip-
tion. speculation, and fascination. For the first time , scientists
t'liscussed the criteria that woulcl make it possibleto identify and
characterizethe hypnotic state, that is, to defne it in relation to
other possibilities.
For Charcot's pupil foseph llabinski. this definitton has to do
u,ith the discrimination betweenhypnosisand simulation,and thus
resultsin the identificationof the somatictraits which would make
it possiblelegitimatelv to afrrm the absenceof simulation. For
Be rn h e i m , th e d e fi n i ti o n has to do w rth the di sti ncti on betw een
hypnosisand suggestion,and imposesthe questionof whether one
can obtain by suggestionin the waking statewhat one obtainsfr<lm
s u b j e c tsu n tl e r h y p n o s i s .
However, this new opportunity-the scientificproblematization
of hypnosis-soon reached a disappointing conclusion.52 In r9o3,
[Jernheim erasedall possibility of distinguishingbetween hvpnosis
and suggestibility,and would later deny that one could speakof a
hypnotic stateas such, one independentof suggestibility. For Bern-
heim "suggestionwas born from the old hypnotism, as chemistry
was born fiom alcherny."This afrrmation had its own ambiguity,
though: if all the phenomenaobtained in the induced stateof sleep
can be obtained by suggestionin the waking state,nonetheless"in-
duced,""incor-nplete"sleepis somethingother than simple suggest-
ibility. This "something;' however,no longer interestedBernheim'
In r90!, Charcot's pupil Babinski proposedto "dismember tradi-
tional hysteria," and to rebaptizethis illnessas "pithiatism." While
fbr Charcot, as we have seen,hysteria ancl hypnosiswere linked
IVarcissisticWounds zjr
(hypnosiscreateda stateof artificial hysteria).Babinski interpretecl
cr eat edby t he im aginat ion,a kind of sim -
hvster iaas a clist ur bance
ulation. The suppressionof a "syrnptom" by hypnosiswas thus no
longer a problem, but becamethe proof that the symptom was not
reallva sym pt om in t he m edicalm eaningo[ t he t er m ; it had always
been a matter of simulation. Ancl just as the commissionershad
explained mesmerism by imagination, without however exploring
imagination, Ilabinski s pithiatism implies that neither hysterianor
simulation has any interestin antl of itself. Under tsabinski'sinflu-
ence,during the First World War doctors"torpedoed" soldierssuf-
fering from combat neurosis-that is, they strbjectedthem to treat-
ment rvith violent electricshocks.The distancebetweenthe "quasi-
simulator" and the "fbot shooter" is, in wartime, quickly closed.
Indeed, the "golden age" of hypnosislastedonly a decade,from
r88z t o 1892,and t he f act t hat it s end coincidedwit h Char cot 's
death in r893 reveaisthe singular role Charcot playedin the fragile
respectabilityhypnosis gained at this time. Even if the thesesof
Bernheim'sschoolat Nancy, which attributed a preponderantplace
to psychologyin the characterization of hvpnosis(seeabove, Chap-
ter r), were to be historically don-rinantover those of the schoolof
the Salp€tridre,the very possibilityof controversy,revealingan in-
terest in hypnosis,dependedon (lharcot'sprestige.A[te r Charcott
tleath, hypnotic treatment was labeleddangerousancl immoral, an
offenseto the dignity of the patier)t,who was transformed into a
dependentancl irresponsibleautomaton. Tieatment by suggestion.
which Bernheim, as rve have seen,undertook to distinguish from
hypnotic treatment by linking the latter with the mysteriesof al-
chemy, was not free from aqtackeither. Treatment by suggestion
also acldresseditself to the inferior, automatic aspectso[ the pa-
inst eaclof callingon will and r at ionalit y.I n I 9r 9,
ti ent 'sper sonalit y,
Pierre Janetwrote the following about Paul Dubois of Berne,Bern-
heim's former pupil, who led his attack and clefendedthe "persua-
sive" method: "He blusheswhen he remembersthat he used sug-
gestion with a child in order to prevent him from wetting his
bed."5'r
We u'ould like to linger a moment over the singular personage
at th e hear t oi t his st or y- Pier r e f anet . Janethas r et aineda sor r v
232 NarcissisticWounds
place in the history of the unconscious-a history that is almost
entirely Freudian-as the one who "missed" the Freudian uncon-
scious,and who refused all his life to admit it (Poincar6plays a
somewhat similar role in relation to Einstein in the apologetichis-
tory ofphysics).It is true that Janetspokeofthe hystericshe treated
and studied with a somewhatcondescendingand pitying sympathy.
This fact authorizes Lacan to settle the question using only one
quotation from fanet: "if Freud had been capableof subscribingto
such feelings,how would he have been able to hear as he did the
truth enclosedwithin the little storiesof his lirst patients,or deci-
pher a gloomy delusion like Schreber'sto the point of extending it
to embraceman eternally bound to his symbols."5a Lacan doesnot,
however,comment on the fact that, in the lines he quotes, fanet
notes that his patient "does not imagine that one can be interested
in science,"55 that is, she did not fulfill the condition sine qua non
for analysis.Indeed, it is difficult to imagine fanet'srespectfuland
illiterate patientson the very bourgeoisViennesecouch.
It is not our aim to make of fanet the "unrecognizedprecursor,"
the martyr, of Freudian history,but rather to attempt to understand
why fanet, unlike Bernheim and Babinski,and also Freud, was not
"disappointed"by hypnosis.Quite to the contrary,Janetdiagnosed
the reasonsfor this disappointment: the decline of hypnosiswas
only a "momentary accident" linked notably to the public'sexces-
sive confidencein this therapy.56 This diagnosismight, as one can
see,just as well apply to Freud. Furthermore, fanet was also the
one who tried to take a "third path," avoiding confrontation with
Charcot and Bernheim. One might hypothesizethat, in one way or
another,thesetwo elementswere linked, that is, that fanett "third
path" both nourished his interest in hypnosisand allowed him to
resistthe reversalsof fashion,the passagefrom enthusiasmto dis-
qualification.How might one then define its specificityl
In opposition to Bernheim, |anet emphasizedthat even if hyp-
nosis had a psychologicaldimension, this didn't mean psychology
could explain it. It meant, rather, that hypnosiscould put psycho-
logical theories into question. While both Bernheim and Charcot
had attempted to characterizehypnosis,hypnosisbecamefor fanet
the means of characterizing the qualitative diversity of possible
Narcissktic Wounds 43
statesof consciousness. Where Charcot distinguishedthree somatic
srarescharacteristicof hypnosis-the lethargic state,the cataleptic
srate,and induced somnambulism-fanet, in his book Psychologi-
c-alAutomatisrz,5T describedthree distinct reorganizationsof con-
sciousness: (r) catalepsy,
a purely affectiveconsciousness reducedto
sensationsand images;(z) suggestion,consciousness stripped of its
ability to control, orient, and organize its perceptions,so that
"thinking" has motor effects,is at once "thinking and acting,"and
cloesn'timply self-restraint;and (3) somnambulism,the appearance
of a field of consciousness comparableto that characterizingthe
waking state,but accompaniedby a modificationof the personality.
In addition, Janetdescribedwhat he called the hypnotized sub-
ject's"somnambulisticpassion"for the hypnotist.This attachment
was well known by the first magnetistslike Puys6gurand Deleuze,
but had been, as we stressedin the first chapter,unrecognizedby
both Charcot and Bernheim. But Janet, far from fleeing like
I3reuer,or far from invoking, like Freud, a love for a "third person,"
seemsto have thought that this attachment was not at all danger-
ous, just as hypnosiswas not dangerous,this being for fanet "un-
fortunate,"because"a treatment cannot really be powerful unlessit
can be dangerous."s8 Well before Freud came to characterizethis
attachmentas "an amorous stateexcluding directly sexualtenden-
cies,"fanet observedand concluded that it was "a quite particular
kind" of love, a love he describedin terms of a "need" to love and
be loved,an affectionmixed with fear,in sum, an attachmentanal-
ogous with that of the child for his parents.
It will be easy to see in what we have fust outlined why fanet
drew the criticism of Freu{ians. They will say that he was not
afraid of the attachment he inspired in his patientsbecausehe felt
superior to them, and that he used hypnosisto study the diversity
of statesof consciousness becausehe thought that his patientswere
characterizedby a different state of consciousness, by a deficient
"capacityfor synthesis."Undoubtedly,all that is correct. It still re-
mains true that mentally "defective" patients don't interest psy-
choanalysts,and that analystsmay therefore ignore or deny the
question that such patientspose.It is also true that if fanet did not
"succeed" in extending what he observedor heard "to embrace
234 NarcissisticWounds
man eternally bound by his symbols,"one can also saythat he suc-
ceeded in avoicling doing that, succeededin avoiding defining
either man or hypnosis by categoriesthat would guaranteetheir
subiectionto the principlesof a science.
In r889, that is, four years before Breuer and Freud's "Prelimi-
"interest-
nary Communication," Janetpublishedwhat he calledan
ing story that shows the influence of subconscious fixed ideasand
the role they play in certain physical illness as well as in moral
illness."5eThis was the story of Marie, whom he was able to cure
from blindness in the left eye after she recoveredunder hypnosis
the memory of a traumatic incident that apparently had causedher
blindness.But such a "fact" did not have for ianet the meaning
Anna O.'s story took on for Freud. 'An interestingstory"' as fanet
wrote, that one might, from this perspective'compare to Jussieu'
For Janet a fact considered well establishedmight be sufrcient,
certainly not to found a theory,but to posea problem' For his part'
Freud sought a technique; that is, like the commissioners,he re-
quired a reliable relation between the supposedcauseand its ef-
fects,namely, the possibilityof removing symptoms' Freud is dis-
tinguished from Janet lessby the notion of "transference"than by
the idea that transferenceis a resistance:the tender attachmentof
the patient for the physician,insofar as it constitutesan obstacle
to the therapeuticrelation, musr havepreciselythefunction of con-
stituting such an obstacle.
From the point of view defrnedby )anet'sposition.one can com-
Dare those of Charcot, Bernheim' and Freud; and perhaps this
.o-p".i.on might illuminate the inrrinsic, as opposedto the solely
cultural. reasonsfor the "decline" of hypnosisat the end of the
nineteenthcentury.Charcot, Freud, and Ilernheim tried, in effect,
rojudge hypnosis,to define it in the name of science-Charcot and
Bernheim as a phenomenon,and Freud as an instrument' Charcot
doubtlessdidn't have time to be disappointedby hypnosis,but his
pupils, after his death, did not succeedin maintaining the purely
somaric criteria he used to identify hypnosis.For Bernheim the
somatic characteristicsdefined by charcot were in fact only arti-
facts, by-procluctsof suggestion'the latter being a purely psychic
ohenomenon:"it is the idea conceivedby the operator that, seized
l{arcissisticWounds 45
upon by the hypnotizeclsubject and acceptedbv his mind, effects
the phenomenon thanks to an exalted suggestibilityproduced by
the special concentrationof the hypnotic state."60But lJernheim
was himself incapableof clefiningmore preciselythe hypnotic state
and the reasonwhy it produces"an exaltedsuggestibility."Sugges-
tion, which induces the hypnotic state,proclucesa statecharacter-
ized by suggestibility.In a way, the snake bites its own tail; it is at
once causeand effect since suggestionitself implies suggestibility.
Hypnosis, as a "state" that mav prove to be specific,eludeswhat is
supposeclto make it comprehensible.As for Freud, hypnosis
obliged him to recognize the very limits of experimentation:the
impossibilityof avoiding the risk that the experimenter,who thinks
he is in cont r ol of t he t est she car r iesout , is him self im plied in an
uncontrollableway in what he thought he could judge.
In the l\'/ameof Measurement
The context changeshere. Not only do we move from the hos-
pital to the university-from those who are designatedas patients
to subiectsvoluntarily undergoing scientificexperiments-bu1 v7s
also enter the registerof regularity.It will no longer be a question
of describingor demonstrating "spectacularcases,"but of perfect-
ing protocolsto which all subjectscan be submitted to. It will no
longer be a question, for instance,of noting that hypnosismakes
the subject insensitiveto intense pain-this will henceforth leave
the clomain of scienceand enter the realm of "anecdote"ct-but of
asking the subject to evaluatethe "pain" he feelswhen his hand is
plunged in extremely coldlwater. We enter at last the domain of
conditions of control and their price. This is why, as we will see,
an experimentcarried out in r959 by Andr6 Weitzenhofferand two
collaboratorscan be cited as an unusual and valuable case.o2 The
experimentwas indeed carried out at a time when the experiment-
ers were not known as specialistsof hypnosis,and were working
in a laboratory without any ties with this field. The experimental
subiectsdidn't know, then, what interestedthe scientists,and, in
this case,a comparison could be effectedbetween the group that
remaineclin ignoranceand the group that was informed.
 Narcissistic Wounds
46
Clark Hulls l:ook, Hypnosisand Suggestibilittt.published in I9j3,
inauguratedthe real experimentalhistory of hvpnosis.Hull was an
experimental,a "behavioral."psychologist.For him, hypnosiswas
n o t, a n d e mp h a ti c a l l ys h oul d not be, ei ther di squi eti ngor fasci nat-
ing. Like all human behavior,hypnosis,in order to becomean "ob-
ject" of science,had to be subjectedto scientificmethod and thus
to conditions that made it possibleto characterizeit in a univocal
fashion,to establishthat what rvasattributed to it could not also be
observedin unhypnotized subiects.Bernheinr'squestion thus be-
comes"methodology": hypnosiswill be defined only by the differ-
encebetween what hypnotized subiectsand unhypnotized subiects
are capable ot' in responseto the s(tmesuggestions.
It goes without sayingthat Hull'-sprimary airn rvasto afrrm the
validity and power of a method that woulcl "at last be scientific"
with regard to a phenomenon that not only was freighted rvith
fascinatingbeliefs,including the attribution of "unnatural" pou'ers
to both the hypnotist and the subiect,but also seemedto prove the
existenceof an unconscious.In r933 psychoanalysisexisted and
seemedthe height of irrationalitv to experimental psychologists. In
this polernical context, hvpnosis, interpreted in Freudian tertrs'
seemedto be one of the rare points where an experimentaltest of
"theoriesof the unconscious"was possible . But as an altered state
of consciousness i la fanet, hypnosiswas still disquieting.The state
of consciousness makes up part of the "hidden variables"that elucle
direct rneasurementand that behavioralpsychologyhad atternpted
to exclude. The possibilityof its modification, that is, of its char-
acterizationin operationaltertns, thus openeda door where all the
descriptionsnlore or less colored by introspectionmight rush in'
And it was preciselydescriptionsof this sort that psychologyhad
to exclude in orcler to become:r science.
In this experimental context, suggestionthus becamean instru-
ment of studv subjectedto a strict protocol. The only "facts" to be
retained would be those that would guaranteethe comparablena-
ture of the results,the possibility,in particular,of comparing the
prerformances of the "experimental groups" (hypnotized)with the
"control groups" (responclingto the same suggestionsin the wak-
i n g s ta te ).A l l q u e s ti o n sh avi ngto do w i th the manner i n w hi ch the
Narcissitic Wounds 47
[vpnotizecl subiects experiencec'ltheir state were evidently ex-
clucledfrom the protocol,as was the meaning that their relation to
t ook on f br t hem . I t is not sur pr is-
the hypnot istor his suggest ions
ing that hypnosis,thus "obiectively" de{ined by Hull, was reduced
to a "generalizedhypersuggestibility."There is no "hypnotic state";
the only difference between the hypnotic state and the "normal"
srateis of a quantitative nature. The differenceis defined by the
variableof suggestibility,which can be evaluateclaccorclingto the
conditionsof the protocol.
The experimentsof Hull anc'lhis pupils efi'ectively"demysti{ied"
hypnosis,and showed particularly that the "hypermnesia"hypnosis
is supposedto produce could iust as well consistin inventedor true
rnemories.It has since been demonstrated"i that when subiects
und er hypnosisar e asked t o r em em ber ,t hev ar e par t icular lyvul-
nerable to biased questions-a toPic of particular importance to
the possibilityof using hypnosisin police and iudicial procedures.
It has also been shown that when a "memory," true or not, is re-
ported under hvpnosis,it becomesfor the subiect the obiect of an
unshakablecertainty. If hvpnosis cloesnot transform its subjects
into "truthful" witnesses,ca;rableof giving voice to a truth they
harbor without realizing it, it is clangerouslyliable to create fbr-
midable "false witnesses,"invincibly harboring pseudomemories
suggested,willfully or not, by their interrogators.
tseginningin r959 (with Weitzenhofferand Hilgard), the quan-
tihcation of hypnosisled to the creationo[ "standard" scalesallow-
ing the classificationof subiectsaccording to their degreeof hyp-
notizability, that is, according to their responsesto sugfJestions of
the experimenter.This stan{ardizationmade it possible to compare
clifferent subjectsand to compare the results of different experi-
ments carried out in different laboratories.But the price o[ this
standardizationis high. The scalespresupposenot only that hyp-
nosismust be accompaniedby hypersuggestibility, but also that the
degreeof suggestibilityis a medsurement of the depth of this state
(rvithout speakingof the supposecllygeneralizablehierarchyof the
performances:if one suggestiondoesn't "work," then others, fol-
l owing on t he scale,can'twor k) . As an inst r um entoim easur em ent '
the scalesthus ernbodythe temptation purely and simply to confuse
 218 l\larcissisticWbunds
hypnosisand suggestibility,that is, to reduce the question of hyp-
n o s i sto th e q u e s ti o no f w hat can provokean i ncreasei n suggesti -
bility.
The history of experimentation{'4 is, as we emphasizedat the
beginning of this chapter,an open history in the sensethat all ex-
perimental settingsraisethe possibilityof exposingthe weaknesses
of the representationthey invent, and also of challengingthe uni-
vocal nature of the relations they expose.Thus Theodore Barber
asked: What is the usefulnessof the hypothesisof hypnosisin ex,
plaining the increaseof suggestibilityproduced by the experimenr-
er's suggestionsl And he answered quite simply: none. This in-
crease,which is supposedto indicate hypnosis,can be obtained in
waking subjects subjected to a command text that "motivates"
them, determines their expectations,and inlluencestheir attitude.
Thking up a type of reasoningsimilar to the commissioners',Bar-
ber concludesthat since the modification of motives,expectations,
and attitudes sufices to produce what is supposedto be the index
of a hypnotic state,then what is called hypnosisis simply the nor-
mal manipulatory effect of the hypnotic induction rexr on the mo-
tives,expectations,and attitudesof the subject.In other words, the
subject is, consciouslyor unconsciously, a simulator. Babinski and
his "pithiatism" are not far away.But we are in the laboratoryand
not at wat and the subjectswill not be "torpedoed."
However, the meaning of Barber'sexperimental setting can be
transformed,and its critical purpose can becomeconstructive.In-
deed, Barber revealeda problem. If subiectsare capableof "simu-
lating," of playing the role one expecrsthem to play,this is because
the induction protocol is not neutral: it may inform the subiects
about what one expectsof them. The study of hypnosisshould then
include a critique of induction protocolsand of the prescriptionsof
experimentaltasks to be accomplishedunder hypnosis.The "par-
adigm of simulation" introduced in r959 by Martin Orne confronrs
the experimenter with two groups-one is made up of "simulat-
ing" subjectswho havebeenidentified as nonhypnotizableand who
have been asked to feign the hypnotic srare;rhe other is made up
of easily hypnotizable subiects.Without knowing which group is
s i mu l a ti n g a n d w h i c h i s not, the experi menterw i l l submi t each
Narcissistic Wounds 49
subjectto questions,suggestions,or tasks prescribedby the proto-
col. The object of the experiment is not, then, the performance
itself, but the drference between the performance suggestedto the
simulator by the protocol and the performanceaccomplishedunder
hypnosis.In this way Orne could proposecertain "specifictraits"
characteristiconly of authentically hypnotized subiects,among
which he noted "trance logic," or tolerancein the hypnotized sub-
ject of a notable logical incoherence.For instance,the subiectwill
acceptthe suggestionthat an individual is in front of him while
continuing to seehim "also" in another part of the room.
Can one go any furtherl (lan one transform the instrument of
measurementconstituted by suggestioninto an instrument of in-
quiry about what is specificto the hypnotic state? (lill and Bren-
man asked a subiect under hypnosis to tell them what made it
possiblefor him to think that he was indeed hypnotized.('5 For each
:rnswer,they administered a countersuggestion("You do not feel
more relaxed . . ."), until the subject I'rnallyannounced: "l know
that I am hypnotized becauseI know that I will do everythingyou
tell me to do." Gill and Brenman stopped there, but others asked
their hypnotized subjectsto simulate the waking state: this time
the experimenter was confronted with both subiects who were
"really" awake and hypnotized subiectswho were "simulating" the
waking state.Once more, "obiective" signs permitting the distinc-
tion between the two groups were proposcd. The "paradigm of
simulation" was this, in its turn, subiectedto criticism. But from
that time, the experimentalhistory of hypnosiswas also marked by
an irreversibledevelopment.Contrary to the caseof measurements
of suggestibility,Orne s prqtocol implies that the interestingques-
tion is not the subject's"obedience"but rather "how" he obeys.The
task is no longer to measurea performancein a standardizedex-
perimental context, but to demonstratethe relation between the
performance and the experimental context. This relation was re-
vealed to be not only a condition of control, but also an active
condition that, to a certain degree,made it possiblefor the phe-
nomenon under study to occur. Thus the simulators and the sub-
jects actually under hypnosiswere asked to carry out acts aPpar-
ently dangerousto themselves(grabbinghold of a poisonoussnake)
24o Narcissistic Wound-t
or to the experimenter (throwing acid in his face).And they were
carried out. In almost all cases,when questionedafterwards,both
the hypnotized and the simulating subjectsgavethe same kind of
answer: rhev ftnetuthey were part of an experiment and that there
could thereforebe no real danger.6t'
How is one, then, to measurea behavior"objectively"if the very
context in which the behavior is obtained, a context where mea-
surement is possibleand reproducible,contributesto determining
itl We seehere the problem of the artifact,classicin all experimen-
ta l s c i e n c e", d ra ma ti c a l l y "i l l umi ned by hypnosi s.The ki nd of ex-
periments hypnosissuggests to the experimenterare usually exper-
iments that address a subject considered as submitted to the
experimenter,that is, as measurableand controllable.How might
one avoid putting suggestibility,which is measurecl,into play at
another level, in the very production of the subjectof experirnen-
tation who knows that he is expecteclto be measurableand con-
trollablef What then is selectedby the scalesthat are still used,for
lack of anything better,to identify "hypnotizable" subfectsl"Hyp-
notizability,"the acceptanceof playing a role, or thosesubjectswho,
under hypnosis,acceptplaying this rolei
Weitzenhoffer'sex-
It is here that, as Didier Michaux stressed,6T
periment on subjects who didn't know hypnosis was at issue is
valuable. The method of induction useclwas the simple visual fix-
ation recommendedin the nineteenthcentury by JamesBraid, and
it could therefore be presentedto the subiect as being directed
toward a study of visual attention. Each group of subjectswas in-
formed in a different manner: one group was authorized to "let
themselvesgo," to close their eyes; another was informed of the
anticipated (hypnotic) effects,but n'ithout the explicit naming of
hypnosis;and another group was informed that the visual fixation
might induce a hypnotic state.Although the impressionof sleepi-
nesswas frequent, only the members of the last group manifested
an increaseof suggestibility,an increasecomparableto that later
produced by a procedureofclassic induction.
This experiment seemsto indicate that the fact of knowing one
is going to be hypnotized is decisive,and that it is not equivalent
NarcissisticWounds 2ar
to having infbrmation about this state without its being namecl.
How might one interpret this essentialrole of "naming hypnosis"l
Perhapsit does confer a suggestiveforce on the image the subject
already has of hypnosis.But, in this hypothesis,one would havero
acceptthat that image doesn'tiust play a role as a sourceof infor-
mation, since such information is, in itself, ineli-ective.Michaux
proposesto reversethe terms of analysis.The naming of hypnosis
would then function lessas a suggestionthan as an authorization.
The subject,brought in lor an experiment he thinks is on visual
attention, uill resistthe hypnogenic effectshindering the accom-
plishment of the task that, he believes,is being asked of him. And
he will not allow himself to yield to a state implying a kind of
relation with the experimenterthat seemsto him to contradict the
experimentalprotocol.
Michaux concludes:
The useof suggestion in the inductionof hypnosis would then takeon a
new meaning.Thesesuggestions would havelessvalueas information
about what is expectedof the subjectthan valueas informationabout
that is authorizcdin the relation.The induction would then use sugges-
tionsnot to createartificiallyan ensemhle of behaviors which would be,
rvithoutthe subject's reallyknowingwhy,clesired by the hypnotist,but to
facilitate,
by namingthem, the modifications of behaviorand conscious-
nessinherentin hypnosis-relaxation, split in relationto reality,etc.,-
and alsoand aboveall, to facilitatethe appearance of a new typeof rela-
tion that is to be establisheclbetweenthe hypnotistand the subiect.and
to makeacceptable the occurrence ofhypnoticeffectsin the contextofthe
relationto the other.
In the interpretive hypothesisproposedby Michaux, the major
presuppositionthat made it possibleto conceivebeing able, in one
way or anothel to "obiectify" hypnosis,submit it to experimental
control, is directly put at issue.Behavioralpsvchology,insofar as it
maintains the principle of avoiding all use of introspection,needs
to take as its object a behavior defined by the possibilityof direct
and methodical observation.It seeks an "objective witness," the
"neutral" support of a relation between what it could define in its
protocols(suggestions)and what it could measure(responses). It
can also perfect "experimental tricks" to control this relation, to
 242 l{arcis.ristic Wounds
distinguish u'hat in the rr:ponses is due to suggesrionfrom what
can be attributed to the 'vpnotic state itself. But how is one to
"objectify" the fact that t-': hypnotic srarecan be induced only if
the subject f-eels"authori:,d" by the experimenrerto enrer into a
hypnotic relation with hir-^only if he knows that rhe experimenter
a c c e p tsp l a y i n g th e ro l e c ' hypnoti stl H ow can rhe experi menrer
obiectify the fact that he i mself is integratedin the experiment in
an essentiallysubjectiven- de, prorecrorand guarclian.as N{ichaux
says.of the one he inten,; to subiect to measurement,and who,
only on that condition, all ws himself to be subjectedto itl Exper-
imental reasoncliscoversr'ar "he.rrt,"which it wished to obiectify,
i s th e v ery c o n d i ti o no f th , obj ecti fi cati on.
Today, however, new i,,ueshave once more mobilized experi-
mental rese:rrchin hypnt is. The descendanrsof fanet have suc-
o ' B ernhei m, ancl thev w i sh to " open the
c e e c l e dth e d e s c e n d a n ts
black box" of what we ca. consciousness.
The Onion and the Articho;:
What is the differencetetweenan onion and an artichokei One
peelsan onion, removing,,nelayer after the other, and finally noth-
ing is lefi. On the other :and, the artichoke hides a hearr, an es-
sence.The difference berrveenthe onion and the artichoke was
adoptedby Richard St Jear,in the debateabout hypnosispublished
in Behauioraland Brain S;iences.63 to characterize the tension run-
ning through the history cihvpnosis.The commissionerswere par-
ti s a n s o f th e o n i o n : " i n i g i nati on w i thout magneri sm produces
convulsions.. . . Magnetisn without imagination produces noth-
ing," one reads in their r:port. Imagination is constitutiveof the
hypnotic phenomenon.T.l<eit away,and norhing will remain. Puy-
s6gur,partisanof the articroke,replies:Thke awaythe baquet,take
away the crisis,and magn:ric sleepremains.
OctaveN{annoni,partisanof the artichoke in St fean'sclassifica-
ti o n , s u mma ri z e sth e h i s o ry l eadi ng to psychoanal ysias s fol l ow s:
" W h e n th e d e v i l i s e l i m i n ated.rhe convul si onari es remai n. W hen
relics are eliminated, the 'magnetized' ol'Mesmer remain. When
th e b a q u e t i s e l i mi n a tec , one has hypnosi s and the ' rel ati on.'
Narci_tsisticWound.c243
W hen hvpnosis is elim inat ed, what r em ain5 i5- 1hg r r ansf er -
.n..."tre And it is futile to seek a "reason,"an explanatory theory
for tl'recapacityfor transference : "()ne must resignoneselfto treat-
ing the capacitl,for transferenceas a 'trait of our nature."'7lr Freud
had of course recognized the existence of a "puzzle" of hvpnc,sis,
oi a remainclereluding a theoretical explanation. But he would
hlve refusedto put it at the center o[ prsychoanalysis. F'or his part,
N l annoniaf ir m s t hat what we can call ar t ichokes,t hat is, posses-
sion and other mystic phenomena,the ceremonyof the baquet,the
beliefi of the magnetists.analytic theorv. all have the same heart,
al l clot he t he sar ne nont heor izable"r em aincler "wit h t heir dis-
courseancl their cultural practices.
Experimentation discoveredthe same rension. After Babinski,
the " disr nem ber er "o[ hyst er iaand hypnosis,Bar ber and his par t i-
sanst r ieclt o show t hat all m easur ableper f or m ancecould be assim -
ilated to a "role" that was acceptecl:once all the roles are peeled
away,nothing is left of the onion. In contrast,Orne and his parti-
sans, using t he par adigm of sim ulat ion. r r ied t o iclent if y what
"really" belongsto hypnosisonce one has removedeverythingdue
to suggestion:what simulatorsin the waking statecould not repro-
cluce,what hypnotized subjectsimitating the waking state couid
not pr et end- in shor t , what eludest he volunt ar ycont r ol of all of
them .
Since the time of the commissioners,the partisansof the onion
have been supported by the verv corrditi<.rns of experimentation.
Wherr, in the Behauioraland Brain Sciencr,cdebate, K. Graham, a
partisanof the artichoke,protested:But really,the child with third-
clegreeburns was not playiqg a role!, and when he referred to
others,desper at et o get r id oi- t heir pain. who never succeeded in
carrying off this blessedhvpnotic "simulation" of a nonsufferer. he
invariablygot the same answer: UnreproducibleanecdotelAnd of
course,u,hat experimental subjects-not hypnotic "virtuosos" but
normal hypnotized subjectsand simulators-are subjectedto is by
clefinition"endurable."'I'he snake does not brte. the acid cloesnot
Lturn: experintental subjectsare right to tt'u.tt the experimenter.Thus
the performancecan alwaysbe "peeledaway" as role-playing.
Todav. the conflict betrveen the onion and the artichoke has
244 NarcissisticWounds
taken a new turn. Another type of specialisthas taken the side of
the artichoke because"naked" hypnosis,stripped ofeverything de-
riving from the attitude, beliefs, and suggestionsof the experi-
menter,is what intereststhem. They are the "cognitivists."Tl
Nowadays,cognitivistsare more and more taking the place of
behavioral psychologistsas promoters of "scientific psychology."
Whereas the latter conceivedmental functioning as a "black box"
whose interior could be describedonly by the correlationsbetween
the input ("stimuli") and the output ("observablebehavior"),cog-
nitivists attempt to "open the black box," and to describeits con-
tents in terms of information proc'essing.
Cognitivism is currently in
full development.Contrary to behavioralpsychology,which is con-
frned in the ghetto of its own methods,cognitivism has recruitsnot
only from psychologvbut also from computer science,logic, an-
thropology,and philosophy.It is interesteda priori in all abnormal
mental functions, whether they are consideredas having a psychic
or a neurologicalorigin. All these phenomenaconstitute for cog-
nitivism evidenceauthorizing the characterizationof mental activ-
ity as "unconscious,"not in the Freudian sense,but in the sensethat
consciousness is incapableof accountingfor what producesit. Not
only do the very proceduresof information processingby definition
elude consciousness, but so do a large number of its products,
whether they are automatic acts or, what is revealedby studiesof
subliminal perception,implicit memory, or hypnosis.
Cognitivism undoubtedly marks a new stage in the history of
heart and reason,a stage that hopes to be the last. Moreover,the
aim of cognitivism is to furnish the keys to a therapy that would
illumine the cognitive distortions responsiblefor different mental
disturbances,and that would persuadethosewho suffer from them
that they are committing an error of attribution when they consign
to the environment responsibilityfor the abnormal, "nonconsen-
sual" results of their own "procedures."The relations between
"heart" and "reason" would then be interpreted as the relations
betweentwo divergent methods of calculation.What we call "rea-
son" would be the "conscious"processingof information, function-
ing explicitly according to consensualproceduresbasedon consen-
sual data. The fact that this consciousprocessingjustifiesan action,
IttrardssisticWounds 245
a belief, a perceptionas rational or, on the conrrary,leads to quali-
fying them as "abnormal" or "irrational," doesnor imply that thcere
is a differenceof nature between theseactioni,beliefs,or perc€p-
tions. It only revealsthe fact that the unconscrous procedures f bl-
lowed on the basisof availabledata have differentresults.For tthe
"cognitivist,"then, heart and reasonare interpretedin terms o f a
split of what we call "reason."Only "reason"e>:ists in the sensetFrat
logic and calculation pertain everywhereand .rlwayswhen a prro-
cedure of information processingcan be recognizedand made ex-
plicit. Ilut "reason" has a more limited sensesinceall procedu=es
are not equivalent;they do not all equally faci,itatesurvival in t-he
environment they interpret, or agreementwitr other informati on
" processors."
Cognitivism is, in its essence,interdisciplinaryand not transd is-
ciplinary.It presupposes a harmoniousarticulatronbetweenthe d:if-
ferent fields it jorns together,the place of eacr being determin ed
by cognitivist hypothesesabout the nature of mental functioning.
The studiesof anthropologicalcases,the cliniral study of the d if-
ferent forms of neuropathologyor psychopathclogy, studieson per-
ceptual illusions,the different mechanismsof ittention and mer:n-
ory, are all consideredas translationsof mental unctioning, as signs
that, in the end, it should be possibleto reconstitutethe structuries
and proceduresof mental functioning. It is use.ess to stressthat t he
first part of this program-the redefinitionof 'data" from the cc,g-
nitivist point of view-is clearlymore easilvaccomplishedthan t he
5666nd-1hs hypotheticaland risky reconstitutiDn that would allcrw
testsof the meaning and relevanceof the point;f view in questio,n.
Undoubtedly,however, elen if cognitivisthypotheses do not ct-rr-
rently enablespecialistsfrom different fields toworrt together,th ey
do enable them to mobilize their data and resrlts,to give themr a
new type of interest,to organize them in a cohcrentway so that .all
contribute to the plausibility of the enterpriseand benefit,in turn,
from its prestige.This is why, if it is prematuretoday to pred:rct
what fruitful questions cognitivism might proaucein the future, it
is neverthelessundeniablethat cognitivismcon;titutesa power tFnat
all fields it endeavorsto mobilize in its servicemustnow take in,to
account.One of the ways of defining oneselfi:r relation to such. a
246 Llarcissistic Wounds
mobilizing power is to complicate the powert task, to destabilize
the authority or the evidenceof its "data," whose veridical nature
is presupposedby the cognitivist translation.
And hypnosis,as we will see,might well fill this role, as it {illed
it with respectto behavioralpsychology.
C o n c e rn i n gh y p n o s i sc, o g ni ti vi stsrecogni zeJanetand, especi al l y,
Ernest Hilgard as precursors.Before the advent of cognitivism,
Hilgard proposed in r965 to direct attention to the "hypnotic ex-
perience,"that is, not to the subject's"responses," but to his testi-
mony. The testimony Hilgard was looking for was, in fact, like the
responses measuredin his behavioristcolleagues'protocols,focused
on the ideal of a discoverableobjectivetruth. It was a question of
taking up again, in a systematicmanner, Janet's"third path," and
of making hypnosisthe instrument of an exploration of the states
of consciousness.
The results of Hilgard's experimentsmark a further return to
|anet'shypothesesin that the latter regarded "normal" conscious-
nessas an active synthesiswhose existenceand potential precari-
ousnesswould be demonstratedby hypnosisand pathologicalphe-
nomena like "split personality."Interrogating subjectscapableof
hypnotic analgesia,Hilgard undertook to enter into relation with
a "hidden observer,"that is, with a "subsystem"that supposedly
maintained contact with reality and remained perfectly capableof
evaluatingpain, but that, in the caseof hypnotic analgesia,would
be "dissociated"from the central ego. Thus pain could not become
consciousor be expressed(in speechor otherwise).
For cognitivists, it is essentialthat hypnosis be related to the
artichoke. Hypnosis then makes it possibleto display the modular
nature of information processing,the multiplicity of the difi'erent
proceduresthat function simultaneously,and the multiplicity of
their possible connections.Analgesia with a "hidden observer"
would reveal the existenceof nonconsciousmental structuresthat
continue to processand register information whether or not they
are cut off from the paths which would ordinarily turn this infor-
mation into "activated" representations.Posthypnoticsuggestions
would reveal the existenceof mental processes that determine the
executionof thesesuggestions,in a way similar to the executionof
I',larcissisticWounds 247
routine automatic actions, which are accomplishedwithout the
subject'shaving a consciousrepresentationof them, and so on. The
"essence"of hypnosis-what subjectsare or do involuntarily,what
cannot be simulated-is thereforewhat the cognitivistsneed,what
they can link to a modification of the unconsciousmechanismsand
proceduresoutside of voluntary control that they seek preciselvto
explor e.
The debate published in The Behauioral and Brain Sciences,
which we have already quoted, had at its center the offensiveof
Barber'spupil, Nicholas Spanos,againstthe evidencethe cognitiv-
ists wish to extract from hypnosis.Spanoswanted to show,above
all, that the notion of the hidden observer,and all the phenomena
(analgesia,suggestedamnesia,ege regression'trance logic) that in-
terest the cognitivists,had nothing intrinsic about them. All these
phenomena may uary according to the context and the formulation of
the suggestions,and thus reveal how the subiect interprets the ex-
perimenter'sexpectationsand how he behavesas a result of that
interpretation.This means for Spanosthat the subiectsknow what
the experimenter wishes, and seek to cooperate,to play the role
they are expectedto play, to experiencethe subiectivestatesthey
imagine are required by the test.
We will not follow all the twists and turns of the discussion
provoked by this thesis,but we will examine Spanos'sanswer to a
classicargument coming from the paradigm of simulation. In con-
trast to simulators,subjectswho are actually hypnotrzedcontinue
to manifest the signs of hypnosisin the (apparent)absenceof the
observer.But, Spanos responds,a secretarycontinues to play his
role as secretaryeven whelr-the bossis absent.The partisansof the
onion theory are no longer the descendantsof Babinski, but of
Irving Goffman and other theoreticiansof socialpsychology.They
no longer accusehypnotized subiectsof iust being simulators;they
describethem as "playing a role," living in a mode that provides
them with an identity, like any other "social actor." In that case,
clifferencesbetween the performancesof hypnotized subjectsand
thoseof simulators,which had been proposedto counter the thesis
of simulation, are not at all surprising. Social psychologyhas no
problem in recognizing that all actors do not have the same "tal-
2A,8 Narcissistic Wounds
ent," that they do not all interpret in the same way what their role
requires of them. It can also explain why some get caught in a
conflict between two roles (being a secretary,but also wishing not
to be "just a secretary";being hypnotized, but also not wishing to
appear credulous).The differencebetween simulatorsand hypno-
tized subjectscan thus be easilyexplained.The two "roles" do not
follow the same rules. For the hypnotized subjects,the rules of the
game require them to be honest (or to think of themselvesas hon-
est),while the simulators' rule is to do their best to lie. The para-
digm of simulation thus compared individuals adhering to differ-
ent roles,and the observeddifferencesrevealthe differencebetween
the rules suggestedby the experimenterand not some "essence"of
hypnosis.
Whether or not Spanos'sarguments would hold up in the face
of new protocols,it is interesting that fohn E Kihlstrom, the prin-
cipal representativeof the cognitivistschoolin this discussion,com,
mented that, evidently,euerybodyfrnows that what the subject under
hypnosisdoes depends on the way he interprets what is asked of
him. In other words, the perspectiveof socialpsychologyis relevant
with respectto hypnosis.The two approaches-that of the cogni-
tivists and that of the socialpsychologists-are not, however,con-
tradictory,Kihlstrom insists:"The mechanismsof compliance,per-
suasion,self-presentation,and causal attribution have long been
understoodby socialpsychologists, without the benefit of hypnosis.
Hypnotic phenomena are interesting becausethey teach us some-
rhing new about psychologicalfun61i6n-f6r example,something
about dissociationor subconsciousmental processing."T2 To which
Spanosanswered,"Welcome to our sidel" Indeed, if the cognitivist
recognizesthat hypnotic performancesdepend, like all other per-
formances,on sugfJestions and general social context, the hypno-
tized subject is no longer the truthful witness he needed to learn
"something new" about what is intrinsic to the hypnotic state.Of
course,even a socialpsychologistlike Spanoseasilyadmits that the
mi n d i s i m p l i e d i n h y p n osi s,as i t i s i n every performance.B ut
Spanos got what he wanted. The bumps in the landscapeare
smooth once more. The functioning of mind does not appear "na-
ked" in hypnosis.Hypnosis does not make it possibleto eliminate
NarcissisticWounds 249
what Spanosis interestedin, any more than any other human ac-
tivity does.There is no mechanism,no "clear-cut,"separablephe-
nomenon that could become the object of a representationof a
"purely mental" dimension of human behavior.Spanos'sadversary,
the cognitivist, cannot make the hypnotic state a reliable ally he
could count on in order to neglect social psychology.He will not
reachthe "heart of the artichoke."
Perhapsthe "cognitivists" have not said their last word on hyp-
nosis. Perhaps the new interdisciplinary light they shed on the
questionwill provide some piecesof information, someexperimen-
tal correlations,supporting, for example,a relation between"hyp-
notizability" and some characteristicsof individual perception
(reading of ambiguous multivocal images).But we will risk wag-
ering that such experimentalcorrelationswill only succeedin rais-
ing more questions, far from reducing them to one "essential"
question.The questionof the affective,social,and cultural meaning
of the hypnotic relation will remain open, as will the question of
what experimentalreasonactivelyseeksto eliminate when it "peels
the artichoke."
Onion or artichokel Perhapsthe fact that the debate has been
"named" as it has, the fact that it has been cast in a humorous
symbol, revealsthat it already belongs to a virtually past history.
ant icipat ions.int er est s
Indeed, what is nam ed ar e r ival st r at egies,
that are recognizedas having dominated the history of experimen-
tal hypnosis,and that can thus be recognizedas inseparablewar-
ring brothers-two sides of the same coin, preciselythe one that
interestsus: experimental reason.
What do the onion and t\ artichoke havein commonl Precisely
the questionof deciding which of them is the truth of the phenom-
enon constitutedby the gestureof experimentalreason-eliminate,
purify, and control in order to identify the "core" phenomenon,or
to conclude that nothing remains. Now this gesture presupposes
that what the experimenteris dealing with can be analyticallyiden-
tified, that the different determinationsintegratedin the phenom-
enon can be decomposedwithout changing meaning. The arti-
choke and the onion "let themselves"be taken apart, but, when
hypnosis is involved, it seems that each time the experimenter
25o liarcissisticWbunds
changesthe conditions of control, he is dealing with a new phe-
nomenon, with the production of a new meaning integrating the
new experimental context and the new relation between subiect
ancl experimenter that this context actualizes.Thus the theoreti-
cian of the onion may u,ell say to the partis:ln of the artichoke:
"You still haven'tgot it, you haven'tproven anything."Indeecl,each
tirne he may find in the new phenomenonthe sameambiguity.the
same possibility of discoveringthe operation of the elementsthat
interesthim. As for the partisan of the artichoke, what can he do
exceptrepeat,"l recognizethe signposts,I am at home here"l Can
he abandon his eternal partner, the one who endlesslyinsiststhat
he subiect the phenomenon to conditions that rvould make it re-
producible, the one rvho, in so doing, clefineshypnosis through
categorieswhose irnplicit sociopsychological meaning he will then
only have to make explicitl Perhaps,in the end, hypnosisisn't any
more mysterious than the paths that lead to "being a secretary,"
"being a mountain climber," or "being a social psychologist."But
perhapsthe "essence"o[ hypnosis,containedentirely in each layer
of the onion, in each procluctionof subjectivity,is to actualizethe
"mystery" of these paths. How does a social psychologistcorne to
believethat, in the same way a physicistknows how a body falls,
he knows how one becomesa secretarvl
The Fourth Wound
As rve have already s:rid,nothing authoriz.esus to think a priori
that Freud should haue falled. Nothing authorizes us to attribute
illusory beliefs about the capacitiesof the analytic setting to a
"scientistic"Freud. Similarly, nothing permits us to afirm a priori
that the searchfor the specificityof hypnotic stateswas destinedto
fail. In both cases,an "obiect" could havebeen invented.Then the
history to be narrated would havebeen that of the discoveryof the
limits of the categoriesappropriateto this object, of the reasonsf or
w,hich the obiect coultl indeed be defined by the operation that
tl e ta c h e di t fro m i ts e n l i ro nment.
One can, of course,refuse to mourn the obiect.Thus lean-Paul
EscandeTiawaits the "new Pasteur" who r.r'illcreate a scienceof
Narci-csisticWounds 25 I
psvchosomaticfactors.perhaps primarily activatedby hypnosis.to
replacethe multiple ancl confusing storieswe now have.F{owever,
the very example of Irasteurought to arouseour attention.
Pasteur revealed a sine qua non condirion of all the phenomena
he 6b561v661-1hs presence of "re sponsible " rnicroorganisn-rs.
l'here is, undeniably,a "before" Pasteur.and an "after,"whether in
the food industry, stock raising, or medicine. The diverse and
tangled narrationsof hygienistsstudying the role of the conditions
of life, the moral and ernotionalcharacter ol contaminatedindivid-
uals.their generalstateof health, and so forth, were all, for a time.
forgotten for another set of "experimental" questions:How w'zrs
the responsibleagent transrnittedf How coulcl one halt its propa-
gationl Was t her e a way t o m ake it har m lesslHowever ,in t he end,
the Pasteurianrevolution lead not to any "reduction" of our prob-
len.rs.but rather to their increase.We havecliscovered the astonish-
ing multiphcity of microorganisms,the diversity of their meansof
action. But especially,we know that the question of microorga-
nisn-rsc'lefinesits own "re n-r:rinder."
As Pasteur himself recognized
at the encl of his life, u,e clon't know why, in a population appar-
ent ly exposedt o t he sam e ger m s, som e individuals "r esist " while
others "get sick." The questionsof the old hygienistsare not dead.
They belong now to the still-obscurefield of preuention Micro-
organisms are "causes,"but we still have to understand why, in
cert:rin cases,thesecauses"act," and why, in others,they don't. Ancl
it is precisely in this clomain that the "psychosomaticfactor" is
often invoked. The example of Pasteur most certainly holclsProm-
ise for a new progressof experimentalreasonthat would comPlete
its own discoveries,but it cgn also point up the dillerencebetween
what experimental methods have been able to conquer and what,
up until now, has eludeclus.
In any case,t he Past eur ianexam plecar r iesa lessonwit h it : our
hope lies not in waiting fbr a key to be miraculously created by
exper im ent alinvent ion.Past eur 'swor k clid not , in f act , illum ine as
bv miracle and all at once a dark, unknorvn field, freighted s'ith
superstitions.It reorganizedand articulateda group of divei'sesto-
ries-stories of farmers, vintners, and epidemiologists-that had
a common denominator: all were constructeclby actors who were
252 l{arcissistic Wounds
rationallyinterestedin n'hat they clescribed.Pasteurthus benefited
from the f-actthat, before him, questionshad been asked, many
detailshad been registered,measuresof preventionhad been tested
whoseeffectiveness had been described.Epiclemiologistswere not
"airaid"of epiclemics,which had already been clisconnected from
th e rd e a o f c l i v i n e p u n i s hment. Farmers no l onger bel i evedi n
witchesand their evil spells.Vintners had fbr a long time linked
up rrith chemists and knew perhaps not why fermentation took
p l a c eb. u t a t l e a s t w h a t p ro ducedi t and i n w hat condi ti ons.Thi s
corpusof "knowledge" is lacking in the studv of hypnosisand psy-
chosomatics, and without it the possibilityof a "new Pasteur" of
pslchosomatics is difficult to conceive.In other words. anv pro-
nouncementon whether the question of hypnosiswill one day be
described in the history of sciencesin the sameway as the question
o Ie p i d e mi c ss e e m sto u s h i ghl y premature.Indeed,w e can com-
p a reo u r s i tu a ti o n ,n o t w i th the si tuati on prevai l i ngi n the ni ne-
teenthcentury, but with that of the eighteenth century, a periocl
whenthe Encvclopedistsstruggled againstthe terrors, the fatality,
the juclgmentsthat claimecl to identifv what alone was deemed
u'orthvof being thought.
Let us recall here the way in which Freud himself presented
psvchoanalysis as the thircl wound, comparableto thoseinflicted by
Copernicusand then Darwin on human n:rrcissistn.It would be
senselessto aliirm that the "third narcissisticrvound" did not occur'
especially on the cultural level where Oopernicus,Darwin, and
Freudcan be cornpared. But Freud evidentlv clid not situate his
r,r'orksolely on that level. He thought of Copernicusand Darwin
and himself principally as creatorsof science.And perhaps,fiom
this pointof vierv.it is too simple to savthat in eachcaseknowledge
r.vasobtained in exchange fbr the painful abandonrnentoi what
that knowledgedefined as an illusion.
In the caseof Copernicus,history leads us to define the knowl-
eclgets gaineci as the very model that all scienceshave since
dreamedof: celestialmechanics,the discoveryof mathematicallaws
of anunheard-ofsimplicity,obeyeclby all celestialbodies.However,
the Copernican wound-or more preciselythe "breaking of the
I,JarcisskticWounds 253
circle" by which Kepler distinguishedthe Copernican vision from
the traditional one-caused suffering of a sort that is forgotten
todav: the new astronomy wounded not only the beliefs of those
who wished to be at the center of the world, but also the rational
ideal of those who benefitedfrom this new knor.r'ledge. It seemed
highly rational that the invariable motion of the planetsand stars-
change without change, mobile figure of eternity-corresponded
to the figure of the circle. But how rvasone to conceiveKeplerian
ellipses-{igures that were apparently arbitrary-if not as the
tri umph of gr oss em pir icism over r easonl "T'is all in pieces,all
coher encegone, " John Donne m oaned in I 6r r . And when t hese
ellipsesbecamerational thanks to Nern'toniangravitation,the scan-
dal was only incr easedbecauseof t he appar entar bit r ar iness of t his
unimaginable force acting at a distance without any conceivable
mode of transmission.CJneshould never forget when one reads
phi l o sopher siike Kant and Hegel. who under t ook t wo cent ur ies
ago to redefine the powers of reason,that they had to erasethe
tracesof a scandal they did not have the means of denying: the
Newtonian force had, as a matter of fact. become indispensable.
The rights and duties of reasonhacl thereforeto be redefined.
By contrast,in the caseof Darwin, no redefinition of this kind
could restorethe power of judging to reason.The vision of a har-
monious ancl intelligible living rvorld was not replaced by anv
single new conception, since what biologists discovereclwas the
necessityof exploring, of attempting to understand,caseby case.
Darwinian theory substitutec'l storiesfbr the rational iustificationoI
the existenceand identity of living species.It gave to biologistsa
hypotheticalnarrative framelvork but not the possrbilityof elimi-
nating the storv in favor of an underlving regularity.That is un-
doubtedly the reasonr.vhythe "scientific" characterof Darwinisrn
can be challengedeven today (American "creationists"are not iust
crazy; they also use very intelligently the dominant irnageof what
a science"ought" to be able to do). Undoubtedly,that is also the
reasonwhy Darwinian evolution remains, contrary to the Coper-
nican "revolution," in the margins of philosophy'The peiorative
connotationsstill accompanying the category of "historicism"' as

254 NarcissisticWound-i
well as the repeatedeftbrts to define agenciestranscendinghistory,
witness to the persistinghumiliation Darwin inflicted on the ideal
of a reasonhaving the right to iudge.
In the case of the "third narcissisticwouncl," the situation is
again clill-erentsince those who afirm that the "ego" is not master
in his own house thought they actually obtained, in exchangefor
this wounding truth, the power of iudging' And the humiliation
that would accompanythe abandonment of this belief could very
well constitutea "fourth wound," inflicted,this time, on the specific
cultural beliefsof our "modern period"'
Modern astronomy allorvs us to iudge traditional knowledge
about the heavens:astrology is nonsense,certain calendars be-
queathed to us by past civilizations reveal remarkably preciseob-
servations.and so forth. Even if, in most cases,we cannot' anymore
than our ancestors,directly affectgenes,modern biology enablesus
to interpret the practicesof selectionand hvbridization,which have
created since prehistoric times the living beings, plants and ani-
mals. with which we live. But psychoanalysis has not been substi-
tutec'lfor traditional therapiesas their rational outcome' It added
yet another techniqueto the corpusofthese therapeutictechniques'
Unlike Darwin and Copernicus,Freud did not give the white man
whose narcissismhe wounded (the Freudian wound evidently af-
fected neither shamans nor miracle workers) knowledge that
would establishhis difference,that would aflbrd him understand-
ing of the practicesmaking up his field.
After Freud, not only must we learn to recognizethe effective-
nessof therapeuticpracticeswe thought we could scorn as irratio-
nal, but we must also learn to recognizethat the relativeeffective-
ness of psychoanalysis,like that of these other practices,refers
aboveall to the particularity of the societywhere it was invented.
Learning to recognize: this is not a question of goodwill, of re-
spect, but of knowledge, of the creation of ways of working to-
gether that engender both associationsand confiontations' In ex-
change for the fourth \vound (which strikes at the narcissism,not
of the descendantof I)escartesthis time, but of the psychoanalyst
descendingfrom Galileo, Lavoisier,and Kant), we haveno promise
of a knowledge permitting us to iudge or even to define the register
llarcissisticWounds 255
in which we can narrate. We inherit the problem of learning horv
to le:rrn,how to interrogate,how to listen to the testimonyof what,
sinceMesmer's6rst attempts,contravenedthe norms by which the
theoretico-experimental sciencesdefined the reliability of their ar-
gument s.We inher it t he pr oblem of lear ning t o hear a t est im ony
as potent iallym ult ivocal,wit hout believing,or t r ying t o m ake ot h-
ers believe,that if the testimony is appropriatelygathered,it rvill
be capableof establishingthe registerin which the witnessis inter-
rogatedas the only one in which his testimonyhas to be retained.
It rvill be useful here to recall the conllict opposing Deslon to
the members of the commissionof inquiry into tnesmerian prac-
tices.Deslon focusedthis inquiry on the therapeutic effectsof the
r.nesr-nerian fluid, but the commission decided that, if the fluid
reallv existed,its action should be perceivablein anyone,any indi-
viclual, ill or healthy.From the beginning of our story, from the
moment Mesmer tried to invent a "rational" meaning for tradi-
tional therapies,to interpret them in terms of causeand effect'from
the time this interpretation r.r'asscientificallytested,the theme of
"anyone haunts the discussion.The fluid should act not onl,von a
heal thy individual, but also on a skept icalindividual, one who is
inattentiveor even ignorant about what he is subiectedto. The tests
that will identify what remainsof hypnosisfrom the scientificpoint
of view must be appropriate for anyone.All the rest is anecdotal,
outside of the scientific 6eld. It is uselessto emphasizethat this
same criterion allows scientific medicine to c'listinguish"placebo
effects"fiom thoseof "real medications,"a distinction that, in itself,
is not debatable,but too often leads one to "forget" the problem
poseclby theseeffects.As Esc{nde reminds us.7athe very term "pla-
cebo" is imprinted with an implicit but effectivederision.It recalls
the question of the uncontrollablesubiectivityof patients,their ir-
rationality,and it excludesthe placeboeffect,fbr that reason'from
the fielc{of rationality.
As we have stressed,Freud irreversiblycreateda distinction be-
trveenhis question and the practicesof the "rational" medicine of
his time (and to a large extent, of our time as well) by "rehabilitat-
ing" hysteria,that is, by defining it at the outseton the basisof the
oDerationsthat Charcot h:rd shown to make symptoms reprodu-
256 NarcissisticWounds
cible, and that he had attempted to use therapeutically.However,
the instrument Freud finally perfected-the transference-reveals
his fidelity to the aims defined in t784 by the commissioners.In
contrastto hypnosis,whoselimits he characterized,this new instru-
ment was to be effectivefor any patient susceptibleto analysis:it
was to be used by any therapist appropriatelytrained, and was to
constitutethe patient as a reliablewitnessof his own illnessin such
a way that psychoanalysis could presenta theory of the illnessthat
would be convincingto any scientistwho had overcomethe narcis-
sistic wound this theory implies. And finally, when the ultimate
explanationof transferencewas linked to the phylogeneticorigins
of mankind, the theory of the neurosesclaimed relevancefor any
individual susceptibleto transference.
The imperative of "anyone" is, of course,doubly linked to the
experimentalsciencesby the protocolsof purification that are their
condition: {irst, the protocols should by rights be masterableby
anyone;and, second,any sampleproduct of a given protocolshould
be representativeof all products of that protocol. In this matter,
there are no half measures.And after the Freudian failure, the
reexaminationof the problem of "heart and reason"will doubtless
require those who examine it to situatethemselves,not in the line
of descendentfrom the commissioners,but rather in that from the
naturalist fussieu.As we have seen,fussieu found nothing abnor-
mal in the fact that the "fluid" (or the "active principle" he pro-
posedto substitute for it) did not always havethe same type of effect
on everyone.Furthermore, it was on the basisof this nonuniform-
ity that he tried to characterizethe multiplicity of concurrent or
antagonisticcausesintervening in that effect.The divergent effects
of the "same" principle constitutedfor fussieua corpus,and not a
badly posedproblem that ought to be reformulated until one cause
correspondedunivocally to one effect.
In order to define the differencebetween the gaze of fussieu's
naturalist and the norms of the experimenter,one might say that,
for the naturalist,and in the casewhere a living being is involved,
no "cause" has in itself the pouer of explaining its ooun fficu. The
living being (insofar as it remains alive) is not subject to general
relationsof causalityas is, for example,the falling body that accel-
Narcksistic Wounds 257
eratesin its fall owing to the force of gravitation,or the iron shav-
ing subject to an electromagneticfield. Thus, no operation that
aims at "verifying" a relation of causeand effect,that is, at consti-
ruting what it is dealing with as a witnessrespondingin a reliable
manner,can provide the meansof verification.It (eventually)maftes
il true, that is, it conferson the "cause" thepower of explaining the
effect it is deemed to have brought about. From the perspectiveof
the naturalist,and when living beingsare involved,all experimen-
ration createsits own obiect,but this creationcannot be understood
in terms of purification. It constitutes,in the strong senseof the
term, a production.
The birth of modern scienceis ordinarily associatedwith the
abandonmentof the "why" of Aristotelianfinal causesfor the ques-
tion of "how." Galileo supposedlywas no longer preoccupiedwith
the reasonswhy bodiesfall; rather he described"how" they fall' If
one acceptsthis description as a first approximation' then one re-
mark follows: the question of "how" has to do with the manner in
which a process,a change,a movement take place.However,we do
not, exceptwithout thinking, often use this expressionof "manner."
In fact, physicsand the other scienceswhose successconstitutesthe
models of our scientifrcknowledge haverather inclined us to think
that an object of scienceshould, "without mannerism" (sansfaire
desmaniires),obey the laws or anstuerthe questions whose meaning
our categoriesdefine.
"Without mannerism": the subjective connotations of this
expressionare not, a priori, any more shocking than thoseof such
current expressionsas "obeying" and "being subject to" or of a
"scientific" expressionof jrqidical origin like "category.""Without
mannerism" defines "manners" as obstaclesto a truly scientific
knowledge. They are what opposethe operationsby which what
we are dealing with should become an "obiect" representativeof
any member of a class of entities subiect by rights to the same
categories.The "manners" of the eighteenth-centurychemical
products, which did not always enter into reactionsaccording to
the predictionsof the chemist,correspondto chemistry as an "art"
as defined by Venel. The proceduresof control and purification
created "pure" bodies and protocols guaranteeing that nothing
 258 NarcissisticWounds
could be produced without being identifiable.chemistry became
x self beyond history, of defining the manner in which bodies fall
science,in the modern senseof the term, when it perfected the
meansof guarding its reactantsagainst"mannerism."
There is another expression:"manner is all." The expressionis
as clangerousas "mannerism." While the latter presupposesthe
ideal of obedienceand thus defines "manners" as an obstaclethat
is, in itself, uninteresting,"the manner is all" suppresses the prob_
lem and carries us back to intuition, to what cannot be communi-
cated,to the "art of manners."It implies that we "know" that there
is nothing to learn.
Hypnosis appearsto us ro be the privileged site where the chal_
lenge of whar we have called a "transdisciplinaryresearch"might
respond to the "fourth narcissisticwound" preciselybecauseit ap-
peals to what we call "reason" to become iinterested i.r "mr.rners,"
ma n n e rso f i n te rro g a ti ng.mannersof i nteracti ng.manners of pro-
duction' manners of relating to (what we called "pragmatism'"in
the preceding chapter). It also reminds us thar th. obje.ts of our
disciplinesdo not correspondto a right of reason.They only reveal
rhefact that, in this case,we have discoveredrhe manner in which
a cause'or an ensembleof causes(linear or circular,it doesn'tmat-
ter), causes.
"How do causescome ro terms with each other.,'that
is.
do causescause"l Hypnosis, but also all therapy whether carried
out by medication or analysis,requires us to take note of this ques-
tion, which also pervadesall scienceof a historicaltype. But learn_
ing to ask this question,learning that no causeis sufficient.in these
cases'to explain the manner in which it acrs,obligesus to abandon
the arrogance that physicshas inspired in us with respectto the
powers of "reason."In this sense,one could say th"t the "fourth
narcissistic wound" marks the necessityof a radicalization of the
characteristics of reasonassociatedwith modern science.This rea-
son, after having abandoned the "why," shoulcl,in the face of the
questionof "heart"' give up the question of how to prevent "heart"
from "mannerism," from "resisting what should illumine it," for
the question of how "heart" fits in with what is supposedto illu-
mine it' how the reasonswe proposeto "heart" producetheir own
reasons'Reason,after having discoveredthe means of situating it-
lJarcissisticWounds 259
u,hateverthe circumstances,after having recognizedthe necessity
of understandinghistory,of narrating the tangle of circumstances
that weavethe evolution of a species,must still learn how reason
participatesin a history, how it makes up a part of the "circum-
st:rnces"whose meaning this history invents and reinvents.
I|/itnessesof Hypnosis?
The common characteristicof all the efforts to subiecthypnosis
to experimentalnorms, as we haveexamineclthem up to this point,
is that they imply and presupposethe selectionof subiectscapable
of maintaining with the hypnotistan experimental kind of relation
that gives to the hypnotist the impression of being able to master
the link between the question or the suggestion that he initiates
and what the subjectsaysor does.C)nly at this price can the exper-
imental resultsbe tested,can their "objectivity" be discussed.Only
at this price can one invent experimental tricks aiming at distin-
guishing the artifact-which refers to the experimenterinsofar as
his attitude, his questions,his suggestionshad effects he didn't
know how to control-from what can be attributed to the hypno-
,,how
tized subjectindependentlyof the particular context of the experi-
men t .
This is a heavy price to pay.The subjects who are incapableof
satisfyingthe conditions of the experimental setting are excluded
from the setting,and, in addition, the very principle dictating this
exclusionescapeselucidation.It seemsone is able to augment the
degreeof suggestibilityof cegtainhypnotized subjects,T5 that is, lead
them to acceptan experimentalrelation with the experimenter.But
the teststhat measurethis transformation are basedon the assump-
tion that the subiectwill no longer be able to witnessto this change
since the tests afrrm preciselythat the subject will, at least to a
certain extent, defer to the experimenter'ssuggestions.
Thking into accountthe intrinsic variability of the hypnotic phe-
nomenon-the fact that certain subjects speak and others remain
silent,that some are awareof being hypnotized and others deny it,
that some become highly suggestibleand others do not, and so
260 NarcissisticWounds
on-means, by definition, that one leavesthe experimental field
for the field of empiricism. The observercan of course construct
typologies,seek correlationsbetween,on the one hand, what the
subject reports about his sensationsafter and during hypnosisin-
sofar as he is capableof doing that, and, on the other hand, his
observablebehavior,the type of induction that was used, the way
in which he experiencedit, the consciousness he had of the role of
the hypnotist,of the extensionor the limits of his power.Neverthe-
less,the observeris in a position to learn from his subjects,but not
to take the initiative, not to decide, through the invention of an
experimental protocol, the categoriesaccording to which the sub-
jects will answer his questions,verify or refute his hypotheses.He
is in a position to explore uith his subject the landscapeof sensa-
tions, emotions, perceptions whose creation he participated in
without being able a priori to control the manner in whrch he par-
ticipated.
On the basisof a study of this type (implying, as is most often
the casein modern empirical practices,a statisticalanalysisof the
data), Didier MichauxT('proposedto distinguish four types of be-
havior that seemedto him to correspondto four types of relation
to the Other (the Other whose role the hypnotist authorizes the
subjectto attribute to him, to the very degreethat he "names hyp-
nosis").According to this typology,"somnambulism,"in which the
subject actively adopts the role suggestedto him, is an "active
putting of the body at the dispositionof the Other," in such a way
that the behavior becomesa tool of seduction."Pseudo-lethargy"
puts the subject in a position to be seducedby the Other through
the passiveabandonment of the body, offered as an obiect of care.
"Catalepsy-prostration"implies a situation of helplesssubmission
to the Other with the abandonmentof the subiect'smechanismsof
defense.Finally, "awake-lethargy,"characterizedby a motor disaf-
fection recalling sleepbut with a maintenanceof defensiveactivity
on the level of consciousness(diminution of suggestibility,negative
verbal responses, absenceofhypnotic experience),translatesthe fact
that the subject feelsthreatenedwith destructionby the Other. On
this point, Michaux recallsanimals that "play dead" but then, when
ItlarcissisticWounds z6t
the opportunity presentsitself, instantaneouslyregain their muscle
tone in order to flee.
"Playing dead" or "becoming cataleptic"are behaviorsthat have,
in fact, been explored by animal ethologists.For Michaux, making
one'sbody into a tool of seductionor an object of care recallsthe
relationsbetween mother and child. The fact that the resultsof an
explorationof hypnosisthus point to other lields would constitute,
from the purely experimental point of view, a fault, an indication
of the observer'ssubjectivity,of the fact that his classificationhad
been influenced, that the "words" organizing this classification
were tainted with uncontrollablehypotheses.No doubt, "neutral"
empiricism is a myth. There are no data that are not filtered
through an informed gaze, through words loaded with meaning.
Ilut this is not a condemnation;far from it. Empiricisrr' is no more
neutralthan experimentation that also supposesa limited and selec-
tive setting. Empiricism is above all a story that, like all stories,
appealsto and should arouseother stories.To the testingthat every
experimentalresult aims at resistingcorrespondsthe multiplication
of stories, that is, the concrete historical apprenticeshipof their
relative pertinence,of the implications and consequencesof the
choicesto which, in one way or another, they subscribe.It is an-
other manner of u,orrtingtogether.
Undoubtedly the one who understood most lucidly what hyp-
nosisinvolvesfor its adeptswas Lawrence Kubie, a true pioneer in
the study of hypnosis,who respectedwhat Freud taught us: hyp-
nosisis a product of touopeople-for the one who de{ineshimself
as experimenter also, and in a manner he can't control, plays an
:l cti vepar t in what he pr oduces.
In t972, after 35 y."rc ol researchand reflection, Kubie be-
queathed a warning to his successors. Hypnosis, he writes,77puts
into play,as doesthe rua\ing state,a continuous flow of distinct pro-
cesses-conscious,preconscious,and unconscious-whose quali-
tative influencescan, at most, be recognizedby our "clumsy" tech-
niques but whose concurrent role cannot be preciselyevaluated.It
is dificult phenomenologicallyto distinguish true sleep from its
consciousor preconscioussimulation. and even the simulator can
262 Narcissistic Wounds
fool himself into believing he is simulating when he is actually
falling asleep.It is difrcult to distinguish a "real" psychosisfrom a
consciouslysimulated psychosisor from a "preconscious"imitation
,.hystericalconversion,"which all use,to accomplishtheir
or from a
unconsciouspurposes,learned or culturally transmitted models of
psychoticbehavior.Why should one be surprised' then, that the
iarne holds true of hypnosis,and that the risk of experimental
sophism-the arbitrary definition of the hypnotic state as a func-
tion of the test,and the test as a function of certain presuppositions
with regard to the state-is always presentl We are not capable
today, Kubie affrrmed, of distinguishing between what hypnosis
"is" and what, in its observablemanifestations,is a consequence or
sequelof the processof induction or of imitation or of preconscious
or hystericalsimulation of hypnotic phenomena'
In view of this, Kubie defined his position as heretical,heretical
on all fronts, psychoanalyticor experimental,exactly insofar as the
defrnition of these fronts presentsan obsracleto perplexity.Even
so. Kubie-who a{firmed that after -15yearsof research,whatever
,,orthodox"
the certainties,he could nor, for his part, say with cer-
tainty what a "subiect under hypnosis" is-was also the one who,
in our opinion, proposeda valuablenew conceptionof the problem
of hypnosis.This conception is founcled on the manner in which
the problem is posed,on the contrast between the induction Pro-
"state"
..dr... which can be describedand transmitted, and the
that eludes our proceduresof identihcation. Beginning in ry({'
Kubie ancl Sidney Margolin proposedthe establishn-rent of a dis-
tinction in kind berween the processof induction and the state it
provokes.T'
What clo we know ask Kubie and Margolin, about the process
of incluctionl we know that it does nor make it possibleto identify
any hi erarchyamong psychodynami c
a n y c o n fl i c t.a n v p re c e d ence.
processesand psychophysiologicalprocesses'As we have seen'
ireud haclnoted the diversityofinduction pr.cedures,and hypoth-
esizedthat when the hypnotist asks his subiect to concentratehis
"tells"
artentlon on a monotonous sound or on a bright light, he
him in fact: "Pay attention only to me, the rest is without interest."
Psychophysiological proceclureswould then be a trick aiming at
$
il
I
I
IrJarcissisticWounds 263
producing a psychodynamiceffect without arousing the subject's
r.rirtrn..r. Ilut, as Kubie and Margolin note, one could just as well
saythat the hypnotist usestricks that are analyzablein psychody-
namic terms to get around the emotional obstaclesthe patient uses
ro oppose the psychophysiologicalchange the induction process
produces.
In any case,thev emphasize,the psychophysiological procedures
having to do with the subject'ssensorimotorrelation to himself and
his environment cannot be reduced to a trick. They actually affect
the sensesubjectshave of themselves.Well before experimentson
sensorydeprivation confirmed this description,Kubie and Margo-
lin had already formed the hypothesisthat the continuousvariation
of information coming from the subject'senvironment and frorn
his own body constitutesthe basison which he activelyconstructs
the senseof his own frontiers. his olr'n autonomousexistencein an
envir onm entwher e he m ust bot h or ient him self and r naint ain a
stateof vigilance.All the proceduresof induction (immobilization,
constancyof sensorialllow with the exception of smell, which is
uncontrollable)would then have as a consequencethe obliteration
of the difference between the universe of the "self" and the uni-
of the "non-self."
'n'erse
In order to describethe "relation" betweenthe hypnotistand the
subject when the induction processreducesthe contact the latter
has with the external world to the v<liceor existenceof the former,
Kr,rbieand Margolin use the phrase:"They engulf eachother."The
phraseis deliberatelyphenomenological.The authors were trving
to avoid metaphors, such as "identi{ication" or "regression,"that
might suggestan explanati<1n. It is true that Kubie and Margolin
compare the situation with the one establishedbetween mother
and infant. but they do not imply that this comparisonwill neces-
sari lylead t o a pur ely psychodynam ic explanat ion.
It will be well to remember here that Stern expressedthe same
reservationsabout the notion of regression,which presupposes
stages.Although Stern clid not discussthe problem of hypnosis,
nothing precludesthe possibility that his notion of an articulated
c<lexistence betweendistinct simultaneousexperiencesof self,a no-
tion he proposesto substitute for that of a successionof stages,
264. NarcissisticWounds
rnrght be connecteclwith the incluctionprocess.The singular effect
of this processcould, for instance,be illumined through its contrast
with aspectsof the "normal" relation between the mother and the
infant as describedby Stern. On the one hand, the tmmobilization,
the monotony,the absenceof stimulation, imply a relation between
the subject and the environment that is the reverseof the relation
whose role Stern describedin the emergenceof the "nuclear self"
(variationsaround a visual, sonorous,or tactile invariant produce
the stimulus; concomitantly,the inf:rnt regulatesthis stimulus, no-
tably by turning his head aside).C)n the other hand, the suggestions
used by the hypnotist in the induction offer a positiveanalogywith
what Stern describesas an operationof "attunement" in which the
infant experienceshis own subiectiveexperiencesas shared rvith
the other.
That said,the incluctionoffersanother particularitythat reminds
us that statesapparently analogousto hypnosisexist in animals' In
animals,"induction" is reducedto a minimum: a specificcry of the
mother, a position clf forced immobility, or an interaction with a
predator sufices to bring on the state of plaving dead.ToBut the
s a meth i n g h a p p e n sw i th a " trai ned" subi ect:the mere presenceof
the hypnotist or a gesture from him sufices, as we have known
since Mesmer'stime. to tip certain trained subiectsinto a hypnotic
state.This might indicate,then, that the induction, as a proce,cs, in
the often laborious senseof the term, is one of the particular traits
of human hypnosis.'fhis would conlirm, perhaps,the discontinuity
between state and processinsofar as the latter would not explain
the former, would not "cause"it, but would createtfor humans.the
conditionsof its production, a comrnon possibilityfor animals and
fbr humans. This doesnot mean. however,that one might speakof
a "hypnotic state" common to humans and animals, an idea that
becomesall the more problematic insofar as the "hypnotic" state,
for anirnalsas well as humans, takes on different ethologicalmean-
ings according to whether it is instituted in relation to the mother,
a predator,or a congener.
We don't know what the hypnotic state "is," Kubie afirmed in
rg7z. However, we can define horv it differs from the processof
induction. In contrast to the latter, the hypnotic state allows the
NarcissisticWounds 26\
subject.at least in the caseof somnambulism,to conversewith the
hypnotistand other people,to move about, and to cliscusswhat he
perceives. In any case(whether the subjectrefusesto communicate,
or whether he has a passiveor negativeattitude),one can say that
the "relation" of mutual engulfment has ended, and that fronriers
distinguishingthe "self" from the "not-self" are reestablished. In-
cleed, the very reconstitution of these frontiers is what enables the
hypnotistto take the initiativesthat allow him to distinguishdiffer-
ent "t ypes"oF hypnosis.
In other words, if the srateo[ hvpnosisis, as Kubie put it, a trap
lbr all those who want to characterizeit in a univocal way on the
basisof a predetermined criterion, this is becausethe subject has
recoveredhis "autonom,v."He is once more related to a world ancl
to "ot her s";his event ualim m obilit y and silencear e no longer con-
ditions proposedby the hypnotist and acceptedbv him. They are
his, just as his eventualsuggestibilityis his.
It is this essentialambiguity-the fact that the "hypnotized"
subiect,far from acting like an autom:lton,a marionette subiectto
the authority of the hypnotist, is perfectly capable of personally
existing rvith respectto an other who is not fused with him-that
led Gill and Brenman to createthe curious notion of'"regressionin
the serviceof the ego." Kubie and Margolin, on the other hand,
preferredto limit themselvesto a hypotheticaldescriptionthat does
not claim to be a functional explanation.They were nevertheless
guided bv an analogy: in one way or anothel the infant must also
createfrontiers, createdistinctionsbetweenhimself and others; yet
in one way or another, this creation does not separatethe infant
from the adult. The infaru "incorporates"a parental image as a
component of himself. The creation of the hypnotic state might
then be defined as an "experimental reproduction of a natural de-
velopmentalprocess."8{r The eventualcomplianceof the hypnotized
subject,his "suggestibilitv."would revealthe fact that an "image"
of the hvpnotist had becornea componentof the "new" personality
the hypnotic statetemporarily creates.In this case,the subiectdoes
not obey the words pronouncedby the hypnotist,but his own "se-
cret voice,"which echoesthem. The subject does not follow sug-
!{estions,but experien6s5th6m-in the caseof somnarnbulism-
266 Narcissistic Wounds
as what he himself thinks. The subject does not submit, but ex-
perienceswhat he is told to do as what he, spontaneously, wants
to do.
When Lacanian psychoanalysts, forgetting that Freud himself
spoke about the puzzle of hypnosis,unproblematically integrate
this phenomenoninto the framework of theoreticalmodels that are
supposedto explain it, they attribute to the hypnotist the statusof
an imposter,as if the hypnotist "took the place"of what he had no
right to be, as if he came, in an illusory way, in the place of the
Other, to fulfill the desire of the Other. In short, they provide for
themselvesthe means of understanding both the reasonsfor his
"power" and the reasonswhy the therapist must, on all accounts,
avoid this power, must resistthe temptation,even for the "good" of
the analysand,to occupy a place that should, by its very nature,
remain empty. Kubie and Margolin'sdescriptionauthorizesus nei-
ther to believe we understand nor to iudge. It attempts rather to
characterizean euentwhose possibilitywe must nrte noteo/ without
claiming to deduce a theory from it, and which, afortiori, we can-
not judge on the basisof that theory.The induction process,which
is in itself irreducible to a purely psychodynamictheory since it
links "psychophysiological"and "psychodynamic" factors, would
doubtlessbe a condition of the hypnotic state,but would not ex-
plain it. The hypnotist cannot, then, be "iudged" as an illusory
occupant of a preexisting place. He is integrated in the creation of
a new order of existencein a mode that he himself cannot control
but only note, or, like Michaux, attempt to categorize.
Like fanet when he spoke in PsychologicalAutomatism of spiri-
tualists,the possessed, of societygames or of mediums, when he
quoted a novel with admiration, but also like Freud when humor,
dreams, or slips struck him as masterpiecesmore than as proofs,
Kubie arousesinterest,opens questionsand hypotheses,and, espe-
cially,situateswhat we think we are able to manipulateand control
in the concreteworld the laboratory is constructedto exclude.Far
from defining it as an obstacle,Kubie was interestedby the fact that
hypnosiseludes experimentalcontrol, identificationby stablecate-
gories,and the purilication that enablesthe hypnotist to claim he
understandswhat he produces.He thus kept open the question of
ItlarcissisticWounds 267
rhe manner in which the "causes"that undeniably intervenein the
production of the hypnotic statecome to terms with eachother.To
r','hatdegreeis the hypnotic statemarked by the induction processi
Ancl even though this processmay be subjectto a protocol, doesn't
it createin an uncontrollableway a "manner" of experiencinghyp-
nosisi What would this statebe if it could be initiated without the
certain of an affectiverelation betweentwo individualsl
In this perspective,the very term "hypnosis" appearsto be am-
biguous. Either one of two options pertains.In one option, "hyp-
nosis"designatesthe specificevent produced by the induction pro-
cess, and is therefore inseparable from the specific role the
hypnotistplaysin this process.One ought then to saythat hypnosis,
bv the same token as psychoanalysis, is linked with modernity as a
dual relation between,on the one hand, an active experimenting
subjectwho createsthe conditions of the experiment,who, follow-
ing Michaux's expression,names and announceshypnosisand pre-
sentshimself as a guarclianand protector,and, on the other,a "sub-
ject of the experiment," the locus of the question. In the second
option, "hypnosis" designatesthe "corpus" of experimentsone will
risk hypothetically considering as similar even when they don't
often make it possibleto distinguish the activesubiectwho directs
lrom the one who is directed and represents,from the other'spoint
of view, the problem of "heart."
All the same,learning more about hypnosisin the limited sense
requires us to engage in the study of the corpus of so-called
"trance" states,if only to attempt to show what hypnosisowes to
the specificposition of the hypnotist.We need to know more about
autohypnosis,collectivetraqces,the subject'sincarnationof a super-
natural being, or even trance statesproduced without "authoriza-
tion" from a person,a rite, or an institution. We havespecialists on
all of that, from ethnologiststo explorers,who study "altered states
of consciousness." Our task is doubtlesslessto "discover"new fields
than to learn to stop creating oppositionsbetween specialistsof
rational studiesand authors who, for motives presumed to be un-
avowable,are "tempted by the irrational." We must perhaps learn
also to stop defending the "specificity" of certain fields as if this
specificityhad some specialethical or political value.
268 NarcissisticWounds N,zrcksistit- Wounds z69

Why is the afirmation that the "rites of pirssage"of traditional rheduti.e-; of rationality are respectecl.8r "Reason" u,ill not refer for
civilizations are part of a "symbolic system" that ought to b. .on- therr-rto Power or rights. but to our capacities of arguing, of con-
"Reason"
sideredin its totality supposedto attest to or guaranteerespectfe1 srrucringproblems,of inventing relevant representations.
theseciviliz-ationsiWhy wouldn't thev have put in place the con_ will not be opposed to heart, but will constitute a way of being that
clitionsfor psychiceventsthat we could learn ar leastto character_ involveswhat rve call heart, that intensifies Ihe passionate require-
ize as such if not unclerstandfWhy should the fact rhar psychoan_ men t oi r elevance, of im aginat ion,: r nd of r isk - a r equir em entt hat
alysts refuse to authorize hypnosis prohibit us from asking, like alone makes it possible for humans to work togethe r. Then a nerv
Kubie and Margolin, if "a successfulhypnotic relation" (in the chapter of the history of heart and reason rvill be inaugurated, a
broad senseof the term, of course)is not "an essentialingredient hi st or yt hat will enable us at last t o lear n along wit h t hosewhose
in every successfulpsychotherapv")ErAnd especiallywhy couldnt practicespeaks to us about r,r.'hatheart can do, along rvith those
such a question be part of the analvtic setting itselfi i'...^ro., of reality"-not only hypnotists but also shamans,magi-
As a product of experimental reason,the analytic setting gives ci ansand ot her coniur er s,pr act it ioner sof "sof t " m edicine,anim al
free reign to irony, which always f udges in the name of a beyond. tamers, fortune tellers,or sorcerers.
What effectrnight the humor of perplexedreason,rvhich emerged
fron.rthe fourth narcissisticwound, have on this settingl It is hu-
mot moreover,that hypnosis should inspire more than anything
else in the experiencedhypnotist. How does he figure in the phe-
nomenon he seemsto be causingi Horv can he, without a senseof
humor, stand to make this statementwhose magical characterGill
and Brenman expressed:"l am going to make you able to do things
v o u o th e rw i s ec a n n o t" I
The witnessesof hvpnosis get their stories tangled. We hear
pouring from their lips referencesto children, savages,the pos-
sessecl,clefbctives,amnesiacs,the miraculously healed, miracle
workers. animals, ancl also to themselves,stuck between the re-
quirements of Lavoisierand the hurnble, wondering astonishment
of Puys6gurbefore the young Alexandre H6bert.8:If they succeed
in the future in integrating this tangled testimony into the history
of our discussedand relevant knorvledge,if they succeedin caus-
ing, thanks to this testimony,different lights and inventiveargu-
ments, undoubtedly no sciencewill be born that can attain the
degreeof certitude of the scienceof ()alileo and Lavoisier.Reason
,, ju,Jg. will not havecliscoveredthe meansof giving a reasonable
account of heart, o[ obtaining fiom the heart the account that
would be an obiect of science.But doubtlessalso, those who will
be engaged in this new history will smile at the identificationot
reasonwith the promise of a Potuergiving the rrght to iudge if only

Conclusion
The harshesttruths are heard and
recognizedat last, after the interests
they have iniured and the emotions
they have roused have exhausted
their fury.
-Freud, "Future Prospectsof
Psycho-AnalyticTherapy"
When Freud presentedpsychoanalysis as "a wounding truth," that
is, as inevitably bound to arousecriticism and rejection,he utilized
the most powerfully suggestiveargument conceivablein our mod-
ern era, haunted as it is by the condemnation of Copernicusand
Galileo. Who among us would like to find himself classifiedby
historiansin the same catelaoryas C-)alileo's judgesor the naturalists
who opposedDarwin with proof of the harmonious finality of the
living realml Moreover,the suggestivepower of Freud'sargument
is intensifiedin the caseof psychoanalysis. Neither Copernicusnor
Galileo nor Dawin could use astronomy or biology to interpret the
resistancesthey had to confront. How could the critic of psycho-
analysisnot wonder if his very objectionswere not the best proof
of the painful relevanceof the truth he criticizedi
The theme of the narcissisticwound is indeed the viaticum
Freud bequeathedto his successors. It is at the sametime the source
of the transferenceonto psychoanalynithat, from generation to gen-
eration, pulls toward the initiatory couch most of those involvedin
the history of heart and reason by their questions,demands,and
suffering. An identical mechanism subtendsthe public history of
psychoanalysis and the history playedout in eachcure. The wound
is the very sign of truth. Criticisms, reluctance,and indifferenceall
have the status of resistanceagainst what one should come to ac-
cept. The question of heart and reasonhas accededhere to a posi-
Conclusion 27r
tion of apparent stability.In the name of reason,heart finds itself
called upon to acceptand to desire, in a kind of "hopeful belief,"
rhat a wounding truth will impose itself on it. Heart thus offers
itself as the domain of a passionwhere the history of reason,rhe
history of truth triumphing over the soothing comfort of illusions
and facsimiles,will be recapitulatedon an individual level.
However, as we have emphasized in this book, the suggestive
fbrce of history derives only from its simplification. Indeed, the
"first narcissisticwound" entailed,for the descendantsof Coperni-
cus, passionfor a unique truth. Before being condemned,Galileo
refused the concordat proposed to him by the Church. He de-
manded that the Church yield and accept,authority against au-
thority, the replacementof revealedtruth by Copernicantruth. But
this same passionfor such a truth is a temptation and a snare for
biologists.Since Darwin, propositionshave succeededeach other,
all aiming, like the most recent one, sociobiology,at conferring on
the specialistof Darwinian evolution the power to judge, to leave
the labyrinth of particular and local historiesfor a global point of
view making it possiblea priori to negateand affirm. The Coper-
nican wound has been forgotten, and we are proud to be different
from our elders,proud to possess the truth they reiected.The Dar-
winian wound persists,however,and marks especiallyDarwin's de-
scendantswho haveto renouncethe power to judge given solelyto
the descendantsof Copernicus,for the passionateapprenticeshipof
practicalrelationsbetweenreasonand history implied by the Dar-
winian mode of interpretation.r
What happens in this perspectiveto the third wounding truth,
the one Freud inflicted oq human narcissismi No doubt, many
psychoanalysts today can envisagerendering the themesof analytic
truth and the analyst'sknowledge more complex. They can even,
following Laplanche'sformulation,z put the analyst'srenunciation
of knowledge at the center of their practice. But this humility
seemscloser to the position of Copernicust descendantwho con-
demns defacto what he seemshumbly to renoun6s-p6n'1 ask us
"why," we can only understand "how"-than to the unquiet per-
plexity of the Darwinian wondering what evolutionary history
might have produced the singularly complex device of the eye, for
272 Conclusion
example.The rejectionof knowledge is not the same as perplexity'
It is basedon a theoreticaliudgment, and founds, in turn, a past
judgment againsttechniquesthat don't enactthis iudgment' as well
as against mechanismsof suggestionthat might be suspectedof
o p era ti n g b y th o s ete c h n i ques.
We have tried throughout this book to give meaning to an ap-
parently paracloxicalobservarion:if a "truth" finds its best proof in
the virulent reaction of the interestsit iniures and the emotions it
rouses,it is not at present the Freudian unconsciousthat such a
reacrion"verifies" (even if many analystsstill claim to define it as
unacceptable,and seethe living proof of this in the "flagrant mis-
understanding"that most of their colleagues,with whom they dis-
agree,have of psychoanalysis). The Freudian unconsciousappears
today rather as the rampart erectedby a professionagainsta ques-
tion that endangers their interestsand challengesthe apologetic
hisrory ir has consrructedfor itself. The question rousing virulent
reactionsis: What if the Freudian foundation of psychoanalysis
were not a break with the practicesof hypnosisand suggestion'
which Freud himself used, but the invention of a new way (or
m a n n e r)o f p ra c ti c i n gth e mi
This question is not new. As we haveseen,Freud tried to answer
it, to particularize the effectsthat might verify the relevanceof an
interpretation in relation ro those effectsthat revealed"only" the
suggestivecharacter of an erroneous or arbitrary interpretatlon.
But he di<1not, for all that, deny the fact that it was contact with
charcot and with hypnosisthat led him to rhe necessityof invent-
ing a "psychic causality" foreign to the categoriesof both physiol-
ogy and psychology.rAs late as 1924he wrote: "lt is not easy to
over-estimatethe importance of the part played by hypnotism in
From a theoreticalas
the history of the origin of psycho-analysis.
psycho-analysishas at its
well as from a therapeuticpoint of view,
command a legacy which it has inherited from hypnotism'"4For
was not the opponent of suggestion,but had
Freud, psychoanalysis
"putting suggestionin the serviceof knowl-
succeededrather in
definesthe
edge."This implies concomitantly that psychoanalysis
unconsciousas a reliable witness of this knowledge' In the ex-
tremely specificconditions createdby the analytic setting,the hu-
Conclusion 273
man psychemust make it possiblefor the analyst to recognizea
differencebetween the practical effectsof an "arbitrary" interpre-
tation and the eft-ects of an interpretation touching the reasonsof
the unconscious.
The history of ideas is hungry for continuity.Without any difii-
culty, it deciphersa continuity making the Freudian conceptionof
the unconsciousthe heir to the tradition that, since Plato, opposes
truth to illusion, definesthe appeal of truth as the primary stakes
of human existence,and judges this existenceaccordingto whether
it answersor resiststhis appeal.The history of ideasfinds confir-
mation of this continuity in the quite strangeway in which some
have,as we have seen,"commanded the legacy psychoanalysis has
inherited from hypnotism." The Freudian unconscioushas taken
the placeof traditional philosophiesof the subject,free and auton-
omous to the degree it is disengagedfrom illusion. Psychoanalysts
comment on this place of analysisin terms that are not, of course,
Cartesian or Kantian, but they define it neverthelessagainst the
same adversaries.Hypnosis and suggestionhave once more taken
on their traditional role: they represent what the practitioner ought
to define himself against,no longer on technicalbut now on ethical
grounds.
We have preferred to read in Freud's creation a new chapter of
the history of heart and reason,recognizing in it an issueforeign
to Plato as well as to theologiansor philosophers.For Freud, the
question of truth in its relations with suggestionwas not ethical,
but principally technical.In order for psychoanalysis to becomea
scientifrctechnique capableof making researchand therapy con-
verge, it was necessaryth-at the truthful decoding of the mecha-
nisms of the unconscious)rave effectson the human psychethat
were distinguishablefrom thoseof suggestion.Then and only then
would psychoanalysisbe distinct from ancient magical practices,
and become a professionalknowledge capableof taking its place
with other scientificknowledge.
In this perspective,the fact that both hypnosisand suggestion
are treated as anathema undoubtedly testifiesto the suggestive
power of tradition. But this power itself derives from afact that is
historical preciselybecauseit was a priori unpredictable.'I'his fact
 274 Conclusion
is that the analytic setting did not confer on the "rruth" the power
Freud had hoped. Resistances are ofien insurmounrable:psycho-
analysisis an "impossible profession."It is the transfbrmation of
this "fact" into a painful badge of glory that psychoanalysishas
"commanded" since r9j7, since the refusal Freud addressedone
l e s t ti m e to F c re n c z i ' sq u e sti ons.
If the failure announcedby Freud in ryj7 was ro be recognized
as a failure instead of being transformed into a theoretical vic-
tory-psychoanalysis is able to decipher and understand the ob-
staclesto treatment; the theory is good even if resistances are often
invincible-should we then conclude that nothing happened,that
absurdity and arbitrarinessare the only keys to the Freudian ad-
venturel Would not then evervthing be allowed since nothing
would havemeaningl Why not then abandonall hope of thought,
becomea shaman or a healerl One could rather easilysilencethis
"Dostoyevskian" cry. and reply that not everyonecan become a
shaman or a healer.One has to have that "tact," that transferential
authority that, according to Freud, the analvtic setting was pre-
ciselygoing to subject to a protocol so that magical art would be-
cotne a techniqueusableby anyone(the analvsisthat every therapist
was to undergo had, beyond its role in the transmissionof psycho-
analvsis,preciselythe function of reducing the imporrance of the
personalequation in analytic u'ork, of bringing the therapist closer
to the ideal of anonymity).But we havetried to listen to this cry in
which we recognize the very expressionof the narcissisticwound
Freud bequeathedto us, the wound that affectsfirst and foremost
the analystswho are Freud's heirs, just as rhe l)arwinian wound
affects the biologists who are Darwin's heirs. One of the major
stakesof this book was the effort ro emerge fiom this "Dostoyev-
skian" alternative,to show that its apparenrlvinsurmountablechar-
acter derived from a specificposition of reasonidentihed with the
power to iudge.
The only answer to the "l)ostoyevskian"alternativeis a practical
one. This alternativealways intends, in effect,to preservea foun-
dation without which, it claims, norhing would hold together.But
foundations have never held things together.They always come
"after,"to justify what alreadyexisrs,to provide arms for thosewho
Conclusion 275
believethat nothing elsecan exist. Foundationsare the instrument
of re asonwhen it has r o be def endedagainsrhist or v.This is why
we do not think post-Freudianhistory will take place in the realm
of philosophy,even though philosophycrearedthe image of reason
as j udge. I t will t ake placer at her in t he r ealm of t he pr act icesand
i nte r est sent wined ar ound t he m enacingquesr ion:"What if hyp-
nosisand suggestionhad been the 'good fortune' of psychoanalysis,
what caused the effectsof its interpretationsand what therefore
mad e possiblet he excit ing cult ur al advent ur e giving so m any
words, so many situations,so many conflictsnew meaningsl"
We did not try to make this book into a demonsrrarionbecause
the stakesof our enterprisewere aboveall of a practicalnature-
arousing perplexity in the very placewhere rnoral judgmenrsabout
liberty,subiection,truth, and illusion havetransformedinto a pow-
erful conflict the division between what we can explain by reason
ancl what makes us lil'e. We know the style u'e adopteclwill wouncl
those who consider as barbarousand scornful the offhand way we
haveat time s-in spite of "scholarly" references-treated decades
of work, of creation of definitions,of theoreticalcontroversies. In-
deed, we dicl not establishthe right to explore, with our limitecl
means, the question of heart and reason in such a way that this
right had to be recognizedby anyone.We tooft this right precisely
so that others will feel iustified in taking it also.Our hope was nor
to prove but to try to open a new realm ofevents and discussionon
the basisof the experiences, questions,and knowledge of our read-
ers, whether thev already consciouslvpossessthem or r.l'hether,by
a kind of resonanceell-ect,they are led to actualizethem. Thrs book
therefore constitutes,and in a literal sense,dz efort of suggestion.
Quite evidently,this effort is addressednot only to psychoana-
lysts but to all those who todav occupy the 6eld defined by the
relations of heart and reason.From the beginning, we choseas a
symbol for what we hoped to make come alive,the name of fussieu,
that naturalist who dared resist the passionfor judging harbored
by the other commissioners,but who, on the other hand, did not
let himself be carried away by Deslon'sand Mesmer'senthusiasm.
Naturalist practiceis an empirical practice.]ust as interestin sug-
gestionand hypnosisdoes not constitutefor us a backward move-
276 Conclusion
ment but the practical translation of the wounding truth Freud
spoke about (a truth that, like the truth of Darwinism, wounds
mostly those whose field it redefines),the challengeof empiricism
does not derive from the old ideal of "neutral" observation.This
challengeas well is the practicaloutcome of a wound, in this case,
the wound hypnosisand suggestioninflict, as we haveseen,on the
experimentalideal of those who believedthemselvescapableof es-
caping the "irrational" ambiguitiesof psychoanalysis. After decades
of "rigorous" experimentation with hypnosis,it is not impossible
that the representatives of experimentalreasonmay come to admit
that the hypnotized subjecteludesthem as it eluded Freud.
H y p n o s i sc h a l l e n g e si,n a n i ntri nsi c w ay and not becausei t has
been "poorly" examined, the purpose of all experimentation,
whether the purpose is to call a phenomenonto account for itself,
to understandthe conditionsin which its testimonycan be retained
as reliable,and to createexperimentallya distinction between this
"objective" register and the totality of other registersde{ined as
illusory or incapableof standing up to testing.Hypnosis produces
"false witnesses."It transforms the conditions that are supposedto
make obiectification possible into so 'rrluchinformation so that the
witnessintegratesinto his testimonythe mode in which he is inter-
rogated and in which he can give, or refuse to give, satisfactionto
his interrogators.Whoever urtesthe meansof obfectifying hypnosis
by that very gesture giues to the one he interrogates the means of
producing what the interrogator fears more than anything'.an ar-
ttfact.
The challengeof empiricism, the challengeposed to our ideals
of knowledge by the "false witnesses"created by hypnosis,is to
achievea practical transformation of the problem of the artifact,
which must ceaseto be a menace threatening every experimenter
with the reduction of his researchto zero. The production of a
"false witness" is an event. Examined in and of itself, the produc-
tion of the multiple falsewitnessesby hypnosisand suggestioncon-
stitutesa corpusdefining the "puzzle" of what we call hypnosisand
of what hypnosismakes suggestioncapableof. It is a corpus that
createsresonanceamong many 6elds partitioned off by our knowl-
edge,but also separatedby millions of yearsof biologicalevolurion,
Conclusictn
by human history,and by cultural pracrices.This corpus is de{ined
by a perplexity that is intensified today both by uneasinessin the
face of irrationality and by the fear of being pulled beyon<lthe
reassuringfrontiers of intellectual disciplines.we believerhar rhis
perplexity is not one rhat a new point of view could miraculouslv
causeto disappear.It particularizes,rather, the way in which we
might learn to learn on the basisof this corpus.Learning to learn
involvesas well learning to transmit and to discuss.perplexity calls
up a way of learning whose rigor and requirementswould not be
defined or pervadedby the ideal of an "end of history,"of a stabi-
lized separationberween the object of learning and the one who
learns.This is why we think the challengeof the "false wirnesses"
of hypnosisand suggestioncould be met by the practiceof a "rrans-
disciplinary" researchidentifying its participantsas perplexedau-
thors and not as representatives of their respectivedisciplines'au-
thority.
C)ne might add that a similar challengeis signaledby the fear
that so many physicianshaveof being confusedwith magical heal-
ers if they take accounrin their pracriceof what rheyftnow in other
respects,that is, the crucial role of "placebo" effects.This has a
paradoxicalconsequence.Patientswho suffer from functional dis-
turbances that are responsiveto these effects and who are not
"lucky" enough to believein some "soft" medicine or anorher will.
if they don't happen upon a physician endowed with suggestive
power,find themselvestrearedas what every physicianknows they
are not-bodies subjectto intelligible relationsof causeand effect,
objectsof science.Physicians"know very well," but still forget in
the name of sciencethat the qredical act is a concreretechnicalact
(giuinga medicationto someone). Here again,fear and "professional
morality" go together just like the barbaric image of suggesrion
(Hitler!) and its mendaciousimage (one can't say just "anything"
to a patient).Physiciansact as if their omitting to take inro accounr
those aspectsof human nature that elude our accountsdoes not
leavethe field open to those who haveexcellentreasonsto be inter-
estedin them and to profit from the naivet6and ignorancebrought
about by silence.
Is it really utopian to hope that a day will come when the presenr
278 Conclusion
situation will, in retrospect,appearincomprehensible(or explicable
r Can "transferenceonto psychoanalysis"
only by cultural and professionalimperatives)l Then historiansof
medicine will try to understand why research,medical training,
euen the criteria of professionalselection have in our time left in the
shadowsthe "subjectivefactor"5 only becauseof its uncontrollable
character(while, on the other hand, some explain the relativesuc-
cessof homeopathicmedicine, for example,by the time and atten-
tion homeopathicdoctorsgive to their patients)f It is dificult now
for us to comprehend the resistanceof Austrian doctorsin the face
of the desperatepleas of Semmelweis:Wash your hands before
delivering a babyl They did not understand the relation between
what their hands carried and the responsible,abstractmedical act
they proceededto accomplish according to the rules of the art.
They were inclignantthat their hands might be suspectedof bring-
ing death. But the physiciansof today close themselvesoff in the
sameabstractionon the pretext that the true authority of medicine
has to do with the power of techniquesand medications,leaving
the "rest" to uncontrollable circumstancesor to enlightened lies.
Here again, transdisciplinarypracticesare not the "universal solu-
tion" but a possiblepath that might lead us to learn how to consti-
tute, beyond truths and lies, a transmissible,practical knowledge
about this "reality" that is inextricablybiological,psychological,so-
cial, and cultural, and that every therapeuticpractice(including the
"human" techniquesof pedagogy,politics,etc.),ancientor modern,
has in one way or another to deal with.
There still remains one objection that needsto be discussed.It
is the objectionthat might be posedby the psychoanalyst who does
not define himself as a researcherbut as a practitionercarrying out,
with the instrumentshe has,an exciting and difficult craft. In what
way do thesequestionsfinally concern himi Why ask him to leave
his field of competencei Why take psychoanalysis as our particular
rargerl
Is the answer of psychoanalysis to the questionof heart and rea-
son really stable, really capableof founding a professionalpracticel
It is certainly stablein principle since in its most sophisticatedfor-
mulations it has erased the touchstonethat the therapeuticeffec-
tivenessof his technique was for Freud. But is it stablein practicel
Conclusion 279
sufficein the long term to
m:rintain the privilegesand claims rhar are the conditions of psy-
choa nalyt icpr act icel
We have already recalledthe proliferation of disparate"psycho-
analytic languages"and the multiplication of maledicrions:"mov-
ing outside of psychoanalysis"is rvhat every theoreticianaccuses
"the others" of doing, and if one lvere to add up all the schools
accu sedby ot her sof pr act icingsuggest ion. one would end up m ak-
ing an exhaustivelist of psychoanalyticpractices.But what about
the "public," what about the "hopeful belief" on which the psy-
choanalyst's craft dependsl Certainly,in a country like the U.S.S.R.,
this expectationis very much alive since it is paralleledby an at-
traction for the frrrbidden. It is possiblethat in the years to come
the U.S.S.R.will becomea privileged "mission 6eld" for the differ-
ent psychoanalyticschoolswho rvill tear each other apart as the
Protestantsand Catholics did in the past (and secretlycontinue to
do today) in the "virgin" territoriesopenedto them by colonization
of the planet. Through a particularity that remains to be clarified,
France has offered to the world the version of a "post-Freudian
Freudianism" that has been the most fit for intensifying"the trans-
ferenceonto psychoanalysis," that is, the transformationof psycho-
analysis into an anthropological doctrine. However, disquieting
signs abound such as the new fashion of "Ericksonianism."Eliza-
beth Roudinescoherself found it appropriate to end her "history"
o[ psychoanalysisin France with a telegram destined by a hypo-
thetically resuscitatedFreud to "history" (that is, to France):
"Thanks to everyone.Start everything over from the beginning."
As for the United States,w(hout taking up again the virulent at-
tacks that for a long time it has been fashionableto addressto
American "moralizing, normalizing adaptionism,"it seemsthat the
"transference' onto a heroic reason,which calls and waits for a
wound, has never really functioned.The presentsituation,with its
proliferation of therapeutictechniquesand the creation of patient
"defense movements,"does not seem to promise a really radiant
future f or psychoanalysis.
Should one then wait for the "beautiful death" of psychoanaly-
sisl Should one be understandingtoward thoseanalystswho bring
z8o Conclusion
the rule of silenceto l>earon challengesthat might shakethe hope-
{ul belief psychoanalysisdepends on, that might "cut off the
s'
branch" we are all sitting on (as Roustangwas accusedof doing)l
We don't think so. One might fear, in effect,that psychoanalysis,
making "its beautiful cleath,"would leavebehind a ravagedintel-
lecrual field. a field where that blind pragmatism might reign
w h o s e d a n g e r p re s e n tl vs e r vesas a rampart agai nsti nteresti n sug-
gestion.This interest constitutes,to our mind, the chanceof avoid-
ing such an alternative,the possibilityof a post-Freudianismthat
would not be a renunciation.It is the chance,then,for psychoanaly-
sr'.',de{inedat this juncture, and first of all, as the heritageof Freud.
It is the continuanceof the demanding path that first led him to
seein the mutative power of hypnosisthe expressionand the proof
that the human psycheeludesordinary causalcategories,and then
to abandon hypnosisas an instrument in order to invent the ana-
lytic setting,and finally to conclude that that setting did not have
the power he had hrst supposed.
Severalyearsago, one of us wrote:
If, one day,one introducedhypnosisinto the trainingcycleof analvsts
(which is still a futuristicidea),one would alsohaveto foreseethat not
evervonewould becomecapableof practicingit. At any rate,it would be
good for them to try. It might be that one or another of them rvould feel
afraid to engagein this practice.In his personalanalysis, he rnight then
discoverthe reasons for his fearsand recoverthe freedomof his attitudes.
Finally,if there were candidates rvhowere decidedlyincapable of practic-
ing hypnosis, this experience w,ouldstill not havebeenuselesssincelater
when they would be obligedto excludehypnosisfrom their psychothera-
peuticrepertoire, they would not get the ideaof making a virtue of ne-
cessitv.As ltor the others,they rvould be led toward a practicewhich,
undeniably,is moreexactingthan the practiceof traditionalanalysis.6
It is clear that we do not intend to presenthypnosisas a skeleton
kev that would open all doors, but as a possibilitythat ought to be
at the disposalof psychoanalysts as it was for Freud, and also,and
perhapsespecially, as an instrument challengingthe symptomsthat
the disgust for hypnosisand the fear of suggestion-which Freud
was never subject 16-h2ys become. As Gill and Brenman re-
minded us, the experienceof hypnosisrevivesthe perplexity of the
psychoanalyst, leads him to confront this question: "What am I in
Conclusion z8 r
this affairi" From this point of vieu.; the experienceof hypnosis
constitutesnot only, as Freud said, the best proof of the existence
of the unconscious,but also the best means for transmitting the
narcissisticwound the unconsciousinflicts on us. The experience
of hypnosis is therefore tor us a test, a possiblerevelationof the
f'ears,disgust,and appetitefbr power revealednow and then in the
vocation of "becoming an analyst,"as well as the sourceof a per-
plexity that should enable the therapist to discover,r,i,ithoutprud-
ishnessor moral scandal,his style, the register of eventshe is ca-
pable of producing. It is probable that this liberty is preciselythe
one that "good" therapists have conquered through experience.
llere again, what is at stake for us was not to "discover" unsus-
pectedpossibilities,but rather to stop defining this liberty,of which
the experienceof hypnosisis a test,as a "surplus" that should,since
ir is unconrrollable,be left in the realm of the implicit. We wish,
on the contrary, to integrate this liberty into the image analysis
constructs for itself through its transmission procedurest (see
Freudt exchangewith Ferenczi on "tact").
However, wouldn't such a changedestroypsychoanalysis sinceit
rvould strike at the "hopeful belief" of the analysanciiWould not
hypnosis,or psychoanalysis, if practicedwithout the direct sugges-
tion constitutedby the knou'n existenceof a doctrine, sap the con-
Edencethe analysandhas in the analyst'sporverl Doesn'rhypnosis
dependon the goodwill of the personwho must acceptundergoing
it. and doesn'tit, in this respect,put the therapist in a position of
eminent vulnerabilityl Doesn't hypnosisannounce,in short, that
the analyst doesn't know about the eventshe producesl In other
words, isni the transferenceannounced by the "therapeutic alli-
ance" addressedbv definition to the power of reason and to the
drama of the wound that establishesit, and nor ro the perplexed
exploration hypnosisinvolvesboth for the hypnotist and the hyp-
notizedi
We do not believein any preformed answersto thesequestions
anv more than we believe in the absolutepower of the Freudian
protocol,valid in principle for "anyone."Practicalapprenticeshipis
here, as elsewhere.necessary.It is true that the very practice of
hypn osii in analvsisim plies t hat t he analysand"accept sa gam e, '
z8z Conclusion

accepts,explicitly or not, a common exploration.But the question

of whether the analysandis capableof entering into this game, of
acceptingthe lack of knowledge it implies, should not posefor the
therapist a problem basicallyany different from the one he deals ReferenceMatter
with when he decideswhether or not to accepta patient for anal-
ysis.It is a question of "tact." In a more generalway, it is useful to
recall the example of janet, for whom, quite clearly,his "poor pa-
tients" were incapable of being interested in science.Perhapshe
was right about "his" patients.But perhaps also the analyst who
today afirms that "his" patients could never be interestedin the
practicesof a perplexedreasonand could never nourish their hope-
ful belief with thesepracticesis allowing himself to be enclosedin
evidencethat tomorrow might make others laugh at him as Lacan
ridiculed Janet.
As Freud, who believedin science,and Lacan also,who believed
only in the "subject of science,"both thought, the chapter consti-
tuted in the history of heart and reasonby the psychoanalyticad-
venture is linked to the hopeful belief in the power of reasonthat
characterizesour era. The fact that the encounterbetweenthe two
authors of this book could take place,and that this book could be
written, is a symptom. The hopeful belief has lost its intensity;
other interestsare awakening,linking up, and mutually nourishing
each other, intereststhat expressno longer the ideal of reasonas a
powerful judge, but the ideal of an impertinent and creativereason,
a perplexedand interestedreason,engagedin a labyrinth of stories
whose tangled paths it explores,a reasonthat itself was produced
by a story teachingit what it is able to do. This reasonwould found
its claims neither on fear of sorcerersnor on fear of judges, but
would be interestedin what sorcerersand judges were capableof
doing and of making others believe.The choicebetweenthe main-
tenanceat all costs of old solidarities-hidden sometimesby the
irony, derision, and perversitythat judges so easily indulge-and
the risk of perplexrtyand pertinenceis now posed,as it was for us,
to all thosewho are today,in the faceof "heart," the representatives
of reason.This choicecannot be expressedwithout humor sincein
any caseit bearson a "hopeful belief,"on the engagementof reason
by heart.
I{otes

Full citations of sourcescited in the Notes can be found in the Biblioera-

phy, pp. 3o7-r5.

Prefaceto thc American Edition

r. The theme of the "narcissisticwound," which we will treat in Chap-
ter 4, was introduced by Freud at the end ofChapter r8 ofthe "lntroduc-
tion to Psychoanalysis."Freud placeshis work in a category similar to that
of the work of Copernicus and Darwin: all three aroused a ferocious
resistancebecausethey inllicted a seriousdenial of humanity's"naive ego-
ism."
z. See,for example, S. Strum's Almost Human: A Journeyinto the World
of Baboons.
3. The acts of the colloquium have been published as l-a suggestion:
Hypnose, infuence, transe, ed. D. Bougnoux.

Preface to the Original Edition "'

r. See Prigogine and Stengers, Entre le temPset l'4ternity'.

z. The latestsuch study drawing public attention is that of Griinbaum,
The Foundationsof kychoanalysis.The work of K. Popper and H. Putnam
should also be kept in mind.
3 . M a n n o n i , "L . C h e r to k,2 o o a n s a p r d s...l 'h yp n o se ," p . r 9 r .
4. To confirm this type of Lacanian analysis,G6rard Miller ("Sur le
discoursdu Maitre et l'hypnose")claims to have "practicedhypnosis,"but
stripped of all "ritual," that is, in conditions where it cannot be distin-
guished from suggestibility. See Chertok, Senseand Nonsensein Psycho'
therapy, pp. r7o-72.
5. Roudinesco,Pour une politiquc de la psychanalyse, p. t6.
 #r
286 Notes to Pages xxiu-g $ Notes to Pages 9-jr 287

6. Roudinesco, La bataille de cent ans: Histoire de la psychanalyseen $ z.o. Ibid.

France.t: zt,t. ''j zr. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Histoire du magnitismeanimal, pp. 42-43.
7. For the "hypnotic symptom" see Roudinesco,I-a bataille de cent ans,
r : 169and z : 4r 3.
i z.z. Ibid., p. 43.
24. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
25.Ibid.,p. 46.
8. Schulz-Keil, "Questionsd'6thique," p. ro4. 26. Ibid., p. t49. 27. Ibid., p. 49.
g. L6vy-Leblond, L'esprit de sel. 28. Ibid., p. 52. 29. Ibid., p. 69.
ro. Freutl,'Analysis Grminable and Interminable,"p. z3o. 3o.Ibid., pp. 7o-7r. 3t . I bid. ,p. 8t .
r r. One of us has already devoteda book to the subiectof hypnosisas 32,. Moscovici, L'dge desfoules.
a "spoil-sport": Chertok, Senseand Nonsensein Psychotherapy. The reader 33. Shor and Orne, eds.,The Nature of Hypnosis,p. 14.
interestedin hypnosis will find there a more systematicpresentationof j4. Ibid., p. r5, italics in the original.
hypnosisthan can be found in the presentvolume. The reader might also 35. Ibid., p. ft.
consult three other works by the same author: Chertok and de Saussure, j6. Ibid., p. r7, italics in the original.
The TherapeuticReuolution; Che rtok, Hypnosis; and Che rtok, Hypnose et j7 . Ib i d .,p p . r 7 - r 8 .
suggestion.The reader will also frnd in Mimories d'un hiritique (written in 38. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Histoire du magnitismeanimal, p. 16o.
collaborationwith D. Gille) a complementary approach to our theme: it 39. Ibid.
is not sufrcient to designatehypnosisas a bearer of heresy; it is equally 4o. See Popper, The Logic of Scienttfc Dicouery.
important to understand what draws an individual to heresy and what 4r. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Histoire du magndtismeanimal, p. 164.
enableshim to remain a heretic. 42.Ibid.,pp. r6o-6r. q. Ibid., p. r8z.
44.Ibid., p. 166. 45. Ibid.
Chapter r: From l-auoisier to Freud 46.Ibid., p. ft8. 47.Ibid.,p. t7o.
48. Ibid. 49.Ibid., p. 173.
r. Darnton, Mesmerismand the End of the Enlightenmentin France. 5o. Ibid., p. r8o. 5r. Ibid., p. t86.
z. Translationsof passages from both the secretreport signedby Bailly 52. For this story, see Chertok and de Saussure,The TherapeuticReu-
jrll
and Desloni responseare taken from Shor and Orne , eds.,The Nature of olution, and Roch and Perry, Hypnosk, Will and Memory. The latter book
Hypnosis.Tianslations of passagesfrom the two official reports are based il proves that neither the representativesof oficial sciencenor magnetists
on the original French text reproduced in Burdin and Dubois, Hutoire ,,ti and hypnotists understood fussieu'sprescription:study thoroughly,avoid
acaddmiquedu magndtismeanimal. l
dramatic effects.The history of hypnosisin the nineteenth century is re-
3. Shor and Orne, ed,s.,TheNature of Hypnosx, p. 2,. petitive: the partisansof hypnosispresentto the commissionsspectacular
4. Ibid., pp.4-5. facts (clairvoyance,etc.),which are difrcult to replicate,and their adver-
5. Ibid., p. 5. sariesuse this weaknessto reject the whole phenomenon as pure charla-
6. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Hitoire du magny'tisme animal, p. 28. tanism.
7. Ibid., p. l9. 53. Bernheim, De la suggestionet de set applications d. la thirapeutiquc,
8. Ibid. p.r. \
9. Shor and Orne , eds.,The Nature of Hypnosk, p. 9. 54. Freud, "Charcoti'p. 14.
to. Ibid. 55. SeeChertok, Hypnosu, pp. 2o-2r.
r r. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Histoire du magndtime animal, p. r49. 56. Binet and F6r6, Le magndtismeanimal, p. ro9.
rz. Ibid., pp.3j-34. 57. Ibid., p. rr3.
r3. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,p. zo. 58. Freud and Breuer, Studieson Hysteria (t8S:-gS), p. Z.
r4. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Histoire du magnitismeanimal, p. 4t. 59. Chertok, "Freud in Paris"; and Chertok and de Saussure,Tle
r5. Shor and Orne, eds.,TheNature of Hypnosis.p. rr. Therapeutic Reuolution, pp. I r 4-29.
16. Ibid. '6o. Freud, quoted in Jones,The Ltfe and Worftof Freud, r: r85.
r 7. Burdin and Dubois, eds.,Histoire du magny'tisme
animal, pp. 4I-42. 6r. Freud, "Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and
r8. Lavoisier,"R6fl6xionssur le phlogistique,"p. 624. Hysterical Motor Paralyses."
r9. Guyton de Morveau, Lavoisier, Berthollet, and de Fourcroy, My'th- 62. "Theory is all very well, but it doesn'tprevent things from exist-
ode de nomenclaturechimqur, p. I I. ing." Freud, "Charcot," p. r3.
288 l{otes to Pagesjt-j8 Notes to Pages j8-58 289

UJ. Ibid.,p. r9. 84. Freud and Breuer, Studieson Hysteria, p. 6.

64. Freud,Cnrrcspondence t87j-r919, p. ry8. 85. Freud, "Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis," p. zz.
u). Freud,"Reporton My Studiesin Parisand Berlin,"p. rr. 86. Freud,'An AutobiographicalStudy,"p. I7.
ob. Freud,"Hysteria,"p. 5o. 87. Swales,"Freud, His Teacherand the Birth of Psychoanalysis."
67.Freud,'An Autobiographical Study,"p. u4. 88. Freud and Breuer, Studieson Hysteria, p. r78.
68.Sincethe publicationof the Frencheditionof our book,Malcolm 89. Freud,'An AutobiographicalStudy,"p. 27.
Macmillant srudy (Freud Eualuated) has shed new light on Freud's inven- go. In 1968one of the authors pointed out that this was the origin of
tion of the cathartic method. Let us only emphasizethat following Mac- the idea of transferenceisee Chertok, "The Discovery of the Tiansfer-
millan, it is only by Freud'sretrospectivereconstructionthat Breuer'sther- ence,"and Chertok and de Saussure,The TherapeuticReuolution, pp. r59-
apy could be seen as a caseof cathartic therapy.Until 1892,Freud used 88.
hypnosisas a tool for locating symptom-producing memories in order to 9r. Freud, "On Psychotherapy," p. z6o.
modify them by suggestion. The idea we will introduce in the following 92. Freud, "Remembering, Repeatingand Working-Through," p. r5z.
section, of the connection between "hysterical symPtom as ignorant of 93. Ibid., p. t48.
anatomy" and the possibility of a therapy,was establishedin r89z only, 94. Ibid., p. r5r.
with referenceto Pierre fanet, a pupil of Charcot. As for the cathartic 95. Ibid.
"Observations on Tiansference-Love,"p. r6u.
(affect-discharge) aspect,it would mark the influenceof Hughlings fack- 96. Freud,
Venel, "Chymie."
sont work on organic speechdisorder.In brief, r89z would mark a theo- 97.
retical turn for Freud, and all posterior texts referring to Breuer and to 98. Ibid.
Charcot would be historical reconstructionsafirming Freud'spriority and 99. Diderot, "On the Interpretation of Nature ;' p. 74.
autonomy.Let us also emphasizethat Macmillani developmentsconcern- roo. Venel,"Chymie."
ing Freudi determinism and the vanity of any distinction between"cause" rcr. Ibid.
and "motive" in Freudi work are in deep agreementwith our conclusions. roz. Guyton de Morveau, Lavoisier,Berthollet, and de Fourcroy, Mdth-
Our perspectivesdiffer however on the following point: we are less inter- ode de nomenclaturechimique. p. 34.
estedin criticizing psychoanalysis as a false or a bad science,and more in ro3. LatouS The Pasleurizationof France,p. 9o.
understandingwhat kind of science would succeedwhe re psychoanalysis ro4. Freud, "On Psychotherapy,"pp. 258-59.
failed. ro5. Freud, "Psychical(or Mental) Treatment,"p. 298.
69. Freud, "Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and ro6. Freud, "Lines of Advance in Psycho-AnalyticTherapy,"pp. I59-
Hysterical Motor Paralyses," p. I7r. 6o.
Freud, "Charcot," p. zz. rc7. Ibid., p. tfi.
7o.
rc8. Ibid., n. r.
7r. Charcot, Legonssur les maladiesdu systlmenerueux,3: 2g7.
ro9. Freud, "'Wild' Psycho-Analysisj'p.zz6.
72. Freud,'An AutobiographicalStudy,"p. 4.
rro. Freud, "Future Prospectsof Psycho-Analysis," p. I4z.
73. Freud, "Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and
Hysterical Motor Iraralyses," p. I68. r r r. Fr e u d , "'Wi l d 'Psych o - An a l ysi s."p . zz6 .
r rz. Freud, "Remembering) R.p.rting and Working-Through," pp.
74. Ibid., p. r69, italics in the original.
r 54-55.
75. Ibid., italics added.
rr3. Freud, "The Dynamics of Tiansference,"p. Io6.
76. Ibid., p. r7o, italics in the original.
rr4. Freud, "lntroductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,"Lecture 28,
77. Freud and Breuer, Studieson Hysteria, P. 7.
'AnalyticTherapy,"p. 45r.
78. Freud, "Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and
Hysterical Motor Paralyses," p. r7r, italics in the original. rt5. Freud,"lntroductoryLectureson Psycho-Analysis,"Lecture 27,
italics in the original.
"Tiansference I' p. +lZ.
79. Ibid.,
8o. Freud, "Psychical(or Mental) Tieatment," p. 298. rr6. Freud, "Remembering,Repeatingand Working-Through," p.
8r. Ibid., p. 299. r54.
82. Freud, "On Psychotherapy," pp. z6o-6t. r17. Ibid.,p. r55.
8y lbid., p. z6t. r18.I bid. .pp. r 55- 56.
:ii

i
$
a
$
t
 I{otes to Pages 7j-8r 2gr
29o Notes to Pages 59*7j
r rg. Freud,"Observations on Transference-Lovej' pP.r7o-7r. <. F'reutl."Psycho-Analysisand Telepathv" p. r79.
rzo. Freud,"Linesof Advancein Psycho-Analytic Therapy,'p. rso. O. I'or this period of Freud's lif e, seeiones, The Ltfe and lllorft of Freud,
rzr. Freud, "Recommendations to PhysiciansPractisingnry.ho- v o l . 3 , ch a Ps.z a n d 3 '
p. r r5. ()rubrich-sirnitis, ed.. "Six I-etters of Freud and Ferenczi,' P. 259.
Analysis," 7.
rzz. Ibid. t4. Ibid. b. F.eud, quoted in Ferenczi, The Clinical Diarl', p. 93.
rz 4 . Ib i d .,p p . rI5 -I6 . r2.5.Ibid., p. rr4. g. Freud, Postscript(t927) to "The Question of Lay Analysisj' p. z5j.
rz6. Freud, "Future Prospectsof Psycho-Analysis," p. I46, italicsin the ro. Ibid.. P. 254.
original. tt. Ibid.
t z 7. I bid. , pp. r 48- 49. r-2. Freu.l. Correspondancet871-t919. p. t66.
rz8. Ibid., p. r5o. r j. Irreud, The Complete Letters of Freud to Fliess, p. t8o.
lu9. Freud, "Lines of Advance in Psycho-AnalyticTherapy,"p. I59. tt. Ibid.
r3o. Freud refers here to a case history presented by Sandor Ferenczi r5. Freud, Postscript(t9z) to "The Question of l-ay Analysis,"p. 254.
in "Technical Difficulties in the Analysis of a Case of Hysteria." This ft. Ibid' P.256.
paper was published in r9r9, but its contents were already known to r7. See Bres, "La dur€e des analyses."
Freud at the time of the Fifth Congress. The case concerned a patient riJ. Ferenczi and Rank, Entuicftlungziele det kychoanalyse,p.3. Pub-
whose masturbatory practices had been prohibited by Ferenczi in the lished in tg74 in French rranslarion(without the preface)as Perspectiues
hope of overcoming her resistances, rvhich tended to prolong the analysis. dt la pst,chanaly.,r^ The English translation (with the introduction) was
"l was compelled in this case,"he explains, "to give up the passivepart published in t9z5 under the tirle The Deuelopmentof Psycho-Analysu'
that the psycho-analystis accustomedto play in the treatment, which is 19. "Prrze Essay,"International lournal of Psycho-Analysis,l)ec.ryzz.
uo. Ferenczi and Rank, The Deuelopmentof Psycho-Analv-;is, p. z'
contined to the hearing and interpretation of the patient'sideas" (p. r96).
Ferenczi adds: "We owe the prototype of this 'active technique' to Freud z r . Fr e u d , "Fu tu r e Pr o sp e ctso fPsych o - An a l ysi s"'p .I4 z.
zz. Ferenczi ancl Rank, The Deuelopmentof Psycho-Analysis, p. j8.
himself." Ferenczi then cites as an example the obligation Freud imposed
on phobics to confront the situationsthat arousedtheir anxiety'It is pre- zj. Ibrd., p. j9. 24.I bid. , p.3.
ciselythis example that Freud will take up again in the following part of 25. Ibid., pp. 4l-44. 26.Ibid., p. 44.
his essay. 27. Ibid.
r3r. Freud, "Lines o[ Advance in Psycho-AnalyticThe rapf]' p. t6z' 28. Freud, "Remembering, Repeatingand Working-Throughj' p' r53'
rjz. Ibid. r11.Ibi d.,p. r6j . It is useiirl ro nore the ambiguity of the expressionin statu nascendi'.in the
t j5. Ibid., P. ft5. "cathartic" period (seethe preceding chapter) it referred to the return of
r34. Ibid., p. ft4.
t36. Ibid. Among the people Freud is alluding to here, one might in- the lii'cclexperience rvith all its original quota of affect'He re the expres-
clude one of his most famous cases,the Wolf Man, whose treatment began sion takes on a limiting function: one must prevent a real story from
in r9ro. The Wolf N'lan was, as we now know, Serge Pankeiev, a rich happening,one that would involve the analystand result in iterativeacts.
Russianaristocrat. In "Lenieu de I'interpr€tationl' |ean-Luc Donnet maintains that Freud's
; r t l i l u ( l etc,w a r d r e p e ti ti o n i s i n Qe e da m b i g u o u s.th a t h e n e ve r ce a se dr e -
rj7. Ibid.
gretting simple remembering. ii ,9ro. w*ith the turn toward the death
r38. Ibid., p. r6z, italics in the original'
rp. Ibid., pp. 167-68. instinct. w,hich manifests itself "beyond ttre pleasure principle" in the
r j9. Ibid., p. ft1
r4z. Ibid. compulsionto repeat,the analytic cure, accordingto Donnet, tilted finally
t4t. Ibid.,p. t68.
into a civilizing processwith the reinforcementof the ego as its PutPo_t!:
\Ve would like to add that Freud'sessay"Bevond the PleasurePrinciple"
Chapter z: PsychoanalystsPut to the Test inauguratesthe use of metapsychologyas an explanation for theJailures
of the c'ure,and foreshadowsthe situation prevailing in rg37 in 'Analysis
r. Freud, "Constructionsin Analysis,"p. z6z. jl;
lbrminable ancl Interminable." which we will discussat the end of this
z. Freud,"Psycho-Analysisand Telepathv,"and "Dreams and Telepa- i,i.
,;rril chapter.
thy"' ,ffi
29. This chapter,including the passagewe will quote' does n9t
3. Freud, "I)reams and Telepathy,"zoI. rn the Oeutn'escimpl?tes of Ferenczi, translateclinto French by Iudith Du-
.fiqyt'
4. Roustang.PsychoanalysiNeuer Lets Go, P. 55.
2g2 I\,lotes to Pages 8z-85 Notes to Pages 86-roz 293

pont and Myriam Viliner. Only chaptersr, 3, and 5 o[Fe renczi and Rank's 18. Freud, quoted in fones, The Ltfe and Wor\of Freud, 3: 6o.
work was retained because,in the opinion of the translators,they were \e. Ibid.,P.&'
wrirten by Ferenczi.They cite as evidencea nore published by the editors +o.For whatfollows,seefones,ThcLrfcandWor\ofFreud,pp.q-72.
of Bausteinezur kychoanaiysr. According to the editors, Ferenczi alone ar. Grubrich-Simitis, "Six Letters of Freud and Ferenczi)' p. 267,
wrote chapter j and was "essentially"the author of chapters r and q. italicsadded'
Chapter z is attributed to Rank. But the preface of Entwicftlungszieledir 42. Ferenczi, "The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Techniquei' p. 89.
kychoanalyse (The Deuelopment of Psycho-Analysis),also omitted from the "Introduction )r S. Ferenczi,"p. zo.
43. Balint,
French C)euures complltes, states that although the first version ofchapter 44. Ibid., pp. 2o-2r.
3 had in fact been written by Ferenczi,and the frrsr versionof chaptlr z 45. Freud, "'Wild' Psycho-Analysis," p. zz6.
by Rank, both chaptershad been iointly reviewed by the rwo aurhorsfor 46. Ferenczi, "The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Gchnique," p. 87.
the definitive edition. Chapters 4 and 6 are absentfrom both the French Fre ud, in Grubrich-Simitis, ed., "Six Letters of Freud and Feren-
47.
and the German editions, and no explanation is furnished in either case. c z i l ' p . z7 r .
l-et us note that in the preface to the third volume of Bausteinezur Psy- d8. Ibid.
choanalyse,which feature s Enttuicftlungsziele der kychoanalyse, Vilma Ko- "The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Technique," p. Ioo.
49. Ferenczi,
vacsindicatesthat the "technical editor" of the volume was Michael Bal- 5o. Ferenczi,"The Principle of Relaxationand Neocatharsis,"p. ro8.
int. It is to the lattel then, that one can attribute the omission of the 5t. Ibid., p. to9. 52. Ibid., italicsin the original.
chaptersin question. Moreover,fudith Dupont informed us thar she had 5j. Ibid.,p. rro. 54. Ibid.
acted similarly for the French edition on the advice of Balint. None of 55.Ibid.,p. rrz. 56. Ibid., p. t17.
Entwicftlungszieledes Psychoanalyse appears in the English edition of Tie 57.Ibid.,p. r18. 58. Ibid., p, rt9.
SelectedPapersof Sandor Ferenczi, first published in London by Hogarth 59. Ibid., italics in the original. 6o. Ibid., italics in the original.
Press in 1926. It was translated in full as The Deuelopment of Psycho- $. Ibid., italics in the original. 62. Ibid.
Analysisin r9z5 by C. Newton, a member of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Q. Ibid. 64. Ibid., p. rzo.
Society. 65. Ferenczi,"Child-Analysis in the Analysisof Adults," p. Iz8.
3o. Ferenczi and Rank, The Deuelopmentof Psycho-Analysis, pp. 6t-62. 66. Ibid., p. r33. 67. Ibid., p. r34.
3I. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysi ofthe Ego, pp. rr4-r5. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid.
Though later in the text Freud describesfeatures of hypnosis "which are 7o. Ibid. 7r. Ibid.,italicsin the original
not met by the rational explanationwe havehitherto given of it" (p. rr5), 72.Ibid.,p. t3z.
hypnosisappearshere as a translation-singular in its clarity,its intensity, 73. Ferenczi,"The Elasticity of Psycho-AnalyticTechnique,"p.9I.
its purity-of the functioning of the psychicagenciesas they are described 74. Fre ud, quoted in fones, The Ltfe and Worftof Frcud, 3: 164.
in Freudian metapsychology.As we have already emphasized, metapsy- 75. Ferenczi,letter quoted in Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, p. 4n.
chology will not be discussedhere. However, we would like to remark 76. Ferenczi, quoted in Masson, The .Assaulton Tiuth: Freud's Suppres-
that this situation is open to two interpretations: the first would see sion of the Seduction Theory, p. fi8.
in the "rational explanation" a sign of the power of Freudian conceptu- 77. Ferenczi, quoted ibid., pp. fi8-69.
alization; the secondwould link up with a hypothesisproposedby Dr. F 78. fones, quoted ibid., p. t7i-
Duyckaerts (personal communication).Duyckaerts suggeststhat although 79. Freud, quoted ibid., p. r7z, italics added.
Freud abandoned the practice of hypnosis, he neverthelessconstructed 8o. Freud, quoted ibid., p. r74, italics added.
his notion of the unconsciouson the basis of a representationof hyp- 8t. Freud, quoted ibid., pp. r8o-8r.
nosls. 82. .Grunberger, "De la technique active ) la confusion de langues."
32. In Grubrich-Simitis, "Six Le tters of Freud and Ferenczi," p. 265. \. Ibid., p. 535.
84. Ibid., p. 11;6.
3j. Ibid.
85. Grunberger\ "De la puret6" ("On Purity") was later published in
34. Ibid. ^
Keuue
j5. Ibid., pp. 265-66. franEaisc de psychanalysc.
j6. Ibid., p. 266, italics in original. E6. Grunberger, "De la technique active i la confusion de langues," p.
529.
37. Ibid., p. 267. /ii

,&
tl
/-
 Notes to Pages roz-r j Notes to Pagesr t4-jz 295
2g4
87. Hermann, "Lobjectivit6 du diagnosticde fonesconcernantla mal- try. Ibid., P. zz5. rzo. Ibid., p. zz.6n.
adie de Ferenczi,"p. 557. rz.t. Ibid.,yt.z4o. rzz. Ibid.,p. zz5.
88. Grunberger, "De la technique active) la confusion de languesi'p. rzj. Ibid., p. zz9. n4. Ibid., p. z3z.
tz5. Ibid.,P. 239. n6. Ibid.
535'
89. Granoff, "Ferenczi: Faux problime ou vrai malentenduJ'p. 37. tz7. Ibid. n8. Ibid., p. z4o.
9o. Ibid., p. 43. tzg. Ibid.
gr. Ibid., p. 56. r jo. Ibid. In the next chapter we will introduce another interpretation,
"particularities."
gz. I bid. , p. 6o. originating with Daniel Stern, of these
9j. Ibid., p.6r, italics in the original. t y. Ibid., PP. 242-43'
94. Ibid., P. 35. t jz. Ibid., P. 248.
95. The English translation of the Diary
was finally published in r988. tjj. Ibid., P. 239.
was published in French in 1985 with the tiile Journal r j4. Freud, Group kychology and the AnalysisoJ'theEgo, p.-rz7-
96. The Diary
clinique by the translation group of the Coq-H€ron. We also owe to the r35. See Roustang, Psychoanalysis Neuer Lcts Go, and the fourth chap-
researchers ofthis review the 6rst publicationofcertain lettersexchanged ter of this book.
by Freud and Ferenczi. Among those working on Ferenczi are fudith r36. Freud. Group Psychologyand the Analysisofthe Ego, p- r15.
Dupont, Balint's niece; Pierre Sabourin, author of Fercnczi,paladin et r37. Freud,'Analysis Terminable and Interminable,"p. z3o.
gro)d ,ir;, secret; and Bernard This. Othe rs who have contributed ro the t3a. On this subiect,see Serres,"D6ontologie: La r6forme et les sept
ieevaluation of Ferenczi are Ilse Barande, who published a biography of p6ch6s."
Ferenczi; Maria Tcirok and her group; and Claude Lorin, author of l,c r39. Soler,"Journalclinique de Ferenczij' p. 3.
jeune Ferenczi.
97. Ferenczi, Clinical DiarY, P. t. Chapter 3: On Some of Freuds Heirs
98. Ibid., p. r99. 99. Ibid-, P. t3o.
rco lbid., p. 93. tot. Ibid. r. ). Arlow, quoted by P6raidi, "K'K.K.," p. r93.
roz. This *rt th. letter written immediately following Ferenczi's z. Eagle, Recent Deuelopmentsin kychoanalysis, pp. t6z-63.
death. j. Ibid., p. r63, italics in the original.
ro3. Unedited letter of October 1928 from Ferenczi to Freud' See Sa- 4. Wallerstein,"One Psychoanalysis or Manyl" p. r8.
Freud, "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," PP' 50'
bourin, Ferenczi,paladin et grand uizit secret,p. t68' 5.
ro4. Ferenczi,Clinical Diary, p. ztz. bb.
rc5. Ibid., p.84. 6. Szasz,"The Concept o[TransferenceJ'p. 432.
rc6. Ibid. 7. Viderman, "La vraie fausseconfessioni'p. rr, italicsin the original'
ro7. Freud, "The Dynamics of Transferencei'p' ro6' 8. Perhaps this day is quite near, though. We take as our proof the
,ob. ;or,.r, telegram to Eitingon, quoted in Sabourin' Ferenczi,pahdin important study of Lawrence Friedman, The Anatomy of kychotherapy.
et grand uizir secret, p. zo7. This work, which claims to study notpsychoanalysisbut rather analyti-
rc9. Ibid., p. zo7 cally based psychotherapies, elucidates the pragmatic role of theory in
rro. Freud,'Analysis Terminable and Interminable,"p' 248' treatment:the eventualpopularizationof its thesescould contribute to the
r r r . I bid. , p. z z t . transformation of the patient's exPectationswith respectto the knowledge
tn. Ibid., p. z3o. of the analyst. In thii case, Wallerstein's "managerial" thesis would be-
rr3. Ibid., p. z5z. come,as such, an ingredient in the analytic settinfJ.
,r+. F.r.n.ri,i'The Problem of the Termination of the Analysisi'pp' g. It is sienificr.,ithat a resrcarried out by Fisher on the suggestibility
(of the hypriotic type) of his patients-one of the rare testsattemPtedby
77-86. an analysi in the context oi the analytic setting-was not capable of
rI5. Freud,'Analysis Terminable and Interminable]' p' 247'
founrling an inte rpre tation, but on the contrary' Puts into- qu-estionthe-
r16. Ibid., p. zz4.
possibiliiv of such a foundation. See Fisher, "studies on the Nature of
tt7. I bid. , p. z z r .
Suggestion."
tft. Ibid., p. zz8, italics in the original'
 Notesto Pages147-58 297
296 Notes to Pagest jz-47
Bowlby,who was himself inspiredby H'
Io. Freud,'Analysis Terminableand Interminable"' p' 239' recallthe role of the pioneerf'
"attachment." SeeBowlby,A SecurcBasc.
,r. Gr"..tron, The Tbchnique and Practice of kychoanalysit' p' if.rir*t ethologicalwork on
World of the Infant'
DeueloPmentt in Psychoanalysts' pp' t5U-59' '73, 16. Stern, The Interpersonal
ouotedin Eagle,Recent
' of theSelf,p' jo7' \7. Ibid.,P. rt.
r z. Kohui TheAnalvsis -rb.tUa., p.
"sandor FerencziBedeutungf0r Theorie und Thera- 46.italicsin the original'
,.. C..rn.ri,.ts,
roo6' io. Koh"i. Hou DoesAnalysisCure?'p' ro5'
pi. Jet PsychoanalYsei'P. p'
io. S,.tn, The IntcrpersonalWorldof the Infant' 277'
Ia. Balint, The BasicFault, P' zo4'
at. Ibid., P. ryl.
r5. Balint,"Introductioni SandorFerenczi"'p'z4'
de Ferenczi"' p' r I23' 42.Ibid., P. t8z.
,6. C"hn. "Le proctsdu cadreou la passion
r7. McDougall, "Le contre-transfert et les cas difrciles"'p' z6o' aa.Ibid.,P' 43'
12' quoted in.Stern'
]i. Ft*a-r", Thc Anatomyof PsychothcraPl'P'
r8. Khan,Lc soicachi,PP'202-5' World of the Infant' P' 43' In his studyFriedmanadvances
pp' tg+-57' Tt)1rr)rproonal
r9. Hansen,"symbiosis.An Aspectof Psychotherapyl' the pa-tientis on the point of
:'Metapsychological and Clinical Aspects of Regression ,fr. inltfi that the porribility oifetli"g what
,o. Winni.ott, of feeling the sign-s of an imminent change'
Psycho-Analytical SecUpi' fiins ."prbl. of b..omi.,g,
Within the P't7' - in the thJrapeutic mlaning.of the word (pp' 4rI-r9)' In
on Tiansference-Lovei' p' r68' ;.ffi.;;;ptrhy
zl. Freud,'"Observations
the question of hypnosis'Thus' ;il;;;,:;f'"ti,y i', for him, an "action,';but it is lived bv "empathic"
zz. Balint'nevertheless comes close to j ,,notir,i." understandingof the subiectt experience,and
he attributes great imPortance to regression'whose il.;;;'.,
io The BasicFault, The emPathyof
aPpear to him to t;ke two forms: one' benign' benefiting ii.rr .t-p.tr."* ,irkr, th...fore' being ielt as inevitable'
manifestations
of the ego'This
.ll-o"ifri." psychoanalysts could,th.n, di-inish the libertyand creativity
the ego,and the oiher,malignant'actingto the detriment changein terms
by-E.n.t Kris, who speaks of "regression in the- ifi.*fit,J' and lead them to conceivethe therapeutic
Ji"i,i"i"" was inspired "i maturation'and integration, while the theorist of conflict
and of the "ego overwhelmed by regression" of
,.."i.. .i,n. ego" _(Sehacd "rti.,rl"tion, to the differ"ent ways in which the motives of the
and Brenman rvouldbe more sensitive
mprrg On thil subjectKris reiers to the work of Gill suggest more
p*[", give form to his experience'and could desireand
frgSg)i,which we wili u,e in the following chapter'but he nowheremakes name a style' the conflict and
its-sublect i"ri.a p'"*iUilities."But insofar as they
)"i iii"r." to rhe fact that the work thui citedhad hypnosis.as .;pr;; approaches./ecl like separate routes' because they are alternative
consrirures for these authors a kind of paradigm for ":e.- rapist's
o.ih^, hypnosis Dostures for the theraptst,eachwith its own tyPeo[ strain'The the
g re s s i o n i n th e s e rv tc e o fth eego.' .A sw ehaveemphasi zed.moreover,i ti s in a narrow' em-
on hypnosislrom the Publrsheo verston attentionis focusedd'iff.t.ntly when it is concentrated
balint who excisedthe passages ove r many regions of. ex-
possibility'
(both in Ge rman and in Fre nch)' ;;;i. ;i^"".1 than when it A,,tt.ts
of Ferenczi'sworks of transformation and substitution such as defense mecha-
;i;;il;;i;;
23. Kohut, Hota DocsAnalysis,Cure?,P' tr.z.' 'nir.r."'I.n.t. waysof perceivingrepresent differentactionson the patient'
his friend f' Pa-
t]. fon.t,'*"s probably."lighttntd L.nt.hispoint by. different ,yp., oi hope and .*i..t"tio", -d1{t:tlt therapeutic. w.ishe.s and
Le non-sauoir des psy de Chertok"' pP'573-
laci.3eePalaci,'Ap.opo,it' intrusions,differenttypesof reiationship" (Friedman, p' 4r9' italicsin the
t6. original).
zs. Kohut, Hou' DocsAnalyskCure?'p' ttz' "unconsciou.s arousing,in tt",t:,lll:
mes.sage"
+i.-f ft. categoryof :l:
26. Ibid., P. rr4. enigm""Whatio.i t'. wantof mel'' is.advanced
t7. E^g\n,RccentDcuclopments in Psychoanalysis' p' 48' "nt* !t !"tJll:\t- l.\:::::::
for psychoanaly-
pou, to pryrtoroiy,,) as the
pour la
fon1ements
fond€ments
fo""d"tioi'
28. Ibid. sis.'The ,,otio., of foundrtion'is significantin that the hypothesisof an
,9. Fr.r'ta, Group Psychology and,theAnalysisof the Ego' pp'89-9o' Tseduction" the infant "perceives"or
Cure?lp: - - by the
originary riddle, incurred
3o. Kohrlt, Hou DoesAnalysi 18-S: ,;:;..,:"'#i;;,^tJ"e'uiJtounde rstand,.-""hiPl':
t t' - ^ ..- r ^ - - .^ - l
|.. L .n l e n ch e to i u sti fv
lr. B"ke. and Baker, "Heittz Kohut's SelfPsychologq"' P'6'
,rt."il"it,i.'r.,,i;;l;;;* way:it is the "'
infants -L.ifllTT::,,t':i:
confrontation *t-tl-t1:
iz. Kohut, Hou Docs Analysis Curc? , p' 47 '
world oi adults thlt confers on sexuality the role that analysispresupPoses
33. Greett,"Lenfant modile"' for it. Howeve r, in order for the ."ttgo'y of the "unconscious message"
to
points this our in Nouueautfondcmenls
34. Laplanch. q,-tit. .igntLy play its "founding" role of lustifyinf the privilege of analysisover other
pour la psychanalYsc, PP.8z-84' also ih.r"p.uti. t..h.,i"qu.r, i, U. ,tioUiti"a in an originary manner; the
here to Stern'stheses'but we should
35. We will limit ourselves -ur,
298 Notes to Pages r 59-6r
seductionthat createsthe riddle must be what unleashesa history sum-
marized up to that point by the essentially static notion of self-
preservation.Now, attributing to an infant, who has neither language nor
consciousness of the subjectivityof the other, the question "What doeshe
want of me " or the possibility o[ "suspectingwithout understanding" is
iust as difrcult as subsuming solely under the sign of "self-preservation"
the history that leads to this question and to this possibility.
46. The regression that is supposedto be induced by hypnotic sugges-
tion seemsequally ill-named. The resemblancebetween the subiect acting
"like a child" uncler hypnosisand an actual child is as superficialas that
between an adult incapable of talking becauseof cerebral damage and an
infans. SeeNash, "Hypnosis as a Window on Regression."
47. See Oppenheimer, "La solution narrativiste."
48. Spence,Narratiue Truth and Historical Truth, p.3r, quoted in Op-
penheimer,"La solution narrativiste;'p. 28.
49. We will cite, in this same perspective,the work of M. Gill on trans-
ference: Glll, Analysisof Tiansference,vol. t, and Gill and Hoffman, Anal-
ysk of Tiansfcrence,vol.z. Gill appeals to the analyst to be attentive to the
patient's indirect allusions to the analytic setting and to the analyst'sown
attitude, and to admit in his interpretationsof them the possibilitythat
the transference,at this juncture, is not purely repetitive but also "based
on a reality," that is, it integratesin a plausible manner significant elements
of the therapistt attitude "here and now." This attention to the experien-
tial "here no*" of the patient was, one will recall, one of the moti-
".rd
vating elements in Ferenczi'squest when he began to believe that his
patients were right, and that the Freudian protocol was not conceived in
their interest.Gill does not go this far. but neverthelesstakes a decisive
step:the transferencehere and now is not a "distortion" ofa "true reality"
whose representative the analyst would be, but a construction that the
analyst himself has, in one way or another,suggested.The analyst is not,
then, to hold on to the ideal ofa neutral analytic setting, but to learn from
his patient what reality this scene takes on for him. Furthermore, the
analyst should keep in mind that he does not have the means of judging
this reality in terms of truth or illusion (repetitionof the past).It remains,
as Friedman remarks (The Anatomy of kychotherapy, pp. 478-85), that this
theoretical argument can claim to produce not a "truer" analytic practice,
tl
but rather other appetites, other expectations,other attitudes in the ther-
1,
apist, that is, pragmatic effectsthat exceedthis theory as well as others.
5o. ln The Anatomy of kychotheraay, Friedman maintains, moreover,
that "phenomenological" efForts that, especially following Paul Ricoeur,
attempted to "purify" psychoanalysis of its "objectivist" theoriesrisk im-
poverishingthe analytic relation: "Theories differ in how much they en-
courage a therapist to travel between the ordinary reality of the session
Notes to Pages t6j-67 2gg
and his theoreticalhallucination of it. . . . Theories that include high ab-
straction,such as Freudian theory, invite the therapist to move ba& and
forth betweensocialmeaning and analytic rneaning,becausethey describe
the mind as an object and do not replaceordinary social reality with a
favored phenomenoloEy" @. aj).
5r. Undoubtedly Friedman's book, The Anatomy of kychotherapy, con_
strtutesan imporranr step in the direction of a "corpus" of analytically
basedpracticesbecauseit inverts the problem posed by Freud: Friedman
doesnot define the analytic settingas the situationwhere the patient must
become the reliable wirness of a theoretical inrerprerarion,but makes
theory an ingredient in treatment,an ingredient that awakensthe analysti
appetite,nourishes his desire, exacerbateshis sensitivity.Concomitantlv.
Friedman reformulatesin a pragmatic mode the questionof *hether anr-
lytic theory can consrirutethe human psycheas an "object" o[ knowledge
or whether it should expressthe singularity of the analytic relation (see
Friedman! p. r58 n. r and p. 163 n. z). While Friedman definesthe sin-
gularity of the analytic tradition by its refusalof manipulation,persuasion,
and direct suggesrion,his book can be read as a study ofthe disiincr effects
of suggestionthat may produce divergent theoretical choicesin therapists.
52. We cannot rake up here the perspectivesopened by ethnopsychia-
try (G. Devereux, T. Nathan). We will resrricrourselvesto emphasizing
the interestfor our problem of the norion of "operator" introduced bv t
Nathan as a hypothesis ro understand rhe reirtiue indifference of the
therapeuticprocessin relation to the theory guiding it: "What a curious
thera.peuticenterprise during which each one sings his own song, and
which neverthelessends with a srrucrural modification of the patient's
symptomatology. Will we go so far as to think, one day, rhat in psycho-
therapeutic activiry, theory-'rlrnce, ideology or religious belief-is noth-
ing but a magiciant lure serving to detract the attention of the protago-
nists from the actual operatorsl" (Nathan, Psychanalyse pai'enne,p. r3ot
53. See,for example, Roudinesco,Lt bataille de cent ans, vol. z.
54. This approach to Lacan is fairly close ro rhe one used by Frangois
Roustang in his book lttcan. pe l'y'quiuoque d I'impasse. Roustang chose
for the main thread of his exarnination the "proiect incessantly pursued
by Lacan: the profect of making psychoanalysis a science"(p. z+). We will
take our inspiration on severalcounts from this book. However, our point
of view differs insofar as we do not examine,as Roustangdoes,the points
where Lacan's thoughr does not meet the test that would require of him
the "minimum of logic and rigor inescapablefor an intellectualenterprise
which unceasinglysituatesitself in relation ro science"(p.tr). Our prob-
lem is less that of knorving if Lacanian psychoanalysis is worthy of the
name of sciencethan o[ understandingwhat meaning it gives ro rhis rirle
in order to claim its worthiness. We also wish to understand how the
 F!7

$
I Notcsto Pagesr 87-zo7 3or
3oo Notes to Pages t68-87
proposes 86. Ibid.,P. tzo'
that Lacanjan only hasmeanlngrn our era
conception of this entitlement
history of
-psYchoanalysis "heart" Ai. i^ ft.l' aswe u'ill seelater'this call
examining-the knowledge: sciences
a n answer in a scientifictypeof
we are
might participatern the history when sufferingseeks
and "reason." ouc'bv thevofferanalvsis what onemight call
pratique' p' 40' ;;;;;;;l;':Beat "'nlvli'' on which it works'
ss. D.l.u, e, Spinoza:Philosophie the raw material
its materialconditionot po"ibllity'
L'acan:Lc sulet'
<6. Ogilvie, 88. SeeMendel.Ia psychanalyse ..
''eutsttee'.
paranol'aquc'
la psychose in Psychoanalysts' pp' 9-to'
57. Llr^", De r,-:) 89. Lacan,'Aggressivity
tbtd''
59' P' 3o3' Dc l'y'quiuoque i I'impassc'p't7'
5b.ruia.,p. j37. ;. ;;;:q,',i'tta in Rou't"ng' I-ncan:
6o.Ibid., p. 33t.
6t' Ibid'' P' 337' *^Jilt^ti-*t'o t""tta tht ltgtnd of.Freudmark-
gr. Significanrry, ', "Do theyknow we
6 2 .Ib i d ..P . j r5 ' Unl"Jst"t' with the question:
i"giir;r1;iin,rt.
63. Ogilvie,Lacan:Le sujet'P' 3b'
ii. oil..tr., Spinoza:Philosophie pratiquc'p' t34' "t3:'ltj:i":T&;:il,:::il, pp.2'\e-
co.e,e,surrariansmissionr,"
paranoiaque'
psychosc p' 4z'
6s. Lacan,De la 20.
66. Ibid.. P. 39' p. zzo.
93. Ibid..
'n.rttl.*.p*
6 7 . Ib i d .' P .3 1 4 ' choanalysis Neuerltts Go' pp' ro4-8'
94. p' 859'
68. Ibid., P. :,46' 'iL. s.i,'nc.et la v6rit€i'
Trcatisc'p' zoo' 95. Lacan,
69. Spino)a,A Theological-Political Ibid.
la paran-oiaque'
psychose p' 255' 96.
7o. I'acao, De
tor example' Laian"'R€ponse au commentairede fean Hip-
zr. See
p o lyte ." p ' 3 8 3 ' Chaptcr 4: NarcissisticlVounds
, TL^
The quotati on ii s. from
^..^.^ri ^^ frnm Lacan
I -acan's
Ia ca n : L e su je t' py' q3-.94'
7 2 . Og ilvie . r . Ku b i e . "H YPn o ri sm "
dans la foimation de l'individu"' p' in the Study of Sleep, Hypnosis'
Psy-
r938 article "t-., to-plt*tt'f^*lii"t- z. Kubie, "lllusion ,.ri R."lity
33' Le chosis and Arousal"'
familiaux" quoted in ogilvie' I-'acan: '" and Laplanche's crit-
,r,. L^r^n, "Les complexes i.'w"-it"". already cited Andr6 Green's position
p. 97. Le nourr*so.n' mire et la psych,analyste'
sutel
"-" . icism of it. See also f'ti<l"iti' .h
r€alit€"'pP'73-92' and understand-
r'^i iir^n, 'Au-del) du 'Principe de Lebovici assertsthat ir i' tnt psychoanalyst's observation
I'iquruoqu.ed PP'25-27' problelalics' o::::9:
il. Ro,rr,"ng , Ltcan: De .l'i,mpasse' ing that can unify tr'"
'i"f"ti''/created ty n"tiou'
ie. L;;;;,:'tu-delirdu de rialit6""pp' 85-86'
'Principe can therefore (still) claim ongrnary
ing to him, the psych<'analyticinfant
rialit|'
77. M.Y.rron,ldentitdet status (p. 368).
'rh.f^l^^,'Au-deli du'Principede r€alit€""pp' 87-88' Hypnots'
4' chertok'
79. Ibid., P. 9o. but also somat:ic effectsare undeniable.
l. Xo, only therap'euticeffects
bo. Ogltui.,l-' canLe sujet'p'.88' .1 ):^--^^",h.t made it iri.,.ii"g t"tchertok' sensc..andNonsensein kvchother-
I" l;;t;;;';
8r. One ,ho,lld tlptttffy to the optical diasramsthat -".1e ft; tpitiilil]t is the "negativation" bv
"f,' ti't i"r"nt't "specular apy\, one of the most ;;;\tg
possiblefbr Lacan,";;;;:;;ht irinciples makins hvpnosis ol the reacrrdn ,o"t,ib.-r..rlin:-in
this case' hypnotic
intelligiblewith the categories of the analyticsetting',This ::jI;.:"; ,'..rp.*r rejponsewell known to biolosists'a response
-t:^tp,-t::t1l
tnat' as
"du.ntur." Js^""Ji"s"r'i'' n"'::*::,i:111ff1,.*:t
;;';;;;' iustin ;llti::l- a tesl invented by mr'Jern medicine'
does not ttJtn to imply on the pa-
mo-
sions.For the patheticrepresentatron Freud invoked with respectto
"l 'n'n;:';"r.."i.","i .f,".". tient's part any kno*lcdgt of tht rype but
tancesthat hinder insight'there is substttute ;';::;il:'d;;;;;;"' ;i'"''' i'lg i' *ithout beinga phvsiorogist'
*hi.h the analyst always sendsback,to ,the "Some Physiolog-
rerizationof' ,r.r,-.nr'in not what a negatrve'""it" i"-t"beiculin is'.SeeBlack'
"Le conceptde I'analyse"' in La- Under Hyp-
analysand the echooi ii' ai"o"'se' See ical Mechanist' R-t:"'"'bl"t'to
C"ti"f by Direct Suggestion
de Freud'
i 6crix techniqucs
can,Les
---8 p' nosis."
---'6.
L " ." rr,' Au -d e l id u ' Pri nci pede r€al i t6" " 9t'
;'LesaffairesGalilie]' SeeespeciallyChertok,'Animal !YPno".t'
i" also stengers' nosisand RelatedStates'p' 83'
83. Koyr6' n,ua"'[ol;il')"' ' z. Gill and n,.n^*n, fry2
84. Brousse, "Le fantasme'
8 . Ib i d .,P.3 7 o '
8 5 .Ib i d .,P. 6 '
r1

3o2 Notes to Pages zo7-r 5
9. Ibid., pp. 369-70.
ro. Ibid., pp. 37r-72.
rr. Keller, A Fccling for the Organism: Thc Ltfc and Wor\ of Barbara
McClintocft.
Iz. Macalpine,"The Development of the Tiansference,"p. 5r9.
I3. Nunberg, "Tiansferenceand Reality,"pp. 7-8.
r4. Freud, Group kychology and the Analysisof the Ego, pp. rz5-26. It
is possibleto see in this phylogenetic "explanation" the solution Freud
proposesto two of the three enigmatic characteristics his "rational" expla-
nation of hypnosis leavesunaccounted for (see pp. r15-16): "paralysis,"
which appears to link hypnosis with animals' expressionof fear, and
evokesthe relation of a superpowerfulbeing with a powerlessbeing; and
the dimension of "play" in the hypnotic relation, which expressesrhe re-
I{otes to pages zr5_jo
3o3
tz. Lacan'sproposed subversionof the "Cartesian subiect" of philo-
sophical tradition does not produce any Practicalconsequences here, in
spite of-or even thanks 16-i15 aPParentradicality.Schematically,one
might say that Lacan inscribesthe whole of hunran experience under the
sign of the malin gy'nieand its suggestions.But the hypnotist and any other
"suggester"can, precisely insofar as they usurP a place that cannot be
theirs-the place of a malin ginie who is 'no one"-be condemned by
I-acan with the same tranquility as they would be by any Cartesian'
23. Laplanche. I'louueauxfondements pour la psychanalyjc'pp. I54-55.
24. lbid.. p. r56.
25. Balmary, Le sacrifce interdit, p. zo4.
26. Ibid., p. 2.84.
27. See, for example, ()riinbaum. The Foundatic''ns of Psychoanalvsis'

sistancesof the "moral conscience"of the hypnotized subject.(The third 28. Kuhn, The Structure oJ'ScienttfcReuolutions'
characteristicis the variability of hypnotizability,which, Freud writes, is 29. The "scientific respectability"of psychoanalysiseven apPearsto
related to "a factor still unknown.") The question remains, however,given some psychoanalyststo be a question of life and death. See the debate
its presuppositions,r.r,hythe phylogeneticexplanationmakes it possibleto future of psychoanalysis"organized by Psychoanalvtic Quar-
"bout-..th.
afirm that "[s]ome knowledge that in spite of everything hypnosisis only terly, r988,vo1.57,and I989, vol. 58, with I-. Rengell,J' Arloul C' Brenner,
a game, a deceptive renewal of these old impressions, may, however, re- and R. Wallerstein.
very lucid and generous Critique des
main behind and take care that there is a resistanceagainstany too serious 30. On this subiect, see Bres\
consequences of the suspensionof the will in hypnosis"(p. rz). raisonspsychanalytiques.
t5. Ibid., p. tz6. 3I. Henrv, Ginialogie de la psyc-hanalyse.
I6. Roustang, Psychoanalysis Neuer lrx Go. 42. Ibid., p. j84.
"Une philosophiepour la psvchanalyse," pp' r I87-8tl'
r7. Friedman describesthis uneasinessin the Anatomy of kychothcrapy 13. Ror.rttrng,
as essentialto analytic practice,which is distinct from other practicesin 34. Ibid., p. r I 8tl.
"De la lin de I'analyseet de I'auto-hypnosecomme gu6r-
that it "never tried to make things clear by acceptingmanipulation out- 15. RoustanlJ,
right" (p. 44r). Friedman comments on the protective role of the psy- ison."
"f)ispute."
choanalyst'simage as "Reader" or "Historian" or "Observer,"and defines 36. Ilorch-facobsen,
the therapist's task by its ambiguity, its double contradictory desire to j7. Ibid., p. 5r.
understand and to see new possibilitiesemerging. Therapistsnever cease j8. Ibid., p. 54.
claiming that they "attend" lassister dl this emergence,while they really 1,9.Ibid., P. 5o.
help it along p'assistentl."The fact that the therapy relationship is both 4r-r.Chertok, ed.,Hvpnoseet psychanalyse-
"l ) i 1 p u te ." p . zr 5 .
similar to, and different from, an expectable social relationship produces 1 r . Bo r ch - fa co b se n ,
constant uneasinessin both parties. That uneasinesscan be sensedin the 42. Ibid. 43. Ibtd.
familiar terms of danger scatteredthrough the therapistt thought and ' 44 lbid., p. ztt. 45. Ibid', P' zog'
46. Henry, "Pour une ph6nonr6nologie de Ia communaut6'"
writing. Seduction and manipulation are examples. The therapist can nei-
Borch-lacobsen, "Dispute"' 1.r.zo6.
ther clear himself on these counts nor accept the accusations.Anxious 47.
terms related to Patien, continually perform in a manner that always leaves qL. H.n.y, "Pour une phdnonr€nologiede la communaut€,"p' 117'
see especiallythe
him open to criticism" (p.++o). 49. L"u..n.. anil Perry Hypnosis, Wilt, and Memory;
r8. Lacan, "The Freudian Thingj'p. 4o9. .h"pt.. "The Contemporary ForensicUse of Hypnosis'"
"On Extra-Ocular Vision"; and Chertok' kycho'
19. Donnet, "La suggestioncomme concept,"p. rr6. io. S.. also Chertoi,
20. Roustang, Psychoanalysis Neuer Lets Go, p. 4j. sontatic Mcthod.r in Painlcr Childbirth.
Will, and Memory, p' r55'
2r. L^can, "The Function and Field ofSpeech and Language in Psy- 5r. Laure nce and Perry, Hypnosi,
Chertok and de Saussure, Naissance du psychanalyst€. p' 155'
choanalysis," pp. 48-49. 52.

fi
fi
 3o4 Notes to Pages zjr-55
53. fanet, Les midicationspsychologiqur-s, p. r85.
54. fanet, quoted in Lacan, "The Funcrion and Field of Speechand
Language in Psychoanalysis,"p. 93.
55. "She doesn'runderstandanything abour science,and doesn,timag_
ine that one could be interestedin it."
56. janet, Lcs midications psychologiqurs, p. r89.
j7. Ianet, L'automarisme psychologique.
58. fanet, Les mtdications psychologiquct, p. 3oJ.
59. fanet, L'automatismcpsychologique,p. 4r3.
6o. Bernheim,De la suggestionet de sesapplications d la th1rapeutiquc,
6r. Thus in the debate published rn Behauioral and Brain Sciences,
r986, no- 9: 449-jo2, Spanos("More on the Social psychology of Hypnotic
Responding," p. 49) refutes K. Grahams argumenr (p.
CZi thai it is
difficult to explain by "role,playing" rhe case of ,nt.,..rr-v."r-old bov
with second-and third-degreeburns who, after three "
sessions of hypnosis,
had ceasedscreaming and thrashing about, and laughed *h.n ih. ,u._
geon incised his wounds. In a follow-up of the same debate $o:
773_gr),
Spanos goes so far as to affirm. in response to Chertok, that no-ieport
existson the spontaneousformation of "blisters" (vesication)that would
eliminate the possibility of a self-inflicted wound. But Spanos'sasserrion
is false: surh an experiment took place in the hypnosis laboratory of the
D6jerine Cenrer in Paris, directed by Chertok, and was recorded on 6lm
(see Chertok, Senseand Nonsensein Psychotherapy).
62. Weitzenhoffer, Gough, and Lande s, 'A Study of the Braid Effect."
63. See Laurence and Perry, Hypnosis, Wilt, and Memory.
61.- We will not give references in the following part of the study; it
would require whole pages to do so. we will restrict ourselvesto .ef.rring
the reader ro the bibliography in the reporr published rn Behauioralan-d
I
,i
Brain sciences'cited above in nore 6r. See also the thesis of Michaux,
Aspecx exp6rimentaux et cliniques dc l'hypnose.
65. Gill and Brenman, Hypnosk and RelatedStates,p. j6.
66. Laurence and Perry, Hypnosis, Will, and Memory, pp. 297-3c,7.
67. Michaux, Aspecx exptrimentaur et cliniques dc I'hypnose:,pp.
1.2-.57.
68. St fean, "Hypnosis: Artichoke or Onion?," Behauioral ini n**
Sciences(cited above in note 6r).
69. Mannoni, Un commencementqui n'enfnit pas, p.5o.
to. Ibid.
7r. See especially Kihlstrom, "The Cognitive Unconscious.,'
72. Kihlstrom, "Strong InferencesAbout Hypnosis," p. 475, italics in
the original.
73. Escande, Mtrages de la midecinc.
74. Ibid., pp. 222-30.
Notes to Pages 259-80 3o5
75. Spanos,"More on the Social Psychologyof Hypnotic Respondingj'
p. 493.
76. Michaux, AspcctsexPirimentaur et cliniques de I'hypnose.
77. Kubie, "lllusion and Reality in the Study of Sleep, Hypnosis, Psy-
chosis,and Arousal."
78. Kubie and Margolin, "The Processof Hypnotism and the Nature
of the Hypnotic State."
79. See, for example, Demaret, "De I'hypnose animale i I'hypnose hu-
maine."
8o. Kubie and Margolin, "The Processof Hypnotism and the Nature
of the Hypnotic State,"p. bzr.
h. Ib i d ., p .6 1 9 .
82. See the account of the treatment of Alexandre H6bert by Puys6gur
in Puys€gur, Appel aux sauantsobscruateursdu dix-ncuuiimc silcle.
83. See Stengers,"Le pouvoir des concepts."
Conclusion
r. On this subject, see the following works by Gould: Euer SinceDar-
uin; Thc Panda's Thumb; Heni Tbethand Horse's Tbes; and The Flamingo's
Smilc.
z. Laplanche, Nouueauxfondementspour la psychanalysc,p. r54.
3. We have seen that the role hypnosis played for Freud has retained
its relevance.This is evident in the way a social psychologist like Spanos
(see Chapter 4 above) classifiesas anecdotal and unverifiable, as eluding
all protocol and statistics, the effects of hypnosis that, as they know, a
psychosocialexplanation cannot iustify. Hypnosis is today, as in the nine-
teenth century, the best witness to what Freud called the "unconscious";
that is, if we go back to his thesesin 1893,it is the best sourceo["facts"
that might upset the Cartesian, and especially the professional, partition
ofthe realm ofliving beings:biologistsand physiciansget the "body,"and
psychologists,social or not, get the "mind."
p. r9u.
4. Freud,'A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis,"
. 5. See Chertok and Bourg\ignon,Vers une autre my'decinc.The hopes
this book discussestoday appear as futile as they did before. But perhaps
the danger the symptomatic successof "soft" medicine constitutes for in-
stitutional medicine will end up producing what the evidence of good
sensealone is incapableof producing.
6. Chertok, 'Arridre-propos," in Chertok, ed., Rdsurgenccde |hyPnosc,
p. 22g. In the same volume, one might also read the article by Nassif,
"Lire la voix," where he also pleads for a return to hypnosis on the part
of psychoanalysts.For Nassif, the practice of the psychoanalyst,"[makingl
heard the suggestionsdictated to him by the voice he listens to, rendering
3c,6 Notes to Page z8r

them legible" (p. r8z), is not opposedto the practiceof hypnosisbut main-
tains an articulation by chiasmus with it "where two subfectsmutually
exchangeplacesinto order to move from a facsimile of power to a sup-
position of knowledge" (ibid.). Bibliography
7. It could be maintained that Lawrence Friedman goes in the same
direction in The Anatomy of Psychotherapy.Indeed, Friedman abandons
the apologetic image of psychoanalysisfor an interest in the way in which
the existence of a "theory of mind" suggestsspecific attitudes and appe-
tites to therapists. In this sense,Friedman's book cannot describe thera-
peutic practicewithout simultaneouslycontributing to its transformation.
In particular, he encouragestherapists to liberate themselvesfrom thefear
o[ suggestionand manipulation in order to experience,in and of itself,
t he am biguit y oI t heir pos it ion.

Baker, H., and M. Baker. "He inz Kohut's Self Psychology."AmericanJour-

nal of kychiatry, 1987, r44t r-9.
Balint, M. The Basic Fault.London: Tavistock, r968.
"Introduction i S. Ferenczil' Psychanalyse 4: Ig27-IgJ3. Paris:
Payor, 1982.Pp. ry-27.
Balmary, M. Le sacrifce interdit: Freud et la Biblc. Paris: Grasset, t986.
Barande, l. SandorFerenczi.Paris: Petite Bibliothique Payot, 1972.
Behauioraland Brain Sciences.Debate on hypnosis. 1986, 9: 449-5ol', and
to 773-8r.
Bernheim, H. De la suggestionet de scsapplications d la thy'rapeutique.Paris:.
Doin, r886.
Binet, A., and C. F&6. Le magny'tisme animal. Paris: Alcan, r887.
Black, S. "Some PhysiologicalMechanismsAmenable to Control by Di-
rect Suggestion Under Hypnosis." ln Psycho-physiologicalMechanismsof
Hypnosis,ed. L Chertok. Nevv York: Springer, ry69.Pp. rc-27.
Borch-facobsen,M. "Disputd' In Hypnoseet psychanalyse,ed. L. Chertok.
Paris: Dunod , ry87. Pp. ry\-2r7.
Bougnoux, D., ed. Le suggestion: Hypnose, Infuence, Tianse. Collection
"Les Emp€cheurs de Penser en Rond." Paris: Editions des Laboratoires
Delagrange,r99r.
Bowlby, l. A Secure Basc: Parent-Child Attachment and Healthy Human De'
uelopment.New York: Basic Books, r988.
Bres, Y. Critique desraisonspsychanalytiques.Paris: PUF, r985.
"La dur6e des analyses."kychanalysed l'uniuersitl, 1977, r2i r47-
54.
Brousse,M.-H. "Le fantasme."ln Lacan, ed. G. Miller. Paris: Bordas,
ry87. Pp. ro5-23.

t
3o8 Bibliography
Burdin, C., and E Dubois. Hitoirc acady'miquedu magn&isme animal.
Paris: Baillitre, r84I.
Cahn, R. "Le procds du cadre ou la passion de Ferenczi." Reuucfrangaise
de psychanalysc,ry83,47: rroT-33.
Charcot, l.-M. LcEons sur lcs maladics du systime nerucux. Vol. 3. Paris:
Delahaye,r887.
Chertok, L., 'Animal Hypnosis." ln Abnormal Bchauior in Animak, ed,.
M. W Fox. New York: W B. Saunders,1968.Pp. Iz9-58.
"The Discovery of the Tiansference: Towards an Epistemological
Inte rpretation )' I n t' I lo urnaI of Psycho-Analy sis,t 968, 49: 56o-76.
"Fre ud in Paris: A Crucial Stage." Intcrnational Journal of Psycho-
Analysis, r97o, 1-ri 5r r-2o.
ed. Hypnosc ct psychanalyse: Riponscs a Miftftel Borch-lacobscn.
Paris: Dunod, I987.
Hypnosc et suggcstion.Collection "Que Sais-fe."Paris: PUF, r989.
Hypnosis.Tians. D. Graham. London, Pergamon, r966.
"On Extra-Ocular Vision: A Historical Notel' American Journal
of Psychothcrapy,1966,zo: 319-22.
-r ed. Psycho-physiological Mcchanisms of Hypnosis. New York:
Springer, r969.
PsychosomaticMcthods in Painlcss Childbirth: History, Thcory and
Practice.New York: Pergamon, r959.
ed. Rtsurgcncc de I'hypnose: Unc bataille de dcux cents ans. Paris:
Descl6e De Brouwer, r984.
Scnseand Nonsensein kychotherapy. Tians. R. H. Ahrenfeldt. Ox-
[ or d: Per gam on. r 98r .
Chertok, L., and O. Bourguignon. Vcrsunc autre m1decine:Espoirsdefor-
mat;on Psychologiqucdcsfuturs my'decins.Toulouse : Privar, 1977.
Chertok, L., and R. de Saussure.Naissanccdu psychanalyste.Paris:Payot,
r973. English-language edition: The ThcrapcuticReaolution: From Mes-
mer to Freud (New York: Brunner and Mazel, t979).
The Therapeutic Reuolution: From Mesmer to Freud. Tians. R'H.
Ahrenfeldt. New York: Brunner, Mazel, 1979.
Chertok, L., I. Stengers, and D. Grlle. Mdmoriesd'un hdritiquc. Paris: La
D€couverte, r99r.
Cremerius, f. "sandor Ferenczi Bedeutung fiir Theorie und Therapie der
Psychoanalyse ." kychi, ry83, 37:988-ror5.
Darnton, R. Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France. Cam'
bridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,r968.
Deleuze, G. Spinoza:Philosophcpratique. Paris: Minuit, r98r.
Demaret, A. "De I'hypnose animale i I'hypnose humaine ." ln Risurgcace
dc l'hypnose,ed. L Chertok. Paris: Descl6e De Brouwer, ry84.Pp.39-
a8.
Bibliography 3o9
Diderot, D., "On the Interpretation of Nature." ln Diderot'sSelectedWrit-
ingr, trans. Derek Coltman, ed. L. G. Crocker. New York: Macmillan,
1966.Pp. 70-87.
Donnet, ].-L. "Lenfeu de I'interpr€tationl' Reuuefranqaisede psychanalyse,
r 9 8 3 ,5 : Ir j 5 - 5 o .
"La suggestion comme concept." Entretiens psychiatriques, r96j,
no . 9 : 9 r - r I9 .
Eagle, M. RecentDeuelopmentsin Psychoanalysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press,r984.
Escande,l.-P. Mirages de la my'decinc.Paris: Albin Michel, r987.
Ferenczi, S. "Child-Analysis in the Analysis of Adults." ln SelcctcdPapers,
3: r z6 - 4 2 .
The Clinical Diary of Sandor Ferenczi. Ed. f. Dupont. Tians. M.
Balint and N. Z. Jackson.Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,
r9 8 8 .
"The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Technique." In SelectedPapers,
3:8 7 - Io r .
"The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis." ln SelcctedPa'
p cr s,3 i r o 8 - 2 5 .
"The Problem of the trmination of the Analysis." ln Sclected
Papers,3: 77-86.
Thc SclectedPapersof Sandor Fercnczi. Trans. f. I. Suttie et al. New
York: Basic Books, r95u.
"Technical Difrculties in the Analysis of a Case of Hysteria." In
SelcctedPapcrs,3: r8g-97.
Ferenczi, S., and O. Rank. The Deuelopmentof Psycho-Analysis. Trans. C.
Newton. New York: Nervous and Mental DiseasePublishing, I925.
En t uic ftlungzic lc dcr Psychoanalyse. Vienna : Internationaler Psy-
choanalytischerVerlag, r 924.
Perspectiucsde la psychanalysc. ln S. Ferenczi, kychanalysc j,
Oeuurescomplltcs, vol.3, r9r9-r926. Paris: Payot, t974.
Fishei, C. "studies on the Nature of Suggestion."Parts t, z. Journal of the
American PsychoanalyticaI /ssociation, I 953, I : 222-5j, 4o6-37.
Freud, S. 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable." In Standard Edition,
231209-53.
'An Autobiographical Study." ln StandardEdition,2oi r-74.
"Charcot." In StandardEdition, 3: 9-23.
The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess: 1887-
tgo4.Trans. and ed. f. M. Masson.Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard Univer-
sity Press,r985.
"Constructions in AnalysisJ' ln StandardEdition,4: 255-69.
Conespondancer 873-rgj9. Paris: Gallimard, 1966.
"Dreams and Telepathy."In StandardEdition, 18: rg5-zzo.

3r o Bibliography
"The Dynamics of Tiansference." In Standard Edition, 12:
97_
r o8.
"Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis."In StandardEdition, rt: t_
"Future Prospects of Psycho-Analysis."In Standard Edirion, rr:
r.l9-5 r .
Group Psychologyand the Analysis of the Ego. In Standard Edition.
r 8: 65- r 43.
"Hysteria." In StandardEdition, r: 37-59.
"lntroductory Lectureson Psycho-Analysis," Lecture 27, "Tians_
ference." In StandardEdition, ft: 43r-47.
"lntroductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis," Lecture 28, "Ana-
lytic Therapy." In StandardEdition, 16: 448-63.
"Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic The rapy." In StandardEdi-
tion, 17: 157-68.
"Observations on Tiansference-Love." In Standard Edition, n:
157- 7r .
"On Psychotherapy."In StandardEdition, T: 255-68.
"On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement." In Standard
Edition. ra 166.
Postscript ft927) to "The Question of Lay Analysis." ln Standard
Edition, 2oi 25r-58.
"Psychical (or Mental) Tieatment." ln Standard Edition, 7. 28r-
302.
"Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy." In Standard Edition, t8: r77-
93.
"Recommendations to PhysiciansPractising Psycho-Analysis."In
Standard Edition, 12 rog-2o.
"Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through." ln Standard
Edition, rz: r45-56.
"Report on My Studies in Paris and Berlin." ln StandardEdition,
r : r - r 5.
'A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis." In Standard Edition, 19:
r89-2o9.
"Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical
Motor Paralysesl'In StandardEdition, r'. 16o-72.
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Worfts of Sig'
mund Freud. Tians. J. Strachey.I-ondon: Hogarth, ryfi-74.
"'Wild' Psycho-Analysi{' ln StandardEdition, rr'. 219-27.
Freud, S., and J. Breuer, Studies on Hysteria. In Freud, Standard Edition,
vol. z.
Friedman, L. The Anatomy of kychotherapy. Hillsdale, N.f.: The Analytic
Press,r988.
Bibliography
3r r
Gill, M. Analysis of Transference.Vol. r. New York: International Press,
r962.
Gill, M., and M. Brenman. Hypnosis and Related States:Psychoanalytical
Studiesin Regression.New York: International Universities Press,r959.
Clill, M., and L Hoffman.Analysis of Tiansference.Vol. z. New York: In-
ternational Press,Ig8z.
Gould, S.l. Euer Since Daruin: Refections in Natural History. New York:
Norton, rg7g.
The Flamingoi Smile: Rflections in Natural History. New York:
Norton, r985.
Heni Tbethand Horsei Tbes:Further Refections in Natural History.
New York: Norton, I983.
The Panda's Thumb: More RSections in Natural History. New
York: Norton, r98o.
Granoff, W "Ferenczi: Faux probldme ou vrai malentendu." Bloc-note de
la psychanalyse,1984,4: 35-62.
Green, A. "Lenfant modEle."Nouuelle reuuede psychanalyse,rg7g, rgt 27-
a/'
Greenson, R. R. 7ic Tbchnique and Practice of kychoanalysri. New York:
International UniversitiesPress,I967.
Grubrich-Simitis, I. "Six Letters of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi
on the Interrelationshipof PsychoanalyticTheory and Technique."1z-
ternationalJournal of Psycho-Analysu,r 986, r 3: 259-77.
()riinbaum, A. The Foundations of Psychoanalysis:A Philosophical Critique.
Berkeley: University of California Press,I984.
Grunberger, B. "De la puret6." ReuucfranEaisede psychanalyse,tg84,48:
795-8r2.
-."'De la technique active i la confusion de langues." Reuuefran-
gaisede psychanalyse,t974, 38:.5zr-46.
Guyton de Morveau, L. B., with A. L. Lavoisier,C.L. Berthollet,and A. F
de Fourcroy. Mdthode de Nomenclaturechimique. Paris: Cuchet, r787'
Hansen, E. K. "symbiosis. An Aspect of Psychotherapy."Bulletin of the
MenningerClinic. t978. 4,2:tgt-2o2.
Henry, M. Gindalogie de li psychanalyse. Collection Epim6th6e. Paris:
PUF, 1985.
"Pour une ph6nom6nologie de la communaut6." In Phinomdnol'
ogie matdrielle,by M. Henry. Paris: PUF, r99o. Pp. 16o-79.
Hermann, I. "Lobiectivit6 du diagnosticde iones concernantla maladie
de Ferenczi." Reuuefranqaisede psychanalyse'1974,4: 557-59.
Hull, C. Hypnosis and Suggestibility: An Experimental Approach-New York:
Appleton-Century Crofts, I 93.3.
fanet, P. L'automatismepsychologique.Paris: Alcan, r889. (Fourth edition
reedited in r973.)
 FI
3rz Bibliography
Les midications psychologiqucs, y'tudeshistoriq ucs, psychologiq ucs et
cliniques sur les my'thodcsde psychothdrapic.Yol. t , L'action morale, l'util-
isation de I'automatisme.Paris: Alcan, r9r9.
fones, E. The Ltfe and Wor\ of Sigmund Freud. 3 vols. New York: Basic
Books, r953.
Kant, L Critique of Pure Reason.Trans. N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan,
r 958.
Keller, E. F. A Feeling for the Organism: The Ltfe and Worft of Barbara
McClintocft. New York: W H. Freeman, r983.
Khan, M. Le soi cachy'.Paris: Gallimard, ry76.
Kihlstrom, f. F "The Cognitive Unconscious."Science,ry87,237: r445-52.
"Strong Inferences About Hypnosisl' The Behauioraland Brain
Scicnces,1986,9: 474-75.
Kohut, H. The Analysis of the Self. New York: International Universities
Pr es s ,t 97r .
Horu Does Analysi Cure? C\icago: University of Chicago Press,
r984.
Koyr6. A. Etudesgalil1enncs.Paris: Hermann, r966.
Kris, Ernst. The SelectedPapersof Ernst Krk. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
Univ er s it y Pr es s .r 975.
Kubie, L. "Hypnotism: A Focus fbr Psychophysiological and Psychoana-
lytic Investigationsl' Gencral Archiuesof Psychiatry,tg6r,4: 40-54.
"lllusion and Reality in the Study of Sleep,Hypnosis, Psychosis
and Arousal." Intcrnational Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypno-
s is .1972, 2ot 2c 5- 29.
Kubie, L., and S. Margolin. "The Processof Hypnotism and the Nature
of the Hypnotic State."Amex Journal of Psychiatry,rg44, roo: 6tt-zz.
Kuhn, T The Structure of Scienttfc Reuolutions. znd edition. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, r97o.
Lacan, f. 'Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis."In Ecrits: A Selection,pp. 8-29.
'Au-deli du 'Principe de r€alit€.' " ln Ecrits, pp. 73-92.
i -. "Les complexesfamiliaux dans la formation de I'individu. Essai
d'une analyse d'une fonction en psychologie." r938 essayreprinted in
vol. 7 of Encyclopddiefrangaise, ed. H. Wallon. Paris: Navarin. Pp. r-8.
"Conclusions" [du Congrds sur la Tiansmission]." ln Lcxrcs dc
l'Ecolc, by f. Lacan. Paris, t979. Pp. zr9-zo.
Dc la psychose paranoilaque dans ses rapports aaec la personnalitl.
r932 thesis,reedited.Paris: Seuil, Collection Points, r98o.
Ecrits. Paris: Seuil, r966.
Ecrits: A Selection.Tians. A. Sheridan. New York: Norton, r977.
Les 6crix techniquesde Freud. Sdminaire, Livre r. Paris: Seuil,
r975.
"The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in
Psychoanalysi{' In Ecrits: A Selection, pp. r r 4-45.
Bibliography
3r3
"The Function and Field of Speechand Language in psycho_
analysis."ln Ecrix: A Selection,pp. 3<l-r r3.
"R6ponseau commentairede fean F{ippolyte."ln Ecrits,pp.
3gr-
99.
"La scienceet la vdrit6." In Ecrits, pp.855-77.
Laplanche, l. Nouueaux fondcmenx pour la psychanalyse.Paris: PUF,
1987.
Latour, B. The Patteurization of France. Tians. A. Sheridan and |. Law.
Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,r988.
Laurence, f.-R., and C. Perry. Hypnosis, Will, and lVemory:A Psycho-Legal
Hutory. Ne rv York: Guildford Press,r988.
Lavoisier,A. L. "R6fl6xions sur le phlogistique,Pour servir de suite i la
thdorie de la combustion et de la calcination, publi€e en 1777."In
Oeuures de Ltuoisier.Paris: Imprimerie Imp€riale, r862. Vol. z,pp.6z3-
55.
Lebovici, S. Lc nourrisson, la mire et la psychanalyste:Irs interactions pr6'
coces.Paris: Editions du Centurion, I983.
L6vy-Leblond,l.-M. L'esprit de sel. Collection "Points." Paris: Seuil, r984.
Lorin, C. Le jeune Fercnczi:PremicrsAcritst899-t9o6. Paris: Aubier, I983.
Macalpine, I. "The Development of the Transference." Psvchoanalytic
Quartqrly,r95o, I9: 5()I-39.
McDougall, f. "Le contre-transfert et les cas difrciles." ln Le psychanalyste
ct sonpatienl, ed. H. Stultzman. Paris: Privat, I983.
"The Disaffected Patient: Reflections on Affect Pathology."Psl-
choanalytic Quarterly 53: 386-4o9.
Theaters of the Body: kychoanalytic Approach to PsychosomaticIll'
ners.New York: Norton, Ig8g.
Macmillan, M. Freud Eualuated: The Completel .4rr. New York: North
Holland, r99r.
Malarewicz, S. A., and f. Godin. De I'hypnoseclinique d la psychothirapie.
Paris: Editions ESF, r986.
Mannoni, O. Un commencemenl qui n'en fnit pas: Tran.sfert,interpritation,
th4oric.Paris: Seuil, r98o.
"L. Chertok, zoo ans\aprds. . . I'hypnose."Euolution psychiatrique,
r982. no. r: t89-2o4.
Masson, J.M. Thc Assault on Truth: Freudi Suppressionof the Sc'
duction Theory. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, I984'
Mendel, G. I-a psychanalyse reuisitde.Paris: [,a D6couverte, I988.
Meyerson,E. Identitdet rialitl.5th edition. Paris: Vrin, r95r.
Michaux, D. ,AspecxexPirimentaur et cliniqucs de I'hypnose.Paris: Univer-
sit6 Paris VII, U.E.R. des SciencesHumaines Cliniques, r982.
Miller, G. "Sur le discours du Maitre et I'hypnose."Lettres de l'6cole, 1977,
2rt 297-3ro.
Moscovici, S. L'6ge desfoules. Paris: Fayard, r98r.
 _.-Z
314 Bibliography
Nash, M. R. "Hypnosis as a Window on Regressionl'Bulletin of thc Mcn-
ninger Clinic, I988, 5z: 383-403.
Nassif, /. "Lire la voix." In Ry'surgencc dc l'hypno.cc,ed. L Chertok. Paris:
DescldeDe Brouwer, r984. Pp. 16187.
Nathan, T. Psychanalyse pai'enne: Essais ethnopsychanalytiques. Paris:
Dunod, r988.
Nunbe rg, H. "Tiansference and Reality." International lournal of Psycho-
Analysi, r9..-t,32i r-9.
Ogilvie, B. Ltcan: Le sqjet. Paris: PUF, Collection Philosophies,I987.
Oppenheime r. A. "La solution narrativiste." Reuuefrangaisede psychana-
lyse, ry88,52: t7-35.
Palaci, J. 'A propos de: Le non-savoir des psy de L. Clhertok." Euolution
psychiatique, 1982,z: 573-76.
P6raldi, R "K.K.K." Etudesfreudiennes,1987,no. 3o: r8t-zrz.
Popper, K. The Logic of Scienttfc Discouery.New York: Basic Books, I959.
Prigogine, I., and I. Stengers. Enn'e le temPset I'lternit6. Paris: Fayard,
r 988.
Puys6gur, A.-M.-1. de . Appel aux sauantsobseruateursdu dix-neuuiime siicle,
de la ddcisionPorty'ePar leurs pridlcesseurscontre le magnitisme animal, et
fn du traitemcnt du jeune Hdbert. Paris: Dentu, r8I3.
Roch, J.R., and C. Perry. Hypnosis, lVill and Memory. New York: Guild-
ford, I988.
Roudinesco, E. Itt bataille dc cent ans: Histoire de la psychanalyseen France.
Vols. r and :. Paris: Seuil, 1986.
Pour unc politiquc de la psychanalysr.Paris: Maspero, I977.
Roustang,E "De la fin de I'analyseet de I'auto-hypnosecomme gu6rison."
Etudesfreudiennes, t987, no. 30: Ijr-4o.
Influence.Paris: Minuit, I99r.
Lacan: Dc l'iquiuoque d I'impasse.Paris: Minuit, r986.
"Une philosophiepour la psychanalys{'Critique, ry85, 463:
r r 72- 69.
kychoanalysis Neuer Lets Go. Tians. N. Lukacher. Baltimore,
Md.: The fohns Hopkins University Press,I983.
Sabourin, P. Ferenczi,paladin et grand uizir secret.Paris: Editions universi-
t air es ,r 985.
Schulz-Keil, H. "Questions d'6thique." In Hypnose ct psychanalyse,ed.
Chertok. Pp. g7-to4.
Serres,M. "Ddontologie : La r6forme et les sept p6chds."In L'interfdfence,
by M . Ser r es .Par is : M inuit , t 9 7 z . P p . 2 o r - 2 2 .
Shor, R. E., and M. T Orne, erls. The Nature of Hypnosis: SelectedBastc
Readings.New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I965.
Soler,C. "Le journal clinique de Ferenczi."L'ane,()cr.-Dec. r985, p. 3.
Spanos,N. "More on the SocialPsvchologyof Hvpnotic Responding."Ilc
Behauioraland Brain Sciences,I986, 9: 489-5o2.
Bibliography 315
Spence,D. Narratiue Truth and Historical Truth. New York: Norton, ro8u.
Spinoza, B. A Thcological-Political Ti-eatise.Tians. R. H. N{. Elwes. New
York: Dover, r95r.
Stengers, I. "Les affaires Galil6e." In Elementsd'histoircdessciences,et!. M.
Serres.Paris: Bordas, r989. Pp. 223-49.
"Le pouvoir des concepts." In Les conceptsscientifques: Inuention
et pouuoir, by I. Stengers and J. Schlanger. Paris: La Ddcouverte, r989.
Pp.t+-57.
Stern, D. The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A Vietufi.om Psychoanalysis
and Deuelopmentalkychologt,. New Y<rrk: Basic Books, r985.
Strum, S. Almost Human: A Journey into the World of Baboozs.New York:
Random House, r987.
Swales,P "Freud, His Teacherand the Birth of Psychoanalysis." ln Freud.
Appraisaland Reappraisal,vol. r, ed. P Stepansky.Nerv York: The Ana-
l yti c Pr e ss,r 9 8 6 . Pp .3 - 8 2 .
Szasz, T "The Concept of Tiansfe re nce." International fournal of Psycho-
Analysis, r96j, 44: 432-43.
Venel, G. "Chymie." In L'Encyclopy'die ou Dictionnaire raisonnd dessciences
et desarts, ed. D. Diderot and J. d'Alembert. r753.
Viderman, S. "La vraie fausseconfession."Psychanalysres, specialissue on
"Laveu," r986, no. r4: 5-r8.
Wallerstein,R. S. "One Psychoanalysis or Manyl" InternationalJournalof
Psycho-Analysrr,r988, 69'. 5-zr.
Weitzenhoffer,A. M.: P. B. Gough; and f. Landes. 'A Study of the Braid
Effect (Hypnosis by Visual Fixation)." The Journal of kychology, t959,
47 67-8o.
Winnicott, D. W "Metapsychologicaland Clinical Aspecrsof Regression
Within the Psycho-Analytical Set-Up." International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis. t955, j6 6-26.
=...-Z

Index of l{ames

A braham (B i bl e), z I7 B reuer, fos eph,29, l I, 33, 35,39,9r,

A braham, K arl , 78, [36-87, Ioo 93, r22,234
A dl er , A l fred, ro2, t29 B ri s s ot,fac ques -P i erre,r
A l exa nder, Franz ,99 B ri i c k e, E rns t W i l hel m v on, z 8
A nna O., z g, 234 B runs w i c k , R uth Mac k , 77
A ri stotl e, 46, rz 8 B udapes tC ongres s ,63, 66
A rl ow , J ac ob,rz 6 Buffon, de, 46

[tabi n s k i . fos eph.z 3o- 12, z q8, z 4q. 247 C ahn, R ay mond, r36
B acon,Franc i s , tz 7 C harc ot, fean-Marti n, x v , z 6-28, 3o-
B adgas tei n,Tr 36, 52, 79, 2o2, 2o4, 216, 23o
B ai l l y , J ean,z C hrobak , R udol f, 3z
l3alclrvin,fames M., r76 C l oquet, z z 9
l l al i nt, Mi c hael , 88. 99, r02! I04, IJ + . C operni c us ,N rc ol as , 214, 212, 254,
rj 6 , r39 27o-7r
B al mary , Mari e, z r6 r13 C remeri us , fohannes , r35-j 6
Barber, Theodo re, zj8, 2.4j, 247
B ergas s e,N i c ol as , I \ D arw i n, C harl es , 214,2j 2-j 4, 270-7r
Eerlin Congress fi9zz), 77 D el euz e, Gi l l es , r68, z j 3
H ern hei m. H i ppol y te, 17, z 7-28, j 6 D es c artes R, en6, r85, z z 8,z 54
j 7, z j o-36, z 4z f)es l on, C harl es . t, 4-5, 7-8, t3-tg,
B erth el ot, Marc el i n, 5o 24-25, 33, 48, zo5, 255,275
B ol k, L., t76, r8o D i derot, D eni s , 46-47, 69
B ona parte,Mari e, 99 D onne, fohn, 253
B orch -fac obs en,Mi k k el , x v , 2rg, 222- D onnet, fean-Luc , z I3
z8
Ilowlby, r34 E agl e, Morri s , rz 7-28, tj o, I33, I4< l -
l l rai d , fames , 26, z 4o ,{I

B ren man, Margaret, z o6-9, z j 9, 265, E i ns tei n, A l bert, z 3z

268, z8o E i ti ngon, Max ,77 78, 86' 98, Ioo, Io9
B reteui l , B aron, r E mpedoc l es ,I r7

n
 _..-r

3r8 Index
3rg
Er ickso n , M ilto n , xv, r 4 5 fussi eu.A ntoi ne Laurent de,5,7, ro, N ew ton, Is aac ,4i l . rfJ 8,z z 8 S emmel w ei s , Ignac e, z 7g
Esca n d e ,fe a n - Pa u l,2 5 o , 2 5 5 rrl . 19 25, 37,46,18,54, 59, r23, N unb erg, H erman. :rc l -r r S i rnmel , E rnes t, 6(r
t7r, 2o5,zzg, zj 4, 256 S ol er,C ol ette, rz z z -3
F a ir b a ir n . r j.1 Ogl i v i e, B ertranti , r6l l . r75 76, r83 Spanos. Nicolas, 2.17-49
F a r ia , Ab b 6 , z6 K ant, E mmanuel , xxv, 7, g rr, 13, Orne, Marti n, z 3ti -39 S penc e,D ani el , r6o
Ferenczi, Sandor, xii, 56, 67 6t1,75, r 7r, r 8 r, r 85, r l l 8. z5j -5,1 Oxfbrd C ongres s .94 S pi noz a, B aruc h. t68-7r, t7), r75,
;;- tt2 .t r 1 1 .t.zr 2 1 . I1 4 lf' . r 4 q. K epl er, fohannes,253
176, 183
r 6 4 6 5 , u l3 r K ernberg, r 34 P aste ur,Loui s , 5o-52, z 5 l ,5z S tern. I)ani el . x i v . x ri -x v ri . r47
F Iie ss.Wilh e lm ,3 9 ,7 6 K han, N l asr"rd,134, r37 49.
P errv ,Oampbel l , z z 9 r5r-6r, r65, :67, r89, r98, z or_2,
F r a n klin , Be n ja m in , 3 , zr K i hl strom. John F., z4tl P i age t, fean, r46 22o,2O3 04
F r e u d , An n a , 9 9 K ohut. H ei nz, xi i i -xi 'i i , r34-35. r38- l 'i nel , P hi l i ppe, 3 r S w al es ,P eter.39
F r e u d , Sig m u n d , viii- ix, xir - xv, xxr- 413,r5o-52, r64, r66, r86, zor P l ato, r9r, z z 5,z z 7-28 S z as z ,Thomas , r3o
xxir , xxiv, xxv! r 7 . z6 - 4 2 ,4 4 ,5 r - 58, K oj dve, A l exandre, r68, r75, r8j P opper, K arl , r66
6 o 6 5 ,6 7 ,6 g - 7 t, j3 - 7 9 ,8 t- 9 1 , 95- K oyr6, A l exandre, r83, r85, rgo P uysi gur, A rmantl de,25, z z g, z j j , Thom, R en6, 93
r o r . r o 5 - 2 6 , r zE- 3 5 , r - 3 7 - 4 o ,r 4 z K ubi e, Law rence, 2oo-2, 2c.4-5,26:r z4z,2.68
4 + ,r 4 7 .r 5 r . r 5 8 5 9 . r b t- ( ) .i, r 6 ('- 66, :68
Ll ex k ul l , J ac obv on, r7o, t76, t8o
6 7 . t6 g - 7 o , 1 7 5 - 7 7 , r 8 o 8 7 . tg o , K uhn, Thomas, xi i i . u r8 R ank, Otto, 77-87, roo, z oo
r 9 2 - 9 4 , t9 6 , :o o - 2 o 3 . 2 o g - r r , 2r.2), R ei ch ,W i l hel m, roz V enel ,(i abri el , 45-50,
2 r s. 2 1 7 ^, 2 9 ,2--^j2 - 3 5 . 2 4 3,
2 2 o ^^
2 4 . --a Lacan, Jacques,xi v-xv, xxi , t64-77, 52, 54, 6o-6r,
Itoudrnesco, Elisabeth, 279 69,7t.t27,257
.-,
z)+ -/' rA' >-o t-> . r79 9/-' 212' 214-2o' 223' 225.
a"' -l'6 R oust .rug,Frauqoi s .x r, ;.2. r;l l , rg-, \Iienna (--ongress,6z
7 4 .2 7 6 , ) 7 9 - 8 2 zz,z,z8z 2r2 | 1,,22r 22, 26C J \/i l l aret, de, 3z
F r ie d r n a n . L a wr e n ce , r 5 tr Lafayette. r
V i nc i , Leonardo da.37
Lapl anche, l ean, zt6, z.7t S abou ri n, P i erre, ro9, rz 3
( ]a lile o , r 2 6 , r 8 5 , r 8 8 , zz8 , 2 5 4 ,2 j7, Laurence, f. R ., zz9 S achs ,86-87 Wallerstein, Robert, r zli--3o
2 6 E,z7 o Lavoi si er,A ntoi ne-Laurent, x, j , 8-r r, S t. Jea n,R i c hard, z 4z Weitzenhoffer, Andr6, zj5, zt7
Classner,Johann Casper, z5 t4,2r, 45,48-5o, 52, 69,74, ro7, S al p€t ri dre,z 6-2.8, to-j r, z j t W i es baden C ongres s ,roo
Gill. M e r to n , 2 0 6 - 9 ,2 3 9 ,2 6 5 . 2 6 8 , z8o rtl , r21,,r3r, r63, r8r. r87, 254,268 S al zbu rg C ongres s ,87 W i nni c ott, D onal d W , r34, r37
[ioffrnan, lrving, 2.47 I-e B on, r7, rzo S aussure,Ferc l i nandde, r84, r9o W ol f Man, 65
Gr e e n , An d r 6 , r 4 7 Li vi -S trauss, C l aucl e, r83-85, r9o, r97 Saussure,Raymoncl de, 99
Gr u n b e r g e r , Be la , r o z Li i heaul t. A rnbroi se A uguste. z7 z8 Schreber, z3z Young,Helmholtz, 3cr
Gu illo tin , fo se p h , Li eben, A nna von, 39-4o S earl e s ,r34
-3
Gu n tr ip , r 3 4 Li ebi g, Justus,B aron von,5o,55
I-orantl , l oz
Ha n se n , Elisa b e th , r 3 7
He g e l, F r ie d r ich , r 6 8 , r 7 5 , r 8 5 ,2 5 3 Macal pi ne. Iti a, .zro-r z. zrtr
He id e g g e r . M a r tin , r 8 5 ]!'lcClintock, Barbara, zo8
He n r y, M ich e l, xv. 2 r 9 2 r , zzj, zz6- McD ougal l , foyce, r36
Mahl er, Margueri te, 134
He r m a n n , Im r e , r o z Mannoni , Octave,z4z 43
Hilg a r d , 2 1 7 ,2 4 6 Margolin, Sidney, u6z-6.1, 265-66, 268
Hu ll, Cla r k, zj6 .3 7 Marienbad (lonference, r z7
Marmor, fudd, r3j
Isa a c( tsib le ) ,zr 7 Masson, feffrey, roo
Mesmer, Franz A nton, i x, x, xv, l , z,
fa n e t, Pie r r c, z3 r 1 1 ,zj6 , 2 4 6 ,2 6 6, 4, 8. r r, t9,25,242,255,264,275
z8 z Meyerson,E rni l e, I79, r83-115,I9o
fo n e s, E,r n e st,7 2 . 7 q , 8 6 . 9 9 - 1 o r , r 04, IU i chaux, D i di er, z4o-42, z6o-6t,
1 0 6 , r o g , r lr 266-67
fu n g . Ka r l- Gu sta r ' , ll7 , r o z, r u 9 N {dbi us,5 r
 -v

Libraty of Congres Cataloging-in-publication Data

Chertok, L. (L6on)
[C--oeuret la raison. English]
A critique of psvchoanalytic reason : hypnosis as a scientific
problem from Lavoisier to Lacan / L6on Chertok t lsabelle
Stengers ;
translated from the French by Martha Noel Evans in
collaboratron
with the authors.
p. cm.
Translation of: Le coeur et la rarson.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
r seN o- 8o47- r g5o- o ( alk. paper )
r. Hypnotism-France-History. z. psychoanalysis_France_
History. L stengers, Isabelle. II. Title.
Rc4g7.c53r3 rgg2
6 r 5.8' 5 r :- dc:o
9t - zzt88
CIP

This book has beentypesetin I l/13 Granronbv

Graphic Composition,Athens,Georgia.It is prinret!on acid_freepaper

.M