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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2018 > July 2018 Decisions > G.R. No.

236629, July 23, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P.
MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.:
G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA

CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) asking

the Court to reverse and set aside the April 25, 2017 Decision 1 and January 11, 2018
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105873, which affirmed the
May 8, 2015 Decision3 and September 16, 2015 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34 (RTC) declaring the marriage of Liberato P. Mola
Cruz (respondent) and Liezl S. Conag (Liezl) void ab initio.
The Antecedents
Respondent and Liezl were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Their dating
relationship began when Liezl's sister gave Liezl's mobile phone number to respondent
so they could become textmates. In the course of their relationship, Liezl left for Japan
to work as an entertainer for six (6) months. The couple got married after Liezl
returned home. They lived for some time in Manila where respondent worked, but later
moved to Japan where Liezl again secured a contract as an entertainer and respondent
found work as a construction worker. It was while living in Japan when respondent
noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without respondent's
permission and started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started getting
angry at respondent for no reason. The couple later returned to the Philippines after
Liezl was released from detention due to overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl
confessed to respondent her romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the
confession, Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused respondent such stress
that he was hospitalized. Respondent expressed her willingness to forgive Liezl but she
chose to walk away from their marriage.
The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back. One day,
however, respondent found Liezl's Japanese lover in their house. To respondent's
surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her elder brother. Respondent went along
with the charade, and allowed Liezl to share her bed with her lover as she threatened to
leave their home. Liezl went on with her partying ways, and continued working in a
Manila nightclub despite respondent's offer for her to start a business.
Despite the concessions given her, Liezl left respondent a second time. Respondent
tried to move on and left for Singapore to work in 2008. Though abroad, he continued
to woo his wife back, but found out that Liezl already cohabited with her lover.
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. The public prosecutor assigned to the case reported, submitted
a written report to the RTC, stating, among others, that the filing of the petition was
not a result of collusion between the spouses.5 Thereafter, pre-trial was held and trial
on the merits ensured.
The RTC's Decision
The RTC granted respondent's petition, and declared respondent and Liezl's
marriage void ab initio and their property regime dissolved.
The RTC relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Pacita
Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Based on the evaluation and assessment
procedure she followed, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was afflicted by histrionic personality
disorder, a pervasive pattern of behavior characterized by excessive emotionality and
attention seeking. A histrionic so afflicted tends to be perceived by others as selfish,
egotistical and unreliable; seeking immediate gratification; over-reactive to even minor
provocations; suggestible; and lacking in analytical ability.
Dr. Tudla presented the following indicators of Liezl's disorder: going out without her
husband's knowledge or permission; coldly treating her husband, verbally and sexually;
quick anger at the slightest provocation or for no reason; arrest in Japan due to
overstaying; admission to an affair; insensitivity towards her husband's feelings, as
shown by introducing her husband as her brother to her Japanese lover; threats of
leaving if her ideas are not agreed to; unabashed declaration of having no feelings for
her husband; maintaining a night life with friends; and choosing to work in a nightclub
instead of engaging in a decent job.
Dr. Tudla found that Liezl's psychological incapacity existed prior to the marriage
because she grew up irritable, hard-headed and more fond of friends than family. She
despised advice or suggestion from her elders, and would rebel when her demands
were not met. This personality aberration was determined by Dr. Tudla as rooted on
Liezl's poor upbringing - Liezl's father resorted to corporal punishment to instill
discipline, while her mother tolerated her whims. Liezl also tended to skip house and
spend nights with her friends to avoid her father's spanking. According to Dr. Tudla, the
irregular treatment she received from her parents led to Liezl acquiring unsuitable
behavioral patterns.
Aside from the existence of Liezl's psychological incapacity prior to the marriage, Dr.
Tudla found her incapacity too grave that it seriously impaired her relationship with her
husband, and caused her failure to discharge the basic obligations of marriage which
resulted in its breakdown. Her incapacity was also found incurable because it was
deeply ingrained in her personality. Further, Dr. Tudla found Liezl unconscious of her
personality disorder and, when confronted, would deny it to avoid criticism. The
disorder was also permanent as it started during her adolescence and continued until
adulthood. Treatment was also deemed ineffective as lack of any indication that
behavioural or medical therapy would play a significant role, considering Liezl's
unawareness of her disorder. Only the people around her noticed her maladaptive
behavior.
The RTC found that Liezl was largely responsible for the failure of her marriage. Her
moral bankruptcy, coupled with respondent's weakness in character inconsistent with
what is expected of the head of a family, left the marital union bereft of any mutual
respect. According to the RTC, the marriage was wrong from the very beginning.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and argued that Dr. Tudla's findings were based
on hearsay because she lacked personal knowledge of the facts on which her evaluation
was anchored; and that the hopelessness of the parties' reconciliation should not mean
that their marriage should be declared void ab initio.
In its Order,6 the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
On appeal, petitioner raised the sole issue of whether respondent was able to prove
Liezl's psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations. It claimed that
respondent failed to do so, and that witness Dr. Tudla only made a sweeping statement
that Liezl's condition was grave and permanent. Petitioner questioned Dr. Tudla's report
as it lacked details regarding Liezl's condition and how Liezl was unable to comply with
her marital obligations. Petitioner contended that the change in Liezl's behavior was
only caused by her illicit relationship and not because of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner asserted that sexual infidelity, indulgence and abandonment can only be
grounds for legal separation as they do not constitute psychological incapacity.
In its decision, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC's
decision. It reasoned that:
What matters in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must rely on the
opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis of
experts.
In the present case, the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by petitioner's

witness Pacita P. Tudla. Ph.D concluded [that] respondent is suffering from histrionic
personality disorder. From interviews of said psychologist with petitioner, respondent
and her sister, it was revealed how her psychological disorder resulted in the failure of
their marriage. At the time the parties were living in Japan, respondent had an affair
with a Japanese national which she admitted to petitioner. Furthermore, her attitude
towards her husband had changed ever since she met her Japanese lover, giving him
the cold treatment and getting angry at him at the slightest provocation. She likewise
refused to have sexual intercourse with petitioner. Respondent preferred to work at a
nightclub over a decent business offered to her by petitioner. Worst, she let her
Japanese boyfriend visit the conjugal home she shared with petitioner and introduced
the latter as her older brother to her lover. Petitioner was forced to keep silent because
she threatened to leave him. And ultimately, Liezl left Liberato and cohabited with her
Japanese boyfriend.
According to Ms. Tudla, respondent's psychological incapacity has antecedence since it

already existed long before she married petitioner. Growing up, Liezl was irritable,
hard-headed and was fond of her group of friends. She did not know how to accept
advice and suggestion from elders.
Respondent's psychological incapacity is considered by the expert witness to be grave,

permanent and incurable. Liezl's histrionic personality disorder seriously impaired the
quality of her relationship with her husband and caused her failure to discharge the
basic obligations of marriage - love, respect, concern, support and fidelity to her
husband. Further, she is unconscious of her personality disorder and if confronted about
it, she would deny it in her attempt to protect herself from criticisms.
Ms. Tudla said in her report that Liezl's psychological incapacity is permanent because it
started in the adolescent stage of her life and continued to manifest as she grew up into
adulthood. Thus, it is already ingrained in her personality make-up and no treatment
will be effective.7
The CA described Liezl's acts of allowing her lover to stay in the conjugal home and
introducing her husband as her brother as extreme perversion and depravity. It then
concluded that, in dissolving marital bonds on account of psychological incapacity, the
court is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
The Present Appeal

Petitioner now questions whether the totality of the evidence adduced by respondent
proves Liezl's psychological incapacity, thus warranting the declaration of their marriage
as null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Using the guidelines set forth in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
(Molina),8 petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's findings because
there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Liezl is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital obligations. Dr. Tudla's assessment, based only on the information
given by respondent, Liezl and her sister, must be weighed strictly and with due care.
Petitioner avers that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the couple
to obtain a conclusive diagnosis of psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and
incurable. Information retrieved from Liezl's interview does not necessarily enhance Dr.
Tudla's conclusion because the details Liezl conveyed were wanting. There is also no
independent collateral informants, which made Dr. Tudla's evaluation fallible. Therefore,
Dr. Tudla's findings should not be accepted without question.
For petitioner, Liezl's purported actuations were not proven to have existed prior to the
marriage; nor was it alleged in respondent's petition that she showed abnormal and
peculiar character and behavior prior to the celebration of the marriage that would
support a conclusion that she is suffering from any psychological incapacity. Petitioner
argues that the CA observed nothing peculiar about the spouses that would insinuate
that they are suffering from psychological incapacity, and that the finding that Liezl was
suffering from a psychological disorder was merely based on incidents that occurred
after the celebration of the marriage. Petitioner, thus, avers that Liezl's incapacity is
merely conjectural since there was no mention or proof that her incapacity manifested,
or at least was hinted at, before the celebration of the marriage.
Petitioner also claims that the CA failed to detail how Liezl's disorder could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable. There should be a
causal connection between the failure of the marriage and the psychological disorder.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", a "refusal" or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. Petitioner maintains that sexual
infidelity and abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and not for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. The change in the spouses' feelings toward each
other could hardly be described as a psychological illness.
Issue
Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was
sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented by respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court explained psychological incapacity as follows:

"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. x x x.10
Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the

obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them x x x." 11
Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating psychological

incapacity cases set in Molina. We quote the fairly recent iteration of the guidelines
in Republic v. Pangasinan12 for reference:
x x x [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expe1ts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential

obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or clinically
identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at the time of
marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be evident after marriage. x x
x.13
In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no longer be viewed
as a stringent code which all nullity cases on the ground of psychological incapacity
should meet with exactitude, in consonance with the Family Code's ideal to appreciate
allegations of psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis and "to allow some
resiliency in its application" as legally designed. 14Ngo Te v. Yu-Te15 predicated, thus:
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this
case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 16
In the case at hand, petitioner is again assailing the CA's affirmance of the RTC's
conclusion that Liezl is psychologically incapacitated to carry out her marital obligations
to respondent (1) by attacking the reliability of expert witness Dr. Tudla's medical
conclusions on the ground that they were based only on interviews of Liezl and her
sister; (2) by claiming that Liezl's actions manifesting her disorder occurred after the
celebration of the marriage; and (3) because the CA failed to detail why it found Liezl's
disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable. These issues were
resolved by the CA by affirming the factual findings earlier made by the RTC as regards
the histrionic personality disorder suffered by Liezl, all of which were deemed binding to
the Court. The Court is so bound "x x x owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute
the veracity of these facts."17 A sharper pronouncement on the respect accorded to the
trial court's factual findings in the realm of psychological incapacity was made in Kalaw
v. Fernandez (Kalaw):18
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a
party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings
and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial court
are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the
appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. It is not
enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute
our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment
of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage
that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.19
The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's psychological report
confirms, contrary to petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla personally interviewed both
spouses regarding their personal and familial circumstances before and after the
celebration of their marriage. Information gathered from the spouses was then verified
by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liez's youngest sister, 20 a close relation privy to
Liezl's personal history before and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based her
psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the information she gathered. Her
findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the
parties as individuals and as a married couple under a factual milieu verified with an
independent informant. The courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and
utilized it as an aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed psychologically incapacitated
to meet essential marital functions. Clearly, petitioner has no basis to assail Dr. Tudla's
psychological findings as wanting evidentiary support.
Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the couple will not
perforce result to the expert's opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner advances.
In Kalaw, a case also involving a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage wherein
the expert witnesses declared the respondent spouse therein as suffering from
narcissistic personality disorder without personally examining the latter albeit with the
support of the medical findings of the respondent spouse's own clinical psychologist. In
said case, the Court had the occasion to re-emphasize that such lack of personal
examination does not per se invalidate the experts' findings of psychological incapacity.
Citing Marcos v. Marcos,21 the Court emphasized the importance of the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity and the
inessentiality of a physician's personal examination to have a party declared
psychologically incapacitated. Kalaw expounded on the point, as follows:
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other
evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state
of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed
as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation. Indeed, an
expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to
establish causation. The expert's findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so, considering
that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates
as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation
had been based on the parties' upbringing and psychodynamics. 22
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the CA and
the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by respondent in
support of his petition, sufficiently established the link between Liezl's actions showing
her psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations and her
histrionic personality disorder. The Court respects the RTC's appreciation of
respondent's testimony during trial on what transpired before and during the marriage,
considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation
and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." 23 In addition,
Dr. Tudla was able to collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her
psychological evaluation of both spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's
report gave a description of histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the
characteristics of this disorder with Liezl's behavior from her formative years through he
course of her marriage to petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony
enjoy such probative force emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the
courts to show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was based. 24
The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after the
marriage was celebrated does not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is no
psychological incapacity to speak of. As held in Republic v. Pangasinan,25 psychological
incapacity may manifest itself after the celebration of the marriage even if it already
exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly, Art. 36 of the Family Code is
explicit - a marriage contracted by a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated
as void even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after the marriage was
celebrated.26
Also, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the CA did expound on the reasons why it
found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable.
To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse's
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the
marriage.27 The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 28 "There must be proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage which must be linked
with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity." 29
The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her
inability to discharge her marital obligations to love, respect and give concern, support
and fidelity to her husband. The CA also narrated how the disorder was evidenced by
Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated, starting from when she and petitioner
lived together in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating the totality
of her actions after she got married. Liezl was unable to accommodate the fact that she
was already married into the way she wanted to live her life, and essentially treated
petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede
to her desires. It is clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital responsibilities.
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and
continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's psychological evaluation that
revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder. Together with its rootedness in Liezl's
personality since her teens, the CA came to agree with the expert findings that any
medical or behavioral treatment of her disorder would prove ineffective.
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and abandonment are
only grounds for legal separation and cannot be used as basis to hold a marriage
void ab initio. According to petitioner, Liezl cheated on and abandoned her husband
because of her illicit affair and not because she is psychologically incapacitated.
It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation. It
may be noted, however, that the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts of
Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such
a disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate
gratification.30 These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of
allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed
with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done
under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the
sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who
reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.
The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as void ab initio, even
as it is clear from the records how much petitioner must love his wife to endure the
pain and humiliation she callously caused him in the hope that their relationship could
still work out. Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the marital responsibilities that came
when she married petitioner. The severance of their marital vinculum will better protect
the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of marriage and family, the importance of
which seems utterly lost on respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2017 Decision and January 11,
2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105873 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Martires, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 56-66; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate
Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, concurring.
2
Id. at 68-69.
3
Id. at 92-101; penned by Judge Celso O. Baguio.
4
Id. at 116-118.
5
Id. at 92-93.
6
Id. at 116-118.
7
Id. at 64-65. Citations omitted.
8
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
9
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
10
Id. at 40.
11
Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 351 (2006).
12
792 Phil. 808 (2016).
13
14
Supra note 8 at 36.
15
598 Phil. 666 (2009).
16
Id. at 699. Citation omitted.
17
Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 10 at 358.
18
750 Phil. 482 (2015).
19
20
Rollo, p. 86.
21
397 Phil. 840 (2000).
22
Supra note 17 at 503. Citations omitted.
23
Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017.
24
See Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017.
25
Supra note 12 at 825-826.
26
Art. 36 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
27
Mendoza v. Republic, et al., 698 Phil. 241, 243 (2012).
28
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 39.
29
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017.
30
Rollo, p. 89.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur. The marriage between Liberato P. Mola Cruz (Liberato) and Liezl (Liezl) Conag
is void due to psychological incapacity.
To recall, this Court first interpreted Article 36 of the Family Code in the 1995 case
of Santos v. Court of Appeals.1 In Santos, this Court outlined the history of Article 36,
noting that the term "psychological incapacity" was not defined in the law "to allow
some resiliency in its application." 2 The Family Code Revision Committee gave no
examples of psychological incapacity to prevent "[limiting] the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis."3
Still, standards were set in Santos. At the very least, the psychological incapacity
should be a "mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage."4 In addition, psychological incapacity must refer to "the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage" 5 and should
be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. 6
This Court went on to lay down more specific guidelines for resolving Article 36
petitions in the 1997 case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.7 The Molina guidelines, as they have been called since, are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.8 (Citations omitted)
With the Molina guidelines, psychological incapacity petitions were rarely granted by

this Court. From 1997 to 2008,9 only the parties in Antonio v. Reyes10 were found to
have complied with all the requirements of Molina.
This led the Court to state in Ngo Te v. Yu Te,11 decided in 2009, that "jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity
should be viewed."12 As accurately noted by the Court, this view was "totally
inconsistent with the way the concept [of psychological incapacity] was
formulated."13 The Molina guidelines were then compared to a "strait-jacket" to which
all Article 36 petitions are "forced to fit," thus:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably,
the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world". The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-
jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court,
in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage.14 (Citation omitted)
The same observation of the "rigidity" of the Molina guidelines was made in Kalaw v.

Fernandez,15 resolved on reconsideration in 2015, thus:
The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of
certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application."
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
"trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."16 (Citations omitted)
Since Ngo Te's promulgation in 2009, Kalaw would only be the fifth17 case voiding the

parties' marriage due to psychological incapacity, at least through a signed decision or
resolution. The present case would only be the sixth. The State's interpretation of its
constitutional mandate to protect marriages as the foundation of the family remains the
same: all Article 36 petitions are to be challenged until they reach this Court.
Protecting marriages, however, is not the same as forcing partners to stay together
when they clearly no longer wish to do so. While the law characterizes marriage as an
"inviolable social institution"18 and a "permanent union,"19 its inviolability and
permanence should be consistent with its purpose of establishing conjugal and family
life.20 This is obviously not the case here, with Liezl having left Liberato to cohabit with
another man. Forcing Liberato to stay married to a woman who has no intention of
sharing her life with him would have been cruel and inhuman.
Furthermore, the notion of "psychological incapacity" should not only be based on a

medical or psychological disorder; it should consist of the inability to comply with the
essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled. Marriage should be
protected only insofar as it affects the stability of society; otherwise, the State has no
business interfering with intimate arrangements.
I maintain that divorce is more consistent with our fundamental rights to liberty and
autonomy. We had absolute divorce laws in the past,21 but as the law stands now,
former partners have to pathologize each other in order to separate. This is inconsistent
with the reality that we are humans and that we make mistakes. There is no need to
punish those who simply made the wrong choice of people to love.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of

Appeals22 voiding the marriage between Liberato P. Mola Cruz and Liezl Conag.
Endnotes:
1
310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
2
Id at 36.
3
Id. citing Salita v. Magtolis, 303 Phil. 106 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]. See
also Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 677 (1997) [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc].
4
Id. at 40.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 39.
Important Note for Court Staff: This is part of the internal deliberations of the Court.
Unauthorized disclosure, sharing, publication, or use of this document or any of its
contents is classified as a grave offense and is punishable by suspension or dismissal
from service.
7
335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
8
Id. at 676-679. The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor General
briefly stating his or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has been dispensed with
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages).
9
Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Bier
v. Bier, 570 Phil. 442 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilia-
Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol,
562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San
Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes,
519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Villalon v. Villalon, 512 Phil. 219
(2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005)
[Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807
(2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 266 (2004) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third
Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second
Division].
10
519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
11
598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
12
Id. at 669.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 695-696.
15
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
16
Id. at 6-7.
17
The other four cases are Azcueta v. Republic, 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-
De Castro, First Division]; Halili v. Santos-Halili, 607 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per J. Corona,
Special First Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura,
Second Division]; and Aurelio v. Aurelio, 665 Phil. 693 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Second
Division].
18
CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family

and shall be protected by the State.
19
FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
20
FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
21
Act No. 2710 (1917) allowed the filing of a petition for divorce on the ground of
adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband. (Valdez v.
Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc]) Executive Order No. 141, or
the New Divorce Law, effective during the Japanese occupation, provided for eleven
grounds for divorce, including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
least one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by deed or
gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable." (Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J.
Ozaeta, En Banc]).
22
CA-G.R. CV No. 105873.
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ChanRobles Special Lecture Series
July-2018 Jurisprudence
 A.M. No. P-16-3595 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-4446-P), June 26, 2018 - HON.
DENNIS PATRICK Z. PEREZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 67, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BINANGONAN, RIZAL, Complainant, v. ALMIRA L. ROXAS, CLERK III, BRANCH 67,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BINANGONAN, RIZAL, Respondent.
 A.M. No. P-18-3842 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3965-P), June 11, 2018 -
CONSTANCIA BENONG-LINDE, Complainant, v. FELADELFA L. LOMANTAS, SOCIAL
WELFARE OFFICER II, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
TAGBILARAN CITY, BOHOL, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018 - OLIVER FABUGAIS, Complainant, v. ATTY.
BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 225219, June 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. RICO DE ASIS Y BALQUIN, Accused-Appellant.
v. ARDIN CUESTA CADAMPOG, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 234499, June 06, 2018 - RUDY L. RACPAN, Petitioner, v. SHARON
BARROGA-HAIGH, Respondent.
v. EVELYN SEGUIENTE Y RAMIREZ, Accused-Appellant.
v. JAY SUAREZ Y CABUSO, Accused-Appellants.
v. LULU BATTUNG Y NARMAR, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 212413, June 06, 2018 - MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, RUTH LIBRADA
AGARRADO AND ROY AGARRADO, FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR
SIBLINGS AND CO-OWNERS ROBERTO AGARRADO, REUEL ANDRES AGARRADO, HEIRS
OF THE LATE RODRIGO AGARRADO, JR., REX AGARRADO AND JUDY AGARRADO,
Petitioners, v. CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO AND ANA LOU AGARRADO-KING,
Respondents.
 A.M. No. P-16-3617, June 06, 2018 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant, v. GILBERT T. INMENZO, CLERK OF COURT III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 52, CALOOCAN CITY, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 224115, June 20, 2018 - MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP./AIR-SEA HOLIDAY
GMBH STABLE ORGANIZATION ITALIA/ MARLON R. ROÑO, Petitioners, v. ELMER V.
ENANOR, Respondent.
v. MICHAEL DELIMA, ALLAN DELIMA, JOHN DOE, PAUL DOE AND PETER DOE ACCUSED,
MICHAEL DELIMA AND ALLAN DELIMA, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 225125, June 06, 2018 - MARLON L. ARCILLA, Petitioner, v. ZULISIBS,
INC., PIANDRE SALON, AND ROSALINDA FRANCISCO, Respondents.
 A.M. No. 18-04-79-RTC, June 20, 2018 - RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR.
FLORANTE B. SUMANGIL, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH
119.
 G.R. No. 200899, June 20, 2018 - HEIRS OF PAZ MACALALAD, NAMELY: MARIETA
MACALALAD, ARLENE MACALALAD-ADAY, JIMMY MACALALAD, MA. CRISTINA
MACALALAD, NENITA MACALALAD-PAPA, AND DANNY MACALALAD, Petitioners, v.
RURAL BANK OF POLA, INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
Respondents.
 A.C. No. 11981, July 03, 2018 - LEAH B. TADAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO
B. APOYA, JR., Respondent.
 A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018 - RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION
DATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R. NO. 237428 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA V. MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO)
 A.C. No. 12137, July 09, 2018 - PHENINAH* D.F. WASHINGTON, Complainant, v.
ATTY. SAMUEL D. DICEN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 221439, July 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RASHID BINASING Y DISALUNGAN, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 212034, July 02, 2018 - COLEGIO MEDICO-FARMACEUTICO DE FILIPINAS,
INC., Petitioner, v. LILY LIM AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING UNDER HER, Respondent.
 A.M. No. RTJ-16-2484, July 23, 2018 - THE OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. HON. SELMA P. ALARAS, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 62, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
ROGELIO BAGUION A.K.A. "ROGEL," Defendant-Appellant.
RODOLFO OLARBE Y BALIHANGO, Accused-Appellants.
ALEXIS DINDO SAN JOSE Y SUICO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 178591, July 30, 2018 - SM SYSTEMS CORPORATION (FORMERLY
SPRINGSUN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION), Petitioner, v. OSCAR CAMERINO,
EFREN CAMERINO, CORNELIO MANTILE, DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ AND HEIRS OF
NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.
MARCIANO UBUNGEN Y PULIDO, Accused-Appellant.
 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2350 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3507-RTJ), July 23, 2018 - SPS.
ALBERTO AND LILIAN PACHO, Complainants, v. JUDGE AGAPITO S. LU, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 88, CAVITE CITY, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 222297, July 09, 2018 - FORTUNATO ANZURES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
ERLINDA VENTANILLA AND ARTURO VENTANILLA, Respondents.
REYNALDO ROJAS Y VILLABLANCA, JR., Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018 - JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 218721, July 10, 2018 - BINGA HYDROELECTRIC PLANT, INC., HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT, ERWIN T. TAN, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 206800, July 02, 2018 - STRADCOM CORPORATION AND JOSE A. CHUA,
Petitioners, v. JOYCE ANNABELLE L. ORPILLA, Respondent.
RANDY GAJILA Y SALAZAR, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 199802, July 03, 2018 - CONGRESSMAN HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS;
MAYOR EFREN B. DIONA; MAYOR ANTONINO A. AURELIO; KAGAWAD MARIO ILAGAN;
BARANGAY CHAIR PERLITO MANALO; BARANGAY CHAIR MEDEL MEDRANO; BARANGAY
KAGAWAD CRIS RAMOS; BARANGAY KAGAWAD ELISA D. BALBAGO, AND ATTY. JOSE
MALVAR VILLEGAS, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.;
SECRETARY CESAR PURISIMA, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; SECRETARY FLORENCIO H.
ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; COMMISSIONER KIM JACINTO-
HENARES, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; AND NATIONAL TREASURER ROBERTO
TAN, BUREAU OF THE TREASURY, Respondents.; G.R. No. 208488, July 3, 2018 -
HONORABLE ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., IN HIS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 2ND DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF BATAAN, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE [PAQUITO] N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HONORABLE CESAR
V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; HONORABLE FLORENCIO H.
ABAD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; HONORABLE KIM S.
JACINTO-HENARES, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; AND
HONORABLE ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
Respondents.
DIONESIO ROY Y PERALTA, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 213446, July 03, 2018 - CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); JUDICIARY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (JUDEA-PHILS); SANDIGANBAYAN EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (SEA); SANDIGAN NG MGA EMPLEYADONG NAGKAKAISA SA ADHIKAIN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG ORGANISASYON (S.E.N.A.D.O.); ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF
APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACAE); DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (DAREA); SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES-DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (SWEAP-DSWD);
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION (DTI-EU); KAPISANAN
PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAWANI NG METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (KKK-MMDA); WATER SYSTEM EMPLOYEES RESPONSE (WATER);
CONSOLIDATED UNION OF EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITIES
(CUE-NHA); AND KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA AT KAWANI NG QUEZON CITY
(KASAMA KA-QC), Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
AND THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
(NAFEDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT ROMAN M. SANCHEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
(DAEA-OSEC), REPRESENTED BY ITS ACTING PRESIDENT ROWENA GENETE, NATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERIES COUNCIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NAFCEA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT SOLIDAD B. BERNARDO, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EMPLOYEES UNION (COMELEC EU), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
MARK CHRISTOPHER D. RAMIREZ, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION CENTRAL OFFICE (MGBEA CO), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
MAYBELLYN A. ZEPEDA, LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (LDCEA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT JOVITA M. GONZALES,
ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (ACE OF PFDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT ROSARIO DEBLOIS,
Intervenors.; G.R. No. 213658, July 3, 2018 - JUDGE ARMANDO A. YANGA, IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE RTC JUDGES
ASSOCIATION OF MANILA, AND MA. CRISTINA CARMELA I. JAPZON, IN HER PERSONAL
CAPACITY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF
COURT EMPLOYEES-MANILA CHAPTER, Petitioners, v. HON. COMMISSIONER KIM S.
JACINTO-HENARES, IN HER CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.; THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN ILOILO CITY, Intervenors.
 G.R. No. 197908, July 04, 2018 - VISITACION R. REBULTAN, CECILOU R. BAYONA,
CECILIO REBULTAN, JR., AND VILNA R. LABRADOR, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES EDMUNDO
DAGANTA AND MARVELYN P. DAGANTA, AND WILLIE VILORIA, Respondents.
 A.C. No. 10557 (Formerly CBD Case No. 07-1962), July 10, 2018 - JERRY M.
PALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, ATTY. GERARD M.
LINSANGAN, AND ATTY. GLENDA M. LINSANGAN-BINOYA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 221813, July 23, 2018 - MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
ELY G. FLORENTINO, GLENN BUENVIAJE, RUDY J. GOMEZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS
HEIRS THELMA GOMEZ, ALEJANDRO H. SITCHON, NENET ARITA, FERNANDO SIGUAN,
DENNIS ABELIDA, NOEL S. ACCOLADOR, WILFREDO TAGANILE, SR., MARTIR S.
AGSOY, SR., MELCHOR APUCAY, DOMINGO LAVIDA, JESUS MOSQUEDA, RUELITO A.
VILLARMIA, SOFRONIO M. AYON, EFREN T. GENISE, ALQUIN A. FRANCO, PABLO L.
ALEMAN, PEPITO G. HEPRIANA, ELIAS S. TRESPECES, EDGAR SOBRINO, Respondents.;
G.R. No. 222723, July 23, 2018 - ELY FLORENTINO, GLENN BUENVIAJE, RUDY J.
GOMEZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS THELMA GOMEZ, FERNANDO SIGUAN, DENNIS
ABELIDA, NOEL S. ACCOLADOR,WILFREDO TAGANILE, SR., MARTIR S. AGSOY, SR.,
MELCHOR APUCAY, DOMINGO LAVIDA, JESUS MOSQUEDA, RUELITO A. VILLARMIA,
SOFRONIO M. AYON, EFREN T. GENISE, ALQUIN A. FRANCO, PABLO L. ALEMAN, PEPITO
G. HEPRIANA, ELIAS S. TRESPECES, EDGAR SOBRINO, ALEJANDRO H. SITCHON,
NENET ARITA, WELILMO T. NERI, ERLINDA FERNANDEZ, AND EDGARDO PEÑAFLORIDA,
Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION - 7TH DIVISION, CEBU
CITY, "G" HOLDINGS, INC., AND TEODORO G. BERNARDINO, ROLANDO DEGOJAS,
MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION. Respondents.
 G.R. No. 192285, July 11, 2018 - MATEO ENCARNACION (DECEASED),
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: ELSA DEPLIAN-ENCARNACION, KRIZZA MARIE
D. ENCARNACION, LORETA ENCARNACION, CARMELITA E. STADERMAN, CORAZON S.
ENCARNACION, RIZALINA ENCARNACION-PARONG, VICTORIA ENCARNACION-DULA,
MARIA HELEN ENCARNACION-DAY, TERESITA ENCARNACION-MANALANG, GEORGE
ENCARNACION, MARY MITCHIE E. EDWARDSON, ERNESTO ENCARNACION, MATEO
ENCARNACION, JR., AND GRACE WAGNER, Petitioners, v. THOMAS JOHNSON,
Respondent.
JOHN CARLO SALGA AND RUEL "TAWING" NAMALATA, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 207711, July 02, 2018 - MARIA C. OSORIO Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 198916-17, July 23, 2018 - MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner, v. ST. FRANCIS SQUARE REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.; G.R. Nos.
198920-21 - ST. FRANCIS SQUARE REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MALAYAN
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
RODEL BELMONTE Y SAA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 222837, July 23, 2018 - MACARIO LIM GAW, JR., Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 216748, July 25, 2018 - DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Petitioner, v.
NIXON Q. DELA TORRE, BENHUR Q. DELA TORRE, QUINTIN DELA TORRE (DECEASED),
REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE CATALINA DELA TORRE AND HIS CHILDREN STELLA T.
NAGDALE, DWIGHT DELA TORRE, VIVIAN T. SUPANGCO, NIXON DELA TORRE AND
BENHUR DELA TORRE, Respondents.
ALVIN J. LABAGALA AND ROMEO LABAGALA, Accused-Appellant.
 A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-2719-MTJ), July 24, 2018 -
ANONYMOUS, Complainant, v. JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVA VIZCAYA, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018 - EVELYN T. GOOPIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARIEL
D. MAGLALANG, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018 - ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE
ALFONSO M. GOMOS, Respondent.
VENERANDO GOZO Y VELASQUEZ, Accused-Appellant.
SHERNIEL UNGRIANO ASCARRAGA A.K.A.SERGIO ONGRIANO ASCARRAGA, Accused-
Appellant.
 G.R. No. 210838, July 03, 2018 - DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 203249, July 23, 2018 - SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 191495, July 23, 2018 - NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018 - DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY, Petitioner, v. THE
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C. TAN, SECRETARY OF FINANCE
MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE GOVERNOR OF BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
(BSP), Respondents.
 G.R. No. 210204, July 10, 2018 - ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED COURT OF APPEALS
JUSTICES, INC. (ARCAJI), REPRESENTED BY TEODORO P. REGINO, Petitioner, v. HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondent.
CAJETO CABILIDA, JR. Y CANDAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 189723, July 11, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
ALAMINOS ICE PLANT AND COLD STORAGE, INC., REPRESENTED BY SAMUEL C. CHUA,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199162, July 04, 2018 - PHIL-MAN MARINE AGENCY, INC., AND DOHLE
(10M) LIMITED, Petitioners, v. ANIANO P. DEDACE, JR., SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SPOUSE
LUCENA CAJES DEDACE, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR THREE [3] CHILDREN,
NAMELY, ANGELICA, ANGELO AND STEVE MAC, ALL SURNAMED DEDACE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 195905, July 04, 2018 - THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO
REPRESENTED BY MAURICIO G. DOMOGAN, CITY MAYOR, CITY BUILDINGS AND
ARCHITECTURE OFFICE REPRESENTED BY OSCAR FLORES, AND PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY DIVISION REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO MOYAEN AND CITY DEMOLITION TEAM
REPRESENTED BY NAZITA BAÑEZ, Petitioners, v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, REGIONAL
HEARING OFFICER-NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES-CORDILLERA
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, MAGDALENA GUMANGAN, MARION T. POOL, LOURDES C.
HERMOGENO, JOSEPH LEGASPI, JOSEPH BASATAN, MARCELINO BASATAN, JOSEPHINE
LEGASPI, LANSIGAN BAWAS, ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY, JULIO DALUYEN, SR.,
CONCEPCION PADANG AND CARMEN PANAYO, Respondents.
NESTOR "TONY" CALIAO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON
AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused.; ESMAEL GERVERO (DECEASED), DANILO
CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused-Appellants.
FRANCISCO EJERCITO, Accused-Appellant.
MICHAEL CABUHAY, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018 - ARVIN R. BALAG, Petitioner, v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ORDER AND DANGEROUS DRUGS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND REVISION OF CODES AND MGEN. JOSE V.
BALAJADIA, JR. (RET.) IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS,
Respondents.
BENITO PALARAS Y LAPU-OS, Accused-Appellant.
ALLAN LUMAGUI Y MALIGID, Accused-Appellant.
MERCINDO BOBOTIOK, JR. Y LONTOC, Accused-Appellant.
EVELYN PATRICIO Y CASTILLO, ALIAS "NINGNAY", Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. Nos. 212761-62, July 31, 2018 - SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA,
Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.; G.R. NOS. 213473-74
- JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, Respondents.; G.R. NOS. 213538-39 - JANET LIM
NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018 - RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.;
G.R. No. 218235 - RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondents.; G.R. No. 218266 - JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION), CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN,
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.; G.R. No. 218903 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), RAMON "BONG" B.
REVILLA, JR., AND RICHARD A. CAMBE, Respondents.; G.R. No. 219162 - RAMON
"BONG" B. REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 205688, July 04, 2018 - VALENTINO S. LINGAT AND APRONIANO
ALTOVEROS, Petitioners, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., MONTE
DAPPLES TRADING, AND DAVID LYONS,* Respondents.
CCC, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 237721, July 31, 2018 - IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY
PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN V.
SANDIGANBAYAN – ROLANDO ELBANBUENA Y MARFIL, Petitioner.
ALJON GUADAÑA Y ANTIQUERA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. Nos. 230950-51, July 23, 2018 - ELPIDIO TAGAAN MAGANTE, Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 226405, July 23, 2018 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. EFREN
BONGAIS, HOUSING AND HOMESITE REGULATION OFFICER IV, CITY HOUSING AND
SETTLEMENTS OFFICE, CALAMBA CITY, Respondent.
PATRICIA CABRELLOS Y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
JOEL JAIME ALIAS "TORNING," Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 232891, July 23, 2018 - LAMBERTO MARIÑAS Y FERNANDO, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RONELO BERMUDO Y MARCELLANO, ROMMEL BERMUDO Y CAPISTRANO AND ROLANDO
BERMUDO Y CAPISTRANO, ACCUSED, ROMMEL BERMUDO Y CAPISTRANO, Accused-
Appellant.
 G.R. No. 224678, July 03, 2018 - SPOUSES JOSE MANUEL AND MARIA ESPERANZA
RIDRUEJO STILIANOPOULOS, Petitioners, v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LEGAZPI
CITY AND THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents.
JOWIE ALLINGAG Y TORRES AND ELIZABETH ALLINGAG Y TORRES, Accused-
Appellants.
RONALD M. COSALAN, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 8854, July 03, 2018 - JULIETA DIMAYUGA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIVIAN
G. RUBIA, Respondent.
XXX AND YYY,* Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 221684, July 30, 2018 - MARIA T. CALMA, Petitioner, v. MARILU C. TURLA,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018 - RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO
MASBATE AND MARLYN MASBATE, Petitioners, v. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 221624, July 04, 2018 - NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. MA. MAGDALENA LOURDES LACSON-DE LEON, MA. ELIZABETH
JOSEPHINE L. DE LEON, RAMON LUIS EUGENIO L. DE LEON, MA. TERESA CECILIA L.
DE LEON, MA. BARBARA KATHLEEN L. DE LEON, MARY GRACE HELENE L. DE LEON,
JOSE MARIA LEANDRO L. DE LEON, MA. MARGARETHE ROSE OLSON, AND HILDEGARDE
MARIE OLSON, Respondents.
GERALD TAMAYO CORDOVA AND MARCIAL DAYON EGUISO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018 - LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, Petitioner,
v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 - THE PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES (PBOAP), THE SOUTHERN LUZON BUS OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC. (SO-LUBOA), THE INTER CITY BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
(INTERBOA), AND THE CITY OF SAN JOSE DEL MONTE BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
(CSJDMBOA), Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB),
Respondents.
 A.C. No. 8962, July 09, 2018 - JILDO A. GUBATON, Complainant, v. ATTY.
AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 229920, July 04, 2018 - SAMUEL MAMARIL, Petitioner, v. THE RED SYSTEM
COMPANY, INC., DANILO PADRIGON, AGNES TUNPALAN, ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ,
JODERICK LOZANO, ENRIQUE ROMMEL MIRAFLORES, DOMINGO RIVERO, Respondents.
RENATO CARIÑO Y GOCONG AND ALVIN AQUINO Y RAGAM*, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 189800, July 09, 2018 - PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL REINOSO, JUAN TRIVINO, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, MARIO ORTIZ, GENEROSO TANSECO, FAUSTINO SY CHANGCO, VICENTE ABAD
SANTOS, EUSEBIO VILLATUYA, MANUEL MORALES, JOSE ROÑO, TROADIO T. QUIAZON,
RUBEN ANCHETA, FERNANDO MARAMAG, JR., GERONIMO VELASCO, EDGARDO L.
TORDESILLAS, JAIME C. LAYA, GERARDO P. SICAT, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., PLACIDO
L. MAPA, JR., PANFILO DOMINGO, VICTORINO L. OJEDA, TEODORO DE VERA,
ALEJANDRO LUKBAN, JR., ROMEO TAN, LUIS RECATO, BENITO S. DYCHIAO, ELPIDIO
M. BORJA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 225199, July 09, 2018 - ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION (NOW
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK), Petitioner, v. EDUARDO DE GUZMAN, SR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SURETY TO THE VARIOUS CREDIT ACCOMMODATIONS GRANTED TO
YESON INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
 A.C. No. 12062, July 02, 2018 - HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO* A. UNITE, REPRESENTED
BY HIS SOLE HEIR, FLORENTINO S. UNITE, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAYMUND P.
GUZMAN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 200712, July 04, 2018 - MARIO A. ABUDA, RODOLFO DEL REMEDIOS,
EDWARDO DEL REMEDIOS, RODOLFO L. ZAMORA, DIONISIO ADLAWAN, ELPIDIO
GARCIA, JR., ROGELIO ZAMORA, SR., JIMMY TORRES, POLICARPIO OBANEL, JOSE
FERNANDO, JOHNNY BETACHE, JAYSON GARCIA, EDWIN ESPE, NEMENCIO CRUZ,
LARRY ABANES, ROLANDO SALEN, JOSEPH TORRES, FRANCISCO LIM, ARNALDO
GARCIA, WILFREDO BRONOLA, GLENN MORAN, JOSE GONZALES, ROGER MARTINEZ,
JAIME CAPELLAN, RICHARD ORING, JEREMIAS CAPELLAN, ARNEL CAPELLAN, MELCHOR
CAPELLAN, ROLLY PUGOY, JOEY GADONES, ARIES CATIANG, LEONEL LATUGA,
CAPILLAN, Petitioners, v. L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS, JULIANA NATIVIDAD, AND
MERLINDA NATIVIDAD, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220898, July 23, 2018 - MON C. ANUAT, Petitioner, v. PACIFIC OCEAN
MANNING, INC./TRAS STAR SHIPPING AGENCY CORPORATION, MASSOEL MERIDIAN
LTD. AND/OR HERNANDO S. EUSEBIO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 225803, July 02, 2018 - SHERYLL R. CABAÑAS, Petitioner, v. ABELARDO G.
LUZANO LAW OFFICE/ABELARDO G. LUZANO, Respondents.
FIDEL G. LAGUERTA, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 11185 [Formerly CBD No. 12-3619], July 04, 2018 - JAIME S. DE BORJA,
Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON R. MENDEZ, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 227147, July 30, 2018 - RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner, v. ALFONSO O. PINEDA, JR., AND JOSEPHINE C. PINEDA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 204361, July 04, 2018 - CECILIA T. JAVELOSA, REPRESENTED BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MA. DIANA J. JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. EZEQUIEL TAPUS, MARIO
MADRIAGA, DANNY M. TAPUZ,1 JUANITA TAPUS AND AURORA MADRIAGA,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 222436, July 23, 2018 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, v. EURO-PHILIPPINES AIRLINE SERVICES, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 233974, July 02, 2018 - CATALINA F. ISLA, ELIZABETH ISLA, AND
GILBERT F. ISLA, Petitioners, v. GENEVIRA P. ESTORGA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 214794, July 23, 2018 - NARCISO VICTORIANO, Petitioner, v. JUNIPER
DOMINGUEZ, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 224972, July 09, 2018 - NG CHING TING, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE
BUSINESS BANK, INC. Respondent.
JERRY ARBUIS Y COMPRADO A.K.A. "ONTET", Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 229955, July 23, 2018 - MELCHOR BARCENAS DEOCARIZA, Petitioner, v.
FLEET MANAGEMENT SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., MODERN ASIA SHIPPING
CORPORATION, A.B.F. GAVIOLA, JR., AND MA. CORAZON CRUZ, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 197831, July 09, 2018 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v.
SPOUSES ANGEL AND BUENVENIDA ANAY, AND SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND DOLORES
LEE, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 209166, July 09, 2018 - DEMETRIO ELLAO Y DELA VEGA, Petitioner, v.
BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELEC I), RAQUEL ROWENA
RODRIGUEZ BOARD PRESIDENT, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 223125, July 11, 2018 - IBM DAKSH BUSINESS PROCESS SERVICES
PHILIPPINES, INC. (NOW KNOWN AS CONCENTRIX DAKSH BUSINESS PROCESS
SERVICES PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ROSALLIE S. RIBAS, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 228503, July 25, 2018 - HEIRS OF RAMON ARCE, SR., Petitioners, v.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY VIRGILIO DELOS
REYES, Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 231655 and 231670, July 02, 2018 - FELISA AGRICULTURAL
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (HAVING BEEN
SUBSTITUTED IN LIEU OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION), Respondent.
Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER
DISTRICT (MCWD), Respondents.
 G.R. No. 217744, July 30, 2018 - JOSE Z. MORENO, Petitioner, v. RENE M. KAHN,
CONSUELO MORENO KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS PIERRE KAHN, PHILIPPE KAHN, MA.
CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 232275, July 23, 2018 - SOLPIA MARINE AND SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Petitioner, v. MICHAEL V. POSTRANO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 233033, July 23, 2018 - ROMEO IGDALINO AND ROSITA IGDALINO,
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 197624, July 23, 2018 - ABACUS CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DR. ERNESTO G. TABUJARA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 210286, July 23, 2018 - WELBIT CONSTRUCTION CORP., WACK WACK
CONDOMINIUM CORP., AND SPOUSES EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ AND MATILDE
GONZALEZ, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF CRESENCIANO C. DE CASTRO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 211450, July 23, 2018 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v.
LOVING F. FETALVERO, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 222710, July 24, 2018 - PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO,
DIRECTOR JOSEPH B. ANACAY AND SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA L. AGUSTIN,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 203217, July 02, 2018 - JOSE L. DIAZ, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018 - STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 5473, July 03, 2018 - GENE M. DOMINGO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 207040, July 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
SHELDON ALCANTARA Y LI, JUNNELYN ILLO Y YAN, NATIVIDAD ZULUETA Y YALDUA,
MA. REYNA OCAMPO Y CRUZ, MAILA TO Y MOVILLON, MA. VICTORIA GONZALES Y
DEDIOS, ELENA PASCUAL Y ROQUE, MARY ANGELIN ROMERO Y BISNAR AND NOEMI
VILLEGAS Y BATHAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 205294, July 04, 2018 - ELMER P. LEE, Petitioner, v. ESTELA V. SALES,
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER LEGAL AND INSPECTION GROUP; EFREN P. MARTINEZ, CHIEF
PERSONNEL INQUIRY DIVISION; NESTOR S. VALEROSO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
REVENUE REGION NO. 8; AND ALL OF THE BIR AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR
ORDERS OR BEHALF, Respondents.
 A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 03, 2018 - RE: MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 10, 2017
FROM ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO; A.M. No. 18-02-13-
SC - RE: LETTER OF RESIGNATION OF ATTY. BRENDA JAY ANGELES MENDOZA, PHILJA
CHIEF OF OFFICE FOR THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER
 G.R. No. 225896, July 23, 2018 - CARMEN ALEDRO-RUÑA, Petitioner, v. LEAD
EXPORT AND AGRO-DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 229192, July 23, 2018 - MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE,INC. AND/OR MOL SHIP
MANAGEMENT (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD., Petitioners, v. MICHAEL PADERES ATRAJE,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 232272, July 24, 2018 - SECRETARY MARIO G. MONTEJO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(DOST), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT SECTOR, CLUSTER B - GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICES II AND DEFENSE,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
MARIA THERESA MANAHAN-JAZMINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018 - PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., ENCARNACION A.
GAOR, JOSEPHINE P. CALAJATE, GENEDINE D. JAMBARO, EDEN C. BATTULAYAN,
EVANGELINE C. TABULOG, Petitioners, MARIA IMELDA JOSEFA "IMEE" R. MARCOS, Co-
Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, THE
HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY T. PIMENTEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LT. GEN. ROLAND
DETABALI (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS SERGEANT-AT-ARMS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents, THE COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, Co-Respondent.
 A.C. No. 11724 (Formerly CBD No. 14-4109), July 31, 2018 - HDI HOLDINGS
PHILIPPINES, INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL N. CRUZ, Respondent.
AMADO BALUBAL Y PAGULAYAN, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 5580, July 31, 2018 - SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AS
REPRESENTED BY REBECCA V. LABRADOR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO B.
ROMANILLOS, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 219774, July 23, 2018 - MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
ROSITA DE LEON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 178696, July 30, 2018 - BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND ITS
MONETARY BOARD, Petitioners, v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
Respondent.; G.R. No. 192607 - BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
Petitioner, v. CENTRAL BANK BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 217682, July 17, 2018 - JOSE "JINGGOY" P. EJERCITO ESTRADA AND MA.
PRESENTACION VITUG EJERCITO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION);
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
JULIA C. BACAY-ABAD; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018 - DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOTR),
MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY (MARINA), AND PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD (PCG),
Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM SEA TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, HERMA
SHIPPING TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ISLAS TANKERS SEATRANSPORT
CORPORATION, MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, PETROLIFT, INC., GOLDEN ALBATROSS
SHIPPING CORPORATION, VIA MARINE CORPORATION, AND CARGOMARINE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
 A.C. No. 12012, July 02, 2018 - GERONIMO J. JIMENO, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY.
FLORDELIZA M. JIMENO, Respondent.
XXX*, Accused-Appellant.
 A.M. No. RTJ-17-2491 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3448-RTJ), July 04, 2018 - LUCIO
L. YU, JR., Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 112, PASAY CITY, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 220949, July 23, 2018 - RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS., INC., GLOBAL
MANAGEMENT LIMITED AND/OR GEORGE C. GUERRERO, Petitioners, v. EDMUND R.
SAN JOSE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 219291, July 04, 2018 - MICHAEL V. RACION, Petitioner, v. MST MARINE
SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., ALFONSO RANJO DEL CASTILLO AND/OR THOME SHIP
MANAGEMENT PTE. LTD., Respondents.
DANILO JAPAG AND ALVIN LIPORADA, Accused; DANILO JAPAG, Accused-Appellant.
JACINTO ANDES Y LORILLA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 227216, July 04, 2018 - YIALOS MANNING SERVICES, INC., OVERSEAS
SHIPMANAGEMENT S.A., RAUL VICENTE PEREZ, AND MINERVA ALFONSO, Petitioners,
v. RAMIL G. BORJA, Respondent.
HENRY DE VERA Y MEDINA, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 12044, July 23, 2018 - MARTIN J. SIOSON, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212786, July 30, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v.
ESTRELLA R. DECENA, MARIETA DECENA BRAZIL, NOLAND D. BRAZIL, HEIRS OF EDITA
R. DECENA, AS REPRESENTED BY VIRGILIO C. BRAZIL, SR., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 229153, July 09, 2018 - EDILBERTO R. PALERACIO, Petitioner, v.
SEALANES MARINE SERVICES, INC., SPLIETHOFF GROUP MANILA, INC. AND/OR
CHRISTOPHER DINO C. DUMATOL AND CAPT. RUBEN AGMATA, Respondents.
 G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018 - CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner,
v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN;
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents; G.R. Nos. 210141-42 - CESAR MATAS
CAGANG, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018 - HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF) PAG-
IBIG FUND, Petitioner, v. CHRISTINA SAGUN, Respondent; G.R. No. 205780 -
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REP. BY SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, STATE PROSECUTOR
THEODORE M. VILLANUEVA, AND PROSECUTOR GENERAL CLARO A. ARELLANO, AND
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), Petitioners, v. CHRISTINA SAGUN,
Respondent; G.R. No. 208744 - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. DELFIN S.
LEE, Respondent; G.R. No. 209424 - HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF),
Petitioner, v. GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS CORPORATION, DELFIN S. LEE, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION, AND TESSIE G. WANG,
Respondents; G.R. No. 209446 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ALEX M.
ALVAREZ, Respondent; G.R. No. 209489 - HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND,
Petitioner, v. ATTY. ALEX M. ALVAREZ, Respondent; G.R. No. 209852 - HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, (HDMF), Petitioner, v. DELFIN S. LEE, Respondent; G.R.
No. 210095 - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. DELFIN S. LEE, Respondent;
G.R. No. 210143 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. DELFIN S. LEE,
Respondent; G.R. No. 228452 - HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF),
Petitioner, v. DEXTER L. LEE, Respondent; G.R. No. 228730 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. DEXTER L. LEE, Respondent; G.R. No. 230680 -CRISTINA
SALAGAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HOME DEVELOPMENT
MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), Respondents.
LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.
Petitioner, v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent; G.R. Nos.
204119-20 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 208004, July 30, 2018 - LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
PRADO VERDE CORPORATION, Respondent; G.R. No. 208112 - PRADO VERDE
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent; G.R. No.
210243 - LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. PRADO VERDE
CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 233572, July 30, 2018 - ALFREDO A. RAMOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 233572, July 30, 2018 - ALFREDO A. RAMOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
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July 2018 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2018 > July 2018 Decisions > G.R. No.

G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) asking

The RTC's Decision

In its Order,6 the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals' Decision

In the present case, the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by petitioner's

According to Ms. Tudla, respondent's psychological incapacity has antecedence since it

Respondent's psychological incapacity is considered by the expert witness to be grave,

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The Present Appeal

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court explained psychological incapacity as follows:

Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the

Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating psychological

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Martires, JJ., concur.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

With the Molina guidelines, psychological incapacity petitions were rarely granted by

The same observation of the "rigidity" of the Molina guidelines was made in Kalaw v.

Since Ngo Te's promulgation in 2009, Kalaw would only be the fifth17 case voiding the

Furthermore, the notion of "psychological incapacity" should not only be based on a

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family

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