1NC – Bronks – R3

OFF
States CP

The 50 States and all relevant territories of the United States should ban local police
departments from accepting federal and local funding for policing.

States can ban localities from accepting federal aid.

Misra 17--- (Tanvi , a writer and multimedia journalist who covers issues related to immigration, cities,
and criminal justice., August 31, 2017, Bloomberg, “The Local Fight to Demilitarize the Police”
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-31/how-cities-say-no-to-military-equipment-for-
police//veronica

On Monday, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a new executive order lifting an Obama-era ban
on the transfer of certain types of military equipment, like grenade launchers and bayonets, to local
police departments. “Those restrictions went too far,” Sessions said in a speech to the Fraternal Order of
Police. “We will not put superficial concerns above public safety.”

The move has elicited grave concern from civil rights groups and criminal justice experts. Not only is it
unclear whether these weapons are actually effective in reducing crime and protecting officers, they
argue, it’s also likely to lead to rights’ violations, worsening the already-frayed relations between law
enforcement and communities of color. “Our communities are not the same as armed combatants in a
war zone,”said Vanita Gupta, former head of Department of Justice’s civil rights division who now leads
the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights.

That means it’s up to cities and local governments to step in—either say “no, thanks” to such weaponry
or lay out a transparent, public process by which these acquisitions will be made by their law
enforcement agency.

“In the absence of leadership from this administration, state and local governments must create their
own guidelines for limiting the acquisition of military equipment, and how it can be used ,” Gupta added
in a statement.

Police militarization garnered renewed scrutiny after images of a heavily militarized police response
emerged in Ferguson, Missouri, in the wake of Michael Brown’s shooting death: armored vehicles and
heavy machine guns stood pointed at protesters. Rubber bullets, tear gas, smoke bombs, and stun
grenades were fired. Journalists were arrested.

The Obama administration, in its broader effort to improve police accountability, decided to place
restrictions on certain types of equipment available through the “1033 program”: weaponized vehicles
and aircrafts, grenade launchers, high-calibre firearms, and bayonets. Other equipment, including
Humvees, helicopters, and M-16 assault rifles, were allowed under certain conditions.

Amid heightened scrutiny, Ferguson and other police departments had to return some of their miitary
equipment. But in recent years, police chiefs have been nudging the government to review these rules.
Some small U.S. counties, in particular, have been eager to get military vehicles and weapons, only to
soon realize that they have no use for it other than publicity stunts to demonstrate to taxpayers that
their money was well-spent.

A survey conducted by the libertarian Cato Institute and YouGov found that 54 percent of Americans
think the militarization of police is “going too far.” But now that the federal government has lifted these
restrictions, the best way to reverse the tide is at the local level, civil rights advocates say. Some
jurisdictions have already passed laws banning particular kinds of military equipment for police use, or
setting hurdles for their approval. They’re attempts to make the acquisitions less opaque, and for local
governing bodies to weigh in on the appropriateness of new police department gear.

And it’s not just liberal cities either. “This is an issue that transcends party lines,” says Kanya Bennett of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

Montana is a good example. In 2014, Bozeman City purchased a BearCat through a federal grant, much
to the surprise and consternation of residents and city representatives. The incident prompted the state
to pass a law with bipartisan support prohibiting the acquisition or purchase of equipment like drones,
armored vehicles, silencers, and grenades. Any other military equipment requested through federal
programs had to be made public. New Jersey has a similar law on the books, requiring the explicit
approval of local governing bodies to approve any acquisition of military equipment. Similar legislation
limiting police militarization has cropped up in other parts of the country—from liberal California to
conservative Tennessee. These laws, like Montana’s, have surfaced after local lawmakers realized the
extent of militarization in their police departments.

Anti-police brutality activists like Samuel Sinyangwe are urging residents to push for similar laws at the
city and state-level, after the federal government lifted restrictions:

Activists have good reason to be concerned. In a 2014 report, the (ACLU) found that the police
departments that got military gear, were likely to use them—not just for special operations or rare,
high-stakes hostage situations—but in routine activities. They used aggressive SWAT deployments to
execute search warrants and seize low-level drugs—sometimes even in spaces where they knew small
children or pregnant women would be present. The brunt of these aggressive tactics were borne by
communities of color.

That’s particularly concerning in light of a 2017 study showing that a higher amount of military
equipment corresponds with higher number of police killings. “As militarization seeps into their cultures,
LEAs rely more on violence to solve problems,” the authors of this study write.

In fact, to many critics, the Obama-era restrictions did not go far enough in the first place : the
additional hoops the police departments were made to go through were not enough to ensure safe
transfer and oversight of dangerous equipment through this program. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) tested it out in 2017. It set up a fake police department and applied for 1.2 million dollars
worth of the equipment, which it promptly received with as much as a verification check. “It was like
getting stuff off of eBay,” Zina Merritt, director of the GAO’s defense capabilities and management team,
told The Marshall Project.

But even if this program was eliminated, police departments can and do access other federal grants to
purchase millions of dollars worth of this war weaponry.
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Ptx DA

The Preventing Future Pandemics Act of 2020 will pass now – bipartisan support
means it’ll make it through Congress but it must pass now.
Kurose 9/30 – senior endangered species policy specialist at the Center for Biological Diversity
(Stephanie, The Hill, “Preventing next pandemic requires new bill's global solutions”, 9/30/20,
https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/518984-preventing-next-pandemic-requires-new-bills-global-
solutions/micahw)
The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed more than one million lives, shattered the global economy and left many people overwhelmed by the
harsh realities of a changing world. Congress has struggled desperately to address the disease’s impacts . Yet
lawmakers and all Americans have to grapple with a disturbing and irrefutable fact: Even as the novel coronavirus continues to inflict immense
suffering, the next pandemic disease could already be brewing somewhere in the world, preparing to leap
to people from bats or other host animals . But what if we could greatly reduce the risk of future pandemics by changing our
interactions with nature? That’s the goal of a groundbreaking new bipartisan and bicameral bill in Congress just
introduced by Sens. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and John Cornyn (R-Texas) and Reps. Mike Quigley (D-Ill.) and Fred Upton (D-Mich.) Scientists have
sounded the alarm for decades that our relentless determination to dominate the natural world would lead to disaster. And it has. In the past
40 years, exploiting wildlife or wildlife habitat caused all of the worst epidemics and pandemics , including HIV,
SARS, avian flu, Ebola, Zika and now COVID-19. As more people come into direct contact with more wild animals ,
whether in markets or wild places, viruses have more opportunities to jump the species barrier and infect us .
Human exploitation of nature is a disaster for biodiversity, too: Scientists predict one million wildlife species now face
extinction, many in just decades if we continue with business as usual . Animals like rhinos and pangolins will vanish
forever. Unless we fundamentally change our relationship with nature and address the root causes of
these pandemics — wildlife exploitation and habitat destruction around the world — COVID-19 certainly won’t be the last
disease to devastate our society. Fortunately, the new bill would take a crucial first step towards drastically
reducing the likelihood of a future outbreak . The Preventing Future Pandemics Act of 2020 would
prohibit the import and export live wildlife for human consumption and close all domestic markets in
the United States where live wildlife is sold for food or medicine . The legislation would invest nearly half a billion dollars
in federal agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. This would combat
global wildlife trafficking, provide assistance and build capacity to improve enforcement and protection in other countries and
help communities in developing nations transition to alternative livelihoods to reduce reliance on
wildlife exploitation. With this legislation, this bipartisan group of lawmakers recognizes that this is a global
problem — and that solving it requires the United States to lead by example . We can’t hypocritically chide other
nations about their behavior if we don’t end our live wildlife markets where similar behavior occurs. We can’t ask other nations to crack down
on the wildlife trade and turn a blind eye to the wildlife products pouring over their borders each year. The U.S. consumes roughly 20 percent
of the global wildlife market, importing more than 224 million live animals and 883 million other wildlife specimens a year. Over a recent five-
year period, the U.S. imported almost 23 million whole animals, parts, samples and products made from bats, primates and rodents. These
groups of mammals are believed to harbor 75 percent of known zoonotic diseases. Our major role in this problem must be addressed. The
new bill’s common-sense approach puts us on the right path towards finally rethinking our relationship
with wildlife. Given the massive scale of human exploitation of wildlife and wildlife habitat and the risks that entails, we should
reevaluate other aspects of this exploitation . We need to ask whether the environmental damage and
disease risks are worth the paltry economic benefits of wildlife use and consumption . If a business is allowed to
continue, as usual, tragedies like the COVID-19 pandemic will happen again and again. Now is the time for Congress to take
bold, transformational action to protect wildlife and nature and help avert future catastrophes .
New CJR measures get bogged down in partisanship and inertia – that causes massive
infighting.
Binder 20 – PhD, professor of political science at George Washington University and a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution (Sarah, “Congress can’t easily pass police reforms,” News Times,
https://www.newstimes.com/opinion/article/Congress-can-t-easily-pass-police-reforms-15321834.php)

Widespread national outrage over the brutal death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police has renewed
public demand for Congress to address police misconduct and remedy racial injustice in the United States. New polls
show strong bipartisan support for police reform and sympathy for nonviolent protesters. What’s more, there are green shoots of
bipartisanship for some policing reforms, such as weakening the legal shield that protects police accused of misconduct and curtailing transfers
of excess military equipment to local police forces. Still, reformers
on Capitol Hill face a tough road, especially if and when
media attention to the protests wanes. Differences
between and within the parties — coupled with the
underrepresentation of black [folk]s in the Senate — raise barriers to legislative action. Even symbolic
measures that express outrage over Floyd’s death face a heavy slog. Media and public attention will probably wane The news
media have increasingly covered episodes of police misconduct in recent years. But even intense media focus — and public interest —
inevitably fades. Decades ago, economist Anthony Downs called this the “issue attention cycle”: A startling event — like police
killing Michael Brown, Eric Garner or George Floyd — provokes a surge in media attention and public demand for
action. But when the difficulty of reform becomes clear, reporters move on to the next big crisis and
public interest wanes. Social issues that don’t directly harm most people are especially prone to the cycle. That helps explain why
coverage of past episodes of police misconduct against racial minorities usually dwindles and Congress fails
to act. True, a Republican-led Congress and President Donald Trump in 2018 enacted significant criminal justice reform that addressed some
racial disparities in sentencing, but that’s probably because conservatives — not street protesters — pushed Republicans to act. The president
could snuff out flickers of bipartisanship House Democrats are likely to move quickly this month; the Republican Senate, probably not. The 53-
member Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) is working (so far largely remotely, given the coronavirus pandemic) on dozens of measures to
address police misconduct, racial inequities in local policing and the deep roots of racial discrimination. Democratic leaders have yet to decide
how they will advance the measures. One option would package the reforms into a single “messaging” bill to signal Democrats’ commitment to
addressing these issues. Alternatively, leaders could bring a series of narrower bills to the floor, a tactic that would both force Republicans to go
on record multiple times for or against each reform but also give any wavering swing-district Democrats a chance to break with more liberal
colleagues. But
opposition from Trump would surely compel House Republicans to oppose the Democrats’
measures, likely leaving the bills dead on arrival in the GOP-led Senate. True, there are glimmers of GOP support for
some measures, notably Sen. Tim Scott’s, R-S.C., push to create and fund a national registry of police misconduct. But absent support from the
president, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., is
less likely to put issues of police and race on the Senate
floor, especially if measures divide Republicans into rival camps . And although some Republicans rebuked the president
for his administration’s use of force against peaceful protesters to clear space for a photo op, few GOP senators appear eager to legislate. Nor is
there currently much electoral pressure on the House or Senate Republican conferences to act: One-quarter of GOP voters report that race
relations will be a major factor in their vote this fall (compared with half of Democrats and a third of independents). Black voices are diminished
in the Senate Racial disparities between the two chambers also raise obstacles. House lawmakers formed the CBC in 1971 with just 13
members. Today, the racial makeup of the House reflects the proportion of blacks in the United States — roughly 13 percent. Lawmakers’ race
and ethnicity matters in how members represent their constituents, as evidenced by the CBC’s swift legislative efforts to address issues raised
by the killing of Floyd and other victims of police brutality. Not so in the Senate. Studies of Senate malapportionment typically emphasize the
overrepresentation of rural interests. And given the whiteness of rural states, black interests are decidedly unrepresented in the Senate. Just
one Republican and two Democrats are black. Racial
disparities in the Senate make it less likely that issues
addressing racial inequities will make it onto the Senate’s agenda, particularly when Republicans control
the chamber.
The next zoonotic disease causes extinction – genetic mutations make the impact of
the next pandemic too large to ignore – specifically, Avian Influenza already has a high
mortality rate and will only mutate further if left unchecked – that uniquely will be the
greatest threat to society.
Quammen 12 – author of author of “Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic.”
(David, The Guardian, “Exposed: A: Could the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?”, 9/29/12,
https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1081152127?accountid=14667/micahw) H5N1 = bird flu

Infectious disease is all around us. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big
beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious
disease can seem grisly and dreadful, under ordinary conditions, it's every bit as natural as what lions do to wildebeests and zebras. But
conditions aren't always ordinary. Just as predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart
from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new target. Aberrations

occur. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person , and succeeds in establishing itself as an infectious presence,
sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a zoonosis. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps
clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic.
It's a
word of the future, destined for heavy use in the 21st century . Ebola and Marburg are zoonoses. So is
bubonic plague. So was the so-called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild
aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people . All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox,
bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia.
Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of a pathogen that can "spillover", crossing into people from
other animals. Aids is a disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human
infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their

. Zoonotic
pathogens can hide. The least conspicuous strategy is to lurk
effects. Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years

within what's called a reservoir host: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems
to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat?
To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological

disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a bottle. It
approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her
story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest
and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching
the sunset. It was Christmas evening 2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The
rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K
Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still
undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and
Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the
following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease
doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a
change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and
then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released
more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they
had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied
circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus

have been very much

disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of Sars, the scenario could

worse. Apart from the 2003 outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for
such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good
luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with
which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and
Toronto. If the virus had arrived in a different sort of big city - more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical
institutions - it might have burned through a much larger segment of humanity. One further factor, possibly the most crucial,
was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That
allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the
order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the 1918-1919 influenza. And that infamous global

pandemic occurred in the era beforeglobalisation. Everything nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses. When the Next
Big One comes, it will likely conform to the same perverse pattern as the 1918 influenza: high infectivity preceding
notable symptoms. That will help it move through cities and airports like an angel of death. The Next Big One is a subject that
disease scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million
deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately, not
every virus goes airborne from one host to another. If HIV-1
could, you and I might already be dead. If the rabies virus could, it would be the most horrific pathogen on
the planet. The influenzas are well adapted for airborne transmission , which is why a new strain can circle the world within
days. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the
cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary in 2003 to the people who understood it best.
Human-to-human transmission is the crux. That capacity is what separates a bizarre, awful, localised, intermittent and
mysterious disease (such as Ebola) from a global pandemic . Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian

influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it
hasn't caused many human fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad
pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing
possibility. It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a
high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch
it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just

the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest
killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of
bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are

dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe :
with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit
upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "As long as H5N1 is out there
in the world," Webster told me, "there is the possibility of disaster. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to
transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God help us."
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NGA CP

The National Governors’ Association should inform the White House that, because it is
in the vital economic and national interests of the United States and especially the
State of Florida, state cooperation with federal initiatives will be contingent upon the
United States enacting substantial divestment of federal support for policing in the
United States.
The CP solves by forcing federal follow-on AND is an aggressive use of uncooperative
federalism
Trevor George Gardner 18, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, “Right
at Home: Modeling Sub-Federal Resistance as Criminal Justice Reform,” SSRN Scholarly Paper, ID
3238245, Social Science Research Network, 2018, papers.ssrn.com,
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3238245

Sub-federal governments that engage in this process may , nevertheless, impact criminal justice in at least
three respects. In their efforts at resistance, these governments may limit the reach of federal criminal
enforcement initiatives by denying the federal government use of sub-federal resources; they may
communicate an alternative theory of public security to a national audience; and they may exhibit, to
the same audience, an alternative model of public-security administration .50 A. Stage 1: Abstention A state or
local government will abstain from a federal criminal enforcement initiative after recognizing a discrepancy
between its own theory of public security and that of the federal government. Sub-federal governments
can abstain by way of legislation or by issuing an administrative order, either through the chief public executive or
the chief police administrator. In mandating enforcement abstinence, a sub-federal government asserts that it can achieve public safety within
the confines of the jurisdiction without participating in the overarching federal initiative. The
sub-federal governments' option to
either participate in or abstain from federal criminal enforcement derives from a series of U.S. Supreme
Court rulings under the Tenth Amendment. These rulings rarely addressed in the criminal law and crime policy
literatures-bar the federal government from issuing directives to state and local government. In both Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.5 2 and New York v. United States,53 the Court established that Congress
may not commandeer the legislative process of the states to compel their participation in federal regulatory programs. The
Court affirmed Congress' power to condition federal funding to states, but it held that states have a constitutional right to abstain from federal
regulatory activity.5 4 This restriction came to be known as the "anti-commandeering" rule following the Court's decision in Printz v. United
States."5 The anti-commandeering rule is increasingly relevant to criminal law, policy, and administration, as it serves as the legal basis for state
and local government resistance to federal criminal enforcement initiatives, particularly those intersecting with domestic and national security
policy. A
state or local government's decision to abstain from a federal criminal initiative has two immediate
implications: one structural, the other cultural. On an institutional level, enforcement abstinence
withholds sub-federal government resources, which are often critical to a credible system of enforcement
within the jurisdiction in question. At the same time, enforcement abstinence impacts social norms in that it
communicates a perspective that, for the remainder of the discussion, will be referred to as an "alternative theory of public
security." Scholars have labeled the culture and policy debates associated with a clash between the federal government and sub-federal
governments as "expressive federalism."5 6 This Article is motivated in part by the observation that expressive federalism has been relatively
scarce in criminal justice over the course of the mass incarceration era. In matters of public security, much of the United States has accepted
the quaint notion that we are all "in it together," and that crime policy at all levels of government should reflect our shared interest in public
safety. In recent years, alternative theories of public security have crept into the national conversation. Government officials in immigrant
sanctuary jurisdictions, for example, claim that local police participation in immigration enforcement is incompatible with effective
municipal policing. The governments of immigrant sanctuary jurisdictions often assert that it is inappropriate for police to take on the
responsibility of enforcing federal immigration law, or that immigrants should not face special penalties (e.g., deportation) for minor criminal
offenses.57 More generally, these governments take issue with the federal government's assessment of risk with respect to unauthorized
immigration. There is a common sentiment among associated officials that the risk posed by the presence of unauthorized immigrants-even
those in contact with the criminal justice system-is much lower than what federal officials claim. 8 Moreover, to the degree that unauthorized
immigrants do pose a risk to residents of the jurisdiction, the subfederal government's interest in eliminating that risk is a lower priority than
other civic interests such as establishing trust between police and the immigrant community, multiculturalism, and adherence to civil and
human rights. 9 Such sentiments about public security are routinely expressed in immigrant sanctuary policy debates and demonstrate the way
in which enforcement abstinence effectively politicizes public-security theory. Apart from policy debates in public fora, alternative theories of public security can be found in the text of
enforcement-abstinence legislation. In 2007, the city of Takoma Park, Maryland, passed an ordinance broadly restricting the Takoma Park Police Department from cooperating with federal officials in the enforcement of federal
immigration law.60 The ordinance expressed that cooperative immigration enforcement would cause a "loss of cooperation with the immigrant community which would threaten the health, safety, and welfare of the entire
Takoma Park Community," and, "discourage immigrant residents from reporting crime and suspicious activity and cooperating with criminal investigations."6 1 Alternative theories of public security are also evident in direct
communications between sub-federal government officials and federal officials regarding a sub-federal government's decision to abstain from enforcement. A letter from the Secretary of Public Safety for Massachusetts to the
Director of the ICE Secure Communities program offers another helpful illustration. The letter, dated June 3, 2011, states that Governor Deval Patrick's administration would restrict police cooperation with the ICE Secure
Communities program: Governor Patrick and I share your public safety objective and agree that serious criminals who are here illegally should be deported.... However, Secure Communities, as implemented nationally, does not
reflect those objectives. As stated in the [proposed Memorandum of Agreement], Secure Communities "is a comprehensive ICE initiative that focuses on the identification and removal of aliens who are convicted of a serious
criminal offense and are subject to removal." Yet, ICE statistics indicate that only about 1 in 4 of those deported since the inception of Boston's pilot participation in Secure Communities were convicted of a serious crime and more
than half of those deported were identified as "noncriminal." The Governor and I are dubious of the Commonwealth taking on the federal role of immigration enforcement. We are even more skeptical of the potential impact that
Secure Communities could have on the residents of the Commonwealth. Through the community meetings we have held around the Commonwealth, residents have expressed concerns about racial profiling as a result of the
program. Some in law enforcement fear the program is overly overbroad and may deter the reporting of criminal activity[.] 62 San Francisco city officials took a more aggressive position,
rejecting cooperative immigration enforcement through a public relations campaign that highlighted
immigrant welfare and ethnic diversity as core city-community values. The San Francisco mayor's office advertised the city's sanctuary policy
across all of northern California by purchasing ads on television, radio, billboards, and bus stops in various languages including English, Spanish,
Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russian. 63 When announcing the public relations campaign, former mayor Gavin Newsom highlighted the
importance of providing public services to all of the city's residents, adding that the city held a moral obligation to "protect" immigrants by
abstaining from the enforcement of federal immigration law.6 4 "Until we get it right in this country on immigration, until we come to grips
with the reality of newcomers from around the world ... then it is appropriate to protect our citizens, to protect our residents and to protect
our families ... ."61 The federal response to the San Francisco ad campaign indicates the nature of the competition between two discordant public security narratives. Soon after Newsom's announcement, ICE Assistant
Secretary Julie Myers published an open letter to Newsom in which she asked San Francisco county officials to expand access to the county jail and alleged that continued adherence to the city's sanctuary policy would result in "the
release of these criminal aliens back into the San Francisco community."6 6 Less than a month later, ICE issued a press release with the following headline: "3-week enforcement surge results in 441 arrests in northern California."
67 The release highlighted just two of the 441 immigrants apprehended: Among those arrested by the Fugitive Operations Teams in northern California was a previously deported Mexican national whose criminal history includes
prior convictions for transportation and sale of heroin. Mauro [last name withheld], 31, was arrested by ICE Fugitive Operations officers at his Sacramento residence Tuesday. [He] was deported five years ago after serving time for
the drug conviction, but subsequently re-entered the country illegally. [He] is being prosecuted by the United States Attorney's Office in Sacramento for felony re-entry after deportation, a violation that carries a maximum penalty
of 20 years in prison. ICE officials also arrested a foreign national sex offender in Watsonville who has prior convictions for spousal rape and burglary. The 41-yearold Mexican citizen, who was taken into custody earlier this week at
a restaurant where he worked, was deported last year and reentered the country illegally.6 8 The press release's reference to the criminal histories of the two profiled immigrant detainees indicates an attempt by federal officials to
discredit the theory of public security promoted by the San Francisco city government. The reference also served to pressure the San Francisco city government and other municipal governments in the region to repeal
enforcement abstinence policies and partner with federal officials in the enforcement of federal immigration law. Sanctuary policies passed in conservative areas of the country around the same time took exception with the
federal security agenda in a broad sense, alleging that the agenda had extended well beyond its lawful authority.6 9 An immigrant sanctuary provision passed in Sitka, Alaska, for instance, was part of a larger piece of legislation
warning of the potential for "abuse of power" in the federal government's enforcement of the Patriot Act.7 0 Another sanctuary provision in Butte-Silver Bow, Montana, declared, "the Patriot Act and related federal actions [in the
field of security] duly infringe upon fundamental rights and liberties of citizens and visitors of the [city]." Sanctuary policy rationales expressed in politically moderate and conservative jurisdictions frequently make the claim that
the federal government holds exclusive responsibility for immigration enforcement and should not look to outsource this responsibility to states and municipalities. 7 2 Some go so far as to describe the federal government's

The immigrant sanctuary movement demonstrates

delegation of immigration-enforcement responsibility to sub-federal police as a power grab and indicative of a constitutional crisis. 7 3

the process by which state and local governments progress from opposing the federal government's theory
of public security, to enacting enforcement abstinence policy, to promoting an alternative theory of public security
governance. B. Stage 2: Nullification Nullification occurs as a consequence of the manpower disparity between
the federal government and local governments. The federal government cannot broadly enforce most of its
criminal initiatives absent cooperation from state and local police. While the federal government employs 105,000 law
enforcement agents across its various public security agencies, 7 4 state and local governments collectively employ 1.2 million. 75 The reach of
a federal criminal initiative within a sub-federal jurisdiction often depends on the extent to which the associated subfederal government allows
its police officers to participate in the initiative's enforcement. If
sub-federal governments broadly decline to assist in the
enforcement of federal immigration law, enforcement abstinence may translate to enforcement nullification. For
example, of the estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States, 2.67 million (24 percent) live in California, and of
California's unauthorized immigrant population, about 814,000 (30 percent) live in Los Angeles County.76 In 2013, the state of California passed the Trust Act, which
barred state and local police from honoring federal immigration detainers for criminal suspects unless the requested detainee had been convicted of (rather than merely arrested for) a "serious or violent felony."77 The Act does
permit California police to lawfully grant federal detainer requests in a limited number of circumstances, but cooperation is not required.78 Far from it. If occurring outside of the narrow range of discretion allowed under the Act,
police cooperation with federal government officials constitutes a misdemeanor criminal offense. 79 Why is the California Trust Act a major problem for the Department of Homeland Security? In short, DHS cannot effectively
enforce federal immigration law in Los Angeles County without the support municipal police. The immigration enforcement policy clash in Los Angeles County indicates the federal government's implementation challenges across
the country. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson addressed the issue in a memorandum in 2014, announcing the termination of "Secure Communities"-one of a succession of cooperative immigration enforcement programs.8 0 The letter
addresses the impact of sub-federal government opposition on the viability of the program: The goal of Secure Communities was to more effectively identify and facilitate the removal of criminal aliens in the custody of state and
local law enforcement agencies. But the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general hostility toward the
enforcement of our immigration laws. Governors, mayors, and state and local law enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive orders or
signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.8 1 Johnson's letter captures the difficulties federal public-security officials face in enforcement-abstinence jurisdictions. Today, however, DHS officials lobby the nation's largest cities in an
attempt to persuade them to drop rigid abstinence policies and refer unauthorized immigrants suspected of terrorism or convicted of gang-related crime or of aggravated felonies under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 82
Several jurisdictions, such as New York City, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Cook County, have resisted compliance with these requests, favoring near-absolute abstinence from the enforcement of federal immigration law.83 In a
hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in July of 2015, Secretary Johnson was asked to explain why his agency opted to terminate the Secure Communities program. Johnson testified that in the past year alone, state and
local police had ignored 12,000 federal immigrant-detention requests. 8 4 In response, the Department decided to scrap Secure Communities and market its replacement, the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), as a tempered
alternative. Under PEP, DHS officials would limit immigrant detainer requests to arrests for serious criminal offenses.85 The federal government's modest objectives under PEP indicate the degree to which federal officials need
subfederal police. When state and local governments refuse to consent to cooperative enforcement, enforcement nullification is, in many instances, a likely outcome.
Staking out an uncooperative role in foreign affairs creates scope for states to mitigate
warming
Jean Galbraith 17, Assistant Professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, JD from the
University of California-Berkeley School of Law, Order of the Coif, BA in Social Studies and the
Comparative Study of Religion from Harvard University, “Book Review: Cooperative and Uncooperative
Foreign Affairs Federalism, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity”, Harvard Law
Review, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2131, Lexis
D. Climate Policy

Mitigating climate change is a challenge for all levels of government -- international, national, state, and
local. As Glennon and Sloane note, some states and cities have embraced climate change mitigation measures (pp. 62-
63). In doing so, states have often coordinated with each other and with foreign counterparts in both practical and
[*2149] expressivist ways (pp. 62-63). California's efforts are exceptionally notable. State legislation requires sweeping
emissions reductions; California and Quebec have sought to integrate their cap-and-trade programs; and California
has spearheaded a coalition of state and local governments around the world who have committed to climate policy. California even sent a
large and high-profile delegation to the United Nations conference on climate change in Paris in 2015.

The issue of climate policy is a rebuttal to all three of the "myths" identified by Glennon and Sloane. It is self-evidently a matter of both
domestic and foreign affairs; states and local governments are acting in this space; and some states and local governments are doing so in
progressive ways. The actions of state and local governments in this space invite constitutional inquiry. Can
California constitutionally regulate carbon emissions, enter into a highly formalized agreement with Quebec and softer
agreements with other subnational governments, and send delegations to international negotiating conferences?

Yet focusing exclusively on these questions would lead to a highly incomplete sense of the legal scope of California's power to act. For although
Glennon and Sloane do not mention it, California is acting amidst a welter of federal laws, regulations, and other executive branch actions
applicable to climate change. In 2007, in a lawsuit brought by liberal states against the EPA, the Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air
Act applies to greenhouse gas emissions. This Act explicitly delegates authority to California to pursue stronger emissions [*2150] measures
for new motor vehicles than are undertaken at the federal level and in general involves states in the Act's enforcement through cooperative
federalism.

During the Obama Administration, state and local government efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were not
only congruent with the aims of the Clean Air Act (as interpreted to apply to greenhouse gases), but also with the goals of the
executive branch. The EPA during the Obama Administration applauded and sought to facilitate state and local efforts. Its leading rule on
climate change mitigation measures, known as the Clean Power Plan, explicitly gave states substantial autonomy in crafting their own
approaches, although this rule is currently facing a court challenge brought by states that oppose federal efforts to regulate emissions. The
Obama White House expressed approval of the transnational coalitions that California and other state and local governments have joined in
seeking to address climate change.

All this positive reinforcement will presumably diminish or disappear under the Trump Administration. The Trump
Administration may even try to roll back climate change mitigation efforts by progressive states and cities, in
addition to undermining or reversing Obama era regulations and international commitments. If it does so, however, the
legal questions that such efforts would raise probably have fairly [*2151] little to do with the constitutional issues posed by traditional
foreign affairs federalism. Instead, they would center on administrative law -- around the interpretation of the Clean Air Act and the
laws and norms that govern regulatory practice -- as they had already come to do by the end of the George W. Bush
Administration.

***

These four illustrations are far from unique. Sometimes

state and local government activity in relation to foreign affairs occurs
against a backdrop of federal inaction, as is the case with the incorporation of unratified human rights treaties into the municipal
law of progressive cities. But interaction is far more common, sometimes cooperative and sometimes full of
contestation. The executive branch approves of and provides some support for states and cities seeking to promote tourism or encourage
exports abroad. The federal government collaborates with states in determining U.S. international negotiating positions with respect to
insurance. In private international law, the federal government has shown strong interest in using state law rather than federal law to
implement certain treaties. And all levels of government deal with security -- both traditional and cyber -- and interact with each other over it.
To understand what is going on, we must focus on the political branches as much as (or even more than) the courts. And we must think not just
in terms of constitutional law, but also in terms of international law, administrative law, and state law.

[*2152] III. COOPERATIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As foreign affairs federalism becomes increasingly interactive, how much will it resemble cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the
domestic context? At the very least, scholarship on cooperative and uncooperative federalism as a domestic matter, especially work focused on
the political branches, provides a valuable starting point for understanding foreign affairs federalism today. This scholarship offers
insights into how the federal government can incentivize state and local governments to help advance federal interests, how these
state and local governments can in turn influence and resist federal policy, and how Congress and the executive branch
can each use state and local action to build power at the expense of the other branch. These broad themes manifest themselves
in the foreign affairs context as well. Yet the foreign affairs context brings some additional complexities because of its ties to international
law and global governance and because it comes with stronger presidential powers. This leads to certain differences between
cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the realm of foreign affairs, in terms of both how practice proceeds and of
what doctrine should be.

A. Structural Implications

The interactions between the federal government and state and local governments in relation to foreign affairs mean that federal policy shapes
state and local policy. By providing assistance, financial and otherwise, to the sister-cities program, the federal government makes it easier for
cities to participate. By signaling its support for state "Buy American" laws, Congress encourages them -- and the Department of Transportation
incentivizes them even further by refusing to participate in contracts governed by state "Buy American" laws that are less strict than the federal
ones. In the context of immigration and climate change, the federal government incentivizes (and sometimes comes close to forcing) state and
local action in support of federal policy. All of these examples in the foreign affairs context reflect
an "increasing concentration
of power at Washington in the instigation and supervision of local policies," just as cooperative federalism arrangements do in the
domestic context.

In work focused on the domestic context, Heather Gerken shows that the
interactive nature of modern federalism also
provides state and local governments with ways to influence federal policy. State and local actors exercise
"the power . . . of the servant," which offers the [*2153] chance "not just to complain about national
policy, but to help set it." In shaping federal policy, these actors are not simply employing the traditional tools of process
federalism; rather, it is their role in administering federal policy that gives them a say in the shape that this implementation will take. Yet the
scope of this role also limits what they can do: "power dynamics are fluid; minority rule is contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by the
national majority." In related work, Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen elaborate on the ways in which state and local governments
can
engage in "uncooperative federalism," including by resisting federal policies that they are charged with
enforcing.

Building on the core insight that state and local governments can help shape federal policy through their roles in
implementing federal law, Bulman-Pozen further shows that these interactions can affect the distribution of
power between Congress and the executive branch. In a pair of articles, she describes the ways in which state and local activities can
strengthen the powers of one branch against the other. The more that Congress invites or effectively requires state and local participation in
the administration of a federal statutory regime, the more these actors can serve as checks on the executive branch's power to implement this
regime. On the flip side, such shared roles in implementing previously enacted statutory schemes can empower the executive branch and
subnational executive actors to work together in ways that crowd out the current Congress.

[*2154] Similar dynamics can occur with respect to foreign affairs federalism. Indeed, some of the examples that Gerken and Bulman-Pozen
focus on are issues that have transnational implications. With
regard to climate, for example, they show how states have used
the power of the servant to try to shape federal policy, including efforts by conservative states to push
back against the federal regulatory scheme and by progressive states to make it stronger. Bulman-Pozen also
uses climate as an example of how "federal and state executives negotiate without Congress" once a broad statutory scheme is in place. Some
payoffs for the foreign affairs context here are simply derivative: the
more that state and local governments enhance or reduce
federal efforts to mitigate climate change, then the more or less the United States does with respect to
addressing this global problem. But other implications relate specifically to how the United States engages internationally.
Continuing with the climate context, the extent to which President Obama could make commitments on behalf of the United States during the
negotiations for the 2015 Paris Agreement was largely limited by the scope of the Clean Air Act, since he had no realistic chance of getting new
congressional legislation that would advance his goals with respect to climate. But since California and other progressive state and local actors
were doing more than what the Clean Air Act required, President Obama could take this into account in setting the target to which the United
States was committing with respect to climate change mitigation. President Obama's option set was thus enhanced by state and local action in
the climate context.

Extinction
Dr. Yew-Kwang Ng 19, Winsemius Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technological University, Fellow
of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of Advisory Board at the Global Priorities
Institute at Oxford University, PhD in Economics from Sydney University, “Keynote: Global Extinction and
Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism”, Global Policy, Volume 10, Number 2, May 2019,
pp. 258–266

Catastrophic climate change

Though by no means certain, CCC causing global

extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non-linearity,
cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g.
Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza,
2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7

A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could
cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global
warming, including:

• the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection
and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming;

• the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and

• higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor,
producing runaway global warming.

Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net
positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is
currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’.

The threat of sea-level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and
more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example , Sherwood and
Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental
wet-bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could ... expose large fractions of the
[world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area
of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making
extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low.

While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that
we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent
probability limit for S [temperature increase] ... to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’.
However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive
warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if
there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to
change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by
literally a trillion times.
 OFF
Not the Base DA

Criminal justice reform is a veil of neutrality that enables more insidious forms of
settler elimination that assuages anxious settler desires whose existence is founded on
the reproduction of Indigenous bare life.
Anthony 20 – Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Technology, Sydney (Thalia, “Settler-Colonial
Governmentality: The Carceral Webs Woven by Law and Politics,” Questioning Indigenous-Settler
Relations, Chapter 2, pp 33-53, SpringerLink, dml)
In invoking the concept of ‘settler colonial governmentality’, I rely on the works of settler colonial scholars such as Wolfe (2006), and critical
Indigenous scholars such as Coulthard (2014). Through centering settler colonial relations, both approaches demonstrate that policy
change is contingent on the logic and structures of colonisation—colonising land, affecting primitive
accumulation and eliminating the native. Accordingly, policy change driven by the state inadequately
materialises Indigenous rights and can often set them back, including where touted as progressive such
as gestures towards reconciliation and native title. State reforms remain built on a ‘logic of elimination’ that shapes
the settler colonial response to cultures, languages, Country and sovereignty (Wolfe, 2006, p. 387). Settler colonial theory is
concerned with how colonialism lives and breathes in the present. The continuity of colonial legacies produces discursive
and non-discursive strategies, according to Coulthard (2014, p. 7), to facilitate the ‘ongoing dispossession of Indigenous
peoples of their lands and self-determining authority’. The relegation of historical colonial wrongs to a ‘dark chapter’ in
history disconnects them from ‘continued child removals, mass incarceration and ongoing land
dispossession’ (Woolford & Hounslow, 2018, p. 205). Equally, designating contemporary forms of systemic
discrimination as exceptional, annuls the entrenched and intergenerational impact of colonisation on
Indigenous peoples. Contemporary injustices—whether that is Indigenous deaths in custody in Australia, the removal of Māori
babies in Aotearoa or the construction of pipelines across North America— deepen existing scars rather than create new
wounds. Situating the various guises of state policy and legality within this historical and continuing trajectory enlivens a relational analysis
of state containment and control of Indigenous people. This approach shows that incarceration and maltreatment are not one
state policy or directive alone, but in fact are a longstanding feature of the settler colonial-Indigenous
relationship. In addition, however, examining the lived experience of settler colonial policies demonstrates another
form of relationality. It brings to the fore Indigenous peoples experience as one of subordination, resilience
and resistance. In undertaking a review of the formal statements in the NT Royal Commission, this chapter exposes the ideologies of the
state officials as well as the perspective of the Indigenous young people who were detained in the criminal justice system and removed from
their families, as well as the standpoints of Indigenous Elders, respected persons and leaders. Through this analysis, it is evident that Indigenous
peoples’ resilient cultural and family ties offset the settler state’s logic of elimination. Indigenous identity extends beyond their relationality to
the non-Indigenous settler state and remains attached to their living culture, notwithstanding the hugely traumatic impact of state violence on
Indigenous people in the NT. 3.4 Colonial Carceralism and Its Multiple Guises While
mass incarceration has become
synonymous with contemporary penal policy, for Indigenous people, incarceration is not an exceptional
state of being. The penal phase of mass incarceration is yet another iteration in Indigenous people’s
long experience of the settler state’s impetus to segregate and contain Indigenous people, whether that be
for Christian, civilising, protectionist, welfare or penal purposes (see Chartrand, 2019). Loïc Wacquant coined the term ‘hyperincarceration’ to
describe the phenomenon of over-representation in the criminal justice system and the broader role of the penal system as an ‘instrument for
managing dispossessed and dishonoured groups’ (Wacquant, 2001, p. 95). For
Indigenous people, management through
mass detention featured long before the war on drugs or neo-liberal class warfare. Declaration of
jurisdiction over Indigenous people by the first settler colonial courts in eastern Australia (New South Wales) were
made in response to Indigenous peoples’ challenges to the capacity of the colonial administration to
imprison them (see R v Bonjon, 1841; R v Murrell, 1836). Since then, Indigenous people have been incarcerated by
settler colonial authorities for administrative and penal ends. Nonetheless, analogies can be drawn with Wacquant’s
description of the ‘never-ending circulus’ between prison and the ghetto for African Americans (Wacquant, 2001, p. 97). It can be likened to
the symbiosis between Indigenous incarceration and a network of institutions designed to further
Indigenous extinguishment. This racialised strategy of institutionalisation has barely shifted since early colonisation;
it has simply been veiled by the state’s claims to neutrality. Concealing bias has become more insidious
by enabling the state, as demonstrated above, to blame the Indigenous person for being more criminal while
exculpating any bias on the part of law enforcers. For example, former Chief Minister Giles (2017, p. 3310) told the NT Royal
Commission that his government was not acting in a discriminatory manner towards Indigenous children when they were segregated in
isolation cells, gassed and tortured, it was simply dealing with a problem with children. Simply
following the law enables all
types of wrongs to be rationalised, and was relied on by detention staff to justify all manner of torture
against Indigenous children. The law removes the need for overt politics because law is conceived by
the settler state as a neutral instrument, while it operates as a coercive tool to disproportionately
regulate Indigenous people.

That causes extinction.

Mitchell 17 (Audra Mitchell, CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics, Balsillie School of
International Affairs, and Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, former Senior Lecturer in
International Relations, department of Politics, University of York, Ph.D. Queen’s University of Belfast,
“Decolonizing against extinction part I: extinction is violence,” Worldly, 7-28-2017,
https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/decolonizing-against-extinction-part-i-extinction-is-
violence/)
Western scientists* [BEGIN ENDNOTE] * see: (Barnosky et al 2011; Ceballos et al 2015; Régnier et al 2015; McCauley et al 2015; WWF 2016; Brook and Alroy 2017)
[END ENDNOTE] are proclaiming the start of a ‘sixth mass extinction event’ that may involve the destruction of more than three quarters of earth’s currently-
existing life forms. In their attempts to explain this phenomenon, most scientists have converged around four major, interlinked drivers: climate change, habitat
destruction, species exchange, and the direct killing of plants and animals. In most cases, these drivers are understood as the unintended consequences of generic
‘human’ activity, and as a result of desirable trends such as development or urbanization (Wilson 2002; Barnosky 2014; Ceballos 2016). A crucial driver is missing
from this list: transversal structural violence against Indigenous peoples and their relations, and colonial violence in particular. ‘Structural violence’ involves systemic
forms of harm, exclusion and discrimination that disproportionately affect particular groups, and which can take many forms (physical, psychological, economic,
gendered and others). They are embedded in and expressed through political, cultural, economic and social structures (Farmer 2009) that can persist across large
spans of time and space. I use the term ‘transversal’ to refer to forms of structural violence that extend across multiple boundaries – not only those of nation-states,
Prime examples of transversal
but also other kinds of nations (human and otherwise), communities or kinship groups, and temporalities.

structural violence include: settler colonialism, colonial genocides (Woolford et al 2014); environmental racism
or ‘slow violence’, including toxification and pollution; and complexes of sexual, physical, communal,
spiritual and land-based violence associated with the extractive industries . Each of these forms of
violence is ecologically devastating, and their convergence in European projects of colonisation is even
more so. Many formations of transversal structural violence are significant causes of the so-called ‘four
horsemen’ of extinction mentioned above. For instance, ‘direct killing’ is carried out to clear land for
settlement, and it occurs as a result of ecological damage caused by resource extraction. Settler
colonialism, carbon-based economies and regimes of environmental racism also support forms of socio-
economic organization (for instance, carbon and energy-intensive urbanized societies) that intensify
climate change and increase habitat destruction. Meanwhile, colonization has played a significant role in the ongoing transfer of life
forms across the planet – whether unintentionally (e.g. the transfer of fish in the bilge water of ships); as an instrument of agricultural settlement (e.g. cattle
ranching), or as a deliberate strategy of violence (e.g. smallpox). However, transversal
structural violence is a driver of extinction in
itself, with its own distinct manifestations. First, it involves the disruption or severance of relations and
kinship structures between humancommunities and other life forms, and the dissolution of Indigenous
systems of governance, laws and protocols that have co-created and sustained plural worlds over
millennia (Borrows 2010; Atleo 2012; Kimmerer 2013). Second, the destruction of Indigenous knowledges through
policies of assimilation, expropriation, cultural appropriation and other strategies undermines these
forms of order and the relationships they nurture. Third, the displacement of and/or restricted access to
land by Indigenous peoples interferes with practices of caring for land or Country that are necessary for
the survival of humans and other life forms (Bawaka Country 2015). Colonial genocides embody all of these
forms of destruction by killing or displacing Indigenous communities, undermining Indigenous modes of
governance and kinship systems, systematically destroying relationships between life forms and erasing
knowledge. All of these modes of violence weaken co-constitutive relationships between Indigenous
communities, other life forms and ecosystems that have enabled their collaborative survival. This results
in disruptions to ecosystems – and climate – that Potawatomi scholar Kyle Powys Whyte (2016) has recently argued would have been
considered a dystopia by his Ancestors. In other words, transversal structural violence, and colonial violence in particular,

are fundamental drivers of global patterns of extinction . It stands to reason, then, that responses to extinction that
focus on managing endangered species or populations, or ‘backing up’ genetic material, are insufficient: they leave the
structures of violence intact and may add to their power. Instead, efforts to address extinction need to
focus on identifying, confronting and dismantling these formations of violence, and on restoring or
strengthening the relations they sever. Yet responses to global patterns of extinction are overwhelmingly rooted in Western scientific concepts
of conservation – a paradigm that emerged within 20th century European colonial government structures (Adams 2004). Contemporary conservation approaches –
from the creation of land and marine parks to the archiving of genetic materials – may exacerbate the destruction of relations between Indigenous peoples and
their relations. For instance, conservation strategies often involve displacing Indigenous peoples from the land that they care for (Jago 2017, Brockington and Igoe
2006), or curtailing of processes such as subsistence hunting, fishing or burning that have enabled the co-survival of Indigenous groups, plants, animals and land for
millennia. Meanwhile, ex situ and genetic forms of conservation (including zoos and gene banks) may violate these relationships by instrumentalizing or
commodifying kinship relations. Increasingly popular conservation approaches based on Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) approaches claim to center
Indigenous communities and knowledges. However, they ultimately instrumentalize fragments of Indigenous knowledge systems (for instance, data on climatic
change) to test or support Western approaches. As such, they leave the structures of colonization and other forms of transversal structural violence untouched, and
may even exacerbate them. All of this suggests that confronting global patterns of extinction calls for decolonization and other ethos that work to eliminate
Enabling the restoration of relations that can enable the
transversal structural violence – and I don’t mean this metaphorically.

ongoing flourishing of life on earth will require the transfer of land and power back into plural
Indigenous peoples and their distinct modes of sovereignty, law and governance ( Tuck and Yang 2012).
These relationships and forms of order have enabled plural Indigenous peoples and their multitude of
relations to co-flourish for millennia, including through periods of rapid climate change, and they are
needed to ensure the continuation of this co-flourishing. This means that decolonization is not simply
related to global patterns of extinction: it is necessary to ensuring the ongoingness of plural life forms
on earth.

The alternative is to force a confrontation with the settler imaginary – only that
process of settler uncomfortability can destabilize the calcified regime of colonialism
which foregrounds all action.
Henderson 15 (Phil, Doctoral Student at the University of Victoria “Imagoed communities: the
psychosocial space of settler colonialism” Settler Colonial Studies DOI:
10.1080/2201473X.2015.1092194, pp. 10-14)

Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, settlers

must answer the legitimate charge that their daily
life – in all its banality – is predicated upon the privileges produced by ongoing genocide. The jarring
nature of such charges offers an irreconcilable challenge to settlers qua settlers. 64 Should these charges become
impossible to ignore, they threaten to explode [the explosion of] the imago of settler colonialism , which had hitherto
operated within the settler psyche in a relatively smooth and benign manner. This explosion is
potentiated by the revelation of even a portion of the violence that is required to make settler life possible. If, for
example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes

more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity. 65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and
identity’ the subject experiences a sense of enormous vulnerability. 66 Threatened with this ‘loss of containment’, the settler subject embarks down the road to
psychosis. 67 Thus, to parlay Brown’s thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not
evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. This panic – this rabid and insatiable anger – is

always already at the core of the settler as a subject. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains
in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening ’. 68 This
disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of settler colonialism’s imago,
wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of the settler as such. Trapped in a
Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics
the subject when it is inevitably contravened. 69 We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to break- age.
Their desire to produce a firm imago means that settlers are also always already in a psychically defensive position – that is, the settler’s offensive position on
occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture. For while settlers desire the total erasure of indi- genous populations, the attendant desire to disappear
their own identity as settlers necessitates the suppression of both desires, if the subject’s reliance on settler colonial power structure is to be psychically naturalized.
Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud
observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a

new idea. In settler colonial contexts, this requires averting attention from the violence of
dispossession; as such, settlers often suggest that they aim to create a ‘city on the hill’. 70 Freud noted that the
conversion defense mechanism does suppress the anxiety-inducing desire, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts’. Such is the case when

settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is
founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original
desire’s energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation
that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community. 71 As we have already seen, this obsession at once
solidifies the power of the settler state , thereby naturalizing the settler and simultaneously perpetuating
the processes of erasing indigenous peoples. Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain
originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential. Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the

phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain suspended in a state of
arrested development between these defensive positions. Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is
necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out , when confronted with his
dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory. This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own
dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized. 72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous
peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the
dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’. 73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which
these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and

cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the
subject’s arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject , indeed of all subjects, is

the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from
Rifkin’s. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful
internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization. 74 As we have seen, within
settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status.
Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and
never totalized as others might suggest. 75 Because
of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject
in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted –
creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to
pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decanter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of
indigenous peoples. 76 The
cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to
panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in
highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake, 77 it also occurs in
reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive
practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they provide a degree of
naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments . 78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these
repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also
to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject . Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-
politics of resistance’, which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census
enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process . 79 These acts panic the subject that is
disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the
settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system,
they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration
from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to
rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen
indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers;
81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships.
With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No
More put the settler subject into serious flux once more. Conclusion Settler colonialism has been distinguished from colonialism
proper by what Wolfe calls its ‘logic of elimination’, which requires the erasure of indigenous peoples from the colonized territory. This is
accomplished through a variety of mechanisms that range from outright violence to policies of gradual
elimination. Ultimately, settler colonialism is perpetuated through a double move: to erase indigenous
peoples and then to disappear settlers by naturalizing the violence inherent their existence in colonized
territory. This is accomplished through the production of spatialities bereft of indigeneity. Out of this spatial logic, an imago of settler society is
produced that binds settlers both psychically and socially to each other and to the colonized spaces. The
continual (re)production of a settler colonial imago is necessary to secure the psychic horizons of the
settler subject; it is also inextricably bound up with an insatiable need to constantly renew the erasure of indigenous peoples. Thus, in order to secure its
continued survival as a subject, the settler must always strive to maintain the conditions of settler colonialism. Total erasure of indigeneity is the

grotesque desire of the settler that must be constantly disrupted. Where indigenous peoples have persisted as an insurgent
presence in the settler imago, they are always already threatening this disruption of the settler subject at its very core. For while the affirmation of indigeneity

can induce panic, and subsequently rage, in the settler, it also opens a crack within the imago – that is, within the settler subject

itself – through which an ethic of decolonization can emerge. While it seems that settler colonialism is propelled
by a tightly circuitous movement of subject formation, projection, and (re)formation , the presence of indigenous
peoples in ongoing and sovereign relationship with the land serves as a powerful blockage of to the smoothness of this process.
Case
 1NC – Defense
1 – Stockpiles thump – if they’re right that the police are overfunded in the status quo
then they can’t solve for the backlog of military weapons that they already have

2 – Doesn’t solve – they don’t assume widespread disparities that exist in policing
budgets across the country which means they can’t solve entirely.
Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, 20 - Stephen Rushin is an Associate Professor of Law at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. Roger Michalski is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Oklahoma College of Law (“POLICE FUNDING” 1 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72, SSRN //DH
Overall, it would likely be an oversimplification to say that the United States currently overinvests in police services. In many large and
wellresourced police departments, that might be true. But as the descriptive data presented above suggests, in
many counties across
the country the available tax dollars are so limited that communities can only afford to hire part-time
police officers that receive wages far lower than their peers in nearby counties—and lower than many other industries.100 This matters
for a couple of reasons. First, this is significant because there is evidence that police departments across the
country are currently struggling to attract entry-level applicants.101 The increasingly tight market for
police officers means that communities unwilling to invest sufficient resources into officer salaries, benefits, and
high-quality working conditions will likely lose out on the limited pool of available talent to other industries . 102 In
cities across the country, applications for open policing jobs have also declined. For example, job applications in Nashville declined from 4,700
in 2010 to 1,900 in 2017.103 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) saw applications decline from 21,000 applicants per year to only 13,000
in 2017.104 In total, nearly 66% of police departments recently surveyed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) reported a decline in
applicants.105 While some have argued that the increased scrutiny of police officers after Ferguson has contributed to a lack of interest in
entrylevel policing jobs,106 others have argued that the strong economy in recent years has meant that police departments cannot compete
with wages offered by the private industry.107 And police departments have had a particularly difficult time attracting minority officers.108
Additionally, police departments have also struggled to retain officers in the profession. 109 The PERF survey found that 29% of individuals who
left their policing jobs voluntarily did so after being on the force for less than one year.110 Another 40% did so after being on the job for less
than five years.111 Second, policing is an industry that exists within a market like any other. And like other industries, if one employer chooses
to undercompensate its employees (in terms of salary, benefits, or working conditions), that employer will likely lose many of its employees to
nearby competitors. In the world of policing, officers often have options to work at many different police agencies. As the data above indicates,
there is widespread inequality in the resourcing of local police departments. Police departments only miles apart
often pay drastically different wages and offer drastically different working conditions for their employees. And particularly at a time when
departments are struggling to fill vacancies, police officers have a choice of where they want to work. A single metropolitan area typically has
dozens or even hundreds of different law enforcement agencies. If
one police department undercompensates its officers
relative to its nearby agencies (as appears to be the case in many places in the U nited States today), it will
likely struggle to retain the top talent—and instead it may be forced to accept officers that could not
qualify for jobs at higher-paying agencies. This only scratches the surface of the consequences of inadequate and unequal
funding of police departments. The next Part considers more thoroughly the implications of these descriptive findings for the delivery of
policing services in the United States.

3 – Gun prevalence is what drives warrior mentalities and police violence

Derek Thompson 20, Atlantic staff writer, 6-19-2020-, “The Overlooked Role of Guns in the Police-
Reform Debate,” https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/overlooked-role-guns-police-
reform-debate/613258/

The morbid exceptionalism of American police violence cannot be explained by the amount of money
the U.S. spends on police, or by the number of cops it employs. The U.S. spends less on police than the
European Union does, as a share of GDP. Italy has more officers per capita than any state in the U. S., according
to a comparison of FBI and Eurostat databases. Greece has more officers per person than Newark, New Jersey; Baltimore; and
Chicago. But none of those places shares our epidemic of police violence . American police kill about 1,000 people every year. Adjusted for
population, that body count is five times higher than that in Sweden, 30 times higher than that in Germany, and 100 times higher than that in the United Kingdom. Many differences between the U.S. and the European Union can

partly explain these gaps, including our history of systemic racism and our porous social safety net. Butwithout the mention of guns, no explanation for
America’s record of police violence is complete . Let’s begin with the simplest fact: Life is more dangerous in the presence
of firearms—period. A 2013 study of U.S. states in the American Journal of Public Health found that for
each percentage-point increase in gun ownership, the overall firearm homicide rate increased by 0.9
percent, controlling for other factors. The correlation between gun availability and violent crime is statistically
significant at every level of income. More money can spare Americans from the material and psychological ravages of poverty, but it does not buy an exception from the deadly social
physics of guns. Gun prevalence—roughly 400 million firearms are in circulation in the U.S.— is a danger for cops,

too. As the Vox reporter German Lopez writes, police officers are especially likely to be shot dead in states with more guns . A 2015 study

published in the American Journal of Public Health examined the relationship between state firearm-ownership rates and police killings, controlling for factors that relate with

homicide rates, such as income, poverty, property crime, and alcohol consumption. The researchers
concluded that “a 10% increase in firearm ownership correlated to ten additional officer homicides”
from 1996 to 2010. Where guns are abundant, civilians are more likely to kill civilians and cops, and
cops are, in turn, more likely to kill civilians. A 2018 study from Northeastern University and the Harvard Injury Control Research Center found that “rates of police shooting
deaths are significantly and positively correlated with levels of household gun ownership,” even after accounting for other variables, such as poverty. One of the most common criticisms

of modern policing is that officers dealing with traffic violations and homeless people shouldn’t be
lugging around military-style weaponry or exhibiting a “warrior” mentality on the street . Seth W. Stoughton, a professor at
the University of South Carolina School of Law, calls that mentality “the most problematic aspect of modern [police] policy.” Both police militarization and this pernicious

“warrior mentality” are a direct response to gun violence and mass shootings. After the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles, where police
officers faced sniper fire over several bloody days, the LAPD responded by creating the nation’s first SWAT team. After the University of Texas clock-tower shootings the following year, other police departments added their own
quasi-military units. In 1997, the LAPD faced off against two bank robbers in North Hollywood, who held off the officers with automatic rifles and body armor. This highly publicized event spurred police departments to arm patrol
officers with heavy weapons, and “the AR-15 rifle, a semiautomatic, civilian version of the military’s M-16 rifle, became the weapon of choice for patrol officers,” Stoughton wrote in the Wake Forest Law Review in 2016.

Today’s warrior-cop training is inappropriate, as violent crime has declined by more than 70 percent
since 1993. But perhaps some police paranoia comes from the fact that the U.S. has added twice as
many guns as people since the mid-1990s. “Generally, when a police officer pulls up to a car in Australia,
they don’t expect someone to be armed ,” Terry Goldsworthy, a criminologist at Bond University in Queensland, Australia, has said. Indeed, just 6 percent of Australian households
own a gun. In the U.S., that figure is 43 percent. We should stop thinking about guns as just an acute threat, and start thinking

about them as something more like lead poisoning—an environmental toxicity that builds over decades
and leads to a host of social and cognitive problems. Gun prevalence increases civilian violence and
officer shootings, which makes cops more concerned about getting killed, which in turn leads officers to
bedeck themselves in quasi-military gear, escalate conflicts that don’t deserve escalation, and, too often,
shoot and kill. “When police are involved in an encounter

4 – They’ll just adapt – means they don’t cut cops or equipment

Erroll G. Southers 20, former FBI special agent, professor of the Practice in National & Homeland
Security at the University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy, director of the USC Safe
Communities Institute and director of Homegrown Violent Extremism Studies, 6-11-2020, "Black ex-cop:
I understand the anger but don't defund police. It could make things worse.," USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2020/06/11/defunding-police-could-backfire-black-
former-detective-column/5331008002/

Nonetheless, removing federal, state and/or local funding from law enforcement will not achieve the
change we want. In fact, it could make things worse. Police can have strong positive impact I am an African American. I grew up during
the civil rights era, and I saw firsthand police abuses and brutality against people who looked like me. It is what motivated me to pursue a career in law
enforcement, to be a part of the change I sought in the world. This career led me to city police forces in California, to the FBI and ultimately to serve as assistant
chief at the Los Angeles World Airports police department. Across my years in law enforcement, I saw plenty of the bad qualities in the profession, but I saw
something else as well — the positive impact police programs and outreach have in supporting safe, strong communities. When police command
staff are presented with a reduced budget, the decision-making is simple. They will not reduce
expenses for personnel and equipment. They will cut the costs of the many programs police
departments provide that are outside of day-to-day law enforcement . There are offerings like cadet and
Explorer programs, which bring together young people and police in community service and personal
development. These are avenues for building the police department of tomorrow . I’ve had the honor of serving with
and leading officers who came from the inner city in Los Angeles — Asian, Hispanic and African American men and women who, like me, wanted to give back by
serving their communities with honor, dignity and respect. Those professionals sought to become police officers in part because of their participation in the
programs offered by the department. Other
programs include things like the Police Athletic/Activities League, which
engages young people and police officers through sports to give kids a positive outlet and create positive
interactions between the community and police. I was a PAL kid growing up in New Jersey, and I helped create the current program in
Santa Monica, California. PAL also includes programs for health and wellness for mothers or the elderly, for after-school activities, community block parties and
much more. If police departments see dramatic budget cuts, these are the kinds of programs that will end up
on the chopping block. This means the public good law enforcement is delivering will go away. The
communities that valued the programs will suffer, but an additional long-term consequence is that the
demographics of the future American police force will not be representative of the public. Preserve the good,
root out the bad If you are a black man and the only time you ever see police is when they are responding to a

complaint or a crime, it cements a view of police as the outsiders, the heavy uncaring hand of the law.
That does not encourage black people to explore careers in law enforcement, where their unique
perspective, experiences and love of community would be so valuable to a peaceful, civil society — and
change the departments in a way we would like. To this end, budgetary changes that can impact the culture and actions of

U.S. law enforcement should preserve and even expand programs and opportunities for police-
community interactions that have nothing to do with arrest and prosecution. These initiatives do not require firearms,
pepper spray or armored vehicles. They just require humanity and a commitment to public service. As angry as we are at the systemic

problems in American law enforcement, we must be careful to preserve what is good in the profession
while rooting out all that is bad.

hold accountable ???

 1NC – Circumvention
The plan is circumvented –
1 – Trump will definitely circumvent the plan BUT he can’t circumvent at the state
level
Bennett 20 – Washington Bureau Chief (John T., Independent, “Trump insists police will not be
defunded amid growing movement across the US”, 6/8/20,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-latest-defund-police-
white-house-today-latest-a9555461.html/micahw)

Donald Trump dismissed a movement among some activists and Democratic lawmakers to " defund the
police" in the wake of George Floyd's death while in police custody. "There won't be de-funding. There won't be dismantling of
our police. And there is not going to be any disbanding of our police," he said during a meeting with law enforcement
officials at the White House. As he often does when weighing in on state and local issues, the president did not cite any
law that might give him the authority to override a decision by a mayor, governor, city council or state
legislature. His comments came as some senior House and Senate Democrats opted against condemning some of the political left calling for
police departments to either be stripped of funding or abolished. Leaders of the "defund the police" movement have spent most of Monday
trying to explain they want to reduce police funding and direct those monies to social programmes to help troubled young people. But the
name those activists chose for the movement has given Mr Trump and his team ample kindling to try
starting a political fire to fire up his conservative base. The Minneapolis city council has approved a measure to dismantle
its police department after Mr Floyd, a black man, was killed by a white officer. Former Vice President Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic
presidential nominee, said in a statement he opposes cutting police funding as he and Mr Trump vie for crucial voting blocs like suburban
women. Speaker Nancy Pelosi has tried to explain the movement is about how taxpayer funds are spent and "changing policies to make sure
our policing is more just." "But those are local decisions," the California Democrat said. Attorney General William Barr, during the same event,
said he has talked to law enforcement officials who want clarification on standards under which their officers should use force. A majority of
Americans, according to several polls, disapprove of Mr Trump's handling of the Floyd death and subsequent protests around the country.

2 – Localities will just hire private security instead which entrenches classism – turns
case
Rushin & Michalski 20 – Stephen Rushin is an Associate Professor of Law at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Roger Michalski is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma
College of Law (“POLICE FUNDING” 1 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72, SSRN]//DH)

E. Private Policing Another

potential impact of defunding local law enforcement is the shifting of private security
forces into the business of public safety. Again, this shift is unlikely to affect all communities equally. In numerous cases, when
local governments do not adequately invest in public police, wealthy residents fill this gap by investing in
private security services. This leaves poorer residents, and often communities of color, underserved
compared to their wealthier counterparts. Take the example of Oakland, California. Back in 2013, the city was reeling from a 24% increase in
robberies and a 45% increase in armed robberies.216 But in the wake of the recession, the city was financially limited in the resources that it
could allocate to the police department.217 Oakland ultimately lost around 200 officers, resulting in an understaffed police force that lacked
the manpower to respond to all reports of criminal activity.218 In response, a number of wealthier communities in Oakland began investing in
private security forces to patrol their neighborhoods.219 This was not the first time that Oakland turned to private security to supplement an
underfunded local police force. Four years earlier, the Oakland City Council approved the hiring of the private security agency International
Services Inc. to patrol some crime-plagued neighborhoods.220 While Oakland paid an average of $250,000 annually to cover the salary and
benefits for each public police officer, it could afford to hire four private security patrolmen for only $200,000 each year.221 Other cities such
as New Orleans have similarly invested in cheaper private security forces when faced with budget shortfalls.222 This
shift from public
to private policing in the face of underfunding comes with several serious drawbacks. First, the move towards
private policing exacerbates inequality. In the above Oakland example, residents received drastically different public-
safety services based in part on their socioeconomic status. Poorer residents had to rely on an underfunded police
department—one that does not even have the manpower to respond to many types of criminal offenses—as their primary provider of
publicsafety services. Wealthier residents, though, could afford to invest in private security forces to supplement the underfunded local law
enforcement. Second, the move towards private policing transfers everyday public-safety services to private
security officers that are
generally poorly trained and inadequately regulated compared to their public counterparts. As one study found, while some
classes of private police commonly take on many of the same everyday policing responsibilities as public police officers—use of force in self-
defense, detention of suspects, and searches of property—they commonly face minimal licensing requirements and few regulations.223
Perhaps most notably, that study found that even states with robust regulations of private police officers still typically required no more than
forty hours of total training.224 Among all of the hypothesized negative side effects of defunding the police, this may be the most challenging
one to empirically evaluate in the future given the lack of a cross-jurisdictional database on the frequency with which each local community
relies on private security forces. Nevertheless, the theory, accompanied by the anecdotal evidence, is worthy of serious consideration.
 1NC – Turn – Predatory Policing
Police shift to predatory policing to recoup funding decreases.
The Economist 20 (The Economist, “Cutting American police budgets might have perverse effects”,
7/7/20, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/07/07/cutting-american-police-budgets-
might-have-perverse-effects/micahw)
“Defund” means different things in different circles. But at its core is a demand that police budgets be cut and that money be diverted to other
services to support public safety, such as mental-health counsellors and social workers. But these efforts
are complicated by the
intricacies of current funding arrangements and the presence of several forces in the same area . The
federal government provides some resources and states also chip in, but 86% of police spending is
locally financed, by counties and municipalities . Any reform needs to take account of two facts about budgeting: that
police departments have long found alternative sources of funds; and that local-government budgets need to be
reformed, too. First, other funding sources. Civil asset-forfeiture laws, which allow police departments to
confiscate property and keep some or all of the proceeds, are a common but problematic example. Their
use has increased dramatically since they were strengthened in the 1980s to separate drug kingpins from their ill-gotten gains. Often
property can be seized without conviction or even a charge . So there are perverse incentives for police
departments to expand the use of techniques like reverse drug stings (where officers pose as drug suppliers rather
than buyers) and pulling cars over (which often yields traffic fines and sometimes more). Unsurprisingly, like the war on drugs itself,
forfeiture disproportionately affects people of colour. An investigation by the American Civil Liberties Union into
forfeitures in Philadelphia found that 71% of people who had cash seized without an accompanying conviction
were African-American. How the money raised can be used varies from place to place . Federal law forbids police
departments from putting future forfeiture proceeds in their budget plans. Some jurisdictions also ban their use for personnel costs, which
make up two-thirds of police spending. Even so, they fund everything from ammunition for SWAT teams to vehicle
maintenance. And many local restrictions can be circumvented by “equitable sharing” agreements, which
allow local departments to keep a large slice of the proceeds when a federal agency is involved . The sums
can be large—the Institute for Justice, a libertarian law firm, estimates that between 2000 and 2013 Massachusetts law
enforcement took in almost $65m under state forfeiture laws , plus $63.5m from equitable-sharing
arrangements. Because such methods insulate departments from budget cuts, police forces loth to
reform might increase their use. Second, effective reform requires an understanding of how local-
government budgets affect the way police departments do their jobs . Police forces play a crucial role in another
alternative means of revenue generation. Since the 1980s, and especially since the global financial crisis of 2007-09, local governments
have increasingly relied on fines and fees to fund themselves . In some jurisdictions, police can impose fines for
offences as trivial as having mismatched curtains , though the most common are for traffic violations. The police department
of Ferguson, Missouri—where the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by a police officer led to widespread unrest in 2014—was notorious in this
regard. A Department of Justice report in 2015 found that city officials had systematically engaged in “a pattern and practice of constitutional
violations” with the aim of “maximising revenue”. These tactics can wreak havoc on citizens’ lives . Ability to pay is
rarely taken into consideration. A small fine attracts further fees if not paid promptly . Non-payment can
also lead to suspension of driver’s licences, debt traps, exclusion from public housing and other
services, a police record and even jail. Again, areas with larger black and Latino populations are
disproportionately affected. Money from police-issued fines and fees tends to go into a general administrative fund. Reducing
police budgets will limit how much forces get back, but will not alleviate the pressure local
governments put on them to collect the cash. A reluctance to raise taxes has meant that such methods are near-
ubiquitous in local government. Fees and fines are common at every stage of the criminal-justice process. This can have odd and
damaging consequences. A report by the Vera Institute of Justice, a non-profit research organisation, found that 41% of the New
Orleans public defender’s budget came from bail, fines and fees —meaning that it was being funded by
those it was appointed to defend because they could not afford an attorney . And the system can turn
predatory. Between 2011 and 2015 the Wayne County Treasurer foreclosed on one in four properties in Detroit because of overdue
property-tax bills. The city had been inflating the values of properties when assessing them for tax, levying
unaffordable taxes and then foreclosing on owners unable to pay . As well as being unjust, these methods are
inefficient forms of revenue-raising. A report by the Brennan Centre for Justice, a think-tank, looked at the use of criminal-court
fees and fines in ten counties across three states. It found that these jurisdictions spent more than $41 for every $100 collected, compared with
$0.34 that the Internal Revenue Service spends to collect the same amount. One county in New Mexico spent $117 for every $100 recouped. In
addition, localities spend large sums incarcerating people who cannot pay. Fees and fines also make governments less accountable, since they
are not subject to the same political scrutiny as new taxes. Ironically, the very programmes that reformers are demanding
might end up being financed by fines and fees . The role of police in raising revenues for local government also gives forces
leverage. In 2014, NYPD officers engaged in an unofficial “slowdown”, entailing a virtual halt in issuing parking tickets, which generated $10.5m
for the city every week. Police officers claimed that the drop in enforcement was due to fear for their safety after the killing of two NYPD
officers, but it was widely interpreted as a protest over a lack of appreciation from New York’s citizens and its mayor, Bill de Blasio. It ended
only when the then-NYPD commissioner, Willam Bratton, publicly ordered officers back to work. So reformers
have to consider how
police departments will react to budget cuts . “Defunding” advocates hope that budget cuts will end the
“over-policing” of neighbourhoods with high non-white populations . But they may take fewer officers off
the streets than they suppose. Cuts to departmental budgets agreed on in Los Angeles will take the LAPD down
to 9,757 officers from about 10,000; in New York the NYPD, which has roughly 36,000 officers, is merely
cancelling the hiring of an additional 1,163 . These forces are large enough to adjust to cuts. The smaller forces that make up
most of America’s 18,000 law-enforcement agencies have tighter budgets. Any change will involve serious trade-offs . It will have
to be carefully managed. Budget cuts could easily be reversed if enthusiasm for reform wanes because, say, crime spikes and people feel less
safe because there are fewer officers. Ultimately, officers’ behaviour matters more than their numbers . Police departments
should be glad to have a more limited range of duties. Indeed, some have been advocating this for years. But there will inevitably be
institutional resistance, especially from police unions , which suspect that reform will reduce their power. More important
than calls for sweeping reforms may be the hard graft of attending public hearings to scrutinise the budgets of both the police and other public-
service providers, and arguing for tax reforms to reduce governments’ reliance on fees and fines. Reforming
police departments
demands more than starving them of resources. It also requires changing how budgets affect their
incentives. Otherwise, defunding may pave the way for more intrusive policing, as forces seek to recoup
lost revenue.
 1NC – Turn – Reinvestment
Framing issue – nothing in the plan text specifies where the money being invested into
policing will go post-plan – they don’t get to fiat where the money goes because
there’s an infinite number of places it can go which leads to unpredictable advantage
ground

That means they don’t solve since they don’t invest in non-police alternatives.
Vitale 20 - Alex S. Vitale is professor of sociology and coordinator of the Policing and Social Justice
Project at Brooklyn College. He is the author of The End of Policing (“The Best Way to “Reform” the
Police Is to Defund the Police” Jacobin, June, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/06/defund-police-reform-
alex-vitale)

MD What does defunding the police look like in practice? AV Practically, on a local level, it means trying to build a
majoritarian politics on the ground to compel a city council to vote to cut the budget for the police and
reinvest as much of that money as possible in community needs. For example, in New York City the
Democratic Socialists of America have been doing issue advocacy around issues of criminalization for some time. Now they’re
planning for next year’s city council races to make one of their key litmus tests whether or not the
candidates seeking endorsement will support a program of reducing the budget for policing by a billion
dollars. They’re helping to put this on the radar in a practical way. And just this week, forty candidates for next year’s city council races
signed a pledge to defund the NYPD. That’s incredible. I’m the coordinator for the Policing and Social Justice Project, which is part of a
movement in New York for budget justice. We put out the target of one billion. Other groups like Communities United for Police Reform and
Close Rikers have called for substantial reductions to policing and reinvesting that money in community needs. So we’re all participating in
budget hearings, writing op-eds, we released a video that’s circulating on social media, including paid advertising, that calls for this billion cut.
We’re making a real push to defund the police not in theory but in practice. And then it’s
important to lobby to divert or
reallocate that money in ways that actually directly replace the function of policing . So for example, in New York
City the Public Safety Committee makes its recommendation about the police budget, other committees make their recommendations to other
departments, but there’s a Budget Committee chair who can send signals to those different subcommittees. So the Budget Committee chair
who we’re targeting in New York could say to the Public Safety Committee, “Hey we want you to take two hundred million out of the police
budget,” and then he could say to the Education Committee, “You’ve got an extra hundred million to put in, but I want you to put it into
counselors and restorative justice.”

Failing to redirect funding empirically increases police violence – turns case.

SIMONE WEICHSELBAUM and NICOLE LEWIS 20 – staff writers at the Marshall Project (“Support
For Defunding The Police Department Is Growing. Here’s Why It’s Not A Silver Bullet.” 6/9,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/09/support-for-defunding-the-police-department-is-
growing-here-s-why-it-s-not-a-silver-bullet//DH)
Decades of over-policing in black and brown neighborhoods has led to black and brown people being disproportionately victims of police
violence and overrepresented in prisons. A better approach, proponents of defunding the police argue, redirects law-enforcement funding to
social services programs such as public housing, early childhood education and healthcare. By equitably distributing resources, they say, the
need for police could be dramatically reduced. Molly Glasgow, a volunteer with MPD150, a grassroots initiative to abolish the Minneapolis
Police Department, said decades of previous reform efforts have not broken a cycle of violence followed by unrest and promises of
improvement that have failed. "What we are asking is that we step out of that cycle/' Glasgow said. "When we say dismantle: Yes, we
mean divest and defund, but also invest in community programs and initiatives that are actually supporting people's
needs." Past attempts to cut police spending or alter police policies offer cautionary tales of how some efforts
backfire, and entrenched aggressive tactics and racially discriminatory attitudes remain. Previous Marshall Project
investigations into cases of attempted police reform in cities like Memphis and Chicago found that cutting law
enforcement budgets did not reduce police violence or produce healthier relationships with the
neighborhoods they patrol. After 2008, cities reduced police spending as the Great Recession depleted
their coffers. Departments that once had record numbers of cops, bankrolled by a Clinton-era federal hiring grant, were forced
to downsize. (The single largest line item in most police budgets is personnel.) As dollars dried up, police manpower
plummeted, more crimes went unsolved, community outreach dwindled, and the cops that were left
were forced to work high amounts of overtime. In Memphis, complaints about use of force rose as
overtime costs nearly doubled from 2015, reaching $27 million two years later. Wait times for 911 calls rose. City officials then
pressed a nonprofit to raise money in secret to pay for police bonuses without public input.
Framing
 1NC – TL
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois isn’t offense for them – the card cites places like
emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, and public morgues as
cites of invisible violence which they definitely don’t solve
Winning counterplans or turns case arguments obviate the framing page – proves that
ways to evaluate impacts aren’t mutually exclusive or that they exert the same
violence they’re critiquing.
The magnitude of extinction outweighs and instantly demands consequentialism –
having a veil of ignorance is good if it prevents extinction. Even if predictions are
imperfect, it shouldn’t be rejected.
Baum and Barrett 18 (Seth D. Baum and Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute.
2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing,
Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, Routledge, pp. 174–184. GCR = Global Catastrophe Risk)

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken

literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way
catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing
just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the
deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a
significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10
trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have

emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead
2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s

potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human
extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some
catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear
winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people.

This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear
winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so
deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of
lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten
million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may
even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the
universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants
are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will
remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists)
the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An
open
question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an
infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002;
Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion

lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al.
2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a

standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate,

it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of
the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times
harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life . Or, preventing one million
deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This
suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually
all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a
statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates.
Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses
a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global
catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which
converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global

catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to
count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected
to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the
stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard risk
equals probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit
significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause
permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives
are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than
others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on
across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are
distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including
GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to
do with our time than worry about them. While
everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the
strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This
position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-
evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers
speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from
nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for
society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing
everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very
high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.