1.

People VS Lacson

FACTS:

Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

The Court held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given
retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. It
emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases
already filed in court.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable because the essential requirements for
its application were not present .The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of the case and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent's
motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal
cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly
impair, reduce, and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its
application to the criminal cases in question since 'the State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them
to do so.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable

RULING: No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The
provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect
to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
2 years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent
is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: (1) the prosecution with the
express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites when the case was dismissed. The
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondents'
admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The
respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such
admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make
exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. Therefore, the State is not
barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
 2. People VS Dela Rosa

FACTS:

The Solicitor General appeals from the order of the Hon. Francisco de la Rosa(Judge)who quashed the information
on the information and the Amended Information, against Berti Hildegard Edery, who was accused of violation of
Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code, Republic Act No. 1937. The charge is that she brought into this
country 28 pieces of gold bars with their corresponding markings at the Manila International Airport, Pasay City,
sometime on the 8th of October, 1968 by means of false statements, both oral and written and other omissions,
having managed such entry by placing the gold bars in pockets of a vest cleverly concealed within her person,
without lawfully passing them through the Customhouse of the airport for the purpose of avoiding declaration of the
same to the customs authorities in order that the said gold bars may be appraised and duties and taxes thereon may
be imposed, as said gold bars are subject to duties, taxes and other charges of which the government was.
accordingly, deprived. The accused Edery, through counsel filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
contained in the information did not constitute the offense charged. An opposition was filed by the People,
hereinafter to be referred to as Petitioner, to the motion on February 3, 1969, to which a Reply was filed by the
accused also on February 3, 1969. Then, the respondent judge issued an order questioning both the Information and
the Amended Information.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Recon consideration which was opposed by respondent Edery. Then, petitioner filed a
Motion to Reopen Consideration of Motion to Quash, 8 praying that the prosecution be allowed to present additional
evidence in the interest of justice. Then, the respondent judge issued an order granting in part petitioner's Motion to
Reopen Consideration of the Motion to Quash, but co g his order of February 12, 1969 in that the Information and
Amended Information filed in the Case did not state facts constituting the offense charged.

ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN QUASHING THE CRIMINAL CASE FILED AGAINST
RESPONDENT EDERY.

HELD: The thrust of petitioner's contention under the foregoing assignments of error is that a motion to quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under Section 2(a) of Rule 117, Rules of Court, must
be decided on the strength of the allegations of the information, and the court may not go beyond said allegations to
inquire into the merits of the case to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the information, which, according
to petitioner, contains, in the instant case, allegations clearly charging an offense.

At bottom of the charge is that respondent Edery did not declare the gold bars before the customs authorities in order
to avoid duties and taxes which would otherwise have been imposed and collected from respondent Edery for
bringing into this country the said gold bars.

It is true that on the basis of the allegations of the amended information, standing alone, an offense is charged. But
from admissions made by the prosecution, and the evidence presented, as even the prosecution asked the court to be
permitted to present such evidence in its Motion to Reopen Consideration of the Motion to Quash of March 21,
1969, the respondent court found justification in quashing the information, as he issued the order comp of on June
14, 1971.
 3. Mercado VS CFI of Rizal

Facts:

There was first a motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Ramon Mercado on the ground of the telegram being a
privileged communication.It was denied.

Then, came a motion to quash, alleging that the facts charged do not "constitute an offense." Again, it met with a
denial. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the present proceeding was instituted.

In the comment submitted, the stress was on the absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith. As stated
therein: "The communication in issue was made by the petitioner with evident malice and bad faith, a matter...
explicitly stated in the information filed with the respondent Court, and the pretense that it was made allegedly in
line with the President's appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government service, cannot
cover up such fact.

Malice in fact and bad faith on the part of the petitioner, and/or that he was motivated by vengeance and ill-will in
making the said communication, is shown by, and can be established by the prosecution thru the testimony of the
private respondent and the following documentary evidence: a) On October 14,... 1972, petitioner filed a letter-
complaint with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent, for alleged grave
violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules ; b) Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the
aforementioned administrative complaint by petitioner against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the
subject libelous telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which was
indorsed for investigation to the... said Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first indorsement of the said
Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation [with a true copy of the
said first indorsement attached];... c) On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an... amended administrative
complaint against the private respondent with the same Board of Transportation docketed therein as Adm. Case No.
72-1, charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices, and
misconduct or discourtesy; d) The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges, and
after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private
respondent as innocent of... the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her; e) On July 17, 1973
petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation,
but the said Board, in an... order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit ; f) While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board of Transportation,
petitioner, to further harrass and malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent, filed with the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the private respondent and her husband Lorenzo
M. Mercado accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. The said office issued a
resolution recommending that the said case be closed for lack of evidence ; g) Also during the pendency of the
administrative complaint filed by petitioner against the private respondent in the Board of Transportation, petitioner
filed with the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for corrupt
practices against the private respondent; and after due investigation the CIS, in answer to the letter of private
respondent's counsel, dated March 24, 1973, requesting information about the result of the said investigation, sent a
letter to said counsel, dated March 27, 1973, advising him that the said case is considered closed for insufficiency of
evidence].

Issues: W/N the court erred in denying the petition

Ruling:

In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari to annul the order denying
the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration does not lie. Neither should respondent court be
ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. Q-2936, the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner. Nor should the
court be prohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action. This petition lacks merit.
United States v. Bustos, as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision.

Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such instance,... The
tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem... to indicate that a doubt
could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should be given the opportunity
then of proving malice.

Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand.

Principles:

Libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees
of free speech and free press.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party... communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although
it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.'

The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege."

In People v. Monton, the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should
be upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those accused of libel.
 4. People VS Plaza (Short FULL TEXT)

Appeal by the State from an order of the Municipal Court of Butuan City dismissing the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 2721, as against Maximino Plaza, on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute a
criminal offense.

The aforesaid information charged Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog, Capistrano Lamboyog and Maximino Plaza with
estafa, alleging:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1954, in the City of Butuan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, cooperating together and helping one
another with accused Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog and her husband Capistrano Lamboyog pretending and
misrepresenting themselves to be the sole and absolute owners of a real estate situated at Barrio Ba-an,
Butuan City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 3824 (9949 located at Doot, Barrio Ba-an, Butuan City) more
particularly described as follows, to wit:

"A parcel of agricultural land bounded on the north by Jose Ato, on the East by Ba-an River, on
the South by Pedro Plaza and on the West by the Agusan River, containing an area of 7,413 square
meters, more or less," when in fact and in truth the above-named accused knew that the said land
above described was already sold in a pacto de retro sale dated July 21, 1953, and later on
converted the same sale into an absolute sale on September 3, 1953, in favor of Felipe F. Paular,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud said Felipe F. Paular
knowing that said property has been previously sold to the said Felipe P. Paular in the amount of
P400.00, both accused entered into agreement whereby the said property above-described was
sold by the accused Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog and her aforementioned husband, to his co-
accused Maximino Plaza and falsely represented the same property to be free from encumbrance,
to the damage and prejudice of said Felipe F. Paular in the amount of P400.00 excluding the
improvements thereon . . . .

Defendant Plaza filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds that (1) the fact charged do not constitute an
offense insofar as he was concerned;(2) that the information charged more than one offense; and (3) that the
criminal liability had been extinguished by prescription of the crime. The court found the first ground to be well
taken and dismissed the information as against him. Hence this appeal..

A perusal of the information discloses that it charges that three defendants with "conspiring, cooperating together
and helping one another etc.," to commit the offense charged, while at the same time another portion thereof would
seem to imply that the Lamboyog spouses falsely represented to their co-defendant, Maximino Plaza, that the
property they were selling to him was free from encumbrance — an allegation justifying the inference that Plaza did
not know that the property he was buying had been previously sold to the offended party, Felipe F. Paular. In view
of this, we are of the opinion that the real defect of the information is not that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute a punishable offense but that its allegations, as to Plaza's participation and possible guilt, are vague.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.  But even assuming that the lower court was right in holding that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute a punishable offense, as far as defendant Plaza was concerned, the case should not
have been dismissed with respect to him. Instead, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, the lower court should have given the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information. That under the
provisions of said rule, the trial court may order the filing of another information or simply the amendments of the
one already filed is clearly in accordance with the settled rule in this jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Muyo, 2 Phil. 177; People
vs. Tan, 48 Phil. 877, 880).
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

5. G.R. No. L-18747 March 30, 1963 ,THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs.
PASTOR SUPNAD, ET AL., accused-appellees.

FACTS: That on or about the 2nd day of December 1958 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Teresa Bautista in the following manner, to wit: both said
accused, well knowing that the 2-story residential house of strong materials owned by them located on Block No.
Sec. 1, Barrio Fugoso, at 958 Wagas St., corner of Callejon Hinahon, Barrio Fugoso, in said City, has been
mortgaged by them to said Teresa Bautista for P2,500.00 and well knowing that the same cannot be encumbered,
alienated or disposed of during the existence of said mortgage without the prior written consent of said Teresa
Bautista, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly sold, transferred and conveyed the same house by way
of absolute sale to one Damian Vasquez for P7,000.00 by making it appear to the latter that the same is free from all
liens and encumbrances of whatever nature, thereby defrauding the said Teresa Bautista in the aforesaid sum of
P2,500.00 Philippine Currency.

After the arraignment, to which both pleaded not guilty, the accused, in a manifestation, dated March 28, 1960,
raised the issue of prejudicial question. The trial court ordered the parties to submit memoranda on such issue. In the
memorandum filed by the counsel for the accused on April 7, 1960, he contended, among others, that the court
should indefinitely suspend the case, because in Civil Case No. 39224, entitled "Teresa Bautista and Eduardo Dava,
plaintiffs v. Pastor Supnad, Brigido Ungos and Damian Vasquez, defendants" which was decided by the CFI of
Manila, said Court made the following observations -

... The fact remains, however, that when Damian Vasquez bought the house, he knew of the existence of the
mortgage in favor of Teresa Bautista and it is but just and fair that he should pay the amount of the indebtedness
because he bought said property, fully knowing that Pastor L. Supnad had obtained a loan in the sum of P2,500.00
from Teresa Bautista with the said house as security. It is true that Damian Vasquez, on the witness stand; denied
having met Teresa Bautista, as alleged by her, but the Court nevertheless, gives full credit to her testimony.

ISSUE: whether the facts alleged in the information constitute or not an offense

RULING:

Considering that the mortgage is not registered, the mortgagee Teresa Bautista is damaged. The Revised Penal Code
provides -

ART. 316. Other forms of swindling. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine
of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed.

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such
encumbrance be not recorded.

The instant case falls within the purview of the clear provision of law cited, under which the appellees were
prosecuted. Appellees sold the property in question to Damian Vasquez knowing that the same was mortgaged to
Teresa Bautista, although such encumbrance be not recorded. The mortgagee who was prejudiced, had come to the
court to vindicate her right as an offended party. The ground for dismissal of the case is that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute an offense. This being the case, the sufficiency of the information must have to be
determined solely upon such facts as alleged therein. The facts as found by the court in the civil case which, by the
way, is not final, because it is pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, can not be considered as a prejudicial
question. At most, they would merely constitute as a defense in the criminal case, which must be substantiated
during the trial. A cursory reading of the information, heretofore quoted, shows that sufficient allegations have been
set forth, to render appellees' acts, a violation of par. 2, Section 316 of the Revised Penal Code.
6. G.R. No. L-46080 November 10, 1978 DOMINADOR LAYOSA, petitioner,

vs.HON. JOSE P. RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and FERNANDO M. DILIG, City
Fiscal of Puerto Princess, Palawan respondents

FACTS: This case is about the suspension of Dominador Layosa the collector of customs of Palawan and Puerto
Princess City, who on March 17, 1947 was charged by the city fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Palawan with
having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019). The information was based on
the complaint filed by the assistant director of the District Anti-Smuggling Action Center. It was one of the five
cases filed against Layosa, aside from a malversation case (p. 85, Rollo).

The gravamen of the charge against Layosa is that during the period from April to December, 1976 he demanded
and received from the patron of the M/V Lady Angelita I, whenever that vessel docked at the Puerto Princesa wharf
to unload and load cargoes of the San Miguel Corporation, two to three cases of beer and soft drinks as the
consideration for giving the vessel preferential berthing facilities (Criminal Case No. 1778).

On the following day, March 18, the fiscal, acting pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, filed a motion
for Layosa's suspension. A copy of that motion and of the orders setting it for hearing were furnished Layosa. The
motion was heard on March 25, 1977. At the hearing, Layosa's counsel cross-examined the prosecution's witness.
Respondent Judge granted the motion in his order dated April 11, 1977 at Brooke's Point. He found that a valid
information had been filed against Layosa.

On May 10, 1977, Layosa filed in this Court the instant petition for certiorari. He prayed that the order of suspension
be set aside. He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had
as yet been issued when the hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent Judge,
that the Chief State Prosecutor in a telegram to the fiscal dated March 24, 1977 directed that the record of the case
be elevated for review, and that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the suspension order.

Because Layosa defied the order of suspension, the lower court in its order of June 15, 1977 adjudged him in
contempt of court and penalized him by imprisonment for three months and a fine of P500. Layosa appealed from
that order to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court has jurisdiction over the case

RULING: here is no question that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the
information. The offense charged is within its jurisdiction. The petitioner was notified of the pre-suspension hearing.
His counsel participated in that hearing. The requirements of due process were observed. The law contemplates an
expeditious hearing on the suspension of the accused. Public interest demands a speedy determination of that
question. (See Sugay vs. Pamaran, L-33877-79, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 260; Luciano vs. Wilson, L-31347,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 638; Luciano vs. Mariano,

L-23950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187; Oliveros vs. Villaluz, L-33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327; Luciano vs.
Provincial Governor, L-30306, June 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 517).

It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into custody when the pre-suspension hearing was held.
However, his voluntary appearance at that hearing through his counsel was a submission to the lower court's
jurisdiction. (Note that in civil cases, defendant's voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.)

Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person
of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear
in court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the objection. (22 C.J.S., 1961 Ed. p. 418).
In the instant case, Layosa waived the objection based on lack of jurisdiction over his person when, as already noted,
he appeared at the pre-suspension hearing and his counsel cross-examined the prosecution witness.

7. SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU G.R. NOS. 111771-77 NOVEMBER 9, 1993

Facts:

Mayor Antonio Sanchez was charged before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna of seven informations of homicide, in
connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez moved to quash the
information on the ground, among others that as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan, among others.

Issue: Whether it is the Sandiganbayan who has jurisdiction over petitioner.

Held:

NO. The petitioner’s contention that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or employees at the
time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts, is untenable. Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by
P.D. No.1861, provides: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code: (2) Other offenses or
felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prisioncorreccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . .
(Emphasis supplied) The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not
fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because
it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the
commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office
is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is
not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions.
8. People v Macandog, L-18601-2

Facts:

The records disclose that on 25 November 1960, the City Fiscal's office filed against appellant, in the Municipal
Court of Manila, two informations for slander and for slight physical injuries.

On 20 and 30 January 1961, respectively, accused filed motions to quash both information, which motions were
denied "for lack of merit" on 10 February 1961. She appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which, as had
already been stated, dismissed the appeal.

The motion to quash in the slander case challenged the jurisdiction of the municipal court allegedly because a
written complaint by the offended party therein is absolutely indispensable. With respect to the slight physical
injuries, appellant claims that the same had already prescribed. 

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the municipal court denying the motions to quash both information is appealable.

Held:

It has been held repeatedly by this Court that an order denying the motion to quash is merely interlocutory, and,
therefore, not appealable (Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil. 534; People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-4930, 17 February 1954;
People vs. Manuel, G.R. Nos. L-6794 and L-6795, 11 August 1954). Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that the accused "shall immediately plead" after the motion to quash is overruled. This means
that trial shall go on, and if judgment is rendered against her, she can later on appeal and then raise again the same
question which she is now seeking to be reviewed.

In support of her appeal, appellant cites the case of Arches vs. Beldia, G.R. No. L-2414. 27 May 1949. Apparently,
as the Solicitor General pointed out, the decision is misconstrued. In that case, after the motion to quash was denied
by the Justice of the Peace Court, the accused brought the issue, by certiorari and prohibition, to the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, a step which this Court held to be erroneous, as "appeal  in due time was the obvious and only
remedy for the accused-petitioner" therein. The phrase "appeal in due time" implies a previous conviction as a result
of a trial on the merits of the case, and does not refer to an interlocutory order denying a motion to quash.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
9. Solidum v Hernandez, L-16570

Facts:

Appellee is charged with violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code, appellant Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr.
filed on April 18, 1959 an amended information alleging in substance that appellee, having acquired shares of stock
in the Avegon Construction and Electrical Co., Inc., and having thus become interested, directly or indirectly, in its
business, granted said corporation tax exemptions and otherwise acted favorably upon its various requests and
petitions in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and participated, as presiding officer, and member of the Monetary
Board of the Central Rank, in meetings thereof wherein said Board decided to grant, and in fact granted said
corporation dollar allocations in the total amount of $1,612,224 from 1954 to 1958 and otherwise acted favorably on
its other requests and petitions.

On June 15, 1959, appellee filed a motion to quash said amended information on the ground that the facts charged
therein do not constitute an offense, alleging three reasons in support, to wit:

1) that 'the mere ownership by him of shares, of stock in a private corporation, whether or not that corporation may
transact official business with him in his official capacity, does not fall within the purview of prohibited interest in a
'contrato u operacion' under Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code; 2) that petitioner had no interest or shareholding
whatever in the corporation, Avegon, Inc., as of any of the material dates when said corporation was granted its tax
exemption privileges in the Department of Finance and other requests by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank;
and 3) that 'Article 216 of the Penal Code does not apply to a department head, such as petitioner, by virtue of
Article VII, Sec. 11 paragraph 2 of the Constitution.

On July 9, 1959, appellant Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., fiscal for the City of Manila, filed an opposition to the
motion to quash

On July 17, 1959 appellant Judge issued an order denying the motion to quash

Appellee filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, which motion was denied by appellant Judge in an order of
August 1, 1959.

On August 12, 1959, appellee filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition and/or mandamus, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In support of tins petition for mandamus, it is alleged that
respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the two
orders complained of and in not having quashed the information on the ground that the provisions of Article 216 of
the Revised Penal Code do not apply and were rendered inoperative as to a department head, such a petitioner, by
virtue of Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Philippine Constitution.

On January 23, 1960, the Court of Appeals rendered, a decision issuing the writ of prohibition prayed for, annulling
the orders complained of and directing respondents to desist from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 47152 of
respondent Court on the ground that Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code had been rendered inoperative by Article
VII, Section 11, paragraph 2 of the Philippine Constitution as regard heads of departments, and chiefs of bureaus or
offices and their assistants.

Disagreeing with the above ruling of the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners have elevated the same to this Court
contending that the Court of Appeals erred

Issue:

In annulling the orders complained of and issuing a writ of prohibition when appeal in due time from said
orders was the obvious and only remedy available to herein appellee?
Held:

We cannot concur with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals regarding the conduct of the herein
respondent judge. A cursory reading of the Order complained of shows how, on the contrary, he had cautioned
himself against acting arbitrarily, despotically or whimsically. The same Order precisely reflects a deep sense of
justice and mature exercise of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge when it recognized that the motion to
quash filed by the defendant "raises fundamental questions which, * * * * cannot be decided properly, intelligently
and adequately without presentation of evidence."
Furthermore, there is no exigency in this instant proceeding which would justify a disregard for the time-
honored rule that prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress
(III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 174). For this particular case, We hold the view that the observation
of the City Fiscal that "the obvious and only remedy available to the appellee is appeal in due time from the decision
that the appellant Court might render in the case" is valid and well taken. And, as the herein respondent has another
and complete remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise. We need proceed no further to justify the lifting of the
writ issued by the Court of Appeals.
10. People v Manlapas, L-17993

A complaint charging ProtacioManlapas and HeracleoInopia with the crime of attempted rape with robbery
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Baleno, Masbate. Having pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived their
right to the preliminary investigation, on motion of the accused, the court forward the record of the case to the court
of first instance. 

On May 9, 1956, on motion of the fiscal praying that the case be returned to the court of origin for further
proceeding on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the offended woman but by her husband, the record
was returned as prayed for.

A new complaint for attempted rape with robbery was subscribed by the offended woman, after which the
record was again forwarded to the court of first instance, whereon June 29, 1956, the fiscal filed the corresponding
information. it appears that the accused waived their right to be informed of the nature of the information at the same
time entering a plea of not guilty to the charge. It also appears that defense counsel raised the question of the court's
jurisdiction and asked for a five-day period to present a motion to quash, but before this could be done, the court, on
July 16, 1956, upon finding that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace on the
amended complaint, motuproprio, dismissed the case "without prejudice to the refiling of the same in the proper
court."

On July 17, 1957 another complaint subscribed by the same offended party charging the two accused with
the same offense was filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Baleno, Masbate. And having waived their right
to the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace court transmitted the case to the court of
first instance where, on November 29, 1957, the fiscal filed the corresponding information. On July 7, 1958, counsel
for the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. This was opposed by the fiscal and, acting
on both the motion and the opposition, the court a quo granted the motion and dismissed the information on the
ground of double jeopardy. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

WON the court a quo committed a miscarriage of justice in quashing the information on the Ground of Double
Jeopardy?

Held:

There is merit in the appeal. The thing that strikes our attention right from the start is the unwarranted
attitude of the court a quo in dismissing the case motu proprio based on the wrong premise that the amended
complaint was given due course by the justice of the peace court without first conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation, albeit "without prejudice to the refiling of the same in the proper court." And then, after the case was
refiled as suggested, the same court, without hesitation, grant the motion of defense counsel to quash on the ground
double jeopardy. This stand is not only erroneous but unwarranted. Erroneous because the court had no justification
whatever in dismissing the case on the simple ground that it was given due course without the inferior court first
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation since this right, being waivable, does not argue again the validity
of the proceeding, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation may
be conducted. And it is unwarranted because after expressly providing that the dismissal without prejudice to the
refiling of the same in the proper court, the court a quo adopted an inconsistent attitude when it dismissed the new
information on the ground double jeopardy. It is an action such as this that gives rise to a miscarriage of justice. The
court a quo should admonished to be more careful in the performance of its official duties so that mistakes such as
this may be avoid in the future.
 Of course, there being a valid information before competent court, and after the accused had pleaded not
guilty, the dismissal of the original information may have the effect of barring further prosecution for the same
offense, in the light of Section 9, Rule 113, of our Rules Court. But here the dismissal was qualified; it was made
without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out of the
purview of the rule regarding double jeopardy.1äwphï1.ñët

Thus, in Jaca v. Blanco, 47 O.G., Supp. 12, p. 108 we held that the dismissal contemplated in the above-mentioned
section of the rule is a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal without
prejudice as in the present case. "In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, we find no reason why the
court may not, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it
before the order becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense." And this ruling was
reiterated in the recent case of People v. Jabajab, G.R. Nos. L-9238-39, November 13, 1956.1

The court a quo, therefore, erred in dismissing the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No costs.
11. Cabral v Puno, L-41692

Facts:

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on
September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of
a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of the
crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original certificate of title was cancelled
and a new transfer certificate of title issued, and since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed
said property and exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts are apparently admitted in the letter of San
Diego's lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953.

After hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the
Information on the ground of prescription. rivate prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion
to quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by
petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in
April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the
criminal Information

Respondent Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975, and reinstated the Information.

petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which
became final immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment";
and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of
the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the second motion for reconsideration, hence this petition.

Issue:

whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

Held:

The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case, and he recommends giving due course to the
petition and the reversal of the challenged order. According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of March 25,
1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of
falsification, including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already become
final and executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom within the.
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy thereof on March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal
moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of
dismissal, the same had already long been final.

We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised
Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego had actual if not
constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26,
1948.

In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9) months
thereafter, this Court held that the order was null and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had already
become final and executory.

Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga setting aside
its order of September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against petitioners nine months thereafter, or
on June 11, 1957. The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter that order. While
the court may find it necessary to hear the views of a private prosecutor before acting on a motion
to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow that it can set aside its order dismissing the case
even if the same has already become final. There is no law which requires notice to a private
prosecutor, because under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted "under the direction and
control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule 106). It appearing that the order already final, the court acted
without jurisdiction in in issuing the the subsequent order.

And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under the circumstances, the sentence having become final, no court, not even
this high Tribunal, can modify it even if erroneous ...". We hold that these rulings are applicable to the case at bar.

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for
reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for
appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The
prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and
only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. 6

The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized under the old Code of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 4 of Rule 110 which provides that the prosecution shall be "under the direction and
control of the fiscal" without the limitation imposed by section 107 of General Order No. 58
subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the right "of the person injured to appeal from any
decision of the court denying him a legal right", said right to appeal by an offended party from an
order of dismissal is no longer recognized in the offended party. ... (U)nder the new Rules of
Court, the fiscal has the direction and control of the prosecution, without being subject to the right
of intervention on the part of the offended party to appeal from an order dismising a criminal case
upon petition of the fiscal would be tantamount to giving said party as much right the direction
and control of a criminal proceeding as that of fiscal. 7

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on
September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that
San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio
Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of
the same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of dismissal was
issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party
against the same defendant, the offended party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and
consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said order. 8

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September 3, 1975,
of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No pronouncement as to costs.
12. People v Gomez, L-32815

On a motion to quash 1 filed in Criminal Case No. 18204 of the of First Instance of Rizal Hon. Amador
Gomez, presiding, dismissed an information for libel

The order of dismissal dated April 15, 1969, is likewise reproduced in full as follows:

What is now before the for resolution is the motion to quash filed by the accused through counsel dated December
18, 1968. No opposition thereto has been interposed by the prosecution despite the fact that the office of the Fiscal
was furnished a copy thereof as early as December 19, 1968, and despite the further fact that this court in its order,
dated February 10, 1969, gave the prosecution a period of three (3) days within which to submit a written opposition
if it so desires.

Not only because the motion to quash at bar is not opposed by the prosecution, but also because the finds the same
to be well founded and meritorious, that this chooses to grant, as it hereby grants the aforesaid motion to quash.

WHEREFORE, and finding the motion at bar to be in order, the hereby orders the quashal of the information at bar
charging costs de oficio. The bail bond executed for the provisional liberty of the accused is declared cancelled and
without further force and effect.

The order of dismissal failed to discuss which of the grounds set forth in the motion to quash said motion was being
sustained, and the reasons in support of the action of the court, or whether both grounds are found "well founded and
meritorious" as may wen be what the court a quo meant with the sweeping statement it made in reaching its
unreasoned conclusion. Hence, in its appeal to this from the order of dismissed filed on August 29, 1969, on the
same day of its receipt by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (p. 38, Original Record of the Case), the Government
contends that neither of the two grounds adverted to is really "well founded and meritorious."

Respondent Aceveda intimates that the respondent court had properly dismissed the case for libel on
ground of lack of interest on the part of the prosecution, asserting that it is within the prerogative of the court to
dismiss a case for non-suit, citing Section 3 of Rule 17 of the New Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent court had properly dismissed the case for libel on ground of lack of interest on the part
of the prosecution.

Held:

We fail to see in the order of dismissal any intent on the part of the court of making the lack of opposition filed by
the prosecution to the motion to quash as a ground for its dismissing the case, as constituting lack of interest, just
because notwithstanding the order of the court for the prosecution to submit its opposition to the motion to quash
within three days from notice, no such opposition was filed. The records show that on the same day, August 29,
1969, a copy of the order of dismissal was received, a notice of appeal was prepared and filed September 8,
1969. 6 This is by no means indicative of lack of interest. 7 The respondent court merely mentioned the lack of
opposition as possibly showing by itself some merit of the motion to quash, aside from its own analysis of the
grounds for said motion, which induced the court to conclude that the motion to quash is "well founded and
meritorious", although it gave no reason for its conclusion. And as so worded, the order is not quite in conformity
with, if not in violation of, the requirement of the Constitution and Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Court, considering that the dismissal of the information would finally terminate the case. An appeal may then be
taken from the order of dismissal and there is need for the appellate Court to be apprised of the reasons, in law and
jurisprudence, deemed by the court to justify the dismissal of the case on a mere motion to quash. Legally defective
both in form and substance, the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 18204 of the of First Instance of Rizal may not,
therefore, be sustained or upheld.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, and let the case be returned to the of origin for proper further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

13. PEOPLE v. CASIANO (FEBRUARY 16, 1961)

G.R. No. L-15309

CONCEPCION, J.

FACTS:

 Ricardo Macapagal filed, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Rosales, Pangasinan, a complaint, which
was amended later on, charging Rosalina Casiano with "estafa".
 After conducting the first stage of the preliminary investigation and finding the existence of probable cause,
said court issued a warrant of arrest, whereupon defendant posted a bail bond for her temporary release.
 When the case was called for preliminary investigation, defendant waived her right thereto, and,
accordingly, the record was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
 The provincial fiscal filed therein an information for "illegal possession and use of a false treasury or
bank notes"
 Defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
 Counsel was granted permission to submit a "motion to dismiss", on the ground that there had been no
preliminary investigation of the charge of illegal possession and use of a false bank note, and that the
absence of such preliminary investigation affected the jurisdiction of the court.
 The motion was granted and, a reconsideration of the order to this effect having been denied, the
prosecution interposed the present appeal.
 Defendant-appellee maintains, and the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan held, that the waiver made by
the defendant in the justice of the peace court did not deprive her of the right to a preliminary
investigation of the crime of illegal possession and use of a false bank note, for this offense does not
include, and is not included in, that of "estafa", to which her aforementioned waiver referred.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendant is entitled to a preliminary investigation of the crime of illegal possession and use of a false
bank note as charged in the information herein. (NO)

RULING:

Regardless of whether or not the crime of "estafa" includes or is included in that of illegal possession or use of a
false bank note or other obligation payable to bearer, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan erred in holding that
the allegations of the information filed in this case were not included in those of the aforementioned amended
complaint and that defendant-appellee was entitled to another preliminary investigation of the charge contained in
the information. It erred, also, in dismissing the case for, even if defendant had a right to such other preliminary
investigation, the same was deemed waived upon her failure to invoke it prior to or, at least, at the time of the
entry of her plea in the court of first instance.

Independently of the foregoing, the absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the information
or otherwise rendered it defective.Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the court of first instance over the
present case. Hence, had defendant-appellee been entitled to another preliminary investigation, and had his plea of
not guilty upon arraignment not implied a waiver of said right, the court of first instance should have, either
conducted such preliminary investigation, or ordered the Provincial Fiscal to make it or remanded the record for said
investigation to the justice of the peace court, instead of dismissing the case, as it did in the order appealed from.
14. G.R. No. L-54110 February 20, 1981

GENEROSO ESMEÑA and ALBERTO ALBA, petitioners, 

vs.
JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY, City Court of Cebu City, Branch III, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
RICARDO B. TABANAO, as Special Counsel, Office of the City Fiscal, Cebu City, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioners herein were charged with Grave Coercion for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas to
withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest
lost it in a game of cards.

Almost a year has passed however but the trial still has not begun due fault of both the parties. Until the judge set a
final schedule of hearing but complainant still failed to appear. The case was subsequently dismissed on the ground
that the right to speedy trial was violated.

Twenty-seven days later, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical
certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza. In response to which Esmeña
and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy

Issue:

Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to
appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy.

Held: AFFIRMATIVE. In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional
dismissal of the grave coercion case. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for
the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of
the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but
for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the
court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the
court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant"

The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since
the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.

For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites:

First - There is a valid complaint or information filed

Second - That it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction

Third - That the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information

In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of
competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to
the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged.

15. PEOPLE v. MANLAPAS ET AL.

(G.R. NO. L-17993, AUGUST 24, 1962, BAUTISTA ANGELO J.)

DOCTRINE:Of course, there being a valid information before a competent court, and after the accused had pleaded
not guilty, the dismissal of the original information may have the effect of barring further prosecution for the same
offense, in the light of Section 9, Rule 113, of our Rules of Court. But here the dismissal was qualified; it was
made without prejudice to the refilling of the case in the proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out
of the purview of the rule regarding double jeopardy. Thus, in Jaca vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, p. 108,
we held that the dismissal contemplated in the abovementioned section of the rule is a definite or unconditional
dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal without prejudice as in the present case.

After the complaint was amended by having it subscribed by the proper offended party, without conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace court forwarded the record to the court of first instance
where the fiscal filed the corresponding information as required by law, and that, upon finding that no such
investigation has been made on the amended complaint, the court a quo, motu proprio, dismissed the case "without
prejudice to the refilling of the same in the proper court." But after the case was refilled, on motion of defense
counsel, the court a quo dismissed the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The government now comes
before us complaining that the court a quo committed a miscarriage of justice in quashing the information on the
aforesaid ground. SC held that the dismissal does not have the effect of barring further prosecution of the accused on
the ground of double jeopardy. It is because the dismissal was qualified; it was made without prejudice to the
refilling of the case in the proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out of the purview of the rule regarding
double jeopardy.

FACTS:

 Bernardino Albuera, husband of ProserfinaBuelo, subscribed to a complaint charging ProtacioManlapas

and HeracleoInopia with the crime of attempted rape with robbery before the Justice of the Peace Court
of Baleno, Masbate.
 Having pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived their right to the preliminary investigation, on motion
of the accused, the court forwarded the record of the case to the court of first instance.
 On motion of the fiscal praying that the case be returned to the court of origin for further proceedings on
the ground that the complaint was not signed by the offended woman but by her husband , the record
was returned as prayed for.
 A new complaint for attempted rape with robbery was subscribed by the offended woman, after which the
record was again forwarded to the court of first instance
 It appears that the accused waived their right to be informed of the nature of the information at the same
time entering a plea of not guilty to the charge. It also appears that defense counsel raised the question of
the court's jurisdiction and asked for a five-day period to present a motion to quash, but before this
could be done, the court, upon finding that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice
 of the peace on the amended complaint, motupropriodismissed the case"without prejudice to the
refilling of the same in the proper court."
 Another complaint subscribed by the same offended party charging the two accused with the same offense
was filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Baleno, Masbate.
 And having waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace
court transmitted the case to the court of first instance where the fiscal filed the corresponding information.
 Counsel for the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. This was opposed by
the fiscal and, acting on both the motion and the opposition, the court a quo granted the motion and
dismissed the information on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether the does the dismissal have the effect of barring further prosecution of the accused on the ground of double
jeopardy. (NO)

RULING:

The thing that strikes our attention right from the start is the unwarranted attitude of the court a quo in dismissing
the case motuproprio based on the wrong premise that the amended complaint was given due course by the justice of
the peace court without first conducting the requisite preliminary investigation, albeit "without prejudice to the
refilling of the same in the proper court."

And then, after the case was refilled as suggested, the same court, without hesitation, granted the motion of defense
counsel to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. This stand is not only erroneous but unwarranted. Erroneous
because the court had no justification whatever in dismissing the case on the simple ground that it was given
due course without the inferior court first conducting the requisite preliminary investigation, since this right,
being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceeding,the most that could have been done
being to remand the case in order that such investigation may be conducted. And it is unwarranted because
after expressly providing that the dismissal was without prejudice to the refilling of the same in the proper
court, the court a quo adopted an inconsistent attitude when it dismissed the new information on the ground
of double jeopardy. It is action such as this that gives rise to a miscarriage of justice. The court a quo should be
admonished to be more careful in the performance of its official duties so that mistakes such as this may be avoided
in the future.

Of course, there being a valid information before a competent court, and after the accused had pleaded not guilty,
the dismissal of the original information may have the effect of barring further prosecution for the same offense, in
the light of Section 9, Rule 113, of our Rules of Court. But here the dismissal was qualified; it was made without
prejudice to the refilling of the case in the proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out of the
purview of the rule regarding double jeopardy.

Thus, in Jaca vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, p. 108, we held that the dismissal contemplated in the
abovementioned section of the rule is a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a
dismissal without prejudice as in the present case.

The court a quo therefore, erred in dismissing the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
16. Galman vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 72670
September 12, 1986
Teehankee, C.J.

FACTS: President Marcos created a Fact- Finding Board to investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The
minority and majority reports of the Board both agreed that Rolando Galman was not the assassin but was merely a
fall guy of the military, which plotted the assassination itself. Marcos rejected the reports of the Board and stuck to
his claim that it was Galman who killed Aquino. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan acquitted the
respondents of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.
Petitioners claim that respondent courts committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and
void ab initio.

RULING: YES.The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacañang Palace. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of
the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of
individual cases. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the
secret Malacañang conference completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified.The Court
is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined
judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
17. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MONICO O, CERVERA,

defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-26395. November 21, 1969. (CONCEPCION, C.J.)

Facts:

On September 29, 1962, Ambrosio Elequin filed, with the Municipal Court of Sibalom,

Antique, two criminal complaints against Monico O. Cervera. In the first complaint, Cervera was

charged with grave oral defamation, later changed to slight defamation. In the second complaint, Cervera was
charged with grave threats.

On April 15, 1963, the defendant filed a motion to quash the complaint for grave threats,

upon the ground: (1) that the charge therein should have been for light threats, the acts imputed to him having been
allegedly committed in the heat of anger; and (2) that he would be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. However, the motion was denied.

The two cases were jointly tried an the court rendered judgment in the two cases,

acquitting the defendant for slight oral defamation, but finding him guilty of light threats. The

defendant appealed from the judgment and contended that his acquittal under the first complaint was a bar to his
prosecution for light threats, both the oral defamation and the light threats having been allegedly committed on one
and the same occasion.

Issue: Whether or not acquittal under the first complaint charging oral defamation is a bar for the prosecution of the
second complaint charging light threat.

Ruling:

No. Offense of oral defamation is not necessarily included in that of light threats. Where

The complaint for oral defamation, when considered in its entirety, strongly suggests the intention of asserting that
the acts therein set forth were performed for no other purpose than to insult the complainant, the crime of light threat
is not necessarily included in the charge contained in said complaint.

Therefore, acquittal under the first complaint charging oral defamation does not bar

prosecution for the second complaint charging light threat.

18. People of the Philippines vs. Liwanag 73 SCRA 473

Facts: For violation of the provisions of RA 1700, silvestreliwanag was charged in an information filed before the
court of first Instance of Bataan, for having unlawfully and wilfully continued and remained as officer and/or
ranking leader of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the HukbongMapagpalaya
ng Bayan, until his apprehension on June 21, 1960, without having renounced his aforementioned leadership and/or
membership therein within the period prescribed by law, and, while remaining as such leader or high-ranking
member, has taken up arms against the Government by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks
against civilians, Philippine Constabulary, and local police forces. The trial court rendered the decision finding the
accused guilty.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Liwanag was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him.

2. Whether or not the “two-witness” rule on the same overt act has not been observed and complied with in
convicting him.

3. Whether or not Liwanag had been charged with rebellion and subversion based upon the same overt act.

Held: 1. The testimony sought to be made part are testimonies of witnesses taken down by question and answer
during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses
to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the
defendant to further crossexamine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduce and, pursuant to said
order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant

2. Appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the
"HukbongMapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB, is borne out by the testimony of Santos Miguel, Melencio Guevara,
Pablo Guintu, and Lazaro Esteban, former associates of the appellant in the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the HMB.

3. The accused is prosecuted under Republic Act No. 1700 for having remained a high ranking member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without
having renounced his membership in said organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive
association, has taken up arms against the Government.
19. People of the Philippines vs. Vicente Vañas (G.R. No. 225511  March 20, 2019)

FACTS:

Vicente was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. The Information read as follows:

“That on June 15, 2009, at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning, xx x Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is an adult, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and, taking advantage of the tender age of BBB, a 16 year-old child, commit the act of
sexual intercourse with the child, which act debases and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as
a human being and prejudicial to her development. The act of the commission of child abuse is attended by the
qualifying/aggravating circumstances of minority of herein victim and relationship, herein accused being the live-in
partner of the mother of the victim.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.”

When arraigned, Vicente pleaded “not guilty”.

ISSUE:

Whether the allegations in the Information are sufficient to constitute the offense.

RULING:

The Information shows the insufficiency of the allegations as to constitute the offense of violation of Section 5 of
RA 7610.

Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discriminatory Act, provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) xxxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
Xxx”

The elements of this offense are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the
said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

An examination of the Information shows the insufficiency of the allegations therein as to constitute the offense of
violation of Section 5 of RA 7610 as it does not contain all the elements that constitute the same. To be more
precise, there was a complete and utter failure to allege in the Information that the sexual intercourse was
“performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse”. “A child is deemed exploited
or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for
money, profit, or any other consideration, or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.”

To be sure, the exact phrase “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse” need not be mentioned in the
Information. Moreover, “the use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.”  However, this established legal precept is not satisfied in this case since the Information
failed to describe in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the Vicente, with reasonable certainty, the
offense charged. The Information did not contain words of similar or identical meaning to describe the offense
allegedly violated.

Thus, Vicente cannot be convicted for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 since not all the elements of this offense
were clearly alleged in the Information. To convict him of an offense not properly alleged in the Information would
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. An Information
that “does not contain all the elements constituting the crime charged cannot serve as a means by which said
constitutional requirement is satisfied.
20. Juan Ponce Enrile v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet
Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.

The Information reads:

xxxx

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named
accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of
Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE
ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts, as follows:

by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES
gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be
ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships, connections,
and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for
deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).

The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.

ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague or indefinite resulting in the serious
violation of Enrile’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him?

HELD: 
NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash,
but a motion for a bill of particulars.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable
the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the
elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may
supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court
should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on
the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the
type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules
designated to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged
carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal
acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of time. Notably, conviction for
plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a
person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized in the due process clause – is
at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.

While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an
accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed
particularly from the prism of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information
did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance.
In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking
in details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of
form. Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of
the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to
be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of
conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.That every
element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting
for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is
precisely the function of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating
the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him
to properly plead and prepare for trial.

We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought that we herein
rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the following:

The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the
Information.

A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.

A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.

The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from
the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions
from the identified projects were received.
The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”

The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each
government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a particular.

All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.

21. NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SP02 ALFREDO CARANDANG y
PRESCILLA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177000

JUNE 19, 2017

FACTS:

In the morning of June 4, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, SP02 Estelito Andaya, P02 Carandang
and SPO1 Garcia set off for Sitio MahabangBuhangin in Tanauan, Batangas to conduct their routine as peace
officers of the area on board a patrol car driven by SPO1 Garcia. While they were in Barangay Gonzales waiting for
a boat that would bring them to Sitio MahabangBuhangin, they heard successive gunshots apparently coming from
Barangay Boot. P/C Insp. Camacho then decided to proceed to Barangay Boot to check and to apprehend those who
were illegally discharging their firearms. At around 2:45 p.m., P/C Insp. Camacho instructed SP02 Andaya and P02
Carandang to join the religious procession to monitor those who will indiscriminately fire guns. As they were
moving on with the procession, they heard successive gunshots, which they determined to have emanated from the
backyard of SilveriaGuelos. They went back to the house of the Barangay Captain to report to P/C Insp. Camacho
what they found out. Acting upon their report, P/C Insp. Camacho decided to go with them to the place of Silveria.
In going to the house, they rode a passenger jeepney in order to conceal their purpose. SPOl Garcia drove their
patrol car and followed them. Upon reaching the place of Silveria who let them in, P/C Insp. Camacho, P02
Carandang and SP02 Andaya then proceeded to the back of the house where they saw around 15 persons drinking
liquor. They also noticed empty shells of armalite rifle scattered on the ground. P/C Insp. Camacho then introduced
himself as the Chief of Tanauan Police Station and told the group that he and his men were verifying who fired the
shots. Someone from the group of drinking men asked him: "Who are you going to pick-up here?" Before P/C Insp.
Camacho was able to respond to the taunting question, P02 Carandang pointed to him the "empty shells" near the
comfort room located at the right side from where the group was drinking. Consequently, P/C Insp. Camacho
instructed him to collect the scattered empty shells. When P02 Carandang was about to follow P/C Insp. Camacho's
orders, the former noticed a person, whom he identified as Nestor, wearing a white sando and blue walking shorts
stood up. While P02 Carandang was collecting the empty shells, somebody hit him on his nape which caused him to
drop his armalite. When he tried to retrieve his firearm, someone hit his hand. As he was trying to stand up, he saw
Alfredo tightly holding P/C Insp. Camacho from behind while Rodrigo grabbed the former's baby armalite. As soon
as P02 Carandang was able to stand up, he was hit by Nestor on his left jaw, even as he received a blow to his left
eye. Thereafter, as P/C Insp. Camacho was in a helpless and defenseless position, he was shot by Nestor causing him
to fall to the ground and later die. While P02 Carandang was retreating, he saw SP02 Andaya being tightly held by
the neck by Gil. He then saw Nestor shoot at SP02 Andaya, who then fell to the ground and died. P02 Carandang
retreated and started to run but Nestor went after him and shot at him. It was at this juncture when SPO1 Garcia
arrived at the scene and returned fire at Nestor, hitting the latter with three out of six shots.
In Criminal Case No. P-204, the RTC finds accused NESTOR and GIL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct
Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249,
in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing SP02 Andaya, and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer the
penalty of eleven (11) years of prisioncorreccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, and a fine of One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00). The accused are directed to pay
the heirs of victim SP02 Andaya an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the
amount of One Million Pesos (Phpl,000,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. P-205, the RTC finds accused NESTOR, RODRIGO and ALFREDO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing P/C Insp. Camacho, and hereby
sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven ( 11) years of prisioncorreccional maximum, as
minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, and to pay a fine of One
Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00) each. The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim P/C Insp. Camacho an
indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the amount of One Million Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Phpl,600,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).

The petitioners appealed to the CA. On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in relying on the unsubstantiated testimony of the alleged eyewitness P02
Carandang and holding the petitioners guilty of the crime charged.

B. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of the lower court notwithstanding the glaring
insufficiency of evidence to warrant the conviction of the petitioners.

C. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that there is conspiracy between the petitioners despite failure of
the prosecution to prove the same.

HELD:

It is clear that the petitioners basically raise only questions of fact. Nonetheless, the Court gave due course to the
instant petition due to the following reasons:

Firstly, pursuant to the settled rule that in a criminal case an appeal throws the whole case open for review, the
Court, however, finds that this case actually presents a question of law; specifically, on whether or not the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
properly observed.

Secondly, the petitioners, in the Reply, invite the Court's attention to the subsequent testimony of P02 Carandang in
the latter case filed against Nestor. The petitioners assert that said testimony should be considered as new and
material evidence which thereby makes the findings of the trial court in the instant case as manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible. Thus, the petitioners moved for a new trial on the ground of alleged newly discovered
evidence without, however, necessarily withdrawing their petition. At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial
is denied. Clearly, the Rules of Court proscribed the availment of the remedy of new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence at this stage of appeal.

In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently established the foregoing allegations including the fact
that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority, as the latter introduced
themselves to be members of the PNP. Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know
that the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the Informations that such
fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective.

In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under paragraph 3 of Article
14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank to justify the imposition of an increased penalty against the petitioners. As the Court held in People v. Rodi.
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing,
told him that he was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide
with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact
that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority.
The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in
the performance of his official duties." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential
averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be
expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required
knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance.

Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be
considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of/or with insult to public authorities" (Par. 2, Art. XIV of the
RPC, or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank," Par. 3, Art. XIV,
RPC).

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly mandates that qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language in the complaint or information. When the law or rules specify
certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a greater penalty than that
ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the
increased penalty. Due to such requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in
favor of even those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).

In People v. Flores, Jr., as reiterated in the more recent cases of People v. Pangilinan and People v. Dadulla, the
Court ruled that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information
filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of
the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information. In other words, the complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the
accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Under Section 9
of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the
insufficiency or defect in the information would not amount to a waiver of any objection based on said ground or
irregularity.

Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal procedure reads:

Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. - The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based in the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

Indeed, the foregoing provision provides that if an accused fails to assert all the grounds available to him under
Section 3 of Rule 117 in his motion to quash, or if he, altogether, fails to file a motion a quash – any objection based
on the ground or grounds he failed to raise through a motion to quash shall be deemed waived, except the following,
thus:

SEC. 3. Grounds.

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead of the complex crime of Direct
Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide due to the simple reason that the Informations do not
sufficiently charge the latter. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble
of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information ... it is not the technical name
given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts
alleged in the body of the Information.

22. Lim v People, GR No. 226590

FACTS: The petitioners were charged with falsification of a public document. They are siblings whom are officers
of Pentel Merchandising Co., (Pentel), established by their father Quintin C. Lim. Quintin died on September 6,
1996. One of the stockholders of Pentel, Lucy Lim, alleged that the petitioners falsified the Secretary’s Certificate
dated February 29, 2000. This Board Resolution authorized Jimmy Lim, one of the petitioners, to dispose the parcel
of land covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) registered under Pentel’s name. Jimmy was able to enter
into a Deed of Absolute Sale on March 21, 2000, conveying the subject properties to Spouses Lee. According to
Lucy, the Secretary’s Certificate, dated February 29, 2000, bearing the sais board resolution, was falsified because it
was made to appear that Quintin signed it, despite having already died on September 16, 1996 -- or more than three
years from the time of its execution. They were found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
However, for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that despite finding their guilt, the
crime with which they were charged already prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal liability of the petitioners has already been extinguished by prescription (YES)

RULING: As a general rule, an action for the quashal of the information on the ground that the criminal liability has
already been extinguished must be made before an accuse enter his plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived. However,
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure carves out an exception, which includes prescription of the
crime. Even prior to the promulgation of the present Rules, the Court in People v. Castro, ruled that the accused may
raise the prescription of the crime at any stage of the proceeding: As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State
of the right to prosecuteand punish the same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or
waived such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally
dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and effective even if the court taking
cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the
resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and this is the mere so since in such a case, there is not yet
any final and irrevocable judgment. The crime was fully consummated through the execution of the Secretary’s
Certificate, dated February 29, 2000, whcih certified under oath that such meeting happened, with the participation
of Quintin, and that the Board Resolution was passed with his approval. Since the Secretary’s Certificate is
notarized, it is considered a public document. As this involves the crime of falsification of a public document, the
imposable penalty under the RPC is prisioncorreccional, falling within the purview of correctional penalty, which
prescribes in ten (10) years. Article 90 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription commences from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. But if the offense is
falsification of a public document, the period for prescription commences on the date of registration of the forged or
falsified document. Since the registration of the documentary requirements for transfer of title, including the
falsified Secretary’s Certificate, was made on March 29, 2000, this is the proper reckoning point from which the
prescription of the crime began to run. From this date, there was a constructive notice of falsification to the entire
world, including Lucy. It is well-settled that the filing of the complaint the fiscal’s office interrupts the prescriptive
period. Unfortunately, the records of this case do not show the date when Lucy’s Afficavit of Complaint was filed.
The Court notes, however, that it was executed on September 21, 2000. Considering that the complaint could not
have been filed earlier than its date of execution, prescription already set in by March 29, 2010, or approximately
five months before the execution of the complaint on September 21, 2010. Their criminal liability was already
extinguished.

23. MAYOR AMADO CORPUS, petitioner vs. PAMULAR, defendant. G.R. No. 186403. September 5, 2018.

FACTS: Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Carlito Samonte (Samonte) at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After
the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the
killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), wife of the deceased, filed a complaint-
affidavit before First Assistant Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses were also
filed, one of which was that of witness Alexander Lozano (Lozano) stating that Mayor Amado Corpus (Corpus) was
the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito RTC dismissed Priscilla’s complaint and the attached affidavits of
witness. Priscilla filed a motion for reconsideration. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the Information/Resolution,
and also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct the review. Bonifacio was
not able to comply with the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to
surrender the records of the case. Florendo took over the the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented
by the parties. Florendo then found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the filing of
an AMENDED INFORMATION before the RTC, now alleging conspiracy between Corpus and Samonte in
committing the crime of murder. Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent
Manifestation/Opposition. Judge Ramon Pamular of the RTC of Nueva Ecija issued an Order (assailed order)
granting the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached amended information, and also directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus. Corpus and Samonte then filed directly to the Court a Petition for
Certiorai with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a TRO. Priscilla prayed that such TRO be lifted. a) Petitioner’s
Arguments (Corpus &Samonte – Lost) Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended
information, Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new defense particularly on any acts of his co-
accused since the “act of one is the act of all.” They cited Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which prohibits substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after
his or her arraignment. Petitioners claim that lifting the TRO would be a relief “too harsh and preposterous” since
Corpus would be immediately imprisoned and constrained to face trial due to a flawed amended information – he
would not be able to discharge his constitutional mandate/duty to his constituents as their duly elected mayor.
Petitioners claim that respondent Judge should have suspended the action on the issuance of a warrant considering
that pendency of their Petition for Review before the DOJ. b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Pamular- Won) Pamular
asserts that he made a careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His independent judgement on
the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence.
There was a reasonable ground to believe in the existence of probable cause for…the immediate apprehension and
prosecution of Mayor Corpus. OSG also adds that the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating
together’ in the amended information will not affect Samonte’s substantial rights because conspiracy is not an
essential or qualifying element of the crime of murder. The amended information merely added Corpus as a co-
conspirator. Before respondent Judge issued the assailed order, a prior hearing was held.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information which proscribes substantial amendment or
information prejudicial to the right of the accused.
Whether or not respondent Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he conducted further proceedings on the Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant
of arrest against Corpus.

RULING: (of the Supreme Court) The petition for certiorari is partially granted. The case was remanded to the RTC
for its preliminary examination of probable cause and thereafter proceed to the arraignment of petition Amado
Corpus. Rule: Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Prcedure provides: Section 14: Amendment or
substitution. –- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Any amendment
to an information which only states with precision something which has already been included in the original
information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only a formal amendment that
can be made any time. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. The following are mere formal amendments: (1) New
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2)
An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) An amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused.
 RULE 117

Motion to Quash

Section 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information. (1)

Section 2. Form and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and
shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (2a)

Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the
court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to
make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the
accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no
new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for
good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge. (5a)

Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. — An order sustaining
the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the
grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this Rule. (6a)

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered
in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be
credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. (7a)

Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n)

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (8)

SECTION 1 (F) RULE 116 Arraignment and Plea - Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —

(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining,
determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to
appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)