Macalintal vs COMELEC

This petition seeks to assail the constitutionality of the R.A. No. 9189, or the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act.

Whether Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of the Consti? –NO

Petitioner argues that Section 5(d)(See Note 1) allows non residents of the Phils. to vote. This
supposedly runs counter to the requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Consti (See Note 2) that a
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. The Court does not think that there is a
violation.

The Constitution must be read as a whole. We must also take into consideration the next Section , Art 2
of the Consti (See Note 3). The section provides that the Congress shall provide”… a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad”. It would be ridiculous if we were to understand Sec 1 as to prevent
those who physically reside in the Phils. from voting, as this would directly contravene the next
preceding Article (Art 2) as one cannot physically reside in the Philippines and be abroad at the same
time. Instead, the Court finds that the residency requirement in Art 1 should mean “domicile”. For as
long as one has the intention to return to the Phils., he resides in the Phils. Additionally, the court finds
that from the records of ConCom, the incorporators meant Sec 2 to be an exception to Sec 1.

Whether Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution? –YES

Section 18.5 provides that the Commission (COMELEC) is empowered to order the proclamation of
winning candidates. This indeed violates paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution which
gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and
vice president. While Section 18.5 does not directly mention the votes of the Pres and VP the phrase,
proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-
presidency.

Whether ections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution? –
YES

Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 creates the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), which
is a purely legislative body. Such body is given the power to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. This power intrudes upon the
independence of the COMELEC which should be respected as per Section 1, Article IX-A which mandates
the independence of constitutional commissions. Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress
relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but
certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC

Notes

1.) Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an
 affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
2.) SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage.
3.) SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as
well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

Nicolas-Lewis vs Comelec

Petitioners were dual citizens who reobtained Philippine citizenship through RA 9225. Under Sec 5 of RA
9225, they may exercise voting rights as long as they meet the requirements under the Consti and
Republic Act No. 9189 or the Overseas Voting Law. Comelec, however, did not allow them to register as
voters as it was the opinion of Comelec that duals,’ upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and
acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their
legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e.,
Filipino) then, ‘duals’ must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their
domicile (basically duals lost their citizenship, and thus starts from zero with regards to the 1 year
residency requirement when they reacquire Filipino citizenship).

Whether petitioners should be allowed to register as voters? –YES

The Court believes that the exception to the residency requirement given to beneficiaries of the
Overseas Voting Act should extend to duals.

There’s no provision in the dual citizenship law requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and
physically stay in PH first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225 implicitly
acknowledged that “duals” are most likely non-residents granted with the same suffrage in RA 9189 for
absentee voter.

Yra vs Abano

Yra the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a quo warranto petition against Abano. , the
municipal president elect of Meycauayan, to the position to which elected on the ground that he is
ineligible.

Abano was native to Meycauayan who went to Manila to study. He managed to register as a voter there.
He later returned to Meycauayan after passing the bar. Abano wanted to run for office in Meycauayan
and so he tried to cancel his voter’s registration in Manila, but his request was denied or the reason that
it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Abano still won in the election.

Whether Albano is eligible to hold a municipal office? –YES

The Election Law required a candidate to be a “qualified elector” in his municipality, while the
Administrative Code requires a candidate to be a “qualified voter”. Both the Executive and Legislative
Branch interpreted the requirement to mean that one does not necessarily be a voter in his
municipality, but it is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications of a voter. By this interpretation,
Albano would be qualified to run. The Court finds that these interpretations, while not controlling on the
Judiciary, is entitled to the Court’s respectful consideration. For the orderly and harmonious
interpretation and advancement of the law, the courts should, when possible, keep step with the other
departments.

Aportadera vs Sotto

Aportaderra and Sotto were running for the office of Vice-Governor of the province of Davao. Sotto won.
Aportadera then filed a quo warranto proceeding against Sotto, alleging that he was not qualified to run
in Davao as he was not a “qualified voter” there. While he was registered in Davaoi, he failed cancel his
registration in Manila on time (the application for cancellation was filed 34 days beyond the period
prescribed by law).

Whether Sotto was qualified to run –YES

The argument of Aportadera was premised upon the theory that registration as a voter is a condition
essential to be a "qualified voter." There is no merit in this pretense, which has already been rejected in
Yra vs. Abaño. Registration is essential to the exercise the right of suffrage, not to the possession
thereof.

The fact that Sotto allegedly committed a crime (Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code) when he subscribed to a voter's affidavit stating that he was "not at present actually
registered in any other precinct, when he in fact was still registered to Manila is not a bar to his
candidacy. He is not disqualified under the Revised Election Code, Sec 99 (a) which disqualifies those
sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment, as no such judgement has
been rendered on him

Akbayan Youth vs COMELEC

Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to

conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the 27 December 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. Memorandum No. 2001-027
which proposed an additional 2 days (Feb 17 and 18 2001) for registration was denied by COMELEC,
mainly because it would contravene Section 8 of R.A. 8189 ("Voter's Registration Act of 1996.)which
provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-
election activities. Petitioners thus filed for certiorari and mandamus.

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when they voted to deny the proposal for an
additional 2 days registration? –NO
The additional 2 days would fall within the 120-day prohibitive period set by RA 8189. Such a period is
intended to avoid abuse of the election process (See Note 1). The imposition of a prohibitive period to
limit the right of suffrage is not unconstitutional. To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by
herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied
in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. The State undoubtedly, in the exercise
of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far
removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.

The Petitioners tried to argue that COMELEC actually had the power conduct registration within the 120
day period as per Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (Automated Election Act)(See Note 2) . The Court
sought to harmonize the law with RA 8189. The proper interpretation was that the COMELEC could
conduct pre-election act (like registration) disregarding the prohibitive period of RA 8189 IF pre-election
acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day. Such should be
determined by the COMELEC itself as it is the body which has the constitutional task to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

The Court also cannot grant mandamus, because COMELEC did not fail to accomplish a ministerial duty.
For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible,
possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise
of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

Notes

1.) "x x x. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of
registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom might
not even be qualified to vote, x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting elections on
the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. If
that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections, regardless of who
wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results. x x x"
2.) "SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - if it should no longer be
possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the
Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the
activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage."
3.) The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting
honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even
pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.

Velasco vs COMELEC
Velasco was a Filipino citizen who obtained US citizenship and then applied to be a dual citizen in the
Phils. He later returned to the Phils. Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga
but the Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his application. Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion
of his name in the list of voters with the MTC, and MTC granted, but the RTC reversed. Velasco then filed
his COC for the position of mayor of Sasmuan. Panlaqui (another candidate) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco's COC, claiming that he was not a voter as per the RTC ruling.
Velasco had the highest no. of votes. The COMELEC later cancelled elasco's COC and declaring his
proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and void.

Whether the cancellation of Velasco’s COC was proper –YES

Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the OEC requires that the facts stated in the COC by the would-
be candidate be true, as any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the COC's cancellation
or the withholding of due course. The false representation that these provisions mention must
necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake.

In this case, the COMELEC was right that Velasco knew that he was not a voter, yet he represented
himself to be as such in his COC.

Asistio vs Aguirre

Echiverri filed a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City
(Petition for Exclusion) on the ground that that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City. This was based
on his observation that the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor was non
-existent. The MeTC granted the petition, thus Asistio was removed as a voter there. Asistio filed an
appeal, but the Appeal was denied for failure to pay appellate docket fees . Hence this petition

Whether the lower court’s dismissal of the appeal on the ground of failure to pay docket fees was
proper? –NO

Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. as the policy of the Court is to
encourage resolution of cases on their merits over the very rigid and technical application of rules of
procedure used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice.

While it was true that Asistio technically did not pay the docket fee on the last day to appeal, he did file
postal money orders for the purpose of paying the appellate docket fees on that day, and he did pay
such fees the following day. He also had a reason as to why his appeal was filed late: Asistio was able to
get copies of the TSNs only on February 10, 2010, the last day to file his appeal, and, naturally, it would
take some time for him to review and incorporate them in his arguments on appeal. To our mind,
Asistio, by purchasing the postal money orders for the purpose of paying the appellate docket fees on
February 10, 2010, although they were tendered to the MeTC only on February

11, 2010, had already substantially complied with the procedural requirements in filing his appeal.

Whether Asistio is qualified to vote in Caloocan –YES

The right to vote is a most precious political right. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon clear and
convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom.
The fact that , Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy a non-existent or false address,
or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter,
should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in
Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC),or an action to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that
Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of
Caloocan City.

Ututalum vs COMELEC

Ututalum and Anni were candidates in the Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. Anni
won. Ututalum filed 2 petitions with the COMELEC: 1.) A petition seeking a declaration of failure of
elections and 2.) praying for the annulment of Respondent Anni's proclamation and for his own
proclamation as Congressman for the Second District of Sulu. During the pendency of the case, Loong, a
candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a petition to annul the List of Voters of Siasi. The COMELEC
granted, thus annulling the Siasi List of Voters "on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the
preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and ordering a new registration of voters for the
next local elections. Petitioner Ututalum filed a supplemental pleading with the COMELEC entreating
that such annulment be considered and applied by the Commission in resolving his two Petitions against
Respondent Anni. The COMELEC still denied the 2 petitions. Hence this petition.

Whether the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results of the
previous election since its original List of Voters had already been finally annulled –NO

To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower it to annul a previous election

because of the subsequent annulment of a questioned registry in a proceeding where petitioner himself
was not a party. This cannot be done. Besides, the List of Voters used in the 1987 Congressional
elections was then a validly existing and still unquestioned permanent Registry List. Then, it was the only
legitimate roster which could be used as basis for voting. There was no prior petition to set it aside for
having been effected with fraud, intimidation, force, or any other similar irregularity in consonance with
Section 145 of the Omnibus Election Code. 1 That list must then be considered conclusive evidence of
persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election

Labo vs COMELEC

Labo obtained the highest number opf votes in the Baguio Mayoralty elections. Lardizabal (the 2 nd
placer) filed an election protest against Labo, alleging that he was a foreigner. The COMELEC initially
treated the case a pre-proclamation controversy (so no docket fee was asked for). COMELEC later
decided to treat the petition as a quo warranto petition. Labo thus filed this petition asking he court to
restrain COMELEC from oking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification as the docket fees of
the quo warranto petition was not filed on time.
Whether the fact that the docket fees for the quo warranto petition was filed belatedly abates the
challenge? --NO

The Election Code provides that a quo warranto petition must be filed within 10 days after the
proclamation of the result of the election. While it was true that the docket fees were filed 21 days after
the proclamation, this cannot be attributed to Lardizabal since it was the COMELE who chose to inititally
treat the case as a pre-proclamation controversy and then a quo warranto. When COMELEC decided to
treat the case a quo warranto, Lardizibal immediately paid the docket fees.

Whether Labo is disqualified? –YES

***The Court admits that the issue of citizenship is not the issue raised in this proceeding, the SC still
chose to rule upon this as it is question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest

Under Section 42 of the Local Government Code(See Note 1) an elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines

It is clear that Labo is a foreigner given that:

 He was a naturalized Australian citizen. CA 63 says that Philippine citizenship may be lost
through naturalization in a foreign country
o There was an official statement of the Australian Government hat the petitioner was still
an Australian citizen
o He had an Australian passport
 He never reacquired Philippine Citizenship (or at least he was not able to prove that he did.

Whether the disqualification of Labo makes Lardizabal the Mayor? –NO

The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.

Notes

1.) Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twentythree years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least
one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write
English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

Romualdez Marcos vs COMELEC

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months. Cirilo Roy
Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House
of Representative. In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven
months to since childhood under residency. COMELEC decided that Marcos could not run. Later, The
COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes. Marcos indeed had the highest member of votes. On
account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First
District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes
to the SC for relief.

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

For purposes of election “residence” is synonymous with “domicile”

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by
any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute.

It is not what is written in the COC that determines domicile, but actual facts.

In this case, Marcos’ domicile since birth was Tacloban. This is because a minor follows the domicile of
his parents, and it so happens that Marcos’ parents were domiciled in Tacloban. The Court finds that
while Marcos had several residences due to several circumstances, she never abandoned her domicile in
Tacloban:

She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in
different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the
height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her
province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part

Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

The fact that Imelda married Ferdinand Marcos did not change her domicile to follow Ferdinand Marcos’
domicile. Nowhere in the Civil Code does it suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. Art 110 of the Code
merely refers to the husband fixing the residence of the family and not the domicile.
Loong vs Ututalum

Loong, Ututalum and Edris all filed their COC for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region. 49 days after Loong’s COC was filed (Loong filed on the last day) (and 16 days after
the election itself), Ututalum filed a petition for disqualification against Loong on the ground that made
a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age. (See Note 1). Ututalum alleged that
Loong fell short of 35 years, which is the required age for the position as per Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act
No. 6734. Loong sought to dismiss the petition arguing that COMELEC had no jurisdiction because this
petition is actually one which is to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy which, under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), should have been filed within 25 days following the
last day for filing of the certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC denied the dismissal. It alleged that it has
jurisdiction due to Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 read in relation with the case of “Frivaldo vs
COMELEC”. Loong was proclaimed the duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous
Region. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.

Whether the petition was filed out of time? –YES

It is clear that the petition to cancel the COC based on a false misrepresentation was filed beyond the
25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Ututalum tried to argue that a petition for disqualification petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds
of ineligibility may be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later
than the date of proclamation as per Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The Court
rules that this Rule does not apply in this case as Sec 25 refers to “disqualifications of candidates”
wghich may be found under Sec 12 and 68 of the same Code(See Note 2). The ground of the present
petition, making a a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, is not one of the
grounds covered under Sec 3, Rule 25. It is Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which governs over the
present petition. In any case, even if Sec 3, Rule 25 covers the current petition, such Rule is a mere
procedural rule issued by COMELEC which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers.
Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

COMELEC on the other hand maintains that in light of the provisions of Section 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No.
6646 (See Note 3) read alongside “Frivaldo” , a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code. The Court
finds that nothing in Sec 6 and 7 alters the 25 year period provided for in Sec 78. This is because there
are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of
candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, (25 days following the last day for filing of the certificate of
candidacy ), and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto (within ten (10) days from the proclamation
of the results of the election).

The Court also finds that the ruling in Frivaldo which made an exception from the period fixed by law for
the filing of a protest, is a mere exception, and should not apply in general. It seems that current
jurisprudence tells us that the periods may be done away with when the ground is lack of Philippine
citizenship (as in the case in “Frivaldo vs COMELEC” and “Aznar and COMELEC”. In this case, therefore,
we must follow the period provided under Sec 78. Since it was filed after the 25 period, it should be
dismissed
The current petition also cannot be treated as a quo warrant since it was filed when no proclamation of
election results had as yet been made, hence, it was premature.