CHAPTER 19: ETHICAL RELATIVISM

Moral Skepticism

Each of us has our doubts about morality

What’s right and wrong?? -> doubts about the content

But there is another kind of doubt, one that can undermine all of confidence in morality – doubts about
its status

Moral skepticism- the denial of objective moral standard

The worry is that moral skepticism is correct -> morality lacks any real authority

The notion of objectivity is ambiguous

Objective moral standards are those that apply to everyone, even if they don’t believe that they do, and
obeying them fails to satisfy anyone’s desires. Moral claims are objectively true whenever they
accurately tell us what these objective moral standards are or what they require of us

There are millions of objective truths: John Milton wrote Paradise Lost, Galileo is dead…

It doesn’t matter what you think of these claims or believing them satisfies any of our desires, neither
personal opinion nor conventional wisdom makes these claims true. They are true and would remain
true even if no one believed them.

But are there any objective moral truths?? Not so clear

Ethical objectivism is the view that some moral standards are objectively correct

If such doubts are correct, Ethical objectivism must be false

There are two forms of moral skepticism: moral nihilism and ethical relativism

Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral truth at all. Don’t be fooled by our common talk of a
murderer’s evil nature. That sort of talk is either just plain false or a disguised way of venting our
feelings (of hatred, disgust,..). David Hume said we gild and stain a value-free world with our feelings
and desires. When we declare a murderer or a relief worker good and kind, we are expressing our anger
or admiration. We are not stating a fact. We couldn’t be since there is no moral reality to describe

Ethical relativists claim that some moral rules really are correct and that these determine which moral
claims are true and which false. But these standards are never objectively correct. Rather, these
standards are correct only relative to each person or each society -> just correct because a person or a
society is deeply committed to it -> standards that are appropriate for some pp may not appropriate for
others.

 There is no objective, universal moral principles.

 Morality is a human construct -> no uniquely set of rules to follow
Two kinds of Ethical Relativism

Individual relativism: The correct moral standards are those endorsed by each individual

- An act is morally acceptable just because (a) I approve of it or (b) my commitments allow it.
- An act is wrong just because (a) I disapprove of it or (b) my commitments forbid it
- My commitments are the principles I support, the values I stand for
- Personal conviction is the ultimate measure of morality
- Subjectivists think that these are right answers but these are always relative to each person’s
values
- There is no superior moral code that can measure the accuracy of each person’s moral outlook
- If subjectivism is correct, each person’s ultimate moral standards are equally plausible

Cultural relativism: The correct moral standards are relative to cultures or societies

- An act is morally acceptable just because it is allowed by the guiding ideals of the society in
which it is performed, and immoral just because it is forbidden by those ideals

The difference amounts to whether society or each person has a final say about that is right and wrong

Pp find subjectivism or relativism attractive for a variety of reasons

- Morality is made especially for humans. Moral requirements don’t apply to other things.
Morality is a set of rules that humans invented for their own use. -> morality is made by and for
human beings
- Subjectivism and relativism provide a straightforward, scientifically respectable account of
morality. Morality is code that reflects personal or cultural taste
- The ease with which subjectivists and relativists can explain the possibility of moral knowledge.
For subjectivists, you can know what you are morally required or forbidden from doing just by
knowing what you are truly committed to. For relativists, moral knowledge comes from having
your finger on the pulse of society
- These theories are egalitarian. For subjectivists, almost everyone is an excellent judge of
morality, since they are pretty knowledgeable about what they actually stand for. There are no
moral experts since everyone is equally well placed. For relativists, we are unable to judge one
culture’s moral code as morally superior to another’s

Some Implications of Ethical Subjectivism and Cultural Relativism

Moral Infallibility – incapable of error - problems for relativists to explain

Two theories occupy a middle ground between moral nihilism and ethical objectivism

There are legitimate moral standards (contrary to nihilism) but their legitimacy depends crucially on our
support (contrary to objectivism).

But subjectivists are suspicious of cultural relativism because of the subjectivists belief that societies can
be deeply mistaken about what is right and wrong
Relativists admit that some social beliefs can be morally mistaken. There are the ones that clash with
society’s most cherished ideals. But if relativists are right, those ideals can never be immoral, since they
just are the ultimate moral standards for each society

The subjectivists have a valid criticism here: the basic ideals of some cultures do appear to be deeply
mistaken.

Ex: there is such honor killing (kill woman because they were raped, have premarital sex, or love
boy of other religion,…) which are supported by deep cultural assumptions:

i. Men should have the power of life and death over women
ii. Women ought to obey their husbands, fathers, and brothers unconditionally
iii. A man’s felling of shame is enough to justify killing the woman who has made
him feel that way

If ethical relativism is right, then man in those cultures may be morally required to kill their
wives, daughters, or sisters for having shown their bare calves, having kissed the wrong man, or
having been raped

 The extreme sexism at heart of honor killings is but one of many ex that raise doubts about
cultural relativism. After all, societies are sometimes based on principles of slavery, of
warlike aggression, of religious bigotry or ethical oppression -> moral duty for all citizens of
those societies. The iconoclast- the person deeply opposed to conventional wisdom- would
always be morally mistaken

Subjectivism faces similar problem. Cultural relativist makes societies morally infallible, at least with
regard to their foundation principles. Yet subjectivists make each person’s basic commitments morally
infallible.

Subjectivism allows that pp can make moral mistakes, but only if they fail to realize what follows
from their own commitments.

THE PROBLEMS with such view is that ultimate moral principles – whether fixed by each individual or by
each society- can be based on prejudice, ignorance, superficial thinking or brainwashing and still be
correct. According to both kinds of relativism, the origins of our basic moral beliefs are irrelevant -> no
matter how we came by them

If morality is in the eye of the beholders, then everyone is seeing things equally well.

Moral Equivalence – problems for relativists to explain

Ethical subjectivism is a doctrine of moral equivalence: everyone’s basic moral views are as plausible as
everyone else’s

But if ethical subjectivism is correct, then the moral outlooks of Hitler or Stalin are just as plausible as
those of a Nobel Peace laureate. If all moral views are on a par with one another, then this is a threat to
tolerance rather than support for it because those with intolerant outlooks would have a moral view as
good as that of their opponents
Cultural relativists will deny the everyone’s moral views are equally plausible. Some pp are much wiser
in moral matters than others, since some pp are better attuned to what their society really stand for. But
relativists allow that every code is equally good -> as the ultimate moral standards are those endorsed
by each society, none is better than any other.

Questioning our own commitments

If subjectivism is correct, then I know what is right as long as I know what I approve of. My approvals are
the ultimate test of morality.

But what about where I want to know whether my commitments are worthwhile? I know what I like but
am still up in the air about its value

If subjectivism is true, this cannot make sense since my approvals and disapprovals are the ultimate test
of right and wrong

Same with cultural relativism. There is no room to doubt about the guiding ideals of one’ s own society
since they are the correct moral standards of that society

Moral progress- fail to make sense

Seems both can make moral progress. When our actions become morally better than they used to be

But how about the progress in our moral beliefs. This occurs when more of them are true and in
particular, when our most fundamental beliefs change for the better. The gradual reduction in racist and
sexist attitudes in US seems to represent this moral progress

But both theories’ problem is they can’t make sense of the most basic kind of moral progress . If a
person’s or a society’s deepest beliefs are true, then they cannot change for the better.

To measure moral progress, you need a standard. In ethics, that standard is the ultimate moral rule. If
subjectivism is correct, the ultimate rule is personal opinion. If relativism is correct, that ultimate rule is
given by society’s basic ideals. These cannot be mistaken. If a society gradually eases out of its deeply
sexist, that cannot be moral progress. That can only be a change to a different moral code. And if
relativism is correct, different moral codes are morally equivalent -> not moral improvement

Ethical Subjectivism and the Problem of Contradiction

A contradiction occurs when a statement is said to be both true and false at the same time. Theories
that generate contradictions are incoherent -> can’t be true

Subjectivism leads to contradiction. We can see this by considering its test of truth and falsity:

(S): A moral judgement is true if it accurately report one’s feelings or commitments, and is false
otherwise
If (S) is correct, then pp on opposite sides of a moral debate are both saying sth true.

Contradiction Problem for Subjectivism argument- against

1. Any theory that generates contradictions is false

2. Ethical subjectivism generates contradictions
3. Therefore, ethical subjectivism is false

P1 is true -> the only way for subjectivists to prove they are right is attack P2

P2:

o
There is a subjectivist strategy to avoiding contradiction, but it has its costs
o
The strategy: we usually don’t mean what we say in our moral debates
Ex: what we say are
 The death penalty is immoral
 Abortion is wrong
 Eating animals is okay
But what we mean is:
 The death penalty is wrong, according to me
 I disapprove abortion
 As I see it, eating animals is okay
 Contradictions disappear as things don’t have both true and false. Just pp approve or
disapprove

Suppose that you and your friend disagree about whether eating animals is wrong. You say it is,
she says it isn’t. As the subjectivists sees things, you are saying that you disapprove of meat
eating, she says that she approves of it. These claims don’t contradict each other.

Here are the costs.

 Subjectivists have to nearly everyone of misunderstanding their own moral

claims

Me: Genocide is immoral

Subjectivist: what I’m hearing is you disapprove of genocide

Me: Yes I disapprove of genocide. But that’s not what I’m saying. I’m not talking
about my attitudes. I’m talking about genocide. You’re changing the subject

In order to avoid the problem of contradiction, subjectivists have to say that our
moral reports facts only about our own commitment. When I say genocide is
wrong, I’m not saying that it has wrongness. I am talking about myself.

 Such a view eliminates the possibility of moral disagreement

Subjectivists understand that all moral judgements as reports of personal

approval or disapproval -> the claim that meat eating is wrong becomes the
claim I disapprove of meat eating.
 It becomes impossible for people to morally disagree with one another

The contradiction has disappeared. And you’ll agree with your friend’s claim and
she with yours. If all that moral judgements do is to report pp’s outlooks, then
there is no way to morally disagree with anyone.

Cultural Relativism and the Problem of Contradiction

Face the same

It says that a moral judgment is true because it correctly describes what a society really stands for. Ex: if
different societies disagree about the appropriate political status of women, then members of each
society are speaking the truth when they assert or deny female moral equality. But they can’t all be true.
The statement that women are deserving of full political equality can’t be simultaneously true and false.

Relativists can escape this problem in familiar ways. They will claim that moral judgments are true only
relative to social agreements. -> just like legal ones. It isn’t contradictory to say that smoking marijuana
is both legal and illegal as it is legal in some areas and illegal in others

All of our moral claims have to be understood by reference to social agreements.

You: Meat eating is accepted by my social customs

Your Hindu friend from another country: meat eating is forbidden by my social customs

 Both can be true. No single judgement is both true and false.

But then the existence of cross-cultural moral disagreement also disappears as all we do when making
moral judgements is to issue sociological reports about what our society stands for. We no longer talking
about meat eating, abortion,… We are talking about how our society feels about such things

The cultural relativist may be unable to escape contradiction after all.

Pp who are members of subcultures -> member of at least two societies and when their ethical
codes conflict, these unfortunate pp face with contradictory moral advice -> they are forced to
choose between allegiance to the larger society and to their particular subculture.

We could solve this problem by figuring out which society’s code is more important. But
relativism doesn’t allow us to do so as no society’s moral code is morally any better than
another’s. So the only thing to do is deciding what we prefer. But this make morality depend on
personal choice -> will be subjectivism not relativism
Critics of cultural relativism often say that the theory eventually collapse into subjectivism. When your
views and society’s views clash, why think that society is always right?

Subjectivists claim that in conflicts between personal and social commitments, the individual is
always morally wiser. Cultural relativists take the opposite line. Sometimes individuals have the
upper hand; sometimes societies do. And sometimes, perhaps both individuals and societies are
mistaken, even in their deepest commitments.

Ideal Observers

We should guarantee that those who create the moral law (whether each individual or whole societies)
are not choosing from ignorance, but are equipped with full info. Also make sure that they are reasoning
clearly and avoiding logical errors.

In other words, rather than allow us to have the final world in morality, we should make the desires and
choices of ideal observers the ultimate standard of morality.

Ideal observers can survey the scene more dispassionately, more knowledgably, and more rationally

 According to this new and improved version of subjectivism, an act is morally right just
because I would favor it were I fully informed and perfectly rational. The relativist version
says: acts are morally right just because a society would approve of them were its members
fully informed and completely rational

Ideal observers don’t really exist. But this does not itself undermine the plausibility of the ideal observer
view. The idea is to remove the sources of error in our thinking- ignorance, emotional bias, irrational and
illogical thinking. Fans of this theory will want to reflect on what our ideal selves would prefer as choices
under ideal conditions are supposed to be morally authoritative.

The ideal observer view will surely correct some of the problems:

i. Even the core moral beliefs of individuals and societies may now be mistaken
ii. The views of individuals and societies will not be morally equivalent, since some will be
better match those of the ideal observers
iii. The sincere endorsements of slavery and genocide will not automatically be morally
authoritative since such endorsements are almost always based on ignorance and
irrationality
iv. Moral progress will now be possible, and will occur when the moral views of individuals
and societies more closely reflect those of ideal observers
v. There will be real disagreement between conflicting moral views since moral judgments
will not be reports of personal opinion or cultural consensus but will rather be claims
about what ideal observers will approve of

But this theory still not problem-free. Two serious concerns:

 There is ever any disagreement among ideal observers?? Solution: an action is morally required
or forbidden only if all ideal observers agree in their attitudes about it, and otherwise.
  This view means: Nothing is intrinsically right, things become right just because an ideal
observer would favor it.
o But what if such pp thought killing off the mentally ill was a great idea
o Even the most rational and well informed among us can be biased, hateful and cruel

o This problem is similar to the one threatens the divine command theory
o How can the decisions of any such person or group be so powerful as to transform a
valueless activity into sth good or right?
o These morally all-powerful pp either are or aren’t basing their decisions on good reasons
o If there are no good reasons to support their decisions -> arbitrary
o If there are good reasons, rather than the decision, determine the morality, then they
are all that’s needed to make thing right or wrong- > my approval or disapproval about
sth don’t add anything to these reasons
o If I’m wise, then my disapproval can be very good evidence of sth’s immorality. But the
approval cannot turn a morally neutral action into a forbidden one.
o Acts are right because they are supported by excellent reasons and not because
individuals or groups just happen to favor them.

Conclusion
Lesson

ARE THERE OBJECTIVE MORAL STANDARDS?

Do you think that slavery is wrong, regardless of whether or not anybody thinks,
believes, or feels otherwise and regardless of whether or not any culture sanctions
slavery? If you do, if you think that it is true that slavery is wrong, and that it would
still be true that slavery is wrong even if somebody or even everybody in the world
believed that it was not wrong, and even if some culture or even every culture in the
world sanctioned slavery, then you believe in objective moral truths.

An objective truth is a statement whose truth is based on something independent of

individual or cultural approval: namely, some non-perspectival fact of the matter.
“Sound travels faster in water than it does in air” is an example of an objective truth:
it is a statement that would remain true even if everyone and every culture in the
world rejected it as false, because its truth depends not upon individual or cultural
acceptance but on facts that are distinct from such acceptance and confirmable
through observation and experiment.

People who believe in objective moral truths believe that moral claims are true in the
same way the above factual statement concerning the speed of sound is true. The
problem with this view is that to this day no clear way of establishing the facts of the
matter exists for moral claims - that is to say, every proposed manner at arriving at
objective moral truths thus far cannot claim the kind of independence it would need
to establish itself as something more than the expression of individual or cultural
points of view.

For any proposed moral truth, we can identify individuals or cultures that have
rejected it as false and accepted its contradictory or contrary as true. Slavery? It was
believed to be morally permissible by the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Americans,
to name but a few. Theft? The Spartans trained their youth to steal, and would
punish them if they were caught, not because they were stealing but because they
were caught. Killing? Most people agree that killing is wrong, but disagree when it
comes to many of the countless exceptions to this notoriously flexible rule. For
example, in some American states killing is wrong, except when it is performed by
the state, as punishment for murder; and in other parts of the world killing is wrong,
except when a father kills a daughter for shaming him by being raped.

Your reaction to reading some of the examples in the previous paragraph was likely
as intensely negative as mine when I wrote them down. We want to be able to
morally condemn most if not all of them. The problem is this: Is there a way of
morally condemning them beyond appealing to the moral standards we happen to
have as particular individuals or members of particular cultures? If all we can say at
the end of the day, for example, is that honour killings are wrong because they are
incompatible with my particular thoughts, beliefs, or feelings, or with Canadian
cultural standards as embodied in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
the Canadian Criminal Code, then how can we counter the objection that other
people have other, equally legitimate thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, or that
Canadian cultural standards are no more legitimate than the cultural standards of
other societies, according to which honour killings are morally permissible?

If we could point to objective moral standards over and above particular cultural
standards, then we could resolve all conflicts of this sort: we could say, for example,
that our individual or cultural perspective corresponds to the moral facts of the
matter. The moral facts of the matter, however, are precisely what we have thus far
failed to discover. Hence, we have no clear way of establishing that in respect of
honour killings, for example, certain individual thoughts, beliefs, or feelings, or
certain cultural standards are morally correct and others morally incorrect.

You likely now see how serious the problem of objective moral standards is. In this
lesson we will be considering two basic standpoints which challenge the idea that
objective moral standards exist, called ethical relativism and moral nihilism. The
standpoints are distinct from one another and ought not to be confused, but they
are in agreement that there are no objective moral truths.

ETHICAL RELATIVISM
Ethical relativism denies the existence of objective moral truth, but does not deny
the existence of moral truth altogether (which is what moral nihilism does). Moral
claims are true, says ethical relativism, if they correspond to either an individual’s or
a culture’s moral standards, provided that we add that under such conditions the
claims are true for the individual or culture in question. Some examples:

If there is a person in the world who considers killing wrong, then it is true that killing
is wrong, for that person.

If there is a culture in the world that considers slavery wrong, then it is true that
slavery is wrong, for that culture.

Of course, this implies that one and same thing can be both morally permissible and
morally impermissible, if one of two individuals or cultures considers it morally
permissible and the other morally impermissible.

For example, if there is a person in the world who thinks that killing is wrong, and
another person in the world who thinks that killing is not wrong, then ethical
relativists who believe that moral truth is relative to the standards of individual
human beings must accept that killing is both morally impermissible and morally
permissible at the same time (although for different people, which is an important
condition).

Another way of saying this is that the ethical relativist must accept that these two,
incompatible moral standpoints are equally correct, equally true.

In sum, moral truth is relative to individuals or to cultures - hence the name

“ethical relativism.” Ethical relativists who believe that moral truths are relative to
the approval or standards of individual human beings are called ethical
subjectivists, while ethical relativists who believe that moral truths are relative to
cultural approval or standards are called cultural relativists.

ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM
The ethical subjectivist believes that if a person accepts a moral claim as true, or if a
moral claim corresponds to a person's moral standards, then it is true for that
person.

Now it may seem that this results in a logical contradiction any time you have two
people one of whom considers a moral claim true that is the contradictory or that is
contrary to the moral claim the other considers true.

The addition of "for that person" to the ethical subjectivist's criterion of moral truth,
however, saves the theory from this sort of logical contradiction.

The theory would imply a logical contradiction in the situation described above only

if "true" means "true for all people," but ethical relativists reject this sense of "true."

Let's consider the example from the previous section to clarify this point. Suppose
we have one person who believes killing is morally impermissible, and another
person who believes that killing is morally permissible.

If "x is true" meant both (1) "x is true for whoever believes x" and (2) "true for
everyone," then both of the people in our example would be facing a logical
contradiction, since each would be required to accept that killing is both morally
permissible and morally impermissible at the same time. Ethical subjectivists accept
(1) but reject (2), which means they avoid this problem. There is nothing which
compels either person to accept the truth of the other.

Ethical subjectivism faces more serious, less easily resolved problems than the
charge of logical contradiction, however. Two of them deserve special attention:
namely, the problem of moral infallibility and the problem of moral equivalence.

ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM AND INFALLIBILITY

If ethical subjectivism is correct, then there is no possibility of error when it comes to
moral knowledge apart from contradictory moral beliefs in one and the same person.
If my considering a moral claim to be true makes it true (for me), then how can I ever
be mistaken when it comes to moral truth, unless I at the same time consider a
contradictory or contrary moral claim to be true (which would make me completely
irrational). In sum, if the moral beliefs of an individual are consistent with one
another, then that individual is incapable of moral error. In short, notwithstanding
logical error, individuals are morally infallible.
This implies the impossibility of moral progress or improvement beyond becoming
logically consistent in our moral beliefs. Assuming logical consistency, there is never
a transition from error to truth where morality is concerned. Such a transition,
however, is a necessary condition of moral progress or improvement.

Why is this a problem? Well consider this example:

A person believes both that killing is wrong and that killing teenagers is permissible.
Someone points out that the two beliefs imply a contradiction, so the person decides
to drop one of the beliefs. Now, according to ethical subjectivism, the person could
drop either the first or the second to correct not only the logical error but the moral
error, too! Dropping the belief that killing is wrong and retaining the belief that
killing teenagers is permissible is as acceptable, from the point of view of ethical
subjectivism, as dropping the second belief and retaining the first! How many of you
believe this?

ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM AND EQUIVALENCE

This brings us to a related, equally serious issue: according to ethical subjectivism,
any logically consistent set of moral standards is as legitimate as any other, provided
each is accepted by at least one individual (but not the same individual). This is the
problem of moral equivalence.

For example, the claim that torture is permissible when it brings pleasure to the
torturer is as legitimate, from a moral point of view, as the claim that torture is
impermissible, provided each is accepted by at least one individual (but, again, not
the same individual).

CULTURAL RELATIVISM
There are ethical relativists who have a problem with the implication that human
beings are morally infallible and that any consistent set of moral standards adopted
by an individual, regardless of its content, is as legitimate as any other. These
relativists have proposed a version of ethical relativism that would appear to avoid
these implications: namely, cultural relativism.

According to cultural relativism, if a culture accepts a moral claim as true, or if a

moral claim follows from a culture’s moral standards, then it is true for every
member of that culture.
Obviously, this theory does avoid the implication that individuals are morally
infallible and that any consistent set of moral standards is legitimate as long as it is
adopted by at least one individual, since it implies that if an individual human being
believes moral claims or adopts moral standards that are incompatible with the
moral standards of his or her culture, then he or she is in moral error. In short,
cultural relativism supplies moral standards that can be used to assess the
correctness of moral beliefs and standards of individuals.

For example, if I believe that killing is morally permissible, but my culture holds that
killing is morally impermissible, then I am mistaken, since it is my culture, not I as an
individual, that sets the standard for me and every other member of my culture.

This is consistent with the deeply held belief that moral standards above and beyond
individual approval exist. The problem with the position, however, is that it does not
do away with the problems of infallibility and equivalence but only transfers them
over from individuals to cultures. At the level of culture we are faced with the same
issues: any consistent set of moral standards, regardless of its content, is true as long
as at least one culture has adopted it, and is as legitimate as any other set of moral
standards that satisfied the same requirement.

For example, if my culture holds that honour killings are morally permissible, then,
according to cultural relativism, I am in moral error if I believe that honour killings
are morally impermissible. The theory implies that no individual can ever be morally
correct if he or she rejects the moral standards of his or her culture. In other words,
the iconoclast - the person who opposes custom, tradition, and conventional
wisdom - is always wrong from the standpoint of cultural relativism.

Consider this next example: if one culture holds that honour killings are morally
permissible, and another holds that honour killings are morally impermissible, then
honour killings are morally permissible for all members of the first culture, and
honour killings are morally impermissible for all members of the second culture -
there is no higher moral standard according to which one culture is correct and the
other incorrect.

IDEAL OBSERVERS
According to ethical relativism, there is nothing - no action or state of affairs - that
cannot be the recipient of legitimate moral approval. The only condition that appears
to be required is rationality - specifically, logical consistency across beliefs in one and
the same person. We have already seen the kinds of problems that result from this
view.

Some people have attempted to avoid the problematic implications of ethical

relativism by arguing that under ideal conditions, all individuals will adopt the same
moral standards and behave in the same ways. These conditions are that the
individuals are not only (1) rational but also (2) fully informed concerning the
circumstances or context of human choice and action. Individuals who meet these
requirements are called ideal observers.

The position is still relativistic, since it holds that the truth of moral claims are
relative to the approval of a group of people, but it also provides us with a moral
standpoint from which we can assess the moral beliefs and the conduct of different
individuals and cultures - the standard, namely of completely rational, fully informed
human beings.

Ideally all individuals would be ideal observers, but in fact Ideal observers will

amount to a small group of people who arrive at general moral standards that all
individuals and cultures ought then to apply as the situation requires.

This would get rid of the problems of individual and cultural infallibility and
equivalence discussed above, but ideal observer theory has problems of its own.

First, Does the mere fact that two or more people are rational and fully informed
guarantee that they will approve of the same moral standards? We have already
seen that rationality (i.e. logical consistency). Two people can each be perfectly
consistent from a logical point of view but have different moral standards. It is not at
all clear why adding “fully informed” would resolve all such differences. Can’t two
people who are equally rational and knowledgeable have different moral beliefs?
Consider the following example:

Let’s say that two ideal observers have identified seven hundred people across four
hundred years of European history whose death before having had the children they
in fact had would have prevented the atrocities committed by the Nazis during
World War II. Finally, let us say that these two ideal observers have a time machine,
and so can travel back, kill these seven hundred people before any of them
procreate, and thus prevent millions of deaths.
One ideal observer says that they should use the time machine to kill the seven
hundred people, since the outcome of saving innocent millions justifies the act of
killing innocent hundreds. The other ideal observer disagrees, saying that killing
human beings to prevent crimes for which those human beings are not themselves
responsible is morally impermissible. If we accept the possibility of the two ideal
observers being equally well informed, then the moral difference of opinion between
them has nothing to do with and, hence, cannot be resolved by factual knowledge.

Ideal observer theorists sometimes try to solve this problem by conceding that
differences in moral beliefs can exist across ideal observers, but that that moral
standards are correct for all individuals and cultures only when all ideal observers
approve of them - that is, when there is consensus about them across all ideal
observers. In other worlds, a moral standard holds for all individuals and cultures if it
receives unanimous approval among ideal observers.

This, however, does not save the theory from the problem that also
undermines divine command theory, as discussed Lesson Three. As we have already
seen, the problem has to do with the question of whether something receives
approval because it possesses moral value or something possesses moral value
because it receives approval. In the case of divine command theory, the question is
whether God commands something because it is morally right, or whether
something is morally right because God commands it. If we replace “God” with
“every ideal observer” we have ideal observer theory.

The problem is that if we go with the first of the two options - namely, that every
ideal observer commands something because it is right - then we are saying that
there is a moral standard that is prior to and independent of ideal observer approval.
This, however, is to affirm the existence of an objective moral standard, which ideal
observer theory denies - remember that it is a species of ethical relativism, which
grounds moral truth on the approval of a group of people.

If, however, we say that something is right only because it is approved of by every
ideal observer, then moral standards are entirely arbitrary. (For more on this, please
have a look at Lesson Three.)