Case: Villarosa v.

Festin
Date: August 5, 2014
Ponente: J. Velasco

DOCTRINE
(1) Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC
division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy
and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration.

(2) With No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC
when the Special First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special
First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of
the case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate
Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions. The
additional term “special,” in this case, merely indicates that the commissioners sitting
therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. Under the
1993 COMELEC Rules, the COMELEC En Banc is strictly prohibited from entertaining
motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders unless unanimously referred to
the En Banc by the members of the division that issued the same, whereas under
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, all motions for reconsideration filed with regard to
decisions, resolutions, orders and rulings of the COMELEC divisions are automatically
referred to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, in view of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804’s
applicability in the instant petition, a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
En Banc is now available.

FACTS:

Petitioner and Respondent were two out of four rival candidates for the mayoral office in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15,
Respondent was proclaimed the victor with 20,761 votes, edging Petitioner who got 19,557 votes.
With a difference of 1,204 votes, Petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the RTC,
alleging irregularities in the conduct of the election. Specifically, Petitioner raised the complaints of
various voters who claimed that some ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the
ballots corresponding to Petitioner’s name were embossed to prevent them from being shaded.

As a consequence of the electoral fraud in the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Petitioner
claims that Respondent was illegally proclaimed. Respondent answered, also impugning the
election results, specifically the number of votes awarded to Petitioner.

Both parties raised an issue in the accuracy of the votes; hence, a physical recount was conducted
in the RTC.

RTC: Declared proclamation of Respondent void. Petitioner is the duly elected mayor. The Court
deducts 2,050 votes from Respondent due to pre-marking and tampering.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Respondent then elevated the case
to COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief. ,Petitioner moved for its
dismissal on the ground that Respondent’s verification is defective.

COMELEC: On Feb. 13, through its First Division, issued a TRO over the RTC from implementing its
decision during the pendency of the case. On Apr. 14, through its Special First Division, also granted
Respondent’s request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC’s decision execution pending
appeal.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion praying for its quashal, but was denied by the First Division.
Petitioner questioned the issuance of the injunction since it was issued by a newly-constituted
Special First Division, which was allegedly formed due to the absence of several COMELEC
Commissioners, who were attending to overseas absentee voter issues. Petitioner points out that
the special division was constituted only on April 8, 2014 and it only had two members, Chairman
Brillantes and Commissioner Parreño.

ISSUES:
WON the formation of the Special First Division and the orders handed down by it is lawful.

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC First Division acquired jurisdiction over the case on
Feb. 13, 2014 when it directed him to file an answer and when it issued a TRO enjoining the
execution. Hence, Petitioner argues that this precluded the Special First Division from acquiring
jurisdiction over the same case and issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Additionally,
Petitioner argues that the absence of two commissioners in the division is not sufficient to remove
it from its jurisdiction and confer it to a new one.

The Court does not agree. It finds Petitioner’s argument both unsound and procedurally
defective.

Petitioner’s procedural lapse becomes manifest with the availability of a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at his disposal, his hasty resort to certiorari to the SC cannot be justified. On this
ground alone, his petition should be dismissed outright.

Taking the facts into consideration, however, the Court rules that the assailed order by the
COMELEC Special First Division was not issued in grave abuse of discretion.

COMELEC’s action in this case finds constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, wherein it is
stated that the COMELEC may sit en banc in two divisions. Pursuant to this mandate, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution 7808, wherein Sec. 6, Rule 3 states that substitution of members of a
division and the designation of a special first division for pending cases. This rule was then amended
by Resolution 9636 and eventually Resolution 9868, wherein it addressed the temporary vacancies
in the divisions of the COMELEC due to pressing election concerns.

Due to the vacancies, and to constitute a quorum for the Divisions, Chairman Brillantes sat
as presiding Chairman for both divisions. Hence, special divisions were created to address pending
cases.

It then becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special Divisions is sanctioned by both
COMELEC Rules and the Constitution.

Therefore, no grave abuse can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special First Division
issued the writ of preliminary injunction, which was questioned by Petitioner. It cannot be said that
the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and there has been a transfer
of jurisdiction.

In other words, COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely filled the vacancies
in both of its divisions. The word “Special” in its title just shows that the commissioners are only
sitting in the division in a temporary capacity or as a substitute. The jurisdiction over cases assumed
by the First Division was not lost by the formation of the Special First Division since this only entails
a change in the composition of magistrates assigned to it. The case was not reassigned or re-raffled.
Simply put, it is still the same jurisdiction since jurisdiction was never lost to begin with.

Petitioner’s cry over violation of due process has no ground to stand on.

Wherefore, Petition is dismissed.