Goma v-CA (Falsification of Brgy.

Reso)
G.R. No. 168437

Facts:

Laurinio and Natalio, as barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution dated September 24, 1995,
allocating the amount of PhP18,000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two officials indicating therein that aforesaid Resolution was passed on
motion of Kagawad Renato Dizon, seconded by Kagawad Recaredo C. Dela Cruz and unanimously approved by those present in the meeting held on
September 24, 1995 at 2:00 P.M., when in truth and in fact no meeting was held as no quorum was mustered, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest.

In their defense, Natalio and Laurinio, while admitting having affixed their signatures on the adverted falsified resolution, alleged that said resolution was
nothing more than a mere proposal or a draft which Natalio, as was the practice, prepared and signed a week before the scheduled September 24, 1995

RTC
The RTC found Res. T-95 to have all the appearance of a complete and "true and genuine document", sealed and signed by the Sanggunian secretary

ISSUE: Whether Res. T-95 may be characterized as a public document to bring the case, and render petitioners liable on the basis of the evidence
adduced, under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC.

HELD:
Subject Resolution a Public Document
-Under Sec. 19 (a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, public documents include "[t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country." Verily, resolutions and
ordinances of sanggunians, be they of the sanggunian panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan, or barangay, come within the pale of the above provision, such
issuances being their written official acts in the exercise of their legislative authority
- public money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-95, in the preparation of which petitioners, in their official capacity, had a hand, is, in context, a
public document in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public document. And it bears to stress that in falsification under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC,
it is not necessary that there be a genuine document; it is enough that the document fabricated or simulated has the appearance of a true and
genuine document or of apparent legal efficacy.

- ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister

- (2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
- elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, as above defined and penalized, are:
- 1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
- 2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
- 3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding.
- 4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding. 18
-
-Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T-95 argue against the very idea of its being merely a proposal or a draft barangay enactment. Res ipsa
loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or be carrying certificatory and attestative signatures, let alone impressed with the dry seal of the
barangay. It would not also include such particulars as the attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the identity of the moving and seconding
kagawads relative to the passage of the resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they have been rehearsed or planned beforehand

-Finally, petitioners urge their acquittal on the theory that they did not benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by, the resolution in question, it
not having been used to obtain the PhP18,000 seminar funds. The argument holds no water. Falsification of a public document is consummated
upon the execution of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public officers' failure
to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or innocenc

-element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a document's integrity, is
not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. 22 What is punished in falsification of public document is principally the
undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein

Del prado v PP (Falsification of Deed of Succession)

G.R. No. 186030

Facts:
Accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified, execute[d] and
cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late
Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit
from the late Rafael Del Prado

-The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafael's surviving spouse
and representative of their five minor children, executed a "Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Rafael Del Prado. Per agreement of the heirs,
Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed of
Exchange dated October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she executed with Norma.

-Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was never registered by Norma, contrary to the latter's undertaking. The
petitioners instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr. and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto
themselves the property covered by OCT No. P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioners' conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners' defense that they never
intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael.

HELD:
There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners since they knew of the untruthful character of statements contained in their deed of
succession
- falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said
elements are as follows: EAIaHD
(a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.

These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts;
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter
of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

- The first and third elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, "(w)hereas, the parties hereto are
the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent." 22 The untruthfulness of
said statement is clear from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their defense, such as the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties' confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Norma's petition for
guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir,
of the late Rafael.

-The petitioners' alleged good faith is disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition of Corazon's right as an heir, because despite knowledge of
said fact, they included in the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a
desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what was due her not only under the provisions of
the law on succession, but also under contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners.

Office of Omudsman v. Torres (Falsification of DTR)

ISSUE: Whether or not the falsification of DTRs would render the authors thereof administratively liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct for the
damaging false narration and the collection of full compensation for inexistent work. (Not liable under rpc daw. - According to petitioner, respondents
were not criminally prosecuted for falsification under the Revised Penal Code, but were being held administratively accountable for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official documents; thus, the elements of damage and intent or malice are not prerequisites.)

(Rule XVII on Government Office Hours of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws)- It argues that DTRs, being representations of the compensable working hours rendered by a public servant, ensure that the taxpaying public is not
shortchanged.- SEC. 4. Falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records will render the guilty officer or employee administratively liable
without prejudice to criminal prosecution as the circumstances warrant
-On its second and third submissions, petitioner assailed the position of the CA that respondents cannot be held guilty of falsification because they did not
cause any damage to the government and there was no intent or malice on their part when they made the false entries in their respective DTRs during the
questioned period of service

CA exonerated administrative liability

HELD: As mentioned above, falsification of a DTR (an official document) amounts to dishonesty. Thus, respondents should be held administratively
liable

Thus, the CA gravely erred when it exonerated respondents from administrative guilt based on the findings of fact of petitioner which it even affirmed.
The jurisprudence 27 adopted by the appellate court in laying the legal basis for its ruling does not apply to the instant case because said cases pertain to
criminal liability for Falsification of Public Document under the Revised Penal Code. The element of damage need not be proved to hold respondents
administratively liable.

But it cannot even be said that no damage was suffered by the government. When respondents collected their salaries on the basis of falsified DTRs, they
caused injury to the government. The falsification of one's DTR to cover up one's absences or tardiness automatically results in financial losses to the
government because it enables the employee concerned to be paid salaries and to earn leave credits for services which were never rendered. Undeniably,
the falsification of a DTR foists a fraud involving government funds.

Likewise, the existence of malice or criminal intent is not a prerequisite to declare the respondents administratively culpable. What is merely required is a
showing that they made entries in their respective DTRs knowing fully well that they were false. This was evident in the many documents viewed and
reviewed by petitioner through GIO Generoso.

GUILLERGAN (Ret.), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES- (Falsification of payroll)

G.R. No. 185493

Facts:
The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by making it appear in several public documents that P1,519,000.00 in AFP
funds intended for the CIAs' payroll were paid for that purpose when in truth these were just given to Rio, resulting in damage and prejudice to the
government. Although the charge was estafa in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts alleged in the information sufficiently made out a case for
violation of Article 172 of which Guillergan was convicted. What is important is that the Information described the latter offense intelligibly and with
reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to understand the charge against him and suitably prepare his defense. 15
What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. 16
Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position;
and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done. 17
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was
the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6
2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; Guillergan committed the offense charged by "causing it to appear
that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate."
and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 19 All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this
case; falsification was committed on the time record, book, and payrolls which were public documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of violation of Article 172 of the RPC under an Information that charged him with
estafa in relation to Article 171 of the code; and
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents.

HELD: YES
The only conclusion . . . is the deliberate falsification of the payrolls; causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. 27
The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents
under Article 172 of the RPC

Spouses Villamar v. People(Falsification of Deed of Sale)- If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification
G.R. No. 178652
Facts:
Manantan (Elena) sold a parcel of land to her nine children. On 6 June 1983, Cornelia Eulalia, Hermogenes, Lucia, Pedro, and Jose sold their
share to Simplicio. Modesta and Felipe did not sell their share. Simplicio sold his total share to his daughter, petitioner Corazon Penuliar-Villamar
(Corazon). Corazon is married to petitioner Revelo Villamar (Revelo). Corazon and Revelo possessed and registered with the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a signed and notarized deed of sale dated 23 November 1989. Notary Public Quirico Bachar notarized the deed. In the
deed, it was made to appear that all of Elena's children, including Modesta and Felipe, sold the property to the spouses. The signatures of
Modesta, Hermogenes, and Lucia were forged. Corazon and Revelo alleged that "employees of the Assessor's Office" committed the falsification.
But the accused maintain that they could not be held guilty of the crime charged because they were not the ones who falsified the document as it was
prepared by somebody in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their knowledge.

RTC found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt- As correctly held by the Court a-quo, the actuation and behavior of the
accused in not immediately informing the complainant about the inclusion of her name in the subject Deed of Sale as one of the vendors therein negate
their claim of innocence.

The Court is in consonance with the ruling of the court a-quo that the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of a public document
and was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author of the falsification.
), it is an established rule that when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference
is justified that such person is the forger. 7

Court of Appeals. In its 27 June 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public
document

From the foregoing, the elements of the crime of falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172 are: (i) that the offender is a private
individual; (ii) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; and (iii) that the falsification was committed in a public or
official or commercial document. All these elements are present in the instant case.

It is not disputed that Modesta's signature in the questioned Deed of Sale was forged. Indeed, petitioner-spouses admitted that Modesta and
Felipe never participated in the sale of the property subject of the Deed of Sale in their favor. They argue, however, that they were not the authors of the
falsification, claiming that the employees of the Assessor's Office of Lingayen, Pangasinan were the ones who falsified the document. They maintain that
the deed of sale they submitted to the Assessor's Office did not include Modesta as one of the vendors but when they returned to said Office after one
month, the employees therein gave them the questioned document which included Modesta as one of the vendors.

We are not convinced.

That petitioners were the authors and/or masterminds of the falsification is presumed from the fact that they actually benefited from it. In
Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. "If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage
of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification." 
In the instant case, petitioners failed miserably to rebut the above presumption. Clearly, they were the ones who benefited from the falsified document,
the same having been executed in their favor. To emphasize, they were the ones who caused the registration of the deed of sale and were the ones who
received the falsified document from the Assessor's Office. Their bare-faced assertion that the employees of the Assessor's Office committed the
falsification is flimsy and unsupported by evidence

Patula v. People
G.R. No. 164457

Facts:
Accused, being then a saleswoman of Footlucker's Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97
from several customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said
company, but far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud
the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.

Issue: , while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her and upon which her
conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty,
WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER, CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATION.

Held:

Failure of information to allege falsification

did not violate petitioner's right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation

Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that
the information did not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b)
of the Revised Penal Code by relying on the evidence on falsification.

The contention of petitioner cannot be sustained.

The crime of estafa charged against petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be
committed by any of the following means: ESCcaT
xxx xxx xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal property. 12 ISHaTA

According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later
falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually
reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification
as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.

We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code within the context of the substantive law and the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to
allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.

Not surprisingly, the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioner's concern thuswise:

In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the] prosecution's evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According to the
defense, the essence of Karen Guivencan's testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by her by changing or
altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art.
315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation
under which the accused was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not
be considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and would violate [the] accused's constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused.

It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa
[t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information
charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity
of alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged. DTcASE

Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify
certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing
estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed.
In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The
falsified or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection
which she did not remit to the company . . . . 13