People vs. Deliola, G.R. No.

200157, August 31, 2016

(minority, discernment, proper penalty in privileged mitigating)

FACTS: Somtime in the first week of June 2020, the victim (MMM) went to the nipa plantation to
defacate when the accused-appelant suddenly appeared. The latter poked a knife at MMM and
eventually forced himself to the victim and had carnal knowledged. Afraid of the threats of the accused
of killing her, MMM never kept quiet. On the 1st of July, the accused forced himself again to the victim
at the point of a knife and threatened to kill her if she would tell anyone. At the trial court, the accused
denied the allegations and said that he is the uncle of victim and that he was only 15 at that time of the
alleged crime.

The trial court found the accused guilty of the two counts of the crime of rape. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court but suspended the judgement due to the minority of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority is applicable to the
accused.

RULING: The decisicion of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION and found
the accused-appelant guilty of two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape.

Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (1) the offended party is under 12 years
of age and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force,
threat or intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether
it was done through fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the
victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April 1987,50 making him 15 years and 2 months
old when the crime was committed. Discernment is the mental capacity of a minor to fully grasp the
consequences of his act, known and determined by taking into account all the facts and circumstances
presented by the records in each case. That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he
raped the victim is demonstrated by the following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim was a
helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the consummation of the offense with People vs. Deliola,
802 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 200157 August 31, 2016.

Given that accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was committed, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. In accordance with the controlling jurisprudence
on the matter, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
 People vs. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
(minority, suspension of sentence)

FACTS: On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree. Suddenly, appellant
appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed.
Unknown to appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them. Appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. The appelant forced himself into AAA and had
carnal knowledge. [AAA’s cousin] witnessed appellant’s dastardly act and to the house of [AAA’s]
mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the privilege mitigsating circumstance and thus
suspension of sentence.

RULING: The decision of Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on
March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of
age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place “in any month and date in the
year 1996.” Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was
committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age
in 1996.

In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable
penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether “carnal
knowledge” took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an
element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape
victim is below the age of twelve.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the
offense charged. To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had
been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and
40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.
 People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017
(insanity)

FACTS: On 22 July 2010, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, Cederina and the accused-appellant
were inside their house. She kept an eye on him from time to time but, eventually, she noticed that
accused-appellant was gone. She went outside to look for him and noticed that the front door of the
house where six-year-old AAA resided was open. She became nervous when she heard the cry of a
child coming from the house. She entered the house and, sensing that the cry emanated from upstairs,
she went up. She then saw accused-appellant holding a knife and the victim sprawled on the floor,
bloodied. She took him downstairs and out of the house where she called out for help for the victim.
After a while, barangay officials arrived and brought the accused-appellant with them. Cederina later
learned that the victim had died. In the medical examination, it was confirmed that the victim sustained
four (4) stab wounds. The accused-appelant claimed that he was confined for mental illness in PGH in
2003. Accused claimed that he cannot recall what happened.

The trial court found the accused-appelant guilty of murder. The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the
decision with MODIFICATIONS on payment of damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of
insanity to exempt him from criminal liability and, in the negative, whether his mental issues constitute
diminished willpower so as to mitigate his liability and to lower the penalty.

RULING: The crime of MURDER was SUSTAINED with MODIFICATIONS on awards of damages.

The RTC and the CA both found that all the elements constituting murder exist in the case at bar, with
accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The accused-appellant did not present evidence controverting such
findings.

Insanity is one of the exempting circumstances enumerated in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
viz.: Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.—The following are exempt from
criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
x x x x Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime
but cannot be held criminally liable therefor. The exemption from punishment stems from the complete
absence of intelligence or free will in performing the act.

The defense of insanity is thus in the nature of a confession or avoidance. The defendant who asserts it
is, in effect, admitting to the commission of the crime. Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to
defendant, who must prove his defense with clear and convincing evidence. In People v. Madarang,
332 SCRA 99 (2000), the Court ruled that a more stringent standard in appreciating insanity as an
exempting circumstance has been established.

The proof proffered by accused-appelant is insufficient to sustain his defense of insanity. A scrutiny of
the evidence presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fails to establish that he was completely
bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he fatally stabbed the victim. The narration
of Cederina does not attribute to accused-appellant any behavior indicative of insanity at the time of, or
immediately preceding, the incident. His seemingly odd behaviour of repeatedly going in and out of the
house in the days prior to the incident does not, in any way, demonstrate his insanity.
 People vs. PO3 Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004
(accident)

FACTS: At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent, an eleven year old boy was flying a kite
with his playment on top of a roof of an abandoned carinderia. Beside this carinderia was a basketball
court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti,
were playing backan, a game of basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming
from the main road across the basketball court. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children
playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. When the appellant saw Vincent and
Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them. After hearing the shouts of the
appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the roof. Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his
stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked
at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed
his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left
parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and
the basketball court. Vincen was later pronounced dean on arrival in the hospital.

The trial court found the accused guilty of murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by abuse of
public position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident.

RULING: The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS for the crime of
MURDER with no modifying circumstances.

The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it. An accident is an occurrence that “happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences.” If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.

This Court held that an accident is a fortuitive circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the
other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand without which such other person
suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part; When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part. Vincent was an eleven-year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a
defense against the appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is not so much as to put
emphasis on the age of the victim, rather it is more of a description of the young victim’s state of
helplessness. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.