SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ELITES

At one level, elites can be defined simply as persons who hold dominant positions
in major institutions or are recognized leaders in art, education, business, and
other fields of achievement. Such individuals exist in all societies, but beyond
this mundane observation, social scientists are interested in why particular
individuals attain positions of status and power. Does achievement reflect superior
talent, or is it a product of social or cultural advantage? Why are some
achievements valued over others? How does the distribution of elite positions in
society reflect the particular social structures in which they exist? These
questions are the focus of much research on stratification and social inequality.

In the social sciences, the concept of elites refers to a more specific issue as
well: the concentration of societal power—especially political power—in the hands
of a few. At the heart of theoretical debates and empirical research on elites is
the famous assertion of Mosca (1939, p. 50): "In all societies . . . two classes of
people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled." One can distinguish
the conception of "functional elites" in a variety of institutional contexts from
that of a "ruling" or "political" elite that in some sense wields societal-level
power. Then the key questions concern the existence and nature of this dominant
group. Is power over the major institutions of society highly concentrated, or is
it broadly dispersed as "pluralists" claim? If a cohesive ruling elite exists, then
who is in it and what is the basis of its power? What is the extent of its power in
relation to the nonelite "masses"? Does this societal elite exercise power
responsibly in the interests of society as a whole, or do elites maximize their own
interests against those of subordinate groups?

ADVERTISING

CLASSICAL ELITE THEORY

Social thought on elites goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle, but
contemporary debates usually begin with the "neo-Machiavellians" Pareto (1935),
Mosca (1939), and Michels ([1915] 1959). Reacting to the turmoil of European
society in the early twentieth century, each developed arguments supporting the
inevitability of elite rule in opposition to classical democratic theory, Marxian
class analysis, and socialist political movements. For Pareto, elites in general
were those holding leadership positions in business, politics, education, and other
areas of accomplishment. Those individuals could be distinguished from the rest of
"nonelite" society. He further distinguished between the "governing elite"—the
segment of the elite with broad political power—and the nongoverning elite. His
best known statements concerned the former group. Though famous for his work in
mathematical economics, Pareto believed that most human behavior was nonrational,
the expression of deep-seated "sentiments" and their observable manifestations, or
"residues." These motivational orientations led to behaviors that were then
"explained" through our post hoc rationalizations, or "derivations" (1935, chap.
IX). For Pareto, the governing elites were those with dominant talents or
leadership skills derived primarily from superior individual attributes. Borrowing
from Machiavelli, he distinguished two ideal types of political leaders on the
basis of their dominant personal qualities and motivations ("residues"). "Lions"
appealed to the conservative instincts that were most common in the masses, relying
on tradition, strength, and coercion to rule. "Foxes" were more innovative leaders
who relied on cunning, new ideas, and manipulation. Both types were necessary, but
Pareto tended to see a cyclical pattern of rule in societies in which "foxes"
dominated in periods of upheaval and transition, only to be displaced by "lions"
after the restoration of social order (1935, chap. XII).

Encyclopedia 1080
Pareto also noted that individuals in positions of power often attempt to maintain
their privileged positions by closing off access for others. This risks social
disruption by shutting off avenues of achievement and power to other talented
individuals, who then mobilize to affect change. The "circulation of elites" refers
to the process by which the ruling class is renewed periodically by superior
individuals from other ranks. For Pareto, obstacles to elite circulation often
resulted in the stagnation of the ruling class. Closed aristocracies and caste-like
systems fostered tension, conflict, and eventually social change.

Like Pareto, Mosca began with the assertion that elite rule is an empirical fact in
all societies. Although he also noted the superior individual attributes of the
"ruling class," his analysis was considerably more sociological than that of
Pareto. Mosca emphasized the organizational advantages of the ruling elite in that
they represented a relatively cohesive and easily organized minority against the
disorganized masses (Mosca 1939, p. 53). He also discussed the role of the
"subelite," a technocratic stratum of managers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats that
was increasingly important for elite rule in modern societies (1939, pp. 404–409;
see also Marger 1987, p. 54). Mosca's conception of social change and the
circulation of elites was also more sociological. Social, economic, and
technological changes often generated new opportunities and called forth new
talents, bringing new elites into prominence. Mosca agreed with Pareto that closed
systems of rule threatened social stability, since a stagnant elite impeded
adaptation to change.

In Political Parties ([1915] 1959), Michels traced the necessity of elite rule in
modern societies to the imperatives of complex organization. His classic study
analyzed the German Social Democratic Party, but his arguments have been applied to
a variety of organizational contexts. Influenced by Weber's ([1921] 1968) work on
politics and bureaucracy, Michels's most famous conclusion is summarized in his
"Iron Law of Oligarchy," the argument that large-scale organizations necessarily
concentrate power in the hands of a few at the top. Once in power, leaders in
organizations such as labor unions and political parties act to preserve their
positions. Those who rise from lower levels in the organization are co-opted in a
process that preserves the structure of power. The resources available to
institutional leaders and their relative unity of interest and perspective give
them numerous advantages in maintaining their power over the unorganized rank and
file. Over time, leaders develop similar interests and intraelite attachments that
reflect their elevated position and separate them from the masses. For their part,
Michels saw the masses contributing to elite rule through their general apathy and
acquiescence. With his focus on organizational factors, Michels has been very
influential in the development of contemporary elite approaches to power (see
Marger 1987, pp. 56–58; Burton and Higley 1987).

C. WRIGHT MILLS AND THE ELITE-PLURALIST DEBATE

Among elite theorists there is an important distinction between those who see the
concentration of power as inevitable or desirable and those who do not. The former
group includes the classical elite theorists and those who have extended their
ideas (see Field and Higley 1980; Burton and Higley 1987). In contrast, "critical"
or "radical" elite theorists recognize the concentration of power in society but
argue that this condition is neither inevitable nor desirable. Unlike the classical
theorists who emphasized mass apathy or incompetence, critical elite theorists
argue that elite domination is maintained through the manipulation and exploitation
of nonelites.

The most influential representative of the critical elite perspective is Mills

(1956). Mills, Hunter (1953), and other critical elite theorists developed their
work in response to the dominance of "pluralist" studies of political power in the
United States. Pluralism, as represented in the work of Dahl (1956), Truman (1951),
Riesman (1950), and others, held that power in modern democratic societies was
widely dispersed and that those in decision-making positions were subject to
significant mass pressures (through electoral or other processes) or the
countervailing power of other institutional elites or organized interest groups.
For Mills, the notion of a pluralist balance of power between competing interest
groups was a romantic ideal rather than a description of political reality in the
United States. He acknowledged the activities of labor unions, farm groups,
professional associations, and other organized interest groups but argued that
those groups operated mainly at the secondary, local, and "middle levels" of power.
The power to make decisions of national and international scope rested with a
"power elite" of individuals in top positions of authority in major corporations,
the executive branch of government, and the military. Congress was consigned to the
middle levels of power, along with most of the interest groups studied by pluralist
social scientists. Mills traced the historical consolidation of the power elite to
the growth of the federal government in the 1930s and especially during World War
II, as industrial production was coordinated with military needs through the
government. That institutional alignment was strengthened in the Cold War years as
the state expanded its commitment to national security, social welfare, and the
direction of economic policy. By the 1950s there was a significant shift in power
from Congress to the executive branch, reflecting an expansion of government that
required a complex information-gathering and administrative capacity. Congress
lacked the resources and coherence required for modern state administration.

Mills argued that most of the members of the power elite had similar values and
interests, which reflected their similar backgrounds, common schools, shared
membership in elite social clubs, and informal social interaction. He also
emphasized the continuous professional interaction between these institutional
leaders and the frequent exchange of top personnel between major corporations, the
military, and the executive branch of government. Another factor contributing to
the relative homogeneity of the power elite was their common experience at the apex
of bureaucratic institutions. The skills, status, and even personality type
required for success were similar in each sphere, reflecting their similarity of
organizational structure (Mills 1956, p. 15).

The other side of Mills's conception of the power elite was that of mass society.
The same social processes that had concentrated political power had created a
society of increasingly fragmented individuals whose lives and interests were
shaped for them from above. Information filtered selectively through bureaucratized
institutions of mass education and the mass media, which became more susceptible to
elite manipulation as they became more centralized. The media emphasized
entertainment and consumption over information and critique. Educational
institutions had developed into sites of large-scale vocational training rather
than havens for the development of critical thought and an informed citizenry
necessary for democratic politics (Mills 1956, chap. 13).

Mills's work became the touchstone for debates about the structure of power in the
United States that have continued to this day. Pluralists argue that he exaggerated
the unity of functional elites and neglected the influence of the electoral process
and interest group competition. From the other direction, neo-Marxist and other
class-theoretical analysts have been critical of the Millsian model for not
acknowledging the extent to which political power is shaped by dominant economic
interests (see the debates collected in Domhoff and Ballard 1968). A key question
in these disputes concerns the degree of elite cohesion. How much consensus (or
competition) between elites is required to support an elite (or pluralist) model?
What is the extent of elite competition? Is there a hierarchy of elites, with a
ruling class or "power elite" on top, or a "polyarchy" (Dahl 1971) of diverse
institutional powers? Elite theorists acknowledge that individuals with different
skills and constituencies hold leadership positions in a variety of institutions
such as prestigious universities, private foundations, major civic organizations,
and the media (see Dye 1995). Pluralists view these institutions as relatively
autonomous sources of societal influence. Although one may identify "strategic
elites," or influential leaders, in a variety of fields (Keller 1963), they see no
overall cohesion or uniform coordination of policy within a single ruling group.
However, those defending an elite perspective argue that disagreements over
particular interests occur within a general elite consensus on basic ideology and
acceptable policy. Developing Mills's arguments, elite theorists have studied
avariety of coordinating mechanisms that foster elite cohesion, such as private
school ties, social networks, shared membership in policy planning organizations,
and the general recruitment process in which future leaders are instilled with
attitudes conducive to maintaining the existing structure of power (see Prewitt and
Stone 1973; Marger 1987; Bottomore 1993; Dye 1995; Domhoff 1998). Some who work in
this tradition go further than Mills in emphasizing the prominence of class
interests and corporate power over the political process and other institutions in
capitalist societies (Miliband 1969; Useem 1983; Domhoff 1990, 1998). Indeed, the
distinction between "elite" and "class "analysis disappears in many such works (on
the similarities and differences, see Marger 1987). From this perspective,
prestigious Ivy League universities may harbor intellectuals critical of the
existing power structure, that but only those academics with "acceptable" views are
selected as advisers to political elites in turn must maintain acceptable levels of
business confidence and campaign finance to remain in power.

In a similar vein, all parties agree that in a modern democratic system, the
"elite," however defined, must pay some attention to the "masses." The question is,
How much attention must be paid, and how do public preferences impose themselves on
elites? Pluralists hold that the public has a significant influence on elite
decision making through voting, public opinion, and the threat of social protest.
From a different starting point, some class-based analysts note the role of working
class mobilization or the effects of other nonelite social movements, such as the
civil rights movement, that force changes in the polity and society (Piven and
Cloward 1977). By contrast, those who emphasize elite power tend to leave little
room for the influence of nonelites in promoting major social change. Change is
viewed as the result of elite mobilization, intraelite conflict, or the circulation
of elites. Mills, for example, viewed the major societal decisions in the United
States as the product of elite decision making, while more specific, localized
issues were more likely to be negotiated at the "middle levels" of power. Domhoff
(1998) considers major policy formation processes by looking at the "agenda-
setting" power of elites, noting that while pluralistic interest group competition
does occur on specific issues, the general parameters of public discourse and
public policy are set in advance and behind the scenes through organizations such
as policy planning groups and presidential task forces that bring elites together
to build a consensus on major policy issues before specific proposals enter the
formal legislative process. Other elite theorists point out that even in periods of
mass mobilization over policy issues, the power of elites over the public agenda
allows public sentiment to be deflected or diffused by temporary measures or by
redirecting public attention to peripheral issues (Prewitt and Stone 1973, pp. 107–
108).

MODERNIZATION, MERITOCRACY, AND ELITE RECRUITMENT

The dominant view of elites in the 1950s developed out of the structural
functionalism of Parsons (1940; 1951) and the "end-of-ideology" arguments that
appeared around that time (see Waxman 1968). This perspective, which is popular
again today, holds that with the emergence of modern industrial societies and
liberal democracy, elites increasingly represent a stratum of talented individuals
filling important positions of leadership in dominant institutions (see especially
Keller 1963; see also Mannheim 1940; Aron 1950). Variations on this theme point to
a "New Class" of "knowledge" workers in "postindustrial" managerial and
information-based professions and a proliferation of new institutional elites that
transcend the old hierarchies of caste and class (Keller 1963; Bell 1974). From
this perspective, modern elites are functionally necessary in a society of complex
organizations and increasingly specialized occupations. Echoing Davis and Moore's
(1945) functionalist theory of stratification, status and material rewards are seen
to reflect the high skill and social responsibility required for those positions.
The legitimacy of functional elites is supported to the extent that relatively
equal opportunities to attain those positions are available to all talented and
motivated individuals.

The validity of this "meritocracy" model of power is directly related to the issue
of elite recruitment and the extent to which positions of power are open to
nonelites. Once again, at one level there is general agreement among all parties on
the relative openness of modern societies in comparison to traditional systems in
which elite "recruitment" often was based on birth. In contemporary societies,
differentiation fostered a proliferation of institutional elites requiring specific
talents and skills in a variety of fields (see Keller 1963). However, beyond this
empirical fact, the questions of contention are: (1) How much openness is there?
and (2) Does it matter?

The first question has been the subject of much research in stratification and will
be dealt with only briefly here. The meritocracy model assumes equal opportunity
for individuals, but considerable research has challenged this assumption. For
example, if elite positions are based on merit, educational institutions must
provide avenues for mobility and equal opportunity for talented individuals from
nonelite backgrounds, but a basic criticism of functionalist theories of
stratification is that existing structures of inequality create barriers to
nonelite achievement (see Tumin 1953). Beyond the obvious inequality of economic
resources and formal educational institutions, the work of Bourdieu and others
(Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; DiMaggio and Mohr 1985) has shown how
the unequal distribution of "cultural capital" among groups in different locations
in the class structure contributes to the reproduction of inequality in a variety
of subtle ways. This research also points to the difficulty in assessing
differences in "talent" among individuals or groups, since indicators such as
"intelligence," cultural appreciation, and political knowledge may reflect a
preexisting distribution of cultural resources.

A more fundamental question regarding the openness of elite recruitment is: Does it
matter? First, if the concern is the overall structure of power, as it was for
Mills and most elite theorists, the success of a few upwardly mobile individuals
from the lower strata does not affect the analysis: Power still may be concentrated
in a few in key positions. Second, elite recruitment from the lower ranks does not
necessarily affect the content of elite decision making, given the selection
process involved in the rise of "talented" individuals into elite positions. Most
analysts agree that in modern societies, attainment of elite positions often
requires a degree of talent, effort, and achievement, but elite theorists argue
that those who make it to the top are selected for specific orientations that are
compatible with existing structures of power. Those from privileged backgrounds,
with access to economic, social, or cultural capital, have a definite advantage,
but it is possible for nonelites people who possess the right attitudes and skills
to rise into positions of power. This maintains the existing structure of power
while providing legitimating examples of individual success. Limited avenues for
mobility also provide a mechanism for the co-optation of promising leaders from
below, as Pareto and Mosca would recognize (see the discussions of elite
recruitment in Prewitt and Stone 1973; Marger 1987; Bottomore 1993; Dye 1995;
Domhoff 1998).

ELITES AND DEMOCRACY

There have been a number of modifications of both "elite" and "pluralist" theory
that have brought the two closer together. The work of Weber, Michels, and others
influenced later theorists who viewed the concentration of power in modern
institutions as necessary. From this vantage point, the issue was not whether broad
"democratic" participation in political, economic, and other institutions was
possible (it was not) but whether the interests of nonelites could be preserved in
the face of modern bureaucratic organization. Democratic elitism represented a
refinement of pluralist assumptions that redefined democracy in a manner congruent
with elite rule. Given the inevitable concentration of power in modern societies,
the central problem became: What legitimates elite rule or preserves elite
"accountability"? The traditional answer of conservative elitists had been the
"virtue," "character," or inward convictions of elite leaders in comparison to the
selfish and undisciplined masses. In this tradition, with adherents from Plato to
Pareto, elites have a stronger commitment to the "public interest" than do the
"people" (Prewitt and Stone 1973, pp. 188–196). The meritocracy model represents a
contemporary variation of this viewpoint: Modern institutions require skilled
leadership, and this means that institutional elites are increasingly likely to be
selected on the basis of superior talent.

Another source of public accountability important for "democratic elitists" is

elite competition for electoral support. Political elites must compete for votes in
formal democracies, and this acts as a broad restraint on their actions. However,
once in office, elite decision makers are relatively free to act as they see fit as
long as their actions remain within acceptable limits. In a well-known formulation
by Schumpeter (1942), elite rule is preserved both by superior talent and by the
general mass apathy that he saw as functional for political rule. For Schumpeter
(1942, pp. 269–296) and other conservative advocates of democratic elitism, the
efficiency of modern representative governments depends on the "people" selecting
their leaders and then leaving them alone. Note that the definition of "democracy"
has been transformed from an emphasis on maximum public participation in political
life to an assertion of the functional necessity of nonparticipation. Far from
government "by the people," democracy is now defined as a procedure for the
selection of political elites. This underscores the difficulty in weighing
empirical claims concerning "democratic" representation made by competing theories,
given the radically divergent definitions of the key concept. Classical theories of
democracy emphasized the importance of political participation as an end in itself,
one that was necessary for the creation of political citizens capable of democratic
self-rule (Pateman 1970). Critics of conservative elitism such as Bottomore (1993,
p. 95) wonder if "a person can live in a condition of complete and unalterable
subordination for much of the time, and yet acquire the habits of responsible
choice and self government which political democracy calls for." This issue is
muddier for the fact that many critical elite theorists are ambivalent about the
possibilities for participatory democracy in modern society. If elite rule is
undesirable, it would seem necessary to provide an alternative. Mills held up
participatory democracy as an ideal from which to judge the contemporary United
States in his concept of "publics" (1956, pp. 302– 304), but he was not very clear
about how that ideal could be implemented in modern "mass society." Other critical
elite theorists seem to have accepted the classical argument for the inevitability
of elite rule in modern, bureaucratically organized socities (see Prewitt and Stone
1973; Marger 1987; Burton and Higley 1987). For these critics, the only option to a
"democracy" of mass apathy is one in which political institutions and decision-
making elites are as open as possible to public scrutiny by a truly informed
electorate.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ELITE PARADIGM
The elite paradigm—and by extension the "elitismpluralism" debate as it usually is
formulated—focuses on the leaders of large-scale organizations and organized
institutions. Power is based on command over organizational resources; the elites
are those in positions of organized power. While there are other ways to
conceptualize elites, this is the dominant model in the social sciences today (see
Marger 1987; Burton and Higley 1987; Dye 1995). Most scholars agree that power is
concentrated in such organizations. The disagreements occur over whether there is a
unified "ruling elite" above and beyond these multiple institutional elites that
characterize all modern societies.

This controversy has led to much fruitful research and theoretical debate, but the
"elitistpluralist" framework is less adequate for dealing with other dimensions of
societal power. For example, many of the social and cultural processes involved in
the reproduction of class, gender, and racial inequality cannot be encompassed
within an organizational paradigm. This includes socialization processes and
everyday practices within the family, school, and workplace that reproduce the
hegemony of a dominant culture. Further, it is possible to map the formal
leadership structure of educational institutions, research foundations, and media
organizations without explaining the content of their decisions. One might ask:
Elite power, yes, but power for what? With its emphasis on the power of individuals
within organizations, the elite paradigm neglects many structural and cultural
forces that constrain those organizations and the elites within them. For example,
how do global economic conditions and the imperative of "business confidence"
constrain the decisions of political and economic elites? How are the ideologies
and cultural practices that govern gender relations reproduced in the boardroom or
the executive mansion? These questions are significant, because without them it is
difficult to explain why elites make the decisions they do or why some societal
interests are better represented than others are in the decision-making process. It
is necessary to consider elites and the organizations they command in their larger
social and cultural context.

This issue was highlighted many years ago in debates over the "managerial
revolution thesis." This was an argument that modern corporations are different
from traditional capitalist enterprises because of their separation of ownership
from management. Managers were seen to have aims different from those of
capitalists, reflecting their organizational position. They were more interested in
long-term growth, stability, labor peace, and good community relations—good
management—and less concerned with profit maximization (Berle and Means 1932;
Burnham 1941) The simple but fundamental weakness in such an argument was that
managers—the "elites" who wield organizational power in modern corporations—were
still constrained by the imperatives of the market and capital accumulation. Time
has shown that their ability to act "managerially" reflected a brief postwar period
of U.S. dominance in the world economy. Global competition has since required that
corporate elites act more like representatives of capital.

The same might be said about political elites as well, which brings one back to the
issue of the relationship between political power and class interest. Recent
debates in political sociology over the degree to which state institutions,
governing officials, and policy intellectuals are "relatively autonomous" from the
constraints of class interest or other societal pressures have again brought into
focus the relationship between political power and economic interest (see Skocpol
1985; Jessop 1990). Class theorists have argued that the decisions of political
elites are shaped not only by the superior resources of a dominant class but also
by the structural constraints on the state in a market economy (see Block 1977;
Lindbloom 1977). Others have traced a clear class bias and pro-capital selectivity
inherent in the very institutions of modern states and the dominant political
discourse ( Jessop 1990). Parallel arguments have been made by feminists who hold
that patriarchal domination is embedded in the very structure of the state (e.g.,
MacKinnon 1989). These lines of inquiry do not negate the importance of research on
elites, but they lead one to ask questions about the larger social forces that
shape their decisions.