Hogan Lovells US LLP

Columbia Square
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004
T +1 202 637 5600
F +1 202 637 5910

February 18, 2021

Inv. Nos. 701-TA-650-651 (Final)

PUBLIC VERSION

Business proprietary information removed

from brief pages 2-4, 7-14, Responses to
Commission’s Questions at pages 2-3, 5-6,
and Exhibits 1-3.

VIA EDIS

The Honorable Lisa R. Barton

Secretary
U.S. International Trade Commission
500 E Street, SW
Washington, DC 20436

Re: Phosphate Fertilizers from Morocco and Russia: Posthearing Brief of Gavilon

Dear Secretary Barton:

On behalf of our client, Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC (“Gavilon”), a U.S. importer and

purchaser of subject merchandise, and in accordance with the United States International Trade

Commission’s (“Commission”) scheduling notice 1/, we respectfully submit the Posthearing

Brief of Gavilon.

In accordance with 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.6 and 207.3, we request business proprietary

treatment for the information contained in brackets in this submission, which includes

1/ Phosphate Fertilizers from Morocco and Russia: Scheduling of the Final Phase of
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,033 (USITC Dec. 8, 2020).
The Honorable Lisa R. Barton
February 18, 2021
Page 2
proprietary domestic industry, importer, and foreign producer data; and other information

released to this firm under administrative protective order (“APO”). Disclosure of this

information would cause substantial commercial and competitive harm to the above companies

and other parties subject to the APO.

Included in this submission is the certification from Hogan Lovells US LLP required by

19 C.F.R. §§ 201.6(b)(3)(iii) and 207.3(a). Service has been effectuated as required by 19 C.F.R.

§§ 201.16 and 207.3(b). In accordance with 19 C.F.R. § 207.23 and the Handbook on Filing

Procedures, we hereby file this final public version of this submission electronically on EDIS.

Please contact the undersigned if you have any questions.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ H. Deen Kaplan

H. Deen Kaplan
Jared R. Wessel
Michael Jacobson
Cayla D. Ebert

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109

Counsel to Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC

 CERTIFICATION

CITY OF WASHINGTON )
) SS:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

I, H. Deen Kaplan, having been duly sworn on this 18th day of February, 2021, do hereby

swear in accordance with section 201.6(b)(3)(iii) of the International Trade Commission’s

regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 201.6(b)(3)(iii), that information substantially identical to the information for

which we have requested proprietary treatment and removed from this submission is not available to

the public.

In accordance with section 207.3(a) of the International Trade Commission’s regulations,

19 C.F.R. § 207.3(a), I further certify that the information contained in the attached submission is

accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge.

____________________________
H. Deen Kaplan

Hogan Lovells US LLP

555 13th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
Tel: (202) 637-5600
 PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Phosphate Fertilizers From Morocco and Russia

(Case Nos. 701-TA-650-651 (Final))

I, Fanggang Zhu, hereby certify that on February 18, 2021, a copy of the attached
submission was served via EMAIL upon the following parties:

On behalf of The Mosaic Company: On behalf of the Government of Morocco:

Patrick J. McLain, Esq. Jonathan M. Zielinski, Esq.

WILMER HALE LLP CASSIDY LEVY KENT (USA) LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 900 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006 Fourth Floor
patrick.mclain@wilmerhale.com Washington, D.C. 20006
jzielinski@cassidylevy.com
On behalf of OCP, S.A. and OCP North records@cassidylevy.com
America, Inc.:
On behalf of Koch Fertilizer, LLC:
Shara L. Aranoff, Esq.
COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP Kenneth G. Weigel, Esq.
850 Tenth Street, N.W. ALSTON & BIRD LLP
Washington, D.C. 20001 950 F Street, N.W.
saranoff@cov.com Washington, D.C 20004
ken.weigel@alston.com
On behalf of PhosAgro PJSC:
On behalf of The Ministry of Economic
Daniel J. Cannistra, Esq. Development of the Russian Federation:
CROWELL & MORING LLP
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Elena G. Nosyreva
Washington, DC 20004 THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC
dcannistra@crowell.com DEVELOPMENT OF THEw RUSSIAN
intltrade@crowell.com FEDERATION
Presnenskaya Naberzhnaya, 10/2
On behalf of J. R. Simplot Company: Moscow, Russia 125039
nosyrevaeg@economy.gov.ru
Jamieson L. Greer, Esq.
KING & SPALDING On behalf of EuroChem North America
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Corp.:
Washington, DC 20006-4706
jgreer@kslaw.com Peter Koenig, Esq.
tradeservice@kslaw.com SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS
2550 M Street N.W.
On behalf of International Raw Materials Washington, D.C. 20037
Ltd.: peter.koenig@squirepb.com

Melissa M. Brewer, Esq.

KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, LLP
3050 K Street, N.W. /s/ Fanggang Zhu
Washington, D.C. 20007 Fanggang Zhu
mbrewer@kelleydrye.com
tradenotifications@kelleydrye.com HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
 BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

)
In the Matter of: )
)
PHOSPHATE FERTILIZERS FROM ) Inv. Nos. 701-TA-650-651
MOROCCO AND RUSSIA ) (Final)
)

PUBLIC VERSION

Business Proprietary Information removed

from Brief pages 2-4, 7-14 and Exhibits 1-3.

POSTHEARING BRIEF OF GAVILON FERTILIZER, LLC

H. Deen Kaplan
Jared R. Wessel
Michael G. Jacobson
Cayla D. Ebert

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109

Counsel to Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC

February 17, 2021

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................... 1

II. THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY IS NOT MATERIALLY INJURED ........................... 7

A. Subject Import Volumes When Viewed In Context Are Not Significant .......... 7

B. Subject Imports did Not Cause Negative Price Effects ..................................... 10

C. Subject Imports Have Not Adversely Impacted the Domestic Industry ............ 11

III. SUBJECT IMPORTS ARE NOT CAUSING INJURY ................................................ 13

IV. SUBJECT IMPORTS DO NOT THREATEN THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

WITH MATERIAL INJURY ........................................................................................ 14

V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 15

i
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
USITC Determinations

Glass Containers from China, Inv. No. 701-TA-630 (Final), USITC Pub. 5068 (June 2020) ........

............................................................................. 10, Responses to Commission's Questions at 8

Silicon Metal from Australia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Norway, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-567-569 and
731-TA-1343-1345 (Final), USITC Pub. 4773 (April 2018) ...................................................... 5

Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solutions from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1006,
1008, and 1009 (Final), USITC Pub. 3591 (April 2003) ............................................................ 6

ii
I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC (“Gavilon”) requests that the U.S. International Trade Commission

(“ITC” or the “Commission”) render a negative determination in these investigations and asks that

the Commission keep these three points in mind when it reviews the record:

First, the lone Petitioner has failed to establish a causal link between subject imports and

domestic industry performance. The largest increases in subject import volumes coincided with

the domestic industry’s greatest success from 2017 to 2018. Likewise, a drop-off of in subject

imports between Q2 and Q3 2020 did not result in improved domestic industry performance as

shown by Mosaic’s quarterly financial data.

Second, subject imports overwhelmingly oversold domestic product throughout the POI.

Subject imports could oversell because they were needed to remedy the domestic industry’s failure

to serve U.S. customers, as the domestic industry exported significant quantities of phosphate

fertilizer.

Third, imports in the second half of 2019 provide no indication of material injury. 1/ The

ratio of inventories of subject imports to U.S. producer inventories was virtually the same in 2018

and 2019 as both groups prepared for the fall 2019 application season. Moreover, subject import

volumes fell during 2019.

The lack of material injury by reason of subject imports is supported in Mosaic’s public

statements. We encourage the Commission to review these statements, which are provided as

exhibits to Gavilon’s prehearing brief. 2/ They provide Mosaic’s view of events at the time they

1/ For more detailed responses to Commissioner Schmidtlein and Chair Kearns’s questions on this topic,
see Gavilon’s Responses to Commission’s Questions at 2: Subject Imports in 2019.
2/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 1A.

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occurred. 3/ If the Commission takes Mosaic’s contemporaneous statements as true, the only

possible result is a negative determination.

It is especially informative to match Mosaic’s statements and the industry’s financial data

during the POI with the events that transpired. In 2017 the domestic industry was successful, and

increasingly so in 2018, rising to an [

], amidst [

]. 4/ From 2017 to 2018, Mosaic’s [

], and Simplot’s [

]. 5/

Amidst this success, Mosaic idled its Plant City facility right before the 2018 planting

season. Subject imports did not cause the idling. Nor did subject imports cause Plant City’s

ultimate closure in 2019, which was a mere formality after Plant City remained idled through the

[ ] 2018. Indeed, Mosaic told the market that it closed Plant City “intentionally”

and that the closure “opened a hole for some imports to increase” (namely from Mosaic’s affiliated

supply in Saudi Arabia). 6/ Mosaic said that the resulting tightening of supply and demand

conditions caused by its own curtailment of U.S. supply was “obviously great for Mosaic,”

pointing to its new affiliated supply located in Brazil. 7/ Mosaic agreed at the hearing with

3/ Mosaic pointed at the hearing to its 2019 annual report as evidence that it told the public that subject
imports were causing injury—a report that was published February 2020, after the events alleged to have
caused material injury and only a few months before the company filed its Petitions. See Phosphate Fertilizers
from Morocco and Russia, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-650-651 (Final), Transcript of the Commission’s Hearing dated
Feb. 9, 2021 (“Hearing Tr.”) at 65–66 (Patrick McLain).
4/ See Phosphate Fertilizers from Morocco and Russia, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-650-651 (Final), January 27,
2021, Prehearing Report (“Prehearing Report”) at Tbl. C-1.
5/ See id at Tbl. VI-3.
6/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company, Mosaic Co Analyst Day – Final
(March 28, 2019) at 30–31; Exhibit 1A, Mosaic Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2017 (Feb. 20,
2018) at 3; Exhibit 1A, Company 2018 Q2 Earnings Call (Aug. 7, 2018) at 3, 8–9.
7/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2018 Q2 Earnings Call (Aug. 7, 2018)
at 3.

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Commissioner Schmidtlein’s characterization of Mosaic’s strategy for the closure: to restrict U.S.

supply to increase prices. 8/ A former Mosaic employee testified that the closure “was part of the

company’s transparent and smart transformation strategy to optimize its U.S. operations in order

to improve financial performance and compete in the global market. The closure was not caused

by imports from Morocco and Russia.” 9/

At the time of closure, Mosaic celebrated its reduction of market share “from 55%, 60%

market share to a more sustainable 50-ish percent market share,” which left Gavilon and other

suppliers scrambling to backfill Plant City purchases with imports—at Mosaic’s direction. 10/

Mosaic’s plan worked. 2018 was a good year for prices and [ ]. And Mosaic made

good on its plan for foreign supply to replace the Plant City tonnage, with imports from Saudi

Arabia skyrocketing across the POI including at the end of 2020 to the highest level of any source

of imports. 11/

The domestic industry’s run of increasingly strong performance from 2017 to 2018 turned

in 2019. Why? Simple: historically bad weather caused a demand shock that caused havoc in the

phosphate fertilizer market until the weather improved and the market rebalanced in Q2 2020

before the Petitions were filed. Mosaic has explained to the public that the bad weather caused the

2019 downturn. In November 2019, Mosaic stated that “{s}ales prices and margins have declined

throughout 2019, primarily attributable to a weather-related demand decline in North

America.” 12/ In February of 2020, Mosaic recapped 2019 as a “challenging year in {the} industry”

8/ See Hearing Tr. at 109 (Joc O’Rourke) (responding “yes” to Commissioner Schmidtlein’s question
about Mosaic “trying to prop up prices”).
9/ See Hearing Testimony of Michael Rahm at 3.
10/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company, Mosaic Co Analyst Day – Final
(March 28, 2019) at 30–31.
11/ See Exhibit 4, Public Import Data.
12/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company Reports Third Quarter 2019 Results,
Business Wire (Nov. 4, 2019).

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due to poor weather. 13/ After the industry’s performance improved in the first half of 2020,

Mosaic pointed to “farm economics” and that “demand is up” as the cause—expressly stating that

these CVD investigations make no difference in domestic performance. 14/ This improved

performance occurred for more than 6 months prior to the filing of the Petitions. Mosaic explained

after filing the Petitions that the CVD case is not “going to make a huge difference” in the U.S.

phosphate fertilizer market because the dramatic fall in demand in 2019 had normalized. 15/

Plainly, 2019 performance was caused by demand-side problems, not subject imports.

Domestic performance improved in 2020, following a return to ordinary weather. However,

Mosaic’s public profitability shows that its performance declined from Q2 2020 to Q3 2020,

amidst declining subject imports. Again, the record demonstrates no correlation between subject

import volumes and domestic industry performance.

Mosaic’s injury case boils down to its argument that subject imports caused harm in the

middle of 2019 as customers sought to station material for the fall application season. But that

argument is fatally flawed. The relative level of subject import inventories remained virtually

identical when compared to U.S. producer inventories. And, more generally, subject import levels

fell between 2018 and 2019 amidst sharply rising imports from Mosaic’s affiliated supply from

Saudi Arabia during the same period. Gavilon has expanded on this discussion in response to

Commission’s Questions. 16/

13/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2019 Q4 Earnings Call (Feb. 20, 2020)
at 2.
14/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2020 Q2 Earnings Call (August 4,
2020) at 6; Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2020 Q3 Earnings Call (Nov. 3, 2020) at 15.
15/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2020 Q3 Earnings Call (Nov. 3, 2020)
at 15.
16/ See Gavilon’s Responses to Commission’s Questions at 1: Failure to Serve/Sales Negotiations; Exhibit
1. In particular, the email exchanges set forth at Exhibit 1B show [
].

4
 Mosaic’s case on price effects is similarly weak and does not comport with its story of

events. Mosaic is the undisputed price leader. 17/ Subject imports are price takers. Subject

imports oversold U.S. product in 136 out of 170 comparisons. 18/ Mosaic and Simplot failed to

explain away the pricing data in responses to questions at the Commission’s hearing. As Chair

Kearns identified, “something just isn’t adding up in {Petitioner’s} case.” 19/ Commissioner

Schmidtlein’s similar skepticism about Mosaic’s characterization of the record showing ‘“mixed’

underselling” is also telling. 20/

And how can subject imports consistently oversell U.S-produced phosphate fertilizer? The

domestic industry is characterized by supply shortages and failures to serve, caused by the U.S.

industry’s decision to ship a majority of its production to foreign markets. 21/ As stated by one

U.S. purchaser of Mosaic’s product in testimony similar to that given in the Silicon Metal from

Australia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Norway investigations: “Ultimately, we prefer to buy from

Mosaic, but it simply has not been a reliable source of phosphate fertilizer . . . We would prefer to

‘buy American’ through Mosaic, but there simply is not enough domestic supply to get the farmers

the product they need when they need it.” 22/ Another U.S. purchaser notes that: “Mosaic will

not sell to us at virtually any price because we are not in their supply plan.” 23/ American farmers

thus require imports to grow their crops. The domestic industry has shown no signs of increasing

U.S. supply to meet demand. Instead, as Mosaic has explained: “as we talk to our customers, some

17/ See Prehearing Report at V-7–V-8.

18/ Id. at V-18–V-19.
19/ See Hearing Tr. at 86 (Chair Kearns).
20/ Compare Hearing Tr. at 69–77 (Commissioner Schmidtlein) with Petitioner Prehearing Brief at 65.
21/ See Prehearing Report at III-10. The record is replete with stories of the domestic industry’s failure to
supply. See, e.g., Hearing Testimony of Jake Niederer at 2–3; Hearing Testimony of Scott McGinn at 2–3;
Hearing Testimony of David Coppess at 2–3.
22/ See Hearing Testimony of David Coppess at 2–3.
23/ See Hearing Testimony of Jake Niederer at 4 (emphasis in original).

5
are concerned mostly about how they’re going to get their supply. We believe that this has opened

up new opportunities for outside competitors to come in and make up some of that supply.” 24/

Much of those new opportunities are for Petitioner’s Saudi Arabian supply. Mosaic

admitted at the Commission’s hearing that it could not ramp up U.S. supply to meet market demand

in 2020, and so chose to import from Saudi Arabia—even though it was shipping millions of U.S.

tons to foreign markets. 25/ Mosaic also conceded that it sometimes does not quote sales. 26/

The facts underlying the Commission’s negative determination in Urea Ammonium Nitrate

Solutions from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine parallel these investigations. In Urea, the

Commission found that “. . . when subject imports increased in the U.S. market, the industry’s

condition improved somewhat. . . .” and that there was a high incidence of overselling at the port

of NOLA. 27/ It found that the domestic industry’s “condition was the worst in 1999 when subject

import volumes were lowest, improved somewhat when subject import volumes increased, and

deteriorated again toward the end of the POI despite a significant gain in U.S. producers’ market

share and a significant reduction in subject import volume and market share.” 28/ Similarly, in

the present case, there is no correlation between import volumes and domestic industry

performance, particularly in 2017 to 2018 when the domestic industry was increasingly successful

amidst increasing subject imports and Q3 2020 when Mosaic’s performance dipped from Q2 2020

despite sharply declining subject imports.

24/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2020 Q2 Earnings Call (August 4,
2020) at 6.
25/ See Hearing Tr. at 103–104 (Andy Jung). See also Hearing Tr. at 130 (Richard Sunderland) (“{W}e
have Saudi Arabian product in the market that we didn’t have quite so much last year.”).
26/ See Hearing Tr. at 97, 99, 101 (Joc O’Rourke).
27/ Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solutions from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1006, 1008,
and 1009 (Final), USITC Pub. 3591 (April 2003) at 16, 20–21.
28/ Id. at 25–26.

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Mosaic is very optimistic for the future of the U.S. phosphate fertilizer market. Gavilon is

similarly optimistic. As such, there is no threat of material injury.

For these reasons, the Commission should find that there is no material injury or threat

thereof to the domestic industry on account of subject imports. The Commission thus should make

negative determinations.

II. THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY IS NOT MATERIALLY INJURED

Applying the traditional factors relied upon by the Commission, this record does not

support a finding of material injury by reason of subject imports.

A. Subject Import Volumes When Viewed In Context Are Not Significant

Imports are necessary to meet U.S. demand, largely because of U.S. producers’ continued

decision to export large quantities to foreign markets thus causing U.S. supply shortages. The

domestic industry exported [

]. 29/ The domestic industry’s exports makes rational business sense—

there is no phosphate producer to supply Canadian demand and margins (or netbacks) are larger

when selling to Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America due to lower freight costs. However, the

domestic industry’s business strategy has ensured that without imports purchased at a premium,

American farmers experience supply shortages.

Domestic industry performance is uncorrelated with domestic industry market share or

subject import volumes. Across the POI market share was [ ] when comparing 2017 with

interim 2020. 30/ And yet, the domestic industry’s performance in interim 2020 was [

] its performance in 2017 amidst [ ] market share. These data do not

demonstrate correlation between domestic industry performance and subject imports.

29/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. III-6.

30/ See id. at Tbl. C-1.

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A year-by-year analysis also shows the lack of correlation. When the domestic industry

was highly successful and increasingly so from 2017 to 2018, the domestic industry’s U.S.

shipments declined by [ ] and the domestic industry [ ]

market share, amidst subject import shipments volumes increasing by 33.9 percent. 31/ These

trends are largely due to the idling of Plant City, which (as Mosaic intended) pulled in larger import

volumes and resulted in [ ]. Petitioner argues that subject

imports “were already significant at the start of the POI”—however the domestic industry’s

increasingly strong performance from 2017 to 2018 shows that subject imports at the time were

not injurious. 32/

Moving from the successful 2018 to the difficult 2019 year for the entire industry caused

by poor weather, subject import volumes declined from 2018 levels by nearly 300,000 short tons,

or by 9.5 percent. 33/ Subject import trends during this period do not evidence injury. In fact,

imports from Mosaic’s affiliated supplier in Saudi Arabia more than tripled from 2018 to 2019,

from 90,249 short tons to 288,338 short tons—an increase of nearly 200,000 short tons. 34/

When comparing trends from interim 2019 with interim 2020, subject import volumes

decreased by 32.4 percent while domestic industry performance declined. 35/ And based on its

public financials, Mosaic’s best quarter in 2020 was Q2—before the Petitions were filed. 36/

Petitioner’s explanation of 2019 subject import volumes as motivated by predatory

targeting of the U.S. market fails. 37/ As an initial matter, Mosaic’s CEO stated in 2018 that OCP

31/ Id. at Tbl. C-1.

32/ See Petitioner’s Opening Statement at para. 3 (Patrick McLain).
33/ Prehearing Report at Tbl. IV-2.
34/ See Exhibit 4, Public Import Data.
35/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. C-1.
36/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at 54.
37/ See Hearing Testimony of Richard McLellan at paras. 10–11.

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is “a very responsible operator . . . Will they flood the marketer or do any of that stuff? I don’t

think so because I don’t think that’s in their best interest.” 38/

The truth is that imports were necessary in 2019 because the market anticipated

improvements in the weather and plantings in each of spring 2019 and then fall 2019, and

additional imports were required for locations where inventories were depleted. 39/ These imports

were not predatory, but instead were brought in to meet farmers’ demand. As evidence, domestic

producer inventories were much [ ] than subject import inventories throughout the POI

including in 2019, and the ratio of subject import inventories to U.S. producer inventories did not

materially change between 2018 and 2019. 40/

Mosaic explained to the public that its decision to close Plant City at the end of 2017

(amidst increasing prices and rising U.S. industry performance in 2017 to 2018) was due to

Mosaic’s ability to source from lower-cost affiliated imports from Saudi Arabia. 41/ As Mosaic

stated at the time, and as it confirmed at the Commission’s hearing, Mosaic told some of its

customers that these supply shortages “would have to be met by imports because {Mosaic was}

not able to supply it anymore.” 42/ Mosaic acknowledges that its customers were unhappy with

Mosaic’s decision to close Plant City. 43/ Mosaic cut Gavilon’s supply contract by 100,000 short

tons following the idling—volume that could have stayed with Mosaic but for Mosaic’s decision

38/ See OCP Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 118, BMO Capital Markets Global Metals & Mining Conference
(Feb. 27, 2018) at 8.
39/ See Gavilon’s Responses to Commission’s Questions at 2: Subject Imports in 2019 for additional details.
40/ See Hearing Tr. at 215, Slide 6 (Jim Dougan). See Gavilon’s Responses to Commission’s Questions at
2: Subject Imports in 2019 for additional details.
41/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2017 Annual Report; Exhibit 2, Craig
Pittman, Mosaic will permanently close its long-idled Plant City fertilizer plant, Tampa Bay Times (June 18,
2019). See also Exhibit 4, Public Import Data (showing Saudi Arabia as the top source of imports since
September 2020).
42/ See Hearing Tr. at 100–01 (Joc O’Rourke).
43/ See id.

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to relinquish the business and encourage Gavilon to import. 44/ Importantly, Plant City is being

reopened by a new operator, Anuvia, which will establish a “large, commercial size granulation

facility” that will manufacture a bio-based phosphate fertilizer in partnership with Mosaic. 45/

It is also vital to note that Gavilon has [

]. 46/

B. Subject Imports did Not Cause Negative Price Effects

The evidence before the Commission demonstrates that there have been no discernible

adverse price effects caused by subject imports. The 136 instances of overselling compared to 34

instances of underselling demonstrates that subject imports were consistently higher-priced than

domestic product, and that very few purchasers reported that subject import prices were lower. 47/

Mosaic and Simplot ask the Commission to disregard its pricing product data in favor of

unsubstantiated trade press reports. 48/ The Commission should reject these results-oriented

attempts to discard the Commission’s meticulously-collected and reliable data.

The bottom line is that the record does not support Mosaic’s view that low-priced imports

undercut and lowered U.S. prices. 49/ This is not a product purchased primarily on the basis of

44/ See Hearing Tr. at 270–271 (Jared Wessel); Exhibit 2, Declaration of [ ]; Exhibit 3,
[ ].
45/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at 34–35; Responses to Commission’s Questions at 3: Reopening of Plant
City. As shown in the investigation of Glass Containers from China, material injury does not occur when
domestic factories are closed only to have factories making the product under investigation open pursuant to a
different business model. See Glass Containers from China, Inv. No. 701-TA-630 (Final), USITC Pub. 5068
(June 2020) at 32, 34–35, 44, II-13 (making a negative determination despite closure of production facilities and
a new entrant’s large capital investment in a customized product).
46/ See Exhibit 2, Declaration of [ ].
47/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. II-9, V-18–V-19.
48/ See Prehearing Brief of Petitioner at 70; Hearing Tr. at 99–100 (Stephen Vaughn).
49/ See Hearing Testimony of Andy Jung at para. 10 (which is unsubstantiated by the record). Compare
Hearing Tr. at 69–71 (Commissioner Schmidtlein).

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price. Only 2 out of the 28 responding purchasers stated that they always purchase the lowest

priced option. 50 / Nearly all purchasers rated availability, quality, and reliability as “very

important.” 51/ The record is also replete with examples of the U.S. industry failing to serve U.S.

customers. 52/

Regarding alleged lost sales, only [ ] of the 28 responding purchasers reported purchasing

lower-priced imports instead of domestic supply where price was a primary reason for

importing. 53/ Regarding alleged lost revenues, only [ ] of the 28 responding purchasers reported

lost revenues. 54/ And, as detailed in Gavilon’s prehearing brief, the [

]. 55/

C. Subject Imports Have Not Adversely Impacted the Domestic Industry

The record does not indicate that the domestic industry has been adversely impacted by

reason of subject imports. The U.S. industry’s performance was strong until market demand

shocks unrelated to subject imports harmed the entire agriculture sector in 2019. 56/ From 2017

to 2018, the domestic industry saw operating income increase [ ]

and net income increase [ ]. 57/ Mosaic cannot credibly claim

that there were “poor market conditions” that caused the idling of Plant City going into the 2018

50/ See Prehearing Report at II-17; U.S. Purchasers’ Questionnaire Responses at III-25.
51/ See Prehearing Report at II-17-18; U.S. Purchasers’ Questionnaire Responses at III-21.
52/ See, e.g., Exhibits 1A, 1B, Information on U.S. Industry’s Failure to Serve.
53/ See Prehearing Report at V-22; U.S. Purchasers’ Questionnaire Responses at III-28.
54/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at 49.
55/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. V-10, Tbl. V-11; U.S. Purchasers’ Questionnaire Responses at III-29.
See also [ ] response to Commission Staff question dated February 5, 2021, admitting that [

].
56/ Petitioner attempts to ignore the successful 2018. See, e.g., Prehearing Brief of Petitioner at 77–78.
57/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. C-1.

11
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application season based on these numbers. 58/ And the domestic industry’s [ ]

profitability in 2018 cannot be discarded as the result of merely “prices {that} improved somewhat”

and “relatively flat” demand. 59/ The record makes clear that the domestic industry was not

materially injured by reason of subject imports, or any other cause, at least through 2018—amidst

the largest increase in subject imports during the POI. The domestic industry prospered [

].

The domestic industry’s [ ] in 2019 and part year 2020 are thus not unexpected under

the backdrop of a record bad year in 2019 for the entire agriculture sector. Nor is it unsurprising

that subject imports declined in 2019 and 2020 amidst [ ] demand. 60/

Mosaic’s public financial statements show that Mosaic’s position has improved over the

course of 2020. 61/ Mosaic enjoyed a rise in prices in Q2 2020 prior to the filing of the Petitions

“reflecting a return to global parity from the discount over the past 18 months.” 62/ Mosaic

explained its improved performance: “With strong global demand for phosphates, the market is

tightening, and prices are rising in response.” 63 / But Mosaic’s 2020 performance also

demonstrates the lack of impact by subject import volumes on domestic performance. While

Mosaic says in its hearing testimony that “Mosaic’s operations and financial performance

improved significantly in Q3 2020 compared to the prior year,” when compared with Q2 2020a

contemporaneous counterfactual for pre- and post-petition performance—Mosaic’s Q3 2020 net

sales and EBITDA for its phosphates business flattened and declined moderately compared to the

58/ See Hearing Testimony of Richard McLellan, paras. 5–6.

59/ See id.
60/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. IV-2, Tbl. IV-7.
61/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company Q3 2020 Performance Data.
62/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company, Mosaic Second Quarter 2020 Earnings
Management Commentary (Aug. 3, 2020) at 8.
63/ Id. at 2.

12
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prior quarter. 64/ Declining subject import levels from Q2 2020 to Q3 2020 also shows that subject

import volumes are uncorrelated with domestic industry performance. 65/

Employment figures are also not indicative of harm by reason of subject imports. Declines

in employment can be attributed to the Plant City closure, which is unrelated to subject imports. 66/

And, the domestic industry’s capital expenditures were [

]. 67/ Mosaic

has continued its stock repurchase program, of at least $150 million in Mosaic shares in 2019. 68/

It also has made foreign investments in Saudi Arabia and Brazil during the POI in the billions. 69/

These are all signs of a strong domestic industry well-equipped to succeed when demand is normal.

III. SUBJECT IMPORTS ARE NOT CAUSING INJURY

As addressed throughout this brief, subject imports did not cause material injury to the

domestic industry—which was highly successful in 2017, enjoyed increasing performance in 2018,

and then suffered from record poor weather conditions throughout 2019 which was the source of

its diminished performance. Subject imports do not correlate with domestic performance because

subject imports did not cause harm to the domestic industry.

It is puzzling why Mosaic and its economist argue about pre-2017 trends in their hearing

testimony, which are not relevant and are outside the POI. 70/ Moreover, the domestic industry’s

strong and improving performance amidst rising subject imports in 2017 to 2018 shows that the

domestic industry can achieve high prices and profitability irrespective of subject imports.

64/ Hearing Testimony of Richard McLellan, para. 12; see Gavilon Prehearing Brief at 54.
65/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. IV-2.
66/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. III-9; U.S. Producers’ Questionnaire Response of Mosaic at III-11.
67/ Prehearing Report at VI-13.
68/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2019 Q3 Earnings Call (Nov. 5, 2019).
69/ Prehearing Report at VII-21.
70/ See Hearing Testimony of Daniel Klett para. 2.

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Final CVD orders would not likely result in substantially increased U.S. supply, or a

reduction of U.S. producers’ export-orientation. U.S. producers have shown little interest in

expanding U.S. supply or redirecting major quantities of export shipments to the U.S. market

amidst shortages in 2020. Instead, because Petitioner partly owns the largest source of nonsubject

imports from low-cost Saudi Arabia, and massive capacity from its $2.5 billion investment in

Brazil, it could easily continue to increase nonsubject imports to replace subject imports. Mosaic

aptly explains to its investors that this dynamic is already happening in the U.S. market, and that

the difference in Mosaic’s performance in 2020 is not from these Petitions, but instead due to

demand recovery after a historically bad 2019. 71/ Specifically, Mosaic [

]. 72/

Simplot helpfully confirmed at the Commission’s hearing that “now that the Moroccans and the

Russians have stopped coming, we’ve been buying product, but it’s come from Jordan or from

Saudi Arabia.” 73/ The Commission should find that nonsubject imports—especially those

controlled by Petitioner—will replace subject imports without material benefit to U.S. production.

IV. SUBJECT IMPORTS DO NOT THREATEN THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY WITH

MATERIAL INJURY

The Commission should find that subject imports do not threaten material injury to the

domestic industry. The domestic industry led by Mosaic is the dominant source of supply to the

U.S. market, benefits from its export orientation and positive global trends, has consolidated into

71/ Gavilon Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company 2020 Q3 Earnings Call (Nov. 3, 2020)
at 14 (stating “So overall, we don't think that this {CVD case} is going to make a huge difference. The big
difference today is demand is up.”).
72/ Prehearing Report at VII-21.
73/ See Hearing Tr. at 76 (Richard Sunderland). See also Hearing Tr. at 137 (Richard Sunderland) (“they've
gone to different countries and they’re bringing in product”), 161 (“We’ve had, obviously, a significant decline
in terms of imports from Morocco and Russia, essentially, a cessation, a switch to imports from other areas.”).

14
just a few companies, and is strategically positioned for future success. The Commission need

only look to recent public statements by the domestic producers about the industry’s great current

and future prosperity. For example, Mosaic believes that the market disruption from late 2018

through mid-2020 is over and it “wouldn’t worry too much” about harm caused by global trends

in the future. 74/ For these reasons, the domestic industry is not vulnerable.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the Commission make negative

determinations.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ H. Deen Kaplan

H. Deen Kaplan
Jared R. Wessel
Michael G. Jacobson
Cayla D. Ebert

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109

Counsel to Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC

Dated: February 17, 2021

74/ See Gavilon Prehearing Brief at 68–69.

15
 BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

)
In the Matter of: )
)
PHOSPHATE FERTILIZERS FROM ) Inv. Nos. 701-TA-650-651 (Final)
MOROCCO AND RUSSIA )
)

PUBLIC VERSION

Business Proprietary Information removed

from pages 2-3, 5-6.

RESPONSES TO COMMISSION’S QUESTIONS

H. Deen Kaplan
Jared R. Wessel
Michael G. Jacobson
Cayla D. Ebert

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109

Counsel to Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC

Dated: February 17, 2021

 TABLE OF CONTENTS (TOPIC)

1. Failure to Serve/Sales Negotiations .....................................................................................1

2. Subject Imports in 2019 .......................................................................................................4
3. Reopening of Plant City .......................................................................................................7

TABLE OF CONTENTS (COMMISSIONER)

Chair Kearns ................................................................................................................................... 4

Vice Chair Stayin .................................................................................................................... 1, 3, 7
Commissioner Karpel ..................................................................................................................... 1
Commissioner Schmidtlein ......................................................................................................... 4, 6
E-Mail Request from the Commission ........................................................................................... 1
 1. FAILURE TO SERVE/SALES NEGOTIATIONS

E-Mail Request from the Commission: The Commission requests that in your post-hearing
briefs you include contemporaneous documentation, such as emails, of sales negotiations that
provide information on price negotiation and/or other factors.

Commissioner Karpel: Thank you. For ADM, and for others, namely Gavilon, has Mosaic's
unwillingness to sell to you changed over the period of investigation? I think ADM says
Mosaic hasn't been willing to sell to them since 2015, so that wouldn't seem to be a change
over the POI. Are there other purchasers who have seen a change in Mosaic's willingness to
sell product to them over the period of investigation? (See Hearing Transcript at 267)

Vice Chair Stayin: I want to get back to another issue that struck me in this case, and that's
the whole question of U.S. capacity. I mean, does it -- if you are not -- if you are having
refusals to sell from the largest producer in the United States, the question comes, why would
they refuse? And it's just not one. It's even more than one person that they were faced with
a refusal to sell. And that just -- to me, that's a question that just doesn't make sense. Why?
Take it from there. Does the U.S. industry have the capacity to provide the product being
requested by the buyers in our country? Does it have the capacity to meet U.S. consumption?
(See Hearing Transcript at 319–20)

RESPONSE: The record in these investigations is replete with examples of U.S. producers like

Mosaic declining to serve the U.S. industry for non-price reasons and the lack of availability

dominating discussions with customers. In Gavilon’s experience, this failure to serve began in the

early parts of the POI and after Mosaic closed the Plant City facility. As Gavilon explained in its

preliminary conference testimony:

{T}he closure of Plant City left a massive supply gap in the market
beginning in late 2017. Gavilon Fertilizer was in the middle of a
three-year supply contract with Mosaic to purchase phosphate
fertilizer from this facility when Mosaic closed it, reducing our
supply. Gavilon Fertilizer had to replace that previously assured
supply with purchases from other suppliers, including imports. In
fact, Mosaic cut our supply by 100,000 tons and encouraged us to
buy from elsewhere, including from foreign suppliers. Mosaic’s
decision to close this large U.S. plant caused increased imports to
close the supply gap, not the other way around. Mosaic’s official
closing of the plant and recording the losses on its books in 2019

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was a mere formality – the market effects from the closure took
place beginning in 2017, not 2019. 1/

As a result, due to the late 2017 closure of Plant City, Gavilon’s quantity for 2018 was lowered by

100,000 [ ]. 2/

This pattern continued through the interim period. For example, in a July 2020 email,

]. 3/ A few weeks later, [

] 4/ At the end of July, Gavilon [

] 5/ Gavilon then asked for product out of

[ ]

Mosaic then [ ]. 6/ At no point, did Mosaic state that it would

[ ].

In response to the Commission’s inquiry regarding sales negotiations, Gavilon is including

[ ]. 7/ These emails are noteworthy because

they clearly show [ ].

1/ Preliminary Conference Testimony of Brian Harlander, Gavilon Fertilizer, LLC at para. 10

(emphasis added). See also Exhibit 2, Declaration of [ ].
2/ See Exhibit 3, [ ].
3/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 7, Information on U.S. Industry’s Failure to
Serve. Reattached to the Post-Hearing Brief and Q&A as Exhibit 1A, Information on U.S.
Industry’s Failure to Serve.
4/ Id.
5/ Id.
6/ Id.
7/ See Exhibit 1B, Additional Information on U.S. Industry’s Failure to Serve.

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These emails—and the lack of availability—is reflected in Mosaic’s financial records.

Moreover, in response to Vice Chair Stayin’s question about why there were so many refusals of

service during the POI, Gavilon respectfully submits that the Commission can look to Mosaic’s

financials for the answer:

Operating results for the three months ended September 30, 2020
were unfavorably impacted by lower sales volumes in our
phosphates segment due to inventory limitations resulting from a
very strong spring season. During the quarter, planned maintenance
turnarounds and severe weather negatively impacted third quarter
2020 production volumes, and together with continued customer
demand, limited the company's ability to rebuild inventory levels. 8/

In other words, inventory limitations kept the company from making the type of sales to Gavilon

discussed above, not price.

It is also vital to note that Gavilon has [

]. 9/

8/ Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 1A, The Mosaic Company Form 10-Q, U.S. Sec.
Exchange Comm’n (Nov. 3, 2020) at 32.
9/ See Exhibit 2, Declaration of [ ].
3
 2. SUBJECT IMPORTS IN 2019

Commissioner Schmidtlein: Given the unusually wet weather conditions that everyone
agrees had an impact on demand and the already high inventory levels for both domestic
producers and subject imports, why did imports continue to increase from 2018 to 2019 even
though the bad weather had already started at the end of 2018? (See Hearing Transcript at
222–23)

Commissioner Schmidtlein: How do we square that, though, with the fact that you had
excess capacity in the U.S. industry and that the U.S. industry was sitting on increasing
inventories of a substantial amount. So it's sort of the argument of, well, we need it, there's
a gap, as you say, so these imports were being pulled in. But, when we look at the data, and
it's bracketed, so I can't repeat it, we see a pretty substantial inventory volume and they also
had excess capacity. (See Hearing Transcript at 230)

Chair Kearns: I was listening carefully to your answer to Commissioner Schmidtlein's

question about the increase in imports in 2019 because that was my top question as well, but
I'm afraid I still don't quite understand. I mean, first of all, even if the imports from 2018,
the big increase in imports in 2018 had just evaporated, I wouldn't have expected 2019 to
increase over 2018, and yet they did, and imports didn't evaporate, they were held in
inventory. So when I heard a mention of, you know, it was due to pent up demand -- but if -
- so I don't know if I'm missing something there. {…} (See Hearing Transcript at 239–40)

Commissioner Schmidtlein: Okay, I want to go back to the question I had when we were
talking about the flooding in 2019 and why the imports were continuing to come in. {…} In
around March of 2019, I think, in early spring, it started raining and the fields were so
underwater. It wasn't that they were wet, there was standing water in all of those fields even
during the fall. It continued like 7 or 8 months. And I think the same was true, you know,
the Mississippi River was above flood stage for some crazy number of days in 2019. Right?
All the way from Cape Girardeau up into Nebraska, through Iowa.

So I just want to understand. When I look at the numbers, and these are not confidential. If
you look at the staff report where it shows the imports by month, you see in 2019 that even
going into June, July, August, September, October. So this is -- the water is there. They've
already had the black swan rain, and everything is still flooded, but you have, you still see
potential quantities of imports coming in, in many cases larger on a monthly basis than what
came in in 2018. Right?

So if you look at July of 2018 there was 99,000 tons of subject imports came in. July of 2019
281,000 tons. The rivers had been flooded for months. So why is such a large volume of
subject imports coming in, continuing to come in even thought all of this farmland is literally
under standing water? (See Hearing Transcript at 262–64)

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RESPONSE: Although shipments of subject import increased by 6.2 percent from 2018 to 2019,

the volume of subject imports declined from 2018 to 2019 by nearly 300,000 short tons, or by 9.5

percent. 10/ According to public data, the volume of imports from Petitioner’s affiliated supplier

in Saudi Arabia more than tripled from 2018 to 2019, increasing by nearly 200,000 short tons. 11/

Although subject imports did decline in 2019, subject imports did not halt amidst record

wet weather because the market anticipated improvements in the weather and plantings in spring

2019 and then fall 2019. Subject imports are arranged far in advance of the time of sale. 12/ For

example, Gavilon [

]. [ ] consistent with the fact that the industry was entering into an

anticipated high use period for fall applications. 13/ Farmers’ predictions turned out to be wrong.

The weather did not substantially improve in 2019 as was expected.

Additional imports were required for locations where inventories were depleted,

particularly for purchasers who testified that the domestic industry would not sell to them. 14/ As

10/ Prehearing Report at Tbl. IV-2, Tbl. C-1.

11/ See Exhibit 4, Public Import Data.
12/ See. e.g., Prehearing Brief of [ ] at Exhibit 6, paras. 3–4 (stating that [

]).
13/ See Hearing Tr. at 269.
14/ See. e.g., Hearing Tr. at 264–65, 269–70 (Don Lambert) (“If you look at the USDA
predictions in terms of planted acres, while there’s no doubt you had a bad fall {2018}, There was
still a prediction and there was still anticipation from our buyers and our customers that the acres
were going to get planted . . . {because} the product is misplaced. So you had product, it got
trapped. It couldn’t get to the right locations and in order to fill in the new needs for new demand,
the only way to accurately do it and economically do it is to bring in fresh product”; “{purchasers}
do not bring tons in here on a hope and pray strategy . . . If we didn’t have that demand from our
customers asking us to bring those tons, we wouldn’t have brought them.”); 223–224 (Jake
Niederer) (“it takes a lot amount of time to stop the imports, the import process, if you will, from
the time you procure a vessel, get to port, and bring it here, the contracts that go into making that
. . . We felt there was pent-up demand from the fall of 2018, and so you anticipate alleviating your
inventories . . . And so the fall of ’19 is what I would call your de-inventorying process where
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explained at the Commission’s hearing, inventories were stuck upriver, without the ability to ship

back downriver to supply markets closer to the NOLA port, requiring additional imports in the

undersupplied locations in 2019. 15/ These volumes were imported to meet farmers’ demand

based on their anticipated planting volumes in 2019.

In this regard, the inventorying behavior of subject imports was no different than the

inventorying behavior of U.S. producers in the build-up to the high use period for fall application.

As shown in Table D-1 of the Prehearing Report, the ratio of subject import inventories to U.S.

inventories in 2019 was consistent with the ratios in 2018, especially during the run-up to the fall

application season: 16/

Ratio of Subject Import Inventories to U.S. Inventories

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2018 [ ]
2019 [ ]

In particular, inventory levels of subject imports were [ ] in Q2 and Q3

2020, the time at issue in Commissioner Schmidtlein’s question. Accordingly, it is impossible to

see how subject import’s inventorying behavior in Q2/Q3 2019 could have caused injury to the

domestic industry as it mirrored the traditional ratio between the two groups of products in 2018,

when the domestic industry was very successful.

product is now pushed up into the interior and into the marketplace . . . And so you can’t take
product that’s now clear up in Minnesota back down into the delta. It makes more sense to begin
bringing product back in to supply some of those other terminals”).
15/ See id.
16/ See Prehearing Report at Tbl. D-1 (ratios calculated by dividing subject import inventories
by U.S. inventories).

6
 3. REOPENING OF PLANT CITY

Vice Chair Stayin: What has happened to the Plant City facility? Is it operating, closed, or
just closed completely? (See Hearing Transcript at 321)

RESPONSE: Plant City is being reopened by a new operator, Anuvia, which will establish a

“large, commercial size granulation facility” which, among other things, will be manufacturing a

bio-based fertilizer in partnership with Mosaic. 17/

In fact, Mosaic took an equity position in Anuvia and, in turn, Anuvia licensed its biobased

phosphate fertilizer—SymTRX™10S—exclusively to Mosaic. 18/ According to Anuvia, “{t}his

agreement enables Mosaic to utilize Anuvia’s SymTRX™10S technology to introduce a next-

generation biobased phosphate fertilizer with sulfur to the marketplace under the Mosaic brand

name Susterra. 19/ Of note, all of this happened pre-Petitions.

The investment by Anuvia, which itself is backed by private equity, agriculture, and

chemical interests, 20/ represents a significant investment in the phosphate production capabilities

of Plant City—especially given Anuvia’s plans to increase production at Plant City to 1.2 million

tons. 21/ It also allows Mosaic to shift commodity types of phosphate fertilizer production to

17/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 2, Bradley George, New Life for Mosaic’s Plant
City Fertilizer Factory, WUSF Public Media (Sept. 25, 2019); Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at
Exhibit 2, Anuvia, Anuvia Plant Nutrients’ sustainable products offer high yields, healthier soils
(Nov. 27, 2020); Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 2, The Mosaic Company, New Bio-Based
Fertilizer Susterra Designed to Help Growers Improve Soil Health (Sept. 15, 2020). See also
Prehearing Report at Tbl. III-3.
18/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 2, Anuvia, Anuvia Plant Nutrients Licenses
SymTRX™10S Product to The Mosaic Company (Sept. 15, 2020).
19/ Id.
20/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 2, Anuvia, Anuvia Investor Information (last
updated 2015).
21/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 2, Anuvia, Anuvia Plant Nutrients to Reopen
Mosaic Plant City Facility as Second Florida Location (Sept. 24, 2019).

7
Saudi Arabia and Brazil, while keeping a specialized production line—through Anuvia—in Plant

City along with its other U.S. based specialty product (MicroEssentials). It also allows Mosaic to

develop a U.S.-produced phosphate product that, according to studies done by Mosaic, is in

demand by 86 percent of its phosphate customer base. 22/ But what the twists and turns

surrounding Plant City does not represent is harm caused by subject imports.

In this regard, the fact pattern mirrors that in Glass Containers from China. In that

proceeding, the closure of a glass facility in Georgia was offset by the opening of another glass

facility in the same state. 23/ Here, the fact pattern is even more evident of the lack of injury—

the exact same facility at issue is being re-opened by a phosphate producer with what it believes

is a better phosphate product, which is now going to be sold by Petitioner.

22/ See Prehearing Brief of Gavilon at Exhibit 2, Margy Eckelkamp, Anuvia Gears Up
Production, Strikes Licensing Deal with Mosaic, The Scoop (Sept. 30, 2020).
23/ See Glass Containers from China, Inv. No. 701-TA-630 (Final), USITC Pub. 5068 (June
2020) at 44 (discussing a new entrant’s large capital investment in a customized product).

8
 PUBLIC VERSION
PUBUC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED
DELETED FROM
FROM BRACKETS
BRACKETS

GAVILON FERTILIZER, LLC

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

POSTHEARING BRIEF IN
PHOSPHATE FERTILIZERS FROM MOROCCO AND RUSSIA
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-650-651 (Final)

Exhibit List

Exhibit No. Description Status

Exhibit 1 Information on U.S. Industry's Failure to Serve BPI
Exhibit 1-A Information on U.S. Industry's Failure to Serve BPI
Exhibit 1-B Additional Information on U.S. Industry's Failure to Serve BPI

Exhibit 2 Declaration of [ ] BPI

Exhibit 3 [ ] BPI
Exhibit 4 Public Import Data PUB
 EXHIBIT 1

Information on U.S. Industry’s Failure to

Serve
 EXHIBIT 1A

Information on U.S. Industry’s Failure to

Serve
Not Capable of
Public Summary

PUBLIC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED FROM BRACKETS
 EXHIBIT 1B

Additional Information on U.S. Industry’s

Failure to Serve
Not Capable of
Public Summary

PUBLIC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED FROM BRACKETS
 PUBLIC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED FROM BRACKETS

EXHIBIT 2

Declaration of [ ]
Not Capable of
Public Summary

PUBLIC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED FROM BRACKETS
 PUBLIC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED FROM BRACKETS

EXHIBIT 3

[ ]
Not Capable of
Public Summary

PUBLIC VERSION
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED FROM BRACKETS
 EXHIBIT 4

Public Import Data

 Quantity
(Short Tons)

Country Quantity Description Year 2017 Year 2018 Year 2019 Year 2020 2020 JAN 2020 FEB 2020 MAR 2020 APR 2020 MAY 2020 JUN 2020 JUL 2020 AUG 2020 SEP 2020 OCT 2020 NOV 2020 DEC
Morocco short tons 1,519,089 2,014,458 2,258,660 1,068,246 178,949 64,265 206,070 293,500 208,959 60,814 55,689 0 0 0 0 0
Russia short tons 577,236 1,032,067 845,789 449,221 131,653 32,024 125,393 18,819 20,841 1,612 1,971 14,365 10,599 56,076 35,337 531
Saudi Arabia short tons 36,792 90,249 288,338 319,692 0 12,120 55,302 35,651 0 0 0 0 60,627 60,023 95,969 0
Mexico short tons 41,780 151,840 177,464 178,346 2,090 2,275 2,597 1,722 1,749 1,801 2,884 1,670 2,235 34,915 42,784 81,624
Israel short tons 199,472 259,554 152,017 198,512 28,671 25,630 148 35,347 688 1,715 24,854 25,241 26,525 27,538 1,312 844
Norway short tons 57,846 63,566 77,099 74,156 4,446 7,134 6,053 9,908 12,712 0 5,293 8,559 0 0 9,640 10,411
Canada short tons 137,115 100,711 72,858 104,657 2,211 7,411 10,566 9,894 19,998 6,561 2,945 7,131 11,040 10,871 7,212 8,816
Lithuania short tons 2,577 45,235 36,709 147,316 37 12,678 16,604 337 88 0 15,162 20 15,496 30,124 34,723 22,046
Finland short tons 17,741 24,771 25,076 21,522 0 3,607 37 0 3,516 0 37 7,121 0 3,524 0 3,678
Japan short tons 12,991 13,767 11,387 9,420 1,563 529 1,154 1,541 1,319 628 854 1,093 699 3 23 12
Belgium short tons 6,400 7,326 6,959 14,145 160 255 259 549 1,825 3,017 2,086 2,517 1,975 671 79 752
China short tons 158,701 29,642 6,799 7,372 658 455 201 798 737 930 909 721 299 1,009 365 290
Greece short tons 1,444 1,603 4,964 2,089 0 0 79 0 0 2,010 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia short tons 478 951 2,498 4,670 196 557 1,174 1,570 1,069 105 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands short tons 2,224 2,153 2,133 3,924 551 885 82 483 497 97 358 485 118 85 163 120
South Africa short tons 294 1,136 1,851 1,105 572 9 299 162 0 50 13 0 0 0 0 0
Australia short tons 5,428 92,927 2,003 215,851 874 151 46 30 140 0 0 450 853 110,438 102,228 640
Brazil short tons 248 3,219 1,743 163 0 99 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 33 0 0
Spain short tons 5,372 6,582 1,687 1,274 0 211 53 192 142 0 11 20 0 95 379 172
United Kingdom short tons 3,046 1,770 1,375 395 44 21 56 34 72 0 86 22 0 0 36 23
Germany short tons 5,684 1,927 1,260 935 100 142 61 63 117 161 86 107 20 21 57 0
Latvia short tons 0 391 817 31 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan short tons 187 923 610 397 397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India short tons 302 697 503 1,054 0 21 228 165 31 0 116 33 54 126 193 87
Egypt short tons 0 304 403 50,725 0 0 53 150 53 0 185 6,116 30,059 14,110 0 0
Dominican Rep short tons 0 239 284 1,808 54 6 137 54 163 245 188 316 175 137 280 53
Monaco short tons 0 0 190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France short tons 898 122 112 84 0 0 0 0 1 60 23 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia short tons 218 188 88 68 0 0 22 0 24 22 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy short tons 218 244 69 137 4 0 0 73 58 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Poland short tons 54 18 61 129 15 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 97 1 0 0
Switzerland short tons 0 0 61 820 20 20 79 0 20 79 60 0 384 79 20 60
United Arab Em short tons 278 238 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria short tons 0 0 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand short tons 0 0 49 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0
Czech Republic short tons 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore short tons 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria short tons 0 0 0 69 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 0 0 0
Belize short tons 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria short tons 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile short tons 434 231 0 74 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 23
Colombia short tons 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica short tons 0 0 0 188 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 132
Denmark short tons 0 118 0 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 106 0
Estonia short tons 4 994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong short tons 22 1,058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jordan short tons 0 0 0 34,737 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34,737 0 0 0
Lebanon short tons 0 0 0 55,116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,069 0 22,046 0 0
Madagascar short tons 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia short tons 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Zealand short tons 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Senegal short tons 0 30,175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia short tons 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea short tons 269 12 0 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 44 18 14 11
Sweden short tons 11 1 0 86 7 0 0 0 40 0 40 0 0 0 0 0
Trin & Tobago short tons 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey short tons 801 387 0 21 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total (1 Metric Ton = 1.10231 Short Ton) 2,795,816 3,981,851 3,982,034 2,968,815 353,297 170,503 426,828 411,040 274,949 79,906 113,865 109,098 196,082 371,997 330,922 130,327
 Quantity
(Metric Tons)

Country Quantity Description Year 2017 Year 2018 Year 2019 Year 2020 2020 JAN 2020 FEB 2020 MAR 2020 APR 2020 MAY 2020 JUN 2020 JUL 2020 AUG 2020 SEP 2020 OCT 2020 NOV 2020 DEC
Morocco metric tons 1,378,096 1,827,488 2,049,024 969,098 162,340 58,300 186,944 266,259 189,565 55,170 50,520 0 0 0 0 0
Russia metric tons 523,660 936,277 767,288 407,527 119,434 29,052 113,755 17,072 18,907 1,462 1,788 13,032 9,615 50,871 32,057 482
Saudi Arabia metric tons 33,377 81,873 261,576 290,020 0 10,995 50,169 32,342 0 0 0 0 55,000 54,452 87,062 0
Mexico metric tons 37,902 137,747 160,993 161,793 1,896 2,064 2,356 1,562 1,587 1,634 2,616 1,515 2,028 31,674 38,813 74,048
Israel metric tons 180,958 235,464 137,908 180,087 26,010 23,251 134 32,066 624 1,556 22,547 22,898 24,063 24,982 1,190 766
Norway metric tons 52,477 57,666 69,943 67,273 4,033 6,472 5,491 8,988 11,532 0 4,802 7,765 0 0 8,745 9,445
Canada metric tons 124,389 91,364 66,096 94,943 2,006 6,723 9,585 8,976 18,142 5,952 2,672 6,469 10,015 9,862 6,543 7,998
Lithuania metric tons 2,338 41,037 33,302 133,643 34 11,501 15,063 306 80 0 13,755 18 14,058 27,328 31,500 20,000
Finland metric tons 16,094 22,472 22,749 19,524 0 3,272 34 0 3,190 0 34 6,460 0 3,197 0 3,337
Japan metric tons 11,785 12,489 10,330 8,546 1,418 480 1,047 1,398 1,197 570 775 992 634 3 21 11
Belgium metric tons 5,806 6,646 6,313 12,832 145 231 235 498 1,656 2,737 1,892 2,283 1,792 609 72 682
China metric tons 143,971 26,891 6,168 6,688 597 413 182 724 669 844 825 654 271 915 331 263
Greece metric tons 1,310 1,454 4,503 1,895 0 0 72 0 0 1,823 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia metric tons 434 863 2,266 4,237 178 505 1,065 1,424 970 95 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands metric tons 2,018 1,953 1,935 3,560 500 803 74 438 451 88 325 440 107 77 148 109
South Africa metric tons 267 1,031 1,679 1,002 519 8 271 147 0 45 12 0 0 0 0 0
Australia metric tons 4,924 84,302 1,817 195,817 793 137 42 27 127 0 0 408 774 100,188 92,740 581
Brazil metric tons 225 2,920 1,581 148 0 90 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 30 0 0
Spain metric tons 4,873 5,971 1,530 1,156 0 191 48 174 129 0 10 18 0 86 344 156
United Kingdom metric tons 2,763 1,606 1,247 358 40 19 51 31 65 0 78 20 0 0 33 21
Germany metric tons 5,156 1,748 1,143 848 91 129 55 57 106 146 78 97 18 19 52 0
Latvia metric tons 0 355 741 28 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan metric tons 170 837 553 360 360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India metric tons 274 632 456 956 0 19 207 150 28 0 105 30 49 114 175 79
Egypt metric tons 0 276 366 46,017 0 0 48 136 48 0 168 5,548 27,269 12,800 0 0
Dominican Rep metric tons 0 217 258 1,640 49 5 124 49 148 222 171 287 159 124 254 48
Monaco metric tons 0 0 172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France metric tons 815 111 102 76 0 0 0 0 1 54 21 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia metric tons 198 171 80 62 0 0 20 0 22 20 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy metric tons 198 221 63 124 4 0 0 66 53 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Poland metric tons 49 16 55 117 14 0 0 0 0 0 13 1 88 1 0 0
Switzerland metric tons 0 0 55 744 18 18 72 0 18 72 54 0 348 72 18 54
United Arab Em metric tons 252 216 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria metric tons 0 0 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand metric tons 0 0 44 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0
Czech Republic metric tons 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore metric tons 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria metric tons 0 0 0 63 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 0
Belize metric tons 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria metric tons 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile metric tons 394 210 0 67 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 21
Colombia metric tons 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica metric tons 0 0 0 171 0 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 120
Denmark metric tons 0 107 0 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0
Estonia metric tons 4 902 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong metric tons 20 960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jordan metric tons 0 0 0 31,513 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,513 0 0 0
Lebanon metric tons 0 0 0 50,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,000 0 20,000 0 0
Madagascar metric tons 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia metric tons 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Zealand metric tons 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Senegal metric tons 0 27,374 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia metric tons 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea metric tons 244 11 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 40 16 13 10
Sweden metric tons 10 1 0 78 6 0 0 0 36 0 36 0 0 0 0 0
Trin & Tobago metric tons 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey metric tons 727 351 0 19 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total (1 Metric Ton = 1.10231 Short Ton) 2,536,325 3,612,279 3,612,445 2,693,267 320,506 154,678 387,212 372,890 249,430 72,490 103,297 98,972 177,883 337,470 300,208 118,231
 Landed Duty-Paid Value
(US Dollars)

Country Quantity Description Year 2017 Year 2018 Year 2019 Year 2020 2020 JAN 2020 FEB 2020 MAR 2020 APR 2020 MAY 2020 JUN 2020 JUL 2020 AUG 2020 SEP 2020 OCT 2020 NOV 2020 DEC
Morocco US Dollars 493,787,715 788,881,314 750,970,949 286,568,295 42,189,880 18,191,752 56,624,275 81,143,154 56,923,125 16,237,544 15,258,565 0 0 0 0 0
Russia US Dollars 189,769,637 400,251,972 314,840,746 130,258,685 34,804,962 8,884,245 33,645,884 5,336,082 6,731,457 1,132,094 1,326,221 4,799,193 3,889,419 18,527,692 10,824,427 357,009
Saudi Arabia US Dollars 11,389,965 32,638,425 94,948,639 97,266,928 0 2,553,850 14,350,656 10,791,964 0 0 0 0 20,405,963 18,293,477 30,871,018 0
Mexico US Dollars 29,720,719 76,816,826 75,556,818 72,473,009 2,014,610 2,155,526 2,489,727 1,089,478 1,170,286 1,543,479 2,414,680 1,394,599 1,901,738 12,446,286 14,943,682 28,908,918
Israel US Dollars 63,034,029 90,528,819 52,694,382 52,346,174 5,905,130 5,841,846 183,849 8,918,474 759,724 777,940 5,828,311 6,180,524 7,729,643 8,007,936 1,348,639 864,158
Norway US Dollars 19,757,784 23,420,572 29,261,942 25,503,206 1,521,233 2,484,243 1,931,600 3,414,958 4,235,867 0 1,841,087 2,763,574 0 0 3,451,949 3,858,695
Canada US Dollars 31,444,645 30,691,093 29,406,819 34,950,290 1,481,728 2,297,446 3,061,251 5,375,152 7,365,372 2,369,218 1,819,187 1,848,242 2,476,499 2,147,185 2,233,323 2,475,687
Lithuania US Dollars 951,930 18,181,439 11,371,933 41,491,929 37,522 3,157,722 4,020,298 279,435 100,080 0 4,151,100 17,210 4,399,927 8,022,469 10,712,463 6,593,703
Finland US Dollars 7,315,336 11,372,518 11,926,158 9,559,839 0 1,444,339 17,270 0 1,709,785 0 16,397 3,050,945 0 1,469,825 0 1,851,278
Japan US Dollars 17,245,893 17,800,822 16,517,416 13,403,560 2,351,454 1,012,137 1,536,195 2,167,912 1,847,258 893,411 1,066,852 1,525,161 936,143 13,989 39,820 13,228
Belgium US Dollars 6,034,268 7,595,782 7,261,954 13,240,641 215,083 331,810 351,678 688,473 1,645,477 2,765,012 1,863,769 2,201,589 1,770,018 642,547 91,570 673,615
China US Dollars 54,473,151 21,677,271 4,993,175 5,999,111 503,956 371,076 170,829 743,010 591,074 858,990 653,673 514,325 265,463 837,220 234,775 254,720
Greece US Dollars 840,104 1,026,300 3,136,205 1,388,316 0 0 85,780 0 0 1,302,536 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia US Dollars 158,093 312,197 778,307 1,468,710 61,025 173,025 370,806 493,873 337,095 32,886 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands US Dollars 2,037,717 1,965,197 2,833,732 3,789,271 183,768 405,310 67,895 608,808 699,528 155,280 416,802 720,709 154,669 96,728 170,642 109,132
South Africa US Dollars 102,290 390,080 3,602,551 1,188,421 419,057 10,489 301,790 128,381 0 310,785 17,919 0 0 0 0 0
Australia US Dollars 1,862,248 37,859,029 2,451,840 79,837,602 716,269 214,506 105,060 122,253 165,807 0 0 765,760 1,093,482 36,020,742 39,994,741 638,982
Brazil US Dollars 306,189 2,636,512 1,478,422 313,902 0 218,997 0 0 58,479 0 0 0 0 36,426 0 0
Spain US Dollars 1,990,832 2,971,942 1,282,742 1,355,145 0 290,450 67,120 145,858 172,850 0 83,091 32,287 0 49,922 330,098 183,469
United Kingdom US Dollars 1,130,388 1,036,089 1,520,969 920,560 132,245 54,712 161,977 94,669 219,287 0 126,150 23,123 0 0 67,654 40,743
Germany US Dollars 1,163,685 1,085,728 1,342,161 1,212,390 132,983 205,489 76,371 89,820 129,107 176,331 122,013 131,913 25,790 29,415 93,158 0
Latvia US Dollars 0 237,601 529,916 24,200 0 0 24,200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan US Dollars 113,874 459,250 368,748 229,620 229,620 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India US Dollars 106,614 293,927 547,726 733,715 0 46,148 71,852 85,194 44,017 0 52,504 36,740 52,412 146,545 70,871 127,432
Egypt US Dollars 0 175,128 241,953 14,969,862 0 0 30,676 89,420 28,420 0 99,320 1,790,840 8,758,130 4,173,056 0 0
Dominican Rep US Dollars 0 89,730 116,900 638,965 22,217 2,246 51,972 19,885 57,638 87,760 72,275 107,068 66,018 38,735 94,119 19,032
Monaco US Dollars 0 0 87,360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France US Dollars 480,187 150,925 74,756 65,722 0 0 0 0 2,516 41,841 21,365 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia US Dollars 105,649 89,994 47,807 33,404 0 0 11,198 0 11,103 11,103 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy US Dollars 152,218 282,892 291,132 548,994 11,700 0 0 307,924 224,444 0 0 4,926 0 0 0 0
Poland US Dollars 58,763 21,618 20,873 116,858 45,229 0 0 0 0 0 11,886 6,467 44,169 9,107 0 0
Switzerland US Dollars 0 0 171,651 733,196 19,555 19,555 78,220 0 18,761 78,220 57,871 0 299,766 79,588 20,415 61,245
United Arab Em US Dollars 376,190 294,754 76,200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria US Dollars 0 0 21,770 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand US Dollars 0 0 27,340 40,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40,000 0 0
Czech Republic US Dollars 0 0 5,084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore US Dollars 0 0 3,432 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria US Dollars 0 0 0 38,591 18,205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,386 0 0 0
Belize US Dollars 0 12,800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria US Dollars 3,997 3,861 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile US Dollars 370,200 201,645 0 61,178 0 0 18,780 0 0 0 0 19,308 0 0 0 23,090
Colombia US Dollars 0 18,300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica US Dollars 0 0 0 104,293 0 0 0 0 45,350 0 0 0 0 0 0 58,943
Denmark US Dollars 0 41,093 0 81,225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81,225 0
Estonia US Dollars 28,896 159,001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong US Dollars 13,006 645,167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jordan US Dollars 0 0 0 10,946,763 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,946,763 0 0 0
Lebanon US Dollars 0 0 0 5,319,600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,393,400 0 5,319,600 0 0
Madagascar US Dollars 0 2,705 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia US Dollars 59,740 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Zealand US Dollars 23,000 0 0 2,766 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,766 0
Senegal US Dollars 0 11,087,908 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia US Dollars 0 6,900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea US Dollars 39,295 16,955 0 171,114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14,401 52,081 17,270 15,361 72,001
Sweden US Dollars 12,703 5,208 0 72,267 5,675 0 0 0 33,296 0 33,296 0 0 0 0 0
Trin & Tobago US Dollars 10,615 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey US Dollars 308,082 223,386 0 32,087 0 0 32,087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 936,779,647 1,583,660,675 1,420,810,508 909,500,404 93,023,106 50,366,919 119,939,296 122,134,177 85,327,203 28,774,430 37,354,334 35,342,304 65,288,479 116,465,760 115,692,716 47,185,080
 Average Unit Value
(USD/Short Ton)

Country Quantity Description Year 2017 Year 2018 Year 2019 Year 2020 2020 JAN 2020 FEB 2020 MAR 2020 APR 2020 MAY 2020 JUN 2020 JUL 2020 AUG 2020 SEP 2020 OCT 2020 NOV 2020 DEC
Morocco US Dollar/Short Ton 325.06 391.61 332.49 268.26 235.76 283.08 274.78 276.47 272.41 267.00 274.00 - - - - -
Russia US Dollar/Short Ton 328.76 387.82 372.24 289.97 264.37 277.42 268.32 283.55 322.99 702.48 672.89 334.08 366.97 330.41 306.32 671.94
Saudi Arabia US Dollar/Short Ton 309.58 361.65 329.30 304.25 - 210.72 259.50 302.71 - - - - 336.58 304.77 321.68 -
Mexico US Dollar/Short Ton 711.37 505.91 425.76 406.36 963.94 947.41 958.68 632.75 668.98 856.93 837.37 835.09 850.71 356.48 349.28 354.17
Israel US Dollar/Short Ton 316.00 348.79 346.63 263.69 205.96 227.93 1,244.67 252.31 1,104.50 453.56 234.50 244.86 291.41 290.80 1,028.12 1,023.44
Norway US Dollar/Short Ton 341.56 368.45 379.54 343.91 342.19 348.22 319.13 344.68 333.22 - 347.82 322.87 - - 358.10 370.63
Canada US Dollar/Short Ton 229.33 304.74 403.62 333.95 670.09 310.01 289.74 543.26 368.30 361.11 617.64 259.19 224.33 197.52 309.65 280.81
Lithuania US Dollar/Short Ton 369.37 401.93 309.78 281.65 1,001.16 249.08 242.13 828.43 1,134.89 - 273.78 867.37 283.93 266.32 308.51 299.09
Finland US Dollar/Short Ton 412.35 459.10 475.59 444.20 - 400.45 460.80 - 486.24 - 437.50 428.45 - 417.08 - 503.28
Japan US Dollar/Short Ton 1,327.55 1,293.03 1,450.57 1,422.83 1,504.38 1,912.91 1,331.05 1,406.79 1,400.01 1,421.91 1,248.82 1,394.76 1,339.52 4,230.21 1,720.20 1,090.93
Belgium US Dollar/Short Ton 942.85 1,036.83 1,043.55 936.08 1,345.66 1,303.09 1,357.61 1,254.16 901.42 916.47 893.65 874.84 896.06 957.16 1,153.76 896.03
China US Dollar/Short Ton 343.24 731.30 734.39 813.74 765.80 815.10 851.50 931.01 801.52 923.30 718.79 713.44 888.65 830.07 643.46 878.62
Greece US Dollar/Short Ton 581.78 640.33 631.83 664.62 - - 1,080.81 - - 648.19 - - - - - -
Slovakia US Dollar/Short Ton 330.46 328.18 311.59 314.47 311.02 310.82 315.86 314.63 315.27 314.04 - - - - - -
Netherlands US Dollar/Short Ton 916.05 912.85 1,328.54 965.61 333.42 457.90 832.34 1,260.96 1,407.10 1,600.77 1,163.44 1,485.95 1,311.34 1,139.61 1,045.97 908.28
South Africa US Dollar/Short Ton 347.55 343.23 1,946.51 1,075.97 732.49 1,189.43 1,010.26 792.28 - 6,265.33 1,354.66 - - - - -
Australia US Dollar/Short Ton 343.10 407.41 1,224.15 369.87 819.41 1,420.41 2,269.26 4,107.64 1,184.39 - - 1,702.66 1,281.64 326.16 391.23 997.72
Brazil US Dollar/Short Ton 1,234.53 819.11 848.33 1,924.10 - 2,207.46 - - 1,894.69 - - - - 1,101.51 - -
Spain US Dollar/Short Ton 370.62 451.53 760.58 1,063.47 - 1,379.54 1,268.55 760.46 1,215.56 - 7,537.90 1,627.24 - 526.61 870.52 1,066.93
United Kingdom US Dollar/Short Ton 371.14 585.26 1,106.50 2,332.73 2,999.27 2,612.31 2,881.24 2,770.40 3,060.52 - 1,467.20 1,048.84 - - 1,859.84 1,760.07
Germany US Dollar/Short Ton 204.75 563.48 1,065.26 1,297.01 1,325.72 1,445.09 1,259.69 1,429.53 1,104.94 1,095.65 1,419.08 1,233.71 1,299.80 1,404.47 1,625.22 -
Latvia US Dollar/Short Ton - 607.18 648.76 784.07 - - 784.07 - - - - - - - - -
Taiwan US Dollar/Short Ton 607.68 497.76 604.92 578.63 578.63 - - - - - - - - - - -
India US Dollar/Short Ton 352.99 421.91 1,089.67 696.25 - 2,203.41 314.89 515.25 1,426.13 - 453.63 1,111.00 970.36 1,166.17 367.39 1,463.35
Egypt US Dollar/Short Ton - 575.63 599.72 295.12 - - 579.77 596.47 537.13 - 536.32 292.83 291.37 295.76 - -
Dominican Rep US Dollar/Short Ton - 375.12 411.05 353.45 411.33 407.51 380.23 368.15 353.30 358.62 383.43 338.43 376.67 283.39 336.16 359.70
Monaco US Dollar/Short Ton - - 460.77 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
France US Dollar/Short Ton 534.50 1,233.49 664.88 784.50 - - - - 2,282.48 702.92 922.95 - - - - -
Indonesia US Dollar/Short Ton 484.06 477.43 542.12 488.77 - - 507.93 - 457.84 503.62 - - - - - -
Italy US Dollar/Short Ton 697.42 1,161.25 4,192.24 4,016.45 2,653.52 - - 4,232.49 3,841.74 - - 4,468.80 - - - -
Poland US Dollar/Short Ton 1,087.94 1,225.72 344.29 906.08 2,930.79 - - - - - 829.45 5,866.77 455.34 8,261.74 - -
Switzerland US Dollar/Short Ton - - 2,831.26 894.01 985.56 985.56 985.56 - 945.54 985.56 972.22 - 781.45 1,002.79 1,028.90 1,028.90
United Arab Em US Dollar/Short Ton 1,354.26 1,237.95 1,280.14 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Algeria US Dollar/Short Ton - - 372.63 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Thailand US Dollar/Short Ton - - 563.69 725.75 - - - - - - - - - 725.75 - -
Czech Republic US Dollar/Short Ton - - 4,612.13 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Singapore US Dollar/Short Ton - - 3,113.46 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Austria US Dollar/Short Ton - - - 555.70 786.44 - - - - - - - 440.33 - - -
Belize US Dollar/Short Ton - 645.11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bulgaria US Dollar/Short Ton 1,813.01 1,167.55 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Chile US Dollar/Short Ton 852.39 871.09 - 828.36 - - 811.28 - - - - 700.64 - - - 997.47
Colombia US Dollar/Short Ton - 830.08 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Costa Rica US Dollar/Short Ton - - - 553.29 - - - - 806.68 - - - - - - 445.60
Denmark US Dollar/Short Ton - 348.40 - 767.56 - - - - - - - - - - 767.56 -
Estonia US Dollar/Short Ton 6,553.51 159.92 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Hong Kong US Dollar/Short Ton 589.94 609.67 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Jordan US Dollar/Short Ton - - - 315.13 - - - - - - - - 315.13 - - -
Lebanon US Dollar/Short Ton - - - 96.52 - - - - - - - 223.57 - 241.29 - -
Madagascar US Dollar/Short Ton - 350.56 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Malaysia US Dollar/Short Ton 497.20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
New Zealand US Dollar/Short Ton 3,477.55 - - 2,509.28 - - - - - - - - - - 2,509.28 -
Senegal US Dollar/Short Ton - 367.46 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Slovenia US Dollar/Short Ton - 6,259.58 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
South Korea US Dollar/Short Ton 146.10 1,398.30 - 1,724.80 - - - - - - - 1,187.67 1,181.18 979.19 1,071.94 6,531.83
Sweden US Dollar/Short Ton 1,152.40 4,724.62 - 840.51 858.05 - - - 839.05 - 839.05 - - - - -
Trin & Tobago US Dollar/Short Ton 320.99 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Turkey US Dollar/Short Ton 384.44 577.36 - 1,532.05 - - 1,532.05 - - - - - - - - -

Total 335.06 397.72 356.81 306.35 263.30 295.40 281.00 297.13 310.34 360.10 328.06 323.95 332.96 313.08 349.61 362.05
Download Date February 8, 2021, 10:29 AM
Step 1: Trade Flow and Classification System
Trade Flow Imports For Consumption
Classification System HTS Items
Step 2: Data and Years
Data To Report First Unit of Quantity, Landed Duty-Paid Value
Data Format 1
Years 2017-2019, 2020
Timeframe Aggregation Annual, Monthly
Step 3: Countries
Select Type Use All Countries
Country Aggregation Break Out Countries
Step 4: Commodities
Select Type Select Individual Commodities
31031900, 31055900, 31052000, 31031100,
Commodity List 31055100, 31054000, 31053000
Commodity Aggregation Level 8
Commodity Aggregation Aggregate Commodities
Description Display NO
Step 5: Programs
Select Type Use All Programs
Import Program Aggregation Aggregate CSC
Step 6: Rate Provision Codes
Select Type Use All Provision Codes
Provision Code Aggregation Aggregate RPCODE
Step 7: Districts
Select Type Use All Districts
District Aggregation Aggregate District
Step 8: Report Layout
Column Order COUNTRY
Column Sort Order
Percent Change Column Unchecked
Show All Checked
Enable Subtotals Unchecked