Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems

and Vote Pooling

Paul Mitchell

Department of Government
London School of Economics

Electoral System Design for Divided Societies

Single Member Alternative Vote (AV) List PR Single Transferable Communal Rolls
Plurality (SMP) Vote (STV)

Plurality system in A majoritarian Proportional Proportional Explicit recognition of

single member electoral system representation representation ethnic groups in
districts. A (usually in using party lists. using an ordinal the electoral
‘winner-takes- single member Fairly represents all ballot in multi system, for
all’ system that districts), with significant groups member example via
can be an ordinal ballot, and can then use constituencies. each
dangerous for on which their Delivers ‘community’
divided societies electors can representatives as proportional having its own
since minorities rank order their the building blocs of results, electoral roll,
can be choices: 1, 2, a power-sharing encourages which elects
permanently 3 . . .etc. settlement. With centripetal party only members
excluded from Horowitz has consociationalism competition via of ‘its’ group to
power. Tends to advocated it, each group can be the desire to parliament.
over represent believing it represented in attract second Provides no real
the largest contains cabinet and and subsequent incentives for
party, incentives government in preferences cooperation.
sometimes towards proportion to their (hence may More common are
massively so. moderation electoral strength. promote inter- ‘reserved
Expected to because parties Minority interests ethnic appeal). seats’ for
lead towards a may need to are further Allows voters a certain ethnic or
small party attract second protected through choice of parties minority groups.
system. and later mutual vetoes, and and candidates Another type:
Not generally preferences community within parties. pre-determined
recommended from other autonomy in cultural ethnically
for divided ethnic groups. matters. composed lists
societies. Enhances leaders
security.
UK, USA, India Australia; Papua South Africa (1994-); Ireland; Northern Fiji; India; Lebanon;
New Guinea most of Europe Ireland; Malta Singapore

1
 Type of Electoral System by past Colonial History (%)
UK France Portugal Spain NL Belgium SU Other None All

Majoritarian 80 63 10 67 30 50 36 49.4

SMP 63 11 67 4 43 26 29.3

2RS 5 39 5 26 7 10 13

Other (AV,
12 13 5 7.1
bloc, SNTV

Mixed
5 14 14 28 34 14 21 15.7
Member

MM-parallel 3 14 14 14 30 14 5 11.4

MM-PR 2 14 4 16 4.3

PR 15 21 86 62 100 37 36 42 34.8

List-PR 12 21 86 62 100 33 37 36 42 33.7

STV 3 1.1

No of States 59 28 7 21 4 3 27 16 19 1843

SMP engineers ‘Majority Dictators’

•  In places with plural segmental cleavages, based on some kind of

ethnic, racial or language divisions there is a tendency for group
identity and political preferences to assume an ascriptive character.

•  There is a tendency towards the development of ethnic party

systems in which elections take on a ‘census-like’ quality and the
pattern of competition becomes centrifugal.

•  In these circumstances, the almost universal wisdom of political

scientists is that SMP, risks turning plurality winners into majority
dictators, and tends to result in the near permanent exclusion of
minorities.

2
 Although there are people who still argue that SMP
is appropriate for democratising states
•  For example Joel Barkan – thinks that SMP works well in ‘agrarian
states’ (by which he means most of Africa).

•  See his debate with Andrew Reynolds (in the Journal of Democracy
1995).

•  More typically . . .

•  Lijphart consistently advocates PR-List Systems, whereas Horowitz

makes a case for the Alternative Vote (AV) believing it to be
significantly different from SMP.

•  We will compare List-PR, AV and STV.

•  But before doing so – let's look more generally at the key differences
of opinion between the power-sharing and integrative approaches. 5

Power-Sharing or Integrative Approaches

•  There has been a difference of opinion as to which

approach has the best prospects.

•  With the consociational power-sharing approach the ethnic

groups, usually by means of ethnically exclusive political
parties), become the building blocs of a settlement.

•  By contrast integrative or incentive-based approaches seek

to devise institutions and incentives which transcend, or at
least cross-cut and fragment ethnic group cleavages.

3
Horowitz: ‘the consociational model contains no mechanism’

•  ‘Ironically, the models that lay out plans for consensual rather than
adversary politics do not explain how to obtain consent to a consensual
plan’ (H 1991, 148).

•  Horowitz cautions against the consociational logic and argues that

proportionality followed by post-election executive coalitions have often
proven highly unstable in divided societies – they tend to be short-lived
and fall apart.

•  He calls the consociational grand coalitions mere “coalitions of

convenience”, because they are arranged simply to form a government
that has just more than 50% support in parliament – rather than for the
purposes of interethnic compromise.

•  ‘Unless there is an incentive to compromise over ethnic issues, the mere

need to form a coalition will not produce compromise. The incentive to
compromise, and not merely the incentive to coalesce, is the key to
accommodation’ (1991, 171).
7

For Horowitz what is the central task?

•  He was consciously writing about South Africa here but the point is more
general:
–  ‘The challenge is to take an environment conducive to ethnic and racial
allegiances in the party system and create incentives for parties to bid for
floating voters who would otherwise vote their group identity. From what we
know of the politics of deeply divided societies, the choice may well be to see
voters floating in the political system or floating in the river’ (1991, 203).

•  Horowitz places a great deal of emphasis on electoral systems which he

says (para-phrasing Sartori) are ‘by far the most powerful lever of
constitutional engineering for accommodation and harmony in severely
divided societies’ (163).
•  And he believes his approach, unlike CD, has a ‘mechanism’:
–  ‘Weaving concern for the interests of others into the fabric of political
calculations is completely different from prescribing altruism ex
cathedra’ (148)

4
 What should an electoral system aim at?

•  The different prescriptive recommendations made by Horowitz and

Lijphart arise because they define the main aim of an electoral system in
a divided society in quite different terms.

•  For Lijphart, proportionality is the key to fairness between groups, and

political stability is achieved by coalitions of leaders engaging in power-
sharing.

•  For Horowitz, proportionality is not the central aim:

–  ‘the test of a good electoral system is not to be found merely in the ratio of
seats to votes or in the number of parties that emerge. The test . .[is] does
the electoral system dispose the parties to ethnic and racial inclusion or
exclusion? Will one system, rather than another, encourage parties to seek
intergroup compromise and accomodation’ (1991, 165, emphasis added)

Pre-ballot Versus post-electoral coalitions.

•  In the consociational approach coalitions are formed after an election –

as a necessary expedient to govern a divided society..

•  Instead he advocates what he calls ‘coalitions of commitment’, alliances

that he believes will be more enduring.

•  Coalitions before elections are either formed as coalitions of parties

forming pre-electoral pacts (‘vote-pooling’), or by a party with multi-
ethnic candidates.

•  This leads Horowitz to caution against Lijphart’s preference for List-

System PR: in which voters simply pick one party – which almost
certainly will be exclusively for their own ethnic group.

•  Instead he prefers systems in which subsequent preferences may be

important, such as the single transferable vote (STV) and alternative vote
(AV).
10

5
 ‘Vote pooling . . . is the engine of compromise’ (175)

•  As an alternative to CD Horowitz advocates what he calls ‘coalitions of

commitment’.

•  Politicians and parties must be incentivised to pool votes rather than

merely pool seats.

•  Inducing parties through the electoral rules to attract not just first
preference votes from their natural constituency, but to premise their
electoral success on widening their campaigns to other groups through
the need to attract second and subsequent preferences.

•  The general idea is that providing incentives for candidates of one group
to attract the votes of other groups would encourage parties to moderate
their appeals.

•  The need for lower preferences induces centripetal appeals that have to
be more moderate to be credible
11

Incentives

•  Consociationalism relies on constraints against immoderate politics –

rather than provides incentives towards moderation.

•  ‘The approach I have advocated is to adopt an electoral system that will

make moderation rewarding by making politicians reciprocally dependent
on the votes of members of groups other than their own. The
dependence is only marginal, of course, but it will sometimes be the
margin of victory. Since the parties must pool votes rather than merely
pool seats, they must find ways before the election to communicate their
ethnically and racially conciliatory intentions to the voters. After the
election they must deliver on those commitments or risk electoral
retribution.’ (Horowitz 1991, 196)

12

6
 Realism

•  Horowitz believes that his vote-pooling prescription has the advantage

over consociationalism of requiring only rational electoral actors rather
than necessarily ‘enlightened leadership’, because its incentives work
mostly at the voter level and do not require ‘elite cartels’

–  ‘these mechanisms work at the voter level, not at the elite level. They
contemplate no elite cartel, no monopoly control over the groups . . . We need
make no assumptions about the politicians' own beliefs and whether they are
more moderate than those of the voters. All we need assume is that politicians
are rational electoral actors, that they like being elected and reelected – not
exactly farfetched assumptions’ (1991, 197).

13

Approaches to Power Sharing (Sisk)

Consociational approach Integrative approach

Post-election elite cooperation; Parties incentivised to create

groups are autonomous; pre-ballot coalitions;
Characteristics
minorities are protected broadly inclusive but
majoritarian governments

Broad coalitions; minority vetoes;
Principles
proportionality; group autonomy
Inducements to inter-ethnic c
ooperation; promotion of
intra-ethnic competition

Federalism, vote-pooling;
Institutions Parliamentary government and PR Presidents elected by
supermajorities

Provides incentives for

Strengths Provides groups with firm guarantees
moderation

Assumption that politicians

‘Coalitions of convenience’;
elites may pursue conflict;
Weaknesses
system relies on constraints rather
than incentives
will respond to the incentives
and voters will vote for
parties not based on their
14
group.

7
 Timeout

How does STV work?

CONSTITUENCY – FOYLE Date of Poll: 7 March 2007

Eligible Electorate 64,889 Invalid Votes - 419 % Poll - 63.88 Quota - 5863

Votes Polled 41455 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5

Transfer/
No. to be Elected 6 of HAY Exclusion of Boyle, Corry & Frazer Transfer of Durkan Exclusion of O’Hara

Total Valid Votes 41036

Elected No Candidate Description 1st Pref Recvd Total Recvd Total Recvd Total Recvd Total

1 Anderson Sinn Féin 5414 1.28 5415.28 33.32 5448.60 13.36 5461.96 149.08 5611.04

2 Boyle Alliance 224 7.52 231.52 -231.52

3 Bradley SDLP 2891 9.92 2900.92 83.16 2984.08 117.60 3101.68 121.40 3223.08

4 Corry Green Party 359 6.56 365.56 -365.56

Elected 5 Durkan SDLP 6401 - 6401 6401 -538 5863 5863

6 Fleming Sinn Féin 2914 0.96 2914.96 23.16 2938.12 13.20 2951.32 85.08 3036.40

7 Frazer Independent 73 26.72 99.72 -99.72

Elected 8 Hay DUP 6960 -1097 5863 5863 5863 5863

9 McCann SEA 2045 8.32 2053.32 114.48 2167.80 19.60 2187.40 587.64 2775.04

10 McCartney Sinn Féin 4321 4.48 4325.48 16.00 4341.48 17.44 4358.92 206.16 4565.08

11 Munce UUP 1755 936.32 2691.32 162.04 2853.36 8.16 2861.52 1.16 2862.68

12 O'Hara Independent 1789 0.48 1789.48 19.00 1808.48 3.20 1811.68 -1811.68

16
13 Quigley SDLP 2648 12.80 2660.80 91.32 2752.12 211.20 2963.32 191.04 3154.36

14 Ramsey SDLP 3242 37.44 3279.44 76.60 3356.04 102.40 3458.44 158.80 3617.24

Non-transferable 44.20 44.20 77.72 121.92 31.84 153.76 311.32 465.08

TOTAL 41036 41036 41036 41036 41036

8
CONSTITUENCY – FOYLE Date of Poll: 7 March 2007
Eligible Electorate 64,889 Invalid Votes - 419 % Poll - 63.88 Quota - 5863

Votes Polled 41455 Stage 1 Stage 6 Stage 7 Stage 8 Stage 9

Transfer
No. to be Elected 6 Exclusion of McCann Exclusion of Munce Exclusion of Fleming Of McCartney

Total Valid Votes 41036

Elected No Candidate Description 1st Pref Recvd Total Recvd Total Recvd Total Recvd Total

Elected 1 Anderson Sinn Féin 5414 361 5972.04 5972.04 5972.04 5972.04

2 Boyle Alliance 224

3 Bradley SDLP 2891 359.80 3582.88 338.04 3920.92 167.72 4088.64 287 4375.64

4 Corry Green Party 359

Elected 5 Durkan SDLP 6401 5863 5863 5863 5863

6 Fleming Sinn Féin 2914 194.80 3231.20 9.04 3240.24 -3240.24

7 Frazer Independent 73

Elected 8 Hay DUP 6960 5863 5863 5863 5863

9 McCann SEA 2045 -2775.04

Elected 10 McCartney Sinn Féin 4321 306.28 4871.36 12.04 4883.40 2392 7275.40 -1412.40 5863

11 Munce UUP 1755 57.88 2920.56 -2920.56

12 O'Hara Independent 1789

13 Quigley SDLP 2648 365.84 3520.20 428.88 3949.08 123.52 4072.60 205 17 4277.60

14 Ramsey SDLP 3242 401.60 4018.84 807.44 4826.28 223.36 5049.64 318 5367.64

Non-transferable 727.84 1192.92 1325.12 2518.04 333.64 2851.68 602.40 3454.08

TOTAL 41036 41036 41036 41036 41036

CONSTITUENCY – FOYLE Date of Poll: 7 March 2007

Eligible Electorate 64,889 Invalid Votes - 419 % Poll - 63.88 Quota - 5863

Votes Polled 41455 Stage 1 Stage 10 Stage 11 Stage 12 Stage 13

Transfer Transfer/ Transfer

No. to be Elected 6 Transfer of Anderson /Exclusion of Exclusion of /Exclusion of

Total Valid Votes 41036

Elected No Candidate Description 1st Pref Recvd Total Recvd Total Recvd Total Recvd Total

Elected 1 Anderson Sinn Féin 5414 -109.04 5863

2 Boyle Alliance 224

Elected 3 Bradley SDLP 2891 42.93 4418.57

4 Corry Green Party 359

Elected 5 Durkan SDLP 6401 5863

6 Fleming Sinn Féin 2914

7 Frazer Independent 73

Elected 8 Hay DUP 6960 5863

9 McCann SEA 2045

Elected 10 McCartney Sinn Féin 4321 5863

11 Munce UUP 1755

12 O'Hara Independent 1789

13 Quigley SDLP 2648 36.45 4314.05

Elected 14 Ramsey SDLP 3242 28.35 5395.99 18

Non-transferable 1.31 3455.39

TOTAL 41036 41036

9
 The Single Transferable Vote and Ethnic Conflict :

The Evidence from Northern Ireland,

1982-2011

Paul Mitchell
Department of Government
LSE

Conference on Ethnic Politics and Electoral Democracy, Zurich 14-16 June

2012

Forthcoming in Electoral Studies

19

Arthur Lewis, 1915-91

There are not many consequential matters about which which political
scientists have (almost) reached a consensus.

One such consensus is summarised in this often cited quote:

‘The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt
the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post.’ (Lewis
1965).

Less well remembered is that Lewis had some other opinions on electoral
system choice.

20

10
 Lewis: Politics in West Africa (1965)
When a society is plural:

‘One needs a system which will give minorities adequate representation,

discourage parochialism, and force moderation on the political
parties. The electoral system most likely to have these effects is the
type of proportional representation known as ‘the single transferable
vote’.

The list system of proportional representation protects minorities and

discourages parochialism, and is therefore better than single-member
plurality systems; but it requires the elector to choose only between
parties; whereas the single transferable vote, permitting the elector to
choose between candidates, is likely to favour the candidates who
are most widely acceptable to persons of different persuasions, and
therefore forces the parties to be more tolerant.

Political parties prefer the list system to the single-transferable-vote

because it strengthens their hold over the candidates. Either of these
is better for a plural society than first-past-the-post. (Lewis 1965, 21
73-4).

Proportionality + Vote Pooling

Lijphart (2008, 279) has generously noted that Sir Arthur Lewis ‘was the
first modern scholar to identify the consociational model of democracy’,
though he did not use that label.

What is apparent from his 1965 book is that not only was Lewis an early
‘consociationalist’, but he was also a very early advocate of ‘vote-
pooling’ without using that name either.

Lewis (who favoured STV over List –PR: though Lijphart attributes this to
his ‘British bias’) could see that a preferential ballot structure in which
candidates can be ranked might incentivise more moderate electoral
appeals by making lower preferences relevant to successful election,
though he is clearly much too optimistic in claiming that STV ‘forces the
parties to be more tolerant’.

Lewis in effect argued that power-sharing and ‘vote-pooling’ should be

combined in an overall proportional framework: hence his preference for
STV had logical foundations.

22

11
 State of Play: Lijphart vs Horowitz
There is by now an established literature on ethnic party systems often
leading to centrifugal competition and potentially a politics of
(Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985; Chandra; Mitchell,
O’Leary and Evans 2009).

SMP risks turning plurality winners into majority dictators, and tends to
result in the near permanent exclusion of minorities.

Lijphart consistently advocates (mostly closed) List-PR Systems

Horowitz makes a case for the Alternative Vote (AV) believing it to be

significantly different from SMP.

There have been frequent intellectual jousts between Horowitz and

Lijphart, and more recently between Horowitz and Grofman and
Fraenkel.

Rather than reprising those debates – the rest of this paper explores
whether there might be any empirical basis to Arthur Lewis’
theoretical expectations. 23

Raging debate over AV!

•  Fraenkel and Grofman Versus Horowitz

•  Round 1: Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman (2004), ‘A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a
Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies’, Public Choice 121: 487-506.

•  Horowitz, Donald (2004), ‘The Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation: A Reply to Fraenkel and Grofman’,
Public Choice 121: 507-16.

•  Round 2:
•  Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman (2006a), ‘Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided
Societies? The Case of Fiji’, Comparative Political Studies 39:5, 623-651.

•  Horowitz, Donald (2006), ‘Strategy Takes a Holiday: Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote’,
Comparative Political Studies 39:5, 652-662.

•  Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman (2006b), ‘The Failure of the Alternative Vote as a Tool for Ethnic
Moderation in Fiji: A Rejoinder to Horowitz’, Comparative Political Studies 39:5, 663-666.

•  Round 3:

•  Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman (2007), ‘The Merits of Neo-Downsian Modelling of the Alternative Vote: A
Reply to Horowitz’, Public Choice 133: 1-11.

•  Horowitz, Donald (2007), ‘Where have all the Parties Gone: Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote – Yet
Again’, Public Choice 133: 13-23.
24

12
 Liphart claims that List-PR is better than STV?
Lijphart says (1991) that STV has ‘several serious disadvantages for
plural societies’ (p.98). These are:

1.  To be practical STV requires relatively small districts that elect 5-6
members – this makes the system prone to gerrymandering, which
is much less likely in the larger districts of List-PR.

2.  STV is ‘considerably more complicated for the voters than list
PR’ (p.99) – a problem for developing countries if they have low
literacy.

3.  Lijphart cites Katz’s claim that the intra-party choices allowed by
STV negatively affects party cohesion.

4.  ‘The small size of STV districts has an adverse effect on

proportionality and minority representation . . .’(Lijphart, p99).

Lijphart judges that ‘these many disadvantages of STV clearly

outweigh the advantage of reciprocal agreements to exchange 25
second preferences.

One qualification: PR is Key, not the particular type of PR

The purpose of this paper is not to argue the opposite of Lijphart (i.e.
that STV is necessarily better than list PR), but rather to argue that both
are valid choices for divided societies, and that Lijphart has been too
harsh in his criticisms of STV.

My basic point – is that the case for the prosecution (against STV) is
currently very weak.

1. STV prone to Gerrymandering. This need not - and in practice is

not - a problem if a body independent of the parties determines
districting, as is the case in Ireland, north and south.

2. STV is too complicated. This common view tends to confuse the

counting of votes with the casting of votes. Counting is complicated,
but anorak’s do this. The act of voting is not complicated – its just a
rank order, and in Ireland a valid vote is registered by indicating a
minimum of one preference.
26

13
 3. STV divides parties

3. STV negatively affects party cohesion and stability.

Again this is a widely held view, that may be a myth!
Lijphart, Taagepera and Shugart, Katz, and (most strongly) Blais all argue that
STV leads to weaker parties and party systems, and government
instability.

Second qualification: In truth - STV is used in too few places to be sure what
the ‘intrinsic’ effects of STV are, but the evidence that we have from Ireland,
Northern Ireland and Malta, does not support any of these propositions.

It seems that there is a sizeable gap between theoretical predictions of the

likely effects of STV and the empirical record of places that actually use it.

Party fragmentation is low. The average effective number of parties in

parliaments for 19 European countries in the 1990-2010 was 4.0. In Ireland
it was 3.2, and in Malta 2.0.

Irish voters are primarily party voters (as evidenced by transfer patterns and
surveys) and the parties themselves have not obviously been ‘weak’.
And governments are mostly stable.
27

4. STV and Proportionality

One of Lijphart’s main criticisms is that the small districts have an
adverse effect on proportionality.

Because voters cast votes for candidates rather than parties under
STV, there is no perfect way of measuring proportionality. The
question is which vote totals to use? (first preference votes, final
votes?)

But Gallagher (1986) has argued that ‘it is more valid to use a party’s
share of FPs as a basis for comparison’ (p255), than final vote totals
(the latter exaggerates STV’s proportionality – because small parties
have been eliminated and thus not counted in final vote totals.

In the Republic of Ireland, (1923-2002) the level of disproportionality

was 3.9 (LSq index, cited in Sinnott 2005), about mid-way in a table
of European countries.

Elections in Northern Ireland have been equally proportional.

28

14
 Election Disprop (LSq) ENP.votes ENP.seats

1. Westminster (SMP)
1983 24.7 4.7 2.2
1987 16 4.4 2.7
1992 17 4.7 2.7
1997 18.6 4.6 2.7
2001 7.3 4.6 3.8
2005 14.9 4.2 2.8
2010 18 5.9 3.2
Average 16.6 4.7 2.9
2. NI Assemblies (STV)
1982 5.9 5.1 4.2
1998 3.7 6.1 5.4
2003 2.9 4.9 4.5
2007 3.1 4.8 4.3
2011 4.2 4.4 4.1
Average 4.0 5.1 4.5
29
3. 1996 Forum (List-PR) 3.9 5.8 5.3

Summary: Lijphart and STV

The evidence is clear:

The medium size districts in Northern Ireland (M=6) have not had any
serious ‘adverse effect on proportionality’ and the operation of STV
has not been depriving any sizeable community of ‘minority
representation’.

At least until recently there have been many political failures in

Northern Ireland but they cannot credibly be attributed to the STV
electoral system.

30

15
 Horowitz’s critique: Proportionality Versus ‘Vote-Pooling’

‘If the choice for a divided society is between list-system PR and the
single transferable vote, STV is a far better choice than list-system
PR’ (Horowitz, 1991: 173).

The difference of approach is ultimately because both authors define

the main aim of an electoral system differently.
For Lijphart, proportionality is the key to fairness between groups, and
political stability is achieved by coalitions of leaders engaging in power-
sharing.

For Horowitz – proportionality is not the central aim.

‘the test of a good electoral system is not to be found merely in the ratio of
seats to votes or in the number of parties that emerge. The test . .[is]
does the electoral system dispose the parties to ethnic and racial
inclusion or exclusion?’ (p165).

31

‘Coalitions of convenience’ Vs ‘Coalitions of commitment’

•  Horowitz cautioned against the consociational logic associated with

Arend Lijphart, and argued that proportionality followed by post-
election executive coalitions (or what Horowitz’s called ‘coalitions of
convenience’) have often proven highly unstable in divided societies.

•  Empirically, there is of course some truth to this: stable power-

sharing coalitions in divided societies are difficult to maintain.

•  Horowitz (1991, 171) explains that ‘the incentive to compromise, and

not merely the incentive to coalesce, is the key to accommodation’.

•  This leads Horowitz to caution against Lijphart’s preference for List-

System PR (in which voters simply pick one party) in favour of
systems in which subsequent preferences may be important, such as
the single transferable vote (STV) and alternative vote (AV).

32

16
 Vote Pooling

In quite an original contribution he argues in favour of the need to create

pre-ballot incentives towards ‘vote-pooling’.

•  ‘Alternative voting provides less proportionality than does list-system

proportional representation, but that is much less important than its
provision of strong incentives towards vote pooling’ (Horowitz 1997,
p35 –book on Fiji’s CRC)

•  The need for lower preferences induces centripetal appeals, that

have to be more moderate to be credible.

•  After all – inflammatory – ethnic or racial caricatures aren’t likely to

win you the lower preferences votes from the targets of your
electioneering attacks!

33

But why does Horowitz prefer AV to STV?

However, having briefly reviewed some very limited evidence of the

operation of STV in Northern Ireland (mainly one election in 1973
election), Horowitz concludes that there was very little evidence of vote-
pooling, largely because the effective threshold remained low thus
allowing parties to win seats without the need to make cross-ethnic
appeals.

Thus in a logical, but ultimately maverick recommendation, Horowitz

favours the Alternative Vote (AV) over STV, precisely because the
much higher effective threshold under AV will induce more vote-pooling.

However, given that party proliferation and breaking down ethnically

exclusive alignments is a central aim for Horowitz, he suggests that AV
in large multi-member constituencies may be required (Horowitz 1991,
194-5).

34

17
 But most think AV is not the answer . . .

The fundamental problem with the Horowitzian prescription is that although well
intentioned, it calls for the adoption of a majoritarian electoral system in a
divided society.

Lijphart (1991) provides an extensive analytic dissection of Horowitz’s electoral

system proposal. He shows that in terms of incentives towards compromise and
levels of disproportionality AV and SMP are not significantly different.

Also Horowitz’s aim of promoting multipartism is empirically much more likely to be

achieved with a PR system than AV.

Finally, Horowitz is quite misguided to believe that running AV in multi-member-

districts solves the problem of second preferences being irrelevant to the
allocation of the seat. The general rule is that:

‘in PR systems proportionality increases as district magnitude (the number of

representatives per district) increases, but the relationship is just the other way round
for majoritarian electoral systems. AV’s disproportionality will rise sharply when it is
applied in multimember districts’ (Lijphart 1991, 96).

In short, the Alternative vote is not a good recommendation for divided societies,
and some form of proportional representation is much to be preferred.
35

PnG / Fiji

•  PnG – most heterogenous society in the world.

•  Used AV (as a direct inheritance from Australia) for its first three pre-
independence elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972

•  Then with independence they changed to SMP – with bad results

•  Finally in 2007 – introduced ‘limited preferential voting’.

•  http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/PG/Papua_new_guinea
%20A4.pdf/view

36

18
 A Better Approach?: Proportionality + Vote-Pooling

STV combines the overall fairness of a proportional system with a

preferential ballot structure, that does not force voters to make
categorical and thus mutually exclusive choices between parties
(and ethnic groups).

It can facilitate some ethnic vote pooling if parties, candidates and

voters are inclined to do so.

At the very minimum it at least does not prevent voters from crossing
ethnic lines, as most list-systems do.

Thus Horowitz’s objection to STV was not theoretical or logical, but

purely based on the empirical observation (from the 1973 election)
that in practice no vote pooling took place.

He generalised from one election and on that basis largely dismissed

STV as an option.
37

Engineering?
While STV might not be ‘strategy proof’ it is difficult to arrange tactical
voting – the information costs are large.

Horowitz’s approach is ‘to aim to engineer a centripetal spin to the

political centre’ (Sisk 1995:19).

But there may be a lot to be said (especially in divided places) for not
trying to engineer particular outcomes by incentivising tactical
voting.

Minority ethnic groups want fair representation and usually want to be

represented by members of their own groups (rather than by
moderate representatives of other groups, as tends to the case with
AV).

Both aims – fairness and direct inclusion -are better achieved by STV
than AV.
38

19
 STV Can Reward Cooperative Strategies

•  STV, by encouraging voters to rank order the candidates (and thus

parties), rewards co-operative electoral strategies.

•  STV is an especially appropriate electoral system for ethno-

nationally divided multi-party systems because its logic encourages
pre-electoral co-operation and potentially even accommodation.

•  Parties with electoral partners, other things being equal, win more
seats.

•  Attracting a greater number of lower preferences entails appealing

to voters identified with other parties, and hence can exert a
moderating dynamic.(1) STV should perform this function better
than list systems (2)

39

Early Example of the Moderating Effects

that STV can Induce: Sinn Fein

•  STV clearly helped moderate Sinn Fein.

•  In its early elections, the party was in an isolated electoral position

often failing to win seats even with an impressive first preference
vote, as other parties moved past it due to transfers in subsequent
counts.

•  The moderation of Sinn Féin’s stance has boosted its first

preference vote and its votes from transfers (see below). More
SDLP terminal transfers now go to Sinn Féin than to the Alliance
Party, a clear reversal of earlier voting behaviour (Whyte, 1990, 74).
[1]

40

20
 STV is information rich

For any vote pooling to take place voters must be willing to cast a
preference for more than one candidate and party, and it must be
the case that most candidates are not elected on the first count (and
thus have no need for lower preference votes.

Both conditions are fulfilled in NI. For example, take the 1998
Assembly election:

26 out of 108 members were elected on first preference votes alone

So 76% needed lower preferences to be elected.
The number of counts tends to be considerable, and ranged from 6 in Mid-
Ulster to 18 in Strangford (the average was 10.8).

It is well known that parties try to influence the direction of the lower
preferences of their supporters – by issuing ‘voting instructions’.

41

‘How to Vote’ Instructions

•  By now it is part of the folklore to marvel at the efficiency and

organization of the ‘Sinn Féin electoral machine’.

•  There is an interesting new finding in our data that relates to party

discipline in voting behaviour.

•  During the 2003 NI Election Study, respondents were asked:

–  ‘Did the political party to which you gave your first preference vote in
the elections ask people in this area to vote for their candidates in a
particular order?’ , followed by

–  ‘Did you vote for the candidates in that order?

42

21
 ‘Voting Instructions’ (2)

•  Only 38 per cent of UUP and 33 per cent of DUP supporters report that
their party issued such voting instructions. If advice was given, DUP
partisans were much more disciplined: 70 per cent of them reported
voting as instructed by their party compared to only 45 per cent of UUP
supporters.

•  But there is a very striking pattern among nationalists.

•  Sinn Féin supporters report that their party was much more likely to
issue detailed ‘candidate voting advice’ (64 per cent say Sinn Féin did;
whereas only 38 per cent of SDLP supporters said their party did so).
•  When candidate voting instructions were issued, an impressive 95 per
cent of Sinn Féin partisans say that they voted in the order that their
party advised.

•  Two-thirds of SDLP supporters say they followed their party’s voting

advice.
43

Context is Key

While STV has many features that may help regulate conflict, it is of
course not guaranteed to do so.

Horowitz found no evidence of vote-pooling in 1973 in NI.

But it is a pretty solid conjecture that no electoral system could have

delivered peace that year – there were more important variables -
like the breakdown of the state and the intensity of communal
violence (1971 to 1976 were by far the most violent years with 1,651
political killings).

The IRA ceasefires and the 1998 Belfast Agreement changed the
context of electoral competition.

But in order to evaluate post-Agreement changes, we need a point of

reference for the pre-Agreement party system. Given that this paper
focuses on STV in NI Assembly elections, the obvious reference is
the 1982 election, Sinn Fein’s first election. 44

22
 Fully Polarized Party System: Terminal Transfers in 1982
Key Message: ‘there aren’t any that cross ethnic lines’

From To N UUP DUP A SDLP SF N.T

UUP DUP, SDLP 4 65 0.5 17

DUP UUP 3 86 1.5

SDLP UUP, APNI 5 1 77 14

SDLP SF 2 25 48

SF UUP, DUP, 4 0.7 0.4 45 48

SDLP

APNI UUP, SDLP 5 30 29 31

45

Electoral Implications of the 1998 Consociation

The 1998 Agreement institutionalised power-sharing institutions that mandated

that executive power can only be achieved by sharing power across the
nationalities.

An Interesting question was whether the need to co-operate in a power-sharing

government would encourage any electoral co-operation both within and
across the traditional communal party systems.

While no one would expect the traditional ethnically isolated party system to be
quickly transformed there is evidence of significant changes in voting
behaviour, particularly those revealed by inter-party transfer patterns.

Some of the voters of pro-Agreement candidates very quickly displayed a new-

found willingness to cross the communal divide in order to support each other
with lower preferences.

Most dramatically in 1998 (barely two months after signing the Agreement) UUP
voters transferred to the SDLP at a rate of 32 per cent! (recall that the figure
in 1982 was 0.5%).
46

23
 Belfast Agreement: Terminal Transfers in 1998
Key Message: Evidence of vote-pooling emerges . . .

From To N UUP DUP SDLP SF N.T

UUP SDLP 6 32 43

DUP UUP, SDLP 8 39 3 30

SDLP UUP 5 11 30

SDLP UUP, SF 3 14 45 34

SF SDLP 8 68 26

APNI UUP, SDLP 9 36 34 14

47

Context of 2003 Election

The ‘peace process’ was clearly stalled.

The optimism of 1998 was either gone, or severely dented

Durable power-sharing had not been established during the

intervening 5 years.

Assembly and its Executive had been suspended for over a year before
the election.

Despite this there was continuing, and even slightly increased evidence
of vote-pooling among the pro-Agreement parties.

48

24
 2003: 2nd Post Agreement Assembly Elections
‘Increased evidence of vote-pooling . . .’

From To N UUP DUP SDLP SF N.T

UUP SDLP 5 41 52

DUP UUP, SDLP 13 48 3.9 32

SDLP SF 2 91 8

SDLP UUP, DUP 1 19 0.6 28

SF UUP, DUP, 5 0.9 0.3 83 13

SDLP

49

2007: 3rd Post Agreement Assembly Elections

Context: no power-sharing since 2002!

From To N UUP DUP SDLP SF APNI N.T

UUP SDLP 5 26 23

DUP UUP 5 68 6

SDLP UUP, DUP 4 14 2 26

SDLP SF, 1 40 45 8

SF SDLP 13 73 18

50

25
 Inter-Ethnic Terminal Transfers between Moderates:
Pooled 1998-2007 (UUP to SDLP; SDLP to UUP)

50

45
41.2
40

35
31.8 32.3
30
26.2 UUP-SDLP %
25
SDLP-UUP %
20

15 18.7
12.7
10 13.9
10.7
5

0 0.5 0.7
1982 1998 2003 2007 Pooled.98-07

51

Conclusion
The ‘flaws’ of STV identified by Lijphart either don’t apply or aren’t nearly as
serious as he suggests.

The Majoritarian AV system proposed by Horowitz is a very bad idea for divided
places, and he is wrong to down-play the importance of proportionality and treat
it as less important than inter-ethnic vote-pooling.

Having said that electoral accommodation and cooperation across ethnic cleavage
lines is clearly very attractive if it can be accomplished voluntarily, and without
the excessive inducement of a ‘big stick’ majority threshold.

Horowitz ‘gives up’ on STV too quickly (and appears not to have thoroughly
examined its operation).

STV in NI has allowed all communities to be fairly represented by a range of

parties, some more moderate than others.

AV makes it more difficult for a minority to be represented by members of its own

ethnic group, whereas this is not a problem with STV. Ethnic groups directly
represent themselves, which is what most want to do in divided lands. 52

26
 Conclusion (2)

And beyond the essential fairness of 1st preference votes translating into
proportional seat allocations, STV can encourages pre-electoral
cooperation between parties. Party leaders can send coalition signals.

And even if such cues do not emerge, voters through the pattern of their
transfers may suggest – and help make viable – certain combinations
of parties in post-election bargaining.

Prior to the Agreement inter-ethnic vote-pooling was very close to zero.

Afterwards transfers from the moderate unionist UUP to the moderate

unionist SDLP averaged 32% (and 13% in the opposite direction).

These transfers are modest (compared with within-bloc transfers), but

are nevertheless quite a big change with the past.

Unfortunately there remains one big problem with STV – it doesn’t get
adopted because many elected politicians don’t like it!

53

Appendix

54

27
 2011: 4th Post Agreement Assembly Elections

From To N UUP DUP SDLP SF APNI N.T

UUP DUP, SDLP 5 65 7 22

DUP UUP 9 66 17

DUP SDLP 8 25 21

DUP SDLP, SF 2 64 1 12

SDLP UUP, APNI 2 2 52 11

SF SDLP 5 54 39

APNI UUP, SDLP 7 25 32 18

55

Intra-Unionist transfers

100
86.2
90

80
68.4
70
% Terminal Transfers

66.8
64.1
60 60.4
46.6
50 43.5
38.7
40

30 UUP-DUP %
25.7
20 DUP-UUP %

10

0
1982 1998 2003 2007 Pooled.98-07

56

28
 Intra-Nationalist Transfers

100
90 90.9

80
83.4
% Terminal Transfers

70
72.7 72.5
68.4
60
51.9
50 SF-SDLP %
44.8
40 39.6 SDLP-SF %
45.2
30
25.3
20
10
0
1982 1998 2003 2007 Pooled.98-
07

57

Inter-Ethnic Terminal Transfers between Moderates

(UUP to SDLP; SDLP to UUP)

50

45
41.2
40

35
31.8 32.3
30
26.2 UUP-SDLP %
25
SDLP-UUP %
20

15 18.7
12.7
10 13.9
10.7
5

0 0.5 0.7
1982 1998 2003 2007 Pooled.98-07

Determinate cases only. Also excludes transfers in which the surplus being distributed was directly received from another party on the preceding
count.
1. UUP-SDLP the N of TT’s was 1982 (4), 1998 (5), 2003 (1), 2007 (4), Pooled (10)
2. SDLP-UUP the N of TT’s was 1982 (4), 1998 (6), 2003 (5), 2007 (5), Pooled (16)

58

29
 Intra-Party transfer solidarity 1982-2007 (%)

90

85
% Terminal Transfers

80 DUP
SF
SDLP
75
UUP

70

65
1982 1998 2003 2007

59

Abstract.
There is a well known debate amongst constitutional engineers
between those who favour the proportional representation of parties
(usually via PR-Closed List systems) and post-election power-sharing
(Lijphart) and those who favour attempting to induce pre-election inter-
ethnic ‘vote-pooling’ (Horowitz) as a more effective and stable method of
governing divided societies.

A potential problem with Lijphart’s prescription is that voluntary ethnic

power sharing is difficult to arrange and sustain, and it is usually not
premised on pre-electoral cooperation but on post-election bargains.

The even bigger problem with Horowitz’s prescription is that he judges

that inter-ethnic vote-pooling can most likely only be achieved in
constituencies with relatively high thresholds.

While no doubt well intentioned this leads him to encourage divided

societies to adopt the Alternative Vote, a (bare) majoritarian system, that
will almost certainly be counter-productive in a divided society.

60

30
 Abstract (2): STV Might be a Better Choice
Little attention has been paid to the fact that other attractive options are
available.

A leading candidate amongst these is the Single Transferable Vote, a non-

categorical preferential ballot system that allows parties to form pre-
electoral alliances across the ethnic divide. Voters can indicate which
coalitions they prefer and help make it happen via their preferences.

Under certain conditions STV may encourage centripetal electoral appeals.

And of course the great advantage of STV over AV is that it allows vote
transfers without abandoning the essential ‘fairness’ of a proportional
electoral system.

Northern Ireland is the only divided society with extensive experience of STV
elections. This paper examines the empirical evidence before and after the
Belfast Agreement by examining the operation of the electoral system at the
NI Assembly elections of 1982, 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2011.

61

31