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Territorial Approaches
to Ethnic Conflict Regulation

Paul Mitchell

Overview of Main Forms of Ethnic Conflict Regulation

A: Methods for ‘eliminating’ differences

1.  Genocide
2.  Forced mass-population transfers
3.  Partition/secession (self-determination)
4.  Integration and/or assimilation

(classification from McGarry and O’Leary 1983).

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Forms of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (2)

B: Methods for managing differences

1.  Hegemonic control

2.  Arbitration (third-party intervention)
3.  Federalism, regional autonomy
4.  Consociation and power-sharing

The Demands of Ethnic Groups

•  The concepts of ‘our land’ and ‘our people’ lead to two different sources of
identification – and the intersection of the two (in cases were they are not
coterminous) leads to disputes about where the state’s borders should be.

•  For example, people who feel that they belong to the same ethnic community
may have only a vague idea of where their territory is.

•  And even if they do have a very precise idea of where their territory is - it
may not conform to the borders of any existing state (and may even be
divided across several existing states – e.g. Kurdistan).

•  By whatever the territorial dispersion of their members, many ethnic groups

feel a strong identification with a particular, so-called ‘national homeland’,
and use a mixture of historical and mythical arguments to establish their
claim to it.
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Historical Phases of Group Demands

Over the longer term the transition to modern statehood is characterised by two
phases through which subordinate ethnic groups may potentially pass (see
Coakley 1993, 2003).

•  1. The demand for equality of citizenship and individual rights.

–  important as this is, in many cases, formal equality before the law was
not sufficient to remove de facto inequality and discrimination.

•  2. The demand for group rights

–  In this phase the demand of the subordinate group is for the recognition
of its separateness.
–  The ‘claim’ is that the ethnic minority are ‘different’ and this difference
should receive institutional recognition.

Hierarchy of Ethnic Demands

Territorial
Implications
•  1. Demand for equality of citizenship
–  (legal, social and economic equality, perhaps even Low
–  including positive discrimination)

•  2. Demand for Cultural Rights

–  (public use of minority languages and cultural
–  symbols in education and dealings with the state, etc).

•  3. Demand for Institutional Political Recognition

–  (ranging from regional autonomy to a full panoply
–  of consociational, federal and/or confederal institutions).

•  4. Demand for Secession

–  (ranging from frontier adjustments to independence High
–  as a separate state).

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State Responses to Territorial Demands

•  Centralism
–  An approach which ignores territorial demands.
–  The refusal to territorially recognise ethnic demands may reflect an
assimilationist ‘melting pot’ strategy – or a Jacobin ‘make peasants into
Frenchmen’ approach.
–  Jacobins see federalism as incompatible with equal citizenship and a unitary
‘indivisible’ Republic.

–  indeed, historically: ‘the notion of assimilation to the dominant culture appears

to be by far the most common strategy for dealing with problems of ethnic
diversity’ (Coakley 1999: 13).

–  But there are dangers in ignoring these demands.

–  ‘Where a territorially based ethnic minority is politically out of step with other
groups, uncompromising centralism in the guise of democratic majoritarianism
will inevitably suppress that minority and provoke a reaction.’ (Horowitz 1991:
224).

•  Regionalism

–  Some powers are devolved from central government to certain regions

–  Regionalist strategies are at least partly motivated by the idea that

ethnic protest can be assuaged by the concession of some regional
autonomy.

–  Its essential weakness is that the centre can withdraw these powers
and autonomy – though in practice, once granted autonomous and
devolved powers may be politically difficult to withdraw.

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Radical Surgery: Partition and Secession

•  Borders are contingent, they are not permanent but rather are
more or less institutionalised (see Lustick).

•  While change in the size and shape of individual states is

sometimes a straightforward function of armed conflict,
coercion is usually only a partial explanation for the changing
shapes of states.

•  But the point is that in principle and in practice all processes of

state-building and state contraction are in principle reversible.

•  Partition, secession and self-determination are compatible with

liberal democratic norms, because they respect the rights of
ethnic communities.

Partition and Secession (2)

•  Partition attempts to resolve ethnic conflict by breaking up multi-ethnic

states or by allowing a political divorce between ethnic communities that no
longer wish to live together in the same state.

•  However, while many groups fought secessionist wars in the post-1945

period, very few were successful.

•  Indeed, between 1948 and 1991 the only new state which owes its
independence to a war of secession was Bangladesh (partitioned from
Pakistan in 1971) – although we should remember that this was at the cost
of about half a million dead in 1971 alone.

•  Clearly the geo-political reality of the cold war stabilised state borders (at
least in Europe) – potential nuclear catastrophe provided the necessary
incentives for each super-power not to interfere with the border’s of the
others client states.
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Partition and Secession (3)

•  Secessionists may be motivated by a reaction against discrimination, and a

belief that a new nation-state will bring greater freedom and prestige.

•  No general conclusions about a correlation between a demand for secession

and relative economic status seem to be possible (Connor 1984).

•  Secessions are demanded by economically advanced groups – for example,

Basques, Catalans, Sikhs and Tamils.

•  And also by economically disadvantaged groups – for example, Kurds,

Slovaks.

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Self-Determination

•  The normative idea behind partitions and secessions is the principle of self-
determination.
•  As Jennings (1956: 56) put it:

–  ‘On the surface [the principle of self-determination] seems reasonable:

let the people decide. In fact it is ridiculous because the people cannot
decide until somebody decides who are the people.’

•  The problem is that the principle of self-determination begs as many

questions as it answers, especially in cases where populations are
geographically interspersed.

•  In practice it is only relatively straightforward if there is a neat and clean

geographical split in the population.
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Questions raised by NSD

1. Who are the people?

2. What are the borders within which they should exercise self-
determination?

3. What constitutes ‘consent’ for change?

–  i.e. what is the decision rule?

4. Will the exercise of self-determination produce domino and

demonstration effects?
–  whereby ethnic minorities in either the seceding region or the rump state (the
state left behind) will feel encouraged by one successful secession and will
decide to ‘have a go’ at trying to form their own states?

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Favourable Conditions for a Secession

1. There must not be a large or disgruntled ethnic minority within the
region which wants to secede (i.e. all of the people in the seceding
region must want to leave).

2.  The seceding region must include the great majority of those who want to
leave – in other words, the secession must not leave other disgruntled
groups in the rump state feeling abandoned.

In other words, both the secessionist region and the rump state should become fairly
homogenous and without large ethnic minorities as a result of the secession.

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Problems with Secession as a Practical Tool

of Ethnic Conflict Management

•  1. Sub-Ethnic Divisions

•  The vast majority of secessionist regions are actually ethnically

heterogeneous.

•  Thus many secessionist movements end up divided or were actually

divided from the outset.

•  Another important point is that if a region attains independence (or even

seems likely to) this prospect is likely to increase the importance of sub-
ethnic divisions within the seceding region (these divisions may have been
latent or at least low intensity in the former state because of the need to
confront a common enemy).

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Problems (2)

•  But ethnic identity is not static – its political significance tends to change
with territorial boundaries.

•  The changed context of a new state (if the secession is ‘successful’) allows
sub-ethnic divisions to achieve renewed prominence.

•  In other words, attaining your immediate goals, allows new divisions to

emerge.

•  Or in the words of a leader of the Eritrean Liberation Front: ‘the nearer we

get to independence, the less chance there is for unity’ (Horowitz 1985: 272).

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2. Ethnic Conflict within the secessionist region

•  Successful secession is supposed to create ethno-nationally homogeneous

states.

•  But actually secessionist warfare will often exacerbate conflict within the
secessionist region.

•  Minority groups in the secessionist region who may fear their future in an
independent state, may fight the secessionist army, at the same time that the
latter is fighting the central government and its army.

•  The central government in turn, may try to divide the secessionists or to

support ‘Unionist’ movements against the rebels.

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3. Demonstration Effects

•  Most attention tends to focus on the region attempting to secede, so that often
we tend to overlook the implications for the rump state, the state that is left
behind.

•  In fact, there are very few cases in the which the rump state would become
homogenous – and therefore hopefully free of ethnic conflict – by the
removal of the troublesome secessionist region.
–  This is because:
•  1. there are likely to be other ethnic minorities in the rump state

•  2. the new political context of the smaller rump state, will allow new lines of
cleavage to emerge and will probably result in the re-emergence of old
divisions that had been dormant because of the dominance of the secessionist
war.

•  So it is unlikely that secession would leave the rump state homogenous. 18

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Horowitz’s conclusion on demonstration effects

–  ‘The principal impact of single powerful movements is bound to be in the

rump state itself, for the one thing a powerful movement does
demonstrate is the vulnerability of that state’s central government.
Ceteris paribus, states experiencing one strong secessionist movement are
likely to experience more than one. They are right to be concerned about
fragmentation.’

–  Donald Horowitz’s (1995: 281)

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Five Arguments in favour of Partition (O’Leary 2006)

1.  The historicist argument

2.  The ‘last resort’ argument

3.  The cost-benefit argument

4.  The ‘better-tomorrow’ argument

5.  The ‘rigorous end’ argument

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1. Historicist argument
•  Many partitionists are historicists. They believe that nationalist, ethnic or
communal conflicts once started will end in partition (or worse, genocide).

•  Historicists claim that partition is already happening, ‘that facts have already
been established “on the ground”.
This may may persuade policy makers that the process should be
speeded up to reduce the pain involved.

•  ‘In 1993 two advocates of the partition of Bosnia and of “populations

transfers”, John J Mearsheimer and Robert A Pape, maintained that “transfer
is already occurring. … The only question is whether it will be organized, as
envisioned by partition, or left to the murderous methods of the ethnic
cleansers” (Mearsheimer and Pape, 1993).’

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2. The ‘last resort’

•  The “last resort” thesis acknowledges that alternative policies are possible
and should be attempted before partition is considered.

•  Partition should be pursued to avoid genocide or large-scale ethnic

expulsions (outcomes universally acknowledged to be the worst possible
outcomes).

•  ‘This argument is a version of “triage” in public health: let us cut where we

can to save what can be saved.’ (O’Leary 2006,2)

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3. Cost-Benefit
•  ‘This third line of argument need not depend on any belief in either the
security dilemma or that partition is absolutely necessary to prevent genocide
or large-scale national, ethnic or religious expulsions. It suggests that
partition offers, on balance, a better prospect of conflict reduction than the
maintenance of the existing borders. It suggests, in other words, that partition
is desirable in its own right as a preventative strategy; it need not be the
option of last resort.’ (ibid p.3).

•  These arguments were common during the last years of British imperial rule
–  They were made by Ulster unionists in Ireland who decided they had to abandon
fellow unionist elsewhere in Ireland.
–  By Zionists who decided that some sovereign Israeli land was better than just
hoping for Eretz Israel
–  By the Muslim league in India who decided that southern Muslims would have to
look after themselves.

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4. ‘Better Tomorrow’
•  More homogeneous states will be created = better futures all round.

•  ‘The analogy is with divorce. After the trauma and pain is over, the former
partners will be able to conduct themselves better because their interests will
not interfere so intimately with one another’s identity, pride and
emotions’ (p.3)

•  This rests on the counterfactual argument that there would have been worse
conflict without partition.

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5. The ‘Rigorous End’

•  The rigorous partitionist claims that policy-makers have not been tough
enough – have not been willing to draw borders to radically reduce
heterogeneity.

•  ‘To criticisms of failings and horrors in historic partitions such partitionists

are likely to respond that the partitions were insufficiently thoroughgoing.
Their claim is that the job was not properly done: Northern Ireland was too
heterogeneous, by contrast with what became the Irish Free State; Pakistan
was too heterogeneous; at inception it had too many Sikhs and Hindus; Israel
was too heterogeneous after 1948 - there were still too many Arabs amid
Jews.’

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note that all ‘These arguments have a powerful normative implication. It is
foolish to insist on maintaining unviable multinational states; that prolongs
the likelihood of public suffering.’ (O’Leary 2006, 5).
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Arguments against Partition (O’Leary 2006)

1.  The rupturing of national territorial unity

2.  The alleged difficulties of multinationalism
3.  The impossibility of just partition
4.  The likelihood of violence

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1. Rupturing of national territorial unity

•  Anti-partitionists argue that partition is a violation of self-determination.

•  ‘One set, at least, of nationalists always oppose a proposed partition. In the

twentieth century partitions were rejected by most of the affected majority
nationalists, whose national homelands were freshly cut. Irish, Indian,
Palestinian and Cypriot nationalists, argued that partition was a violation of
their right to national self-determination and independence, and directly
contravened the expressed preferences of the relevant majorities in their
national territories.’

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2. The alleged difficulties of multinationalism

•  It is just assumed by partitionists that other options – efforts to establish

binational, federal, consociational or confederal arrangements – were not
possible or desirable.

•  ‘The pluri-nationalist case therefore is that pluri-nationalist arrangements

must be properly exhausted before partition is considered genuinely as a last
resort, rather than as a first resort.’ (p11).

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3. The impossibility of just partition

•  Any old partition will not do – only ‘just’ partitions – and these are rarely
possible.

•  Even the credible threat of partition usually provoke pre-emptive action, in

the form of ethnic expulsions, to establish “facts on the ground”.

•  As O’Leary argues: ‘Kaufmann and partitionists get the causality wrong: it is

partitionists who generate a self-fulfilling security dilemma. The credible
threat of partition flows from decisions of a state or imperial authority—or of
known plans by paramilitaries that have state support. It is these threat that
occasion the “security dilemma”, not the mere presence of heterogeneous
populations.’ (p12).

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4. The likelihood of violence

•  Anti-partitionists maintain that partitions invariably led to more violence

than that which preceded them; they have domino effects; they contribute to
post-partition wars, and insecurities; the precedent set may even lead to
demands for re-partitions.

–  The partition of India was accompanied by a death toll, variously credibly

estimated at between 200,000 and 500,000.
–  The partition of Palestine and the war that accompanied Israel’s declaration of
independence led to the deaths of approximately 6,000 Israeli Jews, and over
10,000 Arabs, and to the expulsion and flight of over 750,000 Palestinians who
became homeless refugees (United Nations, 1949), and whom Israel refused to
allow to return. As a direct by-product of the partition, and of Israel’s war of
independence, over half a million Jews were expelled from surrounding Arab
states.

•  O’Leary: ‘It therefore beggars belief that Kaufmann (1998) argues that in all
these cases partition successfully reduced violence.’
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Conclusion on partition / secession

•  For most ethnically divided states ‘secession or partition is merely likely to

effect a ‘reordering of heterogeneity’ (Horowitz: 590) ( a shuffling of
divisions), rather than an end to conflict.

•  Since the potential benefits of partition are not likely to emerge, whereas
new costs are, partition cannot really be recommended as a widely
applicable and benign method of resolving ethnic conflict.

•  Partition is likely to produce further violence, and problems (at least

initially) as bad as the ones it is intended to solve. It is usually a case of the
medicine being worse than the disease.

•  Partition may have to be considered if events have reached the point that it
is considered to be the least bad of a bad set of alternatives – for example
partition might be better than all-out ethnic war.

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Federalism

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Federalism

•  While it has some similarities with regionalism, there is an important difference.

Federalism’s defining feature: a guaranteed division of

power between central and regional governments.

•  In William Riker’s (1975) famous definition:

–  “Federalism is a political organisation in which the activities of government are

divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way
that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final
decisions”

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Secondary Features of Federalism

•  1. Written Constitution
–  Follows from the primary characteristic (above): i.e. the division of powers
between the central and regional governments has to be specified and guaranteed.
A Supreme or Constitutional Court protects it.

•  2. Bicameralism
–  - all federal states are bicameral, whereas unitary states may have one or two
chambers.

•  3. Equal or at least disproportional representation of the smaller regions in

the Federal chamber: i.e. the smaller regions get over-represented.

•  4. Regional units have the right to be involved in amending the federal

constitution, but can change their own constitutions unilaterally.

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Secondary Features of Federalism (2)

•  5. Decentralised Government?

–  - We have said that the federal principle of a central-regional division of power

means that the powers of the regions cannot be taken away without their consent.

–  However, the powers of the regions do not necessarily have to be very extensive.

–  Thus federal states need not be decentralised: some are, and some are not.

–  In general though federalism and decentralisation tend to go together. Lijphart

(1999) reports a correlation coefficient of –0.66.

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When is a Consociation a Federation?

•  Segmental autonomy is one of the defining features of CD.

•  This autonomy can take a territorial or non-territorial format

–  An e.g. of non-territorial autonomy would be powers given to
representatives of a particular cultural / religious community to run its own
schools throughout the entire territory of the state.

•  By contrast – ‘Territorial segmental autonomy means, in practically all

cases, a federal arrangement’ (Lijphart, 1979, 505).

•  So a consociation is a federation if:

1.  The segments of the plural society must be geographically concentrated.
2.  The boundaries between the component units of the federation must follow
the segmental boundaries as much as possible.
3.  The other federal principles apply (the secondary principles of federalism –
bicameralism, written constitution, etc).

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Lijphart argues that federalism contains consociational elements

•  The formal / legal characteristics of federalism boil down to two political

principles:

1.  The component units enjoy a high degree of secure autonomy

2.  They all participate in decision-making at the central level of government.

•  Hence ‘autonomy’ and ‘power-sharing’ are central to federalsim.

‘The idea of grand coalition can be discerned in the rule that every state has
to be represented in the federal chamber’ (Lijphart 1979, 506).
•  Though Lijphart does not mention that federations vary greatly in terms of
the powers granted to the ‘federal’ as opposed to ‘popular’ chamber.
- Some – like the USA – have extremely powerful ‘federal chambers’,
whereas others (like Canada and India) have weak second chambers.

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When is a Federation a Consociation? (Lijphart)

•  To count as ‘consociational democracy’ (CD) the federation must be
democratic – not all are.
- At the time of his 1979 article leading non-democratic federations
included the USSR, Yugoslavia, Argentina and Brazil.

•  Only federations in plural societies count as consociations (thus Australia,

Germany etc are federations but not consociations).

•  To be fully consociational a federations must contain all 4 elements of CD.

•  Only decentralised federations can be consociations.

- ‘Segmental autonomy as a consociational principle entails more than
merely a small area in which the segments are free to run their own
affairs; the scope of their autonomy should be very extensive’ (1979,
510).

•  A federation is only consociational if it is an asymmetrical federalism

- ‘asymmetrical federalism makes a plural society less plural by 38

creating relatively homogenous smaller areas’.

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Federalism and Ethnic Conflict

•  Federalism is of course not necessarily a response to ethnic conflict. The

federations of the USA, Mexico, Germany, Australia or Austria have
nothing to do with ethnic conflict.

•  Nevertheless, it is easy to see why federalism might be used as an

institutional tool when faced with ethnic demands.

•  When federalism is used as a response to ethnic conflict, there are three

main types:

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Three Types of Federalism and Ethnic Conflict

•  1. Non-Communal Federations
–  In this case ethnic divisions cut across the borders of the federal units, so that
there is little correspondence between ethnic and political boundaries.
–  Example: Malaysia. – the principal ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese and Indians)
are dispersed over the 12 states.

•  2. Mixed Federal Structures

–  A mixture of some territorial units based on ethnic interests (e.g. autonomy for
certain regions) combined with other territorial units that are essentially
ethnically heterogeneous.

–  Examples might include Canada – 11 of its 12 provinces and territories are

essentially English-speaking and one is primarily French-speaking. Also, Spain
and India.

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Three Types of Federalism and Ethnic Conflict (2)

•  3. Communal Federations

–  The boundaries of the ethnic groups closely correspond with

those of the federal units.

–  Examples: the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and

Belgium.

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Potential Advantages of Federalism and Autonomy

•  Gives minorities a share of state power

•  offers minorities greater opportunities to protect their culture, language
and symbols
•  it may forestall or help prevent secessionist demands from emerging

•  it may increase the political integration of previously excluded ethnic

groups.

•  Given that power is devolved to sub-units of the state, the

opportunities for political participation increase. Local political
competition, can accentuate differences within groups, hence leading
to the fragmentation of previously monolithic ethnic parties.

•  The proliferation of asymmetrical territorial arrangements may

increase the chances of national unity by diffusing state power. 42

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Potential Problems

•  Majority leaders may be unwilling to grant autonomy

- For example, they may fear that doing so would lose them support in their own
community (for example Sri Lanka).

•  The ‘demonstration effect’: other ethnic communities are likely to

demand autonomy once it has been conceded to one group.

•  In practice, arrangements for autonomy have often not worked well.

•  the biggest fear is that autonomy and ethnically based federalism are a
slippery slope (and even a catalyst) towards secession.

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Federalism revisited
Terminology: ‘pluri-national’ or ‘multinational’:
‘The expressions ‘pluri-national’ and ‘multinatonal’ may be treated as synonyms, but
there is a formal case for the former expression. A ‘pluri-national’ federation
describes a state in which there are multiple recognized nations, whose respective
nationals may be either concentrated or dispersed, and in which individuals may
identify with one, more than one, or none of the nations.

The prefix ‘pluri’ helpfully identifies cases of ‘not one’; that is, it covers both ‘two’
and ‘more’, and suggests that national identity or identities may be variable and
change in instensity . . .

‘Multinational federation’, by contrast, suggests three or more nations, and is more

likely to be associated with an essentialist position in which there are thought to be
spatially discrete and homogeneously adjacent nations, each of whose members has
an equally intense national identity, and no other salient identity (O’Leary 2009,
21).

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Mono or Pluri-National Federations?

•  A federation can be constructed as either ‘national’ (i.e. mono-national) or as

pluri-national (i.e. two or more nations).

•  National federations seek to build ‘one nation’ – and attempt to prevent

internal national and ethnic differences from acquiring or institutionalising
long-term political salience.

•  Those who advocate national federations often avoid this language and
describe their federations as ‘territorial federations’.

•  But this is misleading, because all federations are by definition territorial;

they allocate powers to the federal centre and to the regions that comprise the
federation.

•  Advocates of national federations generally criticise pluri-national

federations – federations designed to accommodate more than one nation, or
ethnicity – by allowing such groups to be territorially concentrated majorities
in their own regions.
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Pluri or Multi-National Federation

•  Supporters wish to protect and institutionalise two or more national

cultures on a durable basis.

•  They reject the integrationist and assimilationist tendencies of national

federalists, which they see as devices for the largest ethnic, national or
religious group to assert its dominance.

•  ‘Multinational federalists reject the view that every minority must

inevitably seek its nation-state, and maintain that even those that do may
settle for their own region instead’ (McGarry and O’Leary 2005, 273).

•  They argue that multi-national federalism may help reduce conflict if the
federal borders are drawn to be congruent with the boundaries of the
relevant societal cleavages.
–  In other words the prescription may help because it makes an ethnically
heterogeneous society less politically heterogeneous via the creation of more
homogenous federal sub-units or provinces.
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Recall the Empirical Record

There is evidence that pluri-national federations may be unstable and likely to
fail.

Jack Synder concludes that ethnic federalsim ‘has a terrible track record’ (2000,
p.327).

It is true that many pluri-national federations have not been successful –

Yugoslavia, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia (‘lost’ Eritrea) and many
post-colonial experiments in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

‘Indeed , of all the states in the former communist bloc of Eastern Europe, it was
only federations that irretrievably broke apart, and all of them did’ (McG and
O’Leary 2005, 274).

But the picture is not completely bleak and their has been a tendency to over-
generalise from the post-communist and post colonial experiences (see
O’Leary 2005).
There have also been long-lasting pluri-national federal democracies, such as
Canada, Switzerland and India.
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Clearly pluri-national federations have failed in most parts of the world.

They certainly make it easier for groups to secede if they want to.

Federalsim provides a venue and resources for a territorially concentrated

ethno-national group to launch a bid for independence.

Philip Roader (2007) in answering the question - where do new nation-states

come from? – says that they emerge from previously self-governing federal
units.

But how strong is the case against pluri-national federations?

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False Negatives (McGarry and O’Leary 2009)

•  ‘The first and most obvious weakness in the case against pluri-national
federations is that the major federal failures were, to a significant extent, sham
or pseudo-federations. These cases are therefore “false negatives”’ (p.9).

The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria.

These cases had neither shared-rule nor self-rule (the essential features of
federalism).

•  ‘The constitutional division of powers and the rule of law were often ignored in
practice and they were not authentically representative (i.e. democratic). There
was, therefore, no possibility of genuine dialogue, never mind cooperation,
among the different national communities involved.

For example, although the Soviet Union was formally federated – the Union
Republics were not autonomous in practice.

Real power lay in the tightly centralized CPSU.

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Implausible counter-factuals

•  Critics of pluri-nationalism implausibly claim that federalism unnecessary as a

method of accommodating diversity in such complex cases.

•  ‘This involves the implausible contention that ‘some states would have stood a
better chance of consolidation and democratic development had they been
unitary’ (p.10).

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Wrong Historical Causation

•  ‘It is arguably not pluri-national federations that caused instability and break-
up, but attempts to unitarize them. To an important extent, secession and
violence in the territory of many failed federations followed directly from
attempts by certain groups to centralize these federations, i.e. to a move away
from the spirit of pluri-national federalism (McGarry and O’Leary 2009, 11).

•  Yugoslavia’s break-up, including the break-away of Kosovo – followed

repeated Serbian attempts to curb the autonomy of Yugoslavia’s other
republics.

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•  The states that broke apart in communist Eastern Europe were all federations

•  But this ‘glosses over the more basic fact that the states that broke apart
were also the most nationally diverse states – and that in turn explains why
they were federations in the first place’ (p.12).

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10 Factors promoting the Failure and Success of Pluri-National Federations

(see O’Leary 2005)

Failure Success
Established by coercion Voluntary unions
Authoritarian Democratic
Maltreat nations Recognise constituent nations
Distributive conflicts over resources Manage distributive conflicts
Experience centralising coups equitably
Centralise only with consent of the
Strongly majoritarian in the federal nations
government Power-sharing, especially important
Interventionist neighbours when no Staatsvolk
‘Exit’ seems a better choice than Non-interventionist neighbours
‘voice’ ‘Voice’ seems a better choice then
Economic stagnation ‘exit.
Promote economic development

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O’Leary’s theory of the Staatsvolk (2001)

•  National federations are more stable than multi-national federations because
they are generally more homogenous.

•  Among federations – those with a dominant people – seem to be more stable

(see O’Leary 2001 for a provisional ‘test’ of the worlds 23 federations).

–  ‘A staatsvolk can feel secure in a multinational federation, and live with the
concessions it must make under such a structure, because, ceteris paribus, it has
the democratic strength and resources to resist secessionism by minority
nationalities. Multi-national federations without a staatsvolk are more likely to
be unstable, and to face secessionism and break-up, because minorities are more
likely to think they can prevail’ (McG and O’L 2005, 281).

•  O’Leary’s conclusions:
1.  Successful democratic majoritarian federations require a staatsvolk.
2.  A democratic federation without a secure staatsvolk must embrace at least
some consociational practises if it is to survive.
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Presence of a Staatsvolk

•  National federations are more stable because they are more homogeneous.

•  But the size of the largest ethnic group is also important for stability.

‘A staatsvolk can feel secure in a multinational federation, and live with the
concessions it must make under such a structure, because, ceteris paribus, it has
the democratic strength and resources to resist secessionism by minority
nationalities. Multi-national federations without a staatsvolk are more likely to
be unstable, and to face secessionism and break-up, because minorities are more
likely to think they can prevail’

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Shared-rule as well as Self-rule

•  When federalism is defended as a useful tool of conflict regulation – the
emphasis is usually on how it can provide a variety of national groups with
guaranteed territorial powers of self-governance
‘those excluded at the centre can be compensated with at least regional powers’

•  In a multi-national federation minorities can be given guaranteed powers

through territorial self-government.

•  However, for the federation to have much prospect of success the minorities
will also want a share of power at the federal centre – otherwise what stake
do they have in the federation?

•  ‘It is not surprising, then, that all of the durable democratic multinational
federations have practised consociational forms of democracy within the
federal government’ (McG and O’L 2005, 282).

•  These are clear cut in the cases of Belgium, Canada and Switzerland.
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McGarry and O’Leary’s preliminary conclusions

on pluri-national federations

‘Those who quite reasonably think that the prospects for pluri-national
federations are grim also need to explain why either a unitary state or a
centralised, nationalizing federation on the American model would be more
likely to win the support of minority nations.’

‘Our view is that there is strength in the argument that pluri-national places, i.e.
states with sizeable mobilized nationalities, can be democratic only if they
are also based on pluri-national federalist principles

‘The likeliest alternatives to pluri-national federalism are not civic nationalist

harmony but control by one group over another, or disintegration . . . (p.21).

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