TOPIC: Compensable Disability

Case: G.R. No. 225425, WILHELMSEN SMITH BELL MANNING, INC.,

WILHELMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD., AND FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR.,
PETITIONERS, VS. FRANKLIN J. VILLAFLOR, RESPONDENT.

Ruling:
For disability to be compensable under Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA - SEC, the two
elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related
injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's contract. The POEA-SEC
defines work related injury as one "arising out of and in the course of employment."
Jurisprudence is to the effect that compensable illness or injury cannot be confined to the strict
interpretation of said provision in the POEA-SEC as even pre-existing conditions may be
compensable if aggravated by the seafarer's working condition. It is not necessary that the nature
of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness or injury suffered by the
seafarer.17 It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the
employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to
the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have
had.
The exception to the 120-day rule repeatedly cited above is Rule X of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of Book IV of the Labor Code, specifically Section 2 thereof which
states:
Section 2. Period of entitlement. - ( a ) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first
day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120
consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond
120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary
total disability shall be paid. However , the System m a y declare the total and permanent status
at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the
degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
(Emphasis supplied)
By contract, it is governed by the employment contract which the seafarer and his employer/local
manning agency executes prior to employment, and the applicable POEA-SEC that is deemed
incorporated in the employment contract.22 In this case, the parties · executed the contract of
employment on August 22, 2012, thus, the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable.

Topic: Service of Judgment

Case: G.R. No. 228572, MICHAEL ADRIANO CALLEON, PETITIONER, VS. HZSC
REALTY CORPORATION, JOHN LEANLON P. RAYMUNDO, EMERSON D.
ANGELES, LLOYD T. ISON, SHERWIN M. ODOÑO, LEMUEL D. VENZON, AND
RONALD F. CALING, RESPONDENTS.

Ruling:
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "[i]f any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party represented by counsel has been
actually notified, said notice is not considered notice in law.26 "The reason is simple - the
parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure, specifically,
the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the
rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best for
the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure - either the lawyer
retained by the party or the party him/herself if [he/she] does not intend to hire a lawyer."27
As to service of court resolutions, Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules pertinently provides:
Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. - Judgments, final orders or
resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him
shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

Topic: Entitlement for Separation Pay

Case: G.R. No. 244210, CALVIN JABALLA CORDERO, PETITIONER, V. HERMA
SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND HERMINIO S. ESGUERRA,
RESPONDENTS.

Ruling:
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated
under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. Section 7, Rule I, Book
VI of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer. — The just causes for terminating the services
of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of
an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code,
without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the
applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or
practice.
In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed
employee as an act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required
that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral
character of the employee.38 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Topic: Motion for Reconsideration

Case: G.R. No. 225115 DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE (PHILIPPINES), INC.,
PETITIONER, VS. DEL MONTE FRESH SUPERVISORS UNION, RESPONDENT.

Ruling:
The 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as the period within which the
party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators may
file a motion for reconsideration. Only after there solution of the motion for reconsideration may
the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court within 15 days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.
The foregoing ruling applies to a petition for review under Rule 43 that is not preceded by a
motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, for, at that time, such motion was a
prohibited pleading under the procedural rules of the Department of Labor and Employment and
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.32
It should be emphasized that the Court En Banc adopted the foregoing interpretation precisely to
put an end to conflicting rulings that have been adopted over the period 1984 through 2015.
Accordingly, respondent's petition for review with the CA was filed on time on the day from
notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner further argues that the CA erred in subjecting the term "shall" in the company's Local
Policy to rules of interpretation that are appropriate only for statutory construction.33 It is true
that the Court has applied the rules of statutory construction to labor legislations and
regulations.34 However, there is no prohibition to the application of these rules to labor
contracts, for Article 1702 of the Civil Code itself provides:
Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Topic: Validity of resignation letter

Case: G.R. No. 216132, AL-MASIYA OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. AND
ROSALINA ABOY, PETITIONERS, V. HAZEL A. VIERNES, RESPONDENT.

Ruling:
Verily, the presumption of regularity of official acts, without a doubt, does not lie in the issue
under consideration as the evidence on record point to the unmistakable conclusion that the
circumstances surrounding the execution of [respondent's] resignation letter, affidavit of
quitclaim, and final settlement are highly suspect. As borne out by the facts of the instant case,
the receipt and quitclaim are not notarized while the affidavit of quitclaim and desistance shows
that the place of execution is the City of Manila on 7 February 2011 when the same was
supposedly verified by the Assistant Labor Attaché within the Philippine Overseas Labor Office
premises in Kuwait. Reason and logic would, thus, dictate that there was something patently
irregular about the foregoing documents. To allow this supposed settlement - anchored on an
inapplicable legal precept - to operate as a bar to [respondent's] legitimate right to institute
judicial proceedings in order to advance her welfare would be the height of injustice. x x x 50
The CA adopted the observation of the NLRC on the patent irregularity of the documents
presented by petitioners purportedly showing respondent's voluntarily resignation. In addition,
the CA held that respondent would not have pursued her suit if she indeed resigned voluntarily
from her work abroad.51
Notably, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA all ruled against the validity, regularity, and due
execution of the subject resignation letter, Affidavit of Quitclaim and Desistance, and the final
settlement. The Court finds no reason to deviate from their findings. In any case, within the
context of a termination dispute, the rule is that quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon
with disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar
claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights.52 The reason for this rule is that the employer
and the employee do not stand on the same footing, such that quitclaims usually take the form of
contracts of adherence, not of choice.
Topic: Jurisdiction of Labor Tribunal
Case: G.R. No. 222212, COMSCENTRE PIDLS., INC., AND PATRICK BOE
PETITIONERS, VS. CAMILLE B. ROCIO

Ruling:
Article 224 of the Labor Code clothes the labor tribunals with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over claims for damages arising from employer employee relationship, viz:
Art. 224. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practices;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;

Topic: Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter

Case: LUIS G. GEMUDIANO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. NAESS SHIPPING
PHILIPPINES, INC. AND/OR ROYAL DRAGON OCEAN TRANSPORT, INC. AND/OR
PEDRO MIGUEL F. OCA, RESPONDENTS.

Ruling:
Article 224 (now Art. 217) of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with acclaim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rate[s] of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code , including questions involving
the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for employees compensation, social security , medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or house hold service ,involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00),
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on this provision, it is clear t hat claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations are under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of labor arbiters.
While there are cases which hold that the existence of an employer-employee relationship does
not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial courts,16 in this particular case, we find that
jurisdiction properly lies with the Labor Arbiter.
Not only are the terms under Article 224, above quoted, clear and unequivocal, practical
considerations bolster the Court 's resolve that jurisdiction of the instant case falls under the labor
tribunals and not with the civil courts.

Topic: Adherence to legal technicalities in Labor case

Case: G.R. No. 212111
CASILDA D. TAN AND/OR C & L LENDING INVESTOR, PETITIONERS, VS.
LUZVILLA B. DAGPIN, RESPONDENT.

Ruling:
Legal technicalities may be excused when strict adherence thereto will impede the achievement
of justice it seeks to serve.30 Ultimately, what should guide judicial action is that a party is given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his or her action or defense rather than for him or
her to lose life, honor, or property on mere technicalities.31 After all, the NLRC is not bound by
the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law. It is
mandated to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Topic: Dismissal based on willful breach

Case: G.R. No. 226089, COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILIPPINES, INC., (formerly known as
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.), Petitioner, -versus - JESSEL. ALPUERTO

Ruling:
A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of
the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services
are to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. There are two (2) types of
positions in which trust and confidence are reposed by the employer, namely, managerial
employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees. Managerial employees are considered to
occupy positions of trust and confidence because they are "entrusted with confidential and
delicate matters." On the other hand, fiduciary rank-and file employees refer to those employees,
who, "in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts
of [the employer's] money or property." Examples of fiduciary rank-and-file employees are
"cashiers, auditors, property custodians," selling tellers, and sales managers. It must be
emphasized, however, that the nature and scope of work and not the job title or designation
determine whether an employee holds a position of trust and confidence. The second condition
that must be satisfied is the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and confidence. This
means that "the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and
confidence." Otherwise, employees will be left at the mercy of their employers.
With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid
dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards
a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached
the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial
employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some
basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
Although a less stringent degree of proof is required in termination cases involving managerial
employees, employers may not invoke the ground of loss of trust and confidence arbitrarily. The
prerogative of employers in dismissing a managerial employee "must be exercised without abuse
of discretion."

Topic: Constructive Dismissal

Case: G.R. No. 240484, Arvin A. Pascual vs. Sitel Philippines Corporation

Ruling:
Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, when there is a demotion in rank or diminution
in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.
Resignation, on the other hand, is the voluntary act of the employee who is in a situation
where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the
service, and one has no other choice but to disassociate oneself from employment. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment.

Topic: Termination by employer

Case: G.R. No. 227070, Adamson University Faculty and Employees Union, represented by
its president and Orestes Delos Reyes

Ruling:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
 
b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
 
c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
 
d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
 
 e. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
a. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;
 
b. To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a
labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
 
c. To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization;
 
d. To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its
organizers or supporters;
 
e. To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership
in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those
employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are
not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable
fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article
242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent;
 
f. To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for
having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
 
g. To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
 
h. To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
 
i. To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of
corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or
ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. 
Topic: Disability compensation
Case: G.R. No. 239055
Richie P. Chan vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, CSCS International NV and/or Ms.
Doris Ho

Ruling:
In disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather, the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. Total disability refers
to an employee’s inability to perform his or her usual work. It dies not require total paralysis or
complete helplessness. Permanent disability on the other hand, is a worker’s inability to perform
his or her job for more than one hundred twenty (120) days, or two hundred forty (240) days if
the seafarer required further medical attention justifying the extension of the temporary total
disability period, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

Topic: Causes of dismissal

Case: G.R. NO. 222289
East Cam Tech Corporation vs. Bambie T. Fernandez, et al.

Ruling:
In fine, an employee’s failure to meet sales or work quotas falls under the concept of gross
efficiency, which in turn is analogous to gross neglected of duty that is a just cause for dismissal
under Art 282 of the code. However, in order for the quota imposed to be considered a valid
productivity standard and thereby validate a dismissal, management’s prerogative of fixing the
quota must exercise in good faith for the advancement of its interest.

Topic: Disability Benefits

Case: G.R. NO. 238578
Ventis Maritime Corporation vs. Edgardo Salenga

Ruling:
The seafarer's complaints for disability benefits arise from (1) injury or illness that manifests or
is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which is usually while the seafarer is on
board the vessel or (2) illness that manifests or is discovered after the contract, which is usually
after the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel. As further explained below, it is only in the
first scenario that Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC applies.

Topic: Probationary Period

Case: G.R. No. 224170
UNIVERSITY OF ST. LA SALLE vs. JOSEPHINE L. GLARAGA et al.

Ruling:
The Court has resolved the question of the probationary period of teachers who, given the nature
of their profession, can only render service during fixed academic terms. The Court has held that
the Labor Code provision on the general probationary period of six months does not apply to
teachers; rather, special regulations of the Department of Education provide that, unless a shorter
period is expressly adopted by their institution, the probationary period of teachers will be for a
maximum of three years, even if within that period they render service under fixed short-term
contracts. The probationary period has been further clarified to mean full-time teaching for three
consecutive academic rather than calendar years30 or six consecutive regular semesters or nine
consecutive trimesters.

Topic: Employment contract

Case: G.R. NO. 228407, JULIAN TUNGCUL TUPIL, JR., et al. vs. LBP SERVICE
CORPORATION

Ruling:
Article 280 of the labor code does not prescribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed
period provided the same is entered into by the parties, without any force, duress or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating
consent. It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden
form agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities. There is thus nothing
essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of employee’s
duties.

Topic: Fit to work

Case: G.R. NO. 241674, ZALDY C. RAZONABLE vs. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING
and/or A.P. MOLLER A/S

Ruling:
A final, conclusive, and definite medical assessment must clearly state whether the seafarer is fit
to work or the exact disability rating, or whether such Illness is work related, and without any
further condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action on the part of the
company-designated physician and it is issued by the company-designated physician after he or
she has exhausted all possible treatment options within the periods allowed by law.

Topic: Ground for Dismissal

Case: G.R. NO. 229013, INTER CONTINENT AL BROADCASTING CORPORATION
vs. ANGELINO B. GUERRERO

Ruling:
To be a valid ground for dismissal, neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual. Gross
negligence implies want of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence in the performance of
one's duties. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them. Habitual neglect, on the other hand, implies repeated failure to perform one's duties
for a period of time.
As for misconduct, it is defined as "the transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment." To constitute a valid cause for dismissal under Article
297 of the Labor Code, the employee's misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Further, it is required that the act or
conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.

Topic: Employer’s liability for diability

Case: G.R. NO. 247221, WILFREDO LIM SALAS vs. TRANSMED MANILA
CORPORATION, TRANSMED SHIPPING LTD., and EGBERT M. ELLEMA

Ruling:
Pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, which applies to this case, the employer is liable for disability
benefits only when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of
his contract. In this regard, work-related injury is defined as an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment.
Upon finding that the seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness, the employer is
obligated to refer the former to a company-designated physician, who has the responsibility to
arrive at a definite assessment of the former's fitness or degree of disability within a period of
120 days from repatriation. This period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, if the
seafarer requires further medical treatment, subject to the right of the employer to declare within
this extended period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.
The responsibility of the company-designated physician to arrive at a definite assessment
within the prescribed periods necessitates that the perceived disability rating has been properly
established and inscribed in a valid and timely medical report. To be conclusive and to give
proper disability benefits to the seafarer, this assessment must be complete and definite;
otherwise, the medical report shall be set aside and the disability grading contained therein shall
be ignored. As case law holds, a final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to
truly reflect the true extent of the sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to
resume work as such. Failure of the company-designated physician to arrive at a definite
assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the prescribed periods
and if the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the law steps in to consider the latter's
disability as total and permanent.

Topic: Rank and File Employee

Case: G. R. NO. 222416, FIAMETE A. RAMIL vs. STONELEAF INCORCOPARTION

Ruling:
A fiduciary rank-and-file employee as one who in the normal and routine exercise of his/her
functions regularly handles significant amounts of money or property. Cashiers, auditors and
property custodians are some of the employees in the second class. And is entitled to service
incentive leave pay, holiday pay and pro-rated 13th month pay. 
Topic: Existence of Illness
Case: G.R. NO. 224616, C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., NORWEIGAN
CRUISELINE LTD. JINKIE P. ILAGAN vs. FEDERICO A. NARBONITA

Ruling:
An illness shall be considered as pre existing if prior to the processing of the POEA contract, any
of the following conditions is present: (a) the advise of a medical doctor on treatment was given
for such continuing illness or condition; or (b) the seafarer had been diagnosed and has
knowledge of such illness or condition, but failed to disclose the same during the PEME, and
such cannot be diagnosed during the PEME.

Topic: Illegal Dismissal

Case: G.R. NO. 217970, NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. MARIE
JEAN DAGUISO

Ruling:
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right. Over the years, however, the case law developed that where
reinstatement is not feasible, expedient or practical, as where reinstatement would only
exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or where the relationship
between the employer and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable
differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key
position in the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of
reinstatement.38 The doctrine of strained relations, however, should not be used recklessly,
applied loosely and/or  indiscriminately, or  be based on impression alone; otherwise,
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. As reinstatement is the rule, for the exception of
strained relations to apply, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position
where he/she enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect
the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned. Strained relations must be of such
nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. Moreover, strained relations must be demonstrated
as a fact, adequately supported by evidence on record. Since the application of this doctrine will
result in the deprivation of employment despite the absence of just cause, the implementation of
the doctrine of strained relations must be supplemented by the rule that the existence of strained
relations is for the employer to clearly establish and prove in the manner it is called upon to
prove the existence of a just cause.
Topic: Constructive Dismissal
Case: G.R. NO. 242364, Elesio Mejares and Victor Cayno vs. Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc., Tai
Taxi Services, Inc., Prime Taxi Services, Inc., WMJJ Taxi Services, Inc., Cesar Lee, Lydia
Mercader, Viola Jhessa Virata, Michael Lee, and the NLRC

Ruling:
Constructive dismissal is a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or
both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in
the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the
circumstances.
Abandonment is defined as the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment
by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, two factors should be present: (1) failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer employee relationship. The second is the more determinative factor and becomes
manifest through overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees have no more
intention to work; the intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified. The burden falls upon the employer to offer substantial evidence
and to establish that its employee deliberately and unjustifiably refused to resume his
employment without any intention of returning.

Topic: Employee’s absences

Case: G.R. NO. 226338, ANTHONEL M. MINANO vs. STO. TOMAS GENERAL
HOSPITAL and DR. NEMESIA ROXAS-PLATON

Ruling:
An employee’s absences and non-compliance with return to work notices do not convincingly
show a clear and unequivocal intention to severe one’s employment. For strained relation caused
by being legitimately disappointed after being unfairly treated could explain the employee’s
hesitation to report back immediately. If any, his actuations only explain that he has a grievance,
not that he wanted to abandon his work entirely.
Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have
abandoned their work. A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing
of a complaint for illegal dismissal. The filing thereof is proof enough of one’s desire to return to
work, thus negating the suggestion of abandonment.
Topic: Work-related illness
Case: G.R. NO. 227447, MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, MASTERBULK
PTE. LTD., and/or MARLON P. TRINIDAD vs. HEIRS OF FRITZ D. BUENAFLOR
represented by HONORATA G. BUENAFLOR

Ruling:
The 2000 POEA-SEC "has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability saying
that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means
that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational
disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the
employer to overcome the presumption." This presumption should be overturned only when the
employer's refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally
defined is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion."
Thus, considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative jurisprudential context,
the rule, restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the seafarer's work-related injury or
illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter, his death, as in this case)
occurs during the term of his employment, then the employer becomes liable for death
compensation benefits under Section 20 (A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The provision cannot be
construed otherwise for to do so would not only transgress prevailing constitutional policy and
deride the bearings of relevant case law but also result in a travesty of fairness and an
indifference to social justice.

Topic: Permanent and Total Disability Benefit 

Case: Joseph Martinez vs OSG Ship Management, GR Nos. 237373 & 237378, July 29,
2020 

Ruling: 
Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC,13 the employer is liable for disability
benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his
contract.
The CA correctly ruled that the findings of the LA, as affirmed by NLRC, that Martinez' colon
cancer is work-related or work-aggravated is supported by substantial evidence while the
certification by the company- designated doctors that Martinez' illness is "likely not work-
related" is uncertain and incomplete. 

Topic: Termination of Employment 

Case: SPC Power Corporation vs Gerardo Santos, G.R. No. 202379, July 27, 2020

Ruling: 
Article 294 f Presidential Decree No. 442, also known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended and renumbered, protects the employee's security of tenure by mandating that "[i]n
cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title." A lawful dismissal must meet both
substantive and procedural requirements; in fine, the dismissal must be for a just or authorized
cause and must comply with the rudimentary due process of notice and hearing. Here, it cannot
be denied that the respondent is a regular employee of the petitioners; thus, he is entitled to a
security of tenure. The bone of contention here is whether his dismissal was lawful or that the
petitioners complied with the due process of law.
It bears stressing that in termination cases, the onus of proving the validity of dismissal lies with
the employer. The quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence
or that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise. In the absence of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the dismissal illegal and the burden is on the employer to prove
that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code. Also, it is not bent
upon dismissed employees to prove their innocence of the employer's accusations against them.
In other words, they have no mandatory duty to forward evidence to prove that they did not
commit any misfeasance or malfeasance in the office. 
It is already doctrinal that an employee may only be dismissed for just or authorized causes.
Thus, the legality of dismissal of an employee hinges on: (a) the legality of the act of dismissal;
that is dismissal on the grounds provided for under the Labor Code and (b) the legality in the
manner of dismissal. Hence, before the employer may terminate the services of the employee he
must comply with the substantive and procedural aspects of due process. Clearly, in order that a
particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be
compliance with both substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due
process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his
property. In labor cases, it refers to the grounds/basis of terminating an employee. On the other
hand, procedural due process means compliance with the procedures or steps prescribed by the
law. This refers to the employer's act of affording the employee to explain his/her side through
the two notices required by the law (notice to explain and notice to terminate). 

Topic: Illegal Dismissal 

Case: First Balfour vs Segundo Palle et all, GR No. 201247, July 13, 2020 

Ruling: 
It is necessary to note that an employer has the burden to prove that the employee is indeed a
project-employee. Thus the employer must establish that a. The employee was assigned to carry
out a particular project or undertaking, and; b. The duration and scope of which is specified at
the time of engagement. 
Regular employees may only be dismissed for just and authorized causes and upon compliance
with procedural due process. 

Topic: Illegal Dismissal 

Case: Eagle Clarc Shipping vs NLRC, GR No. 245370, July 13, 2020 
 Ruling: 
In labor cases, the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or
authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion
is that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. Moreover, not only must the dismissal
for a cause provided by law, it should also comply with the rudimentary requirements of due
process, that is, the opportunity to be heard and defend one's self. Thus, for dismissal to be valid,
the employer must show through substantial evidence - or such amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that (1) the dismissal was
for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the dismissed employee was afforded due process. 

Topic: Casual Employees vs Regular Employees 

Case: Henry Paragele et al vs GMA, GR No. 235315, July 13, 2020 

Ruling: 
Only casual employees performing work that is neither necessary nor desirable to the usual
business and trade of the employer are required to render at least one (1) year of service to attain
regular status. Employees who perform functions which are necessary and desirable to the usual
business and trade of the employer attain regular status from the time of engagement. 
To determine the existence of [an employer-employee relationship], case law has consistently
applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the
employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. Of these criteria, the
so-called "control test" is generally regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator o f
the presence or absence o f an employer- employee relationship. Under this test, an employer-
employee relationship is said to exist where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end result but also the manner and means utilized to
achieve the same. 

Topic: Death Compensation Benefit 

Case: Heirs of Reynaldo Andag vs DMC Construction, GR No. 244361, July 13, 2020

Ruling: 
The clear intent of the law is that the employer should be relieved of the obligation of directly
paying his employees compensation for work-connected illness or injury on the theory that this
part of the cost production or business activity; and that no longer would there be need for
adversarial proceedings between an employer and his employee in which there is specific legal
presumptions operating in favor of the employee and statutorily specified defenses available to
an employer. 

Topic: Unfair Labor Practice 

Case: APRI-Tiwi Employees Labor Union vs Aboitiz Power Renewables Inc, GR No
237036, July 8, 2020 

Ruling: 
An employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts
affect in whatever manner the rights of his employees to self-organize. To prove the existence of
unfair labor practice, substantial evidence must be presented. 

Topic: Disability Compensation 

Case: Intercrew Shipping Agency vs Ofrecino Calantoc, GR No. 239299, July 8, 2020

Ruling: 
There are two elements that must concur before an injury or illness is considered compensable:
1. The injury or illness must be work-related; and, 2. That the work-related injury or illness must
have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. 

Topic: Disability Benefits 

Case: Teodoro Razonable Jr vs Torm Shipping Philippines, GR No 241260, July 7, 2020 

Ruling: 
The 2010 POEA-SEC defines a work-related illness as "any sickness as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied.” As for illnesses not listed as an occupational disease, they may also be compensable,
as they are disputably presumed to be work-related, if the seafarer is able to prove the correlation
of his illness to the nature of his work and the conditions for compensability are satisfied.

Topic: Constructive Dismissal

Case: Alan Ador vs Jamila and Company Security Services, GR No 245422, July 7, 2020

Ruling: 
Temporary "off-detail" or "floating status" is the period of time when security guards are in
between assignments or when they are made to wait after being relieved from a previous post
until they are transferred to a new one. It takes place when the security agency's clients decide
not to renew their contracts with the agency, resulting in a situation where the available posts
under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster. It also happens in
instances where contracts for security services stipulate that the client may request the agency for
the replacement of the guards assigned to it even for want of cause, such that the replaced
security guard may be placed on temporary "off-detail" if there are no available posts under the
agency's existing contracts. During such time, the security guard does not receive any salary or
any financial assistance provided by law. It does not constitute a dismissal, as the assignments
primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the security agencies with third parties, so long
as such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time. When such a "floating status" lasts for
more than six (6) months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively
dismissed.

Topic: Illegal Dismissal 

Case: Pedrito Parayday & Jaime Reboso vs Shogun Shipping Corp., GR No 204555, July 6,
2020 

Ruling: 
Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be
established. 

Topic: Illegal Dismissal 

Case: San Miguel Corporation vs Rosario Gomez, GR No. 200815, August 26, 2020

Ruling: 
Employers may not arbitrarily dismiss their employees by simply invoking Article 297 of the
Labor Code. The loss of confidence must be genuine and cannot be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. 

Topic: Constructive Illegal Dismissal 

Case: Bayview Management Consultant vs Pedrita Heloisa Pre, GR No 220170, August 19,
2020

Ruling: 
There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his
part except to resign from such employment. It exists where there is involuntary resignation
because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. We have held that
the standard for constructive dismissal is "whether a reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the circumstances.
The unreasonably- harsh conditions that compel resignation on the part of an employee must be
way beyond the occasional discomfort brought about by the misunderstandings between the
employer and employee. Strong words may sometimes be exchanged as the employer describes
her expectations or as the employee narrates the conditions of her work environment and the
obstacles she encounters as she accomplishes her assigned tasks. As in every human relationship,
there are bound to be disagreements.
However, when these strong words from the employer happen without palpable reason or are
expressed only for the purpose of degrading the dignity of the employee, then a hostile work
environment will be created. In a sense, the doctrine of constructive dismissal has been a
consistent vehicle by this Court to assert the dignity of labor.

Topic: Dismissal
Case: Roger V. Chin vs. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc., Maersk Line A/S and Renel C.
Ramos, G.R. No. 247338, September 2, 2020
 Ruling:
In the 2018 case of Guagua National Colleges vs. CA, the Court acknowledged the variance in
its rulings and categorically declared that the correct period to appeal the decision or award of
the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court is the fifteen (15)-day period set forth in Section 4 thereof reckoned from
notice or receipt of the VA’s resolution on the motion for reconsideration, and that the ten (10)-
day period provided in Article 276 of the Labor Code refers to the period within which an
aggrieved party may file said motion for reconsideration.
The Court further noted in Guagua that despite the clarification made in Teng vs.
Pagahac in 2010, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and NCMB have yet to
revised or amend Section 7, Rule VII of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings and such inaction has caused confusion, particularly with
respect to the filing of the motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent to the filing of the
petition for review in the CA. Thus, the Court expressly directed the DOLE and the NCMB to
cause the revision or amendment of the aforesaid section in order to allow the filing of motions
for reconsideration in line with Article 276 of the Labor Code. Unfortunately, no revision has yet
been made in this regard Consequently, the DOLE and the NCMB are again reminded to cause
the revision or amendment of Section 7, Rule VII of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings insofar as it prohibits the filing of the motion for
reconsideration, if they have not done so.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner in this case had fifteen (15) days from Receipt of the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration to file his petition for review with the CA.
Having received a copy of VA’s October 29, 2018 Resolution on November 22, 2018, petitioner
therefore had until December 7, 2018 to file his petition. As the records show that the petition
was filed on December 4, 2018, albeit through a private courier, it was therefore timely filed and
the CA erred in dismissing it outright. To rule otherwise would be antithetical to the tenets of the
fair play, not to mention the undue prejudice to the petitioner’s rights. Thus, in light of the fact
that the CA dismissed the petition for review outright based solely on procedural grounds, a
remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is warranted.