MICHELE TRIZIO

(University of Bari)

Eustratius of Nicaea on Absolute and Conditional Necessity.

A Survey of the Commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics

As far as we know Eustratius of Nicaea’s commentary on book VI of Aristotle’s

Nicomachean Ethics should be considered the last work we possess by the author who
in the Latin West shares with Averroes the title of Commentator. He himself claims in
the prologue to this commentary that he is “diseased, afflicted by the natural sickness
due to the old age” (ἡµεῖ  ὀλιγοµαθεῖ  καὶ ἀσθενεῖ  καὶ γήρᾳ καὶ νόσοι
κατακαµπτόµενοι διανοία στενότhτα περικείµενοι), his mind being “affected by
limitation” (διανοία στενότhτα περικείµενοι)1. As is well known the first part of
this prologue is entirely devoted to the person who actually asked Eustratius to write
such a work, a princess endowed with many virtuous and described by the
commentator as “religious and logos-loving”2. The fact that is Anna Comnena the
princess depicted by Eustratius as more devoted to the beauty of the soul than to the
beauty usually pursued by the rest of woman who pay attention to cosmetics and silly
ornaments3, was convincingly pointed out already in 1962 in a famous article by R.
Browning4. It was in order to satisfy a request from Anna Comnena that our
commentator composed his commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Eustratius rhetorically remarks his surprise at such a request, considering his old age
and the limitations of his intellectual capacities. Furthermore, he clearly enphasizes
the fact that this is not the first time that he has been called upon for such a task,
namely the one requested by an important member of the Comnenian court. The
very same princess to whom Eustratius adresses his praise and his acknowledgment
had asked “some time before” (πρὸ χρόνου τινό), as stated in the text of the
prologue, for a commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics5. Thus, it is clear that
cronologically the commentary on book VI of the same work comes after the
commentary on book I. If we accept Draeseke’s hypothesis that Eustratius’ death
should be dated to 11206, we can argue that the composition of the commentary on
this book of the Nicomachean Ethicsshould be datede not much earlier. For the terminus
ante quem Browning’s thesis that the so-called “philosophical circle” of Anna

1 EUSTRATIUS, 256,24-26 (CAG XX, ed. Hayduck).

2 EUSTRATIUS, 256,3-4.
3 EUSTRATIUS, 256,8-12.
4 Cf. R. BROWNING, An Unpublished Funeral Oration for Anna Comnena, «Proceedings of the Cambridge
Philological Society» 188, n.2 (1962), 1-12. Reprinted with slight modifications in R. SORABJI (ed.),
Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, New York 1990, 393-406.
5 EUSTRATIUS, 256,26-257,5: τοίνυν ἐπεὶ πρὸ χρόνου τινὸ ἐζήτhσα ἡµᾶ ἐκθέσθαι σαφήνειαν

εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν Νικοµαχείων τοῦ 'Αριστοτέλου 'Ηθικῶν, καὶ ἡµεῖ  σοι πεισθέντε ὃ
ἀπῄτhσα πεποιήκαµεν, ᾠήθhµεν ἐξ ἐκείνου διαγνῶναί σε τὴν ἡµετέραν περὶ λόγου καὶ νοήσει
ἐλάττωσιν καὶ µhκέτι προσθεῖ ναι πρὸ ἡµᾶ ζήτhσιν περὶ τοιούτου τινό.
6 Cf. J. DRAESEKE, Zu Eustratios von Nikäia, «Byzantinische Zeitschrift», 5 (1886), 319-336. Draeeseke

hypothesis has been criticised by Browning, who nevertheless does not provide a counter-argument or
alternative hypothesis; cf. BROWNING, An Unpubblished cit., 6-7.
Comnena starts its activity after the death of her father, the emperor Alexius I, in
1117, with her retirement in 1118, is also more than probable7. This would also fit in
with Eustratius’ reference to a request “sometime earlier” of commenting on Book I
of the Nicomachean Ethics. The expression in question does not suggest a major
chronological gap between the composition of the commentaries on Books I and VI.
The activity of our commentator at the service of the princess probabily lasted no
more than two or three years, from 1117/1118 to 1120. This may explain the
considerable quantitative difference between Michael of Ephesus’ activity as
commentator and that of Eustratius. The death of the latter left Michael, and perhaps
some other anonymous collaborator of his, the only person responsible for the
intellectual project sponsored by the princess according to the author of the funeral
oration for Anna Comnena, George Tornikès, namely commenting on the “writings
of Aristotle on which commentaries had not yet been written before her time”8.
On the contrary, Eustratius’ commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics
does not seem to be one of the tasks accomplished at the request of princess Anna
Comnena. It is very probable that it belongs to Eustratius’ activity as teacher in one
of the school in XI-XIIth century Constantinople. He himself was a pupil of John
Italos, the man appointed after Psellos as ὕπατο τῶν φιλοσόφων,. During the trial
of Italos for heterodoxy, Eustratius was asked to clarify his position in regard to the
teaching of his former mentor. In this respect, the official documents mention him as
“Eustratius, who had been the director of the school linked to the church of St.
Theodore in the block of Sphôrakiou”9. Commenting on Book II of the Posterior
Analytics, our commentator incidentally claims that he is not a professional
commentator, but that he is carrying out this task “because of a request by
companions” (διὰ τὴν τῶν ἑταίρων ἀξίωσιν)10. We do not know who this
companions were, nor whether at the time of the composition of this commentary
Eustratius was still a teacher in the school of the church of St. Theodore or
somewhere else. But this reference is enough to argue that this commentary belongs
to a different context than that of Eustratius’ activity in the service of Anna
Comnena, and therefore should be most probably considered as earlier than the two
commentaries on Books I and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Several problems about Eustratius’ activity as commentator remain
unsolved11. Nevertheless, it may be useful to point out the chronological relations
between Eustratius’ three commentaries in order to draw out the nature of the

7 Cf. BROWNING, An Unpublished cit., 6. The Annales of Zonaras (Annales, 18,28-29, ed. PINDER)
inform us of the true cause of Anna Comnena’s retirement, namely a plot to place the imperial crown
on the head of her husband, Nicephorus Bryennius, instead of her brother John II and the legitimate
successor of Alexius I.
8
GEORGIUS TORNICES, In mortem Annae caesarissae, 283,7-9 (ed. Darrouzès).
9 Cf. J. GOUILLARD, Le procès officiel de Jean l’Italien. Les actes et leurs sous-entendus, «Travaux et Mémoires»,

9 (1985), 133-174,159. For the school and the church τοῦ ἁγίου Θεοδώρου τῶν Σφωρακίου, cf. R.
JANIN, La géographie ecclésiastique de l’Empire byzantin, I partie: Le Siège de Constantinople et le Patriarchat
Oecumenique, III. Les églises et les monastères, Paris 1969, (II ed.), 154.
10 EUSTRATIUS, In II A.Po., 123,24-31 (CAG XXI,1, ed. Wallies).
11 For a good overview on Eustratius’ life and work, cf. M. CACOUROS, “Eustrate de Nicée”, in R.

GOULET (ed.), Dictionnaire de philosophes antiques, III, Paris 2000, 379-388.

2
arguments employed by the commentator and the way in which he uses his source
materials. It seems that in the commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics
Eustratius refers to certain arguments that were results of his exegesis on other
Aristotelian texts. In particular, the commentator often refers to arguments found
literally in his commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics.
In the present article I shall attempt to give a sample of the inner relations
between these commentaries to give an account of Eustratius’ general attitude
towards the text of Aristotle, by following the commentator’s reading of the
Aristotle’s views on the concepts of “absolute” (ἁπλῶ) and “conditional” (ἐξ
ὑποθέσεω) necessity. In order to do this I shall strictly follow the structure of some
of Eustratius’ arguments, starting from the commentary on the Book VI of the
Nicomachean Ethics and eventually returning to the commentary on book II of the
Posterior Analytics.

1. Eustratius and the Aristotetle’s Standpoints

The Aristotelian definition of necessity has been considered to be the main problem
of his natural philosophy12. In order to briefly reconstruct this problem it may be
useful to refer immediately to a famous passage of the Metaphysics (V,5,1015a20-
1015b16). Here Aristotle distinguishes between necessity in the absolute sense
(ἁπλῶ) and derivative meanings such as “compulsory” (βίᾳ), namely what tends to
hinder and resist, contrary to impulse and choice. In general, “necessity” can mean
that series of conditions without which something cannot live, for it is impossible to
exist withouth these. Eating and breathing are necessary conditions of this kind, for
an animal cannot survive without them. In the same way, Aristotle claims, in order to
cure a disease it is necessary to take a medicine, and a man’s sailing to Aegina is
necessary if he wants to get his money back13. In regard to compulsion, it has already
been said that it involves a force which is contrary to impulse and purpose. About
this kind of necessity Aristotle speaks briefly in the Posterior Analytics (II,11,94b37-
95a3), providing the example of a stone wich could be borne both, upwards and
downwards, but not by the same kind of necessity14. Speaking about this passage, in
his commentary on book II of the Posterior Analytics, Eustratius simply expands the
Aristotelian example, explaining that necessity in this case should be viewed as
related to the nature or natural tendency of something. Thus, it is clear that the fact
that a stone is thrown upwards is necessary in a compulsory sense, because this kind

12 Cf. R. SORABJI, Necessity, Cause and Blame : Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory, London 1980, 144.
13 ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, V,5,1015a20-26: 'Αναγκαῖ ον λέγεται οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν
ὡ συναιτίου (οἷ ον τὸ ἀναπνεῖ ν καὶ ἡ τροφὴ τῷ ζῴJ ἀναγκαῖ ον, ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων
εἶ ναι), καὶ ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν µὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶ ναι ἢ γενέσθαι, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἀποβαλεῖ ν ἢ
στερhθῆναι (οἷ ον τὸ πιεῖ ν τὸ φάρµακον ἀναγκαῖ ον ἵ να µὴ κάµνV, καὶ τὸ πλεῦσαι εἰ Αἴ γιναν
ἵ να ἀπολάβV τὰ χρήµατα).
14 ARISTOTELES, Analytica Posteriora, II,11,94b37-95a3: ἡ µὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὁρµήν, ἡ δὲ

βίᾳ ἡ παρὰ τὴν ὁρµήν, ὥσπερ λίθο ἐξ ἀνάγκh καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀνάγκhν.

3
of movement is against its own natural tendency, namely tomove to its natural place,
which is necessity according to its nature15. In the case of human actions
“compulsory” is for Aristotle what hinders and prevents in opposition to an impulse
or a choice16. Indeed, there cannot be such a compulsory force in the case of what is
eternal and, therefore, by absolute necessity, although it has been pointed out that as
such a compulsory force is an external efficient cause, which causes by absolute
necessity17. But what Aristotle seems to consider the proper meaning of necessity is
“that which cannot be otherwise”. As has already been stated, all of the other
meanings of necessity derive from this main one18. In this respect it is possible to say
that scientific demonstrations are necessary, for the conclusion cannot be otherwise
given the premisses from which the syllogism proceeds in the same order19. It is also
possible to say that absolute necessity is the necessity proper to mathematics, for
“since a straight line is what it is, it is thus necessary that the angles of a triangle
should be equal two right angles”20.
On the other hand, one can say that the real distinction among those things
that Aristotle defines “necessary” is between absolute necessity and a necessity
meaning that without which something cannot exist, often to be found expressed as
“conditional” (ἐξ ὑποθέσεω) necessity21. In Physics (II,9) Aristotle recognizes that in
Nature just as in Art there is a kind of necessity which is due to materials that serve a
purpose. In order to produce a saw that works as such it must necessarily be made of
iron. But this is just conditional/hypothetical necessity, for it simply requires that in
order to accomplish a purpose a certain material is necessary22. The physicist, in the
end, cannot speak about necessity in a different dimension to that linked to what is
inherent in the material. In this respect, his duty is to recognize the purposeful
movement imposed upon certain materials as an addition to their inherent qualities.
This kind of necessity is clearly distinguished from absolute (ἁπλῶ) necessity in the

15 EUSTRATIUS, In II A.Po., 154,16-24: ὁ γὰρ λίθο πρὸ τἀναντία φέρεται ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ὑπὸ

ἐναντίων ἀναγκῶν. ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ βίᾳ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν· τῷ γὰρ λίθJ φυσική τι ὁρµὴ καὶ ἔφεσι
τὸν οἰκεῖ ον τόπον καταλαβεῖ ν ὡ φυσικὴν αὐτοῦ τελειότhτα, καὶ δρᾷ ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν πρὸ ἐκεῖ νον
κίνhσιν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνάγκh, ἣν δὴ καὶ ὕλhν φαµέν, τὴν δὲ πρὸ τὸν παρὰ φύσιν τόπον ἡ βία
καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἀνάγκh. ὡ γὰρ βαρυτάτJ τῷ λίθJ κατὰ φύσιν µὲν ὁ κάτω τόπο, πρὸ ὃν καὶ
κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖ ται, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ ὁ ἄνω, πρὸ ὃν βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ ἡ κίνhσι γίνεται.
16 ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, V,5,1015a26-33.
17
W. DETEL, Aristoteles: Analytica Posteriora. Einleitung, Übersetzung und Kommentar, von W.Detel.
Aristoteles, II, 2 Bd., Berlin 1993, 714.
18 ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, V,5,1015a33-36: ἔτι τὸ µὴ ἐνδεχόµενον ἄλλω ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖ όν φαµεν

οὕτω ἔχειν· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀναγκαῖ ον καὶ τἆλλα λέγεταί πω ἅπαντα ἀναγκαῖ α.
19 ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, V,5,1015b6-9: ἔτι ἡ ἀπόδειξι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται

ἄλλω ἔχειν, εἰ ἀποδέδεικται ἁπλῶ· τούτου δ' αἴ τια τὰ πρῶτα, εἰ ἀδύνατον ἄλλω ἔχειν ἐξ ὧν ὁ
συλλογισµό.
20 ARISTOTELES, Physica, II,9,200a15-18.
21 Passages in which Aristotle states this distinction are, for example, De partibus animalium, I,1,639b21-

640a9, 642a1-13, 642a31-642b4; Metaphysica, VI,2,1026b27-33, IX,8,1050b16-18; Physica, II,9; De

Interpretatione, 13,23a21-26; De generatione et corruptione, II,9,337a34-338b19.
22 ARISTOTELES, Physica, II,9,200a11-15:) τοῦτο µέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἂν µὴ

σιδhροῦ ᾖ· ἀνάγκh ἄρα σιδhροῦν εἶ ναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεω δὴ τὸ
ἀναγκαῖ ον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡ τέλο· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλV τὸ ἀναγκαῖ ον, τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγJ.

4
Parts of Animals (I,1). Here we find clearly stated that absolute necessity belongs
specifically to eternal things, such as the heavenly bodies and, in science, the eternal
truths of mathematics. On the contrary conditional necessity covers the realm of that
which comes into being as well as that wich is the product of Art.
This latter reference provides us with the possibility of approaching the text
of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. In NE VI,3,1139b22-24 the link between
necessity and eternity is stated explicitely. Here we find that the object of science (τὸ
ἐπιστhτόν) is by necessity; therefore it is also eternal, for everything whose status is
to be absolutely necessary is eternal, and therefore not subject to the process of
coming to be and passing away23. Furthermore, science is a judgment about
universals and about necessary realities: on such objects, Aristotle claims, there is no
possibility of any kind of deliberation24.
Eustratius’ commentary on one of these Aristotelian arguments is the sample
we are going to provide of the consistency and of the inner structure of his
commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. In NE VI,1,1139a3-8 Aristotle
introduces the division of the rational part of the human soul into one part dealing
with necessary realities, and the other dealing with contingent ones. This distinction
is derived from the different nature of what is the proper object of these two parts25.
Eustratius immediately stresses the fact that the distinction in question is so easy to
understand that it does not require any kind of demonstration; that is the reason why
the Philosopher uses the verb ὑ π ο κ ε ί σ θ ω , i.e. “let us say” or “let us assume”. The
existence of two components in our soul, one dealing with necessary realities, the
other with contingent ones, is self-evident or at least easily understood by anyone
who has received at least some basic education26. In the same way, Eustratius argues
that the distinction between the objects of sense-perception, the αἰσθhτά, and the
objects of intellection, the νοhτά, does not require an explanation or a
demonstration, at least for those who have some knowledge, however approximative,
of this subject-matter27. The introduction in the commentary on the lemma at stake of
the latter distinction is propedeutic for the explanation of the different natures of
necessary and contingent realities. There follows an example of necessary realities
and of contingent ones. Apparently these two examples conform to the mainstream
of Aristotelian arguments, i.e. setting out from commonly accepted and self-evident

23
ARISTOTELES, Ethica Nicomachea, VI,3,1139b22-24: ἐξ ἀνάγκh ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστhτόν. ἀίδιον
ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκh ὄντα ἁπλῶ πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἀίδια ἀγένhτα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. See also De
Generatione et Corruptione, II,11,338a1-2: ὥστ' εἰ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκh, ἀίδιόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιον, ἐξ
ἀνάγκh.
24 ARISTOTELES, Ethica Nicomachea, VI,5,1140a35-1140b1.
25 ARISTOTELES, Ethica Nicomachea, VI,1,1139a3-8: πρότερον µὲν οὖν ἐλέχθh δύ' εἶ ναι µέρh τῆ

ψυχῆ, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν µὲν ᾧ θεωροῦµεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων
ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ µὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλω ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόµενα.
26 EUSTRATIUS, 267,9-10: διὰ τοῦτο ὑ π ο κ ε ί σ θ ω ταῦτα εἶ πεν, ὡ µὴ ἀποδόσεω χρῄζοντα τοῖ 

µικρὸν παιδεία µετεσχhκόσιν.

27 EUSTRATIUS, 267,1-2: ὅτι γὰρ εἰσί τινα νοhτὰ καὶ ἕτερα αἰσθhτά, πάνυ ὀλίγοι ἠγνόhσαν τῶν

ἐπιστhσάντων τοῖ  πράγµασιν.

5
point of views. In this respect, the Commentator speaks mainly about necessary and
contingent events: necessary events are e.g. the rising and setting of the stars
(ἀνατολαὶ καὶ δύσει ἀστέρων) and related earthly climatic differences due to their
approaching or departure (τινων ἐκ τούτων πλhσιασµοὶ καὶ ἀποστάσει πρὸ τὰ
τῆ γῆ διάφορα κλίµατα), or the cycle of the seasons and the fact that day and
night succeed each other (ὧραι τε τοῦ ἔτου καὶ ἡµέραι καὶ νύκτε ἀλλήλα
διαδεχόµεναι)28. It is a necessity related to events or to things that come into being.
It is interesting in a certain sense to see to which Aristotelian formulation these
examples belong and what is the genesis of Eustratius’ exegetical solution. To start
with the latter problem, it seems that Eustratius is reworking material already used in
his commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics. Commenting on Posterior
Analytics II,12,96a8-10, where Aristotle speaks about the fact that certain events
(γινόµενα) occur or happen universally (καθόλου), while other not always and only
usually (ὡ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ)29, Eustratius mentions exactly the same kind of events we
can find in his commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics: occurrences of this
kind are climatic changes, the fact that day follows night and the revolutionary
movements of the stars, particularly of the sun30. Again: what kind of necessity is
found in things that occur or come to be what they are always and universally? The
answer is provided in the same commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics. If
one takes into account Eustratius’ full commentary on the lemma of II,12,94b37-95a3,
where we find the above-mentioned example of the stone, we find an interesting
attempt at comparing what for the commentator are different Aristotelian arguments
about the different kinds of necessity. In this passage of the Posterior Analytics,
Eustratius claims, Aristotle speaks about two kinds of necessity, one according to the
essence (κατ' οὐσίαν) or to the natural tendency of something (κατὰ φύσιν), the
other according to compulsion (κατὰ βίαν) contrary to its natural tendency (παρὰ
φύσιν). The commentator does not go further in the explanation of the possible
reason for these different prespectives on the same subject. It is interesting to notice
that here Eustratius tries to compare necessity according to nature and compulsion
which strongly opposes to it to other passages of the Physics (II,9) and On Coming to Be

28 EUSTRATIUS, 267,3-6: ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τὰ µὲν ἀναγκαίω τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόµενα, ἀναγκαίω µὲν

ὡ ἀνατολαὶ καὶ δύσει ἀστέρων καί τινων ἐκ τούτων πλhσιασµοὶ καὶ ἀποστάσει πρὸ τὰ τῆ
γῆ διάφορα κλίµατα, ὧραι τε τοῦ ἔτου καὶ ἡµέραι καὶ νύκτε ἀλλήλα διαδεχόµεναι καὶ ὅσα
ἕτερα τούτοι σύστοιχα. Such a reference to necessary events seems to suggest that it wouldn’t be
completely inproper to accept, or at least to justify, the reading of the text of the Aldine edition,
adding at 267,3 γινόµενα to τὰ µὲν ἀναγκαίω τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόµενα, which is also the reading one can
find in Grosseteste, namely “quoniam sunt haec quidem necessario, haec autem contingentes facta” (Cod.
Marcianus,VI,122,f.82v)
29 ARISTOTELES, Analytica Posteriora, II,12,96a8-10: ”Εστι δ' ἔνια µὲν γινόµενα καθόλου (ἀεί τε γὰρ

καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸ οὕτω ἢ ἔχει ἢ γίνεται), τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ µὲν οὔ, ὡ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δέ...
30 EUSTRATIUS, In II A.Po., 178,10-14: τὸ δὲ µετὰ χειµῶνα γίνεσθαι ἔαρ καὶ µετὰ ἔαρ θέρο, καὶ

µετὰ τοῦτο µετόπωρον καὶ αὖθι χειµῶνα µετὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γίνεται. ὁµοίω καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλα νύκτα νύκτ
διαδέχεσθαι
διαδέχ καὶ ἡµέραν,
ἡµέρ καὶ ἀντιπαραχωρεῖ ν ἀλλήλαι τῆ αὐξήσεω ἐπίσh κατὰ τοὺ
πλhσιασµοὺ
πλhσιασµο καὶ τὰ ἀποστάσει τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ γίνεται.

6
and Passing Away (II,11)31, i.e the distinction between absolute and conditional
necessity. It has been argued by John Dudley that the reason why in this passage of
Book II of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle speaks about a necessity in accordance with
nature and a necessity which opposes it reflects an early stage of Aristotle’s
understanding of the problem of necessity. This means that probably at the time of
dictating this passage Aristotle had not yet developed the concept of hypotethical
necessity32. However, Eustratius simply remarks that it in the Physics and On Coming to
Be and Passing Away Aristotle seems to divide the necessity according to the natural
tendency of something (κατὰ φύσιν) into absolute and conditional; in the Posterior
Analytics, on the contrary, the Aristotelian distinction between necessity κατὰ φύσιν/
κατ' οὐσίαν and necessity παρὰ φύσιν entails only the concept of absolute (ἁπλῶ)
necessity. This is enough to remind the reader that Aristotle’s concept of compulsory
- παρὰ φύσιν/κατὰ βίαν - hardly fits into the concept of conditional/hypothetical
necessity. Not only this: Eustratius rightly points out that as such βίᾳ must be
understood as an external efficient cause, which he calls “external necessity” (ἡ
ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκh)33. In a way, one could say, that it is never due to βίᾳ that nature
sometimes does not achieve its end, but due to the presence of a completely passive
obstacle34.
The passage of On Coming to Be and Passing Away (II,11) referred to by
Eustratius in commenting on Aristotle’s example of the stone in Book II of the
Posterior Analytics is important. The reader will notice that there the concept of
absolute necessity is discussed precisely from the perspective of the coming to be of
something. Aristotle’s main argument is that this kind of necessity is also absolute,
though cyclical and returning upon itself35. The examples provided here by Aristotle
in order to explain this kind of cyclical necessity are almost the same as those
provided by Eustratius. They belong to the cyclical movements of the heavens. Since
the upper revolution is cyclical, Aristotle claims, and the sun moves in a particular
way, the seasons (αἱ ὧραι) come to be in a cycle, and one must say the same of the
things caused by the cyclical movements of the heavenly bodies. The sun for
examples moves in a circle in the ecliptic and its motion is the cause of the cyclical
change of the different seasons, upon which the vital periods of living things

31 EUSTRATIUS, In II Apo., 154,8-13 (ed. Wallis): ∆ιττήν φhσι τὴν ἀνάγκhν εἶ ναι, τὴν µὲν κατ'

οὐσίαν τὴν δὲ κατὰ βίαν, ταὐτόν δ' εἰπεῖ ν τὴν µὲν κατὰ φύσιν τὴν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἄλλω
ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν τοῖ  Περὶ γενέσεω καὶ φθορᾶ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοι τῶν Φυσικῶν τὴν ἀνάγκhν διαιρῶν.
καὶ ἔοικεν ἐν ἐκείνοι µὲν τὴν κατὰ φύσιν διαιρεῖ ν ἀνάγκhν εἰ τὴν ἁπλῶ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεω,
ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὴν ἁπλῶ εἰ τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ βίαν.
32 Cf. JOHN DUDLEY, The Evolution of the Concept of Chance in the Physics and Ethics of Aristotle. A

Commentary on Phys. II,iv-vi, Amersfoort 1997, 113.

33
EUSTRATIUS, In II Apo., 155,15-17: ἡ δὲ βίαιο ἔξωθεν καὶ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνh. δύναται δὲ
οὐ µόνον ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκh ἔχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του.
34 Cf. DUDLEY, The Evolution cit., 113.
35 ARISTOTELES, De Generatione et Corruptione, II,11,338a4-5: Εἰ ἄρα τινὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκh ἁπλῶ ἡ

γένεσι, ἀνάγκh ἀνακυκλεῖ ν καὶ ἀνακάµπτειν.

7
depend36. And actually it is exactly in On Coming to Be and Passing Away (II,9) that
Aristotle raises the question whether absolute necessity also occurs in the sublunar
world. It seems that for Eustratius this is the same issue as that discussed by Aristotle
in Posterior Analytics, II,12,96a8-10, where the Philosopher stated that some events
occur universally (καθόλου), while others not always and only usually (ὡ ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ). We can only observe how interesting it would be to follow the chain of
reference which starts from Eustratius’ passage referred to above, for Aristotle is not
the only reference here, but also the tradition of the commentary on On Coming to Be
and Passing Away. There are passages in Philoponus’ commentary on it that look like
Eustratius’ terminological source. Commenting on II,10,336a13-1437, where Aristotle
promises a more detailed discussion of the four causes, Philoponus remarks that the
whole arrangement of the universe is due to the movements of the fixed stars: they
are the efficient causes of the process of coming to be and perishing. The example
provided in this commentary seems to be the terminological source of Eustratius’
examples: it is obviously, Philoponus claims, due to the movements of the heavens
that “night and day always and regularly follow each other” (ἡµέρα τε καὶ νὺξ
τεταγµένω ἀλλήλα διαδέχονται)38. The problem of absolute and conditional
necessity thus provides us with a good sample of Eustratius’ way of proceeding. We
started from Eustratius’ commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics
(VI,1,1139a3-8), where climatic changes served as examples of absolutely necessary
occurrences. At that point, it appeared clear that Eustratius was simply re-elaborating
what he had already sketched in his commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics
(II,12,96a8-10). In this commentary, which as seen above should be considered
earlier than the commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratius
compares various Aristotelian passages on the subject of the different kinds of
necessity, i.e. Physics (II,9) and On Coming to Be and Passing Away (II,11). Finally, it
seems that Eustratius’ source for the examples of absolutely necessary occurrences is
Philoponus’ commentary on On Coming to Be and Passing Away.
Thus, both for Aristotle and Eustratius absolute necessity is to be found also
in the sublunar world. What Eustratius does not seem to develop fully is that
according to Aristotle (1) this necessity is eternal and circular, (2) it does not apply to
the individual, but only toclasses of occurrences, (3) it is caused by movements of the
sun and the moon (like the alternation of night and day) which are in turn caused by

36 ARISTOTELES, De Generatione et Corruptione, II,11,338a17-b6: Ταῦτα µὲν δὴ εὐλόγω, ἐπεὶ ἀίδιο

καὶ ἄλλω ἐφάνh ἡ κύκλJ κίνhσι καὶ ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἐξ ἀνάγκh γίνεται καὶ ἔσται,
ὅσαι ταύτh κινήσει καὶ ὅσαι διὰ ταύτhν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κύκλJ κινούµενον ἀεί τι κινεῖ , ἀνάγκh καὶ
τούτων κύκλJ εἶ ναι τὴν κίνhσιν, οἷ ον τῆ ἄνω φορᾶ οὔσh κύκλJ ὁ ἥλιο ὡδί, ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτω,
αἱ ὧραι διὰ τοῦτο κύκλJ γίνονται καὶ ἀνακάµπτουσιν, τούτων δ' οὕτω γινοµένων πάλιν τὰ ὑπὸ
τούτων.
37 ARISTOTELES, De Generatione et Corruptione, II,10,336a13-14.
38 JOANNES PHILOPONUS, In de Generatione et Corruptione, 289,20-24 (ed. Vitelli): διότι δὲ ἀνωµάλω

ὡ πρὸ ἡµᾶ κινεῖ ται, διὰ τοῦτο ἐναντίαι µεταβολαὶ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἡ
τοιαύτh τάξι καὶ κόσµο ἦν ἄν, εἰ µὴ ἦν ἡ τῶν ἀπλανῶν φορά· ἐκεῖ θεν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκάστh ἡµέρα ἡµέρ
τε καὶ νὺξ τεταγµένω ἀλλήλα διαδέχονται.

8
the efficient causality of the other heavenly bodies, in primis the πρῶτο οὐρανό39.
Finally, an orthodox Aristotelian would have said, quoting Metaphysics (V,5,1015b9-
15) that this kind of necessity, i.e. that involving climatic changes and in general
phenomena in the sublunar world is a kind of derived absolute necessity, for all these
occurrences have a cause of their necessity, i.e those things which are necessary by
what scholars call “unqualified necessity”, and which Aristotle calls “primary”
(πρῶτον) and “simple” (ἁπλοῦν) necessity40. However, Eustratius’ simplyfied
account of Aristotle’s position does not reflect an inconsistent attitude towards the
text. On the contrary, it is the sign of a different and deeper exegetical option. As we
continue to read Eustratius’ commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics
(II,12,96a8-10), we find something interesting immediately after the above-
mentionned examples of occurrences that happen universally. Our commentator
seems to consider it natural to add that “being in the proper sense of the word” (τὸ
µὲν εἶ ναι κυρίω) is a property of the intelligibles (ἐπὶ τῶν νοhτῶν), namely of that
which is never in potency, i.e. those realities whose status is to exist actually in
themselves (αὐτοενεργειῶν ὑπαρχόντων), whereas “becoming” (τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι)
covers the realm of that which is always in potency (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ἐν δυνάµει)41. It
wpuld appear, then, that Eustratius, as we shall see, is deliberately leading the reader
into a non-Aristotelian context.

2. “Causes in the Proper Sense of the Term”

Contingent occurrences are, on the other hand, things such as victories and defeats,
or in general every human operation or actions (ἐνέργειαι καὶ πράξει). It is not
necessary to mention things of this kind one by one, Eustratius claims, for once
again they are well known to almost everyone: they all fall under the class of things
which are product of human beings and under the more general category of
contingent realities42.
As the reader will remember, the aristotelian lemma that is the subject of
Eustratius’ commentary mentions not only the case of realities that cannot be
otherwise and of realities subject to changes. Aristotle speaks here specifically about
those realities the principles (αἱ ἀρχαί) of which can or cannot be otherwise. This
reference provides Eustratius with the possibility to expand his commentary in this
direction, with a discussion on the different existing orders of principles. It is here

39 ARISTOTELES, De generatione et corruptione, II,10,336a31-336b24; II,9,338a17-338b5. See also

Metaphysics, XII,5,1015b12-14 on the attributes of the Unmoved Mover. In De generatione et corruptione

II,9,336b31-34 Aristotle makes clear that the cycle of generation and corruption is an imitation of the
eternal.
40 Cf. DUDLEY, The Evolution cit, 106.
41 EUSTRATIUS, In II Apo, 179,17-20 (ed. Wallis): ἐπεὶ τοιγαροῦν τὸ µὲν εἶ ναι κυρίω ἐπὶ τῶν

νοhτῶν, ἅτε µhδὲν ἐχόντων δυνάµει, ἀλλ' αὐτοενεργειῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀεὶ
ἐν δυνάµει, ἅτινά ἐστι τὰ ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ...
42 EUSTRATIUS, 267,6-9.

9
that our commentator seems to introduce a further and deeper exegetical level in the
structure of his argumentation.
It is true that there are principles of necessary realities and principles of
contingent ones, and that these principles are different exactly just as the realities of
which they are principles. But in themself, Eustratius states, principles can be
understood from two perspectives. For Aristotle, the commentator says, there are
principles in the order of knowledge and principles in the order of existence (ἀρχὰ
δὲ ὠνόµασεν ἢ τὰ τῆ γνώσεω ἢ τὰ τῆ ὑπαρξεω). Thus, when we consider
the case of absolute and unchangeable realities and the case of contingent ones from
the point of view of their principles we always have to keep in mind this twofold
perspective. Eustratius applies it to both of these cases, first to those realities which
cannot be otherwise, then to those subject to generation and corruption. Concerning
the latter, Eustratius claims that principles in the order of knowledge are the
premisses of an arguments when these are merely hypothetical (αἱ ἔνδοξοι τῶν
προτάσεων), i.e. the praemisses of syllogisms when they are derived from what the
most of most people agree on43. In the order of existence, principles of this kind are
the productive and final causes like, as in the case of the architect and the sculptor,
for they sometimes act and sometimes do not, and their capacity is in act only when
they are actually exercising it44. On the other hand, in regard to the principles of
necessary realities, Eustratius claims that in the order of knowledge principles of this
kind are the definitions and the axioms (οἱ ὅροι καὶ τὰ ἀξιώµατα) upon which every
science is based, i.e. those principles not subject to any kind of demonstration45. Such
an explanation is not surprising, for it is the counterpart to Eustratius’ claims that
principles of contingent realities in the order of knowledge are the endoxoi, i.e. the
premisses of Aristotelian dialectical argumentations. But the real surprise comes
when our commentator speaks about the principles of necessary realities in the order

43 Of course, Eustratius’ reference here can easily be traced back to Aristotle, namely to the distinction

between apodictical and dialectical syllogisms, as for instance in Analytica Priora 70a2-4, Analytica
Posteriora 74b21-25; 81b18-22. Our commentator had already developed an argument related to
propositions or syllogisms based upon endoxoi in his commentary on Analytica Posteriora II, in particular
commenting on 93a1-3, where he discusses the Aristotelian distinction, which in the end we find
explicitely stated only in 93a14-20, between demonstration in the strict sense (ἀπόδειξι) and a
dialectical inference of the essence of something (λογικὸ συλλογισµό); In II A.Po.,107,17-23 (ed.
Wallis): ὁρισµὸν γάρ τινο δεῖ ξαι βουλόµενο ὁρισµὸν αὐτοῦ λαµβάνει· ἀλλ' ἔστι, φhσί, λογικὸ
συλλογισµὸ τοῦ τί ἐστι. λογικὸν δέ φhσι συλλογισµὸν τὸν ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόµενον, ἢ ὅπερ
οἰκειότερον ἐνταῦθα, τὸν δεικνύντα µὲν διὰ µέσου τινὸ τὸ ἕτερον κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἄκρων,
µὴ µέντοι γε φυλάττοντα καὶ τὰ εἰρhµένα τῆ ἀποδείξεω παρατhρήµατα. ἀλλ' εἰ µὲν τὸν αὐτὸν
ἐδείκνυεν ὁρισµὸν ὃν καὶ προσελάµβανε, φhσὶν ὁ 'Αλέξανδρο, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἂν ᾐτεῖ το. In this and
in other passages of his commentary on Book II of the Posterior Analytics, Eustratius refers to
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the same work in order to discuss and solve exegetical
problems. On this reference see P. MORAUX, Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise aux «Seconds
Analytiques d’Aristote», Berlin-New York 1979.
44 EUSTRATIUS, 267,22-26: τῶν δὲ ἐνδεχοµένων, εἰ καὶ µὴ αὐτὸ εἶ πεν, ἐνδεχόµεναι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ

τῆ γνώσεω ἅµα καὶ τῆ ὑπάρξεω, τῆ µὲν γνώσεω αἱ ἔνδοξοι τῶν προτάσεων, τῆ δὲ
ὑπάρξεω ὅσα τῶν ποιhτικῶν καὶ τῶν τελικῶν καὶ µὴ εἶ ναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ν ἐνδέχεταί ποτε, ὡ τὸν
οἰκοδόµον καὶ τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιόν.
45 EUSTRATIUS, 267,20.

10
of existence. Once again these principles are the efficient and the final cause. But in
this case one cannot say, as in the case of the architect and the sculptor, that these
causes sometimes act, and sometimes do not. On the contrary, Eustratius claims, the
reason why such principles are necessary is that “they are the only causes in the
proper sense of the term”46. It is here that we have a kind of break in Eustratius’
argumentation, marking the beginning of a new exegetical level in the structure of the
commentary on the lemma in question . The introduction to this new level is due to
the introduction of a non-Aristotelian source. What we have here is a direct
quotation from prop. 75 of Proclus’ Elementatio theologica. A comparison of the two
texts seems to confirm the result of our research:

PROCLUS, El. Theol., prop. 75 (ed. Dodds): Πᾶν τὸ κυρίω αἴ τιον

λεγόµενον ἐξῄρhται τοῦ ἀποτελέσµατο.

EUSTRATIUS, 267,22 (ed. Heylbut): ταῦτα γὰρ µόνα κυρίω αἴ τια,

τι ὅτι
καὶ µόνα τῶν αἰτιατῶν ἐξῄρhται.
ἐξῄρhται

The implications of this reference are doubtless well-known. We are confronted here
with the general neoplatonic attempt to discuss the aristotelian theory of the four
causes, as stated in Physics (II,3), by means of the Neoplatonisit’s own account of the
different kinds of causes. To the Aristotelian account the neoplatonists generally add
other two causes; a paradigmatic one, referring to the Platonic Forms, and an
instrumental one, which on the other hand occurs for the first time only in Galen47.
The general aim of this classification is to place the four Aristotelian essential
conditions in a wider context, where the whole account of the number and kind of
causes is subject to a discussion related to their actual status and function. In
particular the structure of this wider context is basically the distinction already drawn
by Plato in Timaeus 46c-d, exactly the reference Aristotle had in mind in Physics (II 3),
between, “causes” (αἴ τια) and “concomitant causes” (συναίτια)48. It is precisely in

46 EUSTRATIUS,267,18-22 (ed. Heylbut): ἀρχὰ δὲ ὠνόµασεν ἢ τὰ τῆ γνώσεω ἢ τὰ τῆ
ὑπάρξεω. τῆ µὲν γὰρ γνώσεω ἀρχαὶ οἱ ὅροι καὶ τὰ ἀξιώµατα ἐπί γε τῶν ἀναγκαίων, τῆ δὲ
ὑπάρξεω τὰ ποιhτικὰ καὶ τὰ τελικά. ταῦτα γὰρ µόνα κυρίω αἴ τια, ὅτι καὶ µόνα τῶν αἰτιατῶν
ἐξῄρhται.
47 GALENUS, De Causis Procatarcticis, 6,63-64 (ed. Hankinson) . Cf. R. J. HANKINSON, Galen’s Theory of

Causation, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, 2,37,2, 1994, 1757-1774.
48 PLATO, Timaeus, 46c-d. In the Politicus concomitant causes are the instruments employed by one

who is producing something: Politicus, 281c2-5: Πρὸ τοίνυν ταύται ἔτι τὰ τῶν ἐργαλείων
δhµιουργοὺ τέχνα, δι' ὧν ἀποτελεῖ ται τὰ τῆ ὑφῆ ἔργα, δοκεῖ ν χρὴ τό γε συναιτία εἶ ναι
προσποιήσασθαι παντὸ ὑφάσµατο. For the distinction between αἴ τια and συναίτια with a related
survey about the discussion among the commentators, see C. STEEL, Why Should We Prefer Plato’s
Timaeus to Aristotle’s Physics? Proclus’Critique of Aristotle’s Causal Explanation of the Physical World, in W.
SHARPLES-A. SHEPPARD (ed.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus, London 2003, 175-187. In
Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (VI,1059,11-1059,19, ed. Cousin) we find five causes
instead of six. Here Proclus distinguishes between three ἀρχικαὶ αἰτίαι (paradigmatic, efficient and
final causes) and two συναίτιαι (formal and material causes), invoking as authority Plato’s Phaedo
(99a).

11
one passage of Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus that we find, ascribed to Plato
himself, a summary of these six causes49. Nevertheless, as has been said, not all the
six causes are considered to have the same worth. Aristotelian matter and form,
together with Galen’s instrumental cause, are to be found only in the realm of sense-
perception; the true causes of beings are, on the other hand, only the paradigmatic
(τὸ παραδειγµατικόν), the productive (τὸ ποιhτικόν) and the final causes (τὸ
τελικόν)50. True causality, one could say, is thus confined to the intelligible realm.
Physiology, Proclus argues in the beginning of his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, is
subject to a threefold division: one part deals with matter and material causes (τῆ
µὲν περὶ τὴν ὕλhν ἀσχολουµένh καὶ τὰ ὑλικὰ αἰτία), a second part with
(incorporated) forms, and discovers that they are a more important cause than the
material cause, and finally a third part, which is the demonstration that the former
kinds of causes are just concomitant (τῶν συναιτίων). What Plato understood
according to Proclus –that which basically the physiologists prior to Plato did not
notice - is that the true causes of things generated by nature are of another kind: they
are the paradigmatic, the efficient/productive and the final causes51. It is clear that
even the efficient and final causes are in this context non-Aristotelian elements, for
when Proclus explains the reason why these causes are causes in the proper sense of
the term - τὸ κυρίω αἴ τιον was the expression we found in prop. 75 of the
Elementatio Theologica52– he argues that these causes transcend and differentiate
themselves from what they cause (ἐξῄρhται τοῦ ἀποτελέσµατο). This is exactly the
same expression used by Eustratius, with the only exception that instead of using the
word τοῦ ἀποτελέσµατο, which can be translated as “the final effect”, our
commentator uses the word τῶν αἰτιατῶν, “that which have been caused”53. The

49 PROCLUS, In Tim., I,263,19-30 (ed. Diehl). We already find five of these causes ascribed to Plato in
SENECA, Ep. 65,4-16.
50 PROCLUS, In Prm., V,983,1-4 (ed. Cousin): τὰ γὰρ ὡ ἀλhθῶ αἴ τια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ

παραδειγµατικὰ καὶ ποιhτικὰ καὶ τέλεια, καὶ µὴ ὄντων δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν οὔτε παραδείγµατα εἶ ναι
δυνατόν.
51 PROCLUS In Tim, I,2,1-11 (ed. Diehl): τῆ γὰρ δὴ φυσιολογία τριχῆ διVρhµένh, ὡ συνελόντι

φάναι, καὶ τῆ µὲν περὶ τὴν ὕλhν ἀσχολουµένh καὶ τὰ ὑλικὰ αἰτία, τῆ δὲ προστιθείσh καὶ
τὴν τοῦ εἴ δου ζήτhσιν καὶ τοῦτο κυριώτερον αἴ τιον ἀποφαινοµένh, τῆ δ' αὖ τρίτh ταῦτα
µὲν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰτίων λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν συναιτίων ἔχειν ἀποδεικνυούσh, τὰ δὲ κυρίω
αἰτία τῶν φύσει γινοµένων ἄλλα ὑποτιθεµένh, τὸ ποιhτικόν, τὸ παραδειγµατικόν, τὸ τελικόν,
οἱ µὲν πολλοὶ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνο φυσικῶν περὶ τὴν ὕλhν διέτριψαν, οἳ µὲν ἄλλο, οἳ δὲ ἄλλο
τὸ ὑποκείµενον λέγοντε. A full doxographical account related to the different kinds and functions
of the causes, with a reference to the distinction between aitia and sunaitia is to be found in a passage
of the so-called Quaestiones Quodlibetales of Eustratius’ former mentor, John Italos; JOANNES ITALOS,
Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 139,26-38 (ed. Joannou).
52 See also PROCLUS, In Alc., 169,7-8 (ed. Westerink): ἐπειδὴ τὰ κυρίω αἴ τιατι ἄλλα εἰσί· τὸ τελικόν,
τὸ παραδειγµατικόν, τὸ ποιhτικόν.
53 Such an explanation is to be found also in Simplicius commentary on Aristotle’s Physics in relation to

the status of the productive cause; SIMPLICIUS, In Phys., 315,6-12 (ed. Diels): Τρίτον ἐν τοῖ  αἰτίοι
παραδίδωσι τὸ ποιhτικόν, διότι προσπίπτει µὲν ἡµῖ ν πρῶτον τὸ γινόµενον καὶ τὰ τούτου
στοιχεῖ α, γενhτὸν δὲ εὑρόντε αὐτὸ ποιhτικὸν αἴ τιον ζhτοῦµεν, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἧ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ
τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ γίνεται τὸ γινόµενον. καλεῖ δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν ὅ θ ε ν ἡ π ρ ώ τ h τ ῆ  µ ε τ α β ο λ ῆ 
ἀ ρ χ ὴ ἢ τ ῆ  ἠ ρ ε µ ή σ ε ω  βουλόµενο τὸ κυρίω ποιhτικὸν αἴ τιον κεχωρισµένον εἶ ναι καὶ

12
difference between the two expressions does not seem to affect our hypothesis that
Eustratius is actually paraphrasing prop. 75 of Proclus’ Elementatio Theologica, even if
Eustratius does not mention both the paradigmatic cause (among the the true causes)
and the instrumental cause (among the concomitant causes)54. It is remarkable that
Aristotle himself produced an arguments in the Generation of Animals which entails a
division of the four causes into two groups, those which cause by absolute necessity -
the material and efficient causes - and those that cause by conditional/hypothetical
necessity - the formal and final causes55. However, Eustratius prefers to quote
Proclus in order to support another distinction among the four Aristotelian causes,
that between causes in the proper sense and concomitant causes, which can be
considered antithetical to the Aristotelian theory of causation. This option cannot be
considered to be meaningless.

3. “Beings in the proper sense of the Term”.

Apparently the distinction between principles of knowledge and principles of

existence goes back to Aristotle himself. For example, in Book III of the Metaphysics a
series of aporia deal with the problem of whether the investigation of causes belongs
to one or more sciences and whether it should survey only the principles of
substance (τὰ τῆ οὐσία ἀρχὰ) or also the principles by means of which men
produce demonstrations and proofs (περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύοσι πάντε)56.
But in this case the reference to Proclus by Eustratius alters the whole discussion
from its Aristotelian context. All the evidence suggests that our commentator is
referring here to the idea that there are separate and trascendent forms which are
responsable for the existence of things (ἀρχαὶ τῆ ὑπάρξεω). The quotation of
prop. 75 of Proclus’ Elements of theology seemsto support this view. It may be true,
then, that in Proclus the term ὕπαρξι used by Eustratius in the general meaning of
the existence of something, often designates in a more technical sense the proper
mode which determines each being in its distinctive character57. However, the term at

ἐξVρhµένον τοῦ γινοµένου.

γινοµένου τὸ γὰρ ἐνυπάρχον αἴ τιον ὥσπερ τὸ εἶ δο καὶ ἡ φύσι τῆ κατὰ τὸ
εἶ δο ἀρχῆ ἔχεται. Other related passages from Simplicius’ commentary on the same work are: 3,16;
6,11; 36,19; 223,18; 256,29; 284,31; 314,35; 315,18; 316,10; 317,24; 318,20.
54 Such a restrictive reference to the Neoplatonic discussion of the different kinds of causes possibly

depends on Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, where we have only matter and form as
concomitant causes, efficient/productive and final causes as causes in the proper sense of the term
(κυρίω ἐστὶν αἴ τια); JOANNES PHILOPONUS, In Phys., 241,3-5 (ed. Vitelli): ∆ιαλεχθεὶ περὶ τῶν
συναιτίων, ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἡ ὕλh καὶ τὸ εἶ δο, βούλεται νῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δύο
διαλεχθῆναι τοῦτε ποιhτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ τελικοῦ, ἅπερ κυρίω ἐστὶν αἴ τια.
55 ARISTOTELES, De Generatione Animalium, II,1,731b20-24; cf. DUDLEY, The Evolution cit., 113.
56 ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, III,1,995b4-10.

57 See for example PROCLUS, Elementatio theologica, prop. 65,: Πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ὑφεστὸ ἢ κατ'

αἰτίαν ἔστιν ἀρχοειδῶ ἢ καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἢ κατὰ µέθεξιν εἰκονικῶ. The subject is deeply discussed
in C. STEEL, ΥΠΑΡΞΙΣ chez Proclus, in F. ROMANO/D.P. TAORMINA (ed.), HYPARXIS e
HYPOSTASIS nel neoplatonismo. Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul
Neoplatonismo, Università degli Studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992, Firenze 1994, 79-100. It is fairly

13
in question also occurs in Proclus in a more general sense, expressing simply the fact
that something exists, i.e. in accordance with the related verbal form ὑπάρχειν58. This
is also the meaning in which Eustratius says that productive/efficient and final causes
are said to be causes in the proper sense and principlef of the existence (ἀρχαὶ τῆ
ὑπάρξεω) of things.
The question that arises is: what is Eustratius’ view on the status of
absolutely necessary realities? Our commentator provides a pretty clear answer:

EUSTRATIUS, 293,2-9: “We call absolutely necessary (ἁπλῶ δὲ λέγοµεν ἐξ

ἀνάγκh) those realities which are not such by conditional necessity (ἐξ
ὑποθέσεω), as we say that it is necessary that someone is sitting as long as
he is actually sitting, not absolutely, but in a conditional way. The eternal
realities are ungendred and non-perishable. They could not be otherwise if
they were not engendred and unperishable. Thus, the property of always
existing does not belong to what is temporal, but to what is beyond time.
What is beyond time is also beyond generation. Every generation involves
the realm of time, whereas what is beyond generation is also beyond
corruption.” 59

clear that this technical meaning of the term ὕπαρξι and of the expression καθ' ὕπαρξιν is to be
found in Eustratius, via Proclus, when he claims that human intellect neither exists absolutely nor καθ'
ὕπαρξιν, in the sense that the status of intellect does not belong to it as the proper mode determining
its distinctive character. On the contrary, human intellect is just καθ' ἕξιν, an expression understood
by Eustratius as synonymous with κατὰ µέθεξιν, “by partecipation”. EUSTRATIUS, 303,16-17: νοῦν δὲ
λέγοµεν ἐνταῦθα οὐ τὸν ἁπλῶ καὶ καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἀλλὰ τὸν καθ' ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ µέθεξιν. In this case
also Eustratius dependence on Proclus is rather clear; see PROCLUS, In Tim., 2,313,1-4: τριχῶ γὰρ ὁ
νοῦ· πρῶτο µὲν ὁ θεῖ ο, οἷ ο δὴ καὶ ὁ δhµιουργικό, δεύτερο δὲ ὁ µετεχόµενο ὑπὸ τῆ
ψυχῆ, οὐσιώδh καὶ αὐτοτελή, τρίτο δὲ ὁ καθ' ἕξιν, δι' ὃν ἡ ψυχὴ νοερά ἐστιν. PROCLUS, In
Alc., 65,19-66,6: καὶ ἔχει ἐν ΤιµαίJ τὰ τρία ταῦτα σhµαινόµενα τοῦ νοῦ. τῷ µὲν οὖν ἀµεθέκτJ
νῷ τὸν ἔρωτα τὸν ἐν θεοῖ  ἀνάλογον λhπτέον, ἐξVρhµένο γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἐκεῖ νο πάντων τῶν
κατόχων αὐτῷ καὶ ἐλλαµποµένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· τῷ δὲ µετεχοµένJ τὸν ἐν δαίµοσιν, οὐσιώδh γὰρ
καὶ οὗτο καὶ αὐτοτελὴ ὥσπερ ὁ µετεχόµενο νοῦ καὶ προσεχῶ ἐπιβατεύων ταῖ  ψυχαῖ · τῷ
δὲ καθ' ἕξιν νῷ δῆλον ὡ τὸν τρίτον τὸν κατ' ἔλλαµψιν ὑφιστάµενον ἐν ταῖ  ψυχαῖ .
58 In this respect ὕπαρξι fits in with the usual use of ὑπόστασι in Proclus. Cf., for instance,

PROCLUS, In Remp., I,88,3-8 (ed. Kroll). Such a generic occurrence of the term ὕπαρξι seems to be
confirmed from other passages in Proclus where it is associated with the verbal form λαγχάνειν or
ἔχειν, like for instance in In Prm., II,734,2; IV,952,30-31; In Tim, 1,36,22. Also the term ὑπόστασι is
often associated with the verb λαγχάνειν, like in In Prm., II,740,17; IV,891,38; IV,892,38. In both
cases the meaning is related to the generic concept of the existence of something. For related
passages, see STEEL, ΥΠΑΡΞΙΣ cit., 80, n.4.
59 EUSTRATIUS, 293,2-9: ἁπλῶ δὲ λέγοµεν ἐξ ἀνάγκh ὅσα µὴ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκh, οἷ ον τὸ

καθῆσθαί τινα ἔστ' ἂν κάθhται ὁ καθήµενο, ἐξ ἀνάγκh εἶ ναι λέγοµεν τὸ καθῆσθαι αὐτόν, ἀλλ'
οὐχὶ ἁπλῶ ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεω. τ ὰ δ ὲ ἀ ί δ ι α ἀ γ έ ν h τ α κ α ὶ ἄ φ θ α ρ τ α . οὐ γὰρ
ἐνδέχεται ἄλλω ἀίδια εἶ ναι αὐτά, εἰ µὴ εἴ h ἀγένhτά τε καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἐκεῖ νο γάρ ἐστιν ἀεί, ὃ οὐ
κατὰ χρόνον ἔσχε τὸ εἶ ναι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ χρόνον ἐστί. τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ χρόνον καὶ ὑπὲρ γένεσιν. πᾶσα
γὰρ γένεσι ἐν χρόνJ, τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ γένεσιν καὶ ὑπὲρ φθοράν.

14
Eustratius is commenting on NE,VI,3,1139b20-24, where what is subject to
scientific examination (τὸ ἐπιστhτόν) is described as existing by necessity (ἐξ
ἀνάγκh) and therefore eternal and not subject to generation and corruption (τὰ
γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκh ὄντα ἁπλῶ πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δ ̓ἀίδια ἀγένhτα καὶ ἄφθαρτα)60.
Eustratius comments on this passage perhaps producing the most natural
explanatory arguments for a thinker who agrees with Proclus that the four
Aristotelian causes, as seen above, should be divided into causes in the proper sense
of the term and concomitant causes. First of all, Eustratius speaks again about
necessity in the terms we have seen before; what exists by absolute (ἁπλῶ) necessity
cannot be compared with what on the other hand is necessary only in a conditional
sense (καθ' ὑπόθεσιν). “Sitting” as an example of something which is not supposed
to be by absolute necessity can be traced back to Ammonius’ commentary on De
Interpretatione (19a23ff.). In this aristotelian passage the problem of the different kinds
of necessity seems to be discussed from the perspective of the nature of a
predication. We have the opposition between what is necessarily predicated in an
absolute sense and what is necessarily predicated as long as the predicate is true of
the subject61. In his commentary, Ammonius mentions the examples of the sun
obscured by a cloud or the fact that we are walking (βαδίζειν) or sitting (καθέζεσθαι)
as examples of what cannot be considered absolutely necessary (ἁπλῶ δὲ οὐκέτι in
Ammonius - οὐχὶ ἁπλῶ in Eustratius), for we are never always walking or sitting62.
Furthermore, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione is directly mentionned by Eustratius in his
commentary on NE,VI,3,1139b1863, immediately before this quotation from
Ammonius’ commentary. Here the authority of the Aristotle’s work is invoked in
order to ground the distinction between necessary and contingent realities from the
point of view of actuality and potentiality. It is more than probable that in this case
Eustratius has in mind De Interpretatione 23a21-2664, where the actual is described as
prior (προτέρα) to the potential inasmuch the eternal is prior. Realities entirely
without potentiality are in this passage what Aristotle calls “the primary substances”
65
(αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι) .
However, as we continue to read Eustratius’ arguments it becomes clear
from which perspective he understands Aristotle’s reference to τὸ ἐπιστhτόν as

60 ARISTOTELES, EN, VI,1139b20-24.

61 For a discussion of the Aristotelian passage In question and the related Ammonius’ commentary, cf.
M. MIGNUCCI, Ammonius’sea battle, in D. BLANK/N. KRETZMANN, Ammonius. On Aristotle On
Interpretation 9 with Boethius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 (first and second commentary). With Essays by
Richard Sorabji, Norman Kretzmann and Mario Mignucci, London 1988, 53-86.
62 AMMONIUS, In de interpretatione, 153,22-26 (ed. Busse): τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκh ἐπιπροσθεῖ σθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ

νέφου ἢ τῆ σελήνh τὸν ἥλιον, ἕω ἂν ἐπιπροσθῆται, ἀλhθέ, ἁπλῶ δὲ οὐκέτι, καὶ τὸ ἐξ
ἀνάγκh καθέζεσθαί σε ἢ βαδίζειν, ἕω ἄν τι τούτων ὑπάρχV σοι, ἀλhθέ, ἁπλῶ δὲ οὐκέτι. οὔτε
γὰρ ἀεὶ βαδίζοµεν ἢ καθεζόµεθα, οὔτε µὴν ἕω ἂν τοῦ εἶ ναι µετέχωµεν.
63 ARISTOTELES, EN,VI,3,1139b18-19: ἐπιστήµh µὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ

ἀκριβολογεῖ σθαι καὶ µὴ ἀκολουθεῖ ν ταῖ  ὁµοιότhσιν.

64 ARISTOTELES, De Interpretatione 23a21-26. See also the aristotelian argumentations in Metaphysica,

IX,8,1050b6-34.
65 EUSTRATIUS, 291,27-292,10.

15
existing by absolute necessity, and therefore as being eternal. An anticipation of this
understanding was already seen in the above-mentionned passage (293,2-9), where
Eustratius stated that, as such, realities that exist absolutely are also beyond time
(ὑπὲρ χρόνον) and generation (ὑπὲρ γένεσιν). In 293,10-18, the source of this
interpretation is declared explicitely. Our commentator states that contingent realities
cannot be considered to be beings in the proper sense of the term (κυρίω ὄντα),
they are not beings properly so-called, as Plato states in the Timaeus. It is probably a
reference to Timaeus (27d5-28a4), where Timaeus distinguishes between what is
intelligible by means rational thought (τὸ µὲν δὴ νοήσει µετὰ λόγου περιλhπτόν),
being thus always unchangeably real, and that which can only be the object of
opinion, i.e. a non-rational activity (τὸ δ' αὖ δόξV µετ' αἰσθήσεω ἀλόγου
δοξαστόν). The latter cannot be considered to be a proper being (ὄντω δὲ
οὐδέποτε ὄν), the expression that Eustratius takes over almost verbatim in referring to
the Timaeus (ὄντω δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄντα)66. Not only is this quotation from the Timaeus
interesting, as it involves the distinction between that which always exist as object of
understanding or intellection (νοήσει) and that which becomes, i.e. the object of
opinion grounded on sense-perception (δόξV), but even the rest of the terminology
employed by Eustratius seems to reveal his fundamental exegetical options. The
expression κυρίω ὄντα seems to derive directly from Proclus. In his commentary
on Plato’s Parmenides Proclus refers precisely to the opinion of Timaeus (Tim., 29b)
that the explanation (λόγο) of sensible particulars is not “stable” (µόνιµο) nor
“fitted” (ἀραρώ), but is “liable to conjecture” (εἰκαστικό). On the other hand, the
explanation of the intelligibles (περὶ τῶν νοhτῶν) is unmoved and irrefutable
(ἀνέλεγκτο). Thus, what one can say about sensible particulars (αἰσθhτά) is not
supposed to be precise and correct (ἀκριβῶ), whereas intelligibles are subject to
knowledge, for they are beings in the the proper sense of the term (τὰ δὲ νοhτὰ
κυρίω ὄντα)67. It is clear that what Aristotle, in the passage under examination by

66 EUSTRATIUS, 293,10-20: ἢ γὰρ εἰ ἀγένhτον ἢ εἰ γενhτόν. εἰ µὲν γὰρ εἰ ἀγένhτον γέγονε
φθαρέντο τοῦ ἀγενήτου, ἀγένhτον, καὶ οὕτω γέγονε τὸ ἀγένhτον, ὡ εἶ ναι τὸ αὐτὸ γενhτὸν
ὁµοῦ καὶ ἀγένhτον, εἰ δὲ εἰ γενhτόν, µετέβαλλε πάλιν εἰ γενhτὸν τὸ ἀγένhτον, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγένhτον τὸ ἀγένhτον ἀλλὰ καὶ πεφυκότων µεταβάλλειν τῶν ἀγενήτων, οὐκ ἔσται τι
ὑπὲρ γένεσιν. πάντε δὲ ὑπολαµβάνοµεν οὐ µόνα εἶ ναι τὰ ἀγένhτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ γενhτά, ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα µὲν οὐδὲ κυρίω ὄντα, ἀεὶ δὲ γινόµενα καὶ ἀπογινόµενα, ὄντω δὲ δὲ οὐδέποτε
οὐδέποτε ὄντα κατὰ
τὸν παρὰ Πλάτωνι Τίµαιον, εἶ ναι δὲ κυρίω ὄντα τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτω ἔχοντα,
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ πρώτh ἀρχὴ ἀκίνhτο πάντV καὶ ἀµετάβλhτο. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῇ ὁµοιοτέρων
ἀναγκαῖ ον αὐτὴν τῆ ποιήσεω ἄρχεσθαι... = PLATO, Timaeus, 27d5-28a4: ”Εστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐµὴν
δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόµενον µὲν ἀεί, ὂν
δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ µὲν δὴ νοήσει µετὰ λόγου περιλhπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξV µετ'
αἰσθήσεω ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόµενον καὶ ἀπολλύµενον, ὄντω δὲ δὲ οὐδέποτε
οὐδέποτε ὄν.
ὄν
67 PROCLUS, In Prm., V,994,26-32: ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Τίµαιο εἴ ρhκεν ὡ ὁ µὲν περὶ τῶν αἰσθhτῶν λόγο

οὐκ ἔστι µόνιµο οὐδὲ ἀραρὼ, ἀλλὰ εἰκαστικὸ, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν νοhτῶν ἀκίνhτο καὶ
ἀνέλεγκτο· τὰ γὰρ αἰσθhτὰ τοῦτο ὃ λέγεται ἀκριβῶ οὐκ ἔστι, τὰ δὲ δὲ νοhτὰ κυρίω ὄντα καὶ
γνωσθῆναι µᾶλλον δυνατά. The expression κυρίω ὄντα is to be found once again referring to the
intelligibles in an aporematic arguments in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus; PROCLUS, in
Tim.,2,303,16-20. See also Proclus commentary on Timaeus (27d5-28a4), to be found in 1,243,26-
252,10, where the Platonic couple νόhσι and λόγο are both meant to be kinds of knowledge

16
Eustratius, calls necessary realities, describing them as “eternal, engendered and
unperishable” (τ ὰ δ ὲ ἀ ί δ ι α ἀ γ έ ν h τ α κ α ὶ ἄ φ θ α ρ τ α ), are for our
commentator Neoplatonic separate forms. The expression τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ
ὡσαύτω ἔχοντα used by Eustratius in order to describe the status of those realities
existing by necessity reveals a proclean source too. This expression is explicitely to be
found again in in Proclus and, of course, already in Plato. In Proclus it describes the
status of autartic existence68. It means that when Aristotle speaks about necessary
realities, the object of science, as that which cannot be otherwise (µὴ ἐνδέχονται
ἄλλω ἔχειν), Eustratius cannot abstain himself from understanding this status in
terms which both, in words and contents, belongs to a non-aristotelian context.
The reader cannot avoid noticing one basic thing: Eustratius admits that
there are causes in the proper sense of the term, both efficient and final, as well as
beings in the proper sense of the term, namely separate transcendent forms. In both
cases all the evidence suggests that the source is Proclus. On the other hand, what is
subject to opinion or sense-perception does not possess the requirements for being
or exist in the proper sense of the term. Eustratius’ options are made clear by his
sources. Even the reference to the first principle, unmoved (ἀκίνhτο) and
unchangeable (ἀµετάβλhτο), which necessarily must start its productive activity
from what is most similar to itself (ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῇ ὁµοιοτέρων ἀναγκαῖ ον αὐτὴν
τῆ ποιήσεω ἄρχεσθαι...), may disappoint those who support the view that
Eustratius propounded a kind of christian neoplatonism. In terms and content it
resembles the Neoplatonic description of the unmoved and unchangeable nature of
the first principle, the principle that causality in general, including the case of the first
principle, must proceed by likeness69. In this respect, the same principle also partially
explains Eustratius’ reference to a first principle that is absolutely unmoved and
unchangeable. In particular, it seems that in Eustratius this general principle is
supported by a quotation, I believe, from Philoponus’ De aeternitate mundi contra
Proclum, which is the only source I was able to detect that presents at least two
formulations almost identical to that used by our commentator, expecially in regard
to the adverbial form πάντV before the attributes ἀκίνhτο and ἀµετάβλhτο70. It
is, in the end, one of the standard formulations wich Eustratius probably learned by

coordinated in the intellegible realm, though of different degrees; the former being the intellection of
the particular intellect, the latter the medium through which our soul can find its link with the
particular intellect (ὁ νοῦ µερικό). Cf. A. LERNOULD, Physique et Théologie. Lecture du Timée de Platon
par Proclus, Villeneuve d’Ascq 2001, 153-171.
68
PLATO, Phaed., 78c6; Soph., 248a12; Resp., 479a2; Polit., 269d5; PROCLUS, In Remp., I,72,5; Theol. Plat.,
I,90,5; Theol. Plat. I,90,11; Theol. Plat., I,94,4; In Tim. ,1,269,13.
69 See for example PROCLUS, Elementatio Theologica, prop. 29: Πᾶσα πρόοδο δι' ὁµοιότhτο

ἀποτελεῖ ται τῶν δευτέρων πρὸ τὰ πρῶτα.

70 JOANNES PHILOPONUS, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, 60,21-23 (ed. Rabe): εἰ καὶ τέλειο ὁ θεὸ

καὶ πάντV ἀκίνhτό τε καὶ ἀµετάβλhτο καὶ χρόνου µὴ δεόµενο ἅτε δὴ χρόνου ὢν ποιhτή.
75,22-25(ed. Rabe): ἐνδέχεται ἄρα καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀκινήτου ἀκινήτ πάντV καὶ ἀµεταβλήτου
ἀµεταβλήτ µένοντο ποτὲ
µὲν εἶ ναι τὸν κόσµον ποτὲ δὲ µὴ εἶ ναι.

17
his teacher, John Italos71, reflecting the scholarly acquaintance of both Psellos’ pupil
and Psellos himslef with the Neoplatonic tradition and the philosophy of the
commentators72.
It is not clear whether the choice of Philoponus in this case is explicitely
intended by Eustratius to be a Christian option opposed to pagan Neoplatonic views.
I am inclined to believe that this is not the case. It is Eustratius’ own way of referring
to and quoting his sources, expecially his neoplatonic sources, which consist in the
appropriation of their terminology, even of entire sentences, extrapolating them from
their original context and using them in a new argumentative structure. The general
flavour of the arguments produced by our commentator does not show always a
clearly Christian attitude. On the contrary, it seems that the terminological repertoire
used by Eustratius for his formulations is genuinely Neoplatonic. In the end, if our
commentator wanted to indicate a decisive Christian option, he could have referred
to the immense number of patristic sources which he, as court theologian under
Alexius I, must have known very well. The only Christian authority explicitely
mentioned by Eustratius is Ps.-Dionysius, in connection with the famous metaphor
of the bloom of the intellect (ἄνθο τοῦ νοῦ)73, which nowadays is to be found only
in the scholia to the Corpus dionysiacum74. It is barely necessary to recall tha Ps.-
Dionysius derives this expression from Proclus.

4. Conclusions

It has been rightly pointed out that Eustratius’ commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics is affected by a kind of lack of interest in the question of the status of ethics
and, in general, in a further development of the main aristotelian arguments on the
nature of φρόνhσι as a truth attaining disposition75. Furthermore: it seems that
Eustratius is more attracted by those passages in which he can easily see the
possibility for a (Neo)platonic reading of the Aristotelian text. In his commentary on
Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, the opportunity for such an interpretative attitude
had been provided by Aristotle’s famous criticism of Plato’s doctrine of the ideal
Good76. In his commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, this opportunity is
provided by the Aristotelian distinction between, on one hand, what is subject to

71 See for instance JOANNES ITALOS, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 24,32: ὡ καὶ τοῦ πρώτου πρώτ τὸ ἀκίνhτόν
ἀκίνhτ
τε καὶ ἀµετάβλhτον.
ἀµετάβλhτ
72 The influence of Proclus on Eustratius’ background was first detected in 1920 by Zervos, who

linked it to the legacy of Psellus; cf. Chr. ZERVOS, Un philosophe neoplatoniciene du XIe siècle. Michel Psellos.
Sa vie, son oeuvre, ses luttes philosophiques, son influence, New York 1973 (II ed.), 225-227.
73 EUSTRATIUS, 4,3.
74 Patrologia Graeca, IV,565B.
75 Cf. K. IERODIAKONOU, Byzantine Commentators on the Epistemic Status of Ethics, in P. ADAMSON, H.

BALTUSSEN, M. STONE (ed.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, v.1,
London 2004, 21-37.
76 Cf. K. GIOCARINIS, Eustratios of Nicea’s Defense of the Doctrine of Ideas, «Franciscan Studies», 24 (1964),

159-204; C. STEEL, Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Eustratius and
Michael of Ephesus, «Bulletin de philosophie médiévale», 44 (2002), 51-57.

18
production according to Art and, in another way, to deliberation - described as those
realities the principles of which can be otherwise (ἐνδέχονται ἄλλω ἔχειν)77 -, and
on the other hand, the object of science and, ultimatively of sophia. The latter class
includes those realities which for Eustratius, as we have seen, are absolutely necessary
or by absolute necessity. In the case of sophia these realities are called the “divine”
one, and sophia itself is explicitely associated by Eustratius with the theological
understanding of Aristotle’s first philosophy according to the Neoplatonists78.
Furthermore, the same Aristotelian distinction between absolute and conditional
necessity is understood from a (Neo)platonic perspective, the source of which seems
to be mainly Proclus. The requirements for a reality to be absolutely necessary or to
be due to conditional necessity are in this sense non-aristotelian. Only true beings,
beings in the proper sense of the term, are absolutely necessary. They are separate
and transcendent forms. Contingent realities are non-beings, objects of opinion and
sense-perception, and therefore are by conditional necessity. In this respect,
Eustratius’ interpretation of the Aristotelian distinction between absolute and
conditional necessity cannot go beyond a strict distinction between transcendent
Neoplatonic forms (those realities existing by absolute necessity) and contingent
realities (those realities that exist by conditional necessity), the knowledge of which is
confined to the realm of sense-perception. It entails the idea that absolute and
conditional necessity are incompatible, which for different reasons corresponds to
several modern interpretations of the Aristotelian distinction in question79. However,
for Aristotle absolute and conditional necessity seem to be two complementary
approaches80. Without this assumption one could not explain Aristotle’s criticism of
Democritus for reducing the cause of everything used by Nature only to absolute
necessity, i.e. the material and efficient causes. On the contrary, things of this kind
are by absolute necessity, but also by hypothetical necessity insamuch as they are for
some purpose. Breathing, the example sketched by Aristotle in the passage of
Metaphysics (V,5,1015a20-1015b16) referred to above, is by absolute necessity,
insamuch the process of admission and discharge of air is necessary by absolute
necessity given the nature of breathing; but it is also by hypothetical necessity, insofar
as it serves the purpose of living81. This complementarity between absolute and
conditional necessity is to be found also in the superlunary area, where the absolute
necessity proper to the movement of the celestial bodies does not exclude the
attribution of their movement to a final causality. Thus, on one hand, as Aristotle

77 See, for example, ARISTOTELES, EN, VI,4,1140a32ff.; VI,5,1140b27ff.;VI,6,1140b35ff.

78 EUSTRATIUS, 323,33ff.. On the Neoplatonic understanding of Aristotle’s First Philosophy, cf. D.
O’MEARA, Le probleme de la métaphysique dans l’antiquité tardive, «Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie
und Theologie», 53 (1986), 3-22; C. STEEL, Theology as First Philosophy. The Neoplatonic Concept of
Metaphysics, «Quaestio», 5 (2005), 3-21.
79 See, for example, H. WEISS, Kausalität and Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles, Basel 1942, 75-93; J.

BARNES, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1975, 222; A. PREUS, Science and Philosophy in Aristotle’s
Biological Works, New York 1975, 183-204; D.M. BALME, Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I and De
Generatione Animalium I (with passages from II,1-3), translated with notes, Oxford 1992, 76-84.
80 Cf. DUDLEY, The Evolution cit., 114-116.
81 ARISTOTLE, De Partibus Animalium, I,1,642a31-642b4. For more passages of this kind, see DUDLEY,

The Evolution cit., 115, n.64.

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states in De caelo (I,1,269a5-7), the heavenly bodies are by absolute necessity because
of the fact that aether naturally moves in circle without any kind of opposition; on
the other hand, as is well known, the Unmoved Mover moves the heavenly bodies as
an object of desire, which is clearly to be understood as final causality. The heavenly
bodies, then, move in a circle also because of their necessary striving for the
Unmoved Mover, in the attempt to imitate its perfection, which therefore takes place
by hypothetical necessity.
But this is not Eustratius’ view, and in a certain way it cannot be so insofar
as he identifies absolute necessity with those being which exist in the proper sense of
the term and hypothetical necessity those that do not fulfil these requirements, as
Eustratius claims, stated by Plato in the Timaeus. Thus, one would not be wrong in
claiming that Eustratius was not only an expert in dialectics, more than the Stoics
andthe Academics, as rhetorically enphasized by the princess Anna Comnena82. More
than this, he was very well acquainted with the Neoplatonic tradition, which seems
really to have provided him with the widest range of philosophical solutions for his
exegesis on Aristotle.

MICHELE TRIZIO (University of Bari)

82 ANNA COMNENA, Alexias, 14,8,9,10-13 (ed. Leib).

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