GANZON VS CA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:50 PM

G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of
Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from
implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on
various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the
authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President
(through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not
because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the
law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising
that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility
Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in
inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent

15 - PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 195770 17 July 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
petitioners Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Sergio Tadeo, Nelson Alcantara respondents Executive
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, DSWD Secretary Corazon Soliman
summary
Petitioners assert that the budget allocation under the DSWD for its CCTP violates the
Constitution and LGC because it amounts to a recentralization of basic government
functions. SC ruled that unless an LGU is designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government
even if it involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
facts of the case
The DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy and issued AO 16 s. 2008 setting the
IRR for its Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. This Conditional Cash Transfer Program
(CCTP) provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow them to meet certain
human development goals. Under the AO, the DSWD, as lead implementing agency,
institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC
(National Anti-Poverty Commission) and the LGUs Congress funded the program as follows:
2008: PHP298.5M, 2009: PHP5B, 2010: PHP10B, 2011, PHP21B. Former Senator Pimentel, et
al. challenged the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP which
are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of LGUs. Petitioners admit that the
wisdom of adopting the CCTP is with the legislation, however, the object to the fact that it is
being implemented through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the
responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services
have been devolved pursuant to Sec. 17, LGC in relation to Sec. 25, Art. II and Sec. 3, Art. X,
1987 Const. They assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered results in the
“recentralization” of basic government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local
autonomy and decentralization.
Issue
Whether the PHP21B budget allocation under the DSWD in the 2011 General Appropriations
Act (GAA) violates the Constitution and LGC.
NEGATIVE.
Ratio
In order to secure the autonomy of LGUs, Sec. 17, LGC vests in them the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities. Par. (c), however,
provides an exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, programs and services.1
Unless an LGU is designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the GAA even if it
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU
Ganzon v. CA: While it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a
more responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into “mini-states.
”Pimentel v. Aguirre: To enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners have failed
to prove the invalidity of the provisions under the 2011 GAA. The PHP21B budget allocation
for an intervention program formulated by the national government can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of LGs. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
DISMISSED I tell you
 League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR
G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the
following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2)
prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal
the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR)
nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUES:
(1)   Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are
unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy
of provinces.
(2)   Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale
mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved
powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1)   No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has
control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is
subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR
has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining
law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR
under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies. The Court
has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X,
Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization
of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. The
Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law
to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization of the country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored
principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government
a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or
 portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2)   No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance
with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which
is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for
Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of
the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended
by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law
is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in
controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes,
conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR
Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor
in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial
Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the
law.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO

Page
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS vs. ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004

Case Digest, September 27, 2020

Facts:

On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 48 entitled “ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT
AND EQUALIZATION” which was later renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). The program was established to “facilitate
the process of enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of
the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned
pursuant to the Local Government Code.” The Oversight Committee constituted under
Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 or The Local Government Code of 1991, has been
tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation.  Thereafter the Oversight Committee issued Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003,
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001. The
petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as
they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and
2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual
members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-
2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution
as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-001.

The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed a

petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for
each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (₱5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as

Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG).

Whether the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Yes, the assailed provisos infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Under Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them. Also, in Section 284 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third
year of its effectivity, the LGUs’ share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40% and
Section 285 on the allocation to Local Government Units in the internal revenue allotment.

In the case at bar, the respondent put  on hold the distribution and release of the five billion
pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like
Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must
be struck down.

Therefore, the provisos violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES                     G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same,
and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two
(2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business
permit to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.
(ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR
as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils
exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As
a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons
it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been
said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved
only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our
scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped
the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit
and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and
providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both
violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.

Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now
embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted
by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance
No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and
are therefore ultra vires and void.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Cordillera vs COA 181 SCRA 495

Facts

The constitutionality of E.O. 220 was assailed which created the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) on the ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an Organic Act by the
Congress and the creation of autonomous region in the Cordillera conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.

Issue

Whether or not CAR is a territorial and political subdivision?

Whether or not E.O 220 is unconstitutional?

Held

It was held that the CAR is not an autonomous region in Cordillera contemplated in the
Constitution. It was created not as a public or political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality like the provinces, cities or municipalities. It is neither vested
with the powers granted to public corporations.

It was created by virtue of E.O. 220 primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation
of programs and services in the covered areas. CAR in nature is a regional coordinating
agency of the national government. E.O. 220 is not unconstitutional since the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy pertains to the administrative autonomy of the local government
units through the decentralization of government authority. The creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy for the ARMM. The purpose of CAR is to serve as a transitory
coordinating agency that will prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It
does not diminish the local autonomy of the covered provinces and cities. The petition was
dismissed for lack of merit. 

METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION,
INC., [G.R. No. 135962. March 27,
2000]
Facts: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its
Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
Appeals which rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA
has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road
and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in
the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

Issue: Whether the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street,
a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls?

Held: No, -It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA[4] are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been
delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council
to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a “development authority.”[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
All its functions are administrative in nature. 

The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA
is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis.

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan
political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. [56] R. A.
No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his
function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President,
[57]
 whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. 

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It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. 

[1] Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 61

designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215, issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary,
not only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and
hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing
developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised
the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1866
perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically
provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm shall first secure
the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary. With
regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: The Chief of Constabulary
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he
may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.
These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866
empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the decree.

[2] SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal
protection, or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition
therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms or
ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and before
receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings
bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be
issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General
may prescribe, payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of
two hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons
who are actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the
passage of this Act, who at such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not
be required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this section, and the
bond duly executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to
be security for the safekeeping of such arms.

[3] In Mekin vs. Wolfe,[48] an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which
makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense
in order to convict the defendant.

[4] The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares
and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for
traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized “to set the
policies concerning traffic” and “coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs.” In addition, the MMDA may “install and administer a
single ticketing system,” fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic
violations. C

Constitutional Case: MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village

Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government　Agency　
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village　Association (BAVA),　
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air
Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and　convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was　pursuant to MMDA law
or Republic Act No. 7924.　On the same day, the respondent was　appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the　subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be　demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a　preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the　MMDA had　no authority to
do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed　the decision of the
lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to　public traffic because it is
an agent of the State that can　practice police power in the delivery of　basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue:　Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to

its regulatory and police powers.

Held:

The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power　is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to　government
units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government　unit. Therefore, the
MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.

It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA　to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the　inhabitants
of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.　It is an agency created for
the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various　national government agencies,
people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the　private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan　area.

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

March 27, 2000

Puno, J.

FACTS

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner
of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
 On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December
22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

Actions Filed:

1.       BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing, trial court
denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

2.       BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no authority to
order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter
walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

ISSUES
 1.                1.     Has
the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers?
         2.    Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of
subdivision roads to public traffic?

HELD

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in
nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. In
the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent
Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the
powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

 DISPOSITION 

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

are affirmed.