Bataille's theory of religion revisited: A reply to criticism by Tim Murphy

Author(s): CARL OLSON

Source: Method & Theory in the Study of Religion , 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1997), pp. 401-
408
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23555123

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 Bataille's theory of religion revisited:
A reply to criticism by Tim Murphy

CARL OLSON

In the preface to his work entitled Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Friedrich

Nietzsche discusses the tight-rope walker who performs on a rope stretched
between two towers over the market square of a town. As the tight-rope
walker reaches the centre of the rope, a brightly attired buffoon arrives and
rapidly traverses the rope. With a devilish cry, the buffoon leaps over the
tight-rope walker, who is disturbed by this occurrence, loses his balance,
plunges onto the market square below, and lands near the prophet. When
the fallen man regains consciousness the prophet tells him that there is no
devil or hell to fear because the soul of the tight-rope walker would be
dead before his body. The man thinks that if the prophet is right he would
leave no legacy. Zarathustra replies that danger has been the calling of the
tight-rope walker, and he has been faithful to his calling. The riskiness of
walking a tight-rope is shared by someone engaged in hermeneutics.
The hermeneutist runs the risk of misinterpreting his/her subject. Some
times the interpreter runs the risk of distorting his/her subject by using in
adequate, deficient, or inappropriate hermeneutical tools. An essay of mine
published a few years ago in MTSR (1994) attempted to indicate that the
theory of sacrifice developed by Georges Bataille, although very interesting
and worth considering for a different perspective on the subject, embodied
certain problematic aspects that made it inadequate as an overall theory of
sacrifice that could advance our understanding of the subject for those
working within the discipline of religious studies. In short, I attempted to
show that Bataille's theory of sacrifice was ahistorical and devoid of any re
lationship to evidence from any religious culture or based on any such data.
Since Bataille is not alive to defend his theory, Tim Murphy has come to his
defence by assuming the role of the hermeneutist as tight-rope walker.
Since the editors of this journal have graciously offered me an opportunity
to reply to Murphy, I want to focus on the following issues: the problematic
nature of hermeneutics and Bataille's overall theory of religion within the
context of Murphy's criticism of my essay.

Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 0943-3058/97/401-408

9-4 (1997), 401-408 © Walter de Gruyter, Berlin

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402 Carl Olson

1. A postmodern theory of religion

Murphy claims that "the kinds of problems which Bataille raises f

study of religion cannot be solved by applying various theories to
(1996:363). Although Murphy does not mention it, there are, however
reasons why Bataille's theory of sacrifice or religion in general does n
the data of the Sun Dance. If one pauses to reconsider Bataille's ge
theory of religion, it becomes readily apparent that he constructs his t
with the help of Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return and Marxi
losophy, and the way that he creates his theory is reminiscent of som
teenth-century theories of religion, even though the aims and intellec
tools are very different. Without delving into his entire theory, I want
view some essential features of his theory that are germane to this essa
Bataille begins his theory by looking at the state of animals, wh
characterizes as a state of immanence by which he means that it is a s
which animals eat each other in a relationship characterized by differ
(1989:18). Unable to extricate itself from the realm of immanence, the
mal is without autonomy and unable to transcend itself in a world tha
sentially closed to human beings. Having drawn this distinction, B
proceeds to discuss the development of the profane world, supreme be
the sacred, sacrifice, festivals, and other issues. The influence of Niet
eternal return is evident in shaping Bataille's theory of religion becau
concludes with a situation in which an animal eats another animal within
the context of the world of production in which an over abundance of prod
ucts makes destruction possible and even necessary. Within this context of
endless consuming and/or destroying of the objects that are produced, there
is a negation of the difference between the object and subject. Moreover,
the destruction of the object implies the destruction of the subject (Bataille
1989: 102). Besides the Nietzschean influence, the theory contains an em
phatic Marxist critique of contemporary capitalist society, a feature that is
even more evident when Bataille discusses a worker becoming alienated
from what he/she has produced. Although Bataille's theory should not be
dismissed simply because his theory is shaped by both Nietzsche and Marx,
it does demonstrate that Bataille brings to the study of the subject of relig
ion his own philosophical constructions, which necessarily shape the out
come of his theory.
Instead of the philosophical positions of Nietzsche and Marx that shaped
Bataille's thought on the subject of religion, nineteenth-century theorists
like Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer were influenced by the philosophy of positiv
ism and the theory of evolution. Unlike Bataille, Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer
used to their credit data from mostly tribal religions, which they referred to
as savage or primitive, in order to support their theories. Spencer's theory

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 Bataille's theory of religion revisited: 403

attempts, for instance, to demonstrate that divine beings actually originated

with deceased ancestors. The behaviouristic bias of his theory tends to ex
clude meaning and human subjectivity. In contrast to Spencer, Tylor identi
fies animism as the basis of religion in his effort to trace a history of the hu
man mind. Although Tylor makes a point of indicating examples of the
survival, which are items or practices that do not make sense or explain
themselves and represent current forms of superstition, of animistic beliefs
in modern culture, he is intent to show that primitive religion is inferior or
lower on the evolutionary scale. Much like Bataille, Frazer also had a politi
cal agenda in the sense that he advocates monarchy as the best form of gov
ernment. In contrast to Bataille, the encyclopaedic and evolutionary influ
enced approach of Frazer conceived of a gradual development from magic,
which represents the origin of religion, to religion itself, and eventually to
science.

Although these remarks hardly do justice to the overall theories of these

scholars, the theories of religion offered by Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer were
rejected by later scholars. A major reason for the rejection of these theories
of religion by later scholars is that they did not fit the data, which is exactly
a major criticism that Murphy thinks is unfair to level at Bataille. If a theory
of religion is not based on the data or is not historically grounded, it be
comes a "just-so" story that is closer to a fictional account of the subject.
Although Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer did not historically ground their theo
ries of religion, they did remain faithful to Enlightenment philosophy and
its ideal of science that can help us discover the truth and serve as a para
digm for human activity. Like these nineteenth-century theorists, Bataille
also neglects history and runs the risk of ending with a purely subjective po
sition that culminates in a possible reductio ab absurdum.
Such an outcome is clearly not intended by Bataille because he con
ceives of his notion of the general economy as based on historical data that
is then related to present data (1988:41) Although this is a lucid enough ap
proach, I challenge Murphy to isolate any historical data in Bataille's The
ory of Religion. Thus Murphy is a bit ludicrous when he charges that I
shifted the ground of analysis from "the general economy of violence to the
intentional meaning of symbols" (1996: 362). My interpretation of the Sun
Dance is rather based on evidence from eyewitnesses and participants and
not from a prefabricated theory of sacrifice and religion that represents a
philosophical and politically imaginative creation by Bataille that claims to
be historically grounded but is lacking in any such basis. Based on the way
in which he uses it, Bataille's method is actually a non-method because, as
he admits: "My life (or rather my lack of one) is my method" (1992: 110),
which is sufficient reason to give considerable weight to his notion of eroti
cism. Moreover, within the context of his non-book about Nietzsche

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404 Carl Olson

(because it is a work that is focussed on himself and not on the Ge

philosopher), Bataille gives us ample reason for not embracing his theo
religion: "My method has confusion as a consequence - and in the long
this confusion is unbearable (particularly for me!)" (1992: 188). Thi
interesting confession about one's own work.

2. A matter of hermeneutics

Although Murphy claims that he is not attempting to advocate or defend

Bataille's theory of religion in general or any of its specific points in the fi
nal paragraph of his essay, this claim leaves him with a contradiction when
he earlier states: "where Olson goes wrong, then, is where Bataille goes
right" (1996: 363). Even though this might not be an endorsement of
Bataille' general theory or any specific point within his theory, Murphy ap
pears to be endorsing Bataille's approach to the study of religion. Since the
rules of the game that Murphy endorses have been constructed by post
modern thinkers like his intellectual heroes Bataille and Derrida, it is Mur
phy who is guilty of playing the language game. It is undoubtedly true that I
approach the subject of the Sun Dance in my earlier essay (1994) with cer
tain hermeneutic constructs just as Murphy and Bataille do. The difference
between my approach and the postmodern type of approach espoused by
Bataille and intellectual clones like Murphy is that in the former case the
subject of religion is more intelligible and in the latter approach it is not as
understandable because of the radical skepticism embodied in the postmod
ern approach that enables one to discern very little about the subject except
that one is involved in some metalanguage game that signifies nothing be
yond itself. Frankly, such an approach is extremely problematic with respect
to the study of religion because incommensurable discourse is not prefer
able to commensurable discourse of the subject (Rorty 1979: 347). More
over, a radical skepticism also undermines itself because of its internal inco
herence that is exposed when it criticizes another philosophical position by
engaging in philosophy and abandoning the rational project, a fundamental
philosophical purpose, that makes it impossible to realize some basic cogni
tive aims and aspirations (Rescher 1994:203-204).
By reiterating the point once again, it can be affirmed that Murphy is
certainly correct to indicate that my approach to the subject of religion or
sacrifice in the case of the Sun Dance and Bataille's heterology are very dif
ferent kinds of interpretations with different aims. Bataille may not assume
the intentionality of symbols, but he does assume a general economy, that
the meaning of symbols are unconscious, and that elements of Nietzschean
philosophy can be combined with Marxist socio-economic theory to pro

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 Bataille's theory of religion revisited: 405

duce a method for understanding religion or our current human condition,

which confirms that Bataille is interpreting religion from a much different
set of presuppositions, preunderstandings, expectations, and intentions than
I approach the subject. Murphy tries to exempt Bataille's theory of religion
from being applied to data because what constitutes a fit (and here he cites
Davidson and Rorty for support) is actually a theoretical issue. To suggest
that Bataille's theory is a free inquiry devoid of latent constructs is nonsen
sical. Even if we assume that Davidson and Rorty are correct for the sake
of argument, Bataille is also guilty of this transgression because the philo
sophical notions of Nietzsche and the ideology of Marxist thought shape
Bataille's theory of religion. There is no presuppositionless theory of relig
ion. Just as a religious phenomenon or action fits into a particular cultural
context, the interpreter also works out of his/her own cultural context, and
brings to the hermeneutic task certain ideas and experiences that shape
him/her as an interpreter of religion. I also strongly disagree with Murphy
when he claims that because Bataille's theory of religion does not fit the
facts it is just as good as my approach. If a theory of religion, or something
more specific like a sacrifice, is not based on phenomena or behaviour of
past or current religions that is historically grounded or directly observed
by an anthropologist, it is an imaginative creation more akin to a work of
fiction. From the remarks of either Bataille or Murphy, are we to suppose
that participants in the Sun Dance would recognize that they are engaged
in a general economy and that any symbolism associated with the rite is un
conscious and thus cannot be known? If the answer to either question is af
firmative, it would contradict the evidence from the participants themselves.
Another problem with Murphy's essay is his flippant dismissal of inten
tionality that is common with a philosopher like Derrida (1988). In contrast
to this type of dismissal of intention, Merleau-Ponty thinks that intentional
ity manifests an already present unified world (1962: xvii), and from another
philosophical perspective, John R. Searle views intentionality as intrinsic to
many, although not all, mental states and works within a context of nonrep
resentational mental capacities (1983). Along similar lines of agreement,
Jacques Waardenburg thinks that intentions should become central to the
study of religion because: "All human expressions, physical and mental have
to do with intentions through which explicit or implicit meaning can be
come apparent" (1978: 135). Without evaluating the merits of his theory,
Waardenburg wants to indicate that it is possible to focus on intention as an
object of inquiry or investigation in order to attempt to grasp religion in its
original meaning. Waardenburg wants to expose the explicit and implicit in
tentions associated with religion because they are factual expressions that
are empirically verifiable. Therefore, intentions can serve as the interpreta
tive key to such expression, although intentions cannot be traced with com

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406 Carl Olson

píete certainty (Waardenburg 1978:134). From behind his postmodern th

retical guise, Murphy cannot bring himself to admit that intertwined w
every religious action or word there is an intention that refers to a given
tended object which in turn gives a basic meaning to that particular act
or word.

According to Murphy, the discourse of Bataille is not aimed at the pri

mary data of religion, but it is directed at a third order of discourse that is
actually aimed at us: "It is a discourse on discourse" (1996: 364). Murphy
proceeds to cite a standard sociological text that focuses on religion's "con
servative protective function" (1996: 364). Bataille's notion of excess, he ar
gues, is therefore an attempt to undermine this type of conservative posi
tion. I agree with Murphy about Bataille's overall intention to call attention
to excess, the problematic nature of former theories of religion, and his at
tempt to have us look at ourselves. This type of an approach creates, how
ever, other problems because "discourse on discourse" is not necessarily in
tended to help us enhance our understanding of religion. Moreover,
Bataille's promotion of decadence and excess contradict his Marxist politi
cal convictions because of its historically conservative and even tyrannical
nature of governance. This problem is caused by Bataille's adherence to
Nietzsche's insistence that decadence is the necessary precondition for an
understanding of the human situation.
Murphy also argues that what is at stake with my critique of Bataille is
vocabulary: "Bataille's entire conceptual system (using the term in a loose
sense) runs directly counter to that orthodoxy" (1996: 364). Murphy pro
ceeds to claim that my dismissal of Bataille's strategic use of decadence as
an appropriate means of interpreting religious phenomena does not depoli
ticize his theory of religion, but it rather "does not avoid politics or norma
tive claims, but only reiterates the politics and norms which are hegemonic,
and which remain hegemonic because of the failure to recognize their his
torical and political particularity" (1996:364). From Murphy's perspective, if
I oppose Bataille's theory I am being political and creating hegemonic
norms (whose nature he does not identify). Conversely, I have to assume
that if I supported Bataille's leftist political stance, I would also be political,
but I would possibly be free of the political sin of creating hegemonic
norms, which assumes of course that no leftist ever created such a norm, an
historically absurd position. Therefore, I am guilty from Murphy's position
no matter which stance I assume. But if I support Bataille's political posi
tion, I also assume that I would at least be politically correct. Unfortunately,
Murphy's postmodern position reduces everything to politics, a misguided
attitude that seems to have seeped into scholarship through the influence of
scholars like Michel Foucault, who, to his credit, admits that he is using his
scholarship for political purposes (1980: 189). Although it has been done

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 Bataille's theory of religion revisited: 407

over time by different scholars, the introduction of politics into the study of
religion is misguided because it does nothing to enhance understanding of
the subject; it merely exposes one's own prejudices. The politicalization of
the study of religion is just as misguided and disingenuous as former theo
ries that set out to prove the superiority of Christianity or that all religions
were moving toward it.

3. A matter of signification

Murphy's rejoinder to my essay reminds me of the mindless kinds of name

calling in which politicians often engage. By calling someone liberal or con
servative, these words are suppose to give birth to negative images. To be di
rectly or indirectly associated with conservatism, a defender of the status quo,
realism, and functionalism in the same essay is amusing. My objections to the
discourse of Bataille possess nothing to do with "marked/unmarked", "nor
mative/nonnormative", "political/apolitical", as Murphy claims; it is rather a
pragmatic test akin to one that a philosopher like Richard Rorty might use:
Does it enhance our understanding of religion or some aspect of it? A means
of pragmatically testing whether Bataille's approach is fruitful or not is to ap
ply his theory to actual historical data, which is something that he failed to
do, in order to discern if he advances our understanding of the subject.
There is something, however, very sinister and dangerous embodied in
the leftist political agenda of thinkers like Bataille, and apparently uncritical
followers like Murphy, because some postmodern scholars are attempting to
do their own signifying. Although Murphy's criticism of my essay on
Bataille is an excellent example of this tactic, Charles H. Long, a black his
torian of religions, warns us about the power of signification because it in
volves a process of objectification through the names, categories, or con
cepts applied to the other. This process represents an exertion of power that
is both latent and manifest in the process of signification with the eventual
result of oppressing the other (Long 1986: 4-8). By thoughtfully taking the
time to criticize my essay, I do not mean to state that Murphy is engaging in
a form of oppression. However, the central importance of politics in the
postmodern approach lends itself more readily to such an abuse. With his
objection to my empathie approach to the subject of the Native American
Sioux Indians and their Sun Dance, Murphy's attitude seems to suggest that
even members of a tribal religion can become politically correct with the
right type of political signification. Unfortunately, this type of signification
would lead the discipline of religious studies into a blind alley.
There are, however, aspects of Bataille's theory and that of other post
modern thinkers, that can be used to shed light on certain aspects of relig

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408 Carl Olson

ion, a task that I have attempted in another work (Olson 1997). Thus
not reject Bataille as Murphy claims, but I do think that his theory on
ion and sacrifice and his approach to the study of religion are problema
Many postmodern thinkers are creative, insightful, provocative, and edif
as Rorty observes (1979: 377 ), but this does not mean that one shou
critically embrace and ape their theories or approaches in order to blind
follow the latest intellectual fad.

Allegheny College

References

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& Theory in the Study of Religion 8:361-366.
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