MODULE 2
TORBELA, married to Eulogio Tosino, EUFROSINA TORBELA, married to Pedro Rosario,
Distinction between “Title” and “Certificate of Title”
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140528. December 7, 2011.]
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and
children: CLARO, MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all surnamed TOSINO,
APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA,
represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE and DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA;
EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs, namely: ESTEBAN T.
ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO, ROMULO T. ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIO-
HADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA, represented by his heirs,
namely: SERGIO T. TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T. ZULUETA, CANDIDO T.
TORBELA, FLORENTINA T. TORBELA and PANTALEON T. TORBELA; DOLORES
TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by her heirs,
namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN; and
SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and
LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 140553. December 7, 2011.]
LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Presently before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, both assailing the Decision 1 dated June 29,
1999 and Resolution 2 dated October 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 39770.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 140528 are siblings Maria Torbela, 3 Pedro Torbela, 4
Eufrosina Torbela Rosario, 5 Leonila Torbela Tamin, Fernando Torbela, 6 Dolores
Torbela Tablada, Leonora Torbela Agustin, 7 and Severina Torbela Ildefonso
(Torbela siblings).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 140553 is Lena Duque-Rosario (Duque-Rosario), who was
married to, but now legally separated from, Dr. Andres T. Rosario (Dr. Rosario). Dr.
Rosario is the son of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario and the nephew of the other Torbela
siblings.
The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374 square meters,
located in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Lot No. 356-A). It was originally part of a
larger parcel of land, known as Lot No. 356 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta,
measuring 749 square meters, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
16676, 8 in the name of Valeriano Semilla (Valeriano), married to Potenciana
Acosta. Under unexplained circumstances, Valeriano gave Lot No. 356-A to his sister
Marta Semilla, married to Eugenio Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon the deaths of
the spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was adjudicated in equal shares among their
children, the Torbela siblings, by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition 9 dated
December 3, 1962.
On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
10 over Lot No. 356-A in favor of Dr. Rosario. According to the said Deed, the
Torbela siblings "for and in consideration of the sum of NINE PESOS (P9.00) . . .
transfer[red] and convey[ed] . . . unto the said Andres T. Rosario, that undivided
portion of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR square meters of that parcel of land
embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 16676 of the land records of Pangasinan
. . . ." 11 Four days later, on December 16, 1964, OCT No. 16676 in Valeriano's name
was partially cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and TCT No. 52751 12 was issued in Dr.
Rosario's name covering the said property.
Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim 13 was subsequently executed on December
28, 1964, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only borrowed Lot No.
356-A from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same to the latter for
P1.00. The Deed stated: ECSHID
That for and in consideration of the sum of one peso (P1.00), Philippine Currency
1
and the fact that I only borrowed the above described parcel of land from MARIA
PEDRO TORBELA, married to Petra Pagador, LEONILA TORBELA, married to Fortunato
Tamen, FERNANDO TORBELA, married to Victoriana Tablada, DOLORES TORBELA, widow,
LEONORA TORBELA, married to Matias Agustin and SEVERINA TORBELA, married to Jorge
Ildefonso, . . . by these presents do hereby cede, transfer and convey by way of this
ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM unto the said Maria, Eufrosina, Pedro, Leonila, Fernando, Dolores,
Leonora and Severina, all surnamed Torbela the parcel of land described above. 14
(Emphasis ours.)
The aforequoted Deed was notarized, but was not immediately annotated on TCT No.
52751.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on February 21, 1965 in the sum of
P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage constituted on Lot No. 356-A. The mortgage was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 on September 21, 1965 as Entry No. 243537. 15 Dr. Rosario
used the proceeds of the loan for the construction of improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio) executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, 16
on behalf of the Torbela siblings. Cornelio deposed in said Affidavit:
3. That ANDRES T. ROSARIO later quitclaimed his rights in favor of the former owners by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim which he executed before Notary Public Banaga,
and entered in his Notarial Registry as Dec. No. 43; Page No. 9; Book No. I; Series of 1964;
4. That it is the desire of the parties, my aforestated kins, to register ownership over the
above-described property or to perfect their title over the same but their Deed could not
be registered because the registered owner now, ANDRES T. ROSARIO mortgaged the
property with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, on September 21, 1965, and
for which reason, the Title is still impounded and held by the said bank;
5. That pending payment of the obligation with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES or redemption of the Title from said bank, I, CORNELIO T. TOSINO, in behalf of
my mother MARIA TORBELA-TOSINO, and my Aunts EUFROSINA TORBELA, LEONILA
TORBELA-TAMEN, DOLORES TORBELA, LEONORA TORBELA-AGUSTIN, SEVERINA TORBELA-
ILDEFONSO, and my Uncles PEDRO TORBELA and FERNANDO, also surnamed TORBELA, I
request the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to annotate their adverse claim at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52751, based on the annexed document, Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim by ANDRES T. ROSARIO, dated December 28, 1964, marked as Annex "A" and
made a part of this Affidavit, and it is also requested that the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES be informed accordingly. 17
The very next day, on May 17, 1967, the Torbela siblings had Cornelio's Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and Dr. Rosario's Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 28, 1964 annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471 18 and 274472, 19
respectively.
The construction of a four-storey building on Lot No. 356-A was eventually completed. The
building was initially used as a hospital, but was later converted to a commercial building.
Part of the building was leased to PT&T; and the rest to Mrs. Andrea Rosario-Haduca, Dr.
Rosario's sister, who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant.
Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP. Under Entry No. 520197 on TCT No.
52751 20 dated March 6, 1981, the mortgage appearing under Entry No. 243537 was
cancelled per the Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage executed by DBP in favor of Dr.
Rosario and ratified before a notary public on July 11, 1980. cDCHaS
In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) sometime in 1979-1981. Records do not reveal though the original amount of the
loan from PNB, but the loan agreement was amended on March 5, 1981 and the loan
amount was increased to P450,000.00. The loan was secured by mortgages constituted on
the following properties: (1) Lot No. 356-A, covered by TCT No. 52751 in Dr. Rosario's
name; (2) Lot No. 4489, with an area of 1,862 square meters, located in Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, covered by TCT No. 24832; and (3) Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, with an area of
1,001 square meters, located in Nancayasan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, covered by TCT No.
104189. 21 The amended loan agreement and mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated
on TCT No. 52751 on March 6, 1981 as Entry No. 520099. 22
Five days later, on March 11, 1981, another annotation, Entry No. 520469, 23 was made
on TCT No. 52751, canceling the adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A under Entry Nos. 274471-
274472, on the basis of the Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage executed by Dr.
Rosario on March 5, 1981. Entry No. 520469 consisted of both stamped and handwritten
portions, and exactly reads:

Entry No. 520469. Cancellation of Adverse Claim executed by Andres Rosario in
favor of same. The incumbrance/mortgage appearing under Entry No. 274471-72 is
now cancelled as per Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage Ratified before Notary
Public Mauro G. Meris on March 5, 1981: Doc. No. 215; Page No. 44; Book No. 1;
Series of 1981.
Lingayen, Pangasinan, 3-11, 19981 n
[Signed: Pedro dela Cruz]
Register of Deeds 24
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario (spouses Rosario),
acquired a third loan in the amount of P1,200,000.00 from Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To secure said loan, the spouses Rosario again
constituted mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
The mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry No.
533283 25 on December 18, 1981. Since the construction of a two-storey
commercial building on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was still incomplete, the loan value
thereof as collateral was deducted from the approved loan amount. Thus, the
spouses Rosario could only avail of the maximum loan amount of P830,064.00 from
Banco Filipino.
Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr. Rosario's loan from PNB, the
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A in favor of PNB was cancelled per Entry No. 533478 26
on TCT No. 52751 dated December 23, 1981.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, a Complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, against the spouses Rosario, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-4359. On the same day, Entry Nos. 593493 and 593494
were made on TCT No. 52751 that read as follows:
Entry No. 593494 — Complaint — Civil Case No. U-4359 (For: Recovery of
Ownership and Possession and Damages. (Sup. Paper).
Entry No. 593493 — Notice of Lis Pendens — The parcel of land described in this
title is subject to Lis Pendens executed by Liliosa B. Rosario, CLAO, Trial Attorney
dated February 13, 1986. Filed to TCT No. 52751 February 13, 1986-1986 February
13 — 3:30 p.m.
(SGD.) PACIFICO M. BRAGANZA
Register of Deeds 27
The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan from Banco Filipino. As of
April 2, 1987, the spouses Rosario's outstanding principal obligation and penalty
charges amounted to P743,296.82 and P151,524.00, respectively. 28
Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No.
4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. During the public auction on April 2, 1987, Banco
Filipino was the lone bidder for the three foreclosed properties for the price of
P1,372,387.04. The Certificate of Sale 29 dated April 2, 1987, in favor of Banco
Filipino, was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on April 14, 1987 as Entry No. 610623. 30
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their Amended
Complaint, 31 impleading Banco Filipino as additional defendant in Civil Case No. U-
4359 and praying that the spouses Rosario be ordered to redeem Lot No. 356-A
from Banco Filipino. cSIADH
The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on March 4, 1988 a case for
annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and damages, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, against Banco Filipino, the
Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff and his Deputy, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4667. Another notice of lis pendens was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 on March 10, 1988 as Entry No. 627059, viz.:
Entry No. 627059 — Lis Pendens — Dr. Andres T. Rosario and Lena Duque Rosario,
Plaintiff versus Banco Filipino, et al. Civil Case No. U-4667 or Annulment of
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage — The parcel of land described in
this title is subject to Notice of Lis Pendens subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Mauro G. Meris, as Doc. No. 21; Page No. 5; Book 111; S-1988. March 7,
1988-1988 * March 10, 1:00 p.m.
(SGD.) RUFINO M. MORENO, SR.
2
Register of Deeds 32
The Torbela siblings intervened in Civil Case No. U-4667. Eventually, on October 17, 1990,
the RTC issued an Order 33 dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. U-4667 due to the
spouses Rosario's failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino, but
their efforts were unsuccessful. Upon the expiration of the one-year redemption period in
April 1988, the Certificate of Final Sale 34 and Affidavit of Consolidation 35 covering all
three foreclosed properties were executed on May 24, 1988 and May 25, 1988,
respectively.
On June 7, 1988, new certificates of title were issued in the name of Banco Filipino,
particularly, TCT No. 165812 for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and TCT No. 165813 for Lot No.
356-A. 36
The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on August 29, 1988 a Complaint 37 for
annulment of the Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988, judicial cancellation of TCT
No. 165813, and damages, against Banco Filipino, the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, and the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, which was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4733.
On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC of Urdaneta City a Petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession. In said Petition, docketed as Pet. Case No. U-822, Banco
Filipino prayed that a writ of possession be issued in its favor over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
and Lot No. 356-A, plus the improvements thereon, and the spouses Rosario and other
persons presently in possession of said properties be directed to abide by said writ.
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822. The
Decision 38 on these three cases was promulgated on January 15, 1992, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 executed by
Spouses Andres Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino, legal and valid;
2. Declaring the sheriff's sale dated April 2, 1987 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 and
subsequent final Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1988 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT No.
52751 legal and valid;
3. Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751 (now TCT
165813);
4. Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot 356-A together with the
improvements thereon (Rose Inn Building). The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
issue a writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino;
5. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to render accounting to Banco Filipino the
rental they received from tenants of Rose Inn Building from May 14, 1988;
6. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to pay Banco Filipino the sum of P20,000.00
as attorney's fees;
7. Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give [the Torbela siblings] the right of first refusal
over Lot 356-A. The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to annotate the right of [the
Torbela siblings] at the back of TCT No. 165813 after payment of the required fees; cCSEaA
8. Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby ordered to reimburse [the Torbela siblings] the
market value of Lot 356-A as of December, 1964 minus payments made by the former;
9. Dismissing the complaint of [the Torbela siblings] against Banco Filipino, Pedro Habon
and Rufino Moreno in Civil Case No. U-4733; and against Banco Filipino in Civil Case No. U-
4359. 39
The RTC released an Amended Decision 40 dated January 29, 1992, adding the following
paragraph to the dispositive:
Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-[B]-2-A of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-122471, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 104189 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan[.] 41
The Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario appealed the foregoing RTC judgment before the
Court of Appeals. Their appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
In its Decision 42 dated June 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification. Items Nos. 6 and 7 of the appealed decision are DELETED. Item No. 8
is modified requiring [Dr. Rosario] to pay [the Torbela siblings] actual damages, in
the amount of P1,200,000.00 with 6% per annum interest from finality of this
decision until fully paid. [Dr. Rosario] is further ORDERED to pay [the Torbela
siblings] the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Costs against [Dr. Rosario]. 43
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution 44 dated October 22, 1999, denied the
separate Motions for Reconsideration of the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
The Torbela siblings come before this Court via the Petition for Review in G.R. No.
140528, with the following assignment of errors:
First Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY [DR. ANDRES
T. ROSARIO] IN FAVOR OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] DATED DECEMBER 28, 1964
AND THE REGISTRATION OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM EXECUTED BY THE
[TORBELA SIBLINGS], SERVE AS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO CONVEY OR AFFECT THE
LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS THEREOF IN SO FAR AS THIRD PERSONS ARE
CONCERNED.
Second Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 52751 IS CLEAN AND FREE, DESPITE OF
THE ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCES OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM AND
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM APPEARING AT THE BACK THEREOF AS ENTRY
NOS. 274471 AND 274472, RESPECTIVELY.
Third Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] UNDER ENTRY NO. 274471
WAS VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, IN THE ABSENCE OF A
PETITION DULY FILED IN COURT FOR ITS CANCELLATION.
Fourth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK IS A MORTGAGEE
IN GOOD FAITH. CaTcSA
Fifth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
FILING OF A CIVIL CASE NO. U-4359 ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, IMPLEADING
RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO AS ADDITIONAL PARTY DEFENDANT, TOLL OR
SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE ONE YEAR PERIOD OF REDEMPTION.
Sixth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PREMATURELY CONSOLIDATED IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.
Seventh Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AT LEAST WORTH P1,200,000.00. 45
The Torbela siblings ask of this Court:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the [Torbela siblings] most
respectfully pray that the questioned DECISION promulgated on June 29, 1999
(Annex "A", Petition) and the RESOLUTION dated October 22, 1999 (Annex "B",
Petition) be REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and/or further MODIFIED in favor of the
[Torbela siblings], and another DECISION issue ordering, among other reliefs, the
3
respondent Banco Filipino to reconvey back Lot No. 356-A, covered by T.C.T. No. 52751, in
favor of the [Torbela siblings] who are the actual owners of the same.
The [Torbela siblings] likewise pray for such other reliefs and further remedies as may be
deemed just and equitable under the premises. 46
Duque-Rosario, now legally separated from Dr. Rosario, avers in her Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 140553 that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A were registered in her
name, and she was unlawfully deprived of ownership of said properties because of the
following errors of the Court of Appeals:
A
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PERIOD TO
REDEEM THE PROPERTY HAS NOT COMMENCED, HENCE, THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE, THE
CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP BY [BANCO FILIPINO], ARE NULL AND VOID.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO RULE THAT THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COURT A QUO BY THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] HAD ALREADY BEEN
PRESCRIBED. 47
Duque-Rosario prays that the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and
set aside, and that Lot No. 4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A be freed from all obligations
and encumbrances and returned to her.
Review of findings of fact by the
RTC and the Court of Appeals
warranted.
A disquisition of the issues raised and/or errors assigned in the Petitions at bar
unavoidably requires a re-evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by the parties in
the court a quo.
In Republic v. Heirs of Julia Ramos, 48 the Court summed up the rules governing the
power of review of the Court:
Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals, especially where such findings coincide with those of the trial court. The
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, conclusive and binding upon
this Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case. TESDcA
The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both parties; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. 49
As the succeeding discussion will bear out, the first, fourth, and ninth exceptions are
extant in these case.
Barangay conciliation was not a
pre-requisite to the institution of Civil
Case No. U-4359.
Dr. Rosario contends that Civil Case No. U-4359, the Complaint of the Torbela siblings for
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, should have been
dismissed by the RTC because of the failure of the Torbela siblings to comply with the
prior requirement of submitting the dispute to barangay conciliation.
The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 on February 13, 1986, when
Presidential Decree No. 1508, Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the
Barangay Level, was still in effect. 50 Pertinent provisions of said issuance read:

Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. — The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister
of Local Government.
Section 3. Venue. — Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all
disputes which involved real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
1. involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
2. involving real property located in different municipalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. . . . . (Emphases supplied.) TASCEc
The Court gave the following elucidation on the jurisdiction of the Lupong
Tagapayapa in Tavora v. Hon. Veloso: 51
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under
which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually
residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 — while
reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or
in "different barangays" within the same city or municipality — unequivocably
declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties
who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where
such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no
jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city
or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin
each other.
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take
cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:
"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should
operate as such.
The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which
4
is to restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in
the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except something from the
enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or in part; or to exclude
from the scope of the statute that which otherwise would be within its terms." (73 Am Jur
2d 467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on
venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although
venue is generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes involving real
property shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the same
city/municipality. 52 (Emphases supplied.)
The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the Torbela siblings and the spouses Rosario)
do not reside in the same barangay, or in different barangays within the same city or
municipality, or in different barangays of different cities or municipalities but are adjoining
each other. Some of them reside outside Pangasinan and even outside of the country
altogether. The Torbela siblings reside separately in Barangay Macalong, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan; Barangay Consolacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Pangil, Laguna; Chicago, United
States of America; and Canada. The spouses Rosario are residents of Calle Garcia,
Poblacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Resultantly, the Lupon had no jurisdiction over the
dispute and barangay conciliation was not a pre-condition for the filing of Civil Case No. U-
4359.
The Court now looks into the merits of Civil Case No. U-4359.
There was an express trust between
the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to Lot No. 356-A from their
parents, the Torbela spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same from the first registered
owner of Lot No. 356-A, Valeriano.
Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964
in which they transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration
of P9.00. However, the Torbela siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as an
accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name and
use said property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which would be used for
building a hospital on Lot No. 356-A — a claim supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence, and borne out by the sequence of events immediately following the execution
by the Torbela siblings of said Deed. On December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot
No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr. Rosario's name. On December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario
executed his own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which he expressly acknowledged that he
"only borrowed" Lot No. 356-A and was transferring and conveying the same back to the
Torbela siblings for the consideration of P1.00. On February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosario's loan in
the amount of P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by
DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a hospital building started on Lot No. 356-A. DIESHT
Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela siblings is the testimony of Atty.
Lorenza Alcantara (Atty. Alcantara), who had no apparent personal interest in the present
case. Atty. Alcantara, when she was still a boarder at the house of Eufrosina Torbela
Rosario (Dr. Rosario's mother), was consulted by the Torbela siblings as regards the
extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 356-A. She also witnessed the execution of the two Deeds
of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in his name, to prove his
purported title to Lot No. 356-A. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 53 the Court made
a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate
cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used. . . . . 54 (Emphases supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.
55 Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein his acquisition of title to Lot No.
356-A, apart from his submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name.
Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A after paying the Torbela siblings
P25,000.00, pursuant to a verbal agreement with the latter. The Court though
observes that Dr. Rosario's testimony on the execution and existence of the verbal
agreement with the Torbela siblings lacks significant details (such as the names of
the parties present, dates, places, etc.) and is not corroborated by independent
evidence.
In addition, Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute
Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964 and December 28, 1964, even affirming his
own signature on the latter Deed. The Parol Evidence Rule provides that when the
terms of the agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement. 56 Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to the terms
in the two written Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his
pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the Deeds; (2)
failure of the Deeds to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties
thereto; (3) the validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence of other terms agreed to
by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario after the execution of the Deeds. 57
Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosario's testimony on his alleged verbal agreement
with the Torbela siblings, the Court finds the same unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario
averred that the two Deeds were executed only because he was "planning to secure
loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank
and the bank needed absolute quitclaim[.]" 58 While Dr. Rosario's explanation
makes sense for the first Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964
executed by the Torbela siblings (which transferred Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for
P9.00.00), the same could not be said for the second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
dated December 28, 1964 executed by Dr. Rosario. In fact, Dr. Rosario's Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim (in which he admitted that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A and
was transferring the same to the Torbela siblings for P1.00.00) would actually work
against the approval of Dr. Rosario's loan by the banks. Since Dr. Rosario's Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 is a declaration against his self-
interest, it must be taken as favoring the truthfulness of the contents of said Deed.
59 HIEASa
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or asserting ownership
over Lot No. 356-A based on his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28,
1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the said Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No.
356-A is deemed conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code,
"[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon." 60 That admission cannot now be denied by Dr. Rosario as against the
Torbela siblings, the latter having relied upon his representation.
Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that Dr. Rosario only holds Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is
vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with
the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may
either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of
law. 61
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing
or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to
create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended." 62 It is possible to create a trust without using the word "trust" or
"trustee." Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily
indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the
trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is
known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which
he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust. 63
5
In Tamayo v. Callejo, 64 the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or
implied nature in the beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent express
acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale of the property to another
party, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an express
trust. The same situation exists in this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No.
356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964, an implied trust was
initially established between him and the Torbela siblings under Article 1451 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to
be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit
of the true owner.
Dr. Rosario's execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 28, 1964,
containing his express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela
siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the trust to an express one. The express
trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim that he was
already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained
registered in Dr. Rosario's name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of
said property, together with the improvements thereon.
The right of the Torbela siblings to
recover Lot No. 356-A has not yet
prescribed.
The Court extensively discussed the prescriptive period for express trusts in the Heirs of
Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio Labanon, 65 to wit:
On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to rule in Bueno v. Reyes that
unrepudiated written express trusts are imprescriptible:
"While there are some decisions which hold that an action upon a trust is imprescriptible,
without distinguishing between express and implied trusts, the better rule, as laid down by
this Court in other decisions, is that prescription does supervene where the trust is merely
an implied one. The reason has been expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88, as follows: 2005jur
Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all actions for recovery of real
property prescribed in 10 years, excepting only actions based on continuing or subsisting
trusts that were considered by section 38 as imprescriptible. As held in the case of Diaz v.
Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958, however, the continuing or subsisting trusts
contemplated in section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred only to express
unrepudiated trusts, and did not include constructive trusts (that are imposed by law)
where no fiduciary relation exists and the trustee does not recognize the trust at all."
This principle was amplified in Escay v. Court of Appeals this way: "Express trusts prescribe
10 years from the repudiation of the trust (Manuel Diaz, et al. vs. Carmen Gorricho et al.,
54 O.G. p. 8429, Sec. 40, Code of Civil Procedure)."
In the more recent case of Secuya v. De Selma, we again ruled that the prescriptive period
for the enforcement of an express trust of ten (10) years starts upon the repudiation of
the trust by the trustee. 66
To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would bar a beneficiary's action to recover
in an express trust, the repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and made known to the beneficiary. 67 The express trust disables the trustee
from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his management or custody,
at least while he does not openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation known
to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act
190) declared that the rules on adverse possession do not apply to "continuing and
subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts. In an express trust, the delay of the beneficiary is
directly attributable to the trustee who undertakes to hold the property for the former, or
who is linked to the beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The trustee's
possession is, therefore, not adverse to the beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made
aware that the trust has been repudiated. 68
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated the trust on December 16, 1964,
when he registered Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751, so when on February
13, 1986, the Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A from the spouses Rosario, over 21
years had passed. Civil Case No. U-4359 was already barred by prescription, as well as
laches.
The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor v. Ringor 69 for the following
reasons:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by
another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens
Certificate of Title in Jose's name did not vest ownership of the land upon him. The
Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title
already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The
Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust.
It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does
not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration can
confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in
Jose's name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong
result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he
held in trust for his co-heirs. The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust,
notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must be
sustained. 70 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the more recent case of Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose Labiste, 71
the Court refused to apply prescription and laches and reiterated that:
[P]rescription and laches will run only from the time the express trust is repudiated.
The Court has held that for acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the
beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property
held in trust it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts
of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive. Respondents cannot rely on the fact that the
Torrens title was issued in the name of Epifanio and the other heirs of Jose. It has
been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held in trust by
him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. The rule
requires a clear repudiation of the trust duly communicated to the beneficiary. The
only act that can be construed as repudiation was when respondents filed the
petition for reconstitution in October 1993. And since petitioners filed their
complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has not yet prescribed, laches
cannot be attributed to them. 72 (Emphasis supplied.) CEaDAc
It is clear that under the foregoing jurisprudence, the registration of Lot No. 356-A
by Dr. Rosario in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964 is not the
repudiation that would have caused the 10-year prescriptive period for the
enforcement of an express trust to run.
The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Rosario repudiated the express trust when he
acquired another loan from PNB and constituted a second mortgage on Lot No. 356-
A sometime in 1979, which, unlike the first mortgage to DBP in 1965, was without
the knowledge and/or consent of the Torbela siblings.
The Court only concurs in part with the Court of Appeals on this matter.
For repudiation of an express trust to be effective, the unequivocal act of
repudiation had to be made known to the Torbela siblings as the cestuis que trust
and must be proven by clear and conclusive evidence. A scrutiny of TCT No. 52751
reveals the following inscription:
Entry No. 520099
Amendment of the mortgage in favor of PNB inscribed under Entry No. 490658 in
the sense that the consideration thereof has been increased to PHILIPPINE PESOS
Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos only (P450,000.00) and to secure any and all
negotiations with PNB, whether contracted before, during or after the date of this
instrument, acknowledged before Notary Public of Pangasinan Alejo M. Dato as
Doc. No. 198, Page No. 41, Book No. 11, Series of 1985.
Date of Instrument March 5, 1981
Date of Inscription March 6, 1981 73
Although according to Entry No. 520099, the original loan and mortgage agreement
of Lot No. 356-A between Dr. Rosario and PNB was previously inscribed as Entry No.
490658, Entry No. 490658 does not actually appear on TCT No. 52751 and, thus, it
cannot be used as the reckoning date for the start of the prescriptive period.
The Torbela siblings can only be charged with knowledge of the mortgage of Lot No.
356-A to PNB on March 6, 1981 when the amended loan and mortgage agreement
was registered on TCT No. 52751 as Entry No. 520099. Entry No. 520099 is
6
constructive notice to the whole world 74 that Lot No. 356-A was mortgaged by Dr.
Rosario to PNB as security for a loan, the amount of which was increased to P450,000.00.
Hence, Dr. Rosario is deemed to have effectively repudiated the express trust between
him and the Torbela siblings on March 6, 1981, on which day, the prescriptive period for
the enforcement of the express trust by the Torbela siblings began to run.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and mortgage agreement was registered on
TCT No. 52751, to February 13, 1986, when the Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC
Civil Case No. U-4359 against the spouses Rosario, only about five years had passed. The
Torbela siblings were able to institute Civil Case No. U-4359 well before the lapse of the
10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement of their express trust with Dr. Rosario.
Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches. Laches means the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. As the Court explained in the preceding
paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 five years after Dr.
Rosario's repudiation of the express trust, still within the 10-year prescriptive period for
enforcement of such trusts. This does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting
one's right. A delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not
considered to be a delay that would bar relief. Laches apply only in the absence of a
statutory prescriptive period. 75
Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee
and buyer in good faith.
Having determined that the Torbela siblings are the true owners and Dr. Rosario merely
the trustee of Lot No. 356-A, the Court is next faced with the issue of whether or not the
Torbela siblings may still recover Lot No. 356-A considering that Dr. Rosario had already
mortgaged Lot No. 356-A to Banco Filipino, and upon Dr. Rosario's default on his loan
obligations, Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage, acquired Lot No. 356-A as the highest
bidder at the foreclosure sale, and consolidated title in its name under TCT No. 165813.
The resolution of this issue depends on the answer to the question of whether or not
Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith. CHTAIc
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract of
mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to be
mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void. However, an exception
to this rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine, even if the
mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This principle
is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate
of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face
of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for
value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on
the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the
absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further
investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a
valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless,
entitled to protection. 76
On one hand, the Torbela siblings aver that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith
because as early as May 17, 1967, they had already annotated Cornelio's Adverse Claim
dated May 16, 1967 and Dr. Rosario's Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28,
1964 on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471-274472, respectively.
On the other hand, Banco Filipino asseverates that it is a mortgagee in good faith because
per Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, the notice of adverse claim, registered on May 17, 1967 by the
Torbela siblings under Entry Nos. 274471-274472 on TCT No. 52751, already lapsed after
30 days or on June 16, 1967. Additionally, there was an express cancellation of Entry Nos.
274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 dated March 11, 1981. So when Banco Filipino
approved Dr. Rosario's loan for P1,200,000.00 and constituted a mortgage on Lot No. 356-
A (together with two other properties) on December 8, 1981, the only other encumbrance
on TCT No. 52751 was Entry No. 520099 dated March 6, 1981, i.e., the amended loan and
mortgage agreement between Dr. Rosario and PNB (which was eventually cancelled after
it was paid off with part of the proceeds from Dr. Rosario's loan from Banco Filipino).
Hence, Banco Filipino was not aware that the Torbela siblings' adverse claim on Lot No.
356-A still subsisted.
The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith. Entry Nos. 274471-
274472 were not validly cancelled, and the improper cancellation should have been
apparent to Banco Filipino and aroused suspicion in said bank of some defect in Dr.
Rosario's title.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to
apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and
to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute. 77
Adverse claims were previously governed by Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, quoted in full below:
ADVERSE CLAIM
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon
a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and
equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim
thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or
treble costs in its discretion. AIHDcC
Construing the aforequoted provision, the Court stressed in Ty Sin Tei v. Lee Dy Piao
78 that "[t]he validity or efficaciousness of the [adverse] claim . . . may only be
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the
Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication
as justice and equity may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found
unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be cancelled." The Court likewise
pointed out in the same case that while a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in
a number of ways, "the same is not true in a registered adverse claim, for it may be
cancelled only in one instance, i.e., after the claim is adjudged invalid or
unmeritorious by the Court . . . ;" and "if any of the registrations should be
considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens and
not the annotation of the adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be
cancelled without adequate hearing and proper disposition of the claim."
With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree on June 11, 1978, Section
70 thereof now applies to adverse claims:
SEC. 70. Adverse claim. — Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registrations, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right, or interest,
and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in
the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the
validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof
shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall
find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in
an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his
7
adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 79 the Court squarely interpreted Section 70 of the
Property Registration Decree, particularly, the new 30-day period not previously found in
Section 110 of the Land Registration Act, thus:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious
whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered
with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an
inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three,
paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the
adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest." IDSETA
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect
after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the
foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would
not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the
statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-
existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled.
The printed pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may be
examined by the courts in their construction. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between
the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified
petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken
together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to
render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as
a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon
the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of
cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be cancelled," which obviously
indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order
the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the
effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court
cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested
in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the
validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the
court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court
to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without
qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides
for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is
a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where
the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and
serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to
be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a
venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for
the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising
from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision immediately following:
"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be
registered by the same claimant."
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse
claimant will be precluded from registering a second adverse claim based on the
same ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by
the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order
the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and
equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest
of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties." 80
(Emphases supplied.)
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act or Section 70 of the
Property Registration Decree, notice of adverse claim can only be cancelled after a
party in interest files a petition for cancellation before the RTC wherein the property
is located, and the RTC conducts a hearing and determines the said claim to be
invalid or unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has been conducted
herein to determine the validity or merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela
siblings. Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings,
annotated as Entry Nos. 274471-774472, upon the presentation by Dr. Rosario of a
mere Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage. CDHcaS
Regardless of whether or not the Register of Deeds should have inscribed Entry No.
520469 on TCT No. 52751, Banco Filipino could not invoke said inscription in
support of its claim of good faith. There were several things amiss in Entry No.
520469 which should have already aroused suspicions in Banco Filipino, and
compelled the bank to look beyond TCT No. 52751 and inquire into Dr. Rosario's
title. First, Entry No. 520469 does not mention any court order as basis for the
cancellation of the adverse claim. Second, the adverse claim was not a mortgage
which could be cancelled with Dr. Rosario's Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.
And third, the adverse claim was against Dr. Rosario, yet it was cancelled based on a
document also executed by Dr. Rosario.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or
mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing
of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or
mortgagor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value,
if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he
had such notice of the defects as would have led to its discovery had he acted with
the measure of precaution which may be required of a prudent man in a like
situation. 81
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469
might not be evident to a private individual, the same should have been apparent to
Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an ordinary mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-
bank, whose business is impressed with public interest. In fact, in one case, 82 the
Court explicitly declared that the rule that persons dealing with registered lands can
rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks. In another case, 83 the
Court adjudged that unlike private individuals, a bank is expected to exercise
greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands.
A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its
operations.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less a purchaser
in good faith at the foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the Torbela
siblings over Lot No. 356-A is superior over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true
owners of Lot No. 356-A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of said
property even from Banco Filipino.
Nonetheless, the failure of Banco Filipino to comply with the due diligence
requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, or
breach of a known duty for some interest or ill will that partakes of fraud that would
justify damages. 84
Given the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings, there is no more
8
need to address issues concerning redemption, annulment of the foreclosure sale and
certificate of sale (subject matter of Civil Case No. U-4733), or issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of Banco Filipino (subject matter of Pet. Case No. U-822) insofar as Lot
No. 356-A is concerned. Such would only be superfluous. Banco Filipino, however, is not
left without any recourse should the foreclosure and sale of the two other mortgaged
properties be insufficient to cover Dr. Rosario's loan, for the bank may still bring a proper
suit against Dr. Rosario to collect the unpaid balance.
The rules on accession shall govern
the improvements on Lot No. 356-A
and the rents thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of accession is recognized under Article 440
of the Civil Code which states that "[t]he ownership of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially."
There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
The Torbela siblings themselves alleged that they allowed Dr. Rosario to register Lot No.
356-A in his name so he could obtain a loan from DBP, using said parcel of land as security;
and with the proceeds of the loan, Dr. Rosario had a building constructed on Lot No. 356-
A, initially used as a hospital, and then later for other commercial purposes. Dr. Rosario
supervised the construction of the building, which began in 1965; fully liquidated the loan
from DBP; and maintained and administered the building, as well as collected the rental
income therefrom, until the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 before the
RTC on February 13, 1986. TACEDI
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, both the Torbela siblings (as
landowners) and Dr. Rosario (as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings
were aware of the construction of a building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr.
Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his knowledge that Lot No. 356-A
belonged to the Torbela siblings. This is the case contemplated under Article 453 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or
sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of
one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was
done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. (Emphasis supplied.)
When both the landowner and the builder are in good faith, the following rules govern:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right
of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished
the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does
not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where, however, the planter,
builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa
calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the law has provided a just and equitable solution
by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of
the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower
to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the
option because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. 85
The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying
the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. But even
as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to
remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if
the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it
where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner
may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay
for the same. 86
This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the determination of matters
necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of the
Civil Code.Such matters include the option that the Torbela siblings will choose; the
amount of indemnity that they will pay if they decide to appropriate the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A; the value of Lot No. 356-A if they prefer to sell it to
Dr. Rosario; or the reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario
but the value of the land is considerably more than the improvements. The
determination made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1999
that the current value of Lot No. 356-A is P1,200,000.00 is not supported by any
evidence on record. HSTaEC
Should the Torbela siblings choose to appropriate the improvements on Lot No.
356-A, the following ruling of the Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals 87 is relevant
in the determination of the amount of indemnity under Article 546 of the Civil Code:
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements
should be determined. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse
the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not
its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful
improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance
with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this
Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits,
bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material based on the market value
of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, despite the finding that the
useful improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between
eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), the
landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In the same way,
the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a useful
improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the
parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said provision was formulated in trying to
adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to
administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the
other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this
precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should
be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the
private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently,
the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market
value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as
to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. 88 (Emphases
supplied.)
Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such as rents, belong to the owner
of the building. 89 Thus, Dr. Rosario has a right to the rents of the improvements on
Lot No. 356-A and is under no obligation to render an accounting of the same to
anyone. In fact, it is the Torbela siblings who are required to account for the rents
they had collected from the lessees of the commercial building and turn over any
balance to Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosario's right to the rents of the improvements on Lot
No. 356-A shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen their option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.And in case the Torbela siblings decide to appropriate
the improvements, Dr. Rosario shall have the right to retain said improvements, as
well as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has been paid. 90
Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to
the Torbela siblings.
9
The Court of Appeals ordered Dr. Rosario to pay the Torbela siblings P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Indeed, Dr. Rosario's deceit and bad faith is evident when, being fully aware that he only
held Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings, he mortgaged said property to PNB and
Banco Filipino absent the consent of the Torbela siblings, and caused the irregular
cancellation of the Torbela siblings' adverse claim on TCT No. 52751. Irrefragably, Dr.
Rosario's betrayal had caused the Torbela siblings (which included Dr. Rosario's own
mother, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario) mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded
feelings. Resultantly, the award of moral damages is justified, but the amount thereof is
reduced to P200,000.00.
In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages may also be imposed given that Dr.
Rosario's wrongful acts were accompanied by bad faith. However, judicial discretion
granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be exercised with
balanced restraint and measured objectivity. The circumstances of the case call for a
reduction of the award of exemplary damages to P100,000.00. cDCaTH
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest. Because of Dr. Rosario's acts, the Torbela siblings were constrained to institute
several cases against Dr. Rosario and his spouse, Duque-Rosario, as well as Banco Filipino,
which had lasted for more than 25 years. Consequently, the Torbela siblings are entitled to
an award of attorney's fees and the amount of P100,000.00 may be considered rational,
fair, and reasonable.
Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of
possession for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
The Court emphasizes that Pet. Case No. U-822, instituted by Banco Filipino for the
issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC of Urdaneta, included only Lot No. 5-F-8-C-
2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A (Lot No. 4489, the third property mortgaged to secure Dr.
Rosario's loan from Banco Filipino, is located in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, and the petition
for issuance of a writ of possession for the same should be separately filed with the RTC of
Dagupan City). Since the Court has already granted herein the reconveyance of Lot No.
356-A from Banco Filipino to the Torbela siblings, the writ of possession now pertains only
to Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in
favor of Banco Filipino. Dr. Rosario no longer appealed from said judgment of the
appellate court. Already legally separated from Dr. Rosario, Duque-Rosario alone
challenges the writ of possession before this Court through her Petition in G.R. No.
140553.
Duque-Rosario alleges in her Petition that Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A had been registered in
her name under TCT No. 104189. Yet, without a copy of TCT No. 104189 on record, the
Court cannot give much credence to Duque-Rosario's claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 5-
F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Also, the question of whether Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was the paraphernal
property of Duque-Rosario or the conjugal property of the spouses Rosario would not alter
the outcome of Duque-Rosario's Petition.
The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
constituted on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and the two other properties after Dr. Rosario
defaulted on the payment of his loan; Banco Filipino was the highest bidder for all three
properties at the foreclosure sale on April 2, 1987; the Certificate of Sale dated April 2,
1987 was registered in April 1987; and based on the Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24,
1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation dated May 25, 1988, the Register of Deeds cancelled
TCT No. 104189 and issued TCT No. 165812 in the name of Banco Filipino for Lot No. 5-F-8-
C-2-B-2-A on June 7, 1988.
The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year redemption period should be counted
not from the date of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered
with the Registry of Deeds. 91 No copy of TCT No. 104189 can be found in the records of
this case, but the fact of annotation of the Certificate of Sale thereon was admitted by the
parties, only differing on the date it was made: April 14, 1987 according to Banco Filipino
and April 15, 1987 as maintained by Duque-Rosario. Even if the Court concedes that the
Certificate of Sale was annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later date, April 15, 1987, the
one-year redemption period already expired on April 14, 1988. 92 The Certificate of Final
Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation were executed more than a month thereafter, on May
24, 1988 and May 25, 1988, respectively, and were clearly not premature.
It is true that the rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of
the property. The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his
right of redemption. 93 However, the liberal interpretation of the rule on
redemption is inapplicable herein as neither Duque-Rosario nor Dr. Rosario had (4) The Torbela siblings are DIRECTED to submit an accounting of the rents of the
made any attempt to redeem Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Duque-Rosario could only improvements on Lot No. 356-A which they had received and to turn over any balance
rely on the efforts of the Torbela siblings at redemption, which were unsuccessful. thereof to Dr. Rosario;
While the Torbela siblings made several offers to redeem Lot No. 356-A, as well as
the two other properties mortgaged by Dr. Rosario, they did not make any valid (5) Dr. Rosario is ORDERED to pay the Torbela siblings P200,000.00 as moral damages,
tender of the redemption price to effect a valid redemption. The general rule in P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests his
desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and (6) Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, covered by
simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption price should either be fully TCT No. 165812. The RTC Branch Clerk of Court is ORDERED to issue a writ of possession
offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can for the said property in favor of Banco Filipino.
the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith.
94 In case of disagreement over the redemption price, the redemptioner may ||| (Torbela v. Spouses Rosario, G.R. Nos. 140528 & 140553, [December 7, 2011], 678
preserve his right of redemption through judicial action, which in every case, must PHIL 1-63)
be filed within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court action to
enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, would have the
effect of preserving his redemptive rights and "freezing" the expiration of the one-
year period. 95 But no such action was instituted by the Torbela siblings or either of
the spouses Rosario. TcSICH

Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession over Lot No. 5-
F-8-C-2-B-2-A in favor of Banco Filipino by invoking the pendency of Civil Case No. U-
4359, the Torbela siblings' action for recovery of ownership and possession and
damages, which supposedly tolled the period for redemption of the foreclosed
properties. Without belaboring the issue of Civil Case No. U-4359 suspending the
redemption period, the Court simply points out to Duque-Rosario that Civil Case No.
U-4359 involved Lot No. 356-A only, and the legal consequences of the institution,
pendency, and resolution of Civil Case No. U-4359 apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.

Equally unpersuasive is Duque-Rosario's argument that the writ of possession over

Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A should not be issued given the defects in the conduct of the
foreclosure sale (i.e., lack of personal notice to Duque-Rosario) and consolidation of
title (i.e., failure to provide Duque-Rosario with copies of the Certificate of Final
Sale).

The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute upon the expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this right to
possession is the purchaser's ownership of the property. After the consolidation of
title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. 96

The judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look
into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Any question
regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
the refusal to issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a
pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the
purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the
eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. The issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is a ministerial act and
does not entail the exercise of discretion. 97

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition of the Torbela siblings in G.R. No.
140528 is GRANTED, while the Petition of Lena Duque-Rosario in G.R. No. 140553 is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 29, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770, which affirmed with modification the Amended Decision
dated January 29, 1992 of the RTC in Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet.
Case No. U-822, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, to now read as follows:

(1) Banco Filipino is ORDERED to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings;

(2) The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is ORDERED to cancel TCT No. 165813 in the
name of Banco Filipino and to issue a new certificate of title in the name of the
Torbela siblings for Lot No. 356-A;

(3) The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the facts
essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
particularly: (a) the present fair market value of Lot No. 356-A; (b) the present fair
market value of the improvements thereon; (c) the option of the Torbela siblings to
appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A or require Dr. Rosario to purchase
Lot No. 356-A; and (d) in the event that the Torbela siblings choose to require Dr.
Rosario to purchase Lot No. 356-A but the value thereof is considerably more than
the improvements, then the reasonable rent of Lot No. 356-A to be paid by Dr.
Rosario to the Torbela siblings;

10
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000.]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M. FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MALOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA,
DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAI INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P.
HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA,
LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE
H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T.
SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,
ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANGCAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSA GONOS,
ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN,
DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father
CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY,
SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,
intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
Barbara Anne C. Migallos & Troy A. Luna and Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun &
Bienvenido O. Bulataw for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Luna Bontin Perez & Associates, Rodolfo C. Raquista for intervenors/oppositors.
Leilene Carantes-San Juan for Sioco-Carino and Family.
SYNOPSIS
This is a suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Court en banc deliberated on the
petition and the votes gathered were equally divided with no majority vote
obtained. Seven (7) members voted to dismiss the petition. Seven (7) other
members voted to grant the petition. After redeliberation, the voting remained the
same (7 to 7). Thus, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, was dismissed.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DISMISSAL OF PETITION WHERE VOTES EQUALLY
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DIVIDED AND MAJORITY VOTE ARE NOT OBTAINED. — Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules). After due deliberation on the petition, the
members of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. While
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were
equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Puno, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RA 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1977);
RECOGNIZES EXISTENCE OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES OR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE. — Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote
the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA. The IPRA recognizes the existence of
the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector
in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains.
The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.
2. ID.; ID.; ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LAND ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY AND DO
NOT CONSTITUTE PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. — Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are
the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the
public domain. The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid
down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over
their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public
Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into
public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication
is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the
ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or
over, from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition. The option to register
land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited
period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the
date of approval of the IPRA.
3. ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP BY ICCs/IPs OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN LIMITED AND DOES NOT
INCLUDE RIGHT TO ALIENATE. — The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/lPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same. Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the
ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT
formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral domain. The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the
view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private
simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The
ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future
generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and
"negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring
ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." Simply stated, the
ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship.
4. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 7(a), 7(b) AND 57 THEREOF DO NOT VIOLATE REGALIAN DOCTRINE. —
Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the regalian doctrine enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this
"ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a). The ICCs/IPs are given the
right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife,
flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds,
forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found
within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a)
does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution-as belonging to the State. The non-inclusion of ownership by the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian
doctrine. The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA is
allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/lPs the right to "manage and
conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority
rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference.
Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity
that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights
over the resources to whosoever itself chooses. Section 57 is not a repudiation of
the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural
resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by
implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the
light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; SECTION 1, PART II, RULE III OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULE,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA and is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general. Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the
inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article X11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Vitug, J., Separate Opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; SHOULD RESOLVE ISSUES OF GRAVE
NATIONAL INTEREST. — An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a
proper place in any forum and, when it shows itself in a given judicial controversy,
the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the specific remedy
invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by
party-litigants, should not be so perceived as good and inevitable justifications for
advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the Court.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; PARTIES; MUST HAVE PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN
THE DISPUTE. — A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes
the Court's adjudication must have a personal and substantial interest in the
dispute; indeed, the developing trend would require a logical nexus between the
status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one
is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. The rule requires a
party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to
himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation
of the Court's jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the Court's
remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can
easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may,
in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and
consequentiality.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE RELAXED WHERE ISSUE IS OF TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE. — Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exists, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance and paramount interest to the
nation, the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing
of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional
issues that affect them. This Court thus did so in a case that involves the
conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until an exact balance is struck, the
Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal
nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be considered to
be of overriding concern.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; AUTHORITY TO ENACT LAWS FOR
APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS, CONSTRUED. — The second paragraph of
Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as
saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply, express that "customary
laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have
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itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. The
constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary
laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of,
the stream of laws. The "due process clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera
would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take
force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of
statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding
and effective as such.
Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; SHOULD BE CONSTRUED WHENEVER POSSIBLE
IN HARMONY WITH CONSTITUTION. — It is established doctrine that a statute should be
construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the
Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law. AHSEaD
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; REQUISITES. —
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY," DEFINED. — An "actual case or
controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and
susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or
that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. A petition
raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges
a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent
in the term "controversy" is the presence of opposing views or contentions. Otherwise,
the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lack such
concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of
adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests. The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it
must be susceptible of judicial determination.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE. — In the case at bar, there exists a
live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the
government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot
be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in
order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the
contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional
abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural
resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an
alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and
prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES MUST HAVE PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN CASE. — In
addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity
of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has
sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Evidently, the rights
asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens,
the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance." Yet, in a sense, all
citizen's and taxpayer's suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of
government and the allocation of power.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PARTIES; COURT HAS ADOPTED LIBERAL ATTITUDE WITH
REGARD TO STANDING. — In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with
regard to standing. The proper party requirement is considered as merely procedural, and
the Court has ample discretion with regard thereto. This Court has recognized that a
"public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, .may also be the subject of an
actual case or controversy.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS AS CITIZENS POSSESS PUBLIC RIGHT TO ENSURE THAT
NATIONAL PATRIMONY IS NOT ALIENATED AND DIMINISHED. — Petitioners, as citizens,
possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and
diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the
national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to
ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that
any grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies
with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability
of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen's suit.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAXPAYERS, WITH RIGHT TO RESTRAIN OFFICIALS FROM WASTING
PUBLIC FUNDS. — It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public
officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an
unconstitutional statute, and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute
appropriating public funds. The taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the
public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the proceeds of his
taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose of
administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
9. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; PROPER REMEDIES
TO RESTRAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF IPRA AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES. — In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be
restrained from implementing the challenged provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that
the same officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation
of the said law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be
compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the activities pertaining to
natural resources. Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from
implementing the questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in
connection therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise,
mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
the country's natural resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and
mandamus is not an improper remedy for the relief sought.
10. ID.; ACTIONS; HIERARCHY OF COURTS; MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IN
EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES. — Between two courts of
concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon
the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of
courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression,
which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural
rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice. This
Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum. The resort to this court's primary jurisdiction to issue said
writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such
invocation.
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN HARMONY,
AND NOT IN VIOLATION, OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW; RATIONALE. — A statute
should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the fundamental law.
The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted
within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly,
courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid,
sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
12. POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; JURA REGALIA,
CONSTRUED. — Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land
must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its
successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine
Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the
Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for
it cannot issue forth from nowhere. In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers
to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In
Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a
subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during
feudal times by the king as the sovereign.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT NEGATE NATIVE TITLE TO LANDS HELD IN PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP. — The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands
held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs.
Insular Government the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the
pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement: . . . Every
presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. . . . . The above
13
ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership
of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time
immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the
theory of jura regalia. A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated
therein applies only to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to
lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made
between ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription
against the State. Ownership by virtue a of native title presupposes that the land has been
held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since
time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-
in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer
of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State
involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native
title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have
been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title under Cariño
applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks under the Constitution is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño doctrine because
the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public domain
does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1935 CONSTITUTION; SECTION 1, ARTICLE XII THEREOF DOES
NOT DIVEST LANDOWNERS OF THEIR LANDS COVERED BY ANCESTRAL LANDS AND
DOMAIN. — The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor
General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding.
It simply declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State." Nowhere does it state
that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence,"
including those which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the
State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the provision should be
interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of
vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be
construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that
the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those
portions of the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social
welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule
against the diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands
of the public domain and other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be
protected must, perforce, include the right of ownership by indigenous peoples over their
ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual
meaning, and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive
definition.
15. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS THE
PEOPLE ADOPTING IT, PRESUMED TO BE AWARE OF PREVAILING DOCTRINES
CONCERNING SUBJECT PROVISIONS. — It cannot be correctly argued that, because the
framers of the Constitution never expressly mentioned Cariño in their deliberations, they
did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that they were unaware of
native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. The framers of the Constitution,
as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial
doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these
doctrines into consideration in construing the Constitution.
16. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTION; MUST BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE. —
The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is
proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any
provision. That construction should be used which would give effect to the entire
instrument.
17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RA 8371 (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT); SECTION 3(a)
THEREOF MERELY DEFINES COVERAGE OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN AND DOES NOT CONFER
OWNERSHIP OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of
ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains
by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to
be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a)
serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral
domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources
to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
19. ID.; ID.; SECTION 7 (a and b) THEREOF MAKES NO MENTION OF ANY RIGHT OF
OWNERSHIP OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 7
makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the
natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim
ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section
7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of
ownership vis-a-vis the natural resources.
20. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 7(b) AND 57 THEREOF REFER TO EXPLORATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND PRIORITY RIGHTS IN THE UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
— A careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the
indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the
following: "to manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold
it for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just
and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights." It must be noted
that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains
only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to
the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose
of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit. The
exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the
entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources
which under the Constitution belong to the State. Section 57, on the other hand,
grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of natural resources
and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights.
What is granted is merely the right of preference or first consideration in the award
of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs
and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
21. ID.; ID.; SECTION 3(a) and (b), DO NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION. — Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands
and ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands.
They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral
domains violates the due process clause. Petitioners' contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads: Sec. 56. Existing
Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and
protected. The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired
by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes
no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights."
The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they
pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. What IPRA only requires is that these
"property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
22. ID.; ID.; SECTION 1, RULE IX OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES; CUSTOMARY LAW
APPLIES WHERE ALL PARTIES INVOLVED ARE MEMBERS OF THE INDIGENOUS
GROUP. — The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these
present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the
same indigenous group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the
Implementing Rules. The application of customary law is limited to disputes
concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous
peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when
one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when
the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of
customary law is not required.
Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL POWER EXTENDS ONLY TO
ACTUAL CASES AND CONTROVERSIES. — The judicial power vested in this Court by
Art. VIII, § I extends only to cases and controversies for the determination of such
proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights,
14
or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. I do not conceive it to be the function
of this Coat under Art. VIII, § 1 of the Constitution to determine in the abstract whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our
jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to
note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly
begins with the phrase "all cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a
property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand
compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but
only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any
judgment that we render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the
future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of
such legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an
expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL POWER; DUTY TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
PRECLUDES COURT FROM INVOLVING POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE TO EVADE CERTAIN
CASES. — The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether
there has been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give
the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts
from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain
cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF ABSTRACT CONTROVERSIES WILL UPSET BALANCE OF
POWER. — Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual
cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches
of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court,
as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to
rewrite them.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.;-CASE AT BAR. — Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this
case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the
IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute
only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void
on its face.
6. ID.; STATUTES; FACIAL CHALLENGE TO STATUTE, NOT ALLOWED; EXCEPTION. — The
only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the
area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party
to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not
unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as
applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of
expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so
far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not
possible.
7. ID.; SUPREME COURT; CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION CANNOT TAKE PLACE IN A
VACUUM. — For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or
controversy is not only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in
adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation
rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the
Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is
thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot
be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.
8. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; RATIONALE IN REFUSAL TO RESOLVE ABSTRACT
CONTROVERSIES. — To decline the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine
controversy is not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a co-equal department
of government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law,
are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by
Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that "the power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota,
presented." For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.
Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the
presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; PREFERENTIAL
RIGHTS TO BENEFICIAL USE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE ACCORDED TO
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; PRIVILEGE
MUST BE SUBJECT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW. — Our fundamental law mandates the
protection of the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral lands, but
such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." I concede that
indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be
accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as
priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Such
privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
2. ID.; CONSTITUTION, A COMPACT MADE BY AND AMONG CITIZENS TO GOVERN
THEMSELVES; NO GROUP NOR SECTOR IS EXEMPT FROM ITS COMPASS. — [T]he
Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must
conform. It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the
principles upon which the State and the government are founded. Having the status
of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not
just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution is a
compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a
certain manner. Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all
the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector,
however distressed, is exempt from its compass. I submit, that all Filipinos, whether
indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its
all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any
existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions
spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State's implementation of policies
considered to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under
certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
3. ID.; R.A. NO. 8371 (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS ACT OF 1997); SECS. 3(a and
b), 5, 6, 7 (a and b), 8 AND OTHER RELATED PROVISIONS, CONTRAVENE REGALIAN
DOCTRINE. — RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities
and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily
enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and
promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development." Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute,
however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which
it claims origin and authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and
(b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic
foundation of the State's property regime. Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
more specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain,
minerals and natural resources - none of which, except agricultural lands, can be
alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural
land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. Mere possession or
utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private
properties. The presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, . . . all applicants in
land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the
applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the
proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions
of law other than factual evidence of possession and title."
4. ID.; ID.; CONTRAVENES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON ACQUISITION OF
ALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS. — Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution Filipino
citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land, whether by
purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares,
they may hold by lease only. RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to
ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere definitions, they could cover vast
tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed law cover
everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which
may no longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally
had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home
ranges of ICCs/ IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators." Already, as of
June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as
ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands. Based on
ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover
80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million
15
hectares of land in the country. This means that four fifths of its natural resources and one
third of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110
ICCs, while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have
to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of
a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos.
ACTaDH
5. ID.; ID.; ABDICATES DUTY OF STATE TO TAKE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that
"[t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities;
or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. Such
agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and
under terms and conditions as may be provided by law. But again, RA 8371 relinquishes
this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources
found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and
possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share
in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof. And they may exercise such
right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution, the
rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to
such period.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement
its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is
of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in
part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier,
et al.), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression
of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.
For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed
a Motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP
and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition
for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their
earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; TECcHA
"(2) Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
"(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which
are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2
Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners. 3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 4
These provisions are:
"(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition
of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely,
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples." 5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination."
They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President's power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6
Petitioners pray for the following:
16
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[i], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of
the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and
its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted
to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy
and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed
a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality
of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. DcaECT
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Yñares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled
"On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay,
Judge Richard Posner 1 wrote: 2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most
'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual,
custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority,
gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness
of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in
a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come
to terms with history." SHADcT

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced
radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural
resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without
considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our
history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to
our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources,
control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters
of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is
allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be
17
harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous
Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium. 3
This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura
regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first
introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with
respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in
order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those
places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what
may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish. DTIaCS
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to
the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those
who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed
of at our will." 4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all
lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish
Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions
to Spaniards, both military and civilian. 5 Private land titles could only be acquired from
the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.
6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of
1893. 7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to
the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by
previous orders and decrees. 8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory
of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.
9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-
time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the
subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased
the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the
plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the
administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse
possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code,
had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the
State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public
lands in the colonies." 10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special
laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if
so, to what extent was it recognized?" ADCEcI
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the
absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would
be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the
Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754. 11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those
lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or
by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might
be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the
king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person
had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all
the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities
named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had
good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is
apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length
of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them
without any action on the part of the authorities." 12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in
his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. 13 For those
lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such
lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title
deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. 14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered
the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication
of the Crown's instructions:
". . . to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the
date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not . . . cultivated or tenanted, may . . . appear and exhibit to said
subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. . . . .
Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of
their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just
and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and
they will be granted to others." 15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton
construed these regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and
executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no
better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under
the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner." 16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in
force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these
lands by prescription, without any action by the State." 17 Valenton had no rights
other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand,
was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial
secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of
public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title
deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in
Act No. 926." 18
18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; 19 and that the government's title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. 20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, 21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands. 22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law
was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges. 23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution,
Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No.
141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The
main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of
American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino
citizens and corporations. 24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act
496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496
placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is
said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachusetts Land Registration Act of 1898, 25
which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration
formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in
South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law
warrants or reserves. 26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system
highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation. 27 aSHAIC
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. 28 There was an overwhelming
sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. 29 State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. 30 The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land
and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. 31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of
Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"SECTION 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant. ScaEIT
xxx xxx xxx."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this
concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is
the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
— the right to develop lands and natural resources;
— the right to stay in the territories;
— the right in case of displacement;
— the right to safe and clean air and water;
— the right to claim parts of reservations;
— the right to resolve conflict; 32
— the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer,
if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of
the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration. 33
19
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment, 34 social justice and human rights, 35 the right to
preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies. 36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the
President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of
the ethnographic areas — Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island
groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern
and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. 37 The
NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino
which were merged under a revitalized structure. 38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When
still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial
powers. 39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for
review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years
and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages. 40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987
Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"SECTION 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples. — refer to a group
of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others,
who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial,
occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures,
became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the
time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present
state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or
who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains." SIcCEA
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who
inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been
displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands.
They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region — Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg,
Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan;
Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino,
Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III — Aetas.
3. In Region IV — Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon;
Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and
Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V — Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog,
and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur, Itom of Albay,
Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI — Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of
Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII — Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol. DcIHSa
7. In Region IX — the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga
del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X — Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the
Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental;
the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental, the
Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI — There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the
Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur, Mandaya of the Surigao
provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of
Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo,
Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del Sur and South
Cotabato.
10. In Region XII — Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal,
and Iranon. 43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early
as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely
by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. 44 The strains from these groups
eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant
influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese
and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millennium B.C. augmented these
ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of
Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the
religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society. 45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and
the cultivation of the soil. 46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine
communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically
common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout
the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The
generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored
similarities, not differences. 47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh. 48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form.
They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and
used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the
expression of their literary moods. 49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about
the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives. 50
They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of
the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity
whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the
environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the
moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as
something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to
their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the
object of nature. 51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from
the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these
20
shores. 52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to
one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato."
It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and
interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government.
He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of
war. 53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were
preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community.
54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to
time as the necessity arose. 55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas
Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1750 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of
Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. 56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt
with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and
punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose,
these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and
the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays
were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays
acted as arbiters. 57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land.
The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order
was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community.
Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the
instruments of production as a member of the barangay. 58 This ancient communalism
was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no
individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-
existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of
lands. 59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept
similar to those in land communities. 60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and
elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and
benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their
responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them with the
leadership and means of survival. 61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao.
The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas
represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic
groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. 62 The Sultanate
of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del
Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in
common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran.
The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no
provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land." 64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies
where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of
kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and profit. 65
Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and
governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and
separate communities. 66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One
of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all
scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion. 67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government
assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. 68 The Spaniards regarded
it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living
in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of
community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." 69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct
their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. 70 With
the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian
indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion,
to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the
Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and
civilization. 71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as
all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown
lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that
land grants were made to non-Filipinos. 72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the
concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish
colonial theory and law. 73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land. 74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and
religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs,
and divided them into three types. First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos,
who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the
Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.
75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by
the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The
Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes. 76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were
driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the
hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland
societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the
cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the
infieles, in effect, relative security. 77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to
colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly
evolved Christian community. 78 Their own political, economic and social systems
were kept constantly alive and vibrant. SIcEHD
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally
mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one
hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an
otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that
exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos. 79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt
the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North
American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised
to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs." 80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the
path of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as
one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." 81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-
Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a
geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities." 82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they
passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the
Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic
research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a
"special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the
bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological
interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable
materials about them. 83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The
raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
21
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more
rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the
non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and
permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic,
creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law
called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and
for this purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI). 84 The CNI was
given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-
independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation understood
in the context of a guardian-ward relationship. 85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance.
Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the
Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao. 86 Knowledge by the
settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of several
ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative and participation, this
titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were
also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development. 87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision: EHSIcT
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies." 88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural
minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to
as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was
given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be
considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies. President
Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on
National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups
that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the
rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community."
89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral
Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to
members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their
claims. 91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created
under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land
problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos. 92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000
Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam
project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land
bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the
National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately
40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur.
Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. 93 Timber concessions, water
projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national
government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also
to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment. 94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino
created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President. 95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and
domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland
areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central
administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs
that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population. 97 The kind of
response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to
their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode
their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral
to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older
base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the
patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The
economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and
mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction
of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life
portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept
constantly vibrant. 98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples existence. There is no
traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and
the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary
owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not
only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well. 99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land
except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere
stewards. 100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership,
which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are
related by blood or by marriage, 101 or ownership by residents of the same locality
who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership
under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly
collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are
engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden
farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and
burial grounds should be communally-owned. 102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a
common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to
the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also
sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are
governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the
individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not
possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.
103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is
strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden
financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops. 104 Moreover,
land to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-
member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the
ili. 105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The
concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as
inferior, if not inexistent. 106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved
R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a
consolidation of two Bills — Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125. SCIAaT
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier, 107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos.
1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide. 108 At the Second Regular
Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a
background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long
suffered from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority.
Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their
22
territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the
intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their
natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized.
And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement
of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early
years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our
system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the
government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy
titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."
109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for
the land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had
territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These
territories — the land — include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air,
plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as
indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-
cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and
depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples." 110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a
bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens
patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian
Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws"
and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This
exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:
". . . the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the
cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed
"native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent
cases." 111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D.
410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite
the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
". . . the executive department of government since the American occupation has not
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance,
its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early
years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive
resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs." cHECAS
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their
ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in
the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This
principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which
places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others,
are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in
favor and none against, with no abstention." 112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on
Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and
defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato. 113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorship speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that
would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and
ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the
indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be
preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters
seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the
aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year
2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land
was enunciated in Cariño v.Insular Government which recognized the fact that they
had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.
115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous
Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are
defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"SECTION 3 a) Ancestral Domains. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government
and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home
ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." THIcCA
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also
include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators. 116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are
not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots. 117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of
23
1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Angel Alcala. 118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by
special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims
(CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 119 The
guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation. 120 This means that
the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all
the activities pertinent thereto. 121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in
Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of
ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and
upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned. 122
The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous
corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in
accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the
ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). 124
CADTs and CALTs issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register
of Deeds in the place where the property is situated. 125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired
in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens
title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral
lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"SECTION 3 [1]. Native Title. — refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which,
as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been
held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." 126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim
of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to
have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also
include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. 127
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. 128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native
title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains
held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under
native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are
private. HcaDTE
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government 129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government. 130 Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court
146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land
had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his
grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father
cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot
custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document
issued from the Spanish Crown. 131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land
under the Spanish Mortgage Law. 132 The North American colonial government, however,
ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a
Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending,
a U.S. military reservation 133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter,
a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and
trespassers, including Cariño, off the land. 134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.
Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration
court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme Court 135
affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian
doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a
limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute
owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public
domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme
Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment
accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also,
that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the
United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow
that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that
Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide." 137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice
was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S.
law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept
of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives." 138
It was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of
1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in
the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North
American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy
land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the
islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By
the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691),
all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be
administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose
that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own.
The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides
that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted
from Section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in
the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or
that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of
which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association, — of the profoundest factors in human thought, — regarded as their
own." 139
The Court went further:
"[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case
24
like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant
the benefit of the doubt." 140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this
title is presumed to "never have been public land." CHEIcS
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in
the 1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that
the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in
Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any
royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all
"theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the
powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear
proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin
with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to
indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective
of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance,
Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and
others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm
those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the
characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to
exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books."
(Italics supplied). 141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as
to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own
would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but
simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It
was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been
deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees
and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely
because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution,
the court validated this kind of title. 142 This title was sufficient, even without government
administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes
explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper
on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain." 143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in
Baguio Municipality in his name. 144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it
upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the
Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to
which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made
his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it
does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted
and had not the power to enforce." 145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire
length of the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term
"native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor
at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law
School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal
entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law. 146 This article was made
after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country
and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws. 147 He discussed
Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as
discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case. aDSTIC
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native
title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño is conceptually similar to "aboriginal
title" of the American Indians. 148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch,
considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs
was consistently made in reference to native Americans. 149 This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro. 150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the
provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in
a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to
comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was
imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the
petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the
idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the
Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and
protecting the public forests in which they roamed. 151 Speaking through Justice
Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the
United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it
is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States. 152
xxx xxx xxx.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that
Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from
different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they
have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the
general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of
the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the
courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system.
Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes
in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States." 153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for
the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians. 154 It may be set apart by an
act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by
custom and prescription. 155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also
covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy." 156 The aboriginal right of
possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or
nation as their ancestral home; in the sense that such lands constitute definable
territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. 157 It is a right which
exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing
25
their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting
their boundaries. 158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they
have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The
earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title
was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh. 159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the
chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this
conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized
was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for
the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed
that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by
bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they
found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to
establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or
by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession. 160 The exclusion of all other
Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from
the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further
stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made
it. IcHSCT
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." 161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to
acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer — whether to
England, France, Spain or Holland — did this right belong and not to any other nation or
private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian
claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right,
the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal
as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her
subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land
from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an
absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a
title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete
ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of
acquiring that right." 162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves
the universal recognition of this principle. 163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands
without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.
164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia. 165 In this case, the State of
Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to
obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was
deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain
said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as
the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the
relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some
foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection
from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally
termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great
Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the
declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of
the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the
United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." 166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands
within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties
stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to
all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but
guaranteed by the United States. DTAcIa
xxx xxx xxx.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of
the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and
this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means
"a people distinct from others." . . . . 167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of
the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by
our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." 168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the
discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,
169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian
title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to
retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land.
The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land
— either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession — and in so doing,
extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because
it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of
Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the
ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves. 170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to
the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign — first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States
and the United States — a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian
right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection
of complete ownership. 171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes
"permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. 172 It is clear that this right of
occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. 173 It is
vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign,
26
possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will. 174 Thus,
aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and
continuous use and occupancy for a long time. 175 It entails that land owned by Indian
title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to
another sovereign government nor to any citizen. 176 Such title as Indians have to possess
and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual
Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the
property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership. 177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used
to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178
Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. 179 On
the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use
and occupation of a tribe of Indians. 180 Once set apart by proper authority, the
reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but
Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of,
them. 181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of
indigenous Americans. 182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized.
Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view,
certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.
183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at
present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited
authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians
over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as
successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized
as ownership by action authorized by Congress. 184 The protection of aboriginal title
merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal Government. 185
Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans'
ownership of these lands, 186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has
remained firmly entrenched. 187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred from asserting sovereignty over the
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. 188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any
similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-a-vis American Jurisprudence on
aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the
IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did
not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño
was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under
the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land
sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in
Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. 189 The land
ceases to be part of the public domain, 190 ipso jure, 191 and is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period. STHAaD
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands 192 that the court declared that the
rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or
grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property
even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the
provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of
acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this
long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years
both for ordinary citizens 194 and members of the national cultural minorities 195 that
converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens
certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is
Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further
strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-
owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is
that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public
agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"SECTION 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496 — Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall
have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are
hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years
from the approval of this Act." 196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not
domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial 197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act.
For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are
agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture
and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands
regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with
the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the
Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain. 198 Its provisions
apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" . . . "which have
not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law . . . or
which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so." 199 Act 496,
the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public
agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants
to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral
land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,
200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition. EDCTIa
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act
has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20)
years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on
National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral
lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four
categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will
render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of
the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of
sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. 201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the
applicability of customary laws . . . in determining the ownership and extent of
27
ancestral domain." 202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership
over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a
specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative
legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the
same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"SECTION 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall
have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person
shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him
for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in
the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent
application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the
provision of the Public Land Law. 203
xxx xxx xxx.
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] . . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof ." 204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public
agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at
least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse,
public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper
application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively
after which a torrens title is issued. DTIaCS
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to
all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines
ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the
Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under
Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the
owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the
thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the right to
consume the thing by its use, 206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even
destroy the thing owned, 207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing
owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. 208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title
but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the
indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:

"SECTION 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. — Indigenous concept of ownership
sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is
held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view
that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private
simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends
there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one
particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These
communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under
the Civil Code. 210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition
of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "[n]o co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of
customary law of the community but of the very community itself. 212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property,
much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a
maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any
single instance. 213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the
corporation. 214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or
involuntarily. 215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land
but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the
domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the
ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other
persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands
are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following
limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with
customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the
ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains," 216 the
IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept
that has long existed under customary law. 217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil
Code as a source of law. 218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that
custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. 219 In
other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities. 220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a
specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the
civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration. 221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title.
The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section
11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"SECTION 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. — The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is
"belongingness" to the land, being people of the land — by sheer force of having
sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land
by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land — the
28
possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for
man. 222
C. Sections 7(a), 7(b), and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"SECTION 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. — The rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
aSTAcH
a) Right of Ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right
to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories. — The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed
consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. . . .;
d) Right in Case of Displacement. — In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support systems: . . .;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants. — Right to regulate the entry of migrant
settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. — For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access
to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. — The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict. — Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the
complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever
necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"SECTION 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. — The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property. — Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption. — In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property
rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is
tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable
consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same
within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains
which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of
ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case
of displacement, (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe
and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as
reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the
ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or
property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in
keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral
lands, but not to domains. TECcHA
2 . The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the
Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural
Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural
resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution." 223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources — waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources — are owned by the
State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization
of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may
undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production. joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
29
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility
in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may
directly undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow
participation by the private sector through co-production, 224 joint venture, 225 or
production-sharing agreements. 226 These agreements may be for a period of 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these
resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the
President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-
owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale 227 and small-scale mining. 228 "Small-
scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple
implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." 229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their
ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and
limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"SECTION 7.a) Right of ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It
will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in
the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other
natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership
under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and
all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
as belonging to the State. AECcTS
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a)
complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of
Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA 230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"SECTION 1. Rights of Ownership. — ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters,
and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the
ancestral domains/lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the
fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to
recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right
to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated
consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands,
waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare
that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land. 231 The IPRA itself
makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right
of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of
the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later,
do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general. 232 Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of
"natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed
Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7
(b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"SECTION 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section
56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary
laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; DTEScI
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights." 233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them
for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and
utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the
purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation
measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions
over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the
purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation
measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in
the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the
same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within
their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the
"utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment
pursuant to national and customary laws. 234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-
scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of
forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who
exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." 235 Section 7
(b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources
and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which
duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
30
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"SECTION 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. — The ICCs/IPs shall have
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be
allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a
period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five
(25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the
ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process,
has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial
powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same
contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural
resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The
terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not
merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology
other than manual labor. 236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural
resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal written
agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the
natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority
rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of
priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this
entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself
chooses. TaDAHE
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the
said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the
State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the
provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the
State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are
found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement
with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member
of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or
allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State
decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the
agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral
domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by
itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2)
it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with
them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may
allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does
not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several
options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is
nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale
development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake
such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State
does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation.
Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual
occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these
resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by
the following provision:
"SECTION 59. Certification Precondition. — All departments and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing
or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing
agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a
field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the
free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided,
further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or
-controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally,
That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this
Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation
of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject
of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP
certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been
conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs
obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the
right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government
agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be
issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any
ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other
agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or
license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has
been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural
resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that
are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply. SHTEaA
V . THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism
stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus
during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa
brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies.
Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on
Human Rights. 238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to
the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New
Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and
during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people
of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international
indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out
successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and
they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.
240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international
scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing
disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous
peoples' environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal
with the situation. 241 Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the
international agenda. 242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for
example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of
projects in Latin America. 243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy
on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model
for the projects of the Asian Development Bank. 244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and
31
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national
unity and development. 245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with
the international category of IPs, 246 and is heavily influenced by both the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries" 248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. 249 ILO
Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO
No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate
to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of
these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development. 250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and
religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine
government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in
origin or derivation. 251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the
alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories
and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are
vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA that an
attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths
and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the
evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed
democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of
continuing democratization, 253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land
laws in our national legal system. EHSTcC
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
VITUG, J.:
An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when
it shows itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the
propriety of the specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may
ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived as good and inevitable
justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the Court.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court's adjudication
must have a personal and substantial interest in the dispute; 1 indeed, the developing
trend would require a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to
be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke
judicial power. 2 The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
warrant his invocation of the Court's jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise
of the Court's remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that
power can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that
may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and
consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exists, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation, 3 the Court must take
the liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as
citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. 4 This Court thus did
so in a case 5 that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until an
exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from
the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be
considered to be of overriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its
significance to the nation and its people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic
Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"),
enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently
intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity
and development" 6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs," to protect the rights
of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being. 7
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral
domains" to embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources" including "ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and
control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains
covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would
comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-
governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of
the law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which
would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control
and use lands and natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws;"(par. b); the right to stay in the territories
(par. c); the right to return to their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par.
d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of
ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land
conflicts in accordance primarily with customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section
57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the
context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not
an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country
and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State." 8
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other
specific mandates in the 1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," were derived largely from the
report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other
Natural Resources. 9 According to the Committee report, among the principles upon
which these provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forests and other
natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and
should thereby "be presented for those under the sovereign authority of the Nation
and for their posterity." 10 The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention
were of the unanimous view that the "policy on natural resources, being
fundamental to the nation's survival should not be left to the changing mood of the
lawmaking body." 11
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, thus expresses this regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial
doctrine of the new, that all lands and natural resources belong to the state other
than those which it recognizes to be of private ownership. Except for agricultural
lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and
mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources, of the country must remain
with the state, the exploration, development and utilization of which shall be
subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development and utilization. 12
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government,
13 holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a
claim of private ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to
downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override the collective
32
will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and
from them that all government authority emanates. 14 It is not then for a court ruling or
any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former
to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to
provide "for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement
as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws
shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily
provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide Jr.,
has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Convention, thus:
"Mr. Davide. . . . Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights
or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is
concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to
Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the
codification of these customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now
mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We leave it to Congress to
determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to
whatever may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the
horse." 15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the
customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make
them part of, the stream of laws. The "due process clause," as I so understand it in Tañada
vs. Tuvera 16 would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it is
permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to
become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them
correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-
examine the law. Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of Indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail a balancing of interest
between their specific needs and the imperatives of national interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land . . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race
own the land because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of
every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much more man? Man is born to live.
Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives.
And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not
merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be
nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian to all
his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs . . . life.
— Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal
Filipinos" in Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World
Bank Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony
with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. 1 The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 2
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed
in view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these
provisions should take into account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to the
constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples be recognized and
protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and
therefore, their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned
"Indians" of the United States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand
and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous
peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the
promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community realized the
injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment among
the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and most
comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994.
Among the rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories
and even the resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or
damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples. TaDSHC
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning
"within." In the sense the term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the
Latin word indigenus, which means "native." 3 "Indigenous" refers to that which
originated or has been produced naturally in a particular land, and has not been
introduced from the outside. 4 In international law, the definition of what
constitutes "indigenous peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition
of the term "indigenous peoples" has been adopted by the United Nations (UN),
although UN practice has been guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of
UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo: 5
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sections of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns,
social institutions and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period
reaching into the present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a
tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood,
life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the
habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main,
preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
(f) Other relevant facts. 6
In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those
groups of Filipinos who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-
Conquest culture. 7 Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the
indigenous peoples, characterized them as "uncivilized," 8 "backward people," 9
with "barbarous practices" 10 and "a low order of intelligence." 11
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now
employs the politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous
cultural communities" as follows:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. — refer to a group of
people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common
bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which
inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present
33
State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or
who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains . . . .
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already
plowing our soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who
were the original inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native
culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American regime,
12 these native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their lands.
Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao,
the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands, the lands of
their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our
national culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial
rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible distinction between the
cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities. 13 The extant Philippine national
culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign
cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. 14 While the culture of
the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has
retained its essentially native character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around
twelve million Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural
communities, 15 accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated
seventy million Filipinos 16 in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the
poorest sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among
them is significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples are also
among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of
law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any,
voice in national politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less
fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people
empowerment and social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors
of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law
several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous
peoples, to wit:
SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within
the framework of national unity and development. 17
SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. 18
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
property and its increments. 19
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other
natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands. 20
SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It
shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. 21
SECTION 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on
policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which
shall come from such communities. 22
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It
provides, among others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development,
protect their rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains. 23 Moreover, IPRA
enumerates the civil and political rights of the indigenous peoples; 24 spells out
their social and cultural rights; 25 acknowledges a general concept of indigenous
property right and recognizes title thereto; 26 and creates the NCIP as an
independent agency under the Office of the President. 27
Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of
an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon
in order to decide the case. 28
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. 29
The threshold issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the
exercise of judicial review in the present case.
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both
ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not
conjectural or anticipatory, 30 or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or
feigned constitutional problems. 31 A petition raising a constitutional question does
not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power.
Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term
"controversy" is the presence of opposing views or contentions. 32 Otherwise, the
Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lack
such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash
of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation
embracing conflicting and demanding interests. 33 The controversy must also be
justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. 34
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A
law has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved.
Money has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been
directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we
should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of
the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication
of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources.
Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged
unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and
prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the
constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. 35 Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and
taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result
only in a "generalized grievance." 36 Yet, in a sense, all citizen's and taxpayer's suits
are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the
allocation of power. 37
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing. 38
The proper party requirement is considered as merely procedural, 39 and the Court
has ample discretion with regard thereto. 40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case
of Severino vs. Governor General 41 held:
. . . [W]hen the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator
must show some personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is
regarded as the real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the
other hand, when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded
as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
34
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws. 42
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at
large, may also be the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that
a private citizen may enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein
that:
. . . [T]he right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of
any other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which
he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or
different from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as
distinguished from a private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified
electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would suffer the same
injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining a petition
whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted. 43
In Tañada v. Tuvera, 44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be
informed of matters of public concern.
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments, 45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or
consulted on matters of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran, 46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." 47 Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners
— the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. 48
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is
not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the
guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without
distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit
to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony
strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity
and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen's suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that
a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the
implementation of an unconstitutional statute, 49 and by necessity, he may assail the
validity of a statute appropriating public funds. 50 The taxpayer has paid his taxes and
contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the
proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose
of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 51
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79
authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that "the amount necessary to
finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the current year's
appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the "ONCC") and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC")," 52 which were merged as organic
offices of the NCIP. 53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayer's suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said
entity or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 55
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing
the challenged provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed
DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They
further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to
control and supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the
questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection
therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to
compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural
resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy for the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the
Court assumes jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues
raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that
should initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes
through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or
those of first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate
court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the
administration of justice. ADaSET
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts.
Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and
the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, 56 such concurrence does not give a party
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court's primary
jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify such invocation. 57 We held in People v. Cuaresma 58 that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket . . . . 59 (Italics supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its
impact upon the lives not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of
all Filipinos cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest
opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason is
compelling enough to allow petitioners' invocation of this Court's jurisdiction in the
first instance.
Substantive Issues
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves
around the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a),
3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
35
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership 60
over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title. 61 The term "ancestral
lands" under the statute refers to lands occupied by individuals, families and clans who are
members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are required to have
been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or through their ancestors "since time
immemorial, continuously to the present." 62 On the other hand, "ancestral domains" is
defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural
communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of
indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral
domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein. 63 Again,
the same are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present." 64 Under Section 56,
property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and respected."
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to
ancestral lands, ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The
fundamental question is, who, between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the
rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation,
of the fundamental law. 65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is
assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations.
Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a
valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 66
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public
domain and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive
dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the
Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law
upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to
the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private
titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is
the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists.
However, petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the
public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues
that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus,
cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such
native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the
Constitution to protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2,
Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners,
the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and
constitutional mandate of Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the
State, petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public
domain and other natural resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia
is understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has
been regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine
land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been
recognized by the Court. 67
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to
some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the
American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief
that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted
because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from
nowhere. 68
In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights, 69 or those rights
which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. 70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right
which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or
propriedad. 71 These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the
sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the
King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to
hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. 72 By
fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the
true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. 73 The theory of jura
regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. 74
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular
Government 75 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision 76 of the
pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
. . . Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case
like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. . . . . 77
(Italics supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to
land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his
name of an ancestral land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and
his ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as far they
could remember. He also proved that they had all been recognized as owners, the
land having been passed on by inheritance according to native custom. However,
neither he nor his ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The
government opposed the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura
regalia. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the applicant was
36
entitled to the registration of his native title to their ancestral land.
Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the
U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction. 78 We applied the Cariño
doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 79 where we stated that "[a]ll
lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the
Spanish conquest." 80
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Cariño was premised on
the fact that the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription,
having established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral
land applied for by Cariño was transferred from the State, as original owner, to Cariño by
virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for decreeing
"by mere legislative fiat . . . that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous
peoples] without judicial confirmation." 81
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public
domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only
to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public
domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership
of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State.
Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its
possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-
interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of
title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State
involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native
title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have
been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title under Cariño
applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks under the Constitution 82 is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño doctrine
because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public
domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and
occupation thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it
entered into with Portugal, 83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were
considered as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples. 84 The discovery
and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only members
of the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said continents were
deemed sufficient to create title under international law. 85
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did
not mean that it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws
of Spain, the Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over the
unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands. 86
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the
natives of their property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish
King to do no harm to the natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the
early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging
opportunity to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his
written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II
envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could
have been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco
de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King instructed Legazpi to inform
the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons or to their
property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and
"to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although
the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if attacked, the royal instructions
admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might arouse
native hostility. 87
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including
native land occupancy. 88 Thus, the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias expressly
conferred ownership of lands already held by the natives. 89 The royal decrees of
1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier
royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in "unlawful possession of
royal lands" must legalize their possession by means of adjustment proceedings, 90
and within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894,
otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared that titles that were capable of
adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment was not
sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it was held in
the case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not be construed as
confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such
title. 91
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the
United States, contrary to petitioners' assertion that the US merely succeeded to
the rights of Spain, including the latter's rights over lands of the public domain. 92
Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did
not impair any right to property existing at the time. 93 During the American
colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine
Bill of 1902 provided that property and rights acquired by the US through cession
from Spain were to be administered for the benefit of the Filipinos. 94 In obvious
adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley's Instructions, as well as the Philippine
Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the US
Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every
division and branch of the American colonial government in the Philippines, 95 was
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." 96 These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn
expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly,
property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral
domains were firmly established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct
act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935 Constitution." 97 He
advances the following arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power
to restructure the consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State.
Through the mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has
wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been held that the State may
impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential
to but determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite
havoc in the established social system. . . .
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural
resources that have been found from generation to generation to be critical to the
survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State. 98
Stated simply, the Solicitor General's argument is that the State, as the source of all
titles to land, had the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title
to all lands, including ancestral lands and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor
General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair vested rights, he
reasons out that even vested rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police
power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the
Solicitor General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any
misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State." 99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence," including those which are not part of
the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for
37
constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the
preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated
otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean
that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that the landowners were
divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of the
natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and
existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the
diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the
public domain and other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected
must, perforce, include the right of ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and domains. The words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual meaning,
100 and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution 101 to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under
IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the
Congress, 102 since such recognition and protection amount to the alienation of lands of
the public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense,
the term "right" refers to any legally enforceable claim. 103 It is a power, privilege, faculty
or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another. 104 When used in relation
to property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just and legal claim
to hold, use and enjoy it. 105 Said provision in the Constitution cannot, by any reasonable
construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over such
ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its
constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections
7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral lands. TECcHA
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide
for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision,
does Congress have the power to decide whether ancestral domains shall be private
property or part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the power to determine
whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found
therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution
did not intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private
property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private
property, and that customary laws shall merely determine whether such private
ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or
clans within the community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and
Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, Jr., then members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, is instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either
Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL
PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS
OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain,"
because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the extent thereof which determine the
property rights or relations arising therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed
amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights or relations which shall be
used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain. I
assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws
on property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to
Congress to make the necessary exception to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of
such a customary law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the
ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is
the ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and
relations arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may
have a different provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding suggestions
also by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.

MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There
would be ownership based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And
the thinking expressed in the consultation is that this should be codified and should
be recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the concept.
106 (Italics supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from
the following exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we
thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or community ownership or of private
ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as
ownership by private individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the
State will set aside the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within
the ancestral domain it could accept more specific ownership in terms of individuals
within the ancestral lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Italics
supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never
expressly mentioned Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the
concept of native title to land, or that they were unaware of native title as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia. 108 The framers of the Constitution, as well
as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial
doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take
these doctrines into consideration in construing the Constitution. 109
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are
considered as private property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or
acknowledging such ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the
constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the
Constitution to mean "as subject to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution," which vests in the State ownership of all lands of the public domain,
mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners
maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the
declarations made in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of
conservation and nationalization of lands of the public domain and natural
resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and patrimony.
A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that
the framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the provisions of this
Constitution" mainly to prevent the impairment of Torrens titles and other prior
rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral
domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral
lands. How does this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we
did say that in cases where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights,
these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that
parts of Baguio City are considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in
one of the publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be
considered as ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of Cordillera but
not in relation to certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered
38
as ancestral land?
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that
Filipinos can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the
right of a particular person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110
Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the
framers of the Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of
the indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section
2 of the same Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution
must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole
Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision. That
construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument. 111
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands
and other natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof
which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth
hereinbefore, 112 include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article
XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities
and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good;
Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to
their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize,
respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing
the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth. 113 Equity is given
prominence as the first objective of national economic development. 114 The framers of
the Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs," intend to establish a hierarchy of
constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or
to create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the
balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide's formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The
State, SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or tribal communities to
their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural well-being." There are at
least two concepts here which receive different weights very often. They are the concepts
of national development policies and programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal
communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to ask: When the
Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this
because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the
interest of national development policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know
which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands or is it national development policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount.
The concept introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to
attain. We have to balance the interests taking into account the specific needs and the
specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we did so in the
autonomous regions. 115 (Italics supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the natural
resources within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the
public domain and other natural resources, 116 as well as the State's full control
and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources. 117 Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a),
118 5, 119 and 7 120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
which states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State." 121 They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of
IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral
domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership over these
resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the
extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards
and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part
of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a
yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does
not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the
indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind,
important to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties
outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process. The mere
fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources
found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as
private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section
3(a) cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over
the natural resources simply because it recognizes ancestral domains as their
"private but community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the
indigenous peoples' concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in
the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership" is the "independent and general power of a
person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the limits established
thereby." 122 The civil law concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus
utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or
the right to consume the thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate,
encumber, transform and even destroy that which is owned and jus vidicandi or the
right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing owned. 123 In
contrast, the indigenous peoples' concept of ownership emphasizes the importance
of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character of
ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed"
124 because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not
merely the individual member. 125
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the
indigenous peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference
committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their
ancestral domains, to wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8 126 rights to ancestral domain, this is
where we transferred the other provision but here itself —
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to make a very short
Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on
natural resources because we all agree that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or
the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could
be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little
protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should
be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction
because this has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there
could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just propose a provision for
incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be
compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are
already considered in subsequent sections which we are now looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the
indigenous people where they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a
39
need for prior consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is on the record
that you want to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my
assurance is that it is already there and I will make sure that they cross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate
version you do not have and if you agree we will adopt that. 127 (Italics supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples
over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim
ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous
peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which
enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found
within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural
resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples' rights and welfare in
relation to the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, 128 including the
preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous
peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural
resources located therein are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not
been recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v.
Fianza 129 in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld
in this jurisdiction. 130 They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural resources to
vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935
Constitution." 131 However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to
the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to natural
resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership
of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902. IAEcCa
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land
by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged
and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no
similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The unique value of natural
resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for its
consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the
Spanish regime up to the present. 132 Natural resources, especially minerals, were
considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars
against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever
these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the separability of title
over lands and that over minerals which may be found therein. 133
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for
its nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter's
cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens
to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral
lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to
the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting
minerals within his property. 134 Although the United States made a distinction between
minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was
in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it
necessary to maintain the State's ownership over natural resources to insure their
conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country
through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would
become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security
and independence. 135
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources
in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973 136 and 1987 Constitutions. 137
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains
belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the
NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the
lands and not to the natural resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. —
The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The
secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of the Interior and Local Government, and
Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation,
and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be
notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction
previously claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under
the administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of
Agrarian Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral
lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain following the
procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government
agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless,
the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies
are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State,
which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State, through
the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine
that all natural resources are owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and
conserve the natural resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and
share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources.
138 The statute also grants them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains.
139 Before the NCIP can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any
concession, license or lease, or for the perfection of any production-sharing
agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples concerned
must be obtained. 140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the responsibility
to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains or portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation. 141
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and
dominant role in the utilization of our country's natural resources. Petitioners, on
the other hand, allege that under the Constitution the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources may only be undertaken by the State, either
directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements. 142 To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution.
They likewise submit that by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives them control over the use
and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the State. 143
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full
control and supervision of the State, which may directly undertake such activities or
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. This
provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken
interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than
the foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution must be regarded as consistent with
itself throughout. 144 No constitutional provision is to be separated from all the
others, or to be considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the fundamental law. 145
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the
Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress
may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. 146
Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of
natural resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. 147
Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to protect the rights of
subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources. 148
Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor
philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the
Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement, 149 cannot be construed as a
prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the
State's direct participation.
40
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources under existing laws, 150 the State
retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale basis 151 or
otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources
under Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing
laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral land be
declared as a people's small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous peoples
living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining
contracts. 152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining
operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned 153
and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community give their
consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to them by
the parties to the mining to the contract. 154
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the
indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following:
"to manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; to
an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and
to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights."
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section
7(b) pertains only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers
only to the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the
purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit. 155 The
exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the entire
process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources which under
the Constitution belong to the State.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the
utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does
not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of preference or first
consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with
due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in
the grant of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by
government entities. Several factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent
and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the environment and on the
indigenous peoples' way of life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous
peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position to
undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a
blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said
natural resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing
laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these
resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from
undertaking activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with private entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located
within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as between the State and the
indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the
interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous
peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority
granted by the proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership
rights of the State over the natural resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the
utilization of natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article
XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine
and fishing resources, both inland and offshore."
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural
environment as well as the traditional activities of the indigenous peoples therein.
Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before
any search for or utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral domains
is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such
activities, IPRA requires that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples
be obtained. The State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult the indigenous
peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that
national development policies and programs should involve a systematic
consultation to balance local needs as well as national plans. As may be gathered
from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this point, the national
plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the region after thorough
consultation. 156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom without
their free and prior informed consent. 157 As to non-members, the prior informed
consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous
peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters
into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino
citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and
regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy, 158 the Environmental
Impact System, 159 the Local Government Code 160 and the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 161 already require increased consultation and participation of
stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with
significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the
indigenous peoples must be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for
the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the
perfection of any production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a
grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such
concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law is to protect the rights and
interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely affected by the
operation of such entities or licensees.
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
deprived the equal protection of the laws."
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that
the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates
the due process clause. 162 Petitioners' contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads:
SECTION 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. — Property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall
be recognized and protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights
of indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities.
Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the
vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral
domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by
individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no
distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The
IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they
pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not
41
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 163 What IPRA only requires is that these
"property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens
titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes
strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land,
whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. 164 With regard to ancestral
domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural
community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the
Ancestral Domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO;
fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the
final report of the ADO. 165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an
ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first,
application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the
ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the
ADO. 166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords
no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP 167 and the application of customary law, 168 violate the due
process clause of the Constitution. IECcaA
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of indigenous peoples, 169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples, 170 including even disputes between a
member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in
the delineation of ancestral domains. 171 Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that
the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely
contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a
member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one
who is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a
suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 172
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied
first in disputes involving property, succession and land, 173 and that such laws shall
likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples. 174 They assert that "[w]hen
the dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is
not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial
of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what
these customary laws are." 175
Petitioners' concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of
the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be
so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person's possession of
the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots.
In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-
indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its
quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable
to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of
procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of
the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not
absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. 176 The IPRA prescribes the
application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution acceptable to
the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is
supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and
lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary
disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary
laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be
heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Italics supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, 177
where all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples, 178 specifically,
of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a
dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples
involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not
required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary
law in disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved
are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the
constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation
passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this
jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is
proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence, 179 and it is not contrary to law,
public order or public policy. 180 Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991
calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of
issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of
customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays
where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples. 181
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe
upon the President's power of control over the Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx xxx xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect
the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency
under the Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the
NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous
relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall
be carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day
administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the
discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control
of the President over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President as "lateral but autonomous . . . for purposes of policy and
program coordination."
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the
Implementing Rules characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the
Office of the President, such characterization does not remove said body from the
President's control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs
to promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and the
recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto. 182 It has been
granted administrative, 183 quasi-legislative 184 and quasi-judicial powers 185 to
carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP's functions renders it
impossible to place said agency entirely under the control of only one branch of
government and this, apparently, is the reason for its characterization by Congress
as an independent agency. An "independent agency" is defined as an administrative
body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of
42
department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or an administrative body
whose action is subject to administrative review or revision. 186
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all
instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, 187 like
those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was
placed by Congress "under the office of the President" and, as such, is still subject to the
President's power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution 188 with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the
following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President's approval in obtaining loans to finance
its projects; 189 (2) it must obtain the President's approval for any negotiation for funds
and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever form and from whatever
source; 190 (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to
the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples; 191
and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President. 192 The
President is also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP 193 as well as
to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any
indigenous community. 194
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8)
affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by
virtue of native title do not diminish the State's ownership of lands of the public domain,
because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to
have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs. Insular
Government; 195
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other
natural resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the
IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found
within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the
allocation and utilization of the same, as well as priority rights in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control over the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said
rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions
for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 196 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. 197 Moreover, the rights granted
to indigenous peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral
domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid laws;
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their
ancestral lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of ownership lands
or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the ancestral lands and domains;
198
(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections
40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition
of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary law in certain disputes involving
indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not
mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is
sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent
agency under the Office of the President does not infringe upon the President's power of
control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, since said provision as well as
Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and
therefore under the President's control and supervision with respect to its administrative
functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the
NLRC and the SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain
of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to
seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea
that the questions raised are of "transcendental importance."

The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and
controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law
for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or
punishment of wrongs. 1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a
property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to
demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement
of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the
law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case will thus not conclude or
bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court the
question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot be
executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity
of the provisions of the law in question. 2
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the
Constitution to determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is
confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that,
in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins
with the phrase "all cases. . . ."
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there
has been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give
the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude
courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of
certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, 3 in which
this Court, adopting the submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the
following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further
than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public
safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but
that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the
opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve
actual cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the
three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only
to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would
be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the
constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can
question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional.
Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates
in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine
permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him
it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its
face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling"
effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a
provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity
unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a
declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is
not only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating
abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather
than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the
Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and
is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it
cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.
Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners will be a "galling cop out" 4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone
43
isolationism." 5 To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or
a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison 6 to hold
that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace of
the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie,
because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the
United States Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the
court's jurisdiction is mainly appellate.
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial
review, and so that there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country
have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII, §1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result
either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking and
legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the decisions 7 of this Court.
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is
not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government
whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed
to be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in
the Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented." 8 For
the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. 9 Until,
therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the
presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General,
10 reiterated in Tañada v. Tuvera, 11 that "when the question is one of public right and
the object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws." On the
basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to bring these
proceedings. 12
In Severino v. Governor General, 13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel
the Governor General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so.
The ruling was that he did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus
was issued in Tañada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit,
because the public has a right to know and the failure of respondents to publish all
decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed petitioners in
danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right is there
for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in
common with other citizens?
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted
handling of the procedural or preliminary Issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have
shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of
transcendental importance, 1 which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by
the highest court of the land. 2 Further, I am satisfied that the various aspects of this
controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by the parties. Moreover,
prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies 3 to address the problems raised by
petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral
arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling
copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.
Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework
With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia's resolution of the two main
substantive issues, which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that
Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA)
of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as —
1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain,
waters, . . . and other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I respectfully reject
the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not public lands and have
never been owned by the State." Such sweeping statement places substantial portions of
Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond the
collective reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties
constitute a third of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of
the nation's natural wealth.
2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the
"exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources," which the
Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the
State."
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the
provisions of this Constitution." 4 I concede that indigenous cultural communities
and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the
beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to
the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have
less in life, Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our
marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the
Constitution must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to
the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to
equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize
perpetual inequality of access to the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's
imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority
of this Court — the constitution of the Philippines. ESCTaA
The Constitution Is a Compact
My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to
which all other laws must conform. 5 It is the people's quintessential act of
sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the State and the government
are founded. 6 Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks
for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at
intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens
of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner. 7 Truly, the Philippine
Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern themselves.
No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its
compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted
pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and
promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development." 8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute,
however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which
it claims origin and authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and
(b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine — the basic
foundation of the State's property regime.
Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be
Alienated or Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the
"conquest" of our country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire
earthly territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the
Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or
exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources.
By royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon
the showing of (1) a title deed; or (2) ancient possession in the concept of owner,
according to which a title could be obtained by prescription. 9 Refusal to abide by
the system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment or waiver of
ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the
United States. The latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded
to the property rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the US Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the
"free and open . . . exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in
which they are found." 10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to
own, exploit and dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining
patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935
when it crafted and ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution
44
embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging to the
State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources. 11
Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the
further exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who
might be entitled to undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision
reads:
"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8
and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state:
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources.
Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish
workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially
impelled by the desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos
themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers
decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with
the conservation of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino
posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as
follows: "[T]he natural resources, particularly the mineral resources which
constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not only to the generation then but
also to the succeeding generation and consequently should be conserved for them."
12
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
all forces of energy and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State,
the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural resources.
Their disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted
only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The
present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land
classifications and expressly states that only agricultural lands of the public domain
shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision: 13
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. . . . ."
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that
all ancestral domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that
these properties — including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found
therein — are private and have never been part of the public domain, because they
have belonged to the indigenous people's ancestors since time immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the
Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike
the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or
concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because
of the State's implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all
those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of
ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 14 this Court said that once minerals are found even
in private land, the State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and
may not be used by any private person, including the registered owner, for any
other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such owner would be
entitled to just compensation for the loss sustained.
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC, 15 the Court clarified that while mining
claim holders and patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and
enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of
ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws
was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine
political history cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it
may be. The perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be
remedied by conceding the nation's resources to their exclusive advantage. They
cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws.
For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs
cannot now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their
concept of "native title" thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of
Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity
to enjoy the country's resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does
45
not grant ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it
recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain." 16 I say, however,
that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a provision
that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares
that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State"; and
"with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated."
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 17 the Court declared as belonging to the public
domain all lands not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under
laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory
information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al. 18 differentiate the concept of ownership of
ICCs/IPs from that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain
that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair
synthesis of these refers to '. . . the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control . . .,
a collective right to freely use the particular territory . . . [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that
preserves the property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit
of its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however,
still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its
enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of
private respondents' claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and
lands to the pre-Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands
and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-
based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups' ownership claims:
limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use — not ownership — of
ancestral domains, then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution
is IPRA's Section 57 19 — without the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) —
insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting
natural resources within ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must
fail. Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but
in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn
duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution — not to dilute, circumvent or create
exceptions to them.
Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution
In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government 20 has been modified or
superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as
referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I
must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to
the natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, 21 a Decision handed
down after our three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority
member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c). 22 The reason was that the
property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the
solicitor general's following statements:
"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of
law involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is
to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions
do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973
Constitution states that 'with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated.' The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that 'with
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.'"
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court also stated that "forest land is
incapable of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the
defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not
lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land
is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being
void ab initio."

RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains
The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the
natural resources found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the
very wording of the law belies this statement.
Section 3 (a) 24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement . . . . It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds . . . bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources . . . ." (Italics ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs
encompass the natural resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees
recognition and protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such
domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds
that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's private but community property which
belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed."
Simply put, the law declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources
found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed.
Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds
perpetual exclusivity. This means that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral
domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own any part
thereof. DaACIH
On the other hand, Section 3 (b) 25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to
"lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial . . ., under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, . . . including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the
right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such
ownership need not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession
since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, more specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the
public domain, minerals and natural resources — none of which, except agricultural
lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-
agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. 26 Mere
possession or utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert
them into private properties. 27 The presumption is that "all lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, . . .
all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title,
or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements,
or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title." 28
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections
3 are merely definitions and should not be construed independently of the other
provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a
word or word group." 29 It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person
defined. 30 Thus, after defining a term as encompassing several items, one cannot
thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one or more
of the enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people
who would be bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral
domains as including the natural resources found therein and further states that
ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural
resources.
In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these
ancestral domains, with no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this
46
theory directly contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention further
disregards international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the
law of the land. 31
No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371
Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than
12 hectares of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than
that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In
fact, by their mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The
properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
[them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as
they have used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back
to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use
enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic
ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land, several
thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on
compounded or consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what
their forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our country." 32 They trace
their right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient
sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that have become part of Mindanao.
This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral lands. 33
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs
as ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands. 34 Based on
ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80
percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares
of land in the country. 35 This means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third
of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,
36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have
to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of
a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos.
RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter
into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. 37 Such agreements,
however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of
ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found within their territories are concerned.
Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the
natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the
utilization thereof. 38 And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-
ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like
period. 39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and
utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources, 40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the
State. Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the
State's power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national
patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.
I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale
utilization of natural resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no
objection. These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA
8371 — (1) ownership of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources
therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and utilization
of such resources — I believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues
petitioners have brought up:
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains
amounts to undue deprivation of private property
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA
8371.
||| (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385
(Resolution), [December 6, 2000], 400 PHIL 904-1115)

2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants

3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies
and other forms of exaction

4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the
settlements of disputes over their rights and claims

5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of

Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses

6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against
their will

I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered
academic or, at least, no longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my
contention that the two major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional
premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to
await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by specific
provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain."

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the
rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national
development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and
society. This does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights
that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede
giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their
ancestral lands and domains. 41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of
the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens
who have chosen to live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would
be not only unjust but also subversive of the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively

mandating "reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be
doing so at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted
and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term,
fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order
to coddle the few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just
society be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the
injured. Nor can the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit
of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of
opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful
from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice —
empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus,
equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.

47
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 167707. October 8, 2008.]
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL
TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO,
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y.
SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.
[G.R. No. 173775. October 8, 2008.]
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION,
petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J p:
At stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered
the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition
for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 3 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants 4 who live in the bone-
shaped island's three barangays. 5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, 6 which identified
several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. 7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1801 8 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
PTA Circular 3-82 9 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
CTHaSD
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian,
Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
48
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest", which was
not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705
or the Revised Forestry Code, 11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed
by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable
and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. ASIETa
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island;
(2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees;
(3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes. 12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands
in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution
upon submission of their respective memoranda. 13
The RTC took judicial notice 14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in
Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. 15 The titles were
issued on August 7, 1933. 16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a
fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated
to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the
manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent
Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a
title to the land. CITcSH
SO ORDERED. 17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. 18 The
Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. 19 The trial court cited Sections 87 20
and 53 21 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the
forest reserve. 22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows: cADEHI
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court. 24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. 25 Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 26 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred
twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. ITECSH
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, 27 Wilfredo Gelito, 28
and other landowners 29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. 30 They allege
that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay
since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. 31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. 32 Thus, their possession in the
concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition. HEcaIC
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. 34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR
AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705? HcTSDa
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
49
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657. IHCacT
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? 35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve
their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. DCIEac
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b)
Proclamation No. 1801 38 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064
39 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive
acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands
of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber. 40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, 41 giving the government great
leeway for classification. 42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. 43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated. 44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never
been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain. cCTIaS
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. 45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. 46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. 47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will
be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest
of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown. 50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the
Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893.
The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims. 52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law 53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of
legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth
in said decree. 54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
possessory information title, 55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the
date of its inscription. 57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected
one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. 58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded
on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant;
(2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment
title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or
possessory information title. 59
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902. 60 By this law, lands of
the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). 62 It also provided the
definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands". 63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v.
Insular Government: 64 THADEI
. . . In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . . 65
(Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by
which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system. 66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and
made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the
nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the
public domain. 67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding
July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited
the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July
26, 1894, was required. 69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on
December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands, 70 and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State. 71
Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942, 72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, 73
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. 74
The issuance of PD No. 892 75 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. 76 Under the decree, all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands 77 shall be governed by Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. TAcSaC
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws
relative to registration of property. 78 It governs registration of lands under the
Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. 79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
50
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, 80
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. 81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to
those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified." 82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 83 To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 84 There must still be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. 86 aITECA
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 87
Ankron and de Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) 88 and de
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909). 89 These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 90
Private claimants' reliance on Ankron and de Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not
have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely
provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the
public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural
depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had
no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At
that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases,
or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence. 91 This was the Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols Vda. de Palanca v. Republic, 92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:
. . . Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by
an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the
cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
HCDaAS
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public
Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which
there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines
the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or
were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence. 93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in
Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and
alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those
already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly
inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
aESIDH
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases
dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of
imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of
the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by
virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land
was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral
or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted
in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or
another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or
has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and
the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture", "forestry", and "mineral" lands, and
that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be
forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the
forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7,
Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land
or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber
or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry
or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land.
It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by
virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
"public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra) 95
(Emphasis ours) ACSaHc
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. 96 Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify
or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since
then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain. 97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title
in 1933, 98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the property's land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No.
2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer
51
authorized to determine the property's land classification. Hence, private claimants
cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision 99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds of Manila, 100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko
cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government, 101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government, 102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. 103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential
lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution 104
from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural. ASIETa
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the
old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa. 105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants' continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession
of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926
106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a
title in their name. EHSADc
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals. 107
Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands", for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands". In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the government's title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. 108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered
public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR 109 and the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority 110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain. SEHTIc
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not". Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may
seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As
a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on
the island; 111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island's tourism industry, do
not negate its character as public forest. AaIDCS
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution 112
classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks", do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. 113 The discussion
in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry 114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 115 (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or
timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes. 116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land. AHDacC
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801
issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible
of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
"private lands" 117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" 118 does not
by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA.
All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
AHDacC
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to
its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then
Bureau of Forest Development's authority to declare areas in the island as alienable
and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. HEISca
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA
— to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas' tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering
the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas'
alienability. 119
52
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four
(64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in
Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in
Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island
as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all
the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition.
That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 120
provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department
head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands. 121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to
existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so. 122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition. 123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter
buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right
of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
HCSEIT
Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public
forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD
No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without
running afoul of Section 4 (a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands
as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture. aEHASI
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits
of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the
Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In
the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition. 125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the
land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no
prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice 126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4 (a) is the
word "reclassification". Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
[referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed
for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
DcCIAa
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the
limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public
domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which
have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. 127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. 128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained
an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
Private claimants' bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is
clear from the wording of the law itself. 129 Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights. 130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the
name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945. IEAHca
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible
to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay
even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism
industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have
called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants'
plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. HScCEa
53
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141, as amended,
this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other
areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead 131 or sales patent, 132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill 133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether
that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open
up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress. EacHCD
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation's survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz: 134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more
have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property — crops,
livestock, houses, and highways — not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue. 135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. HTCaAD
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., is on official leave per Special Order No. 520 dated September 19, 2008.
Nachura, J., took no part. Justice Nachura participated in the present case as Solicitor
General.
||| (Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. Nos.
167707 & 173775, [October 8, 2008], 589 PHIL 156-201)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155450. August 6, 2008.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA
TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 of the 21 May 2001 2 and 25 September 2002 3
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001
Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines' (petitioner) amended
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity
of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued
Decree No. 381928 4 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters
(subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to
said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No.
11585 5 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. DcICEa
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, 6 issued in the name of the Province of
Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1278, 7 issued in the name of the private respondents,
covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the
filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property
which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of
Decree No. 381928. SEHTAC
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to
conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.
The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses
Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be
still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T.
of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released
as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis
of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and
occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot
2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial. 8
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only
released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982".
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land
Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the
cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the
proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner
54
filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles 9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of
2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was
not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was
classified as alienable and disposable.
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. 10 Private
respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that
petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed
to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a
certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also
maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the
case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. 11 Private respondents also stated that not all the
heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective
resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest
was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private
respondents. 12 DHEACI
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of
decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. 13
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this
court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available". The Amended Complaint
contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be
divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only
on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the
Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and
Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of
timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of
the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No.
11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such
adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio
under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the
Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial
court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. 14 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. IcSADC
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer
available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a
tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings
changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance
over the land; SAHaTc
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and

7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural
grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of
decree has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds
of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree. 15
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the
Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the
public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to
adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract
of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the
Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such
adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and
void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine
constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the
name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto
of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for
the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any
authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot
2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force
and effect whatsoever. 16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) CHDTEA
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was
seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which
petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and
disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
petitioner's failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available".
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, 17 we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the
petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or
final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches. 18
Since petitioner's complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of
the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner's complaint
were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. 19
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
55
SEC. 6. Procedure. — The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial
be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a
judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the
complete and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag
the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion
was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No.
381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square
meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of
the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the
public domain. IEAHca
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. 21
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government, 22 we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided
they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in
accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person . . . 23
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for
some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as
mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law,
during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps 24 petitioner
attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of
the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National
Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no
statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land. 25 HcDSaT
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, 26
which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of
the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have
been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which
have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or
which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public
domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established
or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis
supplied) IEHDAT
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as
lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the
classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in
Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for
some public purpose in accordance with law.
lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution". 29 When the
Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag
had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant
to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court. IaAEHD
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines'
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of
titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Austria-Martinez, * Corona and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in

Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties.
Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private ||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155450, [August 6, 2008], 583 PHIL 157-174)
property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that
the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under
any existing law at that time.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Republic sought to annul

the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration
court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land
was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of
Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or
agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director
of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 28 and 2874. The Court ruled:

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the
authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable
would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been
impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid
law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above,
those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a
decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court
had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the
applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject
land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which
had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural,
forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case.
(Emphasis supplied) CSIHDA

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree
No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the
subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber
or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that
spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title.
The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as
required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject
land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond
review.

The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII
of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and
mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these

56
TORRENS SYSTEM
REASON FOR ADOPTION
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107967. March 1, 1994.]
CONSORCIA TENIO-OBSEQUIO, ORLANDO OBSEQUIO, and MANUEL, REGINA,
TUNAY and MELITON, all surnamed OBSEQUIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
EUFRONIO ALIMPOOS, and PONCIANA ALIMPOOS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION ACT; RIGHT OF ORIGINAL OWNER TO SEEK
ANNULMENT OF TRANSFER, SUBJECT TO RIGHTS OF INNOCENT HOLDER FOR
VALUE. — Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner of registered land may seek the
annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is
without prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of
title.
2. ID.; ID.; TORRENS TITLE; PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE, DEFINED.
— Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner of registered land may seek the
annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is
without prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of
title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER IN CASE AT BAR, A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH. — In
consonance with this accepted legal definition, petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio
is a purchaser in good faith. There is no showing whatsoever nor even an allegation
that herein petitioner had any participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged
forgery. Nor can we charge said petitioner with negligence since, at the time of the
sale to her, the land was already registered in the name of Eduardo Deguro and the
tax declaration was also issued in the latter's name. It was also clearly indicated at
the back of the original certificate of title that Eduardo Deguro acquired ownership
over the said land by virtue of the deed of sale executed in his favor. In fact, it is not
disputed that one of his heirs was actually residing therein. There is no annotation,
defect or flaw in the title that would have aroused any suspicion as to its
authenticity. Such being the case, petitioner has the right to rely on what appears
on the face of the certificate of title.
4. ID.; ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; MAIN PURPOSE. — The main
purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and
to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonable cautious man to make such further
inquiry.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVERY PERSON DEALING WITH REGISTERED LAND MAY SAFELY RELY
ON THE CORRECTNESS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — Where innocent third
persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be
to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FIRST TO ACCEPT VALIDITY OF TITLES
ISSUED THEREUNDER. — The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the
Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder
once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AUTHENTICITY OF CONTRACT OF SALE, BOLSTERED
BY APPROVAL THEREOF BY GOVERNMENT AGENCY. — There is no reason to doubt
the authenticity of the deed of sale which constituted the basis for the issuance of
the transfer certificate of title in the name of Eduardo Deguro, considering that not
only was the contract notarized but that it was also approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in compliance with Section 118 of the Public Land
Act.
57
8. ID.; ID.; NOTARIAL DOCUMENT; PRESUMED ISSUED REGULARLY. — There is no
indubitable, legal and convincing reason for nullifying the deed of sale. Herein private
respondents have not presented any cogent, complete and convincing proof to override
the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence
of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
9. ID.; ID.; FORGERY CANNOT BE PRESUMED; MUST BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. — Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the
burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence. Private respondents in this
case ruefully failed to substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that their
signatures appearing on the deed of sale were forged.
10. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION ACT; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; A
FORGED DEED CAN BE A BASIS OF A VALID TITLE. — It has been consistently ruled that a
forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value
intervenes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor without the authority of the owner of
the land sold is a nullity, and registration will not validate what otherwise is an invalid
document. However, where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name
of the true owner of the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what
appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under
no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARD IN PREVENTING A FORGED TRANSFER FROM BEING
REGISTERED. — The Torrens Act, in order to prevent a forged transfer from being
registered, erects a safeguard by requiring that no transfer shall be registered unless the
owner's certificate of title is produced along with the instrument of transfer.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORIZED HOLDER OF A DOCUMENT OF TRANSFER, AUTHORIZED TO
DEAL WITH THE LAND. — An executed document of transfer of registered land placed by
the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a
third party that the holder of the document of transfer is authorized to deal with the land.
In the case at bar, it was even private respondents who made the allegation that they
further delivered their certificate of title to Eduardo Deguro, allegedly to secure the loan
extended to them. Consequently, petitioner cannot be faulted and, as a matter of fact, she
is vested with the right to rely on the title of Eduardo Deguro.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE THAT AS BETWEEN TWO INNOCENT PERSONS ONE OF WHOM MUST
SUFFER THE LOSS, THE ONE WHO MADE IT POSSIBLE MUST BEAR THE LOSS. —
Furthermore, it was the very act of the respondent Alimpoos spouses in entrusting their
certificate of title to Eduardo Deguro that made it possible for the commission of the
alleged fraud, if indeed there was such a fraudulent conduct as imputed to the latter.
Hence, the rule of law and justice that should apply in this case is that as between two
innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the
one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE MUST BE PROTECTED;
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PERSON PREJUDICED. — The right of the innocent purchaser for
value must be respected and protected, even if the seller obtained his title through fraud.
The remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those who
caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance
Fund.
15. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE MUST BE FILED
WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS FROM ISSUANCE OF TITLE; ACTION IN CASE AT BAR HAS
PRESCRIBED. — It is also significant and worth noting that herein respondents filed the
instant complaint only after twenty-two years from the execution of the supposedly
forged deed of absolute sale, and after sixteen years from the date the title was
transferred in the name of herein petitioner. An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy
granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another's name, but then the action must be filed within ten years from the issuance of
the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22990, dated July 9, 1992, which reversed the
judgment of the trial court, as well as its resolution of November 6, 1992 denying
the motion for reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
The subject matter of the present decision is a parcel of land, designated as Lot No.
846, Pls-225 located at Andanan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. This lot was previously
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1181 registered in the name of herein
respondent Eufronio Alimpoos and which he acquired through a homestead
application. 1 The said land is now registered in the name of herein petitioner,
Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1421.
2 Manuel Deguro, Tunay Deguro and Regina Deguro to reconvey the said property to the
On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint in the court a quo
against herein petitioners Consorcia Tenio and her husband, Orlando Obsequio, and
the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession and ownership, alleging that
sometime in 1964, they mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00; that
to guaranty the loan they delivered to the latter the original certificate of title to the
land; that in the meantime, they continued to cultivate the same and, at the end of
the harvest season, they gave two-thirds (2/3) of the harvest to Eduardo Deguro;
that on June 25, 1965, Eduardo Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and
consent of herein private respondents, prepared a document of sale and through
misrepresentation and other manipulations made it appear that private
respondents sold the land to them. cdphil
This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said certificate of title as Entry
No. 16007. By virtue thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1181 in the name of
Eufronio Alimpoos was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1360 was
correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the death of Eduardo
Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consoria Tenio-Obsequio. On September 22, 1970,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1421 was issued in her name. It was allegedly only
in 1982, when Eufronio Alimpoos received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of
his land from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), that he learned that the
land was already titled in the name of another.
In their answer, the heirs of Eduardo Deguro claimed that respondent Alimpoos
spouses sold the land to their late parents on June 25, 1965 for a consideration of
P10,000.00, as evidenced by the deed of absolute sale; that as a result thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1360 was issued in favor of their parents; that on
April 23, 1970, after the death of their parents, they sold the said land to Consorcia
Tenio-Obsequio; that on September 22, 1970, a new Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-1421 was issued in the name of the latter. Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio, on the other
hand, maintains that she purchased the land in question from the heirs of Deguro in
good faith, for valuable consideration and without knowledge of any flaw or defect
whatsoever.
The trial court, giving credence to the evidence presented by herein petitioners,
defendants therein, ruled in their favor and rendered judgment disposing as
follows:
"1) dismissing the herein complaint;
2) declaring defendant Consorcia Tenio Obsequio as the true and absolute owner of
the land in litis;
3) ordering plaintiffs to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
4) ordering plaintiffs to pay P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
5) ordering plaintiffs to pay the expenses of litigation in the amount of P5,000.00;
6) ordering the plaintiffs to pay (a)ttorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00; and
7) to pay the costs.
In like manner, the money deposited in the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Bayugan
in the amounts of P2,724.95 covered by Official Receipt No. 0442623 dated
September 7, 1988 and P1,658.10 covered by Official Receipt No. 5497715 dated
September 14, 1988, as well as the sum of P3,927.00 deposited in Court pursuant to
the Court's Orders of January 16, 1987 and March 13, 1987, consisting of the
proceeds from the sale of the harvest taken from the area involved, is awarded to
defendant Consorcia Tenio Obsequio, as owner thereof after deducting the
necessary expenses and Clerk of Court'(s) commission fee." 3
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court
58
and rendered judgment:
"1) Declaring the plaintiff Eufronio Alimpoos as the true and legal owner of the property
subject of this case;
2) Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Annex 'C' or Exhibit 'D' and
ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-1360 and T-1421 in the names of Eduardo Deguro
and Consorcia Tenio Obsequio, respectively;
3) Ordering the heirs of Eduardo Deguro and Laureana Rabuya, namely, Gonzalo Deguro,
plaintiffs;
4) Ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale at
the back of TCT P-1181 in favor of Consorcia Tenio Obsequio and to clear said TCT of all
encumbrances executed by Eduardo Deguro and/or his heirs.
In addition, the defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages; P30,000.00 by way of compensatory damages
and P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and costs of litigation." 4
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision which was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated November 6, 1992, 5 hence the instant
recourse by petitioners. cdrep
After a careful review of the records of this case and the legal considerations applicable to
the proven facts thereof, we find the petition at bar to be meritorious. Reconveyance of
the land in question to the original owner is not in order.
Herein respondent Alimpoos, as the original owner of the said land, is assailing the title of
petitioner on the ground that their original certificate of title over the said land was
cancelled by virtue of a forged deed of absolute sale.
Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, an original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of a
transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to
the rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in the property. 6In consonance with this accepted
legal definition, petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is a purchaser in good faith. There is
no showing whatsoever nor even an allegation that herein petitioner had any
participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged forgery.
Nor can we charge said petitioner with negligence since, at the time of the sale to her, the
land was already registered in the name of Eduardo Deguro 7and the tax declaration was
also issued in the latter's name. 8 It was also clearly indicated at the back of the original
certificate of title that Eduardo Deguro acquired ownership over the said land by virtue of
the deed of sale executed in his favor. 9 In fact, it is not disputed that one of his heirs was
actually residing therein. 10 There is no annotation, defect or flaw in the title that would
have aroused any suspicion as to its authenticity. Such being the case, petitioner has the
right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate
and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the
face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
should impel a reasonable cautious man to make such further inquiry. 11 Where innocent
third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. 12
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of lands on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after
all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were
permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land
conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and
possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 13
Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the deed of sale which
constituted the basis for the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name
of Eduardo Deguro, considering that not only was the contract notarized but that it
was also approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
compliance with Section 118 of the Public Land Act. 14
certificate of title is produced along with the instrument of transfer. However, an
executed document of transfer of registered land placed by the registered owner thereof
in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of the
document of transfer is authorized to deal with the land. 23 In the case at bar, it was even
private respondents who made the allegation that they further delivered their certificate
of title to Eduardo Deguro, allegedly to secure the loan extended to them. Consequently,
petitioner cannot be faulted and, as a matter of fact, she is vested with the right to rely on
the title of Eduardo Deguro.
Furthermore, it was the very act of the respondent Alimpoos spouses in entrusting their
certificate of title to Eduardo Deguro that made it possible for the commission of the
alleged fraud, if indeed there was such a fraudulent conduct as imputed to the latter.
Hence, the rule of law and justice that should apply in this case is that as between two
innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the
one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. 24

There is no indubitable, legal and convincing reason for nullifying the deed of sale.
Herein private respondents have not presented any cogent, complete and
convincing proof to override the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of
sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all
these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. 15
The fact alone that the signature of private respondent Eufronio Alimpoos
appearing on the deed of sale to Deguro differs in certain points from his signature
appearing in the "Kasabutan sa Prenda" is not enough to warrant the conclusion
that the signature in said deed of sale is not genuine. The records show that the
signatures of private respondent Eufronio Alimpoos in one of the cash advance
receipts 16 and in the notice of the trial court's order dated March 4, 1988 17 are
similar to the signature appearing in the deed of sale. It is, therefore, not
improbable that, as claimed by herein petitioners, private respondents could have
deliberately and purposely altered their signatures on the mortgage contract to
thereafter make it appear that a discrepancy actually exists. Cdpr
Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it
since a mere allegation is not evidence. 18 Private respondents in this case ruefully
failed to substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that their signatures
appearing on the deed of sale were forged.
The right of the innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected, even if the
seller obtained his title through fraud. The remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are
insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of
damages against the Assurance Fund. 25
It is also significant and worth noting that herein respondents filed the instant complaint
only after twenty-two years from the execution of the supposedly forged deed of absolute
sale, and after sixteen years from the date the title was transferred in the name of herein
petitioner. An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name, but then the
action must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance
operates as a constructive notice. 26
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent court now under review are
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the court a quo is accordingly are REINSTATED.
LLphil
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ ., concur.
||| (Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, [March 1, 1994], 300 PHIL 588-
602)

At any rate, there are several reasons to doubt the authenticity of the "Kasabutan
sa Prenda." Firstly, it has not been sufficiently explained why, although it should
normally be with the mortgagee, the original mortgage contract remained in the
possession of the mortgagor and it was only after the death of the alleged
mortgagee that the same was presented, which was more than twenty years from
the date of its alleged execution. Secondly, the consideration of P10,000.00 for a
mortgage in 1964 of a piece of rural land consisting of only 81,822 square meters,
with the mortgagee paying the taxes thereon, is too high or excessive, considering
that the same piece of land was coetaneously mortgaged with the Development
Bank of the Philippines for only P1,900.00. 19 Thirdly, the texture of the paper on
which it was written and the clarity of the writing show that the document,
supposedly executed on July 25, 1964, is of recent vintage and could not be more
than twenty years old, even as of this late date. 20

Yet, even on the implausible assumption, ex gratia argumenti, that the deed of sale
in favor of Eduardo Deguro was forged and is, therefore, null and void, such fact
cannot be successfully invoked to invalidate the title subsequently issued to herein
petitioner who, as earlier stated, is an innocent purchaser for value and in good
faith.

It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid
title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. 21 A deed of sale executed
by an impostor without the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and
registration will not validate what otherwise is an invalid document. However,
where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true
owner of the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold
to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in
the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate. 22

The Torrens Act, in order to prevent a forged transfer from being registered, erects
a safeguard by requiring that no transfer shall be registered unless the owner's

59
PURPOSE AND MEANING OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 8936. October 2, 1915.]
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.
M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma & Lim for appellants.
D. R. Williams for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; REGISTRATION OF SAME LAND IN THE NAMES OF TWO
DIFFERENT PERSONS. — L obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on
the 25th of October, 1906. S, on the 25th of March, 1912, obtained a certificate of
registration for his land which joined the land theretofore registered by L. The
certificate of title issued to S included a narrow strip of the land theretofore
registered in the name of L. On the 13th of December, 1912, L presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration for the adjustment and correction of the error
committed in the certificate issued to S, which included said narrow strip of land.
Held: That in a case where two certificates of title include or cover the same land,
the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part comprised in the earlier
certificate. In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate
is entitled to the land as against the person who obtained the second certificate.
The decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons.
2. ID.; PURPOSE OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. — The real purpose of the torrens
system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at the time of
registrations in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner
might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The
proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is a judicial
proceeding, but it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
3. ID; ID.; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — The registration
under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not give the
owner any better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the
certificate. He secures his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple
title. If he obtains a certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he really and in
fact owns, the certificate should be corrected. If he does not already have a perfect
title, he can not secure his certificate. Having a fee simple title, and presenting
sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of registration. The
certificate of registration simply accumulates, in one document, a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title, which the owner, in
fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner
has. The certificate should not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished, except to correct errors, in some direct proceedings permitted by law.
The title represented by the certificate can not be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J p:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed for a number of years a stone wall
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of
said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of
the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the
60
wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of
March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that
the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been
included in the certificate granted to the defendant. They immediately presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower
court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory
that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they
failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each of the owners
of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or
decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by
reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the
lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore
registered in their name. Granting that theory to be the correct one, and granting even
that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying
that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the
plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having
thus lost his right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for
registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall,
were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the
land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same,
registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the
title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem
that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting
in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of
land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482).
It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the
world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la
Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass.,
71; American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration
is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who
may claim an interest The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world)
to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration,
under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does
not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in one document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title
can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not
even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision
in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in
the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the
name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
same parties. In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that
future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no Persons who are not
parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted
in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions
which need not be discussed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated,
even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the
torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The
title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one
can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been
settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts.
Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823,
says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in
the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q. S. C. R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N. Z. R., 155; Lloyd vs. May-
field, 7 A. L. T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V. L. R., 152; Register of Titles vs.
Esperance Land Co., 1 W. A. R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents,
that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the
mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian Torrens System," supra, and cases cited.
See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page
99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates
purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled
to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from
the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two
certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the
title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to
include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the
title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.' Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to
file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest."
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after
the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any
reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree
be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land
in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law
contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of
the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the
name of two different persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other
things, that when one piece of real property has been sold to two different persons
it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This
rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired
title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil
Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection
61
thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a
persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree
that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two
different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the
application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a
proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of others, to
the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest
his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they
became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their
day in court and cannot set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of
a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would
be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts."
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet
title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in his registered title then the purpose
of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the
certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred
thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the
method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which
elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title they had mortgaged or sold their right,
what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound
to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is
the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of
the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was first negligent
(granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not
complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-
defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the
appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and
the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by
the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not
be permitted to setup his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the
owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to Oppose the registration of
the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth
against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine
invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act. that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser. "The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his
vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner
as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the
rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of
Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against
defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of
third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser."
That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an
original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the
appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections?
May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original
certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by
him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an
"innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be
two innocent purchasers of the same land, if said sections are to be applied. Which of the
two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should
be protected under the provisions of said sections ? These questions indicate the difficulty
with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in
said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate"
ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the
owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The
record is notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of
what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it,
must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which
the record discloses. This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to
cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U. S.,
620, 629; Delvinon Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice
of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs.
Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs.
International Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N. Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey,
20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains anymore than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to
be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art. 1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage ? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of
what the public record contains is just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that
all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact
that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at
times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
plea of ignorance of the law affecting a contract as to allow the defense of
ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or
all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the
vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be
applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the Phrase "innocent purchasers
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the
vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in
no sense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name
other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties
we think this is the safer rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the
original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even be regarded as the holder in good faith of that
part of the land included in his certificate which had theretofore been included in
the original certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that
62
Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his
lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in
question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip ? Would
his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the
original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying
the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question
must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in
harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We
believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors.
should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the
present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be
permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict
therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public
record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence,
should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has
obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting
from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the
land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the
ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the
view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system must, by the very
nature and purposes of that system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct
then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded under the torrens
system, to examine that record alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the
torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real
status of the title to the land.
It would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied
with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in
question in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the
appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J. Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON J., with whom concurs TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning
and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of
the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent
purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the
double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the
prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate,
and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later
certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority
opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the
rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to
exception, and of course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which
these rules are based is inapplicable to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the
proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would
seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights
in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied
with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to
the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and
equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent
registered titles to the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the
one who first acquired registered title and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the absence of any
express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to
be applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land
Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the
adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes
are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and
that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the
courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a
case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still
more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well
settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit,
that which first accrued will be given the preference." But it is universally laid down
by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be
the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable
ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and many
cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139. note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of
double or overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought
not to prevail so as to, deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of
his title in any case wherein the fraud or negligence of the holder of the earlier
certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of
the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke the " just and equitable
rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected
and the title of an innocent holder of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any
case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without
fault, while the holder of the earlier certificate was wholly or largely to blame for
the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by
merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally
served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second
certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead of
keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered
against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am
contending for by the reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it
undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or
overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original
parties must be held to have been at fault and, their equities being equal,
preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the
reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in
favor of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the
original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such
purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers: because, as it is said,
negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no
event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by
him from the holder of a duly registered certificate of title are included within the
bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid
down under the various systems of land registration, other than those based on the
torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land duly registered in the Land
Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of
the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land
registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain
that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary
lines of anyone of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose
63
original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land
purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy
such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the land purchased
by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison
of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be
found in the land registry office.
But such a ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by
the introduction and adoption of the so called torrens system for the registration of land.
The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchaser of
registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the
vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed
to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the
contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure to
acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land
registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure,
and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and ofttimes uncertain searches of the
land records and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before
purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any
attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased
by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens
system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is
to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve
prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of
looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land
Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a
purchaser or mortgagee of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other
certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him
should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act
desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such
lands have been made the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course
should he pursue ? What measures should he adopt in order to search out the information
with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there
anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which
necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the
existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to him,
if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration,
would seem to be a careful laborious and extensive comparison of the registered
boundary lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy
with those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry.
Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to
impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty that a
lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired maybe imputed to him by this court
as negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which have
been the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a
registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered
against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it
appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the
proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of
Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has
actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant,
claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is
necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's
attention to the certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the
applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping
registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of land registration
which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a registered
title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is
being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or
failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should
not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate to
all the loss and damage resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while he
goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable
rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first
accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties
are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as between opposing claimants
under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the
right of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those
dealing with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto
is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other
certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to
determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of
that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying
the value of the registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public
confidence in the value of the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the
language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the
courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize
the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them."
or fraudulently and collusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them
adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants,
despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and
this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of their titles, and merely to
save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in
the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that
their right, title and ownership in the lands in question has already been conclusively
adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration
without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of
things be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost
invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult
to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud,
without personal service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of
the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served upon the owner or
occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for registration is made; and
the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct
proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice
to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.

It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid
down in the majority opinion, to cases wherein the holder of the earlier certificate
of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which
the later certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal
notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the
pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority
opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be
imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to
the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in such cases
having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it
does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable
negligence in permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be
imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to the land
under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding would have
the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of
a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the
"mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree
with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable
burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not contemplated by the
authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed upon
the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him
when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him
adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he
has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is
entered and despite the fact that he has been personally served with summons to
appear and default his title.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of
a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of
the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any
part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to
plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a
default judgment to be entered against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating
part of the lands included in his own certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from
whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an
adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and was
personally served with summons to appear and defend his rights in the premises. It seems
to me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of
the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will
inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the
future will fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in
the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and
probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands
generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the
Courts of Land Registration.
||| (Legarda v. Saleeby, G.R. No. 8936, [October 2, 1915], 31 PHIL 590-614)

"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting
equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a
registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a
default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.

I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent
purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of
convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title
rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.

One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to

unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such
persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when
any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to
eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the
land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a
certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare,
definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being
challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and
expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of
title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the
innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such
as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double
or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently

64
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86787. May 8, 1992.]
MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA
PANGILINAN, MAGDALENA ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, VIRGINIA
NOVICIO, and LINDA BONILLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA SALANG, respondents.
Saturnino Bactad for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION ACT; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; ISSUANCE THEREOF,
INCONTROVERTIBLE AND CONCLUSIVE AGAINST THE WHOLE WORLD. — The Court
notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original Certificate of
Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now
incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The presumption of
regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the
finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore
registrable under the Torrens system.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE TO SUSTAIN AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT THEREOF FOR BEING
VOID AB INITIO. — To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for
being void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title.
Neither of these requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they
submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question
was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that
this deserved scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification
from an administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision declaring the
land to be registrable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF LAWFUL OWNER TO THE POSSESSION OF SUBJECT
PROPERTY; NOT BARRED BY LACHES. — As registered owners of the lots in question,
the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware
of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
This right is never barred by laches.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTERED OWNER CANNOT LOSE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY
PRESCRIPTION. — In urging laches against the private respondents for not
protesting their long and continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the
petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by
acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land
registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription. As the Court
observed in the early case of Legarda v. Saleeby: The real purpose of the Torrens
system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUS OF BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners
cannot invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to
the constructions they have made on the lots in dispute. A builder in good faith is
one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it.
This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset
that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
6. ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION; CONSIDERED A CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO THE WHOLE
WORLD. — The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the
public domain and even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of
Forestry. The land was in fact registered under the Torrens System and such
registration was constructive notice to the whole world, including the petitioners.
Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of checking such registration. At
any rate, the point is that, whether the land be public or private, the petitioners
knew they had no right to occupy it and build on it. The Court of Appeals was
correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without permission or
authority, land that did not belong to them.
65
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the same
issue, the answer will not change.
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales,
with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the possession of the
petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the name of the private respondents under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29018.
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of
possession of the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners
of the land. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the lots were part of the public
domain and could not have been registered under the Torrens system. All alleged long and
continuous possession of the lots and produced tax declarations in their names. Two of
them maintained that they had acquired their respective lots by virtue of valid contracts of
sale. Another based her claim on inheritance.
After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 1 He held in part as follows:
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question,
necessarily have the lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner of a
land has a right to enjoy and possess it, and he has also the right to recover and repossess
the same from any person occupying it unlawfully.
Art. 428 — New Civil Code
"The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
"The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order
to recover it."
There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the
land in question have also the corresponding right to the recovery and possession of the
same. The defendants who are in physical occupancy of the land belonging to the plaintiffs
have no right whatsoever to unjustly withhold the possession of the said land from the
plaintiffs. The defendants' occupancy of the land in question is unlawful and in violation of
plaintiffs' right to the recovery and possession of the land they owned. The evidence
presented by the defendants claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that
the land occupied by them is within the alienable and disposable public land, deserves
scant consideration as the said certification are without basis in law. The moment the land
in question was titled in the name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to become a part of the public
domain as the same became the private property of the registered owner, the herein
plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land made in the names of the defendants are not
evidence of title, it appearing that the land is already titled to the plaintiffs. The
registration of the land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor's Office for
taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the defendants can not and
does not defeat the title of the plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants have
been in occupancy of the land in question for quite a period of time is of no moment as
prescription will not ripen into ownership because the land is covered by a torrens title.
Acquisitive prescription will not be available to land titled under Art. 496.
PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so holds that
the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in question are entitled to the
possession of the same, and that the defendants who are occupying the land belonging to
the plaintiffs in violation of the right of the latter, are duty-bound to restore possession of
the same to the titled owners, the herein plaintiffs. LibLex
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988. 2 Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this Court,
urging reversal of the courts below.
They allege that:
1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been validly
registered under the Torrens system.
2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to the
rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.
The petition has no merit.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable
to an Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago.
That certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The
presumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This
presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in
nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it
must be shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. 3 Neither of these
requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the
certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and
disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant
consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an
administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision declaring the land to be
registrable. Cdpr
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and
even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in
fact registered under the Torrens System and such registration was constructive notice to
the whole world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the
trouble of checking such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the land be
public or private, the petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it and build on it. The
Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without
permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking us
to overturn long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system
and the indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace of mind of
the registered owner against illegal encroachments upon his property. We are not
disposed to take this drastic step on the basis alone of their feeble arguments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C .J ., Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (Bishop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, [May 8, 1992], 284-A PHIL 125-132)

Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any
other representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to
the land registration proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate
of Title. No less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the
ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the
decree of registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this
late hour. And collaterally at that.

The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land
must also possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the
private respondents of their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they
have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission.

The second ground must also be rejected.

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to
eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even
if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and
continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect
contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an
elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system
cannot lose it by prescription. 5

As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: 6

The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the
title was registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.

Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with
use and has long become a settled rule of law.

In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot
invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the
constructions they have made on the lots in dispute.

A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at
the time he builds on it. 7 This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because
they knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
prcd

66
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016.]
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY [MCIAA], petitioner, vs. HEIRS
OF GAVINA IJORDAN, namely, JULIAN CUISON, FRANCISCA CUISON, DAMASINA
CUISON, PASTOR CUISON, ANGELINA CUISON, MANSUETO CUISON, BONIFACIA
CUISON, BASILIO CUISON, MOISES CUISON, and FLORENCIO CUISON, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of
the others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the
seller.
The Case
This appeal assails the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
61509, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, in Lapu-Lapu City (RTC) on September 2, 1997, 2
and March 6, 1998. 3
Antecedents
On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale 4 (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo,
Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Since then until the present, MCIAA
remained in material, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the
subject lot through the CAA, later renamed the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT),
and is presently known as the Air Transportation Office (ATO). The subject lot was
transferred and conveyed to MCIAA by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958.
In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate
of title covering the subject lot (issued by virtue of Decree No. 531167).
Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina,
Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all
surnamed Cuison. 5 The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced
by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the
subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's
predecessor-in-interest. 6
The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431
prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, 7 alleging in its
complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents
because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject
lot had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387
in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came
under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to
enable the issuance of a new one in its name. CAIHTE
At the trial, MCIAA presented Romeo Cueva, its legal assistant, as its sole witness
who testified that the documents pertaining to the subject lot were the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale and Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the BAT; and
that the subject lot was utilized as part of the expansion of the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority I. 8
After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, 9 contending
that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value to support
MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself." They argued that what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed;
that even assuming that the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale
was unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who had executed the
same without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; that Article 1317
of the Civil Code provided that "no one may contract in the name of another
without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent
67
him;" and that the tax declaration had no probative value by virtue of its having been
derived from the unenforceable sale.
MCIAA opposed the Demurrer to Evidence in due course. 10
In its order dated September 2, 1997, 11 the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as
it pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to
the 1/22 share of Julian, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing considerations, defendants' demurrer to evidence
is granted with qualification. Consequently, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed
insofar as it pertains to defendants' shares of Lot No. 4539, as reflected in Original
Certificate of Title No. RO 2431. Plaintiff, however, is hereby declared the owner of 1/22
share of Lot No. 4539. In this connection, the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby
directed to effect the necessary change in OCT No. RO-2431 by replacing as one of the
registered owners, "Julian Cuizon, married to Marcosa Cosef", with the name of plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 12
The RTC observed that although it appeared from the Deed that vendor Julian was the
only heir of the late Pedro Cuizon, thereby adjudicating unto himself the whole of Lot No.
4539, it likewise appeared from the same Deed that the subject lot was covered by
Cadastral Case No. 20, and that Decree No. 531167 had been issued on July 29, 1930; that
having known that the subject lot had been covered by the decree issued long before the
sale took place, the more appropriate thing that MCIAA or its representatives should have
done was to check the decreed owners of the lot, instead of merely relying on the tax
declaration issued in the name of Pedro Cuizon and on the statement of Julian; that the
supposedly uninterrupted possession by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest was not
sufficiently established, there being no showing of the improvements introduced on the
property; and that even assuming that MCIAA had held the material possession of the
subject lot, the respondents had remained the registered owners of Lot No. 4539 and
could not be prejudiced by prescription.
MCIAA moved for reconsideration, 13 but the RTC denied its motion on March 6, 1998. 14
MCIAA appealed to the CA, submitting that: 15
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ONLY THE SHARE OF JULIAN CUIZON WAS
SOLD TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAY BACK IN 1957.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE UN-EXPLAINED, UNREASONABLE AND
TEDIOUS INACTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEES WHICH CONSTITUTE THEIR IMPLIED
RATIFICATION OF THE SALE WHICH THEY CANNOT NOW CONVENIENTLY IMPUGN IN
ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PHENOMENAL RISE IN LAND VALUES IN MACTAN
ISLAND.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT PROVEN
POSSESSION OVER SAID LOT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING MOTU-PROPRIO DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES AS GUILTY OF LACHES AND/OR ESTOPPEL IN THE FACE OF CLEAR EVIDENCE
FROM THE VERY FACTS OF THE CASE ITSELF; IT SHOULD BE NOTED, MOREOVER THAT IT
WAS PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO INITIATED THE COMPLAINT HENCE THE SAME COULD
NOT PROPERLY BE RAISED AS DEFENSES HEREIN BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VALID PROVISION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES MERELY HOLD THE
TITLE IN TRUST FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND ARE THEREFORE OBLIGATED TO
SURRENDER THE SAME TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SO THE TITLE COULD BE TRANSFERRED
TO IT AS THE VENDEE WAY BACK IN 1957.
In the assailed decision promulgated on February 22, 2006, 16 the CA affirmed the orders
of the RTC issued on September 2, 1997 17 and March 6, 1998. 18
The CA subsequently denied MCIAA's motion for reconsideration 19 on June 15, 2006. 20
Issues
In this appeal, MCIAA submits the following grounds: 21
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING: DETACa
I. RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN 1957 AND
PETITIONER'S CONTINUOUS POSSESSION THEREOF. partition of the thing owned in common.

II. RESPONDENTS' INACTION FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS TO RECOVER
POSSESSION OF THE LOT AMOUNTS TO AN IMPLIED RATIFICATION OF THE SALE.
III. PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE LOT SINCE 1957 IS BORNE BY THE CASE
RECORD.
IV. RESPONDENTS ARE CLEARLY GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, WHICH LEGALLY
BARS THEM FROM RECOVERING POSSESSION OF THE LOT.
In other words, was the subject lot validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner?
In support of its appeal, MCIAA insists that the respondents were fully aware of the
transaction with Julian from the time of the consummation of the sale in 1957, as
well as of its continuous possession thereof; 22 that what was conveyed by Julian to
its predecessor-in-interest, the CAA, was the entirety of Lot No. 4539, consisting of
12,012 square meters, not just his share of 1/22 of the whole lot; that the
respondents were guilty of inexplicable inaction as to the sale, which manifested
their implied ratification of the supposedly unauthorized act of Julian of selling the
subject lot in 1957; that although the respondents were still minors at the time of
the execution of the sale, their ratification of Julian's act became evident from the
fact that they had not impugned the sale upon reaching the age of majority; that
they asserted their claim only after knowing of the phenomenal rise in the value of
the lot in the area despite their silence for more than 30 years; and that they did not
assert ownership for a long period, and did not exercise physical and constructive
possession by paying the taxes or declaring the property for taxation purposes.
MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of
ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel
applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-
interest. 25 Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was
declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to
ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the
respondents in the subject lot. aDSIHc
Lastly, MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the
absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no
acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents'
Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the
registered owners of their title by prescription. 26 The real purpose of the Torrens System
is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting on the mirador sur casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

On their part, the respondents aver that they were not aware of the sale of the ||| (Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Ijordan, G.R. No. 173140,
subject lot in 1957 because the sale was not registered, and because the subject lot [January 11, 2016], 776 PHIL 222-232)
was not occupied by MCIAA or its lessee; 23 that they became aware of the claim of
MCIAA only when its representative tried to intervene during the reconstitution of
the certificate of title in 1980; and that one of the co-owners of the property,
Moises Cuison, had been vigilant in preventing the occupation of the subject lot by
other persons.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

Firstly, both the CA and the RTC found the Deed and the Tax Declaration with which
MCIAA would buttress its right to the possession and ownership of the subject lot
insufficient to substantiate the right of MCIAA to the relief sought. Considering that
possession was a factual matter that the lower courts had thoroughly examined and
based their findings on, we cannot undo their findings. We are now instead bound
and concluded thereby in accordance with the well-established rule that the
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive.
Indeed, the Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, this mode of appeal is limited to
issues of law; hence, factual findings should not be reviewed unless there is a
showing of an exceptional reason to review them. Alas, that showing is not made.

Secondly, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the
respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share.
Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in
favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to
overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership
with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the
Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his
favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article
1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to
represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. But
the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to
his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of
its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:
24

. . . even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the

68
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF QUIETING TITLE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 44493. November 3, 1938.]
MARIANO ANGELES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELENA SAMIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Gutierrez David, for appellant.
Filemon Cajator, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT AND CADASTRAL ACT; PURPOSE OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT; ERROR IN THE DESCRIPTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND IN A
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — The purpose of the Land Registration Act, as this court has
had occasion to so state more than once, is not to create and already vested, and of
course, said original certificate of title No. 8995 could not have vested in the
defendant more right and more title than what was rightfully due her much more
than she expected, naturally to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error,
which gave rise to said anomally, be corrected (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324).
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — The defendant and her coöwners knew or, at least, came to know
that it was through error that original certificate of title No. 8995 was issued by the
court which heard cadastral case No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March,
1933, but from the time said certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from
December 15, 1921. This is evidenced by the fact that, ever since, they remained
passive without even attempting to make the least showing of ownership over the
land in question, until after the lapse of more than eleven years.
3. ID.; TITLE CONFERRED BY THESE TWO ACTS; FRAUD OR ERROR IN OBTAINING IT;
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION AUTHORIZED BY LAW. — The Land Registration Act
as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and
does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or
that one should enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48
Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not
give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and
lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of
his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part,
the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances,
may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.,
590). This is permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496, which is applicable to the
Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the provisions of section 11 of
the latter Act.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ERROR COMMITTED IN THE PLANS DOES NOT ANNUL THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION. — As stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cía.
(55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans of lands sought to be registered in the registry and
reproduced in the certificate of title issued later, do not annul the decree of
registration on the ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which is
registered in the registry.
5. ID.; ID.; ACTION SEEKING THE TRANSFER OF A PARCEL OF LAND ERRONEOUSLY
INCLUDED IN AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — Let it not be said that, as the
decree of registration which gave rise to original certificate of title No. 8995 was
issued on December 15, 1921, and the plaintiff failed to ask for the review of said
decree within one year, in accordance with section 38 of Act No. 496, he still has the
right to question the legality or validity of the decree in question, because the
action brought by him in this case is not for said purpose but merely to ask that the
land in dispute which was erroneously included in original certificate of title No.
8995, be transferred to him by the defendant, he being the owner thereof. This is
possible and it is authorized by law, upon the amendment of the plant which must
be approved by the competent court, for which purpose there is no necessity of
altering or modifying in the least the decree already issued.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION. — The defense of
prescription which the defendant-appellant seeks to avail of to support the
irrevocability of her title and to counteract the action of the plaintiff-appellee, is
untenable because, aside from the fact that neither she nor her coöwners ever
possessed the land in question in any capacity, they never claimed to be the owners
thereof, and if she has done so after the lapse of more than 11 years from the
issuance of the title in their favor, it was due to the fact that they were declared
owners thereof through error.
69
DECISION
DIAZ, J p:
The question involved herein refers to the ownership of a parcel of land having an area of
7 hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares, situated in the municipality of Bacolor, of the
Province of Pampanga, included in lot No. 3679 described in cadastral record No. 11 of the
said municipality, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, and now covered by
the original certificate of title No. 8995 of the registry of deed of Pampanga, registered
and issued on December 15, 1921, in the name of the Macaria Angeles, Petra Angeles,
Felisberto Samia, and Elena Samia as their common undivided property in the following
proportion: One third of Macaria Angeles, 1/6 to Petra Angeles, 1/4 to Felisberto Samia,
and 1/4 to Elena Samia.
The plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the property in question, and the
defendant alleges the same thing saying: (1) that said property was allotted to her when
her coöwners made a partition of all the properties owned by them in common, and (2)
that if the plaintiff ever had any right thereto prior to the issuance of said original
certificate of title, such right prescribed a long time ago.
The lower court decided the question in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant
to execute the necessary deed of conveyance to the plaintiff of the land described in the
complaint, which constitutes the northern portion of 7 hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares
of said lot No. 3679, the sketch of which appears in the plan Exhibit P as lot No. 3679-A,
and to pay the costs of the trial. From this judgment the defendant appealed, assigning in
her brief the following alleged errors as committed by the lower court, to wit:
"1. The lower court erred in not sustaining and holding that the plaintiff's action has
prescribed.
"2. The lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiff has neither alleged nor proven
facts constituting a cause of action.
"3. The lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiff's claim is contrary to the
principal objective of the Torrens System established in this country.
"4. The lower court erred in concluding and holding that a constructive or implicit trust
exists in the present case, as claimed by the plaintiff.
"5. The lower court erred in not holding that the case of 'Villarosa vs. Sarmiento' (46 Phil.,
814), is applicable to and decides the present case, and in holding that the case of 'Dizon
vs. Datu', decided by the Supreme Court as case G. R. No. 30517, applies to the case at
bar.
"6. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in this case with costs to the
plaintiff.
"7. The lower court erred in denying the defendant-appellant's motion for new trial."
It is not disputed by the parties that the land in question was inherited by the plaintiff
from his father Antonino Angeles some time before the year 1896; that thereafter the
plaintiff possessed and occupied the land in question under claim to ownership up to the
present; that about the year 1909, he attempted to register his title to said property in the
registry of deeds pursuant to the Land Registration Act but his application was denied due
to errors found in his plan; that, this notwithstanding, he continued to exercise acts of
ownership over the land in question openly, uninterruptedly and peacefully at least until
March, 1933; that on December 15, 1921, without the plaintiff's knowledge and without
having been purposely applied for by the defendant and her coparticipants Macaria, Petra
and Felisberto, said original certificate of title No. 8995 was issued in the name of the
latter four coöwners; that the said coöwners having decided to partition among
themselves the properties held by them in common, the land in question was allotted to
the defendant; that the defendant, desiring to know the area of said land, had it relocated
about the end of February or the beginning of March, 1933, and, as soon as it had been
done, although she was then aware that neither she nor any of her former coparticipants
ever occupied it before, because it had always been occupied by the plaintiff long before
1896, she entered upon said land to exercise acts of ownership, for which purpose she cut
and availed herself of the leaves of nipa palms found therein, notwithstanding the
protests and objections of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, for the purpose of avoiding
frictions, requested the defendant, inasmuch as it was through error that the land in
question had been adjudicated to her and her coöwners, to deign to execute the
corresponding deed of transfer thereof in his favor, the land being lawfully his; that the
defendant refused to do so claiming that her title was already indefeasible; and that, in
view of such attitude of said defendant, the plaintiff brought this action one or two days
later.

The defense of prescription which the defendant-appellant seeks to avail of to

support the irrevocability of her title and to counteract the action of the plaintiff-
appellee, is untenable because, aside from the fact that neither she nor her
coöwners ever possessed the land in question in any capacity, they never claimed to
be the owners thereof, and if she has done so after the lapse of more than eleven
years from the issuance of the title in their favor, it was due to the fact that they
were declared owners thereof through error. The purpose of the Land Registration
Act, as this court has had occasion to so state more than once, is not to create or
vest title, but to confirm and register title already created and already vested, and
or course, said original certificate of title No. 8995 could not have vested in the
defendant more title than what was rightfully due her and her coöwners. It
appearing that said certificate granted her much more than she expected, naturally
to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error, which gave rise to said
anomaly, be corrected (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324). The defendant and her
coöwners knew or, at least, came to know that it was through error that the original
certificate of title in question was issued by the court which heard cadastral case
No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March, 1933, but from the time said
certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from December 15, 1921. This is
evidenced by the fact that, even since, they remained passive without even
attempting to make the least showing of ownership over the land in question until
after the lapse of more than eleven years. The Land Registration Act as well as the
Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit
its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should
enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Angelo
vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who
resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he
happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor,
more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate
of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and
should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). This
is permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496, which is applicable to the Cadastral Act
because it is so provided expressly by the provisions of section 11 of the latter Act. It
cannot be otherwise because, as stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos,
Ongsiako, Lim y Cía. (55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans of lands sought to be
registered in the registry and reproduced in the certificate of title issued later, do
not annul the decree of registration on the ground that it is not the plan but the
land itself which is registered in the registry. In other words, if the plan of an
applicant for registration or claimant in a cadastral case alleges that the land
referred to in said plan is 100 or 1,000 hectares, and the land which he really owns
and desires to register in the registry is only 80 ares, he cannot claims to be the
owner of the existing difference if afterwards he is issued a certificate of title
granting him said area of 100 or 1,000 hectares.

Let it not be said that, as the decree of registration which gave rise to original
certificate of title No. 8995 was issued on December 15, 1921, and the plaintiff
failed to ask for the review of said decree within one year, in accordance with
section 38 of Act No. 496, he still has the right to question the legality or validity of
the decree in question, because the action brought by him in this case is not for said
purpose but merely to ask that the land in dispute, which was erroneously included
in original certificate of title No. 8995, be transferred to him by the defendant, he
being the owner thereof. This is possible and it is authorized by law, upon the
amendment of the plan which must be approved by the competent court, for which
purpose there is no necessity of altering or modifying in the least the decree already
issued.

For the foregoing reasons and for those taken into consideration in the cases of
Dizon vs. Datu (G. R. No. 30517, promulgated on June 3, 1929, not reported);
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (49
Phil., 433); and Palet vs. Tejedor (55 Phil., 790), which are not repeated herein, for
the sake of brevity, this court holds that the errors attributed to the lower court are
unfounded; that the appeal is unwarranted, and that the appealed judgment is in
accordance with the law.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is question is affirmed in toto, and it is ordered

that, upon the amendment of the plan of parcel No. 3679 of cadastral survey No. 11
of Bacalor, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, the corresponding
writ of the execution of said judgment be issued by the lower court, with the costs
to the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

||| (Angeles v. Samia, G.R. No. 44493, [November 3, 1938], 66 PHIL 444-451)

70
THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 184589. June 13, 2013.]
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC.,respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1
dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated September 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789 for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Said Decision and Resolution reversed
and set aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 3 and November 22, 2007 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, in Land Registration (Reg.)
Case No. N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619).
The facts are as follows.
On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring
125 hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San Mateo, Rizal (subject property), which was
docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. 5 On November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered
a Decision 6 evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as follows:
It has been established by the evidence adduced by [Landicho] that the parcel of
land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and
possessed by the spouses Felix San Pascual and Juanita Vertudes, Ignacio Santos
and Socorro Santos, Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome, Gavino Espiritu and
Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio Manuel and Justina Ramos, all of whom in January 1960,
executed instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of land in favor
of [Landicho], . . ., and on July 20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a final deed of
absolute sale . . . which superseded the conditional sale. Gavino Espiritu, one of the
vendors, fifty-five years old, farmer, resident of Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal,
testified that he and his co-vendors have been in possession of the parcel of land
since 1930 and that the possession of [Landicho], together with her predecessors in
interest, has been open, peaceful, continuous and adverse against the whole world
in the concept of an owner. It has also been established that the parcel of land is
within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of I.C. Project No. 26 of San Mateo, Rizal, .
. .; that the parcel of land is classified as "montañoso" with an assessed value of
P12,560.00 under Tax Dec. No. 7081, . . ., taxes due to which for the current year
had been paid, . . .; and that the same is not mortgaged or affected by any
encumbrance.
The oppositor did not present testimonial evidence but presented the report of
investigation of Land Investigator Pedro R. Feliciano dated August 23, 1965, . . .
which stated substantially that during the investigation and ocular inspection it has
been ascertained that no public land application is involved and that no reservation
is affected thereby, and therefore, he believed that the opposition already filed can
be withdrawn; . . ., 1st Indorsement dated August 24, 1965 of the District Land
Officer, District No. 7, Bureau of Lands, to the Director of Lands, recommending
that, in view of said report of investigation, the opposition be withdrawn; and . . .,
office memorandum of the Chief, Records Division, Bureau of Land, addressed to
the Chief, Legal Division, dated September 23, 1965, to the effect that according to
the records, plan Psu-201023 is not covered by any kind of public land application or
patent.
It is therefore clear from the evidence on record that the applicant is entitled to the
benefits provided by Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as amended. 7 aETADI
In the end, the CFI decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby confirms the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho,
of legal age, married to Teodorico Landicho, Filipino, resident of 74-A South 19th St.,
Quezon City, to the parcel of land under consideration and orders the registration
thereof in her name and personal circumstances aforementioned.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is hereby dismissed.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the order for the issuance of the
71
decree issue. 8
Upon finality of its Decision dated November 16, 1965, the CFI issued an Order 9 on
December 22, 1965 directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC)
"to comply with Section 21 of Act No. 2347" 10 on the issuance of a decree and original
certificate of title (OCT).
Eventually, on July 11, 1966, Jose D. Santos (Santos), Register of Deeds (ROD) for the
Province of Rizal, issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 167681 11 in Landicho's
name covering the subject property. Notably, ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather
than an OCT for the subject property; and although TCT No. 167681 stated that it was
issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no other detail regarding the decree and the original
registration of the subject property was filled out.
The subject property was thereafter sold several times, and as the old TCTs of the vendors
were cancelled, new TCTs were accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of the subject
property could be traced from Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), which acquired
TCT No. 344936 in its own name on November 10, 1971; then to Winmar Poultry Farm,
Inc. (WPFI), TCT No. 425582, November 5, 1973; and finally, to herein respondent
Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), TCT No. 482970, July 15, 1975. 12
Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) 13 instituted Civil Case No. 12044,
entitled A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which was still pending
before the RTC, Branch 167, of Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the
subject property, which was a portion of a bigger tract of land measuring around 513
hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999, dated February 20, 1956, in the name of said
corporation. This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the name of Meerkamp
Co. under OCT No. 301, pursuant to Decree No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429, issued on
November 22, 1906. ADRDI caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens (as regards
Civil Case No. 12044) on TCT No. 344936 of BCPI. Subsequently, based on the ruling of this
Court in A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 14 ADRDI was also able to
have its notice of adverse claim over the subject property annotated on TCT Nos. 344936
and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI, respectively. ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject
property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued on March 25,
1983.
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject
property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later,
on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before the
RTC, Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal, in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged
therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965
of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landicho's title over the subject
property has not been executed. Rodriguez specifically stated that no decree of
registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in
Landicho's name. As Landicho's successor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez
prayed that:
a. Upon the filing of the instant motion, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City be commanded to transmit to the Honorable Court the complete records and
expediente of LRC No. . . . N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619);
b. After hearing, the Honorable Court give due course to the instant motions and issue an
Order as follows:
i. Directing the Administrator of the Land Registration [Authority] to issue the Decree of
Registration, in accordance with the tenor of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 . . .
and the Order dated December 22, 1965 . . ., in the name of the petitioner [Rodriguez];
ii. Thereafter, ordering the Register of Deeds for Marikina City, through the Administrator
of the Land Registration Administration as having direct supervisory authority there-over,
to issue the Original Certificate of Title containing the Technical Description as duly
confirmed in the said Decision and Order . . . in the name of the herein petitioner
[Rodriguez].
PETITIONER further prays for such other measures of relief as may be deemed just and
equitable in the premises. 15
In the course of the proceedings concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion,
Rodriguez himself submitted as his Exhibit "GG" TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged that
said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a
subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 set
on November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration
No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection therewith.
On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to
Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing
that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest
therein as the registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970.
PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No.
482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that
Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970
remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct action or final court decree for its
cancellation. Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the title
of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI
asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could
protect its vested rights and interests over the subject property; to note and admit
its Answer-in-Intervention; and to deny Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion for utter lack
of merit.
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10,
2007, reasoning as follows:
Initially, the issue of jurisdiction arose particularly as to whether this Court may take
cognizance of the instant case previously assigned to the CFI Pasig and,
subsequently, rule upon the Omnibus Motion of [Rodriguez] despite the lapse of
more than forty (40) years after the finality of the Decision of November 16, 1965.
Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction because, as earlier stated, the proceedings in this
Court is merely a continuation of the land registration proceedings commenced in
the CFI Pasig. More importantly, with the creation of this Court under the provisions
of the Judiciary Reorganization Law, all cases involving properties within its
territorial jurisdiction, specifically in San Mateo, Rizal, were transferred to this Court
(Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
Consequently, there is no legal impediment for this Court to reiterate the Decision
dated November 16, 1965 and the Order dated December 22, 1966 because the
Rules on execution of Judgment pertaining to civil cases are not applicable to this
kind of proceedings. A final and executory judgment in a land registration case,
being merely declaratory in nature, does not prescribe. (Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA
1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. De Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316; vda. De Barroga vs.
Albano, 157 SCRA 131; Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 159)
Secondly, a more important issue was put to fore — whether this Court may issue a
writ of execution directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
registration over the subject property and the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal to issue an original certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez]. aADSIc
Consistency dictates and being a mere continuation of the CFI Pasig proceedings,
this Court can only reiterate the directives in the Order dated December 22, 196[5].
It cannot, however, issue, as prayed for, a writ of execution directing the issuance of
a decree of registration and an original certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez].
Finally, during the proceedings in this case, this Court was made aware of the
existence of claimants to the subject property. However, this Court cannot, at this
time and in this proceedings, rule on the legality or illegality of these claims of
ownership. It is best that these claims be ventilated in appropriate proceedings
specifically sought to for this purpose. 16 (Underscoring deleted.)
The RTC decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated December 22, 1966 of the
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Branch 6, is hereby REITERATED. The Land
Registration Authority is directed to issue a decree of registration while the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise directed to issue an original certificate of
title of the subject property, both in favor and in the name of applicant Purita
Landicho, of legal age, married to Teodorico Landicho, Filipino and a resident of 74-
A South 19th St., Quezon City, after compliance with issuance requirements and
procedures. 17
PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order of the RTC. The
RTC resolved both the Motion for Leave to Intervene with the attached Answer-in-
Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration of PCCAI in another Order dated
November 22, 2007. The trial court held:
This Court after receiving evidence that a Decision was rendered in favor of the
72
applicants spouses Landicho as owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, and that
no title was issued pursuant to the said Decision which has become final and executory
even after an Order to that effect was issued, merely reiterated the said Order for the
implementation of the Decision dated November 16, 1966, signed by the Hon. Andres
Reyes as Judge. In other words, Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has
become final and executory. The issue in the instant Petition is the issuance of a decree of
registration and nothing more is being tried.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Leave to Intervene and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the PCCAI are both DENIED. 18
The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, filed a
Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 informing the trial court that it cannot comply with
said Order since there were already two existing titles covering the subject property, i.e.,
TCT No. 70589 of Araneta (traced back to OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No.
482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landicho's TCT No. 167681); and to issue a decree of
registration and OCT in Landicho's name would only further aggravate the problem of
double titling. The LRA also explained that the ROD issued a TCT, rather than an OCT, to
Landicho for the subject property in 1966, following the Order dated July 7, 1966 of then
LRC Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas (Noblejas), who took cognizance of the fact that
the subject property, as part of a bigger parcel of land, was already registered under OCT
No. 301 in the name of Meerkamp Co., pursuant to Decree No. 1480 under GLRO Record
No. 2429 issued in 1906. LRC Commissioner Noblejas additionally stated in his Order that:
The new transfer certificate of title to be issued by virtue hereof is deemed to have been
derived from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-1. (Under Decree No. 1480 dated
November 22, 1906) which should be deemed cancelled with respect to the said property
and that the issuance of the same has been effected without the presentation of the
owners duplicate of subsisting certificate of title. 19 (Emphasis deleted.)
At around the same time, PCCAI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, assailing the Orders dated April 10,
2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC for having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of
execution for a final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued that when
subsequent facts and circumstances transpired which renders the execution of the final
and executory decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the trial court should refrain
from issuing a writ of execution. PCCAI likewise asserted that the RTC, as a land
registration court, did not have the jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership
over the subject property. PCCAI lastly maintained that it was an indispensable party in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by the RTC to intervene
during the hearing of Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion for the execution of the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated May 26, 2008, found merit in the Petition of
PCCAI. The appellate court gave great weight and credence to the Manifestation dated
February 8, 2008 of the LRA reporting the double titling and conflicting claims over the
subject property. The Court of Appeals held that:
The Land Registration Authority, being the repository of land registration documents and
the administrative agency with the necessary expertise concerning land registration
matters, We cannot but agree with the above-quoted Manifestation. Moreover, from the
above facts admitted by the parties and the LRA, it cannot be denied that there are
conflicting claims on the ownership of the property which cannot be passed upon by the
lower court as a land registration court for lack of jurisdiction. 20
The Court of Appeals additionally opined that the intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 was proper given the circumstances:
Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of Information Technology of the Philippines
vs. Comelec, G.R. 159139, August 22, 2006, the following doctrine was enunciated, to wit:
"The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no longer be modified, except only to
correct clerical errors or mistakes, or when the judgment is void, or if supervening events
or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the decision render its execution unjust
and inequitable. In the interest of substantial justice, this Court has allowed exceptions to
this rule. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof, may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."
We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention when the decision of the case was
already final and executory and during the execution stage of the case. However, the
supervening event which is the issuance of a decree of registration which was
already implemented and enforced upon [the] order of the Administrator of the LRC
way back in July 11, 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No. 167861 in the name of Purita
Landicho instead of an OCT makes the said intervention proper and well-taken.
From the foregoing, it appears absurd and senseless that an OCT be issued in favor
of Mr. Rodriguez. Furthermore, it is in the paramount interest of justice that the
assailed orders be not implemented, [PCCAI] being an indispensable party in the
execution and/or implementation of the said orders. The non-execution of the said
orders will prevent further disarray, confusion and complexity on the issue of who is
or who should be the real owner of the subject land which is a matter that can be
threshed out in a proper case for quieting of title between adverse claimants. 21
Based on the foregoing, the appellate court adjudged:
All told, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
[Rodriguez, RTC Presiding Judge Josephine Zarate-Fernandez, the LRA
Administrator, and Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease and desist from
implementing the said orders pending the outcome of a proper case before an
appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the subject land can be put to
rest. 22
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 17, 2008.
Aggrieved, Rodriguez sought recourse from this Court through the present Petition,
arguing that:
I
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED
AN OPEN-ENDED JUDGMENT.
A a derivative of TCT No. 167681 issued to Landicho) against Araneta who holds TCT No.
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ABDICATED ITS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
ON THE MERE MANIFESTATION OF THE LRA THAT THERE WERE ISSUES OF
OWNERSHIP WHICH HAVE FIRST TO BE RESOLVED.
B The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED AN ISSUE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL OR HAD OTHERWISE BEEN RESOLVED.
II
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE [PCCAI] HAD LEGAL
STANDING TO PREVENT OR SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION
LAWS BY WAY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DIRECTING THE LAND
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER
16, 1965. EAISDH
A accordance with law."
THE [PCCAI] HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN LRC NO. N-5098.
B.
THE [PCCAI] CANNOT CLAIM BUYER IN GOOD FAITH STATUS AS ITS TITLE WAS
DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE.
III
[RODRIGUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE CORRECTIVE AND PREROGATIVE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO INSURE THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS ARE PROPERLY AND
FULLY IMPLEMENTED. 23
The instant Petition has no merit.
At the outset, the Court finds unmeritorious Rodriguez's claim that the Court of
73
Appeals rendered an open-ended judgment. In the dispositive portion of its Decision
dated May 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals clearly and categorically "REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE" the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098. The cease and desist order of the appellate court in the second line of
the same dispositive portion is therefore a superfluity. Obviously, by reversing and setting
aside the foregoing Orders, there is nothing more to implement. The phrase "pending the
outcome of a proper case before an appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the
subject land can be put to rest[,]" 24 does not mean that the very same Orders which
were reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals could later on be revived or
reinstated; rather it means that the remedies sought by Rodriguez can be litigated and
granted in an appropriate proceeding by a court with proper jurisdiction.
To clarify matters, it must be stressed that the issue brought before the Court of Appeals
did not involve the question of the ownership. The appellate court only concerned itself
with the proper execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-
5098 but, due to the intricacy of the matter, was compelled to take notice of the
controversy between Rodriguez and PCCAI, both of whom trace back their titles to
Landicho. In view of these conflicting claims, Rodriguez now avers that because ROD
Santos issued TCT No. 167681 for the subject property in Landicho's name, the November
16, 1965 Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was not validly implemented since no OCT
was issued. 25 Corollary to this, Rodriguez posits that PCCAI is not a buyer in good faith of
the subject property and that the latter's TCT No. 482970 is spurious. PCCAI, on the other
hand, insists that the issuance of TCT No. 167681 to Landicho, from which its own TCT No.
482970 may be traced back, was a valid execution of the said CFI decision.
The LRA, in its Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 filed before the RTC, explained that a
TCT was issued to Landicho because the subject property, as part of a bigger parcel of
land, was already covered by Decree No. 1480 and OCT No. 301 dated November 22, 1906
in the name of Meerkamp Co. In other words, Landicho's TCT No. 167681 is a derivative of
Decree No. 1480 and OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co. which were cancelled to the extent of
the subject property.
Complicating the matter further is the pendency of Civil Case No. 12044 in the RTC, Branch
167, Pasig City. Not only is PCCAI questioning the right of Rodriguez to the issuance of an
OCT pursuant to the November 16, 1965 Decision and December 22, 1965 Order of the CFI
in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, it is also defending the validity of TCT No. 482970 (which is
70589 (which is a derivative of Meerkamp Co.'s OCT No. 301). In view of the foregoing,
issuing an OCT covering the subject property to Rodriguez would give rise to a third
certificate of title over the same property. Such act would only cause more confusion and
complication, rather than the preservation, of the Torrens system of registration.
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of
the ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong presumption exists that Torrens
titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. 26 In this case, PCCAI is the registered
owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970, which could be traced back to TCT
No. 16781 issued to Landicho. As between PCCAI and Rodriguez, the former is better
entitled to the protection of the Torrens system. PCCAI can rely on its TCT No. 482970
until the same has been annulled and/or cancelled.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, explicitly provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands of Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of America, 27 the Court declared that a Torrens
title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. A collateral attack is made when, in another
action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said
action.
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an application for registration of the subject property
instituted by Landicho before the CFI, which was granted by the CFI in its Decision dated
November 16, 1965. Rodriguez, asserting that he was Landicho's lawful successor-in-
interest, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 seeking
the issuance of a decree of registration and an OCT in his name for the subject property
pursuant to the said CFI judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of TCT No.
482970 of PCCAI for the same property, but he simply brushed aside said certificate of title
for allegedly being spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not pray that TCT No. 482970 be declared
void and/or cancelled; and even if he did, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in
a land registration case. Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098,
under the circumstances, is a collateral attack on said certificate, which is proscribed
under Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. ACTIcS
If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT issued in his (or even in
Landicho's name) for the subject property, he should have directly challenged the
validity of the extant TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the very same property in an
action specifically instituted for such purpose (i.e., petition for annulment and/or
cancellation of title, petition for quieting of title) and pray the said certificate of title
be annulled or canceled. The proper court in an appropriate action can try the
factual and legal issues involving the alleged fatal defects in Landicho's TCT No.
167681 and/or its derivative TCTs, including TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI; the legal
effects of Landicho's sale of the subject property to BCPI (the predecessor-in-
interest of PCCAI) in 1971 and also to Rodriguez in 1996; and the good faith or bad
faith of PCCAI, as well as Rodriguez, in purchasing the subject property. The
resolution of these issues will ultimately be determinative of who between
Rodriguez and PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject property.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for according weight and credence
to the Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 of the LRA.
The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and protecting the Torrens
system of land titling and registration. 28 In particular, it is tasked with the following
functions:
(1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land
registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registrars of Land Titles and
Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
(2) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled
under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled
lands; and
(3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings and to the other agencies of the government in the implementation of
the land reform program. 29
The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of registration is ministerial in the sense
that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record. They have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to
the preparation and issuance of the decree, these officials ought to seek clarification
from the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically
called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings." 30
In Ramos v. Rodriguez, 31 the LRA filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
and order of the land registration court respectively granting registration of a parcel
of land and directing the issuance of a decree of registration for the same.
According to the LRA, there was already an existing certificate of title for the
property. The land registration court granted the motion for reconsideration of the
LRA and set aside its earlier decision and order. On appeal, the Court declared that
the land registration court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing
itself because it was merely following the recommendation of the LRA, which was
then acting as an agent of the court.
In another case, Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration Authority, 32 the Court
refused to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the LRA to issue a decree of
registration as ordered by a land registration court. The Court took into account the
LRA report that the parcels of land were already registered and held:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather
than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's
reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of
titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. 33
The LRA, in this case, filed the Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 to inform the
RTC that the subject property is already covered by two TCTs, both "uncancelled
and extant[;]" and for this reason, the LRA cannot comply with the RTC Order dated
April 10, 2007, directing the issuance of a decree of registration and an OCT for the
same property in Landicho's name, as it would "further aggravate the already
existing problem of double titling[.]" In filing said Manifestation, the LRA was only
74
faithfully pursuing its mandate to protect the Torrens system and performing its function
of extending assistance to the RTC as regards Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Contrary to
Rodriguez's assertion, the Court of Appeals did not abdicate its jurisdiction when it
granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of PCCAI largely based on the
Manifestation of the LRA, since the LRA filed such a Manifestation as an officer of the
court.
Finally, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of
which read:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI. As the
registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject property. The issuance of
another certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud on
its TCT No. 482970.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the
Court allowed exceptions in several cases, viz.:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial
court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury
and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress
again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the
powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 34 (Citations omitted.)
cEaTHD
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of
procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject
property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No.
N-5098 became final and executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on
November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while
Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996. Second, as
previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho.
Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of Landicho, the original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest
proceedings in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion, filed
before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the November
16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case only to oppose
Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered
in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landicho's TCT No. 167681. And
fourth, after learning of Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose
the same. Such action was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI
to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in
Rodriguez's name. For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders dated
April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San
Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting
the second sentence of the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184589, [June 13, 2013], 711 PHIL 56-
79)

75
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988.]
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; PURPOSE.
— "Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing
the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure
that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens
serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular
property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of
course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14,
Rules of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415,
footnote 3, citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-485).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE COURT TO CANCEL LIS PENDENS;
DELAYING TACTICS OF PARTY IN CASE AT BAR IS A GROUND FOR CANCELLATION. —
A notice of lis pendens of Civil Case No. 15871 was annotated on petitioner's
Certificate of Title No. 106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. It
appears, however, that private respondents in filing said case were trying to delay
the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No.
64432 wherein this Court ordered the immediate implementation of the writs of
possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving said lot. The
foregoing facts necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of
Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect
that: "We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been
filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and
undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under
peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the
plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the
continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily
delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano
v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, supra)"
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; ALLOWS CANCELLATION OF LIS
PENDENS UPON PROOF THAT THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE IS TO MOLEST THE ADVERSE
PARTY; FAILURE TO CANCEL NOTICE PURSUANT THERETO, AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. — Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining
the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot
be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section
77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph
thereof which provides: "Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL. — Under Sections 10
and 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the function of a Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds encumbrance, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL STATUTES MUST BE TAKEN TO MEAN EXACTLY WHAT IT DAYS; P.D.
NO. 1529 IS CLEAR. — The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia
and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute
concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
76
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
6. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF WORD "SHALL". — According to Webster's Third International
Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, . . . obligation
- used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory."
7. CRIMINAL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; A REGISTER OF DEEDS HAS NO
LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; OPINION OF
COMMISSIONER MUST BE SOUGHT IN CASE OF DOUBT. — The respondent Acting Register
of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt
as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument
presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION; DELAY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COURT'S
FINAL RESOLUTION; RESPONSIBILITY FALLS ON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE. — In the
ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of
this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge.
He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse
the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves
another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the
private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the
instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the
earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29,
1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
". . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.
Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda. The
Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No.
4517. The Court, after considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No.
25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion
for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29,
1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera
filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the
Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,
1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March 25,
1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in
accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners
in the instant case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No.
00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation
of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for
engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession
and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused
by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26,
1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to maintain the status quo, both in
the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that
— (1) there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No.
64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been
passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition moot and
academic pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already
resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827.
Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise
ordered." (pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January
7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which
covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited pursuant to our
Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in
G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
"Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
"(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7,
1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division)
in G.R. No. 62042;
"(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
"(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that
of Honorable Supreme Court.
"Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the
same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and
void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,
all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
"The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision
Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo -
G.R. No. 64432).
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo,
Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case before this
Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed
by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court
and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court.
They prayed that an order be issued:
"1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge
Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the
Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
"2. To cancel No. T-25772. Likewise to cancel No. T-106098 and once cancelled to
issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises." (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17, 1986 a Resolution in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another
motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution
dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6, 1986 and
January 6, 1987 respectively, to wit:
"O R D E R
77
"This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through counsel
on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the
City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October
23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds,
Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
"Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was
granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated
September 17, 1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to
register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
"O R D E R
"This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia on December 2, 1986 in compliance with the order of this Court dated November
25, 1986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera
through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its
Order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the
thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is
hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after which
period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the
name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall
contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate." (pp. 286-287,
Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation
asking for clarification on the following points:
"a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772, should
the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution of
November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the
Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
"b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the implementation of
the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot
4517?" (p. 536, Rollo — 64432).
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution
dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
"Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No.
64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our resolutions, this
COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions
upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this Court.
No further motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court." (p. 615, Rollo - 64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6,
1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order
declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and
issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of
petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case
No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after
setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis
pendens.

This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another
order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent
judge to reinstate his order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles
issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of lis
pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to
immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion
and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found
on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
"That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on
the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"'At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of
the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land
and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of Lis
Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk
of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of
disposal thereof.'
"That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-
111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No.
15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, 'Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maxima Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs,
versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents.'
"That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 1529, the cancellation of subject
Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration
of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was
pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
"Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was
based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate
Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can
order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens." (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court
resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and
granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis
pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared
valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary
issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a
notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No.
64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo
Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Providos' counsel,
a notice of lis pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-
78
106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated
October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why
respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting
Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles
of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido
was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name
and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E," G.R. No.
62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera
and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao
L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the
name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners." (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis
supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042
contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the
reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No.
4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring
TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of
petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25, 1983 long before
Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents
herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the
final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered
immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution
proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
"Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning
to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation;
and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69
Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban,
18 SCRA 481, 485-486).
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case
necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovira (55
Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363)
and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
"We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a
proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the
proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for
instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff
is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of
the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal, supra)"
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme
Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfully the already
final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining
the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot
be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section
77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph
thereof which provides:
"Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
thereof."
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming
Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by
the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against
the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (Baranda v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 81163, [September 26, 1988], 248 PHIL 205-220)

This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been
misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he
was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871
prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to
the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but
based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the
parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants
therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the
Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of
Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration . . . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to
the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party
in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the
Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds . . ."

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of
title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to,
must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of
land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed . . .
or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the
Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land
Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil

79
Instances when the RD may validly refuse registration of voluntary instruments
and private documents
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20611. May 8, 1969.]
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT; VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH REGISTERED LAND;
PRESENTATION OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR
REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT; ONLY ONE DUPLICATE COPY OF
TITLE IS SURRENDERED. — Section 55 of Act 496 obviously assumes that there
is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the
registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary
instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the
register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTER OF DEEDS' REFUSAL TO ANNOTATE DONATION
PROPER WHERE THERE WERE THREE OTHER COPIES OF TITLE. — Where, when
the petitioner presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of the
registered owner's certificate of title and a deed of donation for annotation,
three other copies of the title were in existence, the register of deeds was
correct in denying the requested annotation for being "legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law." As correctly observed by the Land Registration
Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was
unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until
otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several
copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may
be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is
annotated on one copy and not on the others.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEED OF DONATION SIGNED BY HUSBAND DISPOSING OF
CONJUGAL PROPERTY CANNOT BE REGISTERED. — Where the deed of
donation executed by the surviving husband bears on its face an infirmity,
namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of the conjugal property which he
donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what
remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three
other parties, the denial of the registration of the said deed of donation was
justified.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT OVER A
REGISTERED LAND MAY BE SUSPENDED. — Where there is a case pending
wherein the civil status of the donor and the character of the land in question
are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by
him, the matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties
could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
5. ID.; OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; IMPORTANCE THEREOF. —
The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the
original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the
title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
reliable.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J p:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC
Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos
80
Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and
an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the
same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be
annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in
OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (2/3)
portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225
hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three
different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
"Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 3.710 square meters only in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to
said area of 3.710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee . . . is
hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor . . .
"Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 16.713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this
Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided
portion . . . and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee . . . is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor . . . "Date of Instrument:
June 9, 1953, . . .
'Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 15.000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this
Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided
portion . . . and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee . . . is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor . . .
"Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952, . . ."
The final part of the annotations referring to the above-mentioned sales contains an
additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title
No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of
Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr.
Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees,
this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-
owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by
petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a
resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy,
the Commissioner observed.
"(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in
the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions
thereof on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently,
aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-
owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers.
Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No.
548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of
counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was
unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction
rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued."
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would
want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their
possession, citing Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented
for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with
such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the
presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it
speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the
property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-
owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies
in their favor was illegal or unauthorized.

We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously

assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely,
that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a
voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for
the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration.
In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence,
presumably issued under Section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the
Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those
copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being
presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There
being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their
integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright
conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself
refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original,
which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions,
particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were
not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the
whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in

upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since
the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of
the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia
Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the
surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may
appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous
settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot
share or interest therein—subject of course to the result of future liquidation.
Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the
property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio
Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its
registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property
which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than
what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to
three other parties.

It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the
character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the
different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed
of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the
rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices
of lis pendens.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos

Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Capistrano J., did not take part.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

||| (Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, G.R. No. L-20611, [May 8, 1969],
138 PHIL 12-18)

81
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22486. March 20, 1968.]
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; REGISTER OF DEEDS; NO POWER TO DETERMINE
VALIDITY OF DOCUMENT. — The Register of Deeds may not validly refuse to
register a deed of sale presented to him for registration. Whether a document
is valid or not, is not for the Register of Deeds to determine; this function
belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed, a register of
deeds is entirely precluded by Section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising
his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of
whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For
under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken
with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question
to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing,
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL TO REGISTER; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES. — Mandamus does not lie to compel the register of deeds to
register the deed of sale in question, because pursuant to the provisions of
Section 4 of Republic Act 1151, where any party in interest does not agree with
the register of deeds, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of
Land Registration, whose decision on the matter shall be binding upon all
register of deeds. Hence, this administrative remedy must be resorted to,
before there can be recourse to the courts.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and
covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the
office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of
sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was
refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated
in his letter of May 21, 1962:
"1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is
considered conjugal property;
"2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the
New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
"3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made,
the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating
the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
"To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of
the surviving spouses and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of
extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or
heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale
executed by their father."
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan
on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of
Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding
transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a
ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and
that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
82
ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the
grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other
legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the
respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for
dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does
not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act
1151," dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his
part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real
properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine;
this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. 1
"Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction." (Gabriel vs.
Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L- 17956, Sept. 30, 1963).
". . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their
registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for
denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid
instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to
know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their
existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give
notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected
to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated
afterwards." (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151
from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.
For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he
is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step
to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
"Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument
presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with
the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be
submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of
the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after
consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of
registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such
cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further,
That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the
notice thereof."
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for
mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does
not agree with the Register of Deeds .. the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to
by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1963 is affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.

||| (Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan, G.R. No. L-22486, [March 20,
1968], 131 PHIL 257-262)

83
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17956. September 30, 1963.]
ELISA D. GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL,
respondent, JUANITA R. DOMINGO, oppositor-appellant.
Romualdo D. Celestra for petitioner-appellee.
Balcos, Salazar & Associates for oppositor-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM; DUTY OF REGISTER OF
DEEDS TO REGISTER WHERE THE DOCUMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY DRAWN UP. —
Where the documents containing the notice of adverse claim is sufficient in
law and drawn up in accordance with existing requirements, it becomes
incumbent upon the Register of Deeds to perform his ministerial duty, without
unnecessary delay, to register the instrument.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION. —
Whether or not the adverse claims, the notices of which are sought to be
registered, are frivolous and merely intended to harass, and such other
litigious matters raised by the protagonists, are for a court of competent
jurisdiction and not for the Land Registration Commission, to decide.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRABILITY DISTINGUISHED FROM VALIDITY. — Registration
of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity. The registration of
an adverse claim will not by itself alone to make it valid. Its validity will be
determined in a separate proceeding.
DECISION
PAREDES, J p:
On January 4, 1960, petitioner herein Elisa D. Gabriel, filed with the Register of
Deeds of Manila, an Adverse claim, against the properties registered in the
name of oppositor-appellant, Juanita R. Domingo, her sister. As grounds for
the adverse claim, petitioner allege —
"Notwithstanding the registration of the foregoing properties in the name of
Juanita R. Domingo, the same properties have been included in the amended
inventory of the estate of the late Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, filed by
Elisa Domingo de Gabriel 1 as they are in fact properties acquired by the
deceased during her, lifetime. The registration of the titles of these properties
should have been made in the name of said Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo,
but due to commission of fraud and deceit, by said Juanita R. Domingo, who
was then living in the same house with the deceased, all the titles of the above
stated properties were registered instead in her name, thus depriving herein
adverse claimant who is likewise an heir of Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, of
her lawful rights, interests and participations over said properties."
On the same date, a similar notice of adverse claim was presented by
petitioner with the Register of Deeds of Rizal, on the properties registered in
the name of Juanita R. Domingo, located in Rizal Province, the ground for
which was stated as follows —
"The foregoing properties are included in the amended inventory of the estate
of their late mother Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, who is the true owner of
said properties, and considering that the registrations in the name of Juanita R.
Domingo were only made fraudulently, thus depriving herein adverse claimant
of her lawful rights, interest and participations over said properties."
For the adverse claim on the Manila properties, Domingo presented an
opposition, claiming that the adverse claim was instituted for (1) Harassment;
(2) Had no legal basis; and (3) Had done and will do irreparable loss to her.
The Register of Deeds of Manila, elevated the matter to the Land Registration
Commission en Consulta, wherein he stated —
"Because the undersigned is in doubt as to whether the registration of the
claim is proper under the circumstances, the same is hereby submitted for
proper determination by this Commission."
84
Oppositor Domingo also asked that the adverse claim of Gabriel on her Rizal
properties be denied, contending that same was presented only to embarrass her;
that said properties were acquired by her pursuant to an extrajudicial partition in
which the petitioner Gabriel and their mother (Antonia), were signatories.
On January 13, 1960, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice
of Adverse Claim, stating —
"P.E. No. 90080 — NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM has/have been found to be legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law and is/are, therefore, hereby denied on
the following ground:
'Where there are other provisions or remedies under this act, the affidavit of adverse
claim is not applicable."
Under date of January 21, 1960, Elisa D. Gabriel appealed the above denial to the
Land Registration Commission.
On February 17, 1960, the Register of Deeds of Rizal, in his letter transmitting the
case to the LRC, tried to justify his denial to annotate the affidavit of Adverse claim,
by pointing out that such procedure was not proper, contending that petitioner's
case does not come under the provisions of Section 110 of Act 496. If at all, he
claims, petitioner should have availed of Section 98 thereof.
On March 7, 1960, the LRC heard the two cases, and before any of the parties could
file his memorandum, the Register of Deeds of Rizal, presented a Supplemental
Memorandum, reiterating his stand. In his reply, Gabriel clarified the issue, stating
that the question at bar concerns the fraudulent registration by oppositor, of the
properties subject of the Adverse Claims, and not their fraudulent acquisition.
The Land Registration Commission, on April 29, 1960, issued a resolution, the
pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereinbelow —
"The only question to be resolved by this Commission in these related consultas is
the registration of the two notices of adverse claim filed with the Registries of Manila
and Rizal. Whether or not these adverse claims are valid, whether or not they are
frivolous and merely intended to harass, and such other litigations matters raised by
the protagonist, are for a court of competent jurisdiction, and not for this
Commission, to decide.
Sec. 110. of Act No. 496, provides that —
"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and
a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner,
and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon
petition of any party in interest, shall grant a specific hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and
equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant, double or
treble the costs in its discretion.'
It is believed that the two notices of adverse claim filed in both registries
substantially comply with the above requirements. And under paragraph 5 of LRC
Circular No. 2, dated July 10, 1954, 'where the document sought to be registered is
sufficient in law and drawn up in accordance with existing requirements, it becomes
incumbent upon the Register of Deeds to perform his ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.
The registration of an invalid adverse claim will not do so much harm as the non-
registration of a valid one. The notation of an adverse claim, like that of lis pendens,
does not create a non-existent right or lien and only means that a person who
purchases or contracts on the property in dispute does so subject to the result or
outcome of the dispute . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, this Commission is of the
opinion, and so holds, that the notices of adverse claim filed by Elisa D. Gabriel
with the Registries of Manila and Rizal are registrable. Registration should not
however be confused with validity. The registration of the adverse claims will
not by itself alone make them valid. Their validity will be ultimately be decided
in Special Proceeding No. 2658 or, in the alternative, in the more expeditious
remedy provided for in Sec. 110 of Act No. 496., i.e., a speedy hearing upon
the question of the validity of the adverse claim."

Oppositor Domingo moved for a reconsideration of the above order,

contending, in the main, that a Register of Deeds exercises some degree of
judicial power to determine upon his own responsibility, the legality of
instruments brought before him for registration. In other words, oppositor
submits that duties of the Registers of Deeds are not wholly ministerial, for
they can refuse and/or suspend the registration of documents when they think
they are not valid or not registrable. In denying the motion for
reconsideration, the Land Registration Commissioner said, in part —

"The only question resolved by this Commission was the registrability of the
two notices of adverse claims. The allegations and counter allegations of the
contending parties on the validity or invalidity of the adverse claims were not
considered. They should be addressed to and decided by a competent court."

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration, oppositor brought the
matter to this Court on Appeal, claiming that the Land Registration
Commission erred (1) in holding the adverse claims registrable; and (2) in
holding that it is the mandatory duty of the Register of Deeds to register the
instant notices of adverse claims "whether or not they are valid, whether or
not they are frivolous and merely intended to harass."

In addition to the well-taken disquisitions of the L.R.C., it should be observed

that Section 110 of Act No. 496, which is the legal provision applicable to the
case, is divided into two parts: the first refers to the duty of the party who
claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
subsequent to the date of the original registration; and the requirements to be
complied with in order that such statement shall be entitled to registration as
an adverse claim, thus showing the ministerial function of the Register of
Deeds, when no defect is found on the face of such instrument; and the
second applies only when, after registration of the adverse claim, a party files
an appropriate petition with a competent court which shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and to enter a
decree, as justice and equity require; and in this hearing, the competent court
shall resolve whether the adverse claim is frivolous or vexatious, which shall
serve as the basis in taxing the costs. In the instant case, the first part was
already acted upon by the L.R.C. which resolved in favor of the registrability of
the two adverse claims and this part should have been considered as closed.
What is left, is the determination of the validity of the adverse claims by
competent court, after the filing of the corresponding petition for hearing,
which the appellant had not done.

Anent the second assignment of error, the Land Registration Commission did
not state that it was mandatory for a Register of Deeds to register invalid or
frivolous documents, or those intended to harass; it merely said that whether
the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is
his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform
with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Land Registration Commission, holding the

registrability of the Adverse Claims under consideration, should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositor-appellant Juanita R. Domingo.

Bengzon, C . J ., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon,

Regala and Makalintal, JJ ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J ., took no part.

||| (Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, G.R. No. L-17956, [September 30,
1963], 118 PHIL 980-986)

85
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3970. October 29, 1952.]
GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH PABLA,
OJAGAR SINGH, DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG KIAT,
petitioners-appellees, vs. HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO,
respondents-appellants.
Jose N. Buendia for appellants.
Eliseo Caunca for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; REGISTRATION OF DEEDS; ITS PURPOSE. — The
purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all persons
(section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the proceedings for registration
to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights over the land,
subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights of these parties,
who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when an instrument is
subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects on other
instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of registration.
2. ID.; ID.; REGISTER OF DEEDS NEED NOT INQUIRE ABOUT VALIDITY OF
DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED. — The law on registration does not
require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties
affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become
aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provision? If the
purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the
effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must
first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards.
3. ID.; ID.; IF QUESTION OF REGISTERABILITY IS BEFORE THE COURT, IT MAY
INQUIRE INTO VALIDITY OF DOCUMENTS IF ALL PARTIES ARE GIVEN
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR EVIDENCE. — The foregoing, however, must
not be understood as an absolute and invariable rule of procedure, for parties
may, by mutual consent, submit issues for determination at the time of the
proceeding to register a document. But the court should only proceed
therewith (determination of the issues) upon giving all the parties concerned
sufficient opportunity to present their respective side and the evidence in
support thereof, and that if this can not be done, the determination of the
issues should be reserved in a subsequent proceeding, and, in the meantime,
the registration of the document ordered.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J p:
This is an appeal prosecuted by the respondents-appellants against an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated November 29, 1949, compelling
them to surrender owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
8071 and 8072, so that the contract of lease entered into between petitioners-
appellees and the owner of the land covered by said certificates of title be
annotated thereon. John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of the land covered by the
above-mentioned certificates of title, and on July 23, 1948, he entered into a
contract (Exhibit A) with the petitioners-appellees, under the terms of which
petitioners-appellees were to construct thereon a three-story building of
concrete and of strong materials valued at from P80,000 to P90,000. The
contract also provided that the building shall become the exclusive property of
the owner of the land, but that the petitioners-appellees were to occupy, hold,
or possess it as lessees for a period of three years and six months from its
completion, without paying any rentals therefor, the sum spent in the
construction being considered as the rentals; that after the above period of
three years and six months petitioners-appellees were to continue occupying
the said building for another two years at a monthly rental of P2,000. This
contract of lease was filed and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Manila on August 10, 1948, under Primary Entry No. 3352, Volume 15. At
the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing mortgage
over the land in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo for the sum of P110,000.
This mortgage in favor of the Calvos was cancelled, and a new mortgage was
executed by the owner in favor of respondents-appellants herein, Honorable
Hermogenes Reyes and his spouse Teodora Tantoco, dated March 8, 1949,
86
which was registered on the same date in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Manila under Primary Entry No. 5014. On May 14, 1949, the original contract of
lease, Exhibit A, was amended by Exh. C, by virtue of which the period under which
the lessees were to hold and occupy the property without rentals was extended to
seven years and four months, and the rental for the additional two years thereafter
reduced to P1,148. This amended contract of lease, Exhibit C, was also registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila under Primary Entry No. 5014, Volume
16, on May 20, 1949.
On May 25, 1949, counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote respondents-appellants
requesting them to allow him to take the certificates of title to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of the contracts of lease entered into
by the owner with them (Exhibit D), and on May 27, 1949, the son of respondents-
appellants acknowledged receipt of the said letter but informed counsel for the
petitioners-appellees that the request could not be granted without the written
consent of the owner of the certificates of title (Exhibit E). On June 16, 1949,
respondents-appellants' son wrote the owner of the land (Exhibit M) demanding the
payment of the overdue interest on the mortgage with the following statement:
". . . For this reason, I wish to request that you come over to my office before 12:00
noon to pay the said interest before we can deliver your Transfer Certificate of Title
to Atty. Manuel P. Calanog who will take charge of registering the lease contract
between Mr. Singh Pabla and your goodself."
On June 3, 1949, the petitioners-appellees filed a motion in the Court of First
Instance of Manila praying that an order issue to the owner for the delivery of the
owner's duplicates of transfer certificates of title Nos. 8071 and 8072 to the
petitioners in order that the Register of Deeds of Manila may be able to make the
annotation thereon of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, and its amendment, Exhibit C.
Against this petition Hermogenes Reyes and Teodora Tantoco filed an opposition,
alleging that they had no knowledge whatsoever of the contract of lease, Exhibit A,
or of its amendment, Exhibit C, and that the execution of the amendment, Exhibit C,
violated the express provision of the mortgage, to the effect that the owner could
not sell, assign, or encumber the mortgaged premises without the written consent of
the mortgagees. It is to be noted that with respect to the original contract of lease,
Exhibit A, no allegation is made in the opposition of the respondents- appellants that
they were not aware of the existence of the contract, Exhibit A, their only allegation
being that the only annotation on the certificates of title at the time they entered
into the contract of mortgage was the mortgage in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos
Calvo. It is also to be noted that respondents-appellants do not deny an express
allegation of paragraph 13 of the amended petition to the effect that notice was
given to the public by a big sign board placed on the premises while the building was
under construction that petitioners- appellees are the owners of the building. The
amended petition further states, without denial on the part of the respondents-
appellants, that as early as October 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds of Manila had
demanded in writing from the owner of the land the submission of his duplicate
certificates of title Nos. 8071 and 8072 in order that the lease executed by him in
favor of the petitioners-appellees may be given due course. At the hearing of the
motion no oral evidence was submitted; only documentary evidence was presented.
Thereafter the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order already mentioned
above, directing respondents to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds of Manila in order that petitioners-appellees' contract of lease may be noted
thereon. It expressly found that respondents-appellants had knowledge of the lease
contract, Exhibit A, but that respondents' deed of mortgage of March 8, 1949, has
priority over petitioner's amended contract of lease, Exhibit C. As regards the
(supposed) prohibition contained in the contract of mortgage, the court held that the
prohibition gives a right of foreclosure; in other words, that in spite of the prohibition
the amended contract of lease, Exhibit C, may not be considered as null and void.
In this court on appeal claim is made on behalf of the respondents-appellants that
the court a quo erred in holding that respondents-appellants had knowledge of the
contract of lease, Exhibit A; that it erred in holding that Tirso T. Reyes is the attorney-
in-fact of the respondents-appellants; that it erred in ordering the registration of the
contract of lease, Exhibit A; and that it erred in not holding that the registration of
the contracts, Exhibits A and C, will prejudice the rights and interest of respondents-
appellants.
It should be noted that all that the petitioners demand or pray for is the surrender of
the titles to the Register of Deeds so that their contracts of lease, Exhibits A and C,
may be noted thereon. The only issue, therefore, is whether petitioners have a right
to have said deeds registered. It is not denied that the contracts have been executed
by the registered owner of the land, or that they have been lawfully executed, or
that they have all the qualities of registerable documents. Indeed, the owner is
agreeable to the registration. The objections interposed by respondents, who for determination in a proper proceeding. With costs against the respondents-
are mortgagees merely, that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, appellants.
or that their mortgage has priority, or that they will be prejudiced, are beside
the issue. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all ||| (Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co. v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-3970, [October 29, 1952], 92 PHIL
persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the proceedings for 177-186)
registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights
over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights
of these parties, who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when an
instrument is subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects on
other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of
registration. Thus, the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they
had no knowledge of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, before the property was
mortgaged to them, or that the same violates their contract of mortgage with
the owner of the land — these are not passed upon by the order for the
registration of petitioners-appellees' contract of lease. The objections, as well
as the relative rights of all parties who have registered their deeds, shall be
decided in the proper suit or proceeding when the opportune occasion arises;
but they are not now in issue, nor may they be adjudicated upon, simply
because petitioners-appellees have applied for the registration of their
contract of lease.

The impropriety and inconvenience of proceeding to determine completely

and in advance all the possible consequences of a document, upon all parties
affected thereby, in the proceeding for its registration becomes apparent
when, as in this case, important and complicated questions of fact and of law
were presented by the respondents-appellants about their alleged lack of
knowledge of the contracts of lease and the invalidity thereof. The court a quo
passed upon vital issues of fact upon the motion and the opposition thereto,
and upon the documents, letters, and receipts presented, without any other
evidence than the above. Yet the question of knowledge is mainly a question
of fact and requires inquiry into many and complicated circumstances, which
can not be satisfactorily shown except by testimony.

On the other hand, the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid
objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-
existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on
registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered.
How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before
they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their
provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then
questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be
decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards.

The foregoing, however, must not be understood as an absolute and invariable

rule of procedure, for parties may, by mutual consent, submit issues for
determination at the time of the proceeding to register a document. But the
court should only proceed therewith (determination of the issues) upon giving
all the parties concerned sufficient opportunity to present their respective
sides and the evidence in support thereof, and that if this can not be done, the
determination of the issues should be reserved in a subsequent proceeding
and the registration of the document ordered.

In accordance with the above opinion, we find that the issues raised by
respondents-appellants, namely, that the contracts of lease, Exhibits A and C,
are invalid because they violate the contracts of mortgage executed in favor of
the owner of the land, that Tirso T. Reyes is not the attorney-in-fact of the
respondents-appellants, and that the respondents-appellants had no
knowledge of the execution of the contract of lease, Exhibits A and C - these
issues were not properly investigated because respondents-appellants did not
have the opportunity to present evidence thereon and did not even present
copy of their mortgage at the hearing, and the trial court decided the
questions without full and complete investigation. The ruling of the trial court
on the above issues should, therefore, be set aside and their determination
reserved in a proper proceeding.

Wherefore, the opposition to the motion for the surrender of the certificates
of title to the Register of Deeds of Manila is overruled, and the order appealed
from, in so far as it orders the surrender of the certificates of title for the
registration of the contracts of lease, is hereby affirmed, but the other rulings
are reversed, and the other issues raised by respondents-appellants reserved

87