Revisiting Vygotsky

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(POST)CRITICAL GLOBAL STUDIES 2 2
Revisiting Vygotsky
for Social Change
Contemporary thinkers and researchers from different parts of the world involved in
Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change

achieving human development employ Vygotsky’s theory in order to deal with new social
challenges arising in a global but deeply divided world (Santos, 2000; Souza e Santos,
2008; Martín-Baró, 1998). The chapters of this book shed light onto Vygotsky’s initial
principles adding critical and social perspectives as a way of expanding his legacy to
global contemporary needs such as a critical reflection from the perspective of social
Bringing Together Theory and Practice
change, social dynamics and human development, ethical-political situations of action
power, dialectic relationship of the human being with society, contradictions in an
individual’s dramatic life events and awareness of the social environment to actively Adolfo Tanzi Neto,
change the existing forms of life.
Fernanda Liberali and
Adolfo Tanzi Neto is head of the Department of Anglo-Germanic Languages, College of
Languages and Arts, at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). He is a researcher in Manolis Dafermos, Editors
the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Applied Linguistics (PIPGLA-UFRJ) and leader of
the Nucleus for Studies and Research of Vygotsky School in Applied Linguistics (NUVYLA/
CNPq). His research interests are in the fields of discourse and social practices as for
human constitution and development, in the dimensions of cognition, semiotics, symbolic,
and aesthetic sense. His interests are related to social activism, linguistic mobility, social
change/justice, identity and agency based on critical and dialectical epistemologies of the
Socio-Historical-Cultural Activity Theory.
Fernanda Liberali is a teacher educator, researcher and professor at the Pontifical Catholic
University of São Paulo, in the English Department, in the Program of Graduate Studies
in Applied Linguistics and Language Studies and in the Graduate Program in Education:
Tanzi Neto, Liberali & Dafermos, Eds.

Education of Educators. She is one of the leaders of the Research Group / CNPq / PUC-SP
Language in Activity in the School Context and an advisor to CNPq and FAPESP. Within
the framework of Socio-Historical-Cultural Activity Theory, her main research interests
are related to teacher education, teaching-learning, multimodal argumentation, and
multilingualism/bilingual education.
Manolis Dafermos is an associate professor in the epistemology of psychology in the

Department of Psychology at the University of Crete. His interests include cultural-
historical psychology, critical psychology, the history of psychology, and methodological
and epistemological issues in the social sciences. He is the author of Rethinking Cultural-
Historical Theory: A Dialectical Perspective to Vygotsky (2018) in addition to being the
author or co-author of papers and chapters in various journals and collective volumes
focusing on dialectics and its significance for social research.
WWW . PETERLANG . COM

(POST)CRITICAL GLOBAL STUDIES 2 2
Revisiting Vygotsky
for Social Change
Contemporary thinkers and researchers from different parts of the world involved in

achieving human development employ Vygotsky’s theory in order to deal with new social
challenges arising in a global but deeply divided world (Santos, 2000; Souza e Santos,
2008; Martín-Baró, 1998). The chapters of this book shed light onto Vygotsky’s initial
principles adding critical and social perspectives as a way of expanding his legacy to
global contemporary needs such as a critical reflection from the perspective of social
Bringing Together Theory and Practice
change, social dynamics and human development, ethical-political situations of action
power, dialectic relationship of the human being with society, contradictions in an
individual’s dramatic life events and awareness of the social environment to actively Adolfo Tanzi Neto,
change the existing forms of life.
Fernanda Liberali and
Adolfo Tanzi Neto is head of the Department of Anglo-Germanic Languages, College of
Languages and Arts, at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). He is a researcher in Manolis Dafermos, Editors
the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Applied Linguistics (PIPGLA-UFRJ) and leader of
the Nucleus for Studies and Research of Vygotsky School in Applied Linguistics (NUVYLA/
CNPq). His research interests are in the fields of discourse and social practices as for
human constitution and development, in the dimensions of cognition, semiotics, symbolic,
and aesthetic sense. His interests are related to social activism, linguistic mobility, social
change/justice, identity and agency based on critical and dialectical epistemologies of the
Socio-Historical-Cultural Activity Theory.
Fernanda Liberali is a teacher educator, researcher and professor at the Pontifical Catholic
University of São Paulo, in the English Department, in the Program of Graduate Studies
in Applied Linguistics and Language Studies and in the Graduate Program in Education:
Tanzi Neto, Liberali & Dafermos, Eds.

Education of Educators. She is one of the leaders of the Research Group / CNPq / PUC-SP
Language in Activity in the School Context and an advisor to CNPq and FAPESP. Within
the framework of Socio-Historical-Cultural Activity Theory, her main research interests
are related to teacher education, teaching-learning, multimodal argumentation, and
multilingualism/bilingual education.
Manolis Dafermos is an associate professor in the epistemology of psychology in the

Department of Psychology at the University of Crete. His interests include cultural-
historical psychology, critical psychology, the history of psychology, and methodological
and epistemological issues in the social sciences. He is the author of Rethinking Cultural-
Historical Theory: A Dialectical Perspective to Vygotsky (2018) in addition to being the
author or co-author of papers and chapters in various journals and collective volumes
focusing on dialectics and its significance for social research.
WWW . PETERLANG . COM

ADVANCE PRAISE FOR

“This book comes from three well-respected scholars who are seen by many
internationally as part of the next wave of Vygotskian theorists. They have put
together a book which has attracted contributions from some of the most outstanding
theorists working on the dialectical relation between theory and practice within
Vygotskian studies. The names of these contributors alone will ensure that the
collection of chapters will be bought and read. But the book is doing more than
bringing together ideas from thoughtful contributors to the field. It is asking us to
pause and to consider where the field of Vygotsky-informed research is going. They
note the need now to look forward and, as valuable as the archive work has been, we
need to consider how some of the key concepts in Vygotsky’s Marxist psychology
allow us to address current pressing problems. The contributions come from people
who choose to work at the margins of different disciplines, including psychology and
linguistics, making this an exciting collection where the potential for links between
chapters is strong. In short it is a coherent collection, discussing how a theory that was
developed to address the challenges of revolutionary Russia can now address some of
the problems currently facing us both nationally and globally.”
—Anne Edwards, Professor Emeritus, Department of Education,
University of Oxford, England
“Cultural-historical psychology offers strong conceptual and methodological tools to

understand and promote social innovation and change, which are most needed in a
fast-changing society. Therefore, the book Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change:
Bringing Together Theory and Practice is much appreciated by students, academic
researchers and practitioners. It gathers a range of talented colleagues and highly
interesting ideas both at the theoretical and practical level. I'm happy to recommend
it to my colleagues, students and librarians.”
—Laure Kloetzer, Assistant Professor, Institute of Psychology and Education,
University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland
“The book is organized by three well recognized authors within cultural-historical

studies, who have invited other very well know scholars in the field as contributors.
These authors have important international collaborations and have an active
participation in international forums in the field. The focus of the book is very original
and interesting, bringing to light a critical perspective on the social significance of
Vygotsky’s theory and the conceptual shift toward social change in the examination of
human development and learning processes in the contemporary Vygotskian studies.
The discussion related to the relevance of Vygotsky for social change is a novelty of
the book that is welcome in the international community of Vygotskian studies.”
—Fernando González Rey (in memoriam), Full Professor of Psychology,
University Center of Brasília; Senior Research Collaborator,
Faculty of Education, University of Brasília, Brazil
Revisiting Vygotsky
for Social Change
(Post)Critical Global Studies
Márcia Aparecida Amador Mascia, Silvia Grinberg

and Michalis Kontopodis
Series Editors
Vol. 2
The (Post)Critical Global Studies series

is part of the Peter Lang Regional Studies list.
Every volume is peer reviewed and meets
the highest quality standards for content and production.
PETER LANG
New York  Bern  Berlin
Brussels  Vienna  Oxford  Warsaw
Revisiting Vygotsky
for Social Change
Bringing Together
Theory and Practice
Adolfo Tanzi Neto, Fernanda Liberali

& Manolis Dafermos, Editors
PETER LANG
New York  Bern  Berlin
Brussels  Vienna  Oxford  Warsaw
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Tanzi Neto, Adolfo, editor. | Liberali, Fernanda, editor. |
Dafermos, Manolis, editor.
Title: Revisiting Vygotsky for social change: bringing together theory and
practice / edited by Adolfo Tanzi Neto, Fernanda Liberali and Manolis Dafermos.
Description: New York: Peter Lang, 2020.
Series: (Post)critical global studies; vol. 2 | ISSN 2297-8534
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019028825 | ISBN 978-1-4331-7038-6 (hardback)
ISBN 978-1-4331-7250-2 (paperback) | ISBN 978-1-4331-7042-3 (ebook pdf)
ISBN 978-1-4331-7043-0 (epub) | ISBN 978-1-4331-7044-7 (mobi)
Subjects: LCSH: Vygotsky, L. S. (Lev Semenovich), 1896–1934. |
Social change.
Classification: LCC BF109.V95 R48 | DDC 155.2—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019028825
DOI 10.3726/b16730
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the “Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie”; detailed bibliographic data are available
on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de/.
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability
of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity
of the Council of Library Resources.
© 2020 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York

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All rights reserved.

Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm,
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Printed in the United States of America

It is necessary that the weakness of the powerless is transformed into a force
capable of announcing justice. For this to happen, a total denouncement of
fatalism is necessary. We are transformative beings and not beings for accom-
modation. (Freire, 1997, p. 6)
A creature that is perfectly adapted to its environment, would not want an-
ything, would not have anything to strive for, and, of course, would not be
able to create anything. Thus, creation is always based on lack of adaptation,
which gives rise to needs, motives, and desires. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 29)
Contents
List of Figures and Tables ixi

(Post)Critical Global Studies: A Note from the Series Editors xi
Introduction 1
ADOLFO TANZI NETO, FERNANDA LIBERALI, AND MANOLIS DAFERMOS
1. Reconstructing the Fundamental Ideas of Vygotsky’s Theory in
the Contemporary Social and Scientific Context 13
MANOLIS DAFERMOS
2. Radical-Transformative Agency: Developing a Transformative
Activist Stance on a Marxist-Vygotskyan Foundation 31
ANNA STETSENKO
3. Building Agency for Social Change 63
FERNANDA LIBERALI
4. Toward a Vygotskian Perspective on Transformative Agency for
Social Change 87
YRJÖ ENGESTRÖM AND ANNALISA SANNINO
5. Vygotsky on the Margins 111
LOIS HOLZMAN
6. Mediation in Neo-Vygotskian Terms: Rethinking School
Mediated Practices from a Social Architectonic Perspective 125
ADOLFO TANZI NETO
7. Vygotsky, Signs and Language: Critical Observations 147
PETER E. JONES
viii CONTENTS
8. Identity as a Sociocultural Phenomenon: The Dialectics of

Belonging, Being and Becoming 175
NIKOLAI VERESOV
9. The Method in Vygotsky: Social Compensation to Achieve Higher
Psychological Functions and Social Changes 193
SUELI SALLES FIDALGO AND MARIA CECÍLIA C. MAGALHÃES
10 Totality, Historicity, Mediation and Contradiction: Essential
Categories for the Analytic Movement in Research in Education 213
WANDA MARIA JUNQUEIRA DE AGUIAR,
MARIA EMILIANA LIMA PENTEADO, AND RAQUEL ANTONIO ALFREDO
11. Imagination and Emotion as the Basis of Social Transformation 241
BADER BURIHAN SAWAIA, LAVÍNIA L. S. MAGIOLINO
AND DANIELE NUNES HENRIQUE SILVA
12. The Challenges of the Reception of Vygotsky’s Theory in View of

Missing Revolutionary Changes 261
GORDANA JOVANOVIć
Instead of an Epilogue. “We Are on Fire”: Crisis as Turning
Point, Vygotsky and Social Change 281
MICHALIS KONTOPODIS, MANOLIS DAFERMOS,
AND ADOLFO TANZI NETO
Contributors 287
Index 295
Figures and Tables
Figures
4.1. Two key steps in the emergence of agency by double stimulation

(after Vygotsky, 1997b) 90
4.2. The emergence of an agentive action as a mediational chain 91
4.3. Chain of actions distributed among the actors and levels
of the hierarchy 106
6.1. School Social Architectonic of situated practices 140
(Tanzi Neto, 2016, p. 94)
8.1. Triangle of activity as a basic model of CHAT
(Engeström, 1987, 1999) 181
9.1 Flexibility of instructions 203
9.2. Myths puzzle—working with dyslexic children 205
9.3. Task flexilibity dyslexic and disorthographic children 206
Tables
3.1 Participants whose speeches were discussed in the chapter 72

4.1 Frequency of use of the terms ‘knot’ and ‘knotworking’
in the Change Laboratory sessions (excluding use of the
name of the project) 102
(Post-)Critical Global Studies:
A Note from the Series Editors
We are very pleased to introduce Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change:

Bringing Together Theory and Practice, the second volume of the book series
(Post-)Critical Global Studies. Challenging and evocative, this edited volume
pushes us to expand Vygotsky’s theories, and to consider new possibilities
for interpreting and implementing his work in a wide variety of contexts.
This groundbreaking investigation on the reception and implementation of
Vygotsky’s legacy across diverse international academic communities supports
an important debate on the challenges of using his ideas in academic research.
This edited volume includes original contributions dealing with topics
of relevance to Vygotskian pedagogies, psychologies, and epistemologies,
addressing questions of how Vygotsky’s theories can successfully contribute
to new possibilities for human development in a complex and troubled world.
This book expands Vygotsky’s work beyond the field of psychology, with
chapters dedicated to bridging the gap between theory and practice: this is
crucial at a time when global economic, political and social crises are challeng-
ing the neoliberal conception of human development that has dominated the
21st century.
We hope that this second thematically oriented volume of (Post )Critical
Global Studies highlights the importance of exploring social issues by think-
ing through possibilities for human development in order to effect the local
and global social change which is the focus of the series. (Post )Critical Global
Studies explores innovative theoretical and methodological approaches to
emerging phenomena in the fields of urban, countryside and indigenous stud-
ies; human rights; social policy and social movements; intersectionality; media
and technology; education; community organization; political economy;
xii A NOTE FROM THE SERIES EDITORS
ecology; migration; and globalization. It includes critical discussions of the

geopolitics of knowledge.
The first two volumes are published in English; the book series welcomes
publications in Spanish and Portuguese, too. For further details, please visit
our website: https://www.peterlang.com/view/serial/PCGS.
Márcia A. Amador Mascia,

Silvia Grinberg & Michalis Kontopodis
Introduction
ADOLFO TANZI NETO, FERNANDA LIBERALI,

AND MANOLIS DAFERMOS
Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory emerged in the first decades of 20th

century in the USSR, with many important works written about the history
of the development of his theory (Yaroshevsky, 1989; Kozulin, 1990; Van
der Veer & Valsiner, 1991; Veresov, 1999; González Rey, 2009; Dafermos,
2018). The “archival revolution” in Vygotskian studies has revealed new,
unknown sides of Vygotsky’s legacy (Yasnitsky, 2010; Zavershneva, 2009;
Zavershneva, 2010a; Zavershneva, 2010b; Zavershneva & Osipov, 2012;
Van der Veer & Zavershneva, 2011).
“Vygotsky’s second life” is connected with the widespread circulation and
implementation of Vygotsky’s theory around the globe (Daniels, Cole, &
Wertsch, 2007; Dafermos, 2016; Jovanović, 2015). Contemporary thinkers
and researchers in the area of human development have employed Vygotsky’s
theory in order to deal with new societal challenges arising in a deeply divided
world (Santos, 2000; Souza e Santos, 2008; Martín-Baró, 1998).
Various interpretive traditions of Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory
have been formulated worldwide by the contemporary thinkers and research-
ers, as a way of facing complex social and scientific problems, and an exam-
ination of how they have been constructed and reconstructed is of great
importance. In these contemporary times, there is a real social and scientific
need to promote critical reflection on modes of understanding, implementing
and further develop Vygotsky’s theory, whereby encouraging dialogue within
the Vygotskian academia.
This book illustrates the existence of a multitude of interpretations and
ways of implementing Vygotsky’s theory across countries and continents,
in which the need to build a dialogical space between them has risen. This
book is a contribution of Neo-Vygotskyan researchers from different parts of
the world all of whom are engaged in a dialogue about the past and future
2 ADOLFO TANZI NETO ET AL .
development of Vygotsky’s theory. Moreover, inspired by the Vygotskian idea

of an “epistemology of the practice”, the contributors to this collective vol-
ume address the question of how Vygotsky’s theory of human development
can be employed successfully in applied research and in practice in concrete
contexts.
Another important challenge is linked with the expansion of Vygotsky’s
extensive literature on psychology, in which it was historically created, to a vast
array of other fields, including: educational studies (Hedegaard & Chaiklin,
2005; Van Oers, Waedekker, Elbers & Van der Veer, 2008; Magalhães &
Fidalgo, 2010; Liberali, 2013), linguistic studies (Byrnes 2006; Jones 2014,
2016; Smagorinsky 2011), cognitive science (Falikman, 2014), the work-
place (Engeström 2007; Holzman 2009), neuropsychology (Toomela, 2014;
Kotik-Friedgut & Adrila, 2014), the theory of art (Bulgakowa 2014), sociol-
ogy (Daniels 2012), etc. This book discusses the transformative reconstruc-
tion of Vygotsky’s theory as a result of its expansion across a wide range
of disciplines and fields, mediated through their theoretical traditions and
practices, with a focus on the reception, reconstruction and implementation
of Vygotsky’s theory in educational studies, applied linguistic studies and
psychology.
Drawing on selected parts of Vygotskian literature to postulate and pro-
pose new insights on the author’s concepts, this book makes an original con-
tribution by suggesting critical perspectives to better integrate Vygotsky’s
extensive work into contemporary research on learning and human devel-
opment. Further, it is argued that Vygotsky’s project can hardly be ade-
quately understood unless from the perspective of Vygotsky’s commitment to
social justice. This book proposes a shift toward the perspective of examining
Vygotsky’s work through the lens of social change in theorizing human devel-
opment and learning. By expanding upon Vygotskina literature, this book
offers a bridge between the cultural-historical theory with critical approaches
to psychology, language and education.
The emergence and development of Vygotsky’s work was embedded
within the radical social change in Russia and the USSR in the 1920s and
early 1930s. The social atmosphere of that dramatic and heroic time was
reported by Alexander Luria, who said: “My entire generation was infused
with the energy of revolutionary change-the liberating energy people feel
when they are part of a society that is able to make tremendous progress in a
very short time” (Luria 2010, p. 17). Developing new theoretical and practi-
cal approaches to human development and education was crucial in order to
Introduction 3
deal with the huge societal and educational challenges arising during that his-
torical period (Dafermos, 2018).
Vygotsky’s work ‘relives’ in the contemporary world that is full of con-
flicts and contradictions. There is an urgent need to recontextualize, expand
and develop his theories, taking into account currently existing societal, envi-
ronmental and educational challenges. Naomi Klein (2007) coined the term
“disaster capitalism” that refers to the instrumental use of financial crises, nat-
ural disasters, wars, coup d’état, etc. by politicians and capitalistic forces to
impose neoliberal economic policies such as privatization, profit maximaliza-
tion and reduction of the role of the state. Collective fear, shock and disorien-
tation prevent resistance to neoliberal economic policies. There is a real need
to develop alternatives to these dominant politics in order “…to keep them
alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevita-
ble” (Klein, 2007, p. 6).
Due to the “cult of empiricism” (Toulmin & Leary, 1985) and the exam-
ination of psychological objects as natural and ahistorical (Danziger, 1999),
the concept of social change has remained unknown for years in the field of
psychology. Mainstream psychology has become inflexible and unable to deal
with real world dynamics and their complexity. Several scholars argue that
there is a crisis not only in psychology but more generally in the sciences
and humanities (Jörg, 2011). Conceptualizing social conflicts and contra-
dictions may be conceived as a way of looking beyond the current crisis in
the sciences and open up the path towards a more dynamic, complex space
of possibilities for social change, whereby reconceptualizing human develop-
ment (Stetsenko, 2017; Wagoner, Moghaddam, & Valsiner, 2018; Dafermos,
2018).
The concept of social change has been defined in diverse ways in differ-
ent disciplines, theoretical traditions and contexts. In sociology various theo-
retical traditions examining change have been formulated (Sztompka, 1993).
Focusing on the examination of society in a constant state of equilibrium, a
functionalist perspective failed to examine radical social change. From an evo-
lutionary perspective, social change is examined as a linear movement of soci-
ety in direction from a simple to a more complex structure (de la Sablonnière,
2017). From a dialectical perspective, internal contradictions can be exam-
ined as the driving force of radical change and development (Ilyenkov,
2007). In stark contrast to functionalist and linear evolutionary approaches,
Vygotsky’s work is based on a dialectical understanding of the contradictory
nature of human development as a result of dramatic tensions, conflicts, and
crises. Moreover, Vygotsky’s project is internally connected with a dialectical
understanding of radical social (societal) change (Stetsenko, 2017; Dafermos,

2018). This book aims to shed light on this dialectical understanding of
human development and radical social (societal) change as part of Vygotsky’s
work and illuminate various ways to recontextulize and futher develop it
through different representatives of contemporary Vygotskian Academia.
Additionally, this book offers a new standpoint regarding how Vygotsky’s
theoretical perspectives can still be redesigned to address current issues such
as increasing social inequalities, economic crises and environmental degrada-
tion, just to name a few. This book offers the opportunity to discuss, within
the Vygotskian academia, a series of important matters such as human subjec-
tivity, transformative agency, identity, mediation, historicity, contradictions,
political power, social change, amongst others.
On these grounds, the reader will get acquainted with the diverse land-
scape of the contemporary Vygotskian Academia and the dialogue between
the different points of view of its representatives. This book aims to clarify
concerns, detect blind spots, redefine research agendas and bring together
theory and practice through a reflection on inequality and social change.
***
This volume opens with the chapter “Reconstructing the Fundamental Ideas
of Vygotsky’s Theory in the Contemporary Social and Scientific Context” by
Manolis Dafermos. This chapter discusses several challenges connected with
the spread of Vygotsky’s theory throughout many countries and continents
as well as across various disciplines. It is argued that it is important to con-
sider essential changes that a theory undergoes as a result of its movement
from one environment to another. Moreover, it is argued that the multiple
attempts to implement Vygotsky’s theory in multidisciplinary domains has
revealed its possibilities and limitations. The author proposes that by going
beyond the present state of affairs through a reflection of the past and antici-
pation of what doesn’t exist may open new perspectives in understanding and
further developing Vygotsky’s theory. Imagining the future is examined as a
powerful force for social change.
The second chapter “Radical-transformative Agency: Developing a
Transformative Activist Stance on a Marxist-Vygotskyan Foundation” by
Anna Stetsenko argues that Marxism and Vygotsky’s approaches are predi-
cated on the ontological centrality of material social practices realized through
Introduction 5
collective human activities. This chapter discusses the significance of agency,

imagination, and social transformation for human development. Its pro-
posal integrates agency into this onto-epistemological conception that is pro-
foundly material and social through and through, yet allows for integrating
what are seemingly fleeting and putatively ephemeral dimensions of human
subjectivity. The transformative worldview and its onto-epistemology as elab-
orated in the transformative activist stance has been construed specifically as a
conceptual frame in which human agency can find its due place without sacri-
ficing any of the non-dualist, dialectical, and materialist premises of focusing
on material social practices that are always more than material.
The third chapter “Building Agency for Social Change” by Fernanda
Liberali examines the concepts of perezhivanie, agency and mobility and their
interconnection from a postmodern perspective. It draws upon the concept
of mobility (Blommaert, 2010) in order to understand agency seen as con-
structed through the type of perezhivanie subjects go through. According
to Blommaert (2014), mobility involves both using the experiences of a spa-
tial-temporal context and understanding that different resources project val-
ues according to space-time, interlocutors and political and ethical situations.
The idea suggested here is that understanding, developing awareness and
using multimodal resources construct repertoires which create new possible
agencies. That is, the possibility to break away from a given frame of action
and to take the initiative to transform it (Virkkunen, 2006a, 2006b). This
process is believed to be constructed in dramatic events and refracted by each
subject in perezhivanie, as suggested by Vygotsky.
The fourth chapter “Toward a Vygotskian Perspective on Transformative
Agency for Social Agency” by Yrjö Engeström and Annalisa Sannino focuses
on Vygotsky’s concept of agency and its relation to Marx’s understanding
of practical-critical activity. Drawing on Marx and the dialectical tradition,
the authors emphasize the human potential of transforming conditions and
forms of collective life. From this perspective, agency is manifested when peo-
ple form intentions and execute willful actions that go beyond and transform
the accepted routines and given conditions of the activity and organization
in which they are involved. The formation of transformative agency in orga-
nizations is examined on the basis of Vygotsky’s theorizing of will and will-
ful action.
The fifth chapter “Vygotsky on the Margins” by Lois Holzman discusses
social therapeutics, an approach to human development that examines people
as creators of their lives, as formulated under the influence of Vygotsky’s ideas
(1971, 1978, 1987, 1993, 1997). This approach emerged forty years ago
and today it has been recognized in education, in the social sciences and the
humanities. It has been employed in the global, cross-disciplinary “commu-
nity education” project that supports the development of people and commu-
nities through their own continuous development. More concretely, this project
support people to become aware of their social environment, actively change
the existing forms of life that stifle their development and create new forms
of life.
The sixth chapter “Mediation in Neo-Vygotskian Terms: Rethinking
School Mediated Practices from a Social Architectonic Perspective” by Adolfo
Tanzi Neto discusses Vygotsky’s concept of mediation [oposredovanie], in
its etymological sense (means and resources) from the principle of the use of
tools and signs (Wertsch, 1985; Meshcherikov, 2007; Daniels, 2008, 2015;
Engeström, 2001; Shotter, 1993). The chapter outlines the principles of the
concept of mediation presented in the work of Vygotsky and the expansions
of neovygotskian researchers together with the contribution of Bakhtin’s
work on architectonic forms seeking to bring reflections to different fields of
research such as language and semiotics, and their implications in the field of
education. This theoretical discussion has as a fundamental objective to justify
the need to understand systems of signs and tools from a social architectonic
perspective that is filled with mediating artifacts, pedagogical practices and
orientations of verbal-visual productions that direct and influence the mind
and behavior of all school participants.
The seventh chapter “Vygotsky, Signs and Language: Critical
Observations” by Peter E. Jones challenges the mainstream functionalist
understanding of communication as an information transmission system.
It proposes that communication can be conceptualized as a purposeful and
intelligent socially organized action which must be co-operatively designed
and performed by actively contributing individuals. It suggests that an action-
al-integrative perspective on communication and sign-making can enrich our
understanding of the discursive dimensions of social change.
The eighth chapter “Identity as a Sociocultural Phenomenon: The
Dialectics of Belonging, Being and Becoming” by Nikolai Veresov focuses
specifically on a critical overview of two theoretical approaches (CHAT and
the cultural-historical theory) to human identity as a socio-cultural phe-
nomenon. The first section of this chapter presents an outline of key chal-
lenges in these theories and suggestions for improvements related to studies
of identity. The second section discusses a cultural-historical perspective of
looking at identity within sociocultural contexts and environments through
the dialectics of belonging, being and becoming. It explores the concept of
Introduction 7
contradictions in an individual’s dramatic life events as an important compo-

nent of the dialectic process of identity development. It then examines the
principle of mediation as reflecting the dialectics of being and becoming and,
finally, it introduces perezhivanie as a conceptual analytical tool which orients
the empirical research of identity. Developing a dialectical account of belong,
being and becoming becomes a challenging task in a rapidly changing world,
full of contradictions.
The ninth chapter “The Method in Vygotsky: Social Compensation
to Achieve Higher Psychological Functions and Social Changes” by Sueli
Salles Fidalgo and Cecília C. Magalhães focus on Vygotsky’s (1993) theoret-
ical-methodological discussions on the human development of children with
specific educational needs (SEN) in school contexts in order to create a flex-
ible environment that might provide alternative paths and channels of devel-
opment that these children may not have experienced before. For Vygotsky,
the development of higher forms of behavior is the key for the development
of all children, and that is achieved under the influence of necessity, and the
organization of collaborative relationships that might provide the possibility
for affective and cognitive dialectical relations (Vygotsky, 1993). The authors
chose to use flexibilization instead of adaptation to avoid a focus on what is
currently known in Brazilian law and public policies (the context of these
particular authors) as: (1) the need for the child to adapt to the school envi-
ronment and (2) the need for the school to adapt its space so as to become
more accessible, which may provide a means for the child to become inte-
grated to the school, but not necessarily included in the school, that is, the
child is there, but is not necessarily learning anything or developing. Going
beyond the mainstream concept of adaptation and one-dimensional environ-
mental determinism, a cultural-historical perspective on human development
reveals the complex, changing, developing relations between children and
their social environment.
The next chapter “Totality, Historicity, Mediation and Contradiction:
Essential Categories for the Analytic Movement in Educational Research”
by Wanda Maria Junqueira de Aguiar, Maria Emiliana Lima Penteado, and
Raquel Antonio Alfredo emphasizes the contributions of Vygotsky with
regard to research method in analyzing educational processes. The authors
highlight the following categories of dialectical historical materialism: total-
ity, historicity, contradiction and mediation. By affirming them as essential in
their theoretical-methodological propositions, they emphasize the defense of
psychology as a science that explains the multiple determinations of the dialec-
tic relationship of human beings with society. The authors also acknowledge
these categories as resources constituting how people view reality, expand-

ing the process of objectivation to new explanations about the object under
study. For this reason, they argue that categories do not exist in isolation
from each other because they are dialectically articulated and, in this way,
they assume the reproduction of the concrete by means of thought. Based on
these assumptions, the authors present some examples for analysis, in which
the goal is to express the dimensions of reality, which is always contradictory,
historical and constituted by multiple determinations.
The eleventh chapter “Imagination and Emotion as the Basis of Social
Transformation” by Bader Burihan Sawaia, Lavínia L. S. Magiolino and
Daniele Nunes Henrique Silva reflects the nuances of affection—emo-
tion, feeling and passion—and its variation in ethical-political action power,
addressing Vygotsky’s theory of emotions and Spinoza’s philosophical theory
of affections. Affection is a broad category in Spinoza’s philosophy, which
distinguishes between the force for existence (emotion) and existential pas-
sivity (passion), simultaneously experienced by our bodies and minds in the
encounters we share. Vygotsky translates these concepts into psychology,
developing a theory based on the nexus between emotions and other psycho-
logical functions and their role of action orientation. Underlying the apparent
terminological indifferentiation in their works, both thinkers point out that
variations occur in the affective field and explain that they do not derive from
the relation to the physiological or representational levels, whereby incur-
ring the Cartesian error of the mind/body dichotomy. Such reflection helps
us better understand political issues, such as the one highlighted by Spinoza
regarding how we can know the best, but choose the worst. From this anal-
ysis, it is concluded that the ethical-political suffering category to indicate
affections is connected to oppression and inequality, which are crystallized in
sad feelings that weaken the action power in the form of fatalism and violent
behavior due to the continuous socially sustained affection.
The chapter “The Challenges of the Reception of Vygotsky’s Theory in
View of Missing Revolutionary Changes” by Gordana Jovanović assesses the
previous chapters, their choice of topics within Vygotsky’s theory considered
relevant for contemporary psychological theorizing and the application of
Vygotskyan approach in different fields. Gordana Jovanović identifies several
aspects of Vygotsky’s theory which are missing in contemporary Vygotskyan
scholarship and examines possible reasons for that. Finally, it is discussed
whether a wholly developed new Vygotskyan psychology is possible without
development of a new societal order, which would be grounded in the prin-
ciple of cooperation instead of competition.
Introduction 9
The edited volume comes to an end with a critical reflection on the sig-
nificance of revisiting Vygotsky’s theory in the context of today’s broader and
multi-faced crisis. The term “crisis” indicates a time of intense difficulty; yet it
also entails the potential of overcoming such difficulty through inventing new
ways of being and acting in the world. For this to happen entering in dialogue
with the future is crucial. Echoing the various contributions to this volume,
the authors revisit Vygotsky’s project as a future-oriented project of collabo-
rative transformation in this frame.
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1. Reconstructing the Fundamental
Ideas of Vygotsky’s Theory in the
Contemporary Social and Scientific
Context
MANOLIS DAFERMOS
Introduction
The ‘Vygotsky boom’ (Cole, 2004) linked with the continuous interpreta-
tions and wide dissemination of his ideas across different counties as well as
across various disciplines has also brought up serious epistemological, meth-
odological and practical questions. In the last years, studies have appeared
about misconceptions of Vygotsky’s theory in international academic com-
munities (Gillen, 2000; Ageyev, 2003; Veresov, 2009). Numerous gaps in
the investigation of Vygotsky’s theory and the context of its formation have
been revealed. The investigation of Vygotsky’s family archives has disclosed
new dimensions of his creative laboratory (Zavershneva 2010a; Zavershneva
2010b; Zavershneva, 2010c; Zavershneva & Osipov 2010). Several research-
ers focus on inaccuracies, mistakes and outright falsifications in translations of
Vygotsky’s works in English (Gillen 2000; Van der Veer & Yasnitsky, 2011;
Veresov, 2009).
All the above-mentioned difficulties are very important to be considered.
However, there are also wider epistemological and methodological difficul-
ties associated with the understanding, implementation and further devel-
opment of Vygotsky’s theory. What does understanding cultural-historical
theory mean? What was the social and scientific context of the emergence of
cultural-historical theory? Why does cultural-historical theory ‘relive’ in the
contemporary globalized world? How does Vygotsky’s theory ‘travel’ across
14 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
different countries and continents? How is it possible to deeply understand

and develop further Vygotsky’s theory in times of socioeconomic crisis?
In contrast to the strict Neokantian dichotomy between understanding
and explanation, it is argued that understanding should be internally connect-
ing with explaining. However, the traditional mechanistic explanation of an
isolate, linear chain between causes and effects does no apply when dealing
with complex, organic systems. It is necessary to develop a nonlinear under-
standing of the historicity of the explanation (included the explanation of
theory) as a dynamic, developmental process. The traditional concept of tem-
porality as a transition from the past to the present and from the present to
the future is not sufficient to grasp the complex process of the formation and
transformation of theory in the history of science and society.
Understanding theory occurs neither in a vacuum nor from a distant and
free position. It is formed as a part of the complex process of a reflection of
the previous theories from the perspective of new challenges and problems.
Both the subject and research object are mediated by a historically defined
complex set of traditions, attitudes and interactions.
It is proposed that generating and anticipating possible solutions is an
essential dimension of dealing with challenges and solving problems. The abil-
ity to go beyond the present situation through anticipation of what doesn’t
exist but may appear opens new perspectives in the reflection of the previously
accumulated knowledge and reformulation of the open-ended problems. In
other words, understanding and futher developing a theory in the process of
problem-solving can be considered as a historical process.
Recontextualizating Vygotsky’s Theory
One of the difficulties in understanding cultural-historical theory is connected

with the existence of the difference between the context of its emergence in
the first decades of the 20th century in the USSR and the multiple contexts
of its reception and implementations in various parts of the globe (Daniels,
Cole, & Wertsch, 2007; Jovanović, 2015; Dafermos, 2018). Innumerable
questions must inevitably arise in the consideration of the context of the
reception of Vygotsky’s theory such as the following: how is it possible to
recontextualize and futher develop cultural-historical theory in the contem-
porary globalized and diverse world? Is it possible to go with and beyond
Reconstructing the Fundamental Ideas of Vygotsky’s Theory 15
cultural-historical theory in a dialectical way? What happens when a theory

travels from one context to another?
Said (1983) proposed the concept of ‘travelling theory’,which states that
changes of a theory occur as a result of its movement from one environment
to another. It is important to take into account not only the origin of theory
but also the conditions of its acceptance, revision and transformation in a new
social environment. The dominant tendency which one can observe nowa-
days as a result of travelling a theory is that scholars and practitioners tend to
accept these sides, dimensions or ideas of the initial theory that make sense in
their own intellectual and cultural milieu, from the perspective of the prob-
lems that arise within their social and intellectual space. At the same time,
scholars and practitioners tend to ignore other sides, dimensions or ideas of
the initial theory that have no direct connection or link with their context. In
other words, the initial theory is refracted through the prism of the concrete
subjects living in another society with other priorities.
Scholars and practitioners tend to create a fragmentary picture of a the-
ory that emerged in a historically distant culture and lifeworld. A fragmen-
tary reception of the theory is an inevitable consequence of its ‘travelling’
across countries and continents. The fragmentary reception is an objective,
rather than subjective illusion connected with the existence of various social
practices of the reproduction of knowledge in different parts of the globe.
Scholars tend to combine the initial theory with other theories or other ways
of conceptualization in their context.
It is really difficult to have a simple repetition of the same theory when it
“travels” from one to another context. As Heraclitus stated, “No man ever
steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same
man”.
Understanding an idea is not its simple repetition. It is possible to repro-
duce the words, the external structure of the sentences and at the same time
to lose the meaning. The identification of understanding with the external
reproduction of quotes and phrases is a kind of external, false objectivity
linked with the external repetition of words without their understanding.
Indicatively, an example of this type of false objectivity of the interpreta-
tion of a theory can be given. It has been reported that Michail Suslov, second
secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who was responsible
for ideology had a notebook with quotations from various writings of Marx,
Engels and Lenin. For each decision of the Central Committee of Communist
Party he would find quotes from the classics of Marxism that confirmed it. In
other words, the quotes from various Marxist texts were used to approve an
16 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
already accepted decision. It’s a good example of an instrumental approach to

theory. It is possible to keep the words and distort their meaning. In this way,
any idea or phrase can be turned into its opposite.
I would like also to give an example from the Greek educational system.
Pupils are forced to memorize and repeat the school textbooks without any
deviation from their text. If the answer of a pupil in exams for entering the
university differs from the way that it is exactly written in school textbooks,
the examiners can perceive it as a mistake. The reproduction of the exact lin-
guistic expressions of the textbook is perceived by the examiners as a criterion
of a high level of knowledge. The school doesn’t teach pupils to think. As a
result of the dominance of this practice of memorization, it is really difficult
for pupils to avoid this dogmatic and simplistic identification of thought with
the linguistic form of its expression. It is not easy for them to express the same
idea by using other words. However, a deep understanding of an idea presup-
poses the ability to glimpse behind the words, grasp its hidden meaning and
express it in another way. Moreover, a deep understanding of an idea means
being aware of the context of its formation, its limitations and the conditions
of its further development and change.
Vygotsky’s theory emerged in the context of the collapse of the Russian
empire and the first steps of building a new society in the USSR. Vygotsky’s
theory relived in the last part of the 20th century in different parts of the
globe. In the USA, the interest in Vygotsky’s theory was formed under the
influence of the crisis of behaviourism and outbreak of the ‘first cognitive
revolution’. In the 1960s in the USA, Vygotsky’s ideas on sign mediation
were considered as an original perspective to overcome the linear, behavior-
istic explanation in terms of a chain between stimulus and reactions, which
demonstrated the complexity of mental life (Papadopoulos 1996; Dafermos
2016).
In the early 1970s in the period of the growing disappointment from the
‘first cognitive revolution’ and the expansion of the ‘second cognitive revo-
lution’ Vygotsky’s ideas on meaning-making and the role of culture on men-
tal development became popular in the USA (Bruner 1990). The crisis of
American experimental psychology and more generally the positivist tradition
in academic practice created conditions of the reception of Vygotsky’s theory
through the prism of ‘sociocultural paradigm’. The representatives of ‘socio-
cultural paradigm’ move beyond ethnocentrism and focus on the need for the
recognition of the knowledge obtained by local cultural communities.
Despite the growing popularity of Vygotsky’s ideas, a clash between
the cultural-historical theory that was formed in Russia/Soviet Union and
‘sociocultural paradigm’ that was developed in North America. The concept

of development is a core concept of cultural-historical theory. The adher-
ents of the sociocultural approach call into question developmentalism, the
explanation of psychological phenomena in terms of a linear progression.
Challenging any kind of universalism in the understanding of cultural devel-
opment, the adherents of the sociocultural approach advocate cultural diver-
sity (Matusov, 2008; Toomela, 2008; Allakhverdov & Ivanov 2008).
The clash between cultural-historical theory and sociocultural approach
is not a purely epistemological or methodological debate. The different ways
of understanding culture between these approaches could not be sufficiently
understood in isolation from the different social contexts of their formation.
However, a comparative analysis of cultural-historical theory and sociocul-
tural approach is out of the scope of the present chapter. In this case, we only
want to emphasize that the differences of these approaches are linked to the
differences in the social and intellectual context of their formation. Cultural
relativism of the ‘sociocultural paradigm’ were accepted in the USSR, while
the developmental perspective of the cultural-historical theory is not suffi-
ciently understood in the USA.
A different tradition in the interpretation of Vygotsky’s theory has been
formed in South America and especially Brazil. In Brazil, the cultural-histor-
ical theory was perceived through the prism of critical pedagogy and “…the
experiences of alternative schooling” (Lima, 1995, p. 443). The movement
of critical pedagogy was formed under the influence of Paulo Freire’s ideas on
adult education. The adherents of critical pedagogy examine the educational
process from the perspective of social liberation and democratization. It is
argued that literacy can serve as the path to social emancipation. Vygotsky’s
ideas on consciousness and ZPD have been included in the framework of crit-
ical collaborative research with its focus on dialogue and social/educational
transformation.
Vygotsky’s theory offers the possibility to examine human development
and education from a dialectical perspective. “Cultural-historical theory con-
tributes to the understanding of the process of construction (sociocultural
historic process) of basic pedagogical knowledge in Brazil and situates the
individual in this historic perspective” (Lima, 1995, p. 457).
In China, cultural-historical and activity research has been conducted
“only after the earth-shattering political movement known as the “Cultural
Revolution” (1966–1976) when China’s new reformation and open-to-the-
world policy launched” (Hong, Yang, & Cheng, 2007, p. 115). The issue of
the interaction between the broader international community and theoretical
18 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
traditions in China is a crucial theoretical, methodological and political issue

in China. It is argued that it is necessary to develop a new version of cul-
tural-historical and activity theory which is “applicable in a Chinese context
(e.g., long cultural-historical tradition, specific social and educational con-
ditions, and dramatic political/ideological changes and economic reforma-
tions)” (Hong, Yang, & Cheng, 2007, p. 127). The limited participation of
Chinese scholars in international forums such as ISCAR makes it difficult to
understand how Vygotsky’s theory in the Chinese context is interpreted and
applied.
“…Vygotsky’s psychological theory based on Marxism has not only been
well introduced and reviewed, it has also been absorbed, elaborated and
reconceptualized, being integrated in many theoretical frameworks devel-
oped by Chinese psychologists, in particular, this is the case in the nation’s
leading theories in child psychology” (Hong, Yang, & Cheng 2007, p. 118).
Although Chinese scholars are aware of the differences between Vygotsky’s
theory and activity theory as well as the differences between Leontiev’s and
Rubinstein’s versions of activity theory, they tend to focus their attention on
the development of cultural-historical activity theory rather than the exam-
ination of cultural-historical theory and activity theory as independent theo-
retical orientations.
In a more general way, Matusov (2008) correctly poses the issue of the
study of the type of reception of Vygotsky’s theory through the prism of the
local cultural, historical, and institutional practices and conditions. “What has
been missing, in my view, is a systematic analysis of the programmatic nature
of Vygotskian (and even non-Vygotskian) research as shaped by local cultural,
historical, and institutional practices and conditions” (Matusov, 2008, p. 6).
Original ways of understanding of Vygotsky’s theory have emerged out of
Europe and North America as for example in Brazil and South Africa. Ronald
Miller, an emeritus professor in the School of Psychology at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) offers an original account of Vygotsky’s theory
and comparison with its widespread versions in North America. Miller (2011)
demonstrates the difference between Vygotsky’s conception of psychologi-
cal tools (signs) and view of mediated action that was accepted in CHAT and
sociocultural theory. However, the challenge is not only to demonstrate the
difference between Vygotsky’s theory and concept of mediated action but
also to understand what the adherents of sociocultural theory attempt to do
by using this concept.
Scientific traditions, research practices and academic politics are involved
in the process of the reception and implementation of Vygotsky’s theory in
the local and global contexts. Being aware of implicit and explicit assump-
tions of each concrete ‘reading’ of Vygotsky’s theory is one of the precondi-
tions of its recontextualization and further creative development. On the one
hand, without a deep knowledge of a theory is impossible to further develop.
On the other hand, understanding the theory is a necessary but not sufficient
condition in order to achieve its further development.
The Challenge of the Implementation of Vygotsky’s Theory

in the Multidisciplinary, Interdisciplinary Domain
Vygotsky had a solid professional background in humanities, before his turn

to psychology. The cultural-historical theory of the development was for-
mulated by Vygotsky as a way to overcome the crisis in psychology. Maybe
his ‘outsider status’ amongst professional psychologists was a privilege that
allowed him to shed light on crucial theoretical and methodological issues of
psychology as a discipline from an unusual, alternative perspective.
The diversity of the disciplinary background of the members of the con-
temporary Vygotskian academia constitutes one of the most important chal-
lenges for cultural-historical theory. The contemporary Vygotskian scholars
have as their disciplinary focus not only psychology but also educational sci-
ences, linguistics, sociology, history, social anthropology, cognitive science,
cultural studies, organizational sciences, social work, and etc.
Vygotsky’s ideas have been applied in the field of education (Hedegaard
& Chaiklin, 2005; Van Oers, Waedekker, Elbers, & Van der Veerand, 2008;
Magalhães & Fidalgo, 2010; Liberali, 2013), language theory (Robbins 2001;
Byrnes 2006; Jones 2008), literacy research (Smagorinsky, 2011), cognitive
science (Falikman, 2014), semiotics (Ivanov, 2014), workplace (Engeström,
2007; Holzman, 2009), neuropsychology (Toomela, 2014; Kotik-Friedgut &
Adrila, 2014), theory of Art (Bulgakowa, 2014), sociology (Daniels, 2012).
Jovanović (2015) argues that the semiotic interpretation of Vygotsky’s
theory has become dominant. She poses the question of the consequences
of the discursive replacement of society by interaction. Moreover, Jovanović
(2015) notes that the very concept of history has been neglected in con-
temporary interpretations of Vygotsky’s theory. She highlights the need to
develop a broad historical perspective on Vygotsky’ theorizing.
Ratner (2008) attempts to bridge the gap between psychology and sociol-
ogy thought to establish macro-cultural psychology at the boundary between
20 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
them. Cole (1985) proposes that “…the sociocultural approach in combi-

nation with concepts developed in Anglo-American cultural anthropology
and cognitive psychology offers a very fruitful framework because of its mil-
itant insistence on linking individual and social activity” (Cole, 1985, pp.
158–159).
The representatives of different disciplines tend to pick up different sides
of Vygotsky’s theory. For example, a psychologist may focus on the method
of double stimulation. An educator usually chooses the concept of ZPD. A
cognitive scientist prefers Vygotsky’s teaching on concepts, while a linguist
connects to Vygotsky’s concept of language and meaning. A neuroscien-
tist emphasizes Vygotsky’s ideas on the systemic nature of mental functions.
The representatives of cultural studies engage with Vygotsky’s concept of
mediation.
The fragmented reception of Vygotsky’s theory brings to mind the Indian
fable about the Elephant and the Blind Men. It is a story of six blind men that
come across different parts of an elephant. Each blind man creates his ver-
sion of reality from the perspective of his limited experience. All these men
are right in their own terms, everyone depicts the real side of the elephant.
At the same time, everyone is wrong, because the elephant is not reduced to
particular parts of its body that they explored in their journey. The elephant is
not an eclectic sum of its sides. Thus, the question of whether or not it is pos-
sible to depict the elephant in a holistic way arises. In the concrete case, the
question can be formulated in the following way: is it possible to develop an
interdisciplinary, holistic account of Vygotsky’s research program in the pro-
cess of its development?
For Vygotsky, parts make sense only within the context of a whole: “the
word acquires its sense in the phrase. The phrase itself, however, acquires its
sense only in the context of the paragraph, the paragraph in the context of the
book, and the book in the context of the author’s collected works” (Vygotsky,
1987, p. 276). Moreover, the legacy of an author is not reduced to the sum
of his works. It is important to immerse oneself in the writer’s creative labo-
ratory and explore its dynamics and development regarding his (or her) con-
tribution in the wider context of the history of science.
Vygotsky is his work “Historical sense of psychological crisis” analyzed
the tendency of the expansion and implementation of a scientific idea beyond
the boundaries of the field of its initial appearance and formation. Many psy-
chological ideas and scientific schools such as psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychol-
ogy, behaviourism followed the path of the expansion beyond the field of
their initial appearance.
It can be said of any important discovery in any area, when it transcends the
boundaries of that particular realm, that it has the tendency to turn into an
explanatory principle for all psychological phenomena and lead psychology
beyond its proper boundaries into broader realms of knowledge. In the last
several decades this tendency has manifested itself with such amazing strict-
ness and consistency, with such regular uniformity in the most diverse areas,
that it becomes absolutely possible to predict the course of development of
this or that concept, discovery, or idea. (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 241)
The expansion and implementation of a theory out of the domain of

its initial emergence into a more general multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary
domain offers the opportunity to reveal both its possibilities and limitations.
A serious discussion about the essential transformation of cultural-historical
theory as a result of its expansion in various disciplines has not yet developed
in Vygotskian Academia. It is important to address and discuss questions such
as the following: how is it possible to further develop the cultural-histori-
cal theory across a wide range of disciplines and fields? how is possible to
carry out interdisciplinary cultural-historical research by avoiding the risk of
its fragmentation and eclecticism? To what extent the cultural-historical the-
ory can deal with the theoretical and methodological challenges in traditional
and ‘hybrid’ disciplines such as neurosciences, cognitive science, pedagogy,
sociology etc.?
Bringing the Gap Between Theory and Practice
The cultural-historical theory was not a purely scientific or cognitive project.

It was historically developed as an attempt to solve complex practical prob-
lems that were at the stake in the USSR in 1920s early 1930s. The central
ideas of the cultural-historical theory were formulated by Vygotsky on the
basis of a critical reflection on problems that has arisen in his own profes-
sional and social practice. It is really difficult to understand the meaning of
Vygotsky’s theory without taking into attention his engagement in defecto-
logical practice, his practical work with the education and training of handi-
capped children.
Both theory and practice are difficult to be sufficiently understood in sep-
aration from Vygotsky’s commitment to social justice. The founder of the
cultural-historical theory perceived his project of building a new theory of
human development as a part of the process of changing the world. “It is this
22 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
commitment to the broader transformative—liberational social project that

puts the cultural-historical approach into stark opposition to much of alterna-
tive developments in the 20th century…” (Stetsenko, 2003, p. 97).
Active participation in social practice was examined by Vygotsky as the
deepest foundation of a scientific theory. “Practice sets the task and serves
as the supreme judge of theory, as its truth criterion. It dictates how to con-
struct the concepts and how to formulate the laws” (Vygotsky, 1997, pp.
305–306).
The gap between theory and practice was one of the most important
causes of the crisis in psychology that was analyzed by Vygotsky. Vygotsky’s
concept of philosophy of practice reflects his creative laboratory in which cru-
cial theoretical concepts emerged as a way to deal with challenges and prob-
lems within the practice (Dafermos, 2018). In other words, knowing is not
something external to practice, but a way to organize, orient and reflect praxis
for solving complex problems. From this perspective, praxis can be examined
as a synthesis of theory and practice.
Contemporary scholars are also concerned about “the long-standing, con-
flicted relationship between science and practice” (Henriques & Sternberg,
2004, p. 1060). Vasilyuk (2015, p. 5) diagnosed as a schism in psychology, a
division “into two sovereign republics that did not have enough communica-
tion with each other…”. As a result of the dominance of the academic division
of labour, scholars and practitioners tend to live in a different world, alienated
from each other. Scholars do not think seriously about practitioners’ expe-
riences, while practitioners are far from understanding the logic of research
practices.
Due to the dominance of narrow empiricism in the domain of psychology,
widespread research practices in North Atlantic psychology neither promote
creative insights nor lead to the building new theories. The famous dictum by
Kurt Lewin that there is nothing more practical than a good theory is rele-
vant in the struggle against “the cult of empiricism” (Toulmin, 1985) in con-
temporary psychology. “The cult of empiricism” has negative effects not only
on theoretical thinking and theory building but also on practical work. There
is nothing more dangerous for practitioners than the blind faith in empirical
data themselves because it conceals the complexity of the real world.
Vygotsky’s postulate of the philosophy of practice highlights both the prac-
tical potential of advanced theory and the theoretical and methodological
importance of practice. Philosophy of practice is a continual cycle in which
theory derives from practice and goes back to practice. Theory building
takes place through a reflection on practice. Dynamic, mutual continuation
between practicing theory and theorizing practice is a crucial characteristic of

a continual cycle that stands opposite to dualism as a way of theorizing and
the dominance of narrow empiricism in the domain of practice.
Bringing the gap that separates researchers and practitioners in the con-
temporary world is one of the most important tasks in Vygotskian academia.
However, a question arises inevitably: how is it possible to apply Vygotsky’s
theory in practice in a totally different context? A direct application of
Vygotsky’s theory in practice is not possible, due to the existence of essential
differences between the nature of practice in Vygotsky’s creative laboratory
and current practice in different parts of the globe in different disciplines.
Bringing together practice and theory means that both practice and theory
should be changed. In other words, an application of Vygotsky’s theory in
practice is impossible without its essential development.
Imaging the Future, Remembering the Past

and Changing the Present
The cultural-historical theory is future-oriented rather than past-oriented. It

focuses on the potential for further development of higher mental functions
rather than the results of the developmental process as static entities. In other
words, the emphasis is given on ‘buds’ or ‘flowers’ of development, rather
than the ‘fruits’ of development.
A similar orientation to becoming was proposed by Frankl: “If we take
man as he is, we make him worse, but if we take man as he should be, we
make him capable of becoming what he can be … So, if you don’t recognize
a young man’s will to meaning, man’s search for meaning, you make him
worse: you make him dull, you make him frustrated. While if you presuppose
in this man, there must be a spark for meaning. Let’s presuppose it and then
you will elicit it from him, you will make him capable of becoming what he in
principle is capable of becoming” (Frankl, 1972).
The adherents of the cultural-historical theory have to think seriously on
the issue of becoming a personality in a contemporary globalized and deeply
divided world. Moreover, the issue of becoming and development is con-
nected with a more general and difficult topic associated with temporality.
From our perspective, it is possible to detect a paradox connected with the
understanding of temporality. Despite the future orientation of cultural-his-
torical theory, it seems that contemporary cultural psychology has mainly past
24 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
or short term present orientation. The dominance of a past-orientation is

an expression of the epigonism in science that reflects a preoccupation with
the previous stages of the development of a theory. Epigonism is only an
expression of the lack of independent and creative thinking but, first of all,
the objective difficulty to overcome a crisis state of discipline and shed light
on new ways for further development of a theory (Dafermos, 2018). The
epigones are limited to repeating or imitating other ideas without further
developing them. Valsiner correctly notes that “…the best way to follow a
thinker is to develop the ideas further, rather than declare one’s membership
in a virtual community” (Valsiner, 2009, p.7).
The lack of future, long-term orientation is one of the main shortcomings
of the bulk of work in contemporary Vygotskian academia. More generally,
the lack of a serious reflection on temporality is one of the characteristics of
the positivist approaches focused on stability and equilibrium, rather than on
becoming and change. The representatives of the positivist approach largely
concerned with the analysis of an object into its constituent elements and sta-
ble characteristics, rather than to reveal its internal contradiction. In a rapidly
changing world, filled with dramatic conflicts and contradictions, the reduc-
tionist and elementalist approaches are doomed to fail due to their inability to
understand complex, developing systems.
In contrast to a linear account of temporality as a transition from the past
to the present and from the present to the future, the non-classical style of
thinking that penetrates Vygotsky’s project offers the possibility to highlight
the complexity of human/social ways of dealing with temporality of events.
In order to solve complex problems, people have the imaginative capacity
to ‘travel’ back in time in order to rethink the previews stages of the devel-
opment from the perspective of the new challenges and problems. They still
have the ability to imagine and anticipate the future and take a distance from
the current situation especially when it seems deadlocked.
It is proposed that imagination is a mode of experiencing that allows to
take distance from here and now. Imagination has to deal with unfolding
time rather than space. ‘Leaving’ reality and coming ‘back’ to it is examined
as a way of the expansion of experiencing and acting in the world (Zittoun
& Cerchia, 2013). The Russian pioneering scholar Nikolai Bernstein (1896–
1966) introduced the concept of the ‘model of the required future’ (or the
‘model of a requisite future’, in Russian ‘potrebnoe budushee’) in order to
highlight active behavior of an organism and the importance of the image of
what yet doesn’t exist, the required final result for carrying out an action. The
projection of what could or should be in the future and the implementation
of future-oriented actions is especially important in times of a socioeconomic

crisis that it is reflected in a cascade of disappointment, gloominess and hope-
lessness. ‘Leaving’ and coming back to reality expands personal and collec-
tive experiencing and offers the opportunity to perceive reality in terms of its
change rather a passive adaptation to it. From this perspective, collective and
personal imagination is a necessary condition for the promotion of human
freedom and agency.
Einstein stated that “Imagination is more important than knowledge. For
knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimu-
lating progress, giving birth to evolution” (Einstein, 2009, p. 97). Imagining
the future is not a simple or a linear projection into the future of the present
or past tendencies. Each form of temporality includes not only continuities
but also discontinuities, ruptures, and breaks. The transition toward the future
is internally connected with an agonizing search for unusual paths, alternative
ways and unpredictable and original solutions of open-ended questions and
complex problems.
Obuhova (1999) reported a discussion between Galperin and Piaget
in August 1966, at the XVIII International Congress of Psychologists in
Moscow. Piaget defined the difference in his position from Galperin’s the-
ory: “I study what exists, and you study what can be. Defending his position
of active, the planned formation of mental processes.” Galperin replied: “But
what exists, is only a special case of what can be!” (Obuhova, 1999, p. 363).
Vygotsky as a truly creative thinker was thinking seriously about the future
of his theory. A. N. Leontiev wrote that shortly before his death, Vygotsky
took from him Kuno Fischer’s book about Descartes. Once A. N. Leontiev
found marks made by Vygotsky commenting the author’s text. “K. Fisher
writes: “…it is possible to distinguish in the transformation (of a system of
ideas) their advanced stages, on the most important of which we now give.
In the first stage, that constitutes the starting point, the guiding principles
are transformed into individual parts. “Vygotsky’s comment: “My research!”
“But if despite these changes on the basis of the system, the problem is not
yet solved, then it is necessary to climb to the second stage and deal with
the complete transformation of the principles…”. Vygotsky’s comment: “The
task of the future”. “If the objective on the new road is not achieved, … then
it is possible to make the task solvable through changing the basic question,
through the transformation of the whole problem: this transformation is an
overturn or era”. Vygotsky’s mark: “The task of the distant future” (Leontiev,
1983, pp. 29–30).
26 MANOLIS DAFERMOS
Unfortunately, in the contemporary Vygotskian Academia, a serious reflec-

tion and dialogue about the future (included the distant future) of Vygotsky’s
theory have not yet developed. A reflection by Valsiner (2009) about con-
structive trajectories for the future of cultural psychology (2009) is one of the
few attempts to pose this crucial and poorly explored question. However, the
attention of the majority of scholars is focused mainly on the question of what
are the main ideas of Vygotsky’s theory, rather than the issue about how it is
possible to further develop it. In other words, it is necessary to think the pos-
sibility of “the transformation of the principles” of the system as well as “the
transformation of the whole problem” regarding in Vygotskian terms.
Promoting genuine dialogue and developing original insights, capable
of shedding new light on these and many other possible problems is cru-
cial for Vygotskian community. Perhaps rethinking temporality in nonlinear,
dynamic terms can become an important dimension of solving crucial theo-
retical and practical problems through remembering the ways of solving sim-
ilarly encountered difficulties in the past, reimagining the future and possible
ways of dealing with these challenges and sharing with others the personal
and collective experiences of these ‘time travels’.
Nowadays, the cultural-historical theory has to meet social challenges that
potentially require its essential development. Some of them may be men-
tioned: What is the impact of the social, economic, political, ecological crisis
in different parts of the globe on cultural development? What is the impact
of digital media and more generally artificial intelligence on human develop-
ment? How to deal with the tendencies of distorted development? How to
promote human development in times of a social crisis? (Dafermos, Triliva,
& Varvantakis, 2017). It is important to develop a higher level of concep-
tual understanding of cultural-historical theory in the context of a critical
reflection on crucial open-ended social, economic, environmental, and edu-
cational problems. Moving with and beyond Vygotsky in a dialectical way
through rethinking and developing cultural-historical theory in the 21st cen-
tury remains an urgent demand for Vygotskian community.
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2. Radical-Transformative Agency:
Developing a Transformative Activist
Stance on a Marxist-Vygotskyan
Foundation
ANNA STETSENKO
There is currently a growing interest in the topic of agency among schol-

ars and across communities of critical sociocultural and activity theories. It is
great to see the rallying of interest and efforts to tackle this important issue,
the relevance of which is especially obvious today, in the context of a global
sociopolitical and economic-structural crisis of the late-stage predatory cap-
italism, now bordering on environmental apocalypse and the destruction of
the world as we know it. The Marxist assumption that the development of
capitalism inevitably encompasses its own destruction is being fully vindi-
cated and the struggle is to assure that the crushing of capitalism does not
take the whole world and the planet itself with it. In my view, the topic of
agency aligns with the need for critical sociocultural scholarship and CHAT to
become more agentive, activist and critical in line with an aspiration to resist
the hegemony of traditional models of social practices including theorizing
and while providing conceptual and theoretical supports, that is, an “intellec-
tual weaponry” (West, 1995, p. 357), for the ongoing and nascent agentive
and activist struggles against exploitation, racism, ecological ruin, social dev-
astation, and capital domination. It is crucial to work on advancing CHAT as
a practical-critical approach infused with the politics of resistance and political
imagination for a better, post-capitalist future. This is in line with the tradi-
tion of critical approaches that strive to act as “a species of dialectical thought,
a mode of critical engagement that refuses to leave the world unchanged and
static in its hubristic and procrustean ways” (Yancy, 2015, pp. 29–30).
32 ANNA STETSENKO
Our agency is obviously at stake especially because “either we act now,

or capitalism will be the death of us all” (Eagleton, 2011, p. 237). It is in
this vein, in directly speaking up against the complicity of the “end of his-
tory” climate predicated on a triumph of “established democracies,” de facto
steeped in and instrumental within the late-stage capitalism, that I consis-
tently made an effort to draw attention to the need to render Vygotsky’s
approach, and CHAT generally, more critical and activist. One way to achieve
this goal, as undertaken in my works currently and in the past, is to address
the conundrums of operating within the CHAT while not avoiding the dif-
ficult question of human subjectivity, agency, mind, and the self (or person-
hood). Relinquishing everything and anything to do with such presumably
old-fashioned categories inevitably and unfortunately leaves them under
the purview of traditional mainstream approaches that severely curtail and
impoverish them by enshrining them within the neoliberal agendas of indi-
vidualism, competition, and self-interest. This is the context in which I wrote
about the risks of arriving at a curious form of a “reductionism upwards” in
CHAT, whereby the self and agency are dissolved in the collective dynamics
of social processes (see Stetsenko, 2005, 2016; Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004).
Such a reductionist trend in CHAT, along with others that are restricted to
a relational worldview, does not fully engage the social and individual levels
of activism and agency and thus inevitably curtails the agentive and activist
potential of CHAT—as this can be achieved, I suggest, within a transforma-
tive worldview.
To overcome the significant limitations of relational approaches to agency,
it is important to rethink and reconstrue no less than the vary basic prem-
ises about how we are and how we can be in the world, what constitutes
human development (or “humanness”), what is reality and, most critically,
what could be a humane and just society in which this humanness is possible,
along and together with sets of closely and non-coincidentally related values
and commitments. What is needed, in other worlds is no less than a philo-
sophically grounded revision, indeed an overhaul, of the major assumptions
about human development, mind, the nature of knowledge and, ultimately,
of reality itself—away from assumptions of passivity, accommodation, quiet-
ism and adaptation to the status quo.
In this chapter, I will first focus on why such an overhaul is absolutely
necessary to then address the core contradictions that still permeate even the
major non-mainstream approaches to agency—the co-determinist framework
of agency and structure (Bourdieu, Giddens, Archer), the actor-network the-
ory (Latour) and the new materialism (e.g., Barad). These approaches all
Radical-Transformative Agency 33
strive to present agency as a relational, ecological and situated process contin-

gent on interactivities of social practices and materiality more generally. While
sharing this broad orientation, my critique is that these accounts are not
“fully critical” as they do not engage discussions of political agenda as part
of their theorizing. They also suffer from other flaws which I will address in
this chapter to then offer a comparison of these approaches with the Marxist-
Vygotskian account. In the following step, I will use this latter account to
offer what I term a radical-transformative agency.
The Core Tasks in Theorizing Agency:

Resistance Versus the Status Quo
The question of agency is, fundamentally, the question of our place and role
(i.e., our position and positionality) in the world, that is, the existential ques-
tion as to how and who we “are” in our environments, contexts and realities
“on the ground.” In other words, agency cannot be defined outside of broad
questions about what has been traditionally termed “the human condition,”
or “human nature,” irreducibly related to questions about the world itself,
including even questions about what is reality and how we get to act in and
know about it. Social and critical scholars of recent decades have been quite
timid about engaging questions of this magnitude, for fear (in my estima-
tion) of falling into the traps of what is perceived to be old-fashioned, total-
izing “grand theories” and hegemonic discourses that impose rigid standards
of truth and undermine the politics of diversity—as indeed they often do,
especially in the context of the western enlightenment tradition. Instead, the
focus in most of the major recent strands of thinking such as social construc-
tionism and sociocultural approaches has consistently been on contextualiza-
tion, situated meaning making, diversity of interpretations, and multiplicity
of positions in experiencing and constructing understandings and practices.
This fear is understandable yet we might need to rethink our reluctance
to engage with such broad questions given the current assault of a well uni-
fied, deeply thought-through and thoroughly grounded, though completely
faulty and misleading, as well as hegemonic and racist, “new grand synthesis.”
This synthesis is emerging on the heels of the “decade of the brain” and simi-
lar developments all spurred by the ethos of neoliberalism and complicity with
unregulated markets that make necessary a hierarchical organization of society
with unequal and racialized access to its social rewards, goods, and services.
34 ANNA STETSENKO
The synthesis that I am referring to is fundamentally reductionist and

mechanistic, spurred by and tailored to the outdated, 17–18th century views
and philosophies that dictate that human beings are passive recipients of exter-
nal stimuli from the outside world, processing these stimuli in a solipsistically
isolated, individual “internal” realm under the skull (or directly in the brain)
of each bounded individual who is understood to be a lonely, autonomous
and solo entity withdrawn from the worldly concerns, other people and above
all, contexts and struggles of the everyday life. Moreover, each bounded, solo
individual is posited as not only isolated from the world and other people, she
or he is actually set contrastively against other individuals and supposed to be
in competition with them in a pursuit of personal gains and advantages.
The development of this supposedly new “grand synthesis” (which in
fact is patently outdated by any reasonable standards) is by far not innocent
or benign. Its increasingly relentless and straightforward imposition across
the vast spectrum of approaches and fields, from psychology and sociology
to especially education, is leading to serious abuses and distortions of not
only theoretical but also political and practical nature. For example, com-
bined with the equally relentless imposition of outdated models of science
including insistence on the so-called neutral objectivity and “evidence-based”
research, the biologically reductionist views on human nature and develop-
ment are entangled with the “testing mania” spawned by the metric-based
reforms in schools.
These trends are in fact directly mirroring and supporting each other, all
in the service of a relentless marketization of society and human lives across
the board, in sync with the neoliberal agendas of the late-stage predatory cap-
italism. The dire consequence of the “new grand synthesis” include sever lim-
itations on the diversity of positions engaging many urgent questions facing
sciences and education, especially in prioritizing funding and other types of
institutional supports. Most regrettably, these consequences also include a
proliferation of harmful and misleading ideas, stereotypes and biases—includ-
ing even eugenics!—in discourses about and practices “on the ground” in
schools. It is the youngest generation of our children, especially poor and
minority, currently in schools, who are being diagnosed at ever earlier ages
with various “disabilities” and conditions supposedly in need of medical treat-
ment, who are suffering from the truly devastating effects of these seem-
ingly abstract philosophies, while hardly any attention is paid to how they are
affected by overcrowded and under-resourced schools.
In line with the notion that theories do not have to comply with what is
but can serve as instruments of realizing what is not yet but can be, as per our
aspirations, commitments and visions, it is critical to offer alternative concep-

tualizations of agency and make an effort to spur and support it. It is precisely
such an activist mode of developing conceptions of agency, where theories
are drawn upon in deliberately political-ideological ways and with explicit
political-ideological agenda, in support of new social movements and strug-
gles for social change, that in my view best fits the task of theorizing agency.
The main thrust of such an approach is to develop research and theory as a
means of advocating and supporting social change in the direction of equality
and social justice. It is important to push more with an activist theorizing that
aspires for social change and overcomes recent tendencies deeply permeated
with neoliberalism as a worldview passing for the “ideology of no ideology”
(cf. Mirowski, 2013; cf. Stetsenko, 2016).
The belief that research and theorizing with activist agendas are not only
necessary but highly timely is spurred not by an “idealist” conviction that
new approaches to agency are all that is needed in the struggle for equality
and against social injustices rampant in our world. Quite on the contrary, the
effort is motivated by a grim realization of the depth of the crisis we are fac-
ing today. In any case, to what extent activist agency and transformative mind
can be realized—as the capacity to transform reality and to co-create history
and ourselves—is a dilemma that is moot if we understand theorizing not
as descriptions of what is, but as an activist project of daring to pursue what
could and must be.
An important point to acknowledge in the present discussion is that, out-
side of the starkly biologically reductionist “new grand synthesis,” the alter-
native voices and approaches within the current landscape feature persistent
sharp disagreements, debates, and controversies on even the most basic prin-
ciples and theoretical positions at the very core of matters related to meth-
odology and theory in social sciences. This is clearly on display even within
relatively distinct fields such as qualitative and sociocultural approaches. For
example, although many in the qualitative community are “relatively united
in the social constructionist belief that knowledge is not disinterested, apolit-
ical, naively found (discovered, uncovered, etc.), and devoid of affective and
embodied aspects of human experience […], they sharply disagree on what
to make of that belief” (Schwandt, 2006, pp. 803–804). The same applies to
the notions of reality and what is considered (or taken) to be real on which in
actuality there is not even a modicum of either clarity or agreement and over-
lap (let alone a consensus). Instead, on this score, there is truly an abiding
and profound confusion in the literature which, however, is typically either
glossed over or just ignored. For example, there is a long tradition of critical
36 ANNA STETSENKO
scholars claiming that there are “multiple versions” of reality, while others
claim that there is one reality about which there are multiple opinions (for a
recent direct juxtaposition of these claims, see Mertens, 2010). These claims
are actually of cosmic—quite literally!—proportions and have no less than
cosmic (or at least, truly profound) implications for anything and everything
to do with research, education and even life itself. Yet we typically find just
brief formulations of these claims without much elaboration and rarely even
a mention of how ambiguous, loaded, contradictory, inherently complex,
and tangled these claims in effect are! My guess is that many researchers go
quickly through broad statements like these when they encounter them in the
handbooks and other authoritative sources (and also when they write these
accounts themselves) to never explore, truly in an in-depth way, what these
positions entail, how they can be warranted, and whether they can be pro-
ductively used.
To illustrate, a widely cited handbook by John Creswell (2007) states that
constructivism (to pick one of the major paradigms today which, as such, one
would expect to be at least somewhat transparent and unequivocal) is a par-
ticular worldview, in which
individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work.
They develop subjective meanings of their experiences—meanings directed
toward certain objects or things. These meanings are varied and multiple,
leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than nar-
row the meanings into a few categories or ideas. The goal of research, then,
is to rely as much as possible on the participants’ views of the situation. Often
these subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically. In other
words, they are not simply imprinted on individuals but are formed through
interaction with others (hence social constructivism) and through historical
and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives (pp. 20–21).
Note how little of substance is actually conveyed in this description

and, moreover, how what is conveyed is actually profoundly confusing. The
first statement—that “individuals seek understanding of the world in which
they live and work”—could be easily applied to an endless number of phil-
osophical and conceptual traditions. This statement really neither conveys
nor explains practically anything that could differentiate constructivism from
other approaches. Indeed, has anyone ever objected to such a bland state-
ment—that people seek to understand their world? Choosing to make such
a statement in the very first sentence apparently meant to introduce the spe-
cifics of social constructivism is at the very least unfortunate. The second
sentence does not do much better: It starts with a vague point that peo-
ple “develop subjective meanings of their experiences.” What do “subjective
meanings” stand for? How do they differ from “objective meanings” that
ostensibly also exist (otherwise, why would one specify meanings as “subjec-
tive”)? Furthermore, what are meanings exactly? How are they different, if
at all, for example from ideas and concepts that people also likely develop? Is
it significant that they are meanings specifically “of experiences,” as stated?
The second half of this sentence—that meanings are “directed toward certain
objects or things”—does not help much either and even adds to confusion
and ambivalence. What kind of objects and things? Why specifically “cer-
tain” objects or things? Some objects and things and not others? If so, then
which ones in particular? What is significant about meanings being “directed”
at objects and things? What kind of a process is implied by the notion that
meanings are specifically directed at objects and things rather than, for exam-
ple, related to objects and things? Are meanings directed at objects and things
only, rather than also at people and at ourselves, in addition? If not, then why
not? What is significant about the selective emphasis on objects and things
specifically? The following statement, namely that “often these subjective
meanings are negotiated socially and historically,” actually blurs things even
further. How can such a negotiation be understood in specific terms and in
implications for the status of meanings, understandings, and other types of
knowing? What is implied by the qualifier “often”? How often is “often”?
None of these questions is posited or even hinted at, let alone answered
even in outlines and the discussion of social constructivism instead quickly
turns to a completely different point, namely, that “these meanings are var-
ied and multiple.” This is followed by an imperative for “the researcher to
look for the complexity of views rather than narrow the meanings into a few
categories or ideas.” This very well may be true and highly significant yet
the reader is left, I believe, with not much to proceed in way of a substantive
understanding. Apparently, understanding does not always come about based
only on a very cursory description of complex phenomena, processes, con-
structs and positions. I believe this critical appraisal is fair because the author
of this description of social constructionism is a guru of qualitative research
(having authored 27 books on this topic and cited hundreds of thousands of
times) and so, I assume, can take a critique.
By way of another example, within the well-established “grounded the-
ory” approach which is currently popular among critical and sociocultural
scholars, the core position is expressed by Charmaz (2008), who writes that
“my constructionist approach makes the following assumptions: Reality is
38 ANNA STETSENKO
multiple, processual, and constructed—but constructed under particular con-

ditions” (p. 402). This is an interesting and provocative position yet there is
no sufficient discussion of what it actually means—how is reality constructed,
who is constructing reality, and under which conditions exactly? The elusive-
ness of these and similar formulations is not a matter of chance or oversight.
The lack of clarity dates back centuries and stems from a profound confusion
in the very basics of how the core concepts and ideas about reality, knowl-
edge, perception, identity etc. are formulated and applied.
The Present Landscape: The Flaws

of Relational Accounts of Agency
Given these high levels of complexity and confusion in our current under-
standings related to broad philosophical positions and research paradigms,
it is not surprising that, currently, there seems to be an impasse in theoriz-
ing agency. My estimation is that the broad community of the critical and
sociocultural scholarship (especially, but not exclusively, in its postmodern-
ist expressions)—after achieving much progress in debunking individualist
and mechanistic paradigms and offering accounts that are relational and situ-
ated—has stopped precisely at a critical juncture when new steps are urgently
needed. One of the obstacles is that along with much confusion, as described
herein, on one topic—that of agency—there does seem to be something of a
consensus emerging recently. Yet I believe this is a false, or superficial, consen-
sus and it needs to be critically scrutinized in order to probe deeper into the
conundrums that are very far from resolved at this time.
What I mean by the false consensus on agency is that it has become almost
a mantra to say that it is somehow true that people are both shaped (or influ-
enced, affected, determined, guided etc.) by the world yet also have agency to
act in it. What is often implied in this position (following, especially, Giddens
and Bourdieu) is that the dichotomy of agency versus structure need not
be upheld and can instead be replaced with an acknowledgement that they
coexist and do not exclude each other, to thus avoid the extremes of both
voluntarism and determinism. In this case, agency is conceived as somehow
both determined and free (e.g., Coole & Frost, 2010). Here is one exam-
ple of expressing such a position: “people are neither wholly determined by
the social categories through which we are recognized, nor can we ever be
free of them” (Moya, 2011, p. 83; note that I reference Paula Moya because
her works are excellent and powerful, hence they also reveal the most critical
“zones of proximal development” in our efforts to move forward).
Much of the talk about overcoming the dichotomy of agency versus struc-
ture has come in the footsteps of Anthony Giddens’ (e.g., 1984) theory of
structuration, broadly related to the sociology of knowledge developed by
Berger and Luckmann (1966). According to Berger and Luckmann, people
interact with one another to produce society and the social products continu-
ously react back on its producers, shaping their consciousness and actions, in
a chain of reciprocal influences (ibid., p. 79). From this it follows that institu-
tions are reducible to human action and the social structure is the sum total of
these actions and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means
of them (ibid., p. 48). That is,
the institutional world is objectivated human activity, and ... despite the objec-
tivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby
acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it.
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 78)
Giddens presents similar insights to provide an account of social dynamics

while affirming that these dynamics are neither reducible to the experiences of
the subjects, no to any societal totality, but instead, are constituted by social
practices, wherein these two realms are synthesized. In this vein, Giddens
points out that
the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of
practices they recursively organise. Structure is not “external” to individuals:
as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense
more “internal” than exterior to their activities. (1984, p. 25)
Similar in many ways is Bourdieu’s (e.g., 1990, 1998) account of agency,

also emphasizing the co-determination of agency and structure (on parallels
between Bourdieu and Giddens, see Dépelteau, 2008). Yet these important
insights leave many gaps especially as pertains to conceptualizing agency.
For example, even in insisting on agency/structure relations being bi-direc-
tional and co-determined, there is still much ambiguity in acknowledging
human agency to transform society. To illustrate, this ambiguity transpires
in Bourdieu’s asymmetrical use of terms when he indicates that objective
structures produce cognitive and motivation structures, whereas the latter—
which are termed “incorporated structures of the habitus”—merely repro-
duce society, rather than creatively and agentively change and produce it.
The same ambivalence transpires when Bourdieu states that “[t]he social
40 ANNA STETSENKO
space is indeed the first and last reality, since it commands the representation
that the social agent can have of it” (1995, p. 22; emphasis added). His ulti-
mate ontological stance is clear: in his own words, his paramount focus is on
the mechanisms that “guarantee the reproduction of social space and sym-
bolic space, without ignoring the contradictions and conflicts that can be
at the basis of their transformation” (1998, p. 13; emphasis added). I share
critiques by Sewell (1992, p. 15) who wrote that
although Bourdieu [and, in my view, Giddens too] avoids either a tradi-
tional French structuralist ideal determinism or a traditional Marxist mate-
rial determinism, he does so only by erecting a combined determinism that
makes significant social transformations seem impossible.
Importantly, both Giddens and Bourdieu leave unspecified the pro-

cesses through which, and conditions under which, agency is realized, sup-
ported and developed. This gap has been addressed within the so-called
critical realism—an approach that blends elements of Marxism with those
of Hegel’s and other philosophies, in a peculiar blend that critiques positiv-
ism and empiricism yet attempts to vindicate many assumptions of a natural
scientific explanation (Bhaskar, 1989). As expressed by Bhaskar, in order to
conceptualize agency, structure and agency need to be “existentially inter-
dependent but essentially distinct. Society is both an ever-present condition
and continually reproduced outcome of human agency” (ibid., p. 92). As
Archer puts it in a similar line of argumentation:
If you have made structure part of people and people—people’s action at
any rate—impossible without them drawing on structure, you have also …
prevented the capacity of the human subject deliberating upon context and
doing things like critiquing and seeking to transform the context that was
not of their making and their choosing. (quoted in Collins et al., 2015, p.
9)
Collins et al. (2015) provide an excellent analysis of how Archer’s solu-

tion does not in fact solve the problem and instead, is quite problematic
itself, for several reasons. Most critically, “having sought to save humanity”
(ibid.), Archer seems to end up “dehumanising so many people—insofar as
they are found not to exhibit the forms of reflexivity which would seem to
be characteristic of what we probably really mean by the ‘agency’ which is
the essence of being human” (Collins et al., 2015, p. 8). Indeed, in addition
to attributing transformative potential to, quite problematically as Collins et
al. state, a limited subset of human action and actors, Archer’s (e.g., 2007)
position, in her attempt to salvage agency by decoupling it from structure,

veers into an individualist account of reflexivity and internal dialogues as
constitutive of agency.
Despite clear and serious problems with accounts of agency provided by
Giddens, Bourdieu and Archer among similarly orientated works broadly
related to Berger and Luckmann’s position, the general consensus seems
to persist that agency and structure have been successfully reconciled. This
is unfortunate since we are nowhere near a true consensus—a broad and
well-grounded philosophical position that could support investigations into
activist agency aimed at transforming the world that are so urgently needed
today. I will provide additional critique of these positions, from a critical-ac-
tivist stance, at the end of this section.
In addition to the apparent consensus on agency and structure, there is
also a broad tendency to reconceptualize agency within the recently popu-
lar interactionist/transactional (or relational, as I term them, see Stetsenko,
2008) accounts, especially as represented in the actor-network theory, eco-
logical approaches and also in the so-called new materialism and feminist
materialism, among others. In these accounts, agency is everywhere, spread
evenly across human and non-human actors, with an emphasis on the dan-
gers of according humans with any sort of a privilege especially as concerns
agency. For example, according to what Barad (2007) terms “performative
metaphysics,”
the world is an ongoing open process of mattering through which “matter-
ing” itself acquires meaning and form in the realization of different agential
possibilities. Temporality and spatiality emerge in the course of processual
historicity. Relations of exteriority, connectivity, and exclusion are recon-
figured. The changing topologies of the world entail an ongoing rework-
ing of the very nature of dynamics … In summary, the universe is agential
intra-activity in its becoming. (p. 135)
In Barad’s account, ontologically central is the ongoing flow of a general-

ized agency of the world’s matter through which one “part” of the world
makes itself differentially intelligible to another “part” of the world—a pro-
cess that takes place not in space and time but “in the making of space-time
itself” (ibid., p. 140). This is a kind of realism that is not about repre-
sentation of something substantialized that is already present but, rather,
about real effects of intra-activity as these effects become elements in fur-
ther ongoing and fluid intra-activities (cf. Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011).
Human beings and their agency, however, in this account are not privileged
42 ANNA STETSENKO
vis- à-vis the fluid totality of processes of matter’s intra-activity that encom-
passes discourse, nature, culture, technology, and so on. Therefore, people
are parts of the intra-activities that make up the world, but they are not the
point of departure because the differences (“cuts”) in the world “are agen-
tially enacted not by willful individuals but by the larger material arrange-
ment of which ‘we’ are a ‘part’” (Barad, 2007, p. 179).
Similarly, in the actor-network theory, the main emphasis is on rela-
tionality and materiality, whereby things and knowledge, people and col-
lectivities, institutions and practices, concepts and ideas are all entangled
and interwoven as networks that form “the very substance of our societ-
ies” (Latour, 1993, p. 4). Indeed, social reality itself is taken to be all about
dynamic and often quite contingent “assemblages” of wide social networks
(Latour, 2005).
This approach is about thoroughly relational circulations of materi-
ality within complex networks, which are not limited to human interac-
tivities (i.e., social interactions and communications, social practices and
institutions, knowledge and information flows) but are densely mediated by
the inclusion of “things” such as machines, objects, animals, technologies,
microbes, and other nonhuman actors. What follows from this approach is
a philosophically radical reconfiguration of agency including its social and
human expressions. The claim is that all social capacities and processes, such
as especially involved in the generation of knowledge and science, can be
attributed to and accounted by considerations of multiply mediated and col-
lective networks—a mode of analysis that substitutes for an exclusive focus
on human actors, social practices and human agency.
In other words, agency can be attributed to actor-networks rather than
to any isolated actors such as humans—because it is thoroughly embedded
and contingent on the circulation of processes far beyond what is “in the
person” or “under one’s skin.” For example, as Law states, “social agents
are never located in bodies and bodies alone” and an agent is an agent
because he or she “inhabits a set of elements (including, of course, a body)
that stretches out into the network of materials, somatic and otherwise, that
surrounds each body…” (Law, 1992, p. 3). Therefore, agency is understood
to be a relational achievement, an effect of authority and power produced
within networks rather than “a monopolisable capacity radiating from a sin-
gle center or social system” (Castree, 2002, p. 122). In this view, “non-hu-
man” elements of networks can have significant social effects and agency is
a composite process.
The gist of these and other relational approaches has to do with over-
coming the dichotomies of human versus non-human and life versus non-life
while debunking the pernicious mythologies of the western enlightenment
tradition, such as especially those that put humans at the center of the world
and consider them to be at the pinnacle of evolution and in control (or aspir-
ing to be in control) of nature and the world. This kind of anthropocen-
trism is revealed in these relational approaches to imply ecological arrogance
and hegemony, along with blindness towards and even instrumentality in
engineering environmental disasters and destruction (Bennett, 2010; Coole
& Frost, 2010). In resisting anthropocentrism, some of the new material-
ist ontologies cultivate a new “sensibility” (Bennett, 2010), and “entangle-
ment” (Barad, 2007; cf. recent discussion in Rekret, 2018). As to agency,
the emphasis is on it being distributed across all forms of existence whereby
even non-biological matter is thought to be agentic in facilitating activities
within “assemblages” (Bennett, 2010) or networks (Latour, 2005).
These positions resonate, in certain ways, with the cultural-historical
activity theory—especially in that agency is considered to be distributed—
though these resonances are unfortunately never acknowledged, and thus
deserve to be scrutinized and engaged. This is important especially because
many scholars across a wide spectrum of disciplines including sociology,
psychology, anthropology, philosophy, geography, science studies and even
education are increasingly enthusiastic about these relational approaches
with their emphasis on dynamic and fluid, open-ended social webs and net-
works which transcend individual-focused theories and paradigms. These
resonances with the cultural-historical activity theory are not completely
surprising given that some ideas in both frameworks go back to Marx and
his paradigmatic shift away from considerations of autonomous individuals
and instead, towards the emphasis upon systemic, situated and historized
dynamics of social processes seen as extending through time and involving
materiality, relationality, historicity, and collectivity.
These broad conceptual developments described in the current sec-
tion—along the lines of, first, replacing the structure versus agency dichot-
omy by general statements of their compatibility and complementarity
in way of co-determinism and, second, situating agency within the over-
all interactivities of matter across the human versus non-human divide—
require further elaborations, critical assessments, and close interrogations.
In both cases, there is a lack of a clear political agenda and commitment as
part of the research program and theorizing itself. What is also missing is
sufficient specifications as to the ways through which the processes at the
44 ANNA STETSENKO
levels of agency and structure are connected and, in a related vein, how the
individual and collective levels of social practices might operate in tandem.
As to the first and most critical point, the major weakness appears to be
that these frameworks eschew discussing any specifics of human agency and
partly as a result, lack sociopolitical engagement. Indeed, as Rekret states,
there seems to be a deeper underlying logic to the popularity of the post-
humanist paradigm, one which ultimately involves the pose of epistemic
innocence these theories imply. … [T]he rhetoric of hybridity permits the
articulation of a critique of capitalism and commodification that can nev-
ertheless celebrate capital’s achievements.” (2019, p. 90; emphasis added)
According to Fuller, posthumanism “makes it difficult to hold anyone

accountable for anything” (2000, p. 26) and has a dull critical edge to a
field that envisions itself as quite progressive (cf. Kirsch & Mitchell, 2004).
In effect, posthumanist frameworks including new materialism and ANT,
in their focus on networking and exchanges of interactivity effects, resem-
ble capital’s core mode of operating and verge on vindicating and legitimat-
ing it. This mode, “through the process of commodification, enables the
exchange of human and machine labor on the basis of such systemic values
as productivity and efficiency” (Fuller, 2000, p. 20). The pervasive effects
of ANT on the wider STS field, Fuller insists, include “an aversion to nor-
mative judgments and even an open antagonism to the adoption of ‘critical’
perspectives” (2000, p. 6).
Importantly, this “aversion to normative judgments” and lack of inte-
gration of political agendas with those of research are also characteristic
of co-deterministic frameworks such as by Giddens, Bourdieu and Archer.
These approaches are dynamic and focused on agency and relations yet are
not critical in the full sense of the term (cf. Fuchs & Hofkirchner, 2009).
I fully share critiques of these theories from a radically critical positions
including Critical Race Theory (see Yosso, 2005, 2006). To Yosso, as sum-
marized by Leonardo (2012), approaches such as by Bourdieu (including,
I would add, other co-determinist and new materialist theories), are “a lop-
sided attempt to speak to issues of racial domination. This is where the love
affair with cultural capital turns south. Favoring the domination half of the
story, Bourdieu [and others] fails to capture the agency side of resistance
theories” (2012, p. 440).
In Leonrado’s estimation, which in my view is right on the mark,
“Bourdieu’s theory does not account for these resistant threads in minority
lives and even aids in further marginalizing them when it reinforces the
deficit discourse about them” (ibid.). Importantly, both co-determinism

and new materialism are in effect convenient within the neoliberal capital-
ism since they draw attention to agency yet at the same time do not radically
challenge the established social order. It can even be argued that by provid-
ing the legitimizing discourse for infinite differentiation, mutual entangle-
ment and co-determination of everything with everything—whereby no one
is taken responsible for devastating effects of these processes—these move-
ments feed the “free” market’s endless pursuit of innovation and differen-
tiation, spread globally, evenly, and without direct political consequences.
Overall, I share the conclusion regarding Deleuze—which I think could be
extended also to new materialism, ANT, and similar relational approaches—
that “few philosophers have been as inspiring as Deleuze. But those of us who
still seek to change our world and to empower its inhabitants will need to look
for our inspirations elsewhere” (Hallward, 2006, p. 164; insert and empha-
sis added).
It is highly significant that both the co-deterministic (e.g., Giddens,
Bourdieu and Archer) and the post-humanist accounts, including ANT,
became especially popular during the time when progressive socialist move-
ments and radical-critical theories have been effaced by the apparent global
victory of neoliberal capitalism starting already in the 1970s and intensify-
ing with the gradual re-emergence of laissez-faire economics as the foun-
dation for the global free market. These progressive movements and the
theories supporting them were apparently completely left in the dust by
the supposed “end of history” and “death of ideology” after the end of the
cold war in the late 1980s. During the post-cold war era (approximately
between the late 1980s and 2008), marked by a highly celebratory atmo-
sphere, extraordinary hubris, and a myopic disregard of the pathologies of
capitalism, the exuberantly optimistic “winners” proclaimed that history has
reached its ostensibly glorious end embodied in “the final triumph” and an
unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism (as Fukuyama notori-
ously claimed). In sync with these developments, the broader move to reject
supposedly deterministic explanations offered by Marx became increasingly
influential across social sciences and education (with few notable excep-
tions such as critical pedagogy). It is quite symptomatic that although many
authors in the ANT and new materialism “have been influenced by Marx
and Marxism more generally, [they] are reluctant to bring this connection
to the fore of their work” (Devellennes & Dillet, 2018, p. 8). This lack
of engagement, in my view, follows with the overall, and rather arrogant,
treatment of Marxism and its practical materializations (certainly far from
46 ANNA STETSENKO
perfect, yet remarkable and instructive in many ways) in Eastern Europe and
other parts of the world.
Thus, it appears that the shifts away from Marxism, with its flagrant par-
tisanship and open hostility toward capitalism, were motivated by a polit-
ical-ideological desire to take distance from a philosophy directly calling
for social transformation of capitalism. Instead, one can impute a desire to
stay neutral in the face of capitalism’s pathologies since these pathologies
had not been apparent—or at least had not been perceived as important
and consequential—to many privileged, middle-class, white scholars, espe-
cially of the western world, artificially shielded as they were, through the
past decades, from cataclysms and turmoil that were ravaging the rest of
the world. The peculiar result has been “the political illiteracy and histor-
ical oblivion fostered by much postmodernism, with its cult of flash, the-
oretical fashion” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 23). It is still an impending task to
analyze how during the past several decades so much remained myopically
disregarded in terms of “the processes building up behind the facades of the
seemingly stable and immutable contexts and structures” of the so called
western democracies in “our ever-dynamic world that only appeared to be
stable and fixed” (Stetsenko, 2016, p. 20).
In addition, all of these approaches to agency suffer, in my view, from
the traps of what can be called a truncated reversal of traditional dualisms
(Stetsenko, 2016; cf. Plumwood, 1993). In the truncated reversal, the orig-
inal dualism is not eliminated but instead, and quite ironically, affirmed
through a simple reduction of one pole on the initial dichotomy to the
other. When the main argument is to establish the primacy of the social
structures over agency or, alternatively, the primacy and exclusivity of the
whole matter’s overall interactivity over local expressions of this interactiv-
ity, then this conceptual shift is de facto a legitimation of the dichotomy we
are striving to overcome! This is because, in effect, the novel notions meant
to substitute for the traditional dualistic ones are operating with one pole
of the initial dichotomy while eliminating the other. This way of operat-
ing with one pole of the dichotomy that had split reality—into polarities of
structure versus agency and, as another version of the same logic, into polar-
ities of matter’s overall interactivity versus local expressions such as human
agency—remains within the premises that are inherited from the very dual-
istic view it purports to reject. Fully and completely reducing the individ-
ual to the social (and the personal to the collective), and human agency to
the overall interactivity of the matter, in fact tacitly affirms the dualistic view
that the persons cannot find their place within accounts of interactivities
and social processes. Ultimately, such conceptual moves are akin to the posi-
tion that the individual (or a person) indeed can only (!) be understood as
isolated, autonomous and solipsistic. This in fact leaves much space for the
old-fashioned notions and approaches to sneak right back into even the
sociocultural and critical theories, which indeed happens again and again.
As a result, for example, many questions remain unanswered such as “how
can we best account for the production of newly ‘active and enterprising’
agents?” (Kirsch & Mitchell, 2004, p. 690).
It is interesting to note that Vygotsky in fact provided a very similar cri-
tique of the ways in which the polarity of dichotomous positions is often
tackled without a truly dialectical take on what overcoming such dichoto-
mies actually entails (I came across the following quote when the writing
of this paper was practically completed but want to add it now, since it is
quite telling and resonant with the notion of a truncated dualism). Vygotsky
wrote in his latest work “Thinking and speech” (1934/1987, p. 197) about
theories that try to navigate the extremes of two opposing views, as between
the mythical Scylla and Charybdis, that a typical approach:
…fails to gain a position above the two extreme [polar] points of view, so
that they [the alternative theories] overcome the extremes of one of these
points of view exactly to the extent that they fall for the extremes of the
other. These [the alternative theories] overcome one false theory by partly
yielding to the other [the opposite] one and vice versa. (Note that the
translation has been corrected in consulting the Russian original, to better
reflect its meaning; see Vygotskij, 1934/1982, p. 228. It can be noted that
the same paragraph contains further errors of translation: the term “dvo-
jstvennij” is translated as “duality” which is incorrect; in fact “dvojstven-
nij” in this context means “ambiguous” or “equivocal”, that is, as being
“of two minds.”)
At the present moment, these and similar positions remain in danger of

vacillating between the poles of subjective versus objective, and of individ-
ual versus collective, dimensions of social practices, or falling into the tra-
ditional superimposition of one dimension (or pole) over the other. This
indeed happens again and again in specific applications of these views and
might continue in this vein unless radical reassessments and concrete formu-
lations are offered that reconcile the individual and the social as ontologi-
cally commensurate, including through indicating specific processes making
such commensurability possible and necessary.
48 ANNA STETSENKO
Agency in Marxism and in Activity Theory
The world economic crisis of 2008 and the devastating developments since
then brought to the fore the appalling poverty and constantly growing
inequality, immigration crises, international strife, racism, and a looming
ecological disaster that threatens the very survival of the planet. Now that
these effects have reached the shores of western democracies (including
quite literally), breaking the walls of the western world’s “gated communi-
ties,” a dramatic shift is beginning to take shape. The prevailing world order
and its attendant ethos are now being challenged more strongly than at any
time in recent history, as it is becoming abundantly clear that we are set on
a trajectory towards authoritarianism that drastically curtails freedom and
democracy amidst the worst economic and political crisis in generations.
Even the supposedly prosperous countries of the west (perceived as such
mostly by the elites), which had previously managed to cover up their prob-
lems, are now facing the collapse of their very social fabric. It is becoming
abundantly clear that unregulated “free” markets inevitably lead to volatile
politics of economic insecurity and environmental devastation.
Now is the time to overturn deeply depoliticising discourses and the-
orizing that had prevailed, for too long, within social sciences and educa-
tion. A fresh look at the present dynamics compels a story that is radically
different from “the end of history” and “death of ideology” discourses—
and the attendant ultra-generalized, apolitical accounts of co-determinism,
ANT, and new materialism suited for a world that is in no need of radical
changes. These accounts can be substituted by renewed radical politics and
discourses including those based on Marxism and an associated ideal of
social justice and equality as one of the most significant and complicated
forces of contemporary history.
A closer engagement with Marx and other philosophies of resistance—
especially works presently aiming at disrupting the status quo, its racism and
its income stratification such as in Critical Race Theories—could help to
more directly engage with issues of politics and ethics including question-
ing the ways in which particular networks and entanglements are generated,
without obscuring or “even valorizing the inner logic of these processes”
(cf. Rekert, 2018, p. 64). This challenge is especially urgent if psychology
and other social sciences are to develop perspectives that not only describe
reality but also help develop the guides for progressive action. I share
this position with Isabelle Stengers (2007), who suggests that “actively
eliminating everything about ‘us’ that cannot be aligned with [posthuman-

ist] conception of what matter is all about” (p. 7) separates materialism from
its relations with struggle and thus puts it in danger of losing its meaning. In
Stenger’s words, “the demands of materialism cannot be identified in terms
of knowledge alone, scientific or other. Rather, just like the Marxist concept
of class, materialism loses its meaning when it is separated from its relations
with struggle” (ibid.).
Although neither Marx nor psychologists who worked in his footsteps
provided full answers to dilemmas we are facing today, their transformative
and revolutionary, indeed rebellious, gist can be usefully deployed today
(even though this gist was only implicit in case of Vygotsky, Leontiev and
others and gradually squashed with the advancing totalitarianism of their
society; cf. Sawchuk & Stetsenko, 2008). This gist is about resisting the
ethos of reproduction and adaptation, and the deep grasp of the unprec-
edented social change and its centrality in theorizing human development
and agency.
Leontiev’s activity theory (e.g., 1978) was explicitly built on the Marxist
notion of social practice. For Marx, what human beings are, the essence
of their humanness or species-specific being, coincides with the process of
materially producing, or actively realizing and concretely enacting, their own
lives and existence. This is a process of an active interchange (or commerce)
with the environment, in which, out of which, and through which people
simultaneously bring into existence (realize, create, produce) both them-
selves and their world (for a detailed presentation, see Stetsenko, 2016).
In Marx’s words, “in creating an objective world by his practical activity,
in working-up inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species
being” (1844/1978, p. 76). This process is about shaping and molding
the world for the benefits of (initially) adapting and surviving and later, for
advancing human lives, society, and human civilization at large. It is the
process in which, out of which, and through which all aspects and forms of
human subjectivity emerge and develop, including the development of con-
sciousness, language, and agency.
Labor is the term that Marx uses to designate this process of a collectiv-
ity of humans acting together in and on nature and its material conditions to
sustain and produce their lives and themselves. Labor—material, collective,
productive human practices (for short, praxis)—stands neither for material
“conditions” as such, nor for production of materials and goods. Instead, it
stands for the process that creates the essence and all forms and expressions
of human life—humans engaging and acting in and on the world (including
50 ANNA STETSENKO
themselves and other people) through practices of changing their condi-

tions and circumstances of life. The historically developing means and forms
of labor constitute the driving force and the very fabric of history, soci-
ety, and human development, including the development of language and
speech. Labor is a life-producing and history-making process—the practi-
cal process that is “creating an objective world” (Marx, 1844/1978, p. 76)
and, at the same time, forming the ontological grounding for human devel-
opment—because “the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-en-
gendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is
contained in the character of its life activity” (ibid.).
There are no terms like “flow” or “network” in the works by Marx, yet
the presentation is clearly focused on a dynamic and continuous unfolding
of “life activity” as a process that is similar on many critical points to that
described in new materialism. That is, even without using these more con-
temporary notions, Marx did express similar ideas in his notion that it is
the flows and circuits of social material practices that constitute the foun-
dational process at the core of human development, society and its social
organization. This is amply illustrated by Marx in application to analyzing
capital flows and dynamics. For example, he showed
in great detail how capital—as value in motion—travels a set of circuits,
from, for example, the hands of the capitalist, into the machines and build-
ings of the work place, and on into the produced commodity. He shows
how capital, precisely because it is a relation, becomes “frozen” for greater
or lesser duration as the means of production or the produced commodity,
only to be returned to the capitalist when the commodity is exchanged on
the market. Commodities “stabilize” social relations in technologies and
“things as such”, and commodity circulation in this sense is a network.
(Kirsch & Mitchell, 2004, p. 696)
Like Marx, Leontiev (e.g., 1978) did not use the terms network or flow
but he did often refer to constant transfers within the system “subject-ac-
tivity-object” that form, in his words, “cyclical movements” (p. 168) of
social practices. These movements and transfers represent “the most com-
plex picture of internal connections, interrelations [or inter-weavings—pere-
pletenij, Russian], and mutual transfers born out of internal contradictions”
(p. 171) within human activities and practices. Understanding activity as a
constantly developing complex dynamic process, or continuous flow, char-
acterized by ever-changing cyclical moves and shifts that are never static nor
reified is central to Leontiev’s approach. These changes never end so that,
for example, perceptual images are themselves processes within activity, rep-
resenting its living and ever-shifting enactments indissoluble from the over-
all activity flows. Importantly, the term object should be clarified, following
Leontiev, as denoting not some reified things separate from people and their
social practice, but as social and material processes themselves (for explication,
see Stetsenko, 1999, 2005, 2016). That is, although flows of social prac-
tices sometimes appear to be “frozen” as embodied in material “things”
(e.g., as a “dream-house” that might motivate a person), these temporary
reifications only matter and exist as moments of social practices, embodying
and representing these practices, always imbued with social (i.e., transfor-
mative and relational) dimensions behind their surface, such as social status,
power, prestige, all of which are aspects of collective life and social practices.
Leontiev’s theory does capture the inherent dynamism of activity, providing
a deeply transactional approach to human development that overcomes the
old “metaphysics of things” and the dichotomy of things versus processes.
Therefore, in activity theory (Leontiev, 1978; as elaborated in Stetsenko,
1999, 2005, 2016), all aspects of reality including all psychological pro-
cesses are more or less unique and particular yet essentially monolith (i.e.,
made up of the same “cloth” of material practices), and also always dynamic
and fluid, moments within collective and material human activities mediated
by culturally generated tools. Importantly, and here the expansion of activity
theory is particularly critical, the cultural tools, just as any other seemingly
“sturdy” things are themselves essentially fluid and dynamic, even though
they might appear “frozen” in things out there—as pencils and pieces of
furniture, hammers and computers, homes and utensils, maps and stat-
ues. Even in such “frozen” material incarnations, tools and things are but
moments within the circuits of material practices, as they stand for modes
of acting that are only temporarily crystallized in what appears to be “mate-
rial things”.
Indeed, think for example of pencils that we all utilize in our every-
day activities (albeit ever less often with the proliferation of computers and
other new technologies)—these formerly ubiquitous and seemingly simple
and sturdy “things.” What could be more trivial than a pencil? Yet if we
look a bit more closely and, for example, inquire into the history of pen-
cils, we realize that this history in fact dates back centuries and is intercon-
nected with an endless variety of discoveries, technologies, and know-how
made and developed across many generations. No wonder that there is a
museum of pencils highlighting this complicated and rich history “behind”
what only appears to be such a simple and utterly mundane thing. Pencils
52 ANNA STETSENKO
stand for, and also potentially embody and enact, particular aspects within
the complex flows of human practices, extending through history, specifi-
cally as relates to writing and drawing (which themselves are social practices
of enormous complexity and deep historicity). If one considers, in addi-
tion, that things like pencils become alive again also only within the next
cycles of practices by people in the here and now of their activities in the
world, then these things can truly be seen as not just external objects but
as moments within the dynamic activity flows. This emphasis allows for an
understanding that cultural tools are indispensable and, importantly, imma-
nent components of developmental processes and human subjectivity (see
Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2014). Thus, in contrast to ANT and post-human-
ist approaches such as new materialism, in which the core effort is about
including nonhumans into the public sphere and accounts of agency, in
Marxism and activity theory this point is implied from the start. This is
because human beings are understood to be by “nature” tool-users inher-
ently fused with these tools and other objects of social practices in their his-
toricity and communality. The advantage of activity theory in this expanded
interpretation is that it allows for simultaneously overcoming both outdated
biases—that of seeing the world as composed of static things separate from
individuals and that of seeing individuals as solipsistic entities separate from
the material world of human practice.
While bearing many similarities with ANT and new materialism, activ-
ity theory is unique for its attention to the dynamics and interactivities of
human practices that are accorded with a central and formative role in con-
stituting all the phenomena of human life and development inclusive of
societal dynamics and their history. This brings up many difficult challenges
of addressing the traps of pernicious anthropocentrism—the point to which
I will return later on. In addition, the important developments in activity
theory, to be viable and strong enough to combat alternative reductionist
and positivist approaches, need to be placed within a sufficiently broad his-
torical and methodological framing including political, ethical, epistemic,
and ontological stakes that abide in such considerations.
Radical-transformative Agency
One way to further advance activity theory—inclusive of Vygotsky’s

approach—at the level of ethics, ontology, and epistemology, while
overcoming some of its gaps and contradictions by capitalizing on activ-

ism and creativity enacted in transformative agency, has been suggested in
my works on transformative activist stance (TAS). To give a brief account
(for details, see e.g., Stetsenko, 2012, 2013a,b, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018),
the TAS builds on Vygotsky’s ideas about collaborative practice as the key
grounding for human development, Bakhtin’s notion of becoming (or pos-
tuplenie; for elaboration, see Stetsenko, 2007; Stetsenko & Ho, 2015),
and Freire’s critical pedagogy—as these are further integrated with insights
from contemporary works in ecological, dynamic, feminist, sociocultural,
and critical approaches. On this foundation, the following expansions are
suggested.
The core premise in TAS is that it is directly through and within the
dynamic process of people entering the stream of social collaborative prac-
tices— while inevitably transforming and co-creating these practices and
the world itself by mattering in them— that people simultaneously come to
be, to know and to act, as active agents of their own lives and society, that
is, as agentive and responsible actors of social-historical practices. That is, we
do not passively dwell in the world, but instead co-create and co-author it
together with other people—thus simultaneously realizing the world and
ourselves. Importantly, this process can be specified as taking place through
the process of mattering via unique contributions to collaborative practices
by each and every person understood in her historical becoming, that is, in
her becoming an agentive actor of social communal practices. This under-
standing contrasts with explanations that premise human development on
passive processes of people being simply situated in contexts while merely
experiencing what is “given,” or passively and obediently reacting to influ-
ences coming from the outside, if even adjusting their responses to some
independently existing external forces. The focus instead is on agency and
creativity, suggesting that our acts and deeds do not just take place in the
world that is somehow simply “given” to us, independently of us; instead,
we simultaneously bring forth the world and ourselves in our agentive and
activist realizations of the world composed of social practices that are con-
stantly challenged and changed in each human act and deed that always and
inevitably contributes to these practices in a spiral of a mutual, bidirectional
becoming.
These practices are dynamic and fluid, contingent and continuous, as
they certainly are. In this sense, there is similarity with Barad’s and Latour’s
accounts of reality as a fluid, contingent, and ever-shifting process with an
emphasis on performativity and production of the world. Yet in distinction
54 ANNA STETSENKO
with the performative metaphysics and actor-network theory, the transfor-

mative activist stance (TAS) suggests that it is human beings who together
enact, perform, and carry out these processes. That is, the world is invented,
reinvented, and sustained by people collectively and practically, in collabo-
rative pursuits and active strivings within the political, cultural, and moral
terrain that frames—informs, constrains, and supports—but does not define
their lives and development.
The world is fully enmeshed with our collective strivings and collabora-
tive projects, in a spiral of mutual historical becoming, wherein each individ-
ual act of being, knowing, and doing—unique, authorial, and irreplaceable
as it is—matters. This is about active and activist projects of co-authoring
the world and history-in-the-making, thoroughly contingent on commit-
ments we make to creating the future we seek and deem to be worth strug-
gling for. These creative acts of being, knowing, and doing bring forth the
world, and the reality itself, essentially co-constituting the world as a col-
lective forum of human deeds, a drama played out in and through indi-
vidually unique contributions to collaborative practices. The world itself is
understood as an arena of human social endeavors (deeds) that continuously
evolve in history as a unified process of human collaborative and purposive
cultural-historical praxis that connects all individuals and all generations in
one unified and unbreakable process.
The TAS starting premise is that every person matters because the world
is evoked, real-ized, invented, and created by each and every one of us, in
each and every event of our being-knowing-doing—by us as social actors
and agents of communal practices and collective history, who only come
about within the matrices of these practices through realizing and co-au-
thoring them in joint struggles and strivings. This position is a departure
from the canonical interpretations of Marxism that traditionally eschew the
level of individual processes such as agency, mind, and consciousness. It is
also an expanded and critical take on Vygotsky’s tradition in which agency
was under-theorized for various reasons including political ones (Stetsenko,
2005). In addition, and most critically, what is suggested by the transforma-
tive approach is yet another shift—a transition from participation (as derived
from the notion of dwelling in the present and adapting to it) to contribu-
tion—a more active, agentive, and activist stance implying that all acts of
being, knowing, and doing take place at the sites of ideological struggles
and are part and parcel of such struggles.
This view radically reshapes what agency stands for based in reformulat-
ing the basic ontology of the world and of human development as processes
that are co-implicated and co-realized. Agency is conceptualized as a situ-

ated and collectively formed ability of human beings—qua fully commu-
nal agents of social practices and history, though each acting from a unique
position and stance—to project into the future, challenge the existing sta-
tus quo, and commit to alternatives in thus realizing the world and human
development. Thus, the critical point is that agency takes place as a con-
frontation with the status quo and its major contradictions and shortfalls in
which both are co-realized and moved to the next level. Importantly, this
ability has to be revealed in its contingency on the mastery of cultural tools
for transformative action and activism through participating in and contrib-
uting to inherently social processes and practices of human communities.
This is a non-mentalist and non-transcendental account of human agency
focusing on its productive, world-forming, and history-making role as a
transformative intervention into the course of collaborative social practices
co-constitutive of reality and its transformations. In other words, agency is
about creating the world and coming into being-knowing-doing in the very act
of bringing about transformative and creative change—in the act of making
a difference in communal forms of life and collaborative practices and thus,
mattering in them (for practical applications of this approach, see Vianna &
Stetsenko, 2014, 2017; Vianna, Hougaard, & Stetsenko, 2014).
This opens up the prospect of possibility against the probability (cf.
Stengers, 2002)—the realization that we are together shaping the world
and our responsibility is to proceed on ethical grounds and commitments
that need to be formed, debated and contested yet always presented and
explicated. It is an urgent demand to debate what kind of a future we want
to build and this debate is at the core of defining agency. As Srnicek and
Williams (2015) write, “for all the glossy sheen of our technological era, we
remain bound by an old and obsolete set of social relations” (p. 2) and, I
would add, it is our obligation to work on the visions for a better future, in
the spirit of solidarity and equality, which can fuel our collective/individual
(or “collectividual,” see Stetsenko, 2013a; Stetsenko, 2019) agency.
Instead of Conclusion: Considering the Pitfalls

of Anthropocentrism
A truly revolutionary and radical agency, as I have argued in this chapter, has
been neglected or under-theorized by the extant frameworks—developed as
56 ANNA STETSENKO
they were in sync with the retreat from radical politics and discourses that
could directly challenge capitalism. Now, however, the illusions and utopias
of prosperity supposedly to be brought about by the “end of history” or, in
the most recent take on these topics, by technocapitalism—which had been
expected to solve humanity’s problems with the help of big data and brain
scans—have evaporated and there is an urgent need to move beyond atti-
tudes of political quietism and complacency with the status quo. Such atti-
tudes, with their myopic disregard of capitalism’s pathologies, valorize what
in fact are predatory practices of the so called “new information/entertain-
ment society” (Kellner, 2004).
The transformative agency of people, qua social agents of communities
and their histories, is an ability to shape and essentially create our world,
our future, and our own development, while relying on the social and cul-
tural resources that we bring into existence and co-create in each and every
act of our own lives, our knowing-being-doing. In this approach, the radi-
cal entanglement, co-determination and knowing processes are understood
to be inseparable from the continuing unfolding of social and ecological life
(where everything is seen as fundamentally connected). Yet what is high-
lighted is that human agency is the construct needed to resist and combat
the pathologies of capitalism. This premise entails an emphasis on the socio-
political and ethical dimensions of research and social practices—on com-
mitments to, and imaginations of, by individuals and communities, how the
present community practices need, can, and ought to be changed for the
better—while addressing their core contradictions.
This approach brings up the need to address the dangers and pitfalls
of anthropocentric accounts and in particular, as these are merged with
the present-day sociopolitical ethos premised on capitalist unbridled con-
trol, hegemony and exploitation. The hubristic prioritizing of humans and
especially of their unlimited consumption, which is the lynchpin of unreg-
ulated markets especially in the western world, is indeed a grave threat
to the ecology, society and the very survival of the planet. While sharing
many critiques of anthropocentrism, I believe it is important to note that,
to paraphrase Gould, anthropocentrism, just like progress, “is not intrinsi-
cally and logically noxious. It’s noxious in the context of western cultural
[and sociopolitical and economic] traditions” (quoted in Grant & Woods,
2003, p. 105). That humanity has played and continues to play an unprece-
dented role in transforming and changing our planet is plainly and painfully
obvious especially in the times of global climate change, international con-
flict, and human strife. There is nothing either romantic or glorious about
Antropocene—the concept that captures this deplorable and tragic dynam-

ics. Instead, Antropocene is defined by nuclear tests, plastic pollution, high
levels of harmful chemicals in soils from artificial fertilizers, soot from power
stations, and other devastating effects directly related to capitalism.
The idea of anthropocentrism—if fashioned outside of the biases and
blinkers of the cultural, economic and sociopolitical model of capitalism—
can bring about a much-needed emphasis on our responsibility in the face
of ecological apocalypse. It also can and should bring the emphasis on
accountability of the powerful forces—especially western corporations and
their leaders who play instrumental role in this apocalypse—and the urgent
need for action against these forces. Indeed, coal or oil do not have agency
or a political agenda of their own, but ExxonMobile and its leaders do. The
ecological crisis brought about by their unrestrained exploitation of the
natural recourses, and our acquiescence with these politics coupled with
unreasonable life styles that add to pollution and ecological disaster, are
not posthuman but “hyperhuman,” steeped as they are in “repercussions
of human history” (Malm, 2018; quoted in Devellennes & Dillet, 2018, p.
12) and its dramatic finale.
The excuses for irresponsive policies based on claims about putatively
incontestable human nature, forces of evolution, or material entanglements
beyond our control have to be abandoned in favor of developing strate-
gies to combat inequalities, environmental devastation, racism and social
injustices—in the spirit of focusing on radical-transformative agency pos-
sible within collaborative projects of social transformation in the process
of co-creating the world in its post-capitalist shape. The time is for activ-
ist scholars to unite in collective struggles that not only reveal the pathol-
ogies of capitalism but also point to alternative social orders the outline of
which Marx and Vygotsky had both laboured to envision, so passionately,
all along.
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3. Building Agency for Social Change
FERNANDA LIBERALI
Poverty in Brazil is a long-term problem that has been eroding its possibilities
for growth for many years. The economic contradictions experienced by the
country have created a separation that is difficult to overcome. The wealthy
have barely any contact with the realities of those who have very little, and
vice-versa. They actually live worlds apart even if their realities are just sepa-
rated by a few streets, boroughs or houses. Still, these Brazilians have always
impacted on each other’s lives, but their encapsulated everyday experiences
seem to keep them planets apart. However, poverty cannot be taken as a nat-
ural situation. It is developed by the greedy tentacles of a society based on
capital and profit which perpetrated social inequalities, exploitation of natu-
ral resources, growth of racism and segregation of those who are different,
the use of age as a means for social division, among other horrible situa-
tions (Apple, 2018; Rolnik, 2018; Souza, 2017; Coburn & Gormally, 2017;
Davies, 2017; Saglio-Yatzimirsky & Landy, 2014; Aued & Vendrani, 2009).
Constructing social change is mandatory for an effective transformation
of these unfair contradictions that seem to be expanding in our reality, and
I argue that schools should take responsibility for this task as part of their
objectives. This chapter discusses a project for school transformation in which
the development of transformative agencies is focused (Liberali, 2019).
Three concepts are integrated in this discussion: perezhivanie, agency and
mobility. The chapter draws upon the concept of mobility (Blommaert, 2010)
in order to understand agency seen as constructed through perezhivanie.
According to Blommaert (2014), mobility involves both using the experi-
ences of a space-temporal context and understanding that different resources
project values according to space-time, interlocutors, political and ethical sit-
uations. The idea suggested here is that understanding, developing aware-
ness and using multimodal resources construct repertoires which create new
possible agencies—that is, the possibility to break away from a given frame of
64 FERNANDA LIBERALI
action and to take the initiative to transform it (Virkkunen, 2006). This pro-
cess is believed to be constructed in the dramatic events and refracted by each
subject, in perezhivanie, as suggested by Vygotsky.
In this chapter, these concepts will be discussed in relation to a proj-
ect developed with deaf and hearing, wealthy and poor students, as well as
with researchers, school coordinators, supervisors, principals, teachers and
Brazilian Sign Language interpreters, aiming at building a transformative
curriculum proposals. As stated above, the chapter is organized to first dis-
cuss the three concepts: perezhivanie, mobility and agency. After that, there is
going to be a short description of the project and how these concepts will be
discussed and analyzed in the data. Finally, the data about the project will be
presented and discussed with references to how, in the project, the dramatic
events were experienced as perezhivanie and created mobility, which in turn,
produced new forms of agency.
Perezhivanie, Agency and Mobility
According to Veresov (2016, p. 139), the concept of perezhivanie, as estab-

lished by Varshava and Vygotsky (1931), could be seen simultaneously as “a
process (act, activity) and a content”, as both “how” one experiences a situa-
tion and “what” the experience actually was. Veresov states that this concept
is more than a simple “emotional experience”. As a process, it can be “cap-
tured and collected as experimental or empirical data”, while, as a concept, it
becomes a tool for “the analysis of the role and influence of social reality on
the course of (…) development” (Veresov, 2016, p. 139). As a phenomenon,
it “refracts social influences” (Veresov, 2016, p. 141) and, as a concept, it
“shows a dialectical unity of social within the individual and individual within
the social”. But how does this connect to the concept of agency and mobility?
According to Stanislavsky (1938/2007), art creates the life of the human
spirit, so it does not imitate the audience, but brings them life from within. In
order to do so, the playwright emphasized the importance of the lived expe-
rience (perezhivanie). He suggested that it would be necessary to feel and
understand with our internal and external lives in order to open and bring up
the life of the actor. Stanislavsky used perezhivanie as a tool to enable actors to
create characters from their own lived-through experiences. Zaltron (2012)
explains that, for Stanislavsky, perezhivanie should cross the actor on the scene
Building Agency for Social Change 65
in order to create a real connection with the audience. In a way, this could be
connected to the idea of the construction of agency by the subjects.
Delari and Passos (2009) explain that the prefix “pere” implies “through”
and “Zhivat’” means “to live”, so perezhivanie involves living through situ-
ations or life in transformation. Therefore, perezhivanie can be seen as a vis-
ceral experience which contributes to the development of who the subject is
and could become.
An important aspect of perezhivanie is the fact that each subject “lives
through” a moment in a very unique way. That is why Vygotsky empha-
sized the description of perezhivanie as a prism that refracts external factors
(Vygotsky, 1934/1994, pp. 339–340). It involves understanding how the
environment influences development. Therefore, it could be connected to
how subjects become agents in the process of being.
Following a Marxist perspective, Vygotsky (1934/1987) emphasized the
need to understand human beings in goal oriented activities, but he focused
on perezhivanie as a central concept to understand the complexity of the indi-
vidual’s developmental process. For Vygotsky (1934/1994), drama, or social
emotional collision experienced by contradictions among individuals (inter-
personal), is the basis for intrapersonal development.
According to the author, experiences lived with others, which refer to
a dramatic event, are refracted and may also be individually experienced.
Vygotsky calls perezhivanie this complex nexus of psychological processes,
including emotions, cognitive processes, memory and even volition, that is
a particular prism, through which the individual internalizes the collective
experience. Based on this, Veresov (2016, p. 140) associates perezhivanie to
the psychological development since he understands internalization as “a pro-
cess of becoming intra-psychological, as a unique combination of higher men-
tal functions (psychological systems) of an individual within social contexts”.
We could say that the dramatic experiences lived with others may become
experiences lived with oneself. However, they do not determine each sub-
ject’s development. As claimed by Veresov (2016), the social becomes the
individual, but not in a deterministic way. The individual process of becoming
includes only those components of the social environment that are refracted
by the individual’s perezhivanie and, therefore, achieve developmental impli-
cation. Because development, in the Vygotskian perspective, implies contra-
diction, its moving force, different forms of agency can be developed from
the same dramatic event. That is, in the struggles lived with others, the sub-
ject builds mobility through the construction of multiple forms of external
and internal dialogues, by questioning each other, and learning to question

oneself.
Thus, the focus of this study is on these dramatic events considered cen-
tral to the development of mobility and possibly of new forms of agencies.
Both the concepts of agency and of mobility will be discussed and exemplified
through the presentation of the agentive power of deaf and hearing, wealthy
and poor students involved in a project with researchers, coordinators, super-
visors, principals, teachers, and interpreters of sign language to build transfor-
mative curriculum proposals.
The concept of agency offers a basis to investigate the development of
individuals in the process of transforming activities. Agency is related to
intentions and willful actions and it can be understood as the rupture of
pre-established patterns of action in subjects’ roles, from taking initiatives
to transform them (Engeström & Sannino, this volume; Engeström, 2006,
2011; Virkkunen, 2006). It centrally refers to the development of authority
and authorship of each individual on their own lives (Engeström, 2009).
Moreover, relational agency, as defined by Edwards (2007, 2011),
involves mutual responsibility, conscious engagement with each other and
the ability to offer and ask for support. It also implies mutual support and
understanding, apart from the awareness of the paramount importance of the
self and other. Similarly, from a transformative perspective, agency is related
to the collective activity of a group of individuals for the development of
new possibilities and transformations (Haapasaari, Engeström & Kerosuo,
2014; Engeström, Sannino, & Virkkunen, 2014). In other words, it com-
prises active participants who are able to resist, criticize, offer other possi-
bilities, think differently, model and undertake new standards for activities
(Engeström & Sannino, 2011; Engeström, Sannino, & Virkkunen, 2014).
From a critical collaborative standpoint, Ninin and Magalhães (2017)
discuss that agency involves pointing out contradictions in order to create
chances for expanding one another’s possibilities for transforming realities.
Therefore, agency, understood from a critical collaborative, relational and
transformative perspective, assumes that individuals develop means to face
the contradictions and engage in transformation processes.
Following a discursive perspective, we suggest that this can be accom-
plished through the possession of several repertoires1 (Busch, 2012;
Blommaert, 2010) that allow for the conscious and intentional performance
in different context. These repertoires are the resources and opportunities
established on ongoing previous contexts—built over personal biographies
and social system stories (Blommaert and Backus, 2012). This closely relates
to the idea of the jointly lived experiences (dramatic events) which are trans-
formed into experiences lived with oneself (perezhivanie). This is so because
these repertoires are architected in a never-ending process and are established
by means of the trajectories of each of these individuals throughout their
lives. Besides, they provide the potential to play certain social roles, produc-
ing certain identities and inhibiting others.
According to Blommaert (2014, 2015), based on Bakhtin’s concept of
chronotope (1937–38), mobility involves using these experiences of a certain
space-temporal context (which are here identified as dramatic event refracted
as perezhivanie) as a basis for the construction of new possibilities of acting
and producing meanings in new and/or different socio-cultural and histori-
cal contexts (which are here considered as new agencies). It implies consider-
ing the range of discourses used by the participants individually, taking into
account different degrees of power, authority and validity—here identified as
individual’s mobility.
As stated elsewhere (Liberali, 2019) mobility, for Blommaert (2010), is
seen as created by different multimodal resources (Kress, 2010) that compose
individuals’ repertoires and enact the construction of meanings and power
relations related to social orders, which are based on historical connections
between current and previous statements. Each verbal-visual mode (colors,
tone of voice, word choice, gesture) imply an order of indexicality, that is,
“historical patterns and processes” that are “responsible for determining feel-
ings of belonging, identity and roles in society” (Blommaert, 2010, p. 153).
From this point onwards, the concept of mobility emerges as paths that
can be covered in different stratified, controlled and monitored spaces. In
order to be appropriate and powerful, individuals develop repertoires that
make it possible for them to master specific resources, which are considered
valid in one situation, but not in another. Thus, these standard organizers
define the agency exercised and allow for understanding their power of trans-
formation in diversified contexts. Therefore, agency could be understood by
observing subjects’ mobility in different activities, focusing on the transfor-
mation of their repertoires. In other words, individuals are called to develop
repertoires that may enable them the conquest of power over oneself, the
understanding of the role and the paramount importance of the other and of
sharing with each other, the engagement with the demands of the others and
with the possibility to recognize the other as a support for oneself.
De-encapsulating Agencies for Social Change
In this chapter, students’ agencies are understood by observing how they par-
ticipate in the activities of the school context, focusing on the transformation
of current practices, aimed at the transformation of their oppressive realities.
It focuses students’ agentive power in the Digit-M-Ed Brazil Project,2 a proj-
ect designed to develop formative agents as a way to overcome representa-
tional limits of encapsulated functions and roles imposed by school contexts.
The present society is characterized by superdiversity (Vertovec, 2007)
which means that there is a large variety of ways of being, acting and under-
standing the world. In many schools, however, it seems that the dominant
culture is to remain a single-truth-only. This truth is based on crystallized
meanings which are transmitted by a few. Taking into account that the global-
ization3 perspective can foster new possibilities of actions (Santos, 2003), the
problems which systematically involve all people in supporting socio-politi-
cal interests—and not just economic ones—should be investigated. In order
to do that, miscegenation of peoples, cultures, values, tastes, beliefs in all
four corners of the world are essential to allow another kind of globalization,
another discourse so that a new world view can be developed.
In this context, it would be possible to think of a collectivity that relearns
to see and read the world, as proposed by Freire (1970). In the contrast-
ing worlds created by the controlled scenery of schools and the turbulence
of society, the participants’ roles should be to overcome stereotypes used as
control tools (Pérez Gómez, 1998). In a conception of reality in which the
reification of individual and social existences prevails, fixed participants’ roles
act as tools that can contribute to the social maintenance of a certain type of
reality. It is urgent that dealing with knowledge, curriculum and culture can
be rethought as a way “to overcome the fatalistic understanding of the sit-
uations of our contexts” (Freire, 1999, p. 37), so that the curriculum, and
school itself, can exist to promote the participation of every citizen involved
and the construction of social change.
This reflection expands the discussions on curriculum de-encapsulation
Engeström, 1987; 1991; Liberali et al., 2015) that understands how school
knowledge, usually fixed and marked by unique and absolute true perspec-
tives, can be overcome by an ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2008), derived
from different sources. In the Digit-M-Ed Project, the inclusion of teachers
and students as effective managers in a school context has resulted not only in
the process of curriculum de-encapsulation but also the de-encapsulation of
participants’ preconditioned roles. In other words, it involved the organiza-

tion of learning processes outside of capsules regarding the participants, the
sources and the educational institution itself. Thus, this process triggers a type
of human development in which the school actors extend their wide-ranged
knowledge beyond school and integrate them into their lives.
More particularly, as stated above, this chapter aims to study the move-
ment of roles assumed by deaf and hearing, wealthy and poor students,
working with researchers, coordinators, supervisors, principals, teachers,
interpreters of sign language in activities for the construction of school pro-
posals in order to break representational limits and promote new forms of
de-encapsulation. Such process, clearly connected with the idea of daring
as proposed by Stetsenko (2015), is expanded here as one that “allows the
broadening of the participants’ action horizons beyond the functions and
duties currently assigned to them, creating foundations for the development
of mobility” (Liberali, 2019, p. 7). This perspective of de-encapsulation thus
implies considering the range of discourses used by participants individually,
whilst accounting for different degrees of power, authority and validity.
This suggests promoting discourses in which the agencies of those involved
(Edwards, 2007, 2011; Engeström, 2006, 2011; Virkkunen, 2006, Freire,
1970) can be rethought and de-encapsulated. Thus, the project focuses on
the reconstruction of agencies by everyone, from the observation of the ways
in which the individuals develop mobility (Blommaert, 2010) to act intensely
in various activities of school contexts, overcoming the boundaries of spaces
and roles usually designated for each of them in a relation that we can evaluate
as pre-established. These pre-established spaces and roles are understood as
forms of encapsulation, since they do not offer chances for new and creative
ways for doing things. The clash participants need to go through, in dramatic
events, are refracted (perezhivanie) in a process through which they overcome
these boundaries that are internalized, and this creates the basis for new forms
of agency to emerge.
From this perspective, this chapter focuses on the analyses of the voices
assumed by students in the construction, development and evaluation of cur-
riculum proposals, discussed during interviews and a roundtable with a group
of students from different schools, which were both video recorded in the
2016. This chapter presents how students developed mobility and how that
has enhanced their de-encapsulated agentive power.
Methodology
This study was carried out through Critical Collaboration Research

(Magalhães, 2010, 2011; Liberali, 2009; Liberali, Schapper, & Lemos,
2012), which is based on the intentional transformation of contexts through
the development of all participants involved (researchers, educators and stu-
dents). It requires a collective process of transformation and involvement in
the search for shared and collaborative solutions to create a school environ-
ment that effectively promotes better conditions for all the involved ones.
In the Critical Collaboration Research, the critical entry implies, as dis-
cussed by Liberali, Schapper and Lemos (2012), the movement of transfor-
mation of reality by means of reflection based on the inseparability of theory
and practice; the structuring of the research from the real participants’ needs;
and reflection on/in the action, which enables other views, other positions
which were not envisioned before. In turn, the entry collaboration requires a
reflection on modes of action that are far from the simple acceptance of pre-
set positions of power and knowledge in order to take the place of each one
as a co-responsible subject for the whole. Everyone and all the others become
responsive and responsible (Bakhtin, 1937–38/1986) for the paths of the
research and for the group development.
This research project was based on the extramural projects developed
by the Brazilian research group ‘Language in Activities in School Contexts’
(LACE/Linguagem em Atividades do Contexto Escolar), more specifically,
the DIGIT-M-ED Hiperconnencting Project / BRAZIL. Considering the
requirements declared by participants of research projects already undertaken
by researchers from LACE and reported in previous studies (Liberali, 2013),
school communities’ formative proposals have been developed in a critical-col-
laborative way. The project was initially part of an international project, coor-
dinated by Kontopodis (2011–2014) and funded by the Interchange Project
Marie Curie International Research Teams—European Union FP7 (IRSES)
(2012–2014) (Kontopodis, Varvantakis, Wulf, 2019). Since 2013, in Brazil,
the project has been developed in three different phases: DIGIT-M-ED/
Brazil—Transforming teaching and learning through multiple media (2013–
2015), DIGIT-M-ED Hiperconectando Brazil—Transforming teaching and
learning (2016–2018), and, currently, Digitmed Program: the construction of
lived spaces for the development of mobility.
This chapter focused on the second phase of the project, its 2016 version.
It assembled public and private schools, focusing on the committed participa-
tion of all different participants4 (Liberali, 2019):
• Teams of researchers—composed of doctors, masters and doctoral stu-

dents, master’s and undergraduate (graduate and primary and second-
ary education) of PUC-SP5 and other partner institutions—responsible
for developing the theoretical basis and constant analysis of the data
generated by the project activities.
• Teams of teacher educators as formative groups—composed of some

of the researchers also responsible, along with the project coordina-
tors, for the organization of workshops and for the direct monitoring
of schools and processes in developing each of them, through school
observation, meetings, and reflective sessions. As the collaborators in
the development of curriculum proposals, they become responsible
for the discussions with principals, coordinators, students and teachers
(everyone as teacher educators); and for developing proposals that are
relevant and appropriate to the context of each institution.
By doing so, it is important to note that the participants of the
focus schools also have specific functions:
• Principals and pedagogical coordinators—participants who monitor

and carry out the process of the training and the implementation of
the project in their schools, backing the researchers and the formative
groups, monitoring the staff training.
• Support group—the group of two to four teachers from each school,

who take the lead with the coordinators and student-educators to con-
duct the training of the institution’s teaching staff. As colleagues, they
support and conduct the others’ training, creating ties of cooperation
in achieving shared objectives for the development of all.
• Student-educators (ten to thirty students from each school), as mem-

bers of youth culture, they become trainers of the researchers, prin-
cipals, coordinators, teachers and other students. They take turns in
participating in monthly meetings held with other schools. (Liberali,
2019, pp. 9–10)
This research takes place, after the participants’ written authorization, by

means of video recordings of two types of activities. The first is a roundtable
with a group of students from different schools during a presentation of the
DIGIT-M-ED Project Hiperconnecting Brazil in the 2016 Forum LACE.
For this roundtable, researchers invited one participant from each school that
had partaken in the project during 2015 to answer some questions and to dis-
cuss the main ideas developed by the project. Some of the schools presented
more than one student for the roundtable and the researchers decided to
accept as many participants as was possible at the table. To mediate the dis-
cussion, a master researcher, Camila, and two high school researchers, Natan
and André, planned questions and organized the presentation, guided also by
the project coordinator, Fernanda. During the discussion, one of the present-
ers was a deaf student, Patrick, who had an interpreter mediating his speech.
The other activity was interviews collected with some students during the
second semester of 2016. For the interviews, questions, similar to the ones
posed in the roundtable, were asked. Students had to discuss their participa-
tion in the project and its impact on their personal lives and on the activities
that take place in their schools.
Table 3.1 comprises information about the participants whose speeches
were analyzed in this chapter.
Table 3.1: Participants whose speeches were discussed in the chapter
Name Age Gender Type of School State Language

Used
F 10 boy private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
G 10 boy private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
B 11 girl private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
Bi 11 girl private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
Ba 11 girl public school Sao Paulo Portuguese
M 13 boy private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
Ge 14 girl public school Sao Paulo Portuguese
Me 14 girl public school Sao Paulo Portuguese
Ma 16 girl public school Sao Paulo Portuguese
D 16 girl public school Piauí Portuguese
Gi 17 girl private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
V 18 girl private school Sao Paulo Portuguese
P 18 boy private school Sao Paulo sign language
interpreted in
Portuguese
This study focuses on the language that materializes the meanings, actions
and desires of the participants. Thus, the multimodal texts are considered as
a texture inherent in the dialogical act, produced during participants’ discus-
sions in the two types of activities. This material was described, analyzed and
interpreted from a dialogical perspective of enunciation (Brait, 2006), whose
categories are not mechanically applicable to the data.
Following a Vygotskian perspective (1934/1994), the episodes were
selected, focusing on the dramatic events experienced by individuals’ con-
tradictions, which were considered central to the development of mobility
and, possibly, of new forms of agencies. The analysis of these dramatic events
involved some procedures: the study of the transcribed verbal-visual texts that
embodied the episodes, focusing on the argumentative categories (Liberali,
2013). This focus is justified since the categories of arguments contribute to
the understanding of how different ideas, positions, opinions are presented,
developed, constructed, discussed, contrasted, related, combined and remade
and how this gives support to understand students’ mobility.
Data Analysis and Discussion
In the project, participants become each other’s educators, and engage in

studying, training and monitoring the other’s development in a collective
transformation cycle. Two aspects were really essential in their perspective
about the project and for the construction of their agentive participation: the
opportunity to express themselves and the contact with diversity.
When analyzing the way they see the project, the first aspect that really
draws attention in the speech of most young people is that they see it as a
place where they can “have voice”. During the roundtable, most students
expressed the importance of effectively participating.
V (18-year-old girl—port6—private school—Sao Paulo): (…) To

learn to see the school as a place where the student, not only listens,
but also starts to interact.
In the first excerpt, V stresses the fact that participants are supposed not
only to listen but also interact with one another. She points out that this is
something they are supposed to learn and not something which is natural.
The fact that she uses “start to interact” emphasizes that this is not usual
in their lives. She points to the expansion of engagement involved in tak-

ing initiatives to overcome pre-established forms of acting. Similarly, Gi and
M focus on the voice discussion from a comparison between what they have
experienced at school and what happens in the project.
Gi (17-year-old girl—port—private school—Sao Paulo): The most

important thing was changing roles because at school every day we
arrived, sat on the chair and had classes. Here it was the first time that
someone said “OK, what do you think?”, and then you had to take
the role of the teacher. It is really “crazy”, really cool.
M (13-year-old boy—port—private school—Sao Paulo): I find it

(Digit-M-Ed) really interesting and really important because, as he
said (pointing to another student), it adds so many things to our dis-
cussions and you have more say here than as a student. I feel really
comfortable because it is a proposal that is really different from class-
room, it is a discussion so you can add and we can get to many con-
cepts and have many ideas and have more thoughts.
According to Gi’s position, there is a change of roles in the project which

creates a distinction between this moment and what happens at school. For
her, school is associated with ritualistic and repetitive actions (“in school
every day we arrived, sat on the chair and had classes”), while the project
is related to a “demand” for participation (“you had to take the role of the
teacher.”). She establishes the project as the first step associated with having
voice when she says that it was the “first time that someone said ‘OK, what
do you think?’”. In this sense, additional forms of being and acting are rec-
ognized and created.
In a similar fashion, M concentrates his argumentation on the difference
between his school (as a student, really different from classroom) and the proj-
ect and he realizes that, although the procedures are different and more excit-
ing, they learn and develop ideas in this process (we can get to many concepts
and have many ideas and have more thoughts). In this sense, the students are
involved in developing new orders of indexicality which create a sense of
belonging and identity, they become persons who can present their voices.
Similarly, F and G, who are among the youngest participants, during the
interview, also connect digit-m-ed to their personal development in relation
to talking to people.
F (10-year-old boy—private school—Sao Paulo): It is a place where I

learned more about citizenship. And, before I went to Digit-M-Ed, I
was ashamed to speak but when I went to digit-m-ed I lost this shame.
G (10-year-old boy—private school—Sao Paulo): First when I was

not in Digit-M-Ed, I was really shy and now when I go to digit-m-ed
I am not anymore. And I like Digit-M-Ed a lot because I can hear dif-
ferent opinions and change my own opinion, and this is really nice.
F also supports the importance of the project as voice projecting by

stating that this process of participating came together with an understanding
of what citizenship is. This suggests that participating is not only a question
of saying things but having content to talk about or, in other words, having
points of views and supporting them. Along the same line, G points out that
in the project they do not simply speak, but really listen to others and change
their ideas as a result of that. In other words, students also act intensely in the
activities, overcoming pre-established boundaries.
P, a deaf student, also sees his and his colleagues’ opportunity to have
voice in the project. The project seems to have opened a door for him to enter
the world of the hearing. Similarly, for Bi, a hearing student, there is also the
recognition of the importance of the voice assigned to the deaf as a means for
the hearing to have access to the views and positions of deaf kids and to share
ideas with them.
P (18-year-old boy—sign language interpreted in port—private

school—Sao Paulo): (…) And thinking about this relation between
Digit-M-Ed and us, deaf students, in classroom is that the group that
has taken part in Digit-M-Ed, we had a lot of these discussions that
were presented here, also through videos, through one’s opinions,
and this was really important because it gave opportunity, gave us
voice so that we could also get involved and comprehend how this
theoretical question can help us in classroom to think in a more crit-
ical way (…)
(Bi 12-year-old girl—port—private school—Sao Paulo): I had never

worked with anyone that was deaf and I found it very cool because we
are, everybody, of different ages and different people so I think that
… this way, it is not because they are deaf that they cannot have opin-
ions and they say really cool and important things and I find it really
interesting and really important: everybody can communicate and
take into consideration what everybody says, without anyone being

more, less, deaf or not.
In his speech, P addresses the importance of participation and of criti-

cal thinking (get involved and comprehend how this theoretical question can
help us in classroom to think in a more critical way). His appointment towards
the importance of theoretical questions suggests that the project is not only
about voicing opinions but about developing grounds for the informed and
critical discussions about them.
This is reinforced by Bi, who stresses the importance of diversity through
the contact she has had with the deaf kids in the project (I had never worked
with anyone that was deaf). But the contact is not a superficial one. Besides
the fact that her colleague in the project is deaf, and that she has contact with
people of different ages, she argues that they all have positions that have to be
taken into consideration. As G had suggested previously, all ideas should be
taken into account and reflected upon, so that each one can create their own
ideas. By using the space-temporal context of the project as a basis for the
construction of new possibilities of acting and producing meanings, students
learn to act with mutual responsibility and conscious engagement with each
other, as proposed by Edwards (2007, 2011).
The diversity they experienced was essential for the realization that one
can always learn from the other. They could experiment with dealing with sit-
uations that were not controlled or pre-established such as the ones discussed
by Ge.
Ge (14-year-old girl—port—public school—Sao Paulo): We also

worked with people from different languages, the deaf, and we
thought it would be very hard to communicate with them. But it was
not. In truth, we learned a lot from them. There were people with dif-
ferent degree levels, even lectures and professors. I thought I would
never talk to a master or a PhD, and so, this was a unique experience
to me, as it was for her (pointing to her friend); I liked it a lot. There
were PhDs, and PhD students, master and master students, teachers
and students. And we interacted in the same way. Listening to each
other’s thoughts, respecting each other’s ideas.
Ge concedes to having had some doubts about her possibility to deal with
the reality of the project. She was unsure about her potential to go beyond
her limits and to dare to interact with deaf kids, masters and PhDs. Her lim-
its were set by her immediate reality. In the project, she could realize that she
had the possibility and the instruments to go beyond (And we interacted in

the same way. Listening to each other’s thoughts, respecting each other’s ideas). In
a similar way, Ge and Me also talked about social class issues and how their
views on this topic could be transformed in the project. They were develop-
ing the authority and authorship of their own lives, as exposed by Engeström
(2009).
Ge (14-year-old girl—port—public school—Sao Paulo): I liked to

interact with people from a different social class than ours. I used
to think, before going there, that they would have some prejudice
against people from a lower social class, against poor people. But what
I realized there was that there was no type of prejudice at all. I liked to
talk to people a lot, to know what they thought. (….)
Me (14-year-old girl—port—public school—Sao Paulo): We talked

to people from a higher social class, a class totally different from ours.
We could interact with people, from different cultures, habits, and
from a region that is different from ours.
The age factor was a topic recurrently addressed in the discussions because
this was more obvious and has always had a more palpable impact in showing
the difference between what happens in schools and the activities in the proj-
ect. Since there is no distinction between the way students, teachers, man-
agers, researchers and parents are treated in the project, some students were
really astonished by the discoveries they made in the process of participation.
As discussed by Blommaert (2013), the expansion of their ways of intertwin-
ing voices seemed to create and expose their new ways of experiencing life.
Ma (16-year-old girl—port—public school—Sao Paulo): I wanted

to talk a little bit about the age relation that, in the beginning, it
was something really hard for me. I had great difficulty in expressing
myself and, because I was used to expressing myself more with stu-
dents my own age… so, the relation I had with you (pointing to Digit-
M-Ed researchers) was really good, it is as he said, the exchange of
information that we had with you was really good, as he said, in the
question of the classroom, the teacher learns with the student and the
student learns with the teacher, that is real, it is a really good thing
that happens here in the Digit-M-Ed meetings.
B (11-year-old girl—port—private school—Sao Paulo): I want to say

something that has already happened here: two years ago, there was
a six-year-old boy and I didn’t think then as I think now, after Digit-
M-Ed. At that time, I did not believe that a little boy could be saying
those things that he was saying. Now, with Digit-M-Ed, I can see that
I should value everybody, regardless of age, because I have the same
idea that the six-year-old boy was saying, I thought that, just because
he was six years old, he would not have anything to say, or “oh, he is
a six-year-old boy, he does not know what is he doing here”.
Gi (17-year-old girl—port—private school—Sao Paulo): one thing

that I have taken for life, is that here, you may be seven years old,
they will give a “super” importance to your opinion, because it is like
Fernanda once said: “everything is valid, every opinion is an opinion
and period”. I do find it really cool.
Students were surprised both by the way the adults (teachers, researchers
and school managers) interacted with them and about how they themselves
interacted with younger/older kids. They realized their own prejudice and
how participating in the project had helped them change their views on this
(I didn’t think then as I think now, after Digit-M-Ed. Now, with Digit-M-Ed.,
I can see that I should value everybody, regardless of age, one thing that I have
taken for life).
The idea that difference was going to create a separation or make it diffi-
cult for interaction to occur was overcome by the fact that no one was taken
as superior or inferior because of academic, social, hearing or age conditions.
The project dared to create a context which emphasized Santos’s (2003) idea
of the miscegenation of peoples, cultures, values, tastes, beliefs. As discussed
by Ba, everyone’s opinions “can influence your conclusions”.
Ba (11-year-old girl—port—public school—Sao Paulo): Something

that really impacted on me was when a little boy, I think he was six at
the time, he had very advanced ideas for his age. Digit-M-Ed was very
important for me because I learned that even if you are different in
terms of social class, people from private or public schools, you may
belong to different social classes, you may have different educational
levels, but you can listen to other people’s opinions, because this can
influence your conclusions. So, participating in the Digit-M-Ed was
very special to me.
In the beginning, however, most students were really surprised with this
opportunity. As D comments:
D (16-year-old girl—port—public school—Piauí): As she said about

thinking that you (looking at researchers and other adults) do not pay
any attention to what we say, that has also happened with me in the
beginning. When we were in a group, talking about things, I didn’t
use to speak, I used to remain quiet because I used to think “no, they
are all correct, I am wrong, I will just listen to you. Here, I am noth-
ing here”, and then they started to say “go ahead, say something” and
I was all like “Wow, can I speak here?”, “Of course, I want your opin-
ion”. (…) I began to state my ideas, I began to share what I wanted
to say, people started hearing me, started giving me other ideas, sup-
porting what I wanted to do. It was really cool, I really liked it.
In the beginning there was a real disbelief in their possibility for partici-
pating; students had to be insistently invited to take part in the discussions,
just as reported by D (“‘go ahead, say something’ and I was all like ‘Wow, can
I speak here?’, ‘Of course; I want your opinion’.”). Since students are nor-
mally criticized for talking too much in class, it sounds natural that they did
not consider that they had important positions to express about classroom
or life issues. The usual procedures created in classrooms in which students
talk simply to reproduce knowledge presented by teachers seem to reinforce
an impression that their ideas and arguments are not relevant. In the project,
according to the students, this pattern is broken. And a new one is created,
in which students see their roles as that of people who have power to express
their ideas, positions and reasons (I began to state my ideas, I began to share
what I wanted to say, people started listening to me, started giving me other
ideas, supporting what I wanted to do).
According to V that is so unusual that students feel “shocked”.
V (18-year-old girl—port—private school—Sao Paulo): I would like

to add one thing, that is important, I may be generalizing, or not,
but it is something that shocks pre-adolescents and teenagers. Even
though we say that it is the age for rebel, the truth is that when we
are heard, we get really shocked because it is not usual for us to be
heard. So, the truth is that we are not used to being heard and taken
into consideration. This is why I understand when Ma said that it was
really hard for her to express herself in the beginning, because there is
that feeling of “Oh my, am I saying something wrong?” “Everybody
is looking at me, is it because it is interesting or because I am say-

ing some nonsense?” Therefore, I think it is very important, it is one
of the things that I want to thank the Project for: teaching me that
nothing I say is wrong, it is simply different from what other people
think. I find it really important. So, thank you for listening to us, for
being here.
In her enthusiastic speech, V clarifies the feeling of surprise they have

when they start in the project. She reproduces the usual way young people
are seen and to which they respond in accordance: as rebels, as those without
anything of importance to say, as people who are unprepared to express their
opinions. And she poses this as part of what she learned in the project, to take
her ideas into consideration, to believe she has important opinions, just like
any other person in the group, to be heard and to see how essential this is for
one to become a person. In this direction, she seems to have overcome ste-
reotypes that, as Pérez Gómez (1998) explained, are used as tools that would
silence students.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter aimed at discussing the concept of mobility (Blommaert, 2010)

in order to understand the construction agency in a Vygotskian framework.
The examples showed the break students triggered with the representational
limits imposed on them by their age, hearing, social and academic conditions.
The lived experiences they had in the project seemed to have been refracted
into perezhivanie that, as reported by the students, could explain how they
had the opportunity to develop new repertoires that supported them to act
in new settings.
These age, hearing, social and academic conditions, which were reported
as promoters of some kind of encapsulation and which set people into roles of
what they could or could not do, and which created different types of oppres-
sive relations, seemed to be overcome to a certain extent. In the dramatic
events of the project, students internalized new possibilities and realized they
could devise new forms of being in a process of de-encapsulation.
Broadening of participants’ acting scope, and that of being in the project
beyond what was assigned to them previously seems to have created founda-
tions for the development of their mobility in broader terms. In the project,
students’ repertoires were architected in new trajectories which led them to

new potential paths. They have reported on how they developed repertoires
in order to give opinion, express their ideas, talk to older or younger partners,
listen to people, incorporate other people’s ideas, ask questions, demand par-
ticipation, use content to support or to expand their ideas, talk to people with
different language/cultural/economic backgrounds.
These resources have a positive order of indexicality in the Digit-m-ed
meetings. For the students of the project, these resources acquired value
which students classified as powerful to be carried to other contexts of their
lives. They became repertoires that made it possible for students to be agents
with power of transformation in diversified contexts.
This provided new roles, expanding their ways of living, their agentive
power for social change. In the project, they went through a conscious and
intentional process of the conquest of power over themselves and the under-
standing of the importance of the other. They became responsible for creat-
ing the project, themselves and the others.
The study of mobility in this context helps to understand how students
managed to develop a new kind of agency, breaking with the determined pat-
terns established for them. The lived collision experience in the Project seems
to have been experienced as a perezhivanie—as this complex developmental
process in which new repertoires were developed and created new forms of
agency.
In a society marked by inequalities and deprivation of the possibility of
being and acting as the one we have being experiencing in Brazil in recent
years, the process of de-encapsulation experienced by the students offered
opportunity for thinking about the possibilities that schools can provide for
strengthening students’ repertoires with dramatic events in which they can
develop mobility for daring to resist and expand in oppressive societies.
According to Stetsenko (2018, p. 2), “there are no impenetrable walls
separating any one person from the most prolific “giants” history has ever
known” in terms of transformative activist stance. The statement seems to
reinforce the idea perpetrated in this chapter about the importance of de-en-
capsulating agencies which can offer everyone opportunities to transform their
oppressive circumstances. Developing mobility and experiencing with possi-
bilities to go beyond immediate constraints generate repertoire for creatively
transcending oppression. Schools may not be the place where the transforma-
tion of society will take place, but they can certainly offer the grounds for the
lived experiences where subjects construct repertoire as transformative agents
who may enact social chance.
Notes
1. Internalized multimodal resources, constructed in socio-historical-cultural prac-

tices, that are turned into multiple possibilities of being and acting.
2. The International Digital Media Education Project was originally coordinated
by Michalis Kontopodis and funded by the Interchange Project Marie Curie
International Research Teams - European Union FP7 (IRSES) (2012–2014).
3. The flow which is called globalization could be seen as a complex process, the
“different scale-levels, with differences in scope, speed and intensity” (Blommaert,
2010, p. 25).
4. This information is expanded in the project description (Liberali, 2016).
5. Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo.
6. The excerpts written “port” next to names were originally said in Portuguese and
freely translated into English by the author.
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4. Toward a Vygotskian Perspective
on Transformative Agency
for Social Change
YRJÖ ENGESTRÖM AND ANNALISA SANNINO
Agency and Will as Challenges to Organizational Research
Agency is commonly defined very broadly, encompassing almost any form of

the human capacity to act intentionally. Drawing on Vygotsky and the dialec-
tical tradition of cultural-historical activity theory, we emphasize the human
potential of transforming conditions and forms of collective life. From this
perspective, agency is manifested when people form intentions and execute
willful actions that go beyond and transform the accepted routines and given
conditions of the activity and organization in which they are involved. In other
words, agency corresponds to the notions of practical-critical activity sketched
by Marx (1976) in the Theses on Feuerbach. This may also be called transfor-
mative agency (Virkkunen, 2006; Haapasaari, Engeström, & Kerosuo, 2016;
Sannino, 2015a; Sannino & Engeström, 2018). In this paper, we will exam-
ine the formation of transformative agency in organizations, using Vygotsky’s
theorizing of will and willful action as the point of departure.
Agency and will have for some time caught the attention of organizational
researchers. A notable example is the work of Bruch and Ghoshal (2004).
They build their approach on the work of Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987)
who distinguished between motivational and volitional states of mind and
demonstrated that focusing only on motivation fails to explain the frequent
failure of people to implement their intentions in practice. Subsequently
Gollwitzer has produced a series of studies on so called implementation inten-
tions, showing that the likelihood of actual implementation of an intention in
practical action is significantly increased when the subject anchors his or her
88 YRJÖ ENGESTRÖM AND ANNALISA SANNINO
intention in some concrete circumstances, such as a specific time, place, or

social situation (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).
By demonstrating our dependency on environmental and external medi-
ating factors, this approach implies the possibility to extend the locus of
human agency beyond the skin of the individual. However, this approach has
two serious limitations. It focuses on individual will, largely neglecting col-
lective volition and agency. And it depicts the formation of implementation
intentions as a rational process, neglecting developmental contradictions and
conflicts of motives as historical and systemic sources of volition.
In neo-institutional studies of organizations, the challenge of agency has
been formulated in terms of “institutional work” (Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006) and “the paradox of embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002). For
Battilana and D’Aunno (2009): “Indeed, if we assume that institutional envi-
ronments shape individuals and organizations who have a very limited degree
of agency, the question is: ‘How can actors change institutions if their actions,
intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institutions they
wish to change?’” (p. 31).
Battilana and D’Aunno (2009, pp. 38–39) point out that neo-institu-
tional studies have shown that jolts, crises, complex problems, and incom-
patibilities in organizational fields may often be seen as enabling conditions
for agency. This insight is indeed missing in the psychological theorizing of
Gollwitzer and his colleagues. However, external enabling conditions do not
explain the actual genesis, that is, the mechanism and process of the forma-
tion of agency and willful action. As Battilana and D’Aunno (2009, p. 41)
acknowledge, “the question of how individual actors are enabled to engage
in institutional work remains largely unanswered.”
Battilana and D’Aunno (2009, p. 48) propose a classification based on
three types of agency, namely iterative agency oriented toward the past, prac-
tical-evaluative agency oriented to the present, and projective agency oriented
toward the future. While such a classification may be useful for identifying
various forms of agency, it does not address the crucial question of the actual
emergence of agentive action.
Vygotsky’s Double Stimulation as a New Perspective
Vygotsky’s principle of double stimulation (Vygotsky, 1997a; Sannino,

2015b) offers a framework within which the limitations sketched above may
Toward a Vygotskian Perspective on Transformative Agency 89
be overcome. Double stimulation refers to the mechanism with which human

beings can intentionally break out of conflicts of motives and change their
circumstances. The conflict is resolved by invoking a neutral artifact as a sec-
ond or auxiliary stimulus which is turned into a mediating sign by investing it
with meaning: “Man placed in the situation of Buridan’s donkey throws dice
and in this way escapes the difficulty that confronts him” (Vygotsky, 1997b,
p. 209). This breaking away from the initial conflictual situation proceeds in
several steps (Sannino, 2015b) among which the main two are the follow-
ing: first selecting an artifact (e.g., dice) and investing it with meaning, sec-
ond taking volitional action by means of the mediating sign. These signs are
used as stimulus-means with the help of which the subject gains control of
his or her action and constructs a new understanding of the initial circum-
stances or problem. Vygotsky also emphasizes the temporal dimension of the
process: “The conflict between motives frequently occurs a long time before
the actual situation develops in which it becomes necessary to act” (Vygotsky,
1997b, p. 215).
Vygotsky uses the “waiting experiment” as a paradigmatic example of
double stimulation:
The subject is asked to wait for a long time and to no purpose in an empty
room. She vacillates—to leave or to continue waiting, a conflict of motives
occurs. She looks at her watch; this only reinforces one of the motives, spe-
cifically, it is time to go, it is already late. Until now the subject was exclu-
sively at the mercy of the motives, but now she begins to control her own
behavior. The watch instantly constituted a stimulus that acquires the signif-
icance of an auxiliary motive. The subject decides ‘When the hands of the
watch reach a certain position, I will get up and leave.’ Consequently, she
closes a conditioned connection between the position of the hands and her
leaving; she decides to leave through the hands of the watch and she acts
in response to external stimuli, in other words, she introduces an auxiliary
motive. (Vygotsky, 1997b, p. 212)
The “waiting experiment” was initially conducted by Tamara Dembo, a

student of Kurt Lewin, but never reported in published form. In Vygotsky’s
(1987; 1997b) works the experiment is described and interpreted as a para-
digmatic example of his principle of double stimulation (see also Sannino &
Laitinen, 2015; Sannino, 2016). The subject is asked to wait in a room for the
start of a psychological experiment, but nothing happens. For Vygotsky this
kind of situation (the first stimulus) involves a conflict of motives: loyalty and
obedience vs. desire to go on with one’s own life activity. To break away from
this paralyzing conflict, agency needs to emerge. As depicted in Figure 4.1,

this happens when the subject employs an external artifact as second stimu-
lus (stimulus-means) to conceptualize the situation and thus to enhance his
or her will; e.g., the subject looks at the clock and decides to leave when the
hands of the clock reach a certain point.
Figure 4.1. Two key steps in the emergence of agency

by double stimulation (after Vygotsky, 1997b)
The first step consists in introducing an auxiliary mediating means into

the problematic situation. The second step consists in the actuation of the
intended action. The introduction of the auxiliary mediating means into the
situation can happen by the subject adopting available means in the situation
or by the subject constructing the auxiliary mediating means.
This experiment was recently conducted in Finland (Sannino & Laitinen,
2015; Sannino, 2016). In this study, the majority of the 25 subjects used the
material environment and their own bodily movements as effective mediat-
ing second stimuli. In several cases, the subjects’ mediation attempts formed
a chain of multiple successive attempts, mediated by diverse artifacts, that led
to the decisive agentive action of leaving the room.
Following this line of thinking, we define agency as dealing with con-
tradictory motives by employing auxiliary cultural means to make conscious
decisions and turn these decisions into action (Sannino, 2008). Thus, agency
refers to the subject’s willed quest for transformation. It transpires in a prob-
lematic, polymotivated situation in which the subject evaluates and interprets
the circumstances, makes decisions according to the interpretations and acts
upon these decisions. In sum, our concept of transformative agency contains
three necessary elements: (1) situation of contradictory motives, (2) con-
struction of an auxiliary stimulus-means, and (3) practical action to transform
the situation with the help of the auxiliary stimulus-means. The three ele-
ments typically come together in successive steps, forming longitudinal medi-
ational chains (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2. The emergence of an agentive action

as a mediational chain
Mediational chains occur when the subject’s first decision and the subsequent
action do not solve the problem. A progressive redefinition of the conflict in
successive steps to work on the problem is carried out through a sequence of
suspended intentional actions (depicted in Figure 4.2). As the problem per-
sists, these actions lead to others. The new meaning found in the different
steps of the mediational chain affects both the second and the first stimulus.
Chaining is thus a progressive elaboration of the evolving problem situation
through the use of multiple auxiliary mediating means and new meanings on
the conflict. This finding points toward an understanding of will as a longi-
tudinally evolving project or process rather than the once-and-for-all decisive
moment of “crossing the Rubicon” proposed by Heckhausen and Gollwitzer
(1987) and Bruch & Ghoshal (2004).
Expansive Learning and Ascending from the Abstract

to the Concrete as Formation of Collective Agency
The identification of mediational chains as a core feature of agency prompts

us to propose a fourth element to complement our initial definition of agency.
This element is the stepwise expansion from momentary individual initiative
to sustained collective effort as depicted in the notion of expansive learning

(Engeström, 1987; Engeström & Sannino, 2010).
Expansive learning is a type of learning which leads collectives to trans-
form their activities. This happens by questioning and breaking away from the
existing activity and by grasping an initial simple relationship which can give
rise to a new form of activity. This simple relationship is a theoretical abstrac-
tion which leads to multiple concrete applications. This is a dialectical pro-
cess known as ascending from the abstract to the concrete (Il’enkov, 1982;
Davydov, 1990; Engeström, Nummijoki, & Sannino, 2012).
Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is a method of grasping the
essence of an object by tracing and reproducing theoretically the logic of its
development, of its historical formation through the emergence and reso-
lution of its inner contradictions. A new theoretical idea or concept is ini-
tially produced in the form of an abstract, simple explanatory relationship, a
“germ cell.” This initial abstraction is step-by-step enriched and transformed
into a concrete system of multiple, constantly developing manifestations.
In expansive learning, the initial simple idea is transformed into a complex
object, into a new form of practice. Expansive learning leads to the forma-
tion of theoretical concepts—theoretically grasped practice—concrete in sys-
temic richness and multiplicity of manifestations. In this framework, abstract
refers to partial, separated from the concrete whole. In empirical thinking
based on comparisons and classifications, abstractions capture arbitrary, only
formally interconnected properties. In dialectical-theoretical thinking, based
on ascending from the abstract to the concrete, an abstraction captures the
smallest and simplest, genetically primary unit of the whole functionally inter-
connected system.
Expansive learning leads to the formation of a new, expanded object and
pattern of activity oriented to the object. This involves the formation of a the-
oretical concept of the new activity, based on grasping and modeling the ini-
tial simple relationship, the “germ cell,” that gives rise to the new activity and
generates its diverse concrete manifestations (Davydov, 1990). The forma-
tion of an expanded object and corresponding new pattern of activity requires
and brings about collective and distributed agency, questioning and breaking
away from the constraints of the existing activity and embarking on a journey
across the uncharted terrain of the zone of proximal development. In other
words, the “what” of expansive learning consists of a triplet: expanded pat-
tern of activity, corresponding theoretical concept, and new type of agency.
Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is achieved through specific
epistemic or learning actions. Together these actions form an expansive cycle
or spiral. An ideal-typical sequence of epistemic actions in an expansive cycle

may be described as follows.
• The first action is that of questioning, criticizing or rejecting some

aspects of the accepted practice and existing wisdom. For the sake of
simplicity, we will call this action questioning.
• The second action is that of analyzing the situation. Analysis invol-

ves mental, discursive or practical transformation of the situation in
order to find out causes or explanatory mechanisms. Analysis evokes
“why?” questions and explanatory principles. One type of analysis
is historical-genetic; it seeks to explain the situation by tracing its
origins and evolution. Another type of analysis is actual-empirical;
it seeks to explain the situation by constructing a picture of its inner
systemic relations.
• The third action is that of modeling the newly found explanatory

relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new idea
that explains and offers a solution to the problematic situation.
• The fourth action is that of examining the model, running, operating

and experimenting on it in order to fully grasp its dynamics, poten-
tials and limitations.
• The fifth action is that of implementing the model by means of prac-

tical applications, enrichments, and conceptual extensions.
• The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on and evalua-
ting the process and consolidating its outcomes into a new stable
form of practice.
Formative Interventions as Methodology

for the Study of Agency
Vygotsky’s principle of double stimulation together with the principle of

ascending from the abstract to the concrete leads to the concept of forma-
tive interventions. One well established type of formative interventions is
the Change Laboratory, developed since 1995 at University of Helsinki and
nowadays implemented also in various other parts of the world (Engeström

et al., 1996; Engeström, 2007; Virkkunen & Newnham, 2013; Vilela et
al, 2020; for a comparison of three different but theoretically related types
of formative interventions, see Sannino, 2011). Interventions such as the
Change Laboratory are radically different from the standard linear interven-
tions aimed at goals predetermined by the interventionists.
In Vygotsky’s work, the principle of double stimulation is both a general
mechanism that explains the genesis of agency and other higher psychological
functions and a methodological guideline for experiments and interventions
aimed at tracing and facilitating the formation of such functions. Vygotsky
(1999, p. 59) points out that the use of this methodological guideline “of
bringing up auxiliary means of behavior allows us to trace the whole gene-
sis of the most complex forms of higher mental processes.” In other words,
when subjects facing a demanding task or problem are given the possibility
to employ external artifacts as mediational means, their ways of constructing
the task and searching for a solution are made visible in a manner typically not
achieved in traditional experimental designs.
In some of Vygotsky’s studies the experimenters themselves prepared the
external stimuli and made them available to the subjects while they were fac-
ing the given task. In other cases, the experimenters waited until the sub-
jects spontaneously identified potential second stimuli and applied them as
meaningful signs by themselves (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 60). Both versions differ
qualitatively from classic experiments in which the only one who can manip-
ulate the conditions in the experimental room is the experimenter; in double
stimulation designs such as the “waiting experiment” the subjects themselves
manipulate the experimental situation.
Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991, p. 399) point out the fundamental chal-
lenge this methodology poses to the experimenter who wants to control the
experimental situation.
The notion of ‘experimental method’ is set up by Vygotsky in a method-
ological framework where the traditional norm of the experimenter’s max-
imum control over what happens in the experiment is retained as a special
case, rather than the modal one. The human subject always ‘imports’ into an
experimental setting a set of ‘stimulus-means’ (psychological instruments)
in the form of signs that the experimenter cannot control externally in any
rigid way. Hence the experimental setting becomes a context of investigation
where the experimenter can manipulate its structure in order to trigger (but
not ‘produce’) the subject’s construction of new psychological phenomena.
The crucial differences between formative interventions and standard

linear interventions may be condensed in four points (Engeström, 2011).
(1) Starting point: In linear interventions, the contents and goals of the
intervention are known ahead of time by the researchers. In for-
mative interventions, the participants face a problematic and con-
tradictory object which they analyze and expand by constructing a
novel concept, the contents of which are not known ahead of time
by researchers.
(2) Process: In linear interventions, the subjects are expected to exe-

cute the intervention without resistance. Difficulties of execution
are interpreted as weaknesses in the design that are to be corrected
by refining the design. In formative interventions, the contents and
course of the intervention are subject to negotiation and the shape of
the intervention is eventually up to the subjects. Double stimulation
as the core mechanism implies that the subjects gain agency and take
charge of the process.
(3) Outcome: In linear interventions, the aim is to complete a solution

module that will reliably generate the same desired outcomes when
transfered and implemented in new settings. In formative interven-
tions, the aim is to generate new concepts that may be used in other
settings as frames for the design on locally appropriate new solu-
tions. A key outcome of formative interventions is agency among the
participants.
(4) Researcher’s role: In linear interventions the researcher aims at con-

trol of all the variables. In formative interventions, the researcher
aims at provoking and sustaining an expansive transformation process
led and owned by the practitioners.
In interventions such as the Change Laboratory participants are given

the possibility to employ external artifacts as meditational means to transform
their activity. When subjects facing a demanding task or problem are given
the possibility to employ external artifacts as mediational means, their search
for a solution is achieved in a manner different from traditional experimen-
tal designs. The emergence of agency becomes visible through the medita-
tional means utilized by the participants. The participants gain control over
the intervention, as this is the context in which they are facing their critical
conflicts.
In Change Laboratory interventions in different organizations we have
identified six main forms of participants’ emerging agency which seem to
be quite specific and characteristic to this type of interventions (Engeström,
2011; Haapasaari, Engeström, & Kerosuo, 2013). These are (1) criticizing the
existing activity and organization, (2) questioning and resisting suggestions
or decisions from the interventionist or the management, (3) explicating new
possibilities or potentials in the activity, (4) envisioning new patterns or mod-
els for the activity, (5) committing to concrete actions aimed at changing the
activity, and (6) taking consequential actions to change the activity. Examples
of the sixth one are seldom possible to observe in Change Laboratory ses-
sions; more typically such consequential actions are reported in follow-up
sessions conducted some months after the actual Change Laboratory sessions
are completed.
An Empirical Case: Formation of Collective Agency

in the Library of University of Helsinki
To illustrate and further examine this approach to agency, we will dis-

cuss a Change Laboratory intervention study conducted in the university
library of University of Helsinki from 2009 to 2011. The project was titled
“Knotworking in the Library.” The broader background of this project is the
emerging crisis of university libraries worldwide. The nature of the crisis is
aptly sketched by Greenstein (2010).
University libraries are principally reliant for their operating revenues on the
same funds that meet the costs of a university’s academic departments (includ-
ing, crucially, the faculties’ salaries). Bluntly, those funds are diminished by
the global recession, and it is not clear that they are likely to rebound, let
alone resume their growth, any time soon. […]
Why invest much at all in the university library when journals, reference
works, and soon tens of millions of books and monographs, both in and
out of print, will be available effortlessly and online? (Greenstein, 2010, pp.
121–122)
Greenstein like many others argues that academic libraries must radically
reinvent themselves.
Thus, “subject librarians” on a leading edge of today’s library services

(undoubtedly travelling under a different name) do not simply assist users in
navigating increasingly complex information resources. They also lend sup-
port to scholars in other ways—using information technology in instruction,
“curating” digital materials that result from research and teaching, and nav-
igating an increasingly vast array of scholarly publishing vehicles. Libraries
may adopt broader institutional roles—managing an institution’s informa-
tion infrastructure (which can include publishing and broadcast services as
well as IT) or taking a larger role in strategic communications, for exam-
ple, by surfacing materials that result from research and teaching and mak-
ing them accessible in a manner that supports institutional advocacy, revenue
generation, or specific public service goals. (Greenstein, 2010, p. 125)
However, such a radical redefinition of the university library is not easy:

“Changes in the library’s scope of operations are more difficult to predict
than trends affecting historic information access functions and collection
management” (Greenstein, 2010, p. 125).
In 2009, the library of University of Helsinki asked our research group
to conduct an intervention study that would help the library professionals
and managers in their efforts to redefine the services, ways of working, and
organization of the library. At the time, the university library was organized
into four campus libraries and a central unit responsible for centralized elec-
tronic services and administration. The university library had approximately
250 employees and its annual budget was over 21 million Euro. About 2.5
million loans were handled annually. The university management had decided
to develop the library without radical cuts in personnel.
The library’s services for students using textbooks and preparing their
theses, as well as centralized digital services are well understood. Services for
researchers and research groups are not well understood. This is the domain
on which our project focused its efforts. We suggested that the project would
be devoted to developing new services for research groups and new models
of collaboration between library professionals and research groups. We used
our work on co-configuration and knotworking (Engeström, Engeström, &
Vähäaho, 1999, Engeström, 2008) as the leading idea of the project.
The notion of knot refers to rapidly pulsating, distributed and partially
improvised orchestration of collaborative performance between otherwise
loosely connected actors and activity systems. […] Knotworking is charac-
terized by a pulsating movement of tying, untying and retying together oth-
erwise separate threads of activity. The tying and dissolution of a knot of
collaborative work is not reducible to any specific individual or fixed orga-

nizational entity as the center of control. The center does not hold. The
locus of initiative changes from moment to moment within a knotworking
sequence. Thus, knotworking cannot be adequately analyzed from the point
of view of an assumed center of coordination and control, or as an addi-
tive sum of the separate perspectives of individuals or institutions contrib-
uting to it. The unstable knot itself needs to be made the focus of analysis.
(Engeström, Engeström, & Vähäaho, 1999, pp. 346–347)
In the case of this intervention the otherwise loosely connected actors

were the librarians and the researcher groups in the different university cam-
puses. The project was carried out in two main phases. In the fall of 2009,
we conducted a Change Laboratory in the Viikki Science Library in the cam-
pus of the biological and environmental sciences. In the fall of 2010, we con-
ducted a Change Laboratory in the Central Campus Library, responsible for
human, social and behavioral sciences.
In both the Viikki Science Library and Central Campus Library, the
Change Laboratory consisted of eight two-hour sessions and a follow-up ses-
sion held about five months later. In both interventions, the library invited
selected research groups from the campus to participate as pilots. In the first
intervention, two pilot research groups participated; in the second interven-
tion, four pilot research groups took part. In the first sessions, the library pro-
fessionals on their own designed and discussed their preliminary offer for new
services to research groups. In the subsequent sessions, the research groups
reacted to the preliminary offer and brought up their own needs and pri-
orities. On the basis of the feedback and ideas developed with the research
groups, the library professionals then revised and specified their offer and
presented it to the research groups. On this basis, a number of concrete ser-
vices and ways of collaboration were agreed upon and plans were made to
implement and test them in practice. Finally, in the last sessions, the library
professionals on their own designed and discussed changes in their internal
organization required by the new services and ways of working with research
groups. In the follow-up sessions, the library professionals and their manage-
ment reported on the implementation and its impact and discussed ideas for
next steps in the process.
In the following, we will focus on the second Change Laboratory inter-
vention conducted in the Central Campus Library in 2010. All the sessions
were videotaped and transcribed. Our analysis in this paper aims at illuminat-
ing important aspects of the formation of agency, not at comprehensive and
systematic treatment of the data. The expansive learning actions taken by the
participants in this intervention have been analyzed in other papers (Engeström,
Rantavuori, & Kerosuo, 2013; Sannino, Engeström, & Lahikainen, 2016).
The intended first stimulus in the intervention consisted of selected inter-
view excerpts collected before the laboratory sessions from both library work-
ers and representatives of the pilot research groups. We selected excerpts that
seemed to contain or imply various tensions and conflicts between the cur-
rent library practices and emerging new expectations of both researchers and
library workers themselves. In particular, we looked for and used expressions
of needs that were not met. This kind of “mirror data” did evoke rich dis-
cussions and a fair amount of resistance among the library staff. However,
the actual encounters between the library professionals and researchers in the
Change Laboratory sessions tended to follow a rather traditional “instruc-
tional script:” the library workers would present some possible new services,
the researchers would listen and passively accept the ideas. This type of dis-
course seemed to be deeply engrained in the culture of the library and the
researchers were surprisingly unwilling to challenge it. Clearly it was a far cry
from the idea of genuine negotiation and co-configuration inherent in the
notion of knotworking.
There were a few critical encounters in which this script was challenged
and broken. In the third session of the Change Laboratory, the library profes-
sionals presented to the researchers a new service called FeedNavigator. This
is a web-based service developed in the Medical Campus Library of University
of Helsinki to enable researchers to follow and obtain relevant new articles
immediately upon release according to their personal preferences and key-
word profiles.1 The Central Campus Library offered the pilot research groups
an opportunity to add into the service all journals they wanted in social sci-
ences and humanities and to test the service personally or as a group, with the
direct help of library professionals. When this service was introduced in the
Change Laboratory session, a researcher reacted in an unexpected way.
[89:00]
Librarian 4: We have follow-up service for new publications, in which

you can make a profile for yourself, so that you’ll get certain journals
continuously for example into your own browser page or into your
mobile phone, or you can go and check the list of new releases on the
FeedNavigator page. So you get the titles of the articles from a cer-
tain journal and you can directly go to check those articles and often
also to read the full texts.
Interventionist: And not only the titles but you can use your own key-
words to make selections, right?
Librarian 4: Yes.
[…]
Librarian 4: Would this be such, that you’d like to hear more about this
FeedNavigator?
Researcher 9: Why not, but I’d like to ask … I mean, you can subscribe
and get e-mails and RSS feeds.
Librarian 4: Well, with this, you can make much better searches. You can
also search according to topics. Would you, P and L, present this?
You would do it much better than I.
Librarian 5: Well, it is possible to follow the contents of many journals at

the same time. You don’t have to go separately to each journal and
search for the feed. You can collect a bundle of journal which con-
tains certain publications which you follow regularly. Or then you
can make these permanent searches into the flow of feeds and follow
according to them.
Researcher 9: Yes. I mean I already have this kind of a service in use but
it is not the one you are presenting.
Librarian 5: Oh really!
Librarian 4: What service is that?
Librarian 5: A competing service.
Researcher 9: Well, it is … it goes to the pages of journal publishers, they

have a service exactly of this type.
Interventionist: But you have to search each one separately?
Researcher 9: Well, I do it once, and it takes half an hour.
Interventionist: Aha!
Librarian 5: You mean, one publisher’s journals can be compiled into a

sort of bundle?
Researcher 9: I think it is like that … they have a pretty wide range…
Interventionist: Is it free?
Researcher 9: Yes.
Interventionist: Hah!
[…]
Librarian 9: Well, it may be a bit similar service.
Librarian 5: But into the feeds of FeedNavigator you also get … very
early stage publications.
Researcher 9: No, it is fine if you have this kind of a service, but…
Librarian 5: Well, we presented this, this is a service developed by the

university library, our library. The library serves in this way. There
are surely plenty of competitors. I mean, this kind of a feed reader
is not… Google, too, has a feed reader. There are plenty of those in
the web.
This episode was significant in two ways. First of all, it broke the routine
of researchers passively listening and accepting suggestions from the librarians
and forced the library professionals to rethink their own approach and their
own competence. Secondly, the researcher’s response brought up a novel vari-
ation of agency, that of questioning and resisting a suggestion from a partner.
The episode opened up a conflict of motives: the motive of continuing with
the comfortable one-way instruction vs. the motive of taking the researchers’
practices as a possibility to develop something new. In this sense, this episode
represents an actually experienced first stimulus—something more powerful
and consequential than the planned and pre-selected “mirror data” excerpts
could accomplish alone.
The second stimulus offered by the interventionists consisted of the
notions of “knot” and “knotworking.” These were briefly explained to the
library professionals at the beginning of the intervention. We hoped that the
practitioners would pick them up and start using them as mediating devices
in their efforts to analyze and redesign their activity. Table 4.1 shows the
frequency of the use of these terms in the intervention sessions, excluding the
use of the project’s official name.
Table 4.1 shows a marked increase in the use of the two key notions, start-
ing in session 5 and culminating in sessions 7 and 8. Perhaps more interest-
ingly, in the early sessions these terms were practically exclusively used to refer
to collaboration with external clients, the research groups. But starting in ses-
sion 6, the key terms were increasingly used to actually envision the way the
library professionals wanted to learn to work and interact internally, within
their own organization. This shift was again something the interventionists
did not expect or plan.
Table 4.1. Frequency of use of the terms ‘knot’ and ‘knotworking’

in the Change Laboratory sessions (excluding use of the name
of the project)
Session 1 1
Session 2 0
Session 3 1
Session 4 1
Session 5 3
Session 6 6
Session 7 13
Session 8 13
This shift came to completion in the follow-up session held in May 2011.
As a result of the previous Change Laboratory in the biosciences campus,
the Viikki Science Library created special web pages which give advice to
researchers on how to store large sets of data in safe and well-organized ways.
This initiative was picked up by practitioners of the Central Campus Library.
00:41:08
Librarian 4: Now we have founded in the spring a joint editorial team,

with the approval of P [director of the Central Campus Library] and
A [director of the Viikki Science Campus Library]. At the moment
it has members from the Central Campus and from Viikki, but of
course we hope to get members from other campuses as well. We
have met once and interacted a lot in other forms. So far we have
done fine-tuning [in the web pages] and added a information con-
cerning the Central Campus, so that it is not anymore just a service
for Viikki. Our intention is to make a bigger renovation, to make it
look different, to make it as clear and good as possible. Our dream
is to make it a good tool that we can genuinely offer to researchers.
So these are our dreams about this. In my opinion our collaboration
with Viikki has worked very well, they have a very positive attitude to
this, there is clearly a common will.
Interventionist: Who is the leader of the editorial team?
Librarian 4: [laughing] I don’t know if we actually have a leader. Probably

not. The members include myself, P, M, K, and probably you, too
[addressing a library worker across the room], at least you have given
us really good comments. And then N, too. I may have forgotten
some people. Did I forget someone, M?
Librarian 6: L and T are members, too.
Librarian 4: Yes, L and T, yes. I have the feeling that there is no chair-
person, unless L feels that she is the chair. But we have not made an
agreement on that [general laughter].
Library director: It is a self-organizing editorial team.
Interventionist: As long as it works.
Librarian 4: We wanted to make it… Just what for example H mentioned,

that we have these different levels, the level of the whole university
library and the campus level. Sometimes this causes rigidity. So we
thought that we will make a somewhat unofficial, grassroots level…
[gesturing with hands indicating search for a word] group. And in it
we will start to do all kinds of things, and then we will get approval
from P and A. So if we try to make a very official committee…. Or
actually we put together a knot here, [gesturing with a hand to indi-
cate focus] around this problem. We thought that if we get some-
thing very official, it will not make progress, and we wanted it to go
forward.
In this excerpt, Librarian 4 displays several intertwined types of emerging

agency. First of all, she displays envisioning new patterns or models for the
activity: “Our dream is to make it a good tool that we can genuinely offer to
researchers. So these are our dreams about this.” Secondly, she criticizes the
existing activity and organization: “We thought that if we get something very
official, it will not make progress.” And thirdly, she reports on having taken
consequential actions to change the activity: “We have met once and inter-
acted a lot in other forms. So far we have done fine-tuning [in the web pages]
and added information concerning the Central Campus, so that it is not any-
more just a service for Viikki.”
The excerpt demonstrates how the ideas of knots and knotworking have
been appropriated by the practitioner. They serve as her second stimulus in
the effort to explain to the audience the fledgling new ways of working she
and her colleagues have initiated. This was further demonstrated when the
interventionist asked the library director how the new organizational model
of the central campus library, designed by the practitioners toward the end of
the change laboratory process, was functioning in practice.
01:52:38
Library director: What has been interesting, what we have learned from
this knotworking with research groups, and I actually hope it will
happen, is that we will get similar thinking rooted inside our own
organization. In other words, we wouldn’t demand anymore a hierar-
chical administrative approach always when there is a new problem to
solve, especially in change processes. Instead, we have clear develop-
ment responsibilities and within those people have the possibility to
quite freely form such knot-like small groups across the responsibil-
ity boundaries. We aim at a certain kind of self-organizing capability.
In other words we don’t anymore wait for ready-made assignments;
when a problem appears, we gather appropriate experts in the orga-
nization for a short period and then we try to solve the problem,
make a proposal how to proceed, and then possibly reorganize our-
selves again. And in some areas this is already becoming visible, peo-
ple clearly dare to take responsibility for development. Such ad-hoc
groups have emerged.
In this excerpt the library director conveys the trajectory of the devel-
opment of the knot as a theoretical abstraction for her personnel. The knot
has been appropriated as an initial simple relationship which first served the
purpose of collaborating with the researchers, but which is now leading to

envisioning other concrete applications. This indicates that the second stim-
ulus is taking the function of an initial abstraction toward theoretical gener-
alization. The excerpt by the librarian is more than breaking away because
she is referring to the rooting of this knot and its becoming a general way of
thinking and acting.
Also, the director’s statement exemplifies envisioning as a form of agency:
the words “hope” and “we aim at” are typical expressions of this. However,
what is not typical is that in her speech the director mixes the past, the pres-
ent and the future tenses in an interesting way. She says that “we have clear
development responsibilities” and that “we gather appropriate experts”. This
is strengthened by the statement that “such ad-hoc groups have emerged.” In
other words, we have here something like grounded envisioning, a perspec-
tive based on ongoing events rather than merely on hopes and aspirations.
The excerpts by the librarian and by the director illustrate agency as will-
ful collective engagement in overcoming critical conflicts with the help of a
second stimulus. The second stimulus was then appropriated as a theoretical
abstraction with interesting expansive and generalizing potential for multiple
concrete applications.
In the case of the intervention in the library the second stimulus and the
initial abstraction coincided. The notion of knot served as both second stim-
ulus and initial abstraction. Second stimuli such as the clock do not serve a
function beyond the one of breaking out from the experiment of the mean-
ingless situation. In this case the second stimulus opens up also possibilities
to ascend from the abstract to the concrete by virtue of becoming an initial
abstraction. The coinciding of these two functions in this case indicates that
double stimulation can open up possibilities for ascending from the abstract
to the concrete.
The excerpt in which the researcher is contesting the librarian provides
a genuine first stimulus, which was not provided by the interventionists but
by the client himself who points out that what the librarians were offering to
them was not useful. This is the point when it is made conflictually and openly
clear to the librarians that they cannot continue this way in their activity.
Double stimulation is very well illustrated in the excerpt in which the librarian
uses the notion of knot to break out of the hierarchical traditional mode of
working. The director’s excerpt at the very end of the intervention indicates
an important step forward, in which the second stimulus takes the function
of an initial abstraction toward theoretical generalization in multiple concrete
applications of the knot. These multiple applications are connected in a chain
of actions which resembles the mediational chain introduced in Figure 4.2.

Now the chain is understood as distributed among different actors and differ-
ent levels of the hierarchy (Figure 4.3).
This analysis seems to indicate that for serving as second stimulus and
perhaps even initial abstraction artifacts have to become embodied by the
participants as instrumentality for working out their conflicts and invest-
ing in agentive initiatives to transform their activities. Embracing a concep-
tual model to the point that it becomes a second stimulus or even an initial
abstraction is in itself an agentive action which cannot be successfully com-
pleted by anybody else but the actors themselves. When in the case of the
library the term knotworking was first introduced, it practically meant next
to nothing for the participants, compared to what they themselves did with it
later on in the excerpts analyzed above.
Figure 4.3. Chain of actions distributed among the actors

and levels of the hierarchy
The excerpts of the librarian and the director indicate that the knot is
progressively filled with both theoretical contours and empirical contents.
The knot for them is still a concept in the making, rather than a fully appro-
priated concept. Yet some degree of appropriation is clearly there. In a seg-
ment of data in the same ending session of the Change Laboratory in which
the library director asks the participants whether to continue using the term
knotworking or if they want to change the name, the decision was made to
keep using this term as it is working for them. By questioning her personnel
whether to continue using this word “knot” or to find some other word the
director is acknowledging that the term was brought to them, it does not
fully belong to them, it comes from somewhere else. Yet the term now is to
a large extent perceived as “their own,” that is why the question about the
name came up. This indicates that there has been literarily an appropriation of
the notion of knotworking by the participants, appropriation understood as
making something your own. As a concept in the making knotworking then
required to be stabilized, perhaps with a new name, a name of their own.
Note
1. See http://www.terkko.helsinki.fi/feednavigator/
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5. Vygotsky on the Margins
LOIS HOLZMAN
Vygotsky’s (1971, 1978, 1987, 1993, 1997) influence on my work began

nearly forty years ago when he was not particularly well known. Fortunately,
today there is, at a minimum, name recognition in all areas of education, in
the social sciences and much of the humanities. Within education, we find
Vygotskian-influenced philosophies, curricula and methods in technology,
math, science, the arts, literacy, second languages learning, diversity and mul-
ticulturalism—and afterschool and informal learning. Interest in Vygotskian
ideas has dramatically increased among scholars and researchers in subdisci-
plines of psychology where he was previously unknown, such as psychother-
apy and social psychology. Among practitioners, too, there is a thirst for the
reenergizing that Vygotsky’s approach brings to mental health workers, social
work practitioners, physicians and nurses, youth workers, arts-based commu-
nity organizations, and organizational psychology consultants. The interest
is international; the Vygotskian tradition in the English-speaking countries,
many European countries, Brazil, Japan, and Russia is augmented by emerg-
ing Vygotskians in China, India, and countries in the Middle East, Africa and
Latin America. Increasingly, international conferences devoted in whole or in
part to Vygotsky and Vygotsky-influenced work bring these diverse disciplines
and scholars together.
Vygotsky’s increasing popularity stems, in large part, from the research,
writing and teaching of university-located academics who educate new gen-
erations of scholars and practitioners. However, just as significant but less
known is the way that Vygotsky has also been spreading around the world
outside the university, and the difference this is making in the lives of dozens
of communities around the world.
The Vygotsky known and followed outside the university is primarily a
developmentalist rather than an educational psychologist. The key features of
this Vygotsky were first articulated by the late Fred Newman and myself in
112 LOIS HOLZMANS
our 1993 book Lev Vygotsky: Revolutionary Scientist (reprinted in 2013 as a

Psychology Press Classic Text). Subsequent writings have expanded on the
ideas presented in that book as well as describing the developmental environ-
ments Newman, I and our colleagues have built (e.g., Holzman, 2016/2009,
2010, 1997a; Newman & Holzman, 2006/1996, 1997). While these and
other writings of ours are known by scholars, the main impact of our work
has been on community organizers, youth workers, educators, therapists and
counselors, and creative arts and theatre activists working outside the acad-
emy. These people are involved in social change efforts, many at the grass
roots with poor and otherwise marginalized groups (men in South African
prisons, adults diagnosed with severe psychiatric disorders in India, youth liv-
ing in refugee camps in Greece and other European countries, children liv-
ing on the edges of polluted waters in Peru, and families in violence-ridden
Juarez Mexico, to name a few).
These people have come to know Vygotsky and been supported to make
use of his method and discoveries through the outreach and networking
my colleagues and I at the East Side Institute for Group and Short Term
Psychotherapy (Institute) have been doing since the 1990s. Both Newman
and I had left the university (he in 1968 and me in 1997) and did our intel-
lectual work within an independent, post-disciplinary environment (of which
the Institute is a part) that is inseparable from community organizing activ-
ity. This location had everything to do with what we saw/heard/felt in
Vygotsky’s writings. We were exploring some of the same issues as other fol-
lowers of Vygotsky, but we were also creating a new and different pathway as
part of the exploration.
Headquartered in New York City, the Institute is a non-profit research,
education and research center that develops and promotes new practices/
understandings of human development that are of practical relevance to psy-
chology, therapy, education, community building and social activism. Chief
among these new practices/understandings is social therapeutics, an approach
to human development that relates to people of all ages and life circumstances
as social performers and creators of their lives. We at the Institute believe that
there is a global development crisis, by which we mean that there is a mass
stoppage of emotional, intellectual, social and cultural development across
the world. We work to bring the issue of development and how to address
individuals and communities’ needs for it to activists, community organizers,
scholars and practitioners worldwide. An important component of our net-
working and organizing efforts is to reach out in the US and around the globe
to bring the most innovative and cutting-edge approaches from academia to
Vygotsky on the Margins 113
the field and vice versa. If there is to be a way out of the human development
crisis we all face, it is, we believe, ordinary people who are going to make it
happen.
The Institute has over twenty years’ experience in collaborating with hun-
dreds of NGOs and individual scholars and community educators and activists
in over 40 countries through its study and training programs, international
exchanges, conferences and institutional partnerships. Approximately 75 rela-
tionships have been sustained for five years or more and are ongoing. A subset
of the 75 is connected to each other and to the Institute as a means of support
and ongoing development of their work. Together, they form a “commu-
nity education” project that is unusual in being global, cross-disciplinary and
non-university based. Perhaps its most unique feature is that it is an ever-ex-
panding development community. By that I mean a community that sup-
ports the development of people and communities through its own continuous
development. It is designed for people to self-organize in whatever ways make
sense to them in their environments, to create new forms of life by activisti-
cally transforming the existing forms of life that stifle their development and
learning.
Before introducing a few of these activists for development, I will summa-
rize some of the key features of the Vygotsky they are inspired by and make
use of, a revolutionary Vygotsky who (1) was searching for method; (2) saw
learning and development as a dialectical unity; (3) described the develop-
mental features of play and (4) posited that speaking completes thinking.
The Developmentalist Vygotsky
Method as Tool-and-Result
In Vygotsky’s psychology, the unique feature of human individual, cultural

and species development is human activity, which is qualitative and trans-
formative (unlike behavior change, which is particularistic and cumulative).
Human beings do not merely respond to stimuli, acquire societally deter-
mined and useful skills, and adapt to the determining environment. The
uniqueness of human social life—and in this Vaygotsky followed Marx—is
that we ourselves transform the determining circumstances. Human develop-
ment is not an individual accomplishment but a socio-cultural activity.
114 LOIS HOLZMANS
Vygotsky’ understanding of development and learning is a forerunner to

the Institute’s psychology of becoming and its methodology of social therapeu-
tics, in which people experience the social nature of their existence and the
power of collective creative activity in the process of making new tools for
growth (Holzman, 2016/2009). As a cultural approach to human life, the
psychology of becoming relates to human beings as the creators of our cul-
ture and ensemble performers of our lives; and to human and community
learning and development as the social-cultural activity of creating “devel-
opment zones/stages” where people can “become” through performing, as
Vygotsky says, “a head taller” (Vygotsky, 1978).
For Vygotsky, the uniqueness of human psychological activity required
a new method designed specifically for that task. In Vygotsky’s words, “The
search for method becomes one of the most important problems of the entire
enterprise of understanding the uniquely human forms of psychological activ-
ity. In this case, the method is simultaneously prerequisite and product, the
tool and the result of the study” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 65). This is a radical
departure from the scientific paradigm in which human beings and non-hu-
mans are investigated in the same manner—namely, with method being a tool
that is used to yield results. For Vygotsky, understanding human life requires
that we create a method different in kind from the existing instrumental
one. Most importantly, the activity of doing so (“the search for method”)
will generate both tool and result at the same time and as continuous pro-
cess. This unity—method as tool and result—is something to be practiced,
not applied—a non-linear, non-temporal relationship between theory and
practice. To capture the dialectical relationship of this new conception, Fred
Newman and I called it tool-and-result methodology, in contrast to the instru-
mental tool for result methodology of psychology, other social science, and edu-
cational research (Newman & Holzman, 2013/1993).
The Unity Learning-and-Development
Vygotsky explored the relationship between learning/instruction (in Russian

there is one word for both) and development. He rejected the view that was
prevalent in his day and remains so today—that learning follows and is depen-
dent upon development—and was critical of teaching that was based in this
belief: “Instruction would be completely unnecessary if it merely utilized
what had already matured in the developmental process, if it were not itself a
source of development” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 212). He proposed, instead, that
learning and development are a dialectical unity in which learning is ahead
of or leads development: “Instruction is only useful when it moves ahead of

development. When it does, it impels or wakens a whole series of functions
that are in a stage or maturation lying in the zone of proximal development”
(1987, p. 212). Learning is a source of development, he proposed, because it
leads development: “The only instruction which is useful in childhood is that
which moves ahead of development, that which leads it” (p. 211)… “push-
ing it further and eliciting new formations” (p. 198). As I understand it, what
Vygotsky is proposing here is a new kind of relationship between develop-
ment and learning/instruction, a dialectical relationship of unity or total-
ity, with learning “leading.” Activating or bringing into existence this unity
(learning-leading-development) is a qualitative transformation of the whole
child (Newman & Holzman, 2013/1993; Holzman, 1997).
This unity “learning-leading-development” or “learning-and-develop-
ment” can be understood as a way that Vygotsky brought Marx’s dialectical
conception of activity to psychology. Vygotsky was not saying that learning
literally comes first, or that it leads development in a linear or temporal fash-
ion. He was saying that as social-cultural, relational activities, learning and
development are inseparable. They are a unity in which learning is connected
to and leads —dialectically, not linearly—development. Learning and devel-
opment co-generate each other. (Newman & Holzman, 1993/2013). If this
is the case, an important investigation to pursue is the kinds of environments
that create and support this co-generation, and how such environments differ
from those that do not—including environments that divorce development
from learning and have acquisitional learning as their goal, i.e., most schools
(Holzman, 1997).
An example of an environment that does create and support the co-gen-
eration of learning-and-development comes from Vygotsky’s discussions of
how very young children become speakers of a language. Babies and their
caretakers are creating the environment and the learning-and-development at
the same time through their language play. This provides a glimpse of what
the dialectical process of being/becoming looks like—how very young chil-
dren are related to simultaneously as who they are (babies who babble) and
who they are not/who they are becoming (speakers), and that this is how
they develop as speakers/learn language. Embracing this revolutionary dis-
covery could transform how psychologists understand the process of human
development and how they and educators relate to the learning lives not just
of children, but of adults as well. In this way, Vygotsky as developmentalist con-
trasts with the pervasive emphasis on learning (specifically, school learning) of
Vygotskian research and commentary.
116 LOIS HOLZMANS
How Play Is Developmental
Vygotsky wrote little about play and, until recently, few people paid attention
to it. However, what he had to say is of great significance for how we under-
stand development and the current global development crisis. Play and its
role in reinitiating development has, for three decades, been a cornerstone of
the practice of the Institute and the grassroots Vygotskians within its network.
Just as for Vygotsky learning/instruction is a source of (leads) develop-
ment, so too is play:
Though the play-development relationship can be compared to the instruc-
tion-development relationship, play provides a much wider background for
changes in needs and consciousness. Action in the imaginative sphere, in an
imaginary situation, the creation of voluntary intentions, and the formation
of real-life plans and volitional motives—all appear in play and make it the
highest level of preschool development. (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 102–3)
For Vygotsky, play creates an imaginary situation, and even the most
imaginative, fantastical play contains rules. What makes play developmental is
the interplay of imagination and rules. Imagination frees us; rules constrain
us. Creating an imaginary situation frees the players from situational con-
straints and, at the same time, imposes constraints (rules) of its own. Vygotsky
noted that in free or pretend play, the rules are of a special kind. They don’t
exist prior to playing, but come into existence at the same time and through
the creation of the imaginary situation. In Vygotsky’s words, they are “not
rules that are formulated in advance and that change during the course of the
game but ones that stem from an imaginary situation” (Vygotsky, 1978, p.
95). That is, they are rules created in the activity of playing.
For example, when a young child takes a pencil and makes horse-like
movements with it, s/he is simultaneously creating this imaginary situation
and the “rules” of the play (keep jumping, make whinnying sounds, don’t
write on the paper). When children are playing Mommy and baby, the new
meaning that the imaginary situation creates also creates the “rules” of the
play (for example, the ways that Mommy and baby relate to each other “in
character”). In these examples, everything—the children who are playing, the
pencil, horse, Mommy and baby—are what/who they are and, at the same
time, other than what/who they are. Here is how Vygotsky captured the dia-
lectical “otherness” and “becomingness” (tool-and-result-ishness) created in
children’s play: “In play a child always behaves beyond his average age, above
his daily behavior; in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself”
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 102).
The “head taller” metaphor raises the question of how we can we become
who we are not, and suggests that the answer lies in the human capacity to
do things without knowing either how or that we are doing them. Vygotsky
was well aware that the opposite of the “know, then do” adage is key to devel-
opment in early childhood. His identification of free play as playing without
pre-existing rules just discussed is a description of doing without knowing
how. Additionally, he noted that young children actively participate in their
development without knowing that they are doing it. As he put it, “…before
a child has acquired grammatical and written language, he knows how to do
things but does not know that he knows…. In play a child spontaneously
makes use of his ability to separate meaning from an object without knowing
that he is doing it, just as he does not know he is speaking in prose but talks
without paying attention to the words” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 99).
The similarity Vygotsky is pointing to here between speaking in prose and
play is important, because it suggests an important continuity between learn-
ing/instruction and play. Vygotsky’s concentration on learning/instruction
in formal educational settings may have led him to overlook the striking sim-
ilarities between play and non-school learning and, in particular, the ZPDs
of both learning/instruction and play. Indeed, those of us who have pursued
this similarity in studying early childhood, middle childhood, adolescence and
adulthood have come to appreciate that all learning-leading-development is
play in a Vygotskian sense.
Following this direction, I suggest that we can substitute the word per-
formance for play. It might even enhance our understanding, for performance
evokes the magic of the theatre—its deliberate invitation to imagine and be
captivated by people on stage being other than who they are, to play along
with the players. Just as children go “beyond” their normal behavior as if
“a head taller” in play, so too do performers on stage. Performance in early
childhood, as discussed above, is not in the performers’ awareness. Adults
and little children together create the “stage” and perform on it without
any awareness that they’re performing. Nevertheless, the countless “conver-
sations” like this one: “Mama, baba, babababa”; “Yes, sweetie, that’s a little
baby doll” both create and are the scenes in an ongoing performance of “The
Life of the Developing Baby.” In contrast, performers on the theatrical stage
are aware that they’re performing and so is the audience. This kind of delib-
erate performance highlights, experientially, the being-becoming dialectical
“space” in which we live and in which development is always potential.
118 LOIS HOLZMANS
Studying these performances in early childhood and on theatrical stages

and exploring what the casts of characters are doing as they build the different
stages and scenes (as my colleagues and I have done), reveals how the capacity
to create new performances of ourselves as individuals and groupings (class-
room, family, work team, community, etc.) is essential to learning and devel-
opment at any age. Through the lens of performance, we see development
as stages and scenes of a play rather than scaffolds and ladders (Holzman,
1997b).
The language of theatrical performance (stages, scenes, characters, etc.) is
key to the Institute’s understanding of human development and learning. In
philosophical terms, theatrical performance and its language allows us to see
performance not merely socio-culturally, but ontologically, as a characteristic
and activity that human beings engage in in the most mundane of situations.
Speaking Completes Thinking
Learning, development and play were not the only social-cultural activities
Vygotsky explored in his search for method to understand human life. He
also delved deeply into the relationship between thinking and speaking, and
the role that imitation plays in child development.
Vygotsky examined the activity of children’s imitation because, “A full
understanding of the concept of the zone of proximal development must
result in a reevaluation of the role of imitation in learning” (1978, p. 87).
As he had done with existing understandings of learning and development,
he found fault with the mechanistic view of imitation that he observed was
“rooted in traditional psychology, as well as in everyday consciousness,” and
in which “the child can imitate anything” and that “what I can do by imitat-
ing says nothing about my own mind” (1987, p. 209). Children are not like
parrots. They don’t imitate anything and everything. They imitate only those
things in their environment and relationships that are just beyond them,
developmentally speaking. Children creatively imitate others in their daily
interactions—saying what someone else says, moving to music, picking up a
book and “reading,” “talking” on a smart phone, and so on. In other words,
creative imitation is a key element in “The Performance of Being a Head
Taller.” Or, in Vygotsky’s words, “Development based on collaboration and
imitation is the source of all specifically human characteristics of conscious-
ness that develop in a child” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 210). It is how children are
capable of doing so much in collective activity.
The partner to imitation in this ongoing developmental performance is

completion. This is the Vygotskian term for the dialectical relationship he pos-
ited between thinking and speaking. Conventional wisdom today is similar
to that of Vygotsky’s day—words express our thoughts and feelings. This
expressionist or pictorial view of language has been discredited by philoso-
phers of language throughout the 20th century and by social constructionists
and other postmodernists into this century. Yet it prevails. Vygotsky rejected
this view in favor of a dialectical one. Speaking, he believed, is not the out-
ward expression of thinking. It is, rather, part of a unified, transformative
process that entails thinking/speaking. He stated this most clearly in the fol-
lowing two passages from Thinking and Speech:
The relationship of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a move-
ment from thought to word and from word to thought … Thought is not
expressed but completed in the word. We can, therefore, speak of the estab-
lishment (i.e., the unity of being and nonbeing) of thought in the word. Any
thought strives to unify, to establish a relationship between one thing and
another. Any thought has movement. It unfolds. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 250)
The structure of speech is not simply the mirror image of the structure
of thought. It cannot, therefore, be placed on thought like clothes off a
rack. Speech does not merely serve as the expression of developed thought.
Thought is restructured as it is transformed into speech. It is not expressed
but completed in the word. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 251)
There are, then, not two psychological behaviors—the private one of

thinking and the social one of speaking. There is, according to Vygotsky, just
one human social-cultural activity: speaking/thinking, a dialectical unity in
which speaking completes thinking.
Newman and I expanded Vygotsky’s speaking-thinking unity beyond
the individual (Holzman, 2016/2009; Newman & Holzman, 2006/1996;
2013/1993). We reasoned as follows. If speaking is the completing of think-
ing, if the process is continuously creative in social-cultural space, then the
“completer” does not have to be the one who is doing the thinking. Others
can complete for us. Indeed, if this were not the case, how would children be
able to engage in language play, create conversation and perform as speak-
ers before they know language? In early childhood, thinking/speaking must
be a continuously socially completive activity in which others are completing
for them.
120 LOIS HOLZMANS
Creative imitation and completion create the ensemble performance of

conversation. The baby’s babbling (rudimentary speech) is a creative imita-
tion of the adult’s speech. The adult completes the baby in Vygotsky’s dialec-
tical transformative sense. And so it goes, throughout the days of baby and
toddlerhood, when the people in our lives are most supportive of us doing
what we aren’t yet able to do, and most embracing of us as the simultaneity
of who we are and who we are not. Out of this social-cultural activity, a new
speaker emerges.
One of the implications of Vygotsky’s characterization of thinking and
speaking, imitation and completion is that meaning making is not the outcome
of using language. Rather, the process of language development (becoming
a languager) is not one of learning the language to make meaning. Quite the
opposite. Vygotsky suggests that meaning-making “leads” language-making
(dialectically, just as learning leads development). Engaging in language play
with others, being related to as a speaker and language-maker before one is,
being supported to perform as a conversationalist—all this (and, of course,
the actions and relational subjectivity occurring simultaneously) is joint activ-
ity, or ensemble performance. Furthermore, such meaning-making perfor-
mances are necessary to becoming a rule-governed, societal language user
and language maker (Newman & Holzman, 2013/1993, pp. 112–118). This
counter-intuitive characterization of language development has many educa-
tional implications, including subject matter school learning as well as sec-
ond-language teaching-learning-development.
Vygotskians at the Grassroots
As mentioned, there are hundreds of people across the globe whose study of
Vygotsky has been through the Institute and whose work at the grass roots
has been influenced by that. Space permits the sharing of only a few of them.
Ishita Sanyal is one of the few psychologists in India. She lives in Kolkata.
When her brother had a schizophrenic break she was faced with the stark
reality that there were precious few services for people with severe mental ill-
ness, and none that gave them any dignity. So she founded her own organiza-
tion, Turning Point. At the beginning Ishita focused on involving people in
educational activities, like computer training. This in itself was a big step, as
what was available in other places was so-called occupational therapy such as
bookbinding and pickle making. But being introduced to Vygotsky’s method
through the Institute, and meeting hundreds of people who were utilizing
creative and performance activities in their work around the world, Ishita
began to involve her staff and clients in developmental activities. She recog-
nized that in order to reinitiate development and growth in people suffering
from mental illness, you had to relate to them, in Vygotsky’s sense, as a head
taller through play. Over the years, since 2007, she has introduced readings
on human development to them, helped them create skits from these read-
ings and their life experiences, and taught them improv games. They even put
on a show in the village square. The experience of being related to doing what
they don’t know how to do and what no one expects of them, of working col-
lectively to create their growth, of succeeding, being appreciated and being
seen as a human being has been transformative.
Recently, Ishita described a talent show Turning Point organized for peo-
ple with mental illness. She wrote: “At the initial screening we saw people
complaining of headaches and becoming restless. But when the performance
started they became increasingly enthusiastic and often performed more than
once, not for the sake of competition, but for the pleasure of performing and
discovery. They were able to create a completely different and more positive
environment together where instead of only thinking about their problems
and difficulties they were immersed in creatively praising each other. I think
this helped them to grow and develop because they went from I can’t to I
can.” (Sanyal, 2015, personal communication)
Miguel Cortes from Cuidad Juàrez in Mexico is a community educator
and non-diagnostic therapist. Three years ago, he shared with other commu-
nity activists the following: “Four years ago I was struggling to adjust myself
to working at the University. I dreamt of doing community work but had
no idea of how to do it. A friend of mine was trying to find people he could
work creatively with playing music. Now, through totally different paths we
come to be involved in doing community work with youth. We not only play
drums together, we now record albums created by youth, we create work-
shops about comics that reflect life in Juarez, and so many other things. In
just 4 years we have created conditions where we can do things unimaginable
before. And it wasn’t by reading the “7 steps for successful community build-
ing” or “Community building for dummies.” It was our growing and play-
ing and creating community, it was participating in creating with our groups
which is not a “let’s all hold hands” kind of thing, but a huge struggle, of us
at times having no idea what we were doing, of people leaving our commu-
nity, of finding ways of continuing our work even when the conditions don’t
exist for it. You cannot appreciate Vygotsky deeply if you are not building
122 LOIS HOLZMANS
with him, if you are not creating environments for growth.” (Cortes, 2015,
personal communication)
Peter Nsubuga is a community worker in Kampala, Uganda. While in the
UK studying accounting, Peter saw a TV show on the plight of children in
Africa. He returned home to respond to the need for help in communities
suffering from disease, extreme poverty and lack of clean water. He himself
grew up poor and had lost three brothers and one sister to AIDS. In 2008,
Peter founded Hope for Youth, an organization that provides food, cloth-
ing, education and social-emotional development experiences to children and
families in a remote area of Kampungu village in the Mukono District. Hope
for Youth started with seven children under a tree, and today cares for over
250 children between 4 and 14 years old in their school program, and over 50
youth and women in play and performance-based out-of-school programs.
Commenting on what he learned and now practices, Peter says, “It’s an
eye opener to me on how we can continuously create development in our
communities by becoming creators of changes instead of just passively watch-
ing life passing by. This is unique especially to those of us who were used to
the system that was only encouraging us to be who we are, to develop our
identities, rather than to continue performing as who we were becoming.”
Nsubuga, 2014, personal communication)
Yuji Moro of Tsukuba University is a prominent developmental psycholo-
gist in Japan who had been following cultural historical research since the early
1980s when his colleagues visited Michael Cole’s lab in San Diego. Coming
in contact with the Institute and Vygotsky as developmentalist, he has come
to recognize that human development can only come about through com-
munity development, and he has become a community activist. Among the
projects he has implemented in the past five years are radical changes in uni-
versity education that brings creativity and performance into the classrooms
and collaborations with community organizations in Tokyo’s poorest neigh-
borhoods to re-initiate development in the most marginalized of teens and
young adults.
Yuji recently commented on the impact of the Vygotsky the develop-
mentalist in Japan: “In the past few years, he’s been an omnipresent figure,
provoking academics into discussion on the unity of learning and develop-
ment in conference rooms, working as a community builder in various cities
and countries, and making stages for young people beginning their future”
(Moro, 2015, personal communication).
Norwegian psychologist Paul Carlin contrasted his university study with
his Institute learning:
My Vygotsky was an aloof, distant scientist, when I first met him at the uni-
versity of Oslo. He was mostly used in theoretical dueling with the ghost
of Piaget in student papers over casting development as blank slate or the
preplanned blooming of biology. And the zones of proximal development
were represented by technical drawings and equations on the blackboard.
The drawings traced the predicted path/bridge within a ZPD of the trans-
formation of a skill from novice to expert. My Vygotsky never questioned
the tool for result methodology. Never imagined another ontology. What I
really appreciate and in turn struggle with in implementing this revolution-
ary Vygotsky is that it opened my imagination to what is alive, transformable,
buildable. A new psychology of becoming. That the human world is alive in
a myriad ways, not dead, commodified, closed off. Celebrate what has been
built for us to build with further. (Carlin, 2015, personal communication)
I have learned much from sharing Vygotsky the developmentalist with

these people and so many others and being involved in their ongoing work.
One important insight has been that when people create stages for develop-
ment and development simultaneously and through this activity build com-
munity, they confront some paradoxes of contemporary life. The paradox that
life is lived socially, but is experienced and related to individualistically. The
paradox that life is continuous process, but is experienced and related to as
products located in a particular time and space. The paradox that people live,
learn and develop in social units, but are not instructed in ways of creating
or functioning effectively in them. With few exceptions, people do not know
how to talk about such things. Conversations are rare among family mem-
bers on how they want to live together, or among students and teachers on
how they want to create their classroom, or among work groups on how they
could function to maximize productivity and creativity, and so on.
It is as performers that people are able to engage, in a developmental way,
the paradox of experiencing what is a social existence as a separate and indi-
viduated one.
What is needed is creating environments for people to participate in activ-
ities in which they will have to discover for themselves such things as how to
create a group, what learning is, how to talk and listen and create a conver-
sation. This is, I believe, part of the developmental task history has raised for
us all.
124 LOIS HOLZMANS
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Psychology). New York: Plenum.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky (Vol. 2, The Fundamentals
of Defectology). New York: Plenum.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky, Volume 4. New York:
Plenum.
6. Mediation in Neo-Vygotskian Terms:
Rethinking School Mediated Practices
from a Social Architectonic Perspective
ADOLFO TANZI NETO
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the principles of the concept of mediation presented

in the work of Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, adding to these the contribution
of Bakhtin’s work and the expansions of Neo-Vygotskian researchers in order
to reflect upon different fields of research, such as language studies, semiot-
ics and education. This theoretical reflection has the fundamental objective of
justifying how the systems of signs and tools (artifacts) that mediate discur-
sive relations are present in the situated practices of a school. One must think
of a whole, an architectonic form of dialogic relations of discourses impreg-
nated of sociocultural-historical semiotic meanings, that imposes a temporal
and spatial order on the operations and that also produces a social organiza-
tion and internalization of ways of thinking. A verbal-visual inherited mass
of tacit and formative resources of artifacts and social relations of power and
control embedded in participants’ discursive practices whilst carrying it out,
materializing it, making it real, concrete for all participants involved. This
chapter highlights the need to look into how school mediated artifacts, social
positioning of power and control and their discursive relations are used in the
social space of a school, influencing the dialogical and axiological positions
of its participants and their internal discourses. A school social architectonic
form of realization—intertwined with mediating artifacts, pedagogical prac-
tices and orientations of verbal-visual productions—is constantly directed to
influence our minds and behaviors. In this sense, I attempt to theoretically dis-
cuss the school social space of sociocultural-historical practices materialized in
126 ADOLFO TANZI NETO
forms of verbal-visual dialogical interactions, voices, social positions and iden-

tities. I propose to evaluate the production of psychological tools, of inter-
actions among subjects, so as to be able to understand the formative effects
of a social context of production on the psychological level and ponder on
the transformation/production of different social spaces—rethinking visual,
physical and verbal artifacts, for human development/agency to cater for the
needs of young people, either for transformation of oppressive realities for
social justice (Liberali, 2020) or as an agentive action in disruption of pre-es-
tablished discourses/patterns of their realities.
Mediated Semiotic Social Positioning
By applying Marx’s concepts for psychological development, Vygotsky had

to deal with the problem of how higher mental functions develop, concern-
ing abstract thoughts. At this point, Vygotsky’s great contribution to Marxist
psychology was given in his proposal that it is in tool mediated semiotics that
human activities work (Lee, 1985).
The semiotic mediation of practical activity, primarily through speech, trans-
forms humans and creates the possibility of human society. Human labor dif-
fers from animal tool use because humans are aware of and plan their actions
using historically transmitted and socially created means of production. This
awareness and planning ability is a form of generalization made possible only
through speech. (Lee, 1985, p. 75)
Thus, for Lee (1985), Vygotsky proposes a discussion of thought and

language in human development in order to understand the different mental
functions between thought and word. In this notion, it is a mistake to find
that this interrelationship is fixed and constant. Through this perspective,
Vygotsky proposes a discussion between the world and the words, since there
is no word without its material constitution and there is no tool without its
condition imposed by human thought. Vygotsky emphasizes that the connec-
tion between the two is mediation itself, for they are mediated by temporary
semiotic bonds artificially created by signs (Shotter, 1993). At first, mediation
acts with the function of controlling the behavior of others, but then it is used
to control the behavior of the interlocutor themselves.
Shotter (1993) revises Vygotsky’s concept of mediation by considering
that thought and speech have a variable and socially negotiable character that
Mediation in Neo-Vygotskian Terms 127
does not take into account only the responsibilities and rights from the point
of view of one’s social position, which generates certain tension and conflict
to the nature of mediation as postulated by Vygotsky. Shotter (1993) argues
that, although linguistic signs are arbitrary, they are sustained in stable ways
or as “devices” in the mediation of social relations and that their possible
forms of transgression “can be sanctioned or repaired” (Shotter 1993, p. 62).
Thus, the internalization of knowledge cannot be seen only by the prism of
an action but must also focus on the development of the human being as a
politically, ethically, culturally and, rhetorically positioned member of society.
In the words of Shotter,
Thus I claim, following Wittgenstein and Bakhtin-Vološinov, that although
words can be used in a ‘tool-like’ way, as a means in the ‘shaping’ of mean-
ingful speech and action, they cannot just be used as we please; these enable-
ments are also constraints upon our forms of being. They exert an ontological
as well as an epistemological influence upon us. (Shotter, 1993, p. 62)
In this argument, Vygotsky’s idea of internalization goes far beyond the

simple process of internalization of what is in the world to the plane of indi-
vidual consciousness. This would imply a very well-developed individuality,
about which we would have only the task of dealing with self-control. On the
contrary, Vygotsky’s idea of internalization, suggests that we learn to be crit-
ical and autonomous members in a society, “how to see and to hear things as
others do, how to link our actions to theirs in acting in a socially intelligible
and legitimate ways” (Shotter, 1993, p.62), that is, how to be/act/perform
as individuals of a certain type of social culture; to the author this why the
ontological is more important than the epistemological.
Shotter (1993) argues that mental processes are similar to the transac-
tions we conduct among ourselves, for example, they do not function only
systematically or mechanically; they also reflect and are influenced by ethi-
cal and rhetorical performances among people around the world. Thus, the
thought or sense effect of a sentence does not come simply from a well-de-
veloped, internally-ordered, cognitive system, but rather, as “vague, diffused
and unordered feelings” (Shotter, 1993, p. 63), influenced by the way we are
semiotically positioned in relation to those around us (Shotter, 1993). In my
discussion, I seek to understand how semiotically positioned the learners are
inside their social school space in terms of the dialogic relations of discursive
school practices: their voices, their identities, their communities’ represen-
tation; how the relations of power and control are exerted upon them. For
Shotter (1993), thought develops in complex temporary transactions, from
which expressions are negotiated and tested by the interlocutors in a process

of mutual exchange.
This view is based on Bakhtin and The Circle’s assumptions about the
question that words are not neutral, abstract and meaningless unities, since
“the word is interindividual and gathers in itself the voices of all of those who
use or have historically used it” (Cereja, 2010, p. 203). Such reflections lead
us to the discussions that the word is dialogic and inseparable from discourse,
“word is discourse, history, ideology, social struggle, because it is a synthesis
of historically constructed discursive practices” (Cereja, 2010, p. 204). From
this point of view, I notice that there is a social construction/production of
meanings. People are not isolated in the world and do not possess an internal
sovereignty of knowledge-building (Shotter, 1993). Quite the contrary, we
are in a heterogeneous system of meanings for our use in negotiation between
ourselves and the people around us.
We can add to this argument Stella’s (2010) perspective, that the word
is also closely related to life, to reality, that is, to the process of interaction
between a speaker and an interlocutor, concentrating in itself the intonations
of the speaker, the values corresponding to an assessment of the situation by
the positioned speaker not only semiotically, “but also historically in front of
his interlocutor” (Stella, 2010, p. 178).
To expand the question of semiotic positioning in front of the interlocu-
tor, we remember that the sign is internally orienting the interlocutor and the
tool, externally. For Shotter (1993, pp. 72–73), the mind is at work in pro-
spective and retrospective tensions, in the “finding and doing” of the forms
of a speech, in the speech actions, and in the reactions of others from which
we develop the sociocultural-historical and intralinguistic context of a society.
It is in this context that I attempt to defend the importance of looking into
the social school architectonic, in what should be taken into account, based
on the semiotic/ethical character of people’s positions in a school context.
In this regard, Blommaert (2015) seeks, through the analysis of the
context/condition of a semiotic action, to understand how sociohistorical
schemas are reconstituted in a situated activity. To do so, he argues from
Silverstein’s perspective that what happens in one semiotic action is usually
taken to the other action, that is “[…] is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is an
unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms, contextualised to situ-
ations of interested human use and mediated by the fact of cultural ideology”
(Silverstein, 1985, p. 220).
In this sense, Shotter (1993) claims that interiorization has an ethical, prac-
tical and social movement through which children intellectualize themselves
in contact with those around them. The child not only learns from people’s
ways of behaving toward them but appropriates the mental resources of oth-
ers through social practices to be used for their own forms of agency and
control. Later, in the more adult and autonomous phases, he/she develops
what Shotter calls ethical logistics, in which the person learns, within groups,
ways of negotiating personal transactions, that is, means to coordinate the
different responsibilities involved in the social construction negotiations of
meanings (Shotter, 1990). Shotter is based on Bakhtin’s (2003 [1979]) per-
spective at the center of which the utterance is the device that dynamizes all
human verbal interaction, insofar as it gives material stability to the most dif-
ferent genres and tonalities, as and wherever language is used, in oral, written
or multimodal form.
On this view, Shotter expands the considerations of mediation from the
Vygotskian perspective to the aspect that in mediation either implicit or
explicit,1 we also find the development of the semiotic positioning of the
human being in a particular discursive genre, and, in the forms of meaning
that involve it in the genre discursively, different argumentative positions can
be taken, and internalization as per this prism can be seen as an ethical-rhe-
torical phenomenon. In our practical-theoretical discussion of this chapter,
implicit mediation in a school context shall be the external community rela-
tions, relations of power and control from teachers/head/principals, and
explicit shall be verbal-visual artifacts within the school (walls, exhibitors, cor-
ridors), pedagogical practices and orientation etc.
Mediated Practices in the Social Space of a School
Hasan (2005) discusses discourse genres, semiotic mediation and the devel-
opment of higher mental functions, taking into account that few linguis-
tic models consider that language can form the mind whilst the mind can
form language. In her paper, Hasan (2005) seeks, by means of intersect-
ing Semiology, Sociology and Psychology, in the works of Bakhtin and The
Circle, Vygotsky, Halliday and Bernstein, to propose a discussion between
“semiotic variation with the material social conditions of human existence”
(Hasan, 2005, p. 69). For this, the author searches, in the work of Vygotsky
and Bakhtin and The Circle, for theoretical foundation on the actions medi-
ated for the social formation of the mind. For Hasan, despite some specific
discussions about the development of the social situation in Bakhtin’s work,

such authors, together with Vygotsky, share the same idea that
[…] members of different social groups might experience different forms

of verbal interaction that the heterogeneity of semiotically mediated con-
sciousness could find a ‘rational’ explanation. Language seen socially is dis-
course specific to a particular stratum in society, defined by some social
attribute such as class, profession, race, gender, or age […]. Moreover mem-
bers belonging to distinct social groups experience a different subset of these
varieties and this experience actively shapes their own verbal consciousness or
their own ways of saying and meaning. It is these habitual fashions of speak-
ing—and coding orientations to meanings (on Bernstein’s perspective)—that
mediate specific forms of human consciousness. (Hasan, 2005, p. 97, empha-
sis added)
In this idea of the habitual modes of speech, Hasan (2005) and Brait
and Pistori (2012) consider that forms of verbal interaction linked to the
social situation react sensibly in different ways. To that end, Brait and Pistori
(2012) affirm that the psychology of the social body, the initial environment
of speech acts, should be studied from two perspectives: the first “refers to
the contents of the themes updated in a given time and space, and the other
concerns the types and forms of discourse” (Brait & Pistori, 2012, p. 387).
For the authors, each discursive genre of everyday life corresponds to
“a group of themes” (p. 387) that is organically connected as an indissolu-
ble unity. Hasan (2005) and Brait and Pistori (2012), thus seek in Bakhtin/
Vološinov’s work (1997), reflections on the social function of the sign, that
is, its semiotic-ideological notion and those who wish to deal with this theme
must follow specific methodological requirements for the question of the sign
and its ideology. They are: (i) not separating the ideology from the material
reality of the sign (placing it in the field of consciousness or other fugitive and
indefinable domains); (ii) not separating the sign from the concrete forms of
social communication (meaning that the sign is part of a system of organized
social communication that has no existence outside of this system, except as
a physical object); (iii) not dissociating communication and its forms from its
material basis (Bakhtin/Vološinov, 1997).
For Hasan (2005), in Bernstein’s perspective (2003 [1990]), different
forms of semiotic mediation are due to different material conditions of social
existence, which act on human relations and actions, affecting and being
affected by different forms of consciousness (Hasan, 2005). This fact comple-
ments the argument that communication is not dissociated from the material
basis, which is found in the discussion of sign and ideology, in Vološinov’s

semiotic-ideological constitution.
Maintaining the polemical tone of the work (Marxism and the philosophy of
language) and refuting the idealist subjectivism, Vološinov demonstrates that
the “enunciation is social in nature”; that all enunciations are determined by
the most immediate social situation and the wider social environment; that
even the inner discourse of each individual—adapted and organized accord-
ing to the possibilities of expression of the social environment in which they
live—has a well-established own audience; that the “organizing center of
every enunciation, of every expression, is not internal but external: it is sit-
uated in the social environment that surrounds the individual.” (Brait &
Pistori, 2012, p. 389)
In the perspective of Bernstein’s work, Hasan (2005) considers that the

non-dissociation of the material basis postulated by Vološinov (1973) is the
orientation for meanings, that is, the guiding codes, in Bernstein’s perspective
(2003 [1990]). For Hasan, the relation between meanings and the material
basis presented by Bakhtin/Vološinov (1997) is linked to social positioning;
for example, students entering school as learners from different spheres of
human social existence are in a specific relationship in the distribution of
power and control. In this way, their discourse experiences create different
forms of human consciousness (Hasan, 2005). To elucidate this question,
Hasan (2005) seeks in Bernstein’s work a passage for these considerations.
The particular forms of social relation act selectively upon what is said, when
it is said, and how it is said… [they] can generate very different speech sys-
tems or codes… [which] create for their speakers different orders of rele-
vance and relation. The experience of the speaker may then be transformed
by what is made significant or relevant by different speech systems. As
the child… learns specific speech codes which regulate his verbal acts, he
learns the requirements of his social structure. The experience of the child
is transformed by the learning generated by his own, apparently, volun-
tary acts of speech… From this point of view, every time the child speaks
or listens, the social structure in reinforced in him and his social iden-
tity shaped. The social structure becomes the child’s psychological real-
ity through the shapings of his acts of speech. (Bernstein, 1971, p. 144)
From this thought, I consider that the school space, social in nature, is
therefore produced through a social structure of psychological reality, of lan-
guage as the materialization of practices that realize it, materialize it, make it
real, concrete and impregnated with meanings. This space imposes a temporal
and spatial order on the operations, produces a social organization of inherent,

tacit and formative resources, for all who are involved in their resources, arti-
facts, speeches, in which their participants “combine their gestures and direct
their energies as a function of specific tasks” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 72).
On this view, the constitution of a social space, for Lefebvre (1991), is
when Descartes emancipates himself from the Aristotelian concept of space
and brings to the discussion time and space as empirical tools represented by
the human senses that we pass from space discussion only in the mathemati-
cal sense for the question of “social space”. Lefebvre (1991), however, pon-
ders that for Kant, space—although a tool of knowledge, and as a means of
classifying phenomena—was clearly, over time, separating from the empirical
sphere of consciousness, that is, from the subject, remaining in the field only
of the structure.
In Lefebvre’s notion, epistemological and philosophical ideals failed to
explain the “science of space,” either because they were based only on mere
descriptions that never reached more analytical and theoretical conclusions,
or because they remained in discussions of fragmented intersections, which
led them to understand only what exists in space or what discourse occurs in
space—the language itself—leaving aside all the attributes and properties that
emerge from it.
Besides this, Blommaert (2015) also argues that researchers have failed
to study language in society by applying “a simple untheorized distinction in
the levels of context” (Blommaert, 2015, p. 3). For the author, the discourse
analysis, many times, when investigating only the interactions and sociolin-
guistics, only the variables of the discourse, ended up typifying the microanal-
yses; the critical analysis of discourse and the politics of language studies have
ended up typifying macro distinctions in a given time and space, leaving aside,
in micro distinctions, how people affect language, and, in macro distinctions,
how language affects people (Blommaert, 2015). However, the author com-
plements, indicating that recent studies in the area of language are evolving
from linear models to more complex models of analysis, now including ques-
tions such as time and space, with the aim of searching for a contextualization
of the signs of language in society. By this token, language ceases to be just
verbal and structural to be understood as complex semiotic sociocultural-his-
torical objects of situated human practices.
According to Lefebvre (1991, p. 9), understanding a space in a con-
text consists in seeking (a) a political representation of the use of knowl-
edge (knowledge, in this system, presents forces of production that are not
as immediate as the social relations of production); (b) an implicit ideology
for the use, from which the participants of this space accept, but do not dis-
tinguish it from the knowledge; (c) an involvement of space, architecture,
urbanism or social planning, as a simulator for the future, within a structure
of the real, a real form of production.
For Lefebvre (1991), the understanding of “space” goes beyond the
scope of the “social”, so that its analysis must take place through a theoretical
unit of different fields of knowledge: first, the physical—nature, the Cosmos;
secondly, the mental, including logical and formal abstractions, and thirdly,
the social (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 11). It is a search for a logical-epistemological
understanding of the levels of interrelations that are established in a space of
social practices, sensorial phenomena, “products of the imagination such as
projects and projections, symbols and utopias” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 12). For
this, understanding the social space is to understand its multiple intersec-
tions between: (i) spatial practices: that comprise the production and repro-
duction of characteristics of social formations; (ii) representations of space:
they comprise the relations of production related to the order imposed by
these relations, and thus to knowledge, signs, codes, etc.; (iii) representa-
tional spaces: they comprise the complex symbols, sometimes codified, some-
times not linked to social life (Lefebvre, 1991).
In this direction, Lefebvre (1991) seeks a careful explanation of the ques-
tion of social space, through its production; the concept of production pres-
ent in the Hegelian work (1770–1831) problematized the cardinal role of
“production”, as a constituent of a whole, from which the idea produces the
world and nature produces the human; already the human, in turn, through
struggles and work, produces history, knowledge and self-consciousness
(Lefebvre, 1991).
On Lefebvre’s work the concept of production is based on the princi-
ples of Marx and Engels (1983 [1946]), when they postulate that humans
are social beings who produce their own lives, consciousness and worlds:
“there is nothing in history or in society, which does not have to be achieved
and produced” (Lefebvre, 1991, p.68). Thus, we produce political, juridical,
religious, artistic, social and philosophical forms; production, in its broadest
sense, comprises a multitude of works and forms of production. However,
Lefebvre (1991) ponders that Marx and Engels reduce this concept only to
the question of “products”: who the producer is; how s/he produces, why,
for whom, leaving aside such concerns as imagination, creativity or inventive-
ness, and taking the discussion of the concept of production only from the
perspective of the work.
For the author, Marx and Engels postulate that production is constituted
by the conception of nature and work and, consequently, of organization or
division of labor and instruments of labor, including technology and knowl-
edge. Since then, the concept of production has been used in the most varied
forms: “we speak of the production of knowledge, or ideologies, or writings
and meanings, of images, of discourses, of language, of signs and symbols…”
(Lefebvre, 1991, p. 69). However, for the author, this breadth of uses of the
concept of production has withdrawn us from the central idea and defini-
tions of production and product, labor and product, nature and production.
Lefebvre (1991) understands that we need to retake this theme, restoring its
value and making it dialectical, but not neglecting its rigorous relationship
between nature and work.
On Lefebvre’s (1991) viewpoint, the sense of production starts from
the principle that nature creates and does not produce; it offers us differ-
ent resources for more creative and productive activities; already humanity,
through its social practice, creates, works and produces things. In Marx’s view,
production organizes the sequence of actions for an object to be produced; it
imposes a temporal and spatial order on the operations, in which results coex-
ist. In this view, all productive activity must be defined less by invariable and
constant facts and more by the “temporality (succession, concatenation) spati-
ality (simultaneity, synchronicity)” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 71). These forms must
be analyzed together as a totality, they cannot be separated from the precon-
ditions of individuals and their collective activity. Thus, the author argues that,
when we understand space from this perspective, we do not find the result of
the quality or property of a human action, or of human work, or of its social
organization, but rather the occult origin, the inherent resource that is, at the
same time, implicit and formative (Tanzi Neto, 2016, 2017).
Bakhtin, in his text Art and responsibility, published in 1919, brings to
light the discussion of an architectonic form2 of performing human activi-
ties in social spaces, such as the ancient Greek Agoras or Parisian boulevards,
which go beyond the situation of communication determined in a historical
time and place of social relations, and considers the whole, as an architectonic
form between the practices of language and the situation of communication
that allow certain discursive genres to materialize and others not, seeking a
connection between the mechanical and the physical, as exposed by Lefebvre
(1991), a physical, social and mental articulation.
Through these lenses, the parts are internally connected rather than dis-
connected from each other; only by looking at them this way will we be able
to understand/interpret how new genres, uses, senses, dialogic formations,
contents and social relations are established in different social spaces that I
understand to be full of semiotic historicity, sociocultural human practices.
For Blommaert and Backus (2012), subjects engage in a wide variety of
groups, networks and communities, in which language resources are learned
through tactics, trajectories and technologies, in formal and informal linguis-
tic encounters. These ways of learning a language lead us to different lev-
els of knowledge/recognition of such language, developed in repertoires
that are “functionally distributed in a patchwork of competences and skills”
(Blommaert & Backus, 2012, p. 1). From my standpoint, based on Bakhtin’s
perspective, these encounters can be seen in the totality of an architectonic
form, where the forms of language, “the verbal-visual mass” (Brait & Pistori,
2012, p. 390) are found in their aspects of private, social and historical lives.
The architectonic form of a space corresponds to the fields of human activi-
ties. In seeking to study and understand this architectonic form and its spe-
cific composition, we can better understand the different forms of language
that mediate the consciousness of a specific social space.
In line with the forms of language, I seek Vygotsky’s contributions (2001
[1934], 2004 [1968], 2009 [1934]), his sociocultural-historical theory, to
reflect upon how human consciousness is intrinsically linked to the use of arti-
facts,3 which are mediated by human activities. In this thought, I believe that
all artifacts of a social space are culturally, historically and institutionally situ-
ated. Daniels (2008) also points out the need to broaden the understanding
of the “social” and to develop research tools to analyze the conversation in
the context and the context in the conversation, both in post-Vygotsky stud-
ies (Daniels, 2008) and in language studies in society, focusing on the impli-
cations of the ways in which “individuals take positions and are positioned in
practices” (Daniels, 2008, p. 148).
Vygotsky (1978) brings to the foreground the study of the mediating role
of specific cultural tools and their impact on the development and access to
specific tools, in my discussion artifacts, assuming that activities are socially
rooted and historically developed; however, we ask how we should under-
stand the activities in a certain space in relation to the sociocultural-historical
contexts of production. I suppose that, from the Bakhtinian perspective of an
architectonic form (totality) imbued with human activities, we shall attempt
to find a way of evaluating the whole of psychological artifacts, of interactions
among subjects, in order to better understand the formative effects of a social
context of production in the psychological level. In this sense, Bernstein also
proposes that internal and external symbols should be looked at, some exter-
nal symbols/artifacts shall be the area of the school environment, school
community and its surroundings, parents’/guardians’ involvement, external

agents’ involvement in the school etc.
Internal symbols/artifacts shall be the demarcation of teaching and learn-
ing areas (integration and flexibility of teaching and learning spaces), visibility
in the teaching-learning spaces, integration between spaces: teachers, coor-
dination/staff and students, organization and planning of the lesson, peda-
gogical orientation of the class planning, classroom groupings organization,
space organization in the classroom, orientation and evaluation of the contents
worked in class (hierarchical relations), verbal-visual rules in different spaces
(social rules in class, on the corridors, on leaflets etc.), production of students
exposed in the spaces (texts, discourses, genres—student’s identities/commu-
nity/voice, controlled/not controlled), interaction with all participants in the
school context (dialogical verbal-visual interactions), all these schools’ exter-
nal and internal symbols/artifacts can be looked at from the perspective of
schools’ artifacts of dialogic relations, degrees of power and control and social
positioning of its participants (Tanzi Neto, 2016, 2017). Bernstein (2003
[1990], 2000 [1996]), starting from a sociological perspective, emphasizes
that, in the school space, power and control relations also regulate forms of
communication or open spaces for different forms of communication emerge,
thus giving rise to social positions and to different discursive artifacts.
In this light, if we consider the power of mediated discursive artifacts in a
school context and how directly they affect our identity, linguistic and socio-
cultural-historical constitutions, we shall reflect upon the importance of the
materialization/production of a school social space embedded of dialecti-
cal/dialogical relations “between the social and the individual, the external
and the internal, the person and the world, the mind and shared communal
practices” (Stetsenko, 2017, p. 2), and shall put forward the discussion of
which social school space of a group’s collective activity is necessary to provide
human development for the new societal challenge. According to Liberali,
in this book, the way schools should take responsibility for making effective
transformation of prejudicial contradictions is increasingly part of our realities
(Liberali, 2020).
Mediation on Neo-Vygotskian Terms
For Bakhtin, the architectonic form is the construction or structure that

unites and integrates the material, the form and the content. In his view, the
architectonic form always allows us to ask “who produced it, for whom [was
it produced] and under what circumstances” (Sobral, 2008, p. 13). Brait
and Pistori (2012) supplement this argument by saying that, for Bakhtin, the
text/statement should not be seen from its external, autonomous form alone,
but by its “concrete living conditions, interdependencies, relationships, val-
ues” (Brait & Pistori, 2012, p. 378), that is, from its architectonic form of
realization.
For Brait and Pistori (2012), Bakhtin in his book Problems of the Poetics
of Dostoevsky (2008), demonstrates the dialogical relation between the inter-
nal and the external for the composition of the genre, since the genre is not
limited only to “structures or texts, although it considers them as constitu-
ent dimensions It implies, essentially, dialogism and a way of understanding
and facing life” (Brait & Pistori, 2012, p. 375). In this context, for Bakhtin
(1986), statements are neither indifferent nor self-reliant; there is a mutual
exchange that is reflected between one and the other.
Every utterance must be regarded as primarily a response to preceding utter-
ances of the given sphere. Each utterance refutes, affirms, supplements, and
relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes
them into account. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91)
In this perspective, the main point of discussion for genre must starts
from the discussion postulated by Bakhtin between compositional form and
architectonic form, since
[…] the unity of the text is not given exclusively by its apparently autono-
mous external form, but by its plan, that is, by its concrete conditions of life.
This plan (Bakhtin) calls it an architectonic form, an aspect that has to be
seen, in terms of the whole proposal of Bakhtinian thought, in relation to
the other—the other for me—present in texts, discourses, genres. (Brait &
Pistori, 2012, p. 378)
This dialogical relationship of speech to one another and of the other to

me presented in the Bakhtinian work is what for Shotter (1993) is related to
Vygotsky’s concept of semiotic mediation. As Shotter (1993, p. 63) states,
[…] the expression of a thought or an intention, the saying of a sentence or
the doing of a deed, does not issue from already well-formed and orderly
cognitions at the center our being, but originates in a person’s vague, diffuse
and unordered feelings—their sense of how, semiotically, they are ‘positioned’
in relation to the others around them. (Shotter, 1993, p. 63)
In Bakhtin’s perspective (2003 [1979], p. 261), language materializes

through utterances stated by members of different fields of activity and each
field of language use elaborates its relatively stable types of utterances, called
genres of discourse. For a better understanding, one can state that language
practices are determined by the communicative situation, that is, by the fields
of human activities, which also include the time, the historical place and the
social relations among participants. Thus, the genre of discourse is marked by
three basic characteristics, as they are known: content (thematic), the style of
language and its compositional construction.
However, the architectonic form is situated between the situation of com-
munication and the genre of discourse. To better understand this dynamics,
let us imagine a school that, with its architectonic form of realization, allows
a specific organization of student (rows only, semicircle, circle), desk designs
(individual, for two, for groups), social space structures (furniture organiza-
tion, walls, gates, padlocks, supervised, not supervised, hierarchical relations’
of use), blackboard (for the teacher only, for the teacher and students to
work), exhibitors (students’ messages, community messages, school adminis-
tration messages only, principal/head’s message, monitored/not monitored
by the teacher/head/administration), etc., and which provides certain modes
of interaction from one-to-many, many-to-many, centered on the teacher/
head/principal/students. This particular/architectonic composition allows
certain genres to fit in it while others not.
Bernstein seeks, from the perspective of the distribution of power and
control, to understand how dominant and dominated forms of communi-
cation are generated, distributed, reproduced and legitimized, as the differ-
ent principles of communication regulate relations between and within social
groups, how these principles of communication produce and distribute forms
of pedagogical awareness (Bernstein, 2000 [1996]). By bearing this in mind,
if we consider the issues of social transformation as our young people are
increasingly embedded in different social contexts, I wonder how much they
transform/reconfigure these architectonic social spaces for social change or
only replicate voices, discourses, pre-established repertoires, shaped by socio-
historical-cultural contexts, already defined by the structures of class, ethnic-
ity, culture, race, etc. In Stetsenko’s words (2017), how can we understand
our agentive role in choosing “our way” but at the same time understanding
the constitution of our being and the existence of forces and social structures
that go beyond ourselves? (Stetsenko, 2017).
Blommaert (2015) also contributes, affirming that the language is ideo-
logically loaded with semiotic characteristics; its implicit values of identity
and power are called “culture”, but to understand a context, we need to look
at the interactions of social life in its historicity, seeking local interpretations
based on a translocal vision, that is, historically configured, attributed genre,
manipulation, position and identity (Blommaert, 2015). In this sense, a situ-
ated activity, such as classroom speech or social school space discourses, not
only contributes to learning, but also to the inclusion of its participants in a
given social class. For Silverstein (1985) and Blommaert (2015), interactions,
or a semiotic event, are an unstable exchange of forms of signs, mediated by
an ideological culture of contextualized situations of human interest.
To Bernstein (2000 [1996]) on the relations of power and control, school
contexts can be translated to forms of communication by its interlocutors. In
this sense, such forms of communication transmit codes through which sub-
jects are differently positioned, that is, participants in the communication
situation, and due to their power and control relations, can, for example,
configure the architectonic form (relationships between agents, hierarchical
rules). Once that relations of power and control in discursive artifacts can also
alter genres that materialize from its participants.
I believe that by looking at their interdependencies, their dialogical and
axiological positions in the architectonic form, we can enlarge this view on
how the architectonic form “governs the construction of the verbal or ver-
bal-visual mass” (Brait & Pistori, 2012, p. 390). In order to broaden this
position, I expand, from the contributions of Vygotsky (1978, 1981, 1987,
1991, 2008), to understand how different forms of mediation or different
codes (Bernstein, 2003 [1990], 2000 [1996]) can lead to different forms
of utterances, since, in Vološinov’s (1973, p. 86) idea, a specific “situation
shapes the utterance, dictating that it sound one way and not another”.
From this thought, I argue that a school social space is produced through
a sociocultural-historical structure of psychological reality, as I have already
pointed out, of language discourse (implicit and explicit) of mediating arti-
facts for the materialization of practices that realize it, materialize it, make it
real and concrete to learners’ internal discourse and formation of their con-
sciousness. In this sense, a social space imposes a temporal and spatial order
on the operations, produces an organization of social positioning of inher-
ent, implicit, explicit resources generating internal (formative) discourses for
those involved.
On this take, our greatest challenge when attempting to understand a
social school space is with what tools or lens should we evaluate/understand
a specific school context for proposing social subjects’ transformative actions.
For Wells and Claxton (2002) uncertainties brought about by globalization,
and the search for answers to an education that addresses the needs of stu-
dents for 21st century society has led people, to more radical views of educa-
tional spaces.
Even though, we may know that simply designing new fancy spaces/fur-
niture is not changing traditionalists or knowledge transmission schools arti-
facts into better spaces for learning. Unfortunately, much of the discussion
revolves around the school curriculum structure, the physical structure, the
teaching-learning theories, the organization of the disciplines, the different
uses of digital technologies and little around the creation of different social
spaces, rethinking visual, physical and verbal artifacts, for human develop-
ment/agency to cater youth’s needs, either for transformation of oppressive
realities for social justice (Liberali, 2020) or as an agentive action in disrup-
tion of pre-established discourses/patterns of their realities.
Thus, I present a summary of what I have discussed so far, bearing in
mind Bernstein, Vygotsky and Bakhtin’s persepectives. This tool, that I have
been using in my research (Tanzi Neto, 2016, 2017) to better understand
the social spaces of schools, summarizes part of the theorecial reflections of
this chapter (see Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: School Social Architectonic of situated practices

(Tanzi Neto, 2016, p. 94)
I consider, that a school social space is constructed or produced from a

tenuous relation between implicit and explicit mediations (hence the represen-
tation of overlapping circles), although we know that these relations change,
depending on the intention of the use more reflective or not (Gillespie &
Zittoun, 2010); I can still point out that the production of a school social
space occurs through pedagogical practices and verbal-visual statements that
generate more explicit discourses for those involved, and of semiotic acts and
cultural artifacts in more implicit ways, but also are generators of discourses,
intentions, semiotic mediations, social positions that alter, create, and pro-
duce a specific school social context.
This large verbal-visual mass (Brait & Pistori, 2012), which can be ana-
lyzed by the tools of power and control of the sociologist Basil Bernstein,
together with the discussion of Vygotsky’s uses of tools and signs (1978),
the unfolding of cultural artifacts of Cole (1998) and also of the implicit and
explicit mediations of Wertsch (2007) and Gillespie and Zittoun (2010)—that
leads us to understand that a school social space is constituted of an accom-
plishment architectonic rooted in a culture (values of identity and power and
control) of social mediating artifacts (visual, physical and verbal), manifested
in exchanges and intentions within a specific school context of speech, dis-
courses, physical spaces that may to a greater or lesser extent provide different
interactions, semiosis, consciousness, of internalizations that shape or alter
our inner discourse, that is, our consciousness.
In Brazil, researchers such as Anísio Teixeira, Mario de Andrade, Paulo
Freire, Darcy Ribeiro and Mayumi Souza Lima, have long pointed out the
need to discuss social learning spaces (Faria, 2012). However, few studies can
be found that extrapolate the question of architecture (physical space) to the
question of an architectonic (social space). The area of studies of education
and language, for example, still lacks research on the subject of space prac-
tices, representations of spaces and representational spaces, as discussed by
Lefebvre (1991), for the understanding of social space. Unfortunately, most
countries are still attached to secular legislations, resulting in the production
of school spaces
which silent pedagogy, inscribed in its walls, teaches to us the discipline, the
segregation and the control. And, precisely because of this, they do not wel-
come or promote autonomy and creativity, they do not allow the practice and
development of the multiple languages, curiosity, unforeseenness and free-
dom of those who attend school. (Faria, 2012, p. 101)
On this perspective, there is an ideal to go beyond the discussion of the

physical field alone, expanding the discussion for deeper reflections in the field
of social relations and their mediated interrelations with the physical, mental
and social, in a field of activities human beings. Faria (2012) points to the fact
that the school institution, that underwent major transformations of pedagog-
ical proposals, curricular contents, ways of teaching-learning, has not looked
into their social spaces that remained unchanged and rooted in the its essence
and the concept, as for Faria (2012) of “taming bodies, modeling subjectiv-
ities, homogenizing behaviors, fragmenting perception and controlling pro-
duction” (Faria, 2012, p. 103). As in the discussion of this chapter a school
social space that impacts directly on the agentive and transformative roles of its
subjects on how to understand the world, act upon it, and change it.
Final Considerations
I have attempted to reflect upon how social spaces within schools are replete
with mediating artifacts, implicit and explicit symbols, pedagogical discursive
practices and orientations, verbal-visual productions that direct and influence
the mind and behavior of all their participants. In this sense, I must point
out the importance of rethinking school social spaces, since the forms and
habits that surround school learners guide them, instruct them, shape them.
And if we really want these young people to be future transformative agents
(Engeström, Sannino, & Virkkunen, 2014; Stetsenko, 2017) of our society,
an instinct of extrapolation must be sought to offer a social space of verb-visu-
ality that privileges voices, multifaceted identities, social positions and diverse
contexts: external/internal (communities). To offer different mediating arti-
facts materialized for subjects in their human historical development of rec-
ognition of their situationality, respecting culture, ethnicity, creed, proposing
a critical reflexive verbal-visual mass, of ethical, political and cultural empow-
erment, essential characteristics of the future transforming agents of a society
in need of social justice and equality.
Notes
1. See Werstsch, 2007; Kozulin, 2002; Kinnucan and Kuebli, 2002; Gillespie and
Zittoun, 2010; Diaz et al., 1990.
2. This notion will be expanded.
3. Based on Cole (1998), as mediating artifacts, since I focus explicitly on the
materiality of language, in its verbal-visual mass constituted in an “architectonic
totality”.
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7. Vygotsky, Signs and Language:
Critical Observations
PETER E. JONES
Introduction
In this chapter, I make a case for a critical view of Vygotsky’s legacy in keep-
ing with the general aim of this volume to promote serious reflection on
Vygotsky’s theory in the light of contemporary social and educational chal-
lenges. I should stress that I do not mean to belittle Vygotsky’s achievements
or to diminish his historical significance as a pioneer in the development of
what is commonly considered to be a social theory of mind. My starting
point, rather, is that key principles of Vygotsky’s psychology are problematic
in today’s light in so far as they depend on perspectives on language in partic-
ular, and communication more generally, that can no longer be entertained
in part or in full. To properly explain and defend this position is no small task,
and certainly one which is beyond the bounds of the present contribution.
My limited purpose here is to sketch out, in rather stark lines, part of the case
I am making in advance of a fuller treatment of the issues (Jones, in prepara-
tion) and to consider some of the implications of such a critical reappraisal.
Of particular concern here are the ways in which our interpretations of
Vygotsky’s key concepts may inform our understanding of, and indeed our
practices of, social change and transformation. Vygotsky has long been consid-
ered an original thinker and contributor within the Marxist tradition and his
work has not only profoundly influenced scholarly expectations and percep-
tions of ‘Marxist psychology’ but has also, in turn, helped to shape and fore-
ground particular readings of Marxism itself. Recently, however, Vygotsky’s
relationship to Marx and the Marxist tradition has become the explicit focus
of debate and controversy. Elsewhere, for example (Jones, 2016b, 2019),
I have argued that the linguistic and communicational infrastructure of
148 PETER E. JONES
Vygotsky’s psychological theory puts him, in certain key respects, at odds

with Marx. Other scholars, notably Sawyer and Stetsenko (2018) and Ratner
and Silva (2017), have mounted strong and cogent defences of Vygotsky’s
theoretical principles and his continuing significance and relevance within the
Marxist tradition. In short, the perspective we take on Vygotsky’s key theo-
retical advances is full of significance for our wider view of what kind of world
we want to see and, no less important, how we might achieve it.
Vygotsky’s Psychology ‘from the Language End’
In his recent paper on the critical reception of Vygotsky’s work, Dafermos

(2016) chooses to focus on ‘three widespread theoretical frameworks of inter-
pretation of Vygotsky’s theory: cognitivism, culturalism, cultural historical
activity theory’ (2016, p. 28). Dafermos also gives thoughtful consideration
to the ‘challenges connected with the “archival revolution” in Vygotskian
studies’ (see Yasnitsky, 2010; Zavershneva, 2010) which he argues, quite cor-
rectly, ‘highlight the need for a reconsideration and deeper investigation of
Vygotsky’s theory’.
However, an additional perspective is urgently needed, namely a frame-
work of interpretation which focusses specifically on a critical examination of
the linguistic and communicational concepts and assumptions in Vygotsky’s
work. This is certainly necessary, in part, to enable a fuller historical contex-
tualisation and understanding of Vygotsky’s work. But it is also necessary,
no less importantly, in order to engage critically with his work—to assess its
plausibility—in the light of advances in the understanding of language and
communication represented within particular currents of thought in the con-
temporary language sciences. It is this latter dimension of critical evaluation
which is also missing, I believe, from current contributions to the ‘archival
revolution’.
Why the need to approach Vygotsky’s psychology from the language end
specifically? Firstly, because no psychological theory is more explicitly depen-
dent on ideas about language and communication than Vygotsky’s. This is
a theory built around particular conceptions of speech, writing, word, word
meaning, sense, sign, signification, the pointing gesture, and the command, to
name the most obvious and important linguistic and communicational con-
structs in Vygotsky’s work. Secondly, because language (indeed, communi-
cation generally) has been relatively neglected as a focus of critical attention
Vygotsky, Signs and Language 149
in its own right within Vygotskian studies: ‘language is the weakest link in
the chain of cultural-historical argument’ (Jones, 2007, p. 57; and see Jones,
2016b). A preliminary review of the eclectic appeal to incompatible linguis-
tic and semiotic principles current in Cultural-historical and Activity Theory
(CHAT) research led me to argue that CHAT ‘has failed thus far to develop a
conception of language which is equal to and in harmony with its distinctive
and radical theoretical premises, principles, and methodology’ (2007, p. 57).
Very broadly speaking, treatments or applications of Vygotsky’s psychologi-
cal principles often take for granted and adopt whatever conceptual apparatus
or terminological distinctions Vygotsky was using (or implying) at particu-
lar stages in the evolution of his thinking, whether the sign as ‘psychological
tool’, ‘egocentric speech’, ‘meaning versus sense’ etc., without critical scru-
tiny of the intellectual roots of these notions, their ideological baggage, their
mutual compatibility given the development of Vygotsky’s views, and their
communicational plausibility from today’s standpoint.
Just as Vygotsky’s own views developed, often radically, in order to absorb
the influence of contemporaneously emerging trends in linguistic thinking, so
we must now review the linguistic and communicational underpinnings of his
own theorising from the standpoint of those subsequent and currently emerg-
ing fields of research in language and communication which are compatible
with his fundamental aims.1 In that light, I should emphasise the contribution
of a number of leading scholars within the broad CHAT field, to this criti-
cal rethinking (in particular, Stetsenko, 2005,2 2016; Arievich & Stetsenko,
2014; Sawyer & Stetsenko, 2018) although I have no opportunity to address
these important contributions here.
In Vygotsky’s new approach to human psychology, human mental pro-
cesses are neither determined by our biology nor the expression of some oth-
er-worldly ‘spiritual’ powers. Our mental faculties, rather, are created by us:
they are a purely human accomplishment, forged in a historical process of
collective self-development. More specifically, these powers are formed in the
relationship between people and the instruments beyond their bodies which
they have fashioned and incorporated into their vital activities. Human mental
functioning, then, included these extra-bodily instruments—tools of all kinds
(including linguistic and communicational tools)—whose forms and func-
tions were themselves subject to historical change and re-design in human
practice. Such tools, both the product and the vehicle of historically develop-
ing culture, now became a proper part of the study of the human mind itself
and its development in social and individual history. This was Vygotsky’s orig-
inal vision and the heart of his contribution as a psychologist. And if we zoom
150 PETER E. JONES
out from the detail, with the longer perspective that our historical distance
allows, we see a powerful programme of intellectual innovation that amplified
and contributed to the earth-shattering power of the Russian Revolution of
1917 and which might arguably be considered revolutionary in its own right.
But if we zoom in, up close, we see that the principles according to which this
programme was articulated are problematic, to say the least. From amongst
all the varied instruments of historical human action Vygotsky singled out the
role of symbols or signs, primarily linguistic signs—which he dubbed ‘psycho-
logical tools’—for their special significance in the development of distinctively
human thought and action. And it is the perspectives on signs and sign-mak-
ing which Vygotsky borrowed and/or developed to support his psychologi-
cal theorising which are beset with difficulties and, arguably, work against the
grain of an approach to language, action and the mind from the perspective
of historically developing social practice. In that light, I think we must agree
with Zavershneva (2010, p. 84):
Just as Vygotsky sought to problematize psychology at the time and find its
weaknesses and growth areas, we must find them in his own theory. In this
respect polemics with Vygotsky can be no less valuable than literal adherence
to his texts.
For my purposes here, I will concentrate fire on two conceptions of the

sign which explicitly and implicitly underpin fundamental concepts and prin-
ciples of Vygotsky’s psychology at particular periods in the evolution of his
thinking. These two conceptions I will refer to as:
1. The causal-mechanical sign: a sign which acts, by virtue of its physi-

cality, as a ‘stimulus’ causing a ‘response’ or ‘reaction’ as in Pavlov’s
‘reflex’ theory or Western behaviourism.
2. The abstract-scholastic sign: a verbal sign (a word) considered from the

standpoint of its ‘meaning’ or semantic ‘content’ where this content
is seen in terms of a representational relation to ‘reality’ on a scale of
increasing generalizing power leading towards a ‘true concept’.
While these two theoretical conceptions of the sign as a communica-

tional phenomenon are not only equally impoverished but also fundamen-
tally incompatible, they are combined in Vygotsky’s conception of mediation,
planned action and internalization.
Mediation, Internalization and the Causal-mechanical Sign
Vygotsky’s concept of mediation is constructed around a particular view of

the sign deriving initially from the reflexological notion of signal elaborated
and deployed by Pavlov (1927/1962) in his theory of the conditioned reflex.
By this means, Vygotsky attempted to re-orient psychological theory towards
a distinctively human psychology via the semiological principles of reflexol-
ogy, which he, along with so many other Soviet scholars and political leaders
at the time, took to be more or less axiomatic (Joravsky, 1989).
The reflex model was one half (the mechanistic half, as it were) of the leg-
acy of René Descartes’ 17th century dualistic conception of human action
and thinking (Yaroshevsky, 1985; Jones, 2016b), namely that half which
offered a purely mechanical interpretation of animal behaviour. In attempting
to extend reflex principles to the whole of human behaviour, in the materi-
alistic, atheistic and Darwinian atmosphere of the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, researchers (including Vygotsky) uncritically assumed that this reflex
model accurately captured what human behaviour had in common with ani-
mal behaviour and that any theory of distinctively human psychology must,
therefore, begin to build on this common ground.
The reflex model, in brief, considered animal behaviour generally as (a)
merely reactive, responsive, that is, caused by particular physical cues or trig-
gers external to the organism (Pavlov’s ‘signals’) and (b) progressing automat-
ically without deliberate or conscious initiation or intelligent interpretation.
The problem Vygotsky faced was how to get human behaviour that was con-
scious, deliberate, voluntary and active from this purely automatic and reactive
psychological ground. This reactive-active dichotomy—in effect a reformu-
lation of dualistic principles—was one of the key formative considerations
in the whole complex of distinctions (‘natural’ versus ‘cultural’, ‘lower’ ver-
sus ‘higher’ psychological functions, etc.) which are fundamental to the for-
mulation and subsequent evolution of the whole architecture of Vygotskian
psychology. Vygotsky’s solution to the problem was his novel conception
of mediation. In this, Vygotsky retained the communicational model that
reflexology offered, i.e., the Pavlovian signal with its mechanical causal power
along with the attendant reactivity of psychological processes. But he added
a further layer of psychological operation: he proposed that it was the cre-
ation of signals and their deliberate disposal within relevant tracks of reac-
tive behaviour which allowed control and pre-planned direction of such
behavioural reactions. Signals created and deployed in this way were ‘signs’
152 PETER E. JONES
and their operation referred to as ‘signification’ in contrast with Pavlovian sig-

nalization. As his succinct definition puts it: ‘We call artificial stimuli-devices
introduced by man into a psychological situation where they fulfill the func-
tion of autostimulation “signs”’ (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 54).
Signification, then, involves sign-based self-stimulation (‘autostimula-
tion’): bringing the ‘natural’ psychological processes under the conscious con-
trol of the reacting person by means of the artificially created (and disposed)
sign-stimulus. In other words, mediation is defined in relation to the stimu-
lus-reaction mechanism; it is the connection between stimulus and reaction
which is mediated (by the sign as artificial stimulus). In that sense, Vygotsky’s
theory was, and remained, reflexological to its ‘foundation’.
However, the novelty of Vygotsky’s two-layered sign was that it appeared
to offer a way of getting society and social history into the psychological pic-
ture. It was precisely this sociohistorical dimension that reflexology (at least
initially) lacked but which was fundamental to the creation of a ‘Marxist psy-
chology’. Missing in Pavlov’s naturalistic account was the power of society to
make individual behaviour conform to the social norms embodied in the sys-
tem of cultural signs or language. As Vygotsky put it:
social life creates the necessity of subordinating the behaviour of the individ-
ual to social requirements and with this creates complex signalizing systems—
means of connection directing and regulating the formation of conditional
connections in the brain of each separate person … These means of psycho-
logical connection are in their nature and function signs, that is artificially
created stimuli whose purpose lies in influencing behaviour. (Vygotsky, in
Leont’ev, 1967, p. 79)
Reflexology, then, was not simply a part of a model of psychological or

physiological functioning but also appeared to offer the all-important ‘mate-
rialist’ hook up between individual psychology and sociology.
Is it necessary in this day and age to spell out why the conception of
the causal-mechanical sign, or a behaviourist view of linguistic communica-
tion, is not going to help us in understanding human thinking, talking and
action? For the record, let us briefly make a couple of salient remarks. Firstly,
talk-in-interaction simply does not work on causal principles. The interpreta-
tive, empathetic methods and practices by which people (including children)
design and construct their contributions to everyday conversational interac-
tions—their powers of communicational ‘responsiveness’ in that sense—are
not amenable to reflexological (or behaviourist) accounting (Wootton, 2006);
the utterances and other signs through which people manage their activities
and social relationships are creatively and intelligently ‘fitted’ to their contri-
bution to and understanding of specific interactional purposes. Furthermore,
while signs are always created in the course of purposeful action, the nature
and provenance of the ‘material’ of the sign, so to speak, is not a defining cri-
terion for something being a sign (‘signhood’) as such. We haven’t created
the stars that we navigate by but we do create their signifying status or role
with respect to our navigational activity:
Signhood is conferred on a sign—on what thereby becomes a sign—if and
when human beings (or other semiotically competent creatures) attach a sig-
nification to it that goes beyond its intrinsic physical properties, whether in
furtherance of a particular programme of activities, or to link different aspects
or phases of their activities, to enrich their understanding of their local cir-
cumstances or general situation. (Love, 2004, p. 531)
Finally, one might add that the second layer of Vygotsky’s hybrid con-
ception of ‘signification’, namely the assumed ability or capacity to create
(and arrange) signs to initiate or control pre-planned courses of action was
itself never explicated by Vygotsky. And clearly, this is not a capacity that can
be explained in reflex terms since it depends generally on powers of imagi-
nation and interpretation and, more specifically, on the power to handle and
reconcile the ethical and interpersonal exigencies and subtleties of particular
situations and relationships—powers which Vygotsky had excised from the
‘natural’ psychological functions which the child was supposedly endowed
with. But if we grant such far-reaching powers to human subjects—including
the power to create ‘artificial stimuli-devices’—then the reflex model cannot
provide a theoretical foundation for the account and becomes quite beside
the point.
In a nutshell, then, the problem with the causal-mechanical sign is that it
is rooted in a conception of behaviour (or action) as reactive or responsive in
the reflexological sense, rather than as active and responsive in ways that are
characteristic of human social interaction.
Internalization: The Command and ‘Self-regulation’
We have seen that, at a particular stage in his theoretical evolution, Vygotsky

found the key to understanding human psychological functioning in a concep-
tion of signification built around the idea that ‘lower’ psychological functions
154 PETER E. JONES
could be controlled by and subordinated to the use of signs with ‘auto-stimu-

latory’ properties. If, by hypothesis, this principle itself was the psychological
ground of socially organized human activity (interpersonal regulation), then
it was also the psychological basis of the independent, voluntary and con-
scious behaviour of the individual human subject via a process of internaliza-
tion of the social signification process. Closely following the arguments and
theorising of Pierre Janet (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1988), Vygotsky consid-
ered the verbal command to be the primary communicative means of social or
interpersonal regulation:
According to Janet, the word was initially a command for others … According
to Janet, the word is always a command and consequently it is the basic
means of controlling behaviour. (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 103)
Janet’s view was that ‘the power of the word over mental functions is
based on the real power of the superior over the subordinate’ (Vygotsky,
1997, p. 104). Vygotsky converted this entirely speculative view of the ori-
gins of human sociality into a story of child development by proposing that
the verbalized form of the boss-subordinate relationship (i.e., the command)
was to become the means of individual self-control and voluntary action:
‘Regulating another’s behavior by means of the word leads gradually to the
development of verbalized behavior of the individual himself’ (Vygotsky,
1997, p. 104).
Particularly striking is that the source of the power of the verbal com-
mand to ‘regulate another’s behaviour’ goes entirely unquestioned by Janet,
Vygotsky and Luria and, indeed, has not generally been scrutinised in subse-
quent CHAT research (Jones, 2009, but see also Sawyer & Stetsenko, 2018),
the implication being that a verbal command somehow automatically pro-
vokes or causes compliant behaviour). In this way, by these assumptions,
the ‘causal-mechanical sign’ colonizes the domain of consensual communi-
cational interaction. The complex interactional practices and relationships
between the parties involved in situated acts of commanding and compliance
(or non-compliance) are thereby more or less reduced to the status of auto-
matic responses. Furthermore, no other communicational actions involved
in spoken discourse (such as ‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘request’, ‘assertion’, to
name but a few obvious candidates) are considered in any depth or detail in
Vygotsky’s work. In effect, then, this view of a specifically linguistic function
of ‘commanding’ is the key point of intersection between the ‘regulation’ and
organisation of behaviour at the society level and the ‘self-regulated’ volun-
tary behaviour of the individual.
The picture of speech internalization (or ‘differentiation’; see Vygotsky,

1987, Chapter 7) presented in Thinking and Speech, puts more detailed lin-
guistic flesh on the role of language in this view of self-regulation (see Jones,
2009, 2011 for a critical account and an alternative perspective; see Sawyer
& Stetsenko, 2018, for a counter). Vygotsky argued that the child’s ver-
bal thinking activity, primarily and initially developed in linguistic interac-
tion with others (‘social speech’), is progressively ‘turned inward’ as a means
of ‘self-regulation’ and cognitive self-guidance. Ultimately, the child is capa-
ble of independent communicative self-direction in ‘inner speech’, a form of
verbal thinking taking place silently ‘in the head’. However, this process of
‘inwardization’ passes through a transitional phase in the form of a kind of
speech activity Vygotsky refers to (following Piaget) as ‘egocentric speech’
(or ‘private speech’ as it is now more commonly known). ‘Egocentric speech’
utterances are said out loud when in company but are apparently addressed
to no-one, as in Vygotsky’s example (1987, p. 70):
‘Where is the pencil? I need a blue pencil now. Nothing. Instead of that I will
color it red and put water on it—that will make it darker and more like blue’.
The child conducted this entire discourse with himself.
The interesting research question surrounding such instances of talk was:

why would children say things out loud if their utterances neither initiate
a conversation nor are responsive contributions to a conversation already
in progress? Vygotsky argued that such utterances mark the beginning of
the functional shift from ‘social speech’ to ‘inner speech’ as they express the
child’s task-related verbal thinking activity in a form which still reflects the
social origins and functions of social speech:
egocentric speech develops in a social process that involves the transmission
of social forms of behavior to the child. Egocentric speech develops through
a movement of social forms of collaboration into the sphere of individual
mental functions. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 54)
Furthermore, egocentric speech of this kind has a vital role to play in the
child’s cognitive self-regulation:
it guides and directs the child’s action from the outset, subordinating it to inten-
tion and plan and raising it to the level of a unique form of activity. (Vygotsky,
1987, p. 71, my emphasis)3
156 PETER E. JONES
As the ‘self-regulative’ function of ‘egocentric speech’ develops, ‘egocen-

tric’ utterances undergo systematic changes in structural-semantic properties,
in particular acquiring an elliptical quality Vygotsky referred to as ‘predicativ-
ity’. By following the line of travel from ‘social speech’ to ‘egocentric speech’
one can, Vygotsky argued, extrapolate the further stages of that ‘inwardiza-
tion’ process and thereby arrive at a characterization of the peculiar proper-
ties that ‘inner speech’ must have as a purely private and self-directed form of
verbal thinking.
In Jones (2009), I argued that this theory of speech ‘internalization’ was
vulnerable to a number of potent challenges. Firstly, we must bear in mind
the theoretical motivation for the ‘internalization’ approach in the context
of key Vygotskian assumptions about the role of language—most specifically
‘the command’—that we have examined above. Vygotsky assumed (following
Janet) that the alleged ‘self-regulating’ function of utterances was due to the
self-application by the child of the interpersonally functioning verbal com-
mand. I tried to show that this assumption is communicationally implausible
and offered an alternative perspective on self-communication grounded in the
‘integrationist’ approach of Roy Harris (Harris, 1996).4
Secondly, from a narrow linguistic point of view, there were insupera-
ble problems in trying to take the brief utterances of ‘egocentric speech’ as
abbreviated in the sense of deriving in some way (either developmentally or in
real time) from hypothetical complete or more complete sentence structures.
Indeed, as argued initially by Wittgenstein (1968; and see Jones, 2009) and
then Harris (1981) it was more plausible to consider the abbreviation posi-
tion as reflecting the prejudices of the western grammatical tradition with its
‘written language bias’ (Linell, 2005) than as an empirically based account of
contextualized language use in either children or adults.
A third critical issue is Vygotsky’s problematic assumption that planned
and conscious activity requires prior formulation in words which have an
abstract semantic content—the so-called ‘planning function of speech’
(Levina, 1981).5 However, this understanding of planning, and the role of
language more generally in cognition, manages to combine both problematic
conceptions of the sign: the causal-mechanical sign (as a means of ‘self-regu-
lation’) and the abstract-scholastic sign as a vehicle of ‘abstract thought’ (to
be explored below).
A different critical angle on Vygotsky’s view of egocentric speech is pro-
vided by Erving Goffman in his paper ‘Response cries’ (Goffman, 1978;
1981).6 The scope of Goffman’s sociological enquiries was extensive but his
most important and enduring contribution perhaps was the identification of
the ‘interaction order’—roughly, face to face interaction—as a topic worthy

of study. In appealing to aspects of the social situation in his account of the
child’s use of ‘egocentric speech’, Vygotsky therefore makes a pioneering
move in opening up the territory of the ‘interaction order’ which Goffman
would later make his own (e.g., Goffman, 1961).
Goffman looks in detail at how we behave when in the company of others
and shows the mutual awareness and attention that individuals, even in what
he calls ‘unfocussed gatherings’, demonstrate towards one another as they go
about their business:
We owe, to any social situation in which we find ourselves, evidence that we
are reasonably alive to what is already in it—and furthermore to what may
arise, whether on schedule or unexpectedly. (Goffman, 1978, p. 191)
Goffman applies these insights directly to the phenomena discussed by

Vygotsky and Piaget. He starts with the claim that:
Utterances … do not stand by themselves—indeed, they often make no sense

when so heard—but are constructed and timed to support the close social
collaboration of speech turn-taking. (Goffman, 1978, p. 787)
In that light, he ‘considers some roguish utterances that appear to violate

this interdependence, entering the stream of behavior at peculiar and unnat-
ural places, producing communicative effects but no dialog’ (1978, p. 787).
His focus is on the ‘blurted vocalization—semi-word response cries, impreca-
tions, and self-talk’. Referring directly to the treatments of self-talk proposed
by Vygotsky and Piaget, Goffman rejects both developmental accounts and
argues that self-talk (in both children and adults) is constructed situation-
ally (not ontogenetically), i.e., under quite specific interactional conditions
and with quite specific interactional functions. He argues that the apparently
self-directed utterances of ‘egocentric speech’ are not occasioned by cognitive
difficulties or task-planning requirements on the part of the speaking subject;
in other words, they are not the expression of (or ‘externalization’ of) a ‘ver-
bal thinking’ process necessary to purposeful action. Rather, self-talk of the
relevant kind has a socio-communicative purpose, namely it helps to contex-
tualize, for others co-present, our current behaviours, most strikingly when we
need to make what might seem to others to be abrupt or possibly unpredict-
able changes to our current line of action. Egocentric utterances, then, are
not self-directed means of cognitive self-regulation guiding us in our actions,
rather they are fitted to the interactional circumstances of the ‘unfocused
158 PETER E. JONES
gathering’, designed for the people who are co-present as a guide for them
as to what we are about, rendering our behaviour intelligible in their eyes
(to the extent that they are interested) as well as offering them the chance to
engage with us in response. The crucial point, then, is that such instances of
self-talk are not direct expressions of, or windows onto, the individual’s cog-
nitive operations or emotional states; they do not present the child’s thinking
and reflection in overt form, but are ways in which children construct a piece
of communicational conduct from which they expect co-present others will
be able to infer ‘a presumed inner state’, i.e., a particular intention or atti-
tude on the child’s part, or gain a reassuring due acknowledgement from the
child that he or she is aware of things not going to plan. In Goffman’s terms
(see, particularly, Goffman, 1975), such verbal ‘accountings’ are fabrications
or, to use Goffman’s favoured dramaturgical discourse, dramatizations staged
for others.
Thus, while Goffman applauds Vygotsky’s pioneering appeal to social fac-
tors in his treatment of the appearance and functions of egocentric speech,
Goffman takes from Vygotsky’s study a quite different interpretation:
The implication [i.e. Vygotsky’s] is that self-talk serves a self-guidance func-
tion, and will be most evident, presumably, when the child senses that task
performance is problematic. Given that Vygotsky’s early work required an
adult observer to be within listening distance, one could go on to suggest an
additional interpretation, namely that for children the contingencies are so
great in undertaking any task, and the likelihood so strong that they will be
entirely discounted as reasonably intentioned persons if they fail (or indeed
that they will be seen as just idling or fooling around anyway), that some
voicing of what they are about is something they are always prepared to
offer. An adult attempting to learn to skate might be equally self-talkative.
(Vygotsky, 1981, pp. 95–96)
Let’s look again at Vygotsky’s example of ‘egocentric speech’ from

Goffman’s perspective. Such ‘roguish utterances’ help to contextualize for
the observer the current actions and changes in the child’s behaviour in rela-
tion to the lines of action that this behaviour might have been taken to be
projecting. Far from revealing the child’s cognitive workings these utterances
provide a display by which others’ assessments of and inferences about those
workings can be manipulated or guided. Therefore, Vygotsky’s discussion of
examples of ‘egocentric speech’ do not disclose evidence of a verbal thinking
process heading inwards, but confirm the child’s success in making Vygotsky
himself think that he’s looking at a (functionally) ‘inner’ process: the child is
laying down displays, interpretative crumbs from which a putative ‘inner pro-
cess’ may be inferred and Vygotsky is picking these up and taking them at
face value.
While Vygotsky paints a picture of children as old as 6 or 7 still engaged
in the process of talking out loud as a necessary cognitive means of support
(with inner speech still some way away), Goffman implies a picture of even the
very young child as able to design contextually relevant and appropriate utter-
ances with a sense of how others will interpret and assess his or her behaviour
in context. In any case, it is surely clear from the descriptions (and transcribed
protocols) of child self-talkers in the work of both Vygotsky and Piaget that
their self-talk is more than ample evidence of an already highly developed,
purposeful interactional intelligence (for more on this see Steinbach Kohler
and Thorne, 2011). Their ‘egocentric utterances’ do not signal a cognitive
need to provide a preliminary verbal formula to control and direct their own
actions but are the fruit of their practiced skills in intelligently and interac-
tively constructing their communicative activity as an integrated dimension
of their intelligible social conduct. Goffman’s perspective on self-talk, there-
fore, does not simply offer an alternative (or additional) way of looking at
Vygotsky’s ‘egocentric speech’ but offers an alternative to Vygotsky’s theory
of internalization and the psychological theory which underpins it.
Meaning and the ‘Abstract-scholastic Sign’
In later work, Vygotsky moved his attention from the causal-mechanical con-
trolling power of the sign’s outer ‘body’ to a different kind of controlling
power lodged in ‘word meaning’—the semantic content or ‘inner side’ of
the verbal sign.7 Vygotsky attempted to explain the meaning of words—and
the dynamic development of word meaning in children’s cognitive develop-
ment—in terms of a view of intellectual progress towards ‘concepts’. Such
conceptual development was an essential part of the process through which
‘lower’ psychological functions were transformed into increasingly ‘higher’
functions in childhood and adolescence. Thus, the ‘signification’ account,
based around the causal-mechanical sign, and the ‘word meaning’/‘concept’
account are two complementary sides of Vygotsky’s linguistically mediated
psychology, rather than rival principles. If the causal-mechanical sign gives
us a picture of people exploiting their own natural reactivity by specially cre-
ated external stimuli, then the abstract-scholastic sign assumes that particular
160 PETER E. JONES
types of verbal generalization free us from the direct push and pull of factual,
empirical situational givens in everyday activity and allow us to plan actions
according to universal or logical principles or laws. The conceptual abilities
of educated western adults, specifically the use of language in scientific dis-
course and syllogistic reasoning, are here the model. The treatment of word
meaning in terms of concepts was therefore a further attempt to capture the
active nature of human cognition and action on an assumed reactive psycho-
logical foundation.
Vygotsky’s thinking about conceptual development as a cultural accom-
plishment clearly drew some inspiration from a well-known passage in which
Marx had addressed the nature of scientific knowledge:
The essence of any scientific concept was defined in a profound manner by
Marx: ‘If the form in which a thing is manifested and its essence were in
direct correspondence, science would be unnecessary.’ (Vygotsky, 1987, p.
193)
However, it is less clear whether Marx’s views on the nature of science and
the history of scientific practice are fully compatible with the understanding
of concepts and conceptual development which Vygotsky goes on to elabo-
rate. It is particularly difficult to see how the critical dissection by Marx and
Engels of concrete examples of the development of scientific thinking and
practice would lend itself to being rendered as a theory of child psychology.
After all, the ‘childish’ conceptual systems of political economy that Marx
took to pieces were those developed by some of the intellectual giants of the
age. By contrast, instead of looking carefully at scientific endeavour as a spe-
cialised, socio-historically situated practice, Vygotsky, channelling French eth-
nologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl on the cognitive processes of ‘primitive people’,
begins by putting a very abstract view of the ‘scientific concept’ or ‘true con-
cept’ at the top end of a ladder of word meanings leading up from the ‘every-
day’, ‘spontaneous’ use of words which all children (and adults) engage in in
daily life. The development of thinking from childhood to adolescence is thus
seen in terms of a schematized and idealized verbal-cognitive journey from
spontaneous concepts towards the ‘true concept’, epitomised by the scientific
concept, a journey which is organized and accelerated under the influence of
social science lessons, literacy practices and grammar instruction in the main-
stream school classroom. It is this conception of the word as a vehicle or focus
of an abstract conceptual generalization understood in representational terms
(as a ‘reflection of reality’) that I will refer to as the ‘abstract-scholastic sign’.8
Vygotsky’s distinction between spontaneous and ‘true’ or scientific con-

cepts is a distinction between kinds of verbal thinking dealing in empirical and
factual matters in everyday life situations on the one hand and conceptual or
logical connections on the other. Closely following Levy-Bruhl, he consid-
ered the spontaneous or everyday thinking of the child as a mark of what he
viewed as superficial or confused thinking, ‘thinking in complexes’ (or ‘syncre-
tism’), in his terms, as opposed to genuinely abstract and systematic concep-
tual thinking. He explains how thinking in complexes differs from conceptual
thinking: ‘The foundation of the complex lies in empirical connections that
emerge in the individual’s immediate experience’ (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 136).
And, further: ‘The most important characteristic of complexive thinking is
that it occurs on the plane of concrete-empirical thinking rather than on the
plane of abstract-logical thinking’ (1987, p. 136).
Vygotsky explains:
The concept is based on connections of a single, logically equivalent type. In
contrast, the complex is based on heterogeneous empirical connections that
frequently have nothing in common with one another. Stated somewhat dif-
ferently, objects are generalized by a single feature in the formation of the
concept but by multiple features in the formation of the complex. Therefore,
a single, essential, and uniform connection or relationship among objects is
reflected in the concept, while the connections are empirical, accidental, and
concrete in the complex. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 137)
It is this notion of ‘the concept’ that underlies the experimental work

in concept formation. In line with his general theoretical assumption that
children’s psychological development begins with ‘natural’ (‘lower’) psycho-
logical functions which are transformed into ‘cultural’ (‘higher’) psycholog-
ical functions through the power of verbal signs, Vygotsky takes the kinds of
everyday activity and types of reasoning that young (and older) children (and
adults) engage in as symptomatic of the exercise and influence of ‘lower’ psy-
chological functions, a psychological state he refers to as ‘child primitivism’
(Vygotsky, 1994) although it is also applied to ‘primitive man’. Let us take
an example:
A girl of nine years, quite normal, is primitive. She is asked, ‘in a certain
school some children can write well and some can draw well. Do all children
in this school write and draw well?’ She answers, ‘How do I know; what I
have not seen with my own eyes, I am unable to explain. If I had seen it with
my eyes.’ (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 58)
162 PETER E. JONES
Vygotsky, following closely the research conclusions of A Petrova’s

(1926) work ‘Child-primitives’, comments as follows:
The retardation in the development of logical reasoning and in the formation

of concepts is due here entirely to the fact that children have not sufficiently
mastered the language, the principal weapon of logical reasoning and the for-
mation of concepts. (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 58)
He goes on:
In our first example, the girl has changed her imperfect Tartar language for
the Russian, and has not fully mastered the use of words as means of reason-
ing. She displays her total inability to think in words, although she speaks,
i.e. can use the words as means of communication. She does not understand
how one can draw conclusions from words instead of relying on one’s own
eyes. (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 59)
And further:
Usually the two lines of psychological development (the natural and the cul-
tural) merge into each other in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish
them and follow the course of each of them separately. In case of sudden
retardation of anyone of these two lines, they become more or less obvi-
ously disconnected as, for example, in the case of different primitiveness.
(Vygotsky, 1994, p. 59)
Children may, then, be able to reason from experience, from their per-
sonal knowledge of the way things are, but true conceptual knowledge—
abstract and logical thinking—involves ‘drawing conclusions’ from words.
Apart from all the other criticisms we may want to level at Vygotsky’s argu-
ment, it is remarkable that Vygotsky has overlooked the quite obvious point
that the child is clearly able to articulate in words her so-called experience-based
reasoning principle: ‘what I have not seen with my own eyes, I am unable to
explain’. Whether we agree with the child’s principle or not (and many emi-
nent philosophers would be on her side in this debate), it is constructed as a
verbal argument, as a consequential contribution to a coherent conversational
interaction.
However, this alleged inability to play by the rules of the ‘abstract scho-
lastic sign’ is the leitmotiv of the research by both Vygotsky and Luria into
conceptual development in children and the socio-historical development
of thinking. Thus, in relation to the latter, Vygotsky and Luria (1993, p.
108) argue that the language of primitive man ‘turns out to be more meagre
in means, cruder, and less developed than the language of a cultural man’
(Vygotsky & Luria, 1993, 108). In particular:
The wealth of vocabulary is directly dependent on the concrete and precise

nature of primitive man’s language. In the same way that he photographs and
reproduces all his experience, he also recalls it, just as precisely. He does not
know how to express himself abstractly and conditionally, as the cultural man
does. (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993, p. 110)
In furtherance of Vygotsky’s psychological programme, Luria’s expedi-

tions to Central Asian Republics within the USSR at the beginning of the
1930s, while collectivization crashed and burned, brought confirmation that
the illiterate farming communities could not think as cultured, educated peo-
ple do (Luria, 1976). In making his case, Luria sets out his view of concepts
and abstraction:
In abstract or categorical classification, the normal subject forms a distinct
category by selecting objects corresponding to an abstract concept. This kind
of classification yields instances of abstract categories such as vessels, tools, ani-
mals, or plants in an appropriate group, no matter whether the particular
objects are ever encountered together. An ax, saw, shovel, quill, and a knit-
ting needle are all assigned to the category tools; a dog, elephant, polar bear,
giraffe, and mouse are similarly assigned to the category animals. (Luria,
1976, p. 48)
By contrast, he argues (Luria, 1976, p. 49) that there is a type of classifi-

cation which:
Goldstein and his colleague termed …concrete or situational thinking.

Subjects who gravitate toward this type of classification do not sort objects
into logical categories but incorporate them into graphic-functional situa-
tions drawn from life and reproduced from memory. These subjects group
together objects such as a table, a tablecloth, a plate, a knife, a fork, bread,
meat, and an apple, thereby reconstructing a ‘meal’ situation in which these
objects have some use … such an ability hinges on situational thinking, in
which objects are grouped not according to some general principle of logic
but for various idiosyncratic reasons.
Perhaps more clearly than elsewhere, we see here the paradox of a

would-be Marxist approach to psychology which denigrates practices of clas-
sification, calculation and judgement imbued with the wisdom of experience
in favour of ‘conceptual’ thinking in which objects are categorized ‘logically’
164 PETER E. JONES
independently of their real-life practical utility or connections. The method-

ology of this research as an approach to psychology was refuted most clearly
perhaps by Cole (1999). The flawed linguistics behind it was exposed most
recently by Harris (2009). In effect, Vygotsky and Luria had mistaken the cat-
egories of the western tradition of formal (genus-species) logical analysis, inti-
mately bound up with culture-centric assumptions about written language,
for universal stages of ‘cultural’ psychological development. As Cole notes:
Luria neither studied nor modelled in his experiments the practical activity
systems of the Uzbeki and Kazaki people and the psychological processes
associated with them; hence, his interpretations were not grounded in an
analysis of culturally organized activities. Instead, for purposes of psycho-
logical diagnosis he introduced distinctly Western European activity sys-
tems in the form of psychological tests and interviews, which did not model
local reality, but served instead as measurements of generalized psychologi-
cal tendencies for which there was a developmental interpretation in Western
European societies. (Cole, 1999, p. 399)
Furthermore, and most importantly, for present purposes, the contrast

between the Marxian understanding of concepts and the traditional view
of concepts underpinning the abstract-scholastic sign was explored in detail
in Ilyenkov (1982). In blistering style, Ilyenkov argues that the traditional
view of the superiority of the ‘abstract concept’ as a mode of cognition and
the ideal of intellectual development is in complete contradiction with Marx’s
understanding of the power of thinking in human practice. In the Marxian
view, he argues:
thinking in concepts is directed at revealing the living real unity of things,
their concrete connection of interaction rather than at defining their abstract
unity, dead identity. The analysis of the category of interaction shows directly,
however, that mere sameness, simple identity of two individual things is by no
means an expression of the principle of their mutual connection. (Ilyenkov,
1982, pp. 88–89)
From that point of view, conceptual development cannot be equated with

the ‘educated’ or ‘civilized’ use of words:
The concept (in its strict and precise sense) is not therefore a monopoly of
scientific theoretical thought. Every man has a concept, rather than a gen-
eral notion expressed in a term, about such things as a table or chair, knife
or matches. Everybody understands quite well both the role of these things
in our lives and the specific features owing to which they play a given role
rather than some other one and occupy a given position, rather than some
other one, in the system of conditions of social life in which they were made,
in which they emerged. In this case the concept is present in the fullness of
its definition, and every man consciously handles things in accordance with
their concept, proving thereby that he has this concept. (Ilyenkov, 1982, pp.
98–89)
On this view, one which is fundamentally diametrically opposed to

Vygotsky’s view, conceptual power is about the concrete, understood in terms
of a grasp of factual connectivity in its regularities and sequential dynamic,
of the unity in diversity of a real system of interacting phenomena. Hence
the wisdom and intelligence of Luria’s subjects are manifest in the way that
they can think and talk concretely about the preconditions, constraints and
dynamic course of development of particular activities (abstracted in a rational
way from the rest) and the utility and functionality of objects of quite differ-
ent kinds with respect to their purposeful, practical interconnections within
those activities (e.g., Luria’s ‘meal situation’). For Luria and Vygotsky, on
the other hand, the move to conceptual thought is the move away from this
grasp of empirical, situational, factual interconnection to the kind of ‘logi-
cal’ abstraction or empirical generalization captured in what Ilyenkov calls
‘the notion’. Now we begin to see the problems with Vygotsky’s ‘experimen-
tal study of concept formation’ (Vygotsky, 1986, 1987) in which the ‘true
concept’ captures ‘a single, essential, and uniform connection or relationship
among objects’ while ‘the connections are empirical, accidental, and concrete
in the complex’. By ‘single, essential and uniform’ Vygotsky means charac-
terized by an invariant conjunction of perceptually identifiable features (e.g.,
big and blue versus small and green). The irony in fact, then, is that the ‘con-
nections’ he has in mind are matchings or samenesses which are empirically
accessible; it is the ‘concrete abstraction’ of the child or ‘primitive’ which is
‘non empirical’ in the sense of not based on immediate visual or perceptual
‘stimuli’. The practical connection between food, a plate, and a fork cannot
be found in any empirical qualities these objects have in common, and cannot
therefore be generalized in the formal logical way. The connection between
them, rather, is to be found in their complementary functions within the rele-
vant system of activity (the ‘meal situation’). In this way, the abstract-scholas-
tic sign encapsulates a view of language and thinking which is not only quite
separate from—‘above’—the practical accomplishments of everyday life but
obscures the role of linguistic communication within ‘the system of condi-
tions of social life’, including scientific practice and tradition.
166 PETER E. JONES
Re-thinking Language and Communication
Because communication (including self-communication) is an integral dimen-

sion of all our activities (practical or intellectual), then the view that we take
of communication clearly informs and constrains our view of what it is to be
human and what humanity can be. In turn, of course, views of communi-
cation always imply particular perspectives on activity, cognition and social-
ity (Jones, 2007). I have tried to show very sketchily here, and no doubt in
overly blunt fashion, the reciprocal inter-relations between particular concep-
tions of the sign held and developed by Vygotsky at different points in the
evolution of his psychological thinking and the view of social-historical and
individual development which these conceptions support.
Vygotsky’s indelible achievement is to raise, in the most acute way, the
problem of how to understand the role of language and communication in
enabling and supporting the intelligent and conscious social practices of his-
torically developing human communities. The limitations, and limits, to that
achievement were set, to a considerable extent, by the attempt to reconcile
conscious, creative and active human practice with (a) the mechanistic ‘mate-
rialism’ of the then fashionable reflexological model of communication, and
(b) a view of thinking and conceptual development heavily skewed away from
the forms and modes of concrete, practically oriented talking and intelligent
action in everyday life towards the abstract, school-based, ‘concept’.
Largely absent from Vygotsky, then, is a view of language and communi-
cation as forms and means of situated co-operative or collaborative practice,
that is, in terms of intelligent, socially organized, ethically charged commu-
nicational conduct through which individuals reflexively concert, coordinate
or integrate their individual contributions (verbal and nonverbal) into a joint
or collective effort towards a common goal. On this view, communicational
actions have no mechanical causal power, nor do words ‘represent reality’ as
such. Rather, as Kravchenko (2012) nicely puts it, ‘the “object” of commu-
nication is not a referential state of things in an objective external reality, but
the coordination of actions between the interacting cognitive agents’.
It is true that Vygotsky caught the beginnings of developments of this kind
in language research, as we see particularly from his later work in Thinking
and Speech: his appeal to different functions of language and functional differ-
entiation, to the role of shared cognitive context in conversational exchange,
to the significance of dialogic speech, to the distinction between differ-
ent aspects of word meaning (‘meaning’ and ‘sense’), etc. But his instinct,
reflecting his general perspective on the direction of movement between

‘lower’ and ‘higher’ psychological functions, was to consider the everyday
talk of children and adults as evidence of the kind of spontaneous, unplanned,
empirically and situationally conditioned, more or less automatic types of ver-
bal-cognitive activity that were definitely located on the lower rungs of the
cultural psychological ladder. At the same time, there was no interest at all in
looking at communicationally mediated collaborative action per se (either in
children or adults) and at the communicational proficiencies presupposed and
on display in such contexts of transformational practice. The various currents
of ‘activity theory’ (both Leont’evan or Rubinshteinian), developing long
after Vygotsky’s death, suffered from the same fundamental blindspot since
they retained the same kind of representational view of language.
The crux of the problem, then, in trying to develop and take forward
Vygotsky’s theoretical legacy today is the fact that his key linguistic and com-
municational constructs presuppose a foundation of psychological function-
ing which is reactive or automatically responsive to situational or perceptual
givens and which sees the abstract representational power of the concept as
necessary in order to imbue actions with the cognitive content to free them
from the clutches of local, empirical and situationally conditioned ‘thinking
in complexes’.
So let us leave this ‘reactive’ view of language and communication behind
us along with the psychological assumptions and constructs which it supports.
Let us turn instead to that broad current of thinking in the language and
communication sciences which, for convenience here, and somewhat arbi-
trarily, I will refer to as ‘actional-integrative’. While the terms ‘integration’,
‘integrationist’ and ‘integrationism’ belong to one particular tradition of rad-
ical thinking about language and communication initiated and developed by
Roy Harris (1981, 1996), some concept of integration (or ‘coordination’,
see Jones, 2016a) has proved indispensable to a much broader stream of lin-
guistic research which focusses on the inseparability of signs and sign-making
practices from the situated and real time life activities of those individual peo-
ple who exercise these communicational powers. As Harris puts it:
Signs, for the integrationist, provide an interface between different human
activities, sometimes between a variety of activities simultaneously. They play
a constant and essential role in integrating human behaviour of all kinds…
Signs are not given in advance, but are made. The capacity for making signs,
as and when required, is a natural human ability. (Harris, 2000, p. 69, in
Love, 2004)
168 PETER E. JONES
From this point of view ‘using language is a matter of creatively endow-

ing certain phenomena with semiotic significance in order to operate rele-
vantly on the world in accordance with the exigencies of an incessant flow of
unique, real-time communication situations’ (Love, 2004: 532). If Harris’s
work is perhaps the most explicit and the most forthright in developing the
fundamental principles of such an actional-integrative perspective on lan-
guage and communication, similar tendencies have been clearly in evidence
over a number of decades, often explicitly articulated in their own terms, in
the work of wide range of scholars (for example, Clark, 1996; Cowley, 2009;
Goodwin, 2002, 2013, 2017; Kravchenko, 2015; Linell, 2009; Steffensen,
2015). In the actional-integrative tradition, then, signification is always activ-
ity, activity which is always bound up with, and contributes to, the activities
and social relationships of particular people interacting in concrete contexts.
As Goodwin notes: ‘More generally, in the human sciences language has typi-
cally been analysed almost exclusively as a symbolic system rather than a form
of social organization in its own right’ (2002, p. 18).
In other words, communication is not an information transmission sys-
tem which merely aids and enables the social organization of action: com-
munication itself is purposeful and intelligent socially organized action which
must be co-operatively designed and performed as part of and within a com-
plex stream of developing lines of thinking and action to which individuals
are committed and actively contributing. Social activity overall, then, requires
of its participants the power to cooperatively engage in a whole dynamically
developing confluence of purposeful, intelligent practical and communica-
tional behaviours:
To build action participants must know in detail what each other is doing,
the kinds of knowledge each can accountably be expected to possess, and
relevant features of the materials, whether language structure, artifacts or
features of the setting, that contribute to the organization of the action in
progress. (Goodwin, 2013, p. 14)
If such a view of sign-making requires a departure from the Vygotskian

dichotomies of ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ (or ‘lower’ and ‘higher’) in the psycho-
logical sphere, it requires no less a re-thinking of the social character of lan-
guage and communication. What is it that makes the individual’s utterance a
social event? The Western language tradition has assumed that the answer is to
be found in some abstract set or system of forms and meanings which all indi-
viduals share. A consistent actional-integrative perspective, however, brings a
different understanding. From this point of view, the sociality of the linguistic
or communicational act consists in all those ways in which particular individ-

uals relate to one another, act with one another and influence one another in
the course of ongoing practice: when I communicate with you I involve you
in my business and involve myself in yours. This is sociality seen concretely,
not as abstract identity of individuals or their attributes and knowledge but
as the real, dynamically unfolding inter-connections between unique individ-
uals, inter-connections which are necessarily forged in unique behavioural
acts designed for particular moments in ongoing enterprise. Communication,
then, is born of this interpersonal difference, of the interdependence of self-act-
ing individuals. Learning to communicate, from this perspective, is about
‘infant experiments with cooperation’ (Sennett, 2012, p. 9), in particular a
‘practical, situated grasp of the emergent sequential structure and trajectory’
of an ‘ongoing activity’ (Lerner, Zimmerman, & Kidwell, 2011, pp. 44–45).
I believe it is now high time to focus the insights of this emergent action-
al-integrative view of sign-making on a critical re-appraisal of Vygotsky’s psy-
chology. If the ball has already started to roll in this direction, I hope this
chapter may play some small part in pushing it along its way. Furthermore,
adopting such a perspective on language and communication cannot but
entail a radical re-examination of our fundamental ideas of human social-
ity, of social change and social transformation, in a way that will allow us
to re-connect our studies of communicational interaction more productively
with Marx and the Marxist tradition. More specifically, it opens up the pros-
pect of a profoundly critical understanding of the concrete role of communi-
cational activity in the production and transformation of social and political
structures, allowing us to better appreciate, for example, how the most basic
processes of economic production and exploitation are communicationally
organized and accomplished (Jones, 2018a,b) and how, therefore, we may
organize ourselves more intently for their replacement.
Notes
1. Critical discussion of Vygotsky’s linguistic influences and innovations can be

found in Wertsch (1985), Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991), Seifrid (2005),
Phillips (1986), and in a series of very valuable papers by Ekaterina Zavershneva,
including Zavershneva (2014).
170 PETER E. JONES
2. Anna Stetsenko (2005) presents a very interesting and, within CHAT research,
almost unique study of the ontogenetic development of pre-verbal and verbal
communication.
3. The final phrase in the Russian original might be rendered more accurately as
‘raising it to the level of purposeful activity’ (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 48).
4. The alternative to ‘internalization’ is pursued in more detail in Jones (2011).
5. For some critical commentary on this linguistic conception of planning, see
(2017a).
6. This discussion is taken from a more detailed presentation of the issues and argu-
ments (Jones, 2014).
7. By this I do not mean to imply, as some scholars have, that Vygotsky completely
moved away from, rejected or repudiated the mediation model built around the
causal-mechanical sign in heading towards a new ‘semantic’ theory of conscious-
ness. Reflexologically informed assumptions, albeit with qualifications, remained
axiomatic for Vygotsky’s psychology as all Luria’s later statements, for instance,
clearly imply.
8. For a much more sympathetic reading of Vygotsky’s work on concepts, see Derry
(2013).
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8. Identity as a Sociocultural
Phenomenon: The Dialectics of
Belonging, Being and Becoming
NIKOLAI VERESOV
Looking at Identity from Cultural-historical Activity Theory (CHAT):

Challenges and Suggestions
The purpose of this section is an analysis of the approach to study of identity

emerging within the framework of cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT).
For this, I selected five key papers, which challenge traditional views on iden-
tity and develop new approaches based on CHAT framework. I am aware that
these papers do not reflect the whole complexity and variety of approaches
existing within CHAT, however they somehow illustrate and summarise key
trends and directions of theorisation and empirical studies of the problem of
identity within CHAT framework. My task therefore is not to present detailed
analysis of these papers, but rather to identify the main trends and theoretical
perspectives of reconceptualising identity that CHAT provides.
The first paper is by Penuel and Wertsch (1995). Despite the fact that the
paper does not refer to CHAT directly, it is probably the first attempt to link
the problem of identity to the theoretical stance of CHAT. The paper presents
an integrative sociocultural approach to identity formation; an approach that
utilizes different elements of both Vygotsky’s and Erikson’s work (Penuel &
Wertsch, 1995, p.84). Suggested approach to identity formation considers
sociocultural processes and individual functioning as interacting moments in
human action, rather than as static processes that exist in isolation from one
another. “Human action, whether by individuals, groups, or institutions, pro-
vides the unit of analysis for a consideration of how individual intentions are,
moreover, realized by different cultural tools or mediational means used for
176 NIKOLAI VERESOV
carrying out action, tools that in turn shape individual functioning” (Penuel
& Wertsch, 1995, p. 84). The authors suggest that identity formation must
be viewed as being shaped by and shaping the forms of action, that involves
a complex interplay among cultural tools employed in the action, the socio-
cultural and institutional context of the action, and the purposes embedded
in the action.
Taking human action as the focus of analysis, we are able to provide a more
coherent account of identity, not as a static, inflexible structure of the self,
but as a dynamic dimension or moment in action, that may in fundamental
ways change from activity to activity, depending on the way, in each activity,
the purpose, form, cultural tools, and contexts are coordinated. (Penuel &
Wertsch, 1995, p. 84)
The authors claim that mediated action, rather than an inner sense of
identity, provides a basic unit of analysis, as it allows a different set of ques-
tions about the way individuals use cultural tools to form an identity. “In this
approach, what we are attempting to interpret, explain, or analyze is mean-
ingful human action, rather than either inner states of individuals or socio-
cultural processes considered in isolation” (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995, p. 91).
The second paper is by Wertsch (1997). The author looks on identity
through history:
Knowledge about the past is widely viewed as a crucial ingredient in the con-
struction of identity. From this perspective, we can’t know who we are if
we don’t know where we have been, or, in the words of the historian David
Lowenthal (1985): ‘the sureness of “I was” is a necessary component of the
sureness of “I am.” (Wertsch, 1997, p. 5)
Further, Wertsch develops this view in the following way:
Claims about how history shapes national identity and political action are
inherently grounded in a set of assumptions about psychological processes.
However, the discipline of psychology has had relatively little to say about
just what these processes are. Indeed, commentators such as Marty (1994)
have claimed that psychologists are often distinctly unhelpful in dealing with
such topics due to various forms of psychological reductionism that underlie
their research… The implication of Marty’s comments is that in order to con-
tribute to our understanding of issues such as national identity, psychology
will have to do so as part of an interdisciplinary effort. (Wertsch, 1997, p. 6)
Identity as a Sociocultural Phenomenon 177
As a possible contribution to this interdisciplinary effort, the article exam-

ines the assumption of history as being an essential ingredient in the forma-
tion of identity from the perspective of how narratives about the past serve as
a kind of ‘cultural tool’ in ‘mediated action’ that creates and re-creates iden-
tity. The paper argues that both the production and consumption of these
cultural tools must be taken into account in order to develop an adequate
analysis of history and identity (Wertsch, 1997, p. 5).
The importance of Wertsch’s paper in relation to identity and CHAT is
obvious as it introduces three important aspects of theorisation of identity;
history, narratives as cultural tools, and mediated action.
The third paper I want to refer to is that of Roth (2007). This author sug-
gests another angle of approach to identity within CHAT theoretical frame-
work. He begins with the statement that identity itself is a difficult concept,
suggesting that we are only at the beginning of understanding how to theo-
rize it (p. 83).
In everyday usage, as my driver’s license and passport serving as “pieces of ID”
show, the question of identity is reduced to the question of when (and where)
someone is born, a name, and a photograph (perhaps augmented by a descrip-
tion of hair and eye color)…There is therefore a developmental process required
that allows children, who equate identity with their names, to become adults,
who equate identity with their relations and actions captured in autobiographies.
(Roth, 2007, pp. 83–84)
From his point of view, cultural-historical activity theory constitutes one

of a range of approaches that build on a dialectic relation between agency and
structure, which means that the two parts mutually presuppose and consti-
tute—and therefore cannot be reduced to each other. Most researchers draw-
ing on CHAT focus on its structural aspects; “but precisely these do not allow
us to theorize identity” (Roth, 2007, p. 88).
The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the development and
expansion of CHAT so that it includes the tools for theorizing often neglected
aspects of human praxis: identity and the moral nature of agency (Roth, 2007,
p. 84). Discussing how the ethico-moral nature of agency mediates identity,
Roth offers an expansion of CHAT as a way to theorise an identity, not only
in terms of a consistent notion of identity but also in terms of a linkage of
identity to ethics and morality:
Because these are tied to concrete practical activity, the corresponding
notions do not need to be imported into the theory from the outside: they
178 NIKOLAI VERESOV
are an integral aspect of theory and praxis. In this approach, therefore, eth-
ical aims cannot be considered independent of the ongoing activity but are
tied both to the object/motives, the (by)products, and the concrete (moral)
norms concretely enacted in the process. The ethico-moral dimensions and
identity thereby come to be articulated through concrete participation in
ongoing collective activity. (Roth, 2007, p. 92)
The fourth paper referenced is that of Daniels (Daniels, 2007). Referring

to Holland et al. who studied the development of identities and agency spe-
cific to historically situated, socially enacted, culturally constructed worlds
(Holland et al, 1998), he finds the link of this study to Bakhtin and Vygotsky
“to develop a theory of identity as constantly forming and person as a com-
posite of many often contradictory, self understandings and identities which
are distributed across the material and social environment and rarely durable”
(Daniels, 2007, p. 96). What Daniels supports in Holland’s approach is devel-
opmental perspective. As Holland et al. put it: “The identities we gain within
figured worlds are thus specifically historical developments, grown through
continued participation in the positions defined by the social organisation of
those world’s activity” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 41). The approach Daniels
refers to is that of Bernstein (1990, p. 13), who used the concept of social
positioning to refer to the establishment of a specific relation to other subjects
and to the creation of specific relationships within subjects:
He relates social positioning to the formation mental dispositions in terms
of the identity’s relation to the distribution of labour in society. It is through
the deployment of his concepts of voice and message that Bernstein forges
the link between division of labour, social position and discourse and opens
up the possibilities for a language of description that will serve empirical as
well analytical purposes. The distinction between what can be recognised as
belonging to a voice and a particular message is formulated in terms of dis-
tinction between relations of power and relations of control… Thus, social
categories constitute voices and control over practices constitutes message.
Identity becomes the outcome of the voice—message relation. (Daniels,
2007, pp. 97–98)
Bernstein’s theoretical stance creates some challenges to CHAT. First,

“the theoretical move which Bernstein makes in relating positioning to the
distribution of power and principles of control opens up the possibility of
grounding the analysis of social positioning and mental dispositions in rela-
tion to the distribution of labour in an activity. Through the notions of ‘voice’
and ‘message’ he brings the division of labour and principles of control (rules)
into relation with social position in practice” (Daniels, 2007, p. 98).
Second, it
…suggests that Activity Theory should…develop a language of description
which allows for the parameters of power and control to be considered at
structural and interactional levels of analysis. A systematic approach to the
analysis and description of the formation of categories through the main-
tenance and shifting of boundaries and principles of control as exercised
within categories would bring a powerful tool to the undoubted strengths of
Activity Theory. This would then allow the analysis to move from one level to
another in the same terms rather than treat division of labour and discourse
as analytically independent items. (Daniels, 2007, p. 98)
The fifth and last paper is that of Dang (2013). This is an example of
an empirical study of professional identity within CHAT theoretical frame-
work. Findings from this study suggest that an individual teacher’s identity
influences her/his cognitive and affective perception of an event. Paired-
placement created an environment whereby the student teachers’ (ST’s)
conflicting identities, associated with different cognitive and affective percep-
tions of the experience, were challenged, leading to contradictions (Dang,
2013, p. 58).The contradictions in turn enabled the student teachers to work
to resolve the contradictions. Through planned and supervised collaboration
the STs resolved most of the conflicts, leading to qualitative change in their
teaching professional identities, though in each individual case it was rather
different. “From an activity theoretical perspective, shared community, past
experiences, division of labour, and potentially shared objects were all part of
this process” (Dang, 2013, p. 58).
These five papers suggest improvements of CHAT theoretical tools to
address the problem of identity as a socio-cultural phenomenon by devel-
oping new ways of description or incorporating new conceptual tools (nar-
ratives, power and control, or moral agency). On the other hand, there is
something in common which can be presented as a series of key statements
leading to key words:
• identity is addressed as a phenomenon which exists within the

“social-individual” space where the individual (personal) and soci-
ety… are not in opposition but rather, the “individual is a higher
form of sociality” (Roth, p. 84) and “sociocultural processes and
180 NIKOLAI VERESOV
individual functioning are viewed “as interacting moments” (Penuel

& Wertsch, p. 84).
• identity is approached from historical (developmental) perspective;

“The identities we gain within figured worlds are thus specifically his-
torical developments” (Daniels, 1997, p. 96).
• cultural mediation (narratives, mediated actions) is important to

study identity as sociocultural phenomenon (Wertsch, p. 5).
• Mediated action, rather than an inner sense of identity, provides a

basic unit of analysis as it allows the asking of a different set of ques-
tions about the way individuals use cultural tools to form an identity
(Penuel & Wertsch, p. 91).
The list of key-words might be: social and individual, mediation,

development.
Looking at Identity Through the Dialectics of Belonging,

Being and Becoming: Cultural-historical Perspective
This section presents key dimensions of the study of identity within the frame-
work of cultural-historical theory. It shows possible directions of studying
identity as a cultural and social phenomenon through the dialectics of belong-
ing, being and becoming. Cultural-historical theory is the theory of psycho-
logical development; it looks at processes rather than objects and results of
development, and this opens some new perspectives on the study of identity
as it allows an approach to identity not only as a psychological phenomenon
(subjective sense of belonging) but within a process of being and becoming.
Contradictions and Drama: Dialectics of the Process
CHAT, which looks at identity as a result of a complex process of develop-

ment (sense of belonging), provides strong analytical tools to study identity
within “social-individual” space, where individual and social are viewed as
interacting moments. I would agree that “identity is addressed as a phenom-
enon which exists within the “social-individual” space where “the individual
(personal) and society… are not in opposition but rather, the “individual is a
higher form of sociality” (Roth, 2007, p. 84).
However, in the triangle of activity which is the main theoretical model

of CHAT (Figure 8.1) there is no such component as “an individual”; it con-
tains a subject as opposed to an object, which is connected to subject through
actions mediated by cultural artefacts.
Figure 8.1. Triangle of activity as a basic model of CHAT

(Engeström, 1987, 1999)
On the other hand, in the triangle of activity, the subject is connected to

community through rules; so “subject-object-mediating artefacts-rules-com-
munity” is a theoretical framework to analyse the relations of the individual
and the social.
Another strong point in CHAT is an opportunity to study identity
through contradictions of key components of the triangle of activity, which
leads to the transformation of the whole activity system.
Cultural-historical theory provides a different perspective as it allows
investigation of identity as a process of obtaining of a sense of belonging
within changing socio-cultural contexts and environments; it allows change
to the focus of studying interactions between the social and individual to
study of how the social becomes the individual.
This theoretical principle comes from the general law of cultural
development:
…every function in the cultural development of the child appears on the stage
twice, in two planes, first, the social, then the psychological, first between the
people as an intermental1 category, then within the child as an intramental
category…Genetically, social relations, real relations of people, stand behind
all the higher mental functions and their relations. (Vygotsky 1997, p. 106)
182 NIKOLAI VERESOV
Three points are important here: First, psychological functions do not

appear IN social relations, but AS social relations; “every higher mental func-
tion was external because it was social before it became an internal strictly
mental function; it was formerly a social relation” (Vygotsky 1997, p. 105).
Second, even in being transformed from inter-psychological to intra-psycho-
logical “they remain quasi social” (Vygotsky 1997, p. 106). So, “intra-psy-
chological” is social by its origin and construction. However, there is one
more aspect in the relations of “inter-psychological” and “intra-psycholog-
ical” which highlights a complex and dialectical character in the process of
development. “The basic principle of the functioning of higher functions
(personality) is social, entailing interaction of functions, in place of inter-
action between people. They can be most fully developed in the form of
drama” (Vygotsky 1929/1989, p. 59). The social, inter-psychological form
of higher mental functions is a dramatic interaction between people (Vygotsky
1929/1989, p. 69).
The dramatic frame of the personality as the unique organization and hier-
archy of mental functions is the result of unique dramatic inter-psychological
collisions that have happened in the life of the human being and their over-
coming by a human being, the intra-psychological result of the individual’s
unique developmental trajectory. Therefore, the psychology “must be devel-
oped in the concepts of drama, not in the concepts of processes” (Vygotsky,
1929/1989 p. 71). Overcoming social dramatical collisions (dramas of life)
the human being creates his/her unique personality.
The drama of the personality as a participant in the drama of life is the
essential contradiction and the moving force for development. Thus, the
intra-psychological consists of internalized dramatic social interactions: “the
dynamic of the personality is drama” (Vygotsky, 1929/1989 p. 67). Here an
abstract dialectical idea of a contradiction as a moving force of development
obtains its concrete psychological content in the concept of the drama of life
as a moving force in the development of human personality. This introduces
a theoretical perspective of rethinking human psychology in terms of drama.
CHAT approaches identity as a socially and culturally constructed sense
of belonging within the “social-individual” space by analysis of interactions
and contradictions of “subject-object-mediating artefacts-rules-community”
components of activity system. The cultural-historical approach opens a dif-
ferent perspective as it allows study of the process of creation and cultural con-
struction of identity, identity in motion and identity in its becoming. This
approach refocuses the research lens from looking at results of development
to the process of socio-cultural genesis of identity. Dramatic collisions, social
dramas and conflicts as forms of social change are key components of this
process. They are the turning points of the development of identity; in other
words, identity as an individual sense of belonging is always a result of a series
of individual (inter-psychological) collisions and dramas. The cultural-histor-
ical approach to studying identity allows investigation of the role of individ-
ual dramatic collisions as important foundational components that reflect the
dialectics of this process of development. This theoretical framework leads
empirical studies to identify and analyse social changes, specifically differ-
ent dramatic collisions, socio-cultural situations and conflicts of personality,
which challenge the individual’s identity and bring changes to the sense of
belonging.
Transformation and Reorganisation
In CHAT’s theoretical perspective, the contradictions of key elements of

activity systems lead to the transformation of the system (Engestrom, 1999).
This is a valuable approach to study identity, as transformations are important
outcomes and reflect the changes within the activity system as well as within
the individual.
The cultural-historical approach looks at transformations from a different
angle. Development is always a very complex and contradictory process, but,
first of all, it is a dialectical process of qualitative change. The process of men-
tal development,
…is not confined to the scheme “more-less,” but is characterized primarily
and specifically by the presence of qualitative neoformations that are subject
to their own rhythm and require a special measure each time. It is not correct
to assume that all development is exhausted by the growth of these basic, ele-
mentary functions which are the prerequisites for higher aspects of the per-
sonality. (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 190)
“Neoformation” is a result of reorganisation of the whole system of func-

tions, a new type of construction of consciousness and mental functions. This
new type of construction is the result of metamorphosis (qualitative reorgan-
isation of the whole system). Actually,
Higher mental functions are not built up as a second story over elementary
processes, but are new psychological systems that include a complex merging
of elementary functions that will be included in the new system, and them-
selves begin to act according to new laws; each higher mental function is,
thus, a unit of a higher order determined basically by a unique combination
184 NIKOLAI VERESOV
of a series of more elementary functions in the new whole. (Vygotsky, 1999,

p. 43)
Thus, not a new function or even a new higher mental function, but a qual-
itatively new structure of functions, characterizes the result of development.
This dialectical understanding orients research to focus on transforma-
tions as an important aspect of the process of development. However, not
every transformation is of a dialectical nature and not every transformation
is a qualitative change of the whole system. There are transformations which
happen within the system as reconfiguration of existing components, parts
and elements. Following Hegel’s dialectical approach, we could call them
“mechanical transformations”. The human mind is not a mechanical system
by its nature and developmental transformation is not a recombination of
existing components. Developmental transformation is a qualitative change
of the whole system where a new organ brings re-organisation to the whole
system in such a way that the new (re-organised) system becomes a unit of
a higher order and begins to act according to new laws. Distinguishing two
types of transformations allows study of the process of social formation of
human mind in two interrelated aspects: (1) as a quantitative change and (2)
as a qualitative re-organisation.
CHAT looks at identity as an outcome of the transformation of activity
systems. Cultural-historical theory allows looking at identity as specific psy-
chological neoformation which is the result of qualitative reorganization of
the whole system of the psychological functions of the personality. Changes
in identity might have a huge impact on reorganization of all higher mental
functions of an individual.
In summary: both theoretical approaches (CHAT and cultural-histor-
ical theory) share the common theoretical approach to human identity as
a socio-cultural phenomenon emerging and developing within constantly
changing social and cultural contexts and environments. On the other hand,
there are significant differences: CHAT provides strong analytical tools to
study identity in the process of interactions and contradictions of “sub-
ject-object-mediating artefacts-rules-community” components of an activ-
ity system. Cultural-historical theory provides theoretical tools to discover
identity as a process of self-identification of the individual and looks at iden-
tity in its dialectical becoming. It opens a perspective for empirical studies of
social collisions, social and cultural dramatic events as turning points bringing
qualitative reorganisations to the whole structure and construction of human
consciousness. In other words, the cultural-historical theoretical framework
opens a perspective enabling discovery of the sociocultural genesis of identity

as a psychological process in its complexity and dialectics.
Mediation and Identity: Becoming and Being
I would agree that “cultural mediation (narratives, mediated actions) is

important to study identity as sociocultural phenomenon” (Wertsch, 1997,
p. 5). Refocusing analytical lens from inner sense of identity to mediated
action which “provides a basic unit of analysis as it allows to ask a different set
of questions about the way individuals use cultural tools to form an identity”
(Penuel & Wertsch, 1995, p. 91), is an important step forward in developing
the conceptual analytical tools of CHAT.
Cultural-historical theory conceptualises cultural mediation in a differ-
ent way. First, it understands mediation as “unique activity consisting in cre-
ating artificial stimuli and in mastering his own processes” (Vygotsky 1997,
p. 51). Vygotsky means a unique mediating activity (the creation and use of
signs), not mediated activity as developed in CHAT. Second, looking from
the developmental perspective, the point does not lie in creating and using
signs as artificial stimuli, but in the “transition from direct, innate, natural
forms and methods of behaviour to mediated, artificial mental functions”
(Vygotsky 1998, p. 168). And third,
…cultural signs and sign mediation are essential for the process of qualita-
tive reorganisation of the psychological functions in a course of development:
The sign as a tool reorganizes the whole structure of psychological functions.
It forms a structural centre, which determines the composition of the func-
tions and the relative importance of each separate process. The inclusion in
any process of a sign remodels the whole structure of psychological opera-
tions. (Vygotsky 1929, p. 421)
Hence, two dialectical moments are of the most importance in this respect:
(1) the dialectical transitions in the process of development and (2) the qual-
itative reorganization of the whole system of mental functions as a result of
such transitions. This allows connecting of this understanding of mediation
with concepts of drama and reorganization discussed in a previous section of
this chapter.
However, there is one more point here. The creation and use of signs is an
activity of an individual who creates artificial stimuli-devices for mastering his
psychological processes (Vygotsky 1997, pp. 49–50). Analyzing Levy-Bruhl’s
story of a Kaffir, he highlights the main difference between two cases:
186 NIKOLAI VERESOV
…in the first case, remembering was wholly determined by the principle of
stimulus-response, then in the second case, the activity of the man hearing
the speech and memorizing it by means of notches on wood is a unique activ-
ity consisting in creating artificial stimuli and in mastering his own processes
by means of the notches; it is based on a completely different principle…
Man himself determines his behavior with the help of artificially created stim-
uli-devices. (Vygotsky 1997, pp. 49–51)
This new principle does not comprise only the self-determination of the
individual. In all Vygotsky’s examples such as throwing dice, knot-tying oper-
ation, counting with fingers and others (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 50) a man is
being involved in various social situations and environments. As Vygotsky
himself puts it, “in all three cases that we considered, human behavior was
determined not by the stimuli present, but by a new or changed psycholog-
ical situation created by the man himself” (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 54). A new
psychological situation appears within the social context and life itself brings
challenging tasks to the individual. The most important aspect is that an indi-
vidual always acts within changing social contexts as an active participant
using culturally and socially created signs. By doing this, an individual reorga-
nizes the whole social situation and makes it different. Rethinking the individ-
ual means seeing the individual as actively involved in social interactions and
actively reorganizing the situation by creating and using signs.
Both CHAT and cultural-historical theory emphasise the importance of
cultural mediation in the process of formation of identity as a sociocultural
phenomenon. However, they provide different perspectives in relation to what
is the basic unit of analysis. For CHAT this unit is a mediated action; cultur-
al-historical theory emphasises dialectical and dynamic aspects by introducing
the mediating activities of an individual within changing social environments.
In other words, cultural-historical theory is not focused on mediated actions,
but on a human being who uses or creates cultural tools in order to reorga-
nise the social situation and overcome existing challenges. Mediated actions
are the results of development and they are important for maintaining or
re-establishing an inner sense of identity. Mediating activities are activities
of a human being who actively creates and recreates his/her sense of iden-
tity interacting with the sociocultural environment. In other words, CHAT
provides strong theoretical tools to study various types of mediated actions
and cultural mediators. The cultural-historical approach opens a perspective
of researching the very process of how an individual uses or creates various
cultural tools of mediation in situations of choice or challenge. On the other
hand, cultural-historical theory opens an opportunity to study identity as an

internal cultural tool, which mediates human actions in situations of choice
or challenge.
Summarising this section, two important points should be mentioned:
First, identity as a complex sociocultural phenomenon of the individual
sense of belonging could be approached from two theoretical perspectives.
Both CHAT and the cultural-historical theory look at identity as a phenom-
enon that emerges within sociocultural environments and settings. To study
identity CHAT provides strong analytical theoretical tools: the concepts of
contradiction and transformation. Cultural-historical theory provides the
analytical tools to study the very process of formation of identity and it looks
at identity in its becoming. It looks at identity as a dialectical process where
contradictions exist not in a form of contradictions of components of an activ-
ity system, but as an inter-psychological dimension of socially created or exist-
ing dramatic collisions and therefore it is looking at how dramas in human life
bring changes to the whole system of psychological functions of an individ-
ual and how these changes create and re-create the identity of an individual.
Second, both CHAT and cultural-historical theory emphasise the fun-
damental importance of cultural mediation in the process of human mental
development. CHAT is focused mostly on mediated actions taking this as a
basic analytical unit. Cultural-historical theory looks at mediation as a mediat-
ing (not mediated) activity of a human being and orients researchers to study
the transitions from non-mediated to mediated actions as a qualitative change
of the whole system of psychological functions of the individual. Second, it
takes as a basic analytical unit a human being acting in various sociocultural
contexts and environments and using various cultural tools in order to reor-
ganise existing social situations of development. Cultural-historical theory
suggests a shift from studying mediated actions to studying the human being
who is actively involved in his/her constantly changing social environment
by acting and interacting using various cultural signs as tools for creating and
recreating his/her identity.
Perezhivanie: Dialectics of Being and Becoming
Perezhivanie is a concept in cultural-historical theory; I believe this con-

cept might be productive for studying identity in the dialectics of being and
becoming (Veresov, 2015).
188 NIKOLAI VERESOV
…perezhivanie is a concept which allows us to study the role and influence of

environment on the psychological development of children in the analysis of
the laws of development. (Vygotsky 1994, p. 343)
What is important is that perezhivanie is a tool (concept) for analyzing the

influence of sociocultural environment, not on the individual per se, but on
the process of development of the individual. In other words, the environment
determines the development of the individual through the individual’s pere-
zhivanie of the environment (Vygotsky 1998, p. 294). This approach enlarges
the developmental perspective as it introduces the principle of refraction. No
particular aspects of the social environment in itself define the development,
only aspects refracted through the child’s perezhivanie (Vygotsky 1994, pp.
339–340). The perezhivanie of an individual is a kind of psychological prism,
which determines the role and influence of the environment on development
(Vygotsky 1994, p. 341). The developing individual is always a part of the
social situation and the relation of the individual to the environment and the
environment to the individual occurs through the perezhivanie of the individ-
ual (Vygotsky 1998, p. 294).
The principle of refraction is a principle which shows the dialectical rela-
tions of being and becoming in the process of development. The social becomes
the individual, but the dialectics of this becoming are that only those compo-
nents of the social environment refracted by the perezhivanie of the individual,
achieve developmental significance (Vygotsky 1998, p. 294). The principle of
refraction shows dialectical relations between significant components of the
social environment and developmental outcomes (changes in the structure
of higher mental functions). This principle shows how the same social envi-
ronment affects unique developmental trajectories of different individuals.
Vygotsky’s famous example of three children from the same family shows that
the same social environment, being differently refracted through perezhivanie
of three different children, brought about three different developmental out-
comes and individual developmental trajectories (Vygotsky 1994, pp. 339–
340). In a certain sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the social
environment as a source of development of the individual, exists only when
the individual participates actively in this environment, by acting, interacting,
interpreting, understanding, recreating and redesigning it. An individual’s
perezhivanie makes the social situation into the social situation of development.
CHAT does not apply perezhivanie as a concept; perezhivanie is not a
component of the triangle of activity. To incorporate this concept to CHAT
system of concepts remains a challenging task. Even more, Leont’ev’s activity
theory, which is a fundamental theoretical root of CHAT, does not have this
concept incorporated and related to other key theoretical concepts (activ-
ity, goals, operations etc.). The fundamental principle of refraction as it was
developed in cultural-historical theory, remains mostly unknown in CHAT
and this means that the dialectics of the social and individual and the dialectics
of identity as belonging, being and becoming is outside the scope of CHAT.
Cultural-historical theory having perezhivanie as one of its key theoretical
concepts, creates opportunities to study identity (as belonging) within social
changes through the dialectics of being and becoming. It provides the theo-
retical tools for researching the following problems: (1) what are key compo-
nents and aspects of social and cultural contexts and environments and their
influence in the process of creating and recreating an identity? (2) how social
changes may influence on the process of becoming of an identity? (3) how
they are refracted through different perezhivanie of an individual and what
are the outcomes of this refraction in terms of individual trajectories of devel-
oping identity? (4) what are key developmental characteristics of individu-
al’s perezhivanie of identity, especially in dramatic situations of social change
when identity is challenged?
What Does This Mean for Empirical Research?
The purpose of this paper is not a comparative analysis of two theoretical per-
spectives—CHAT and cultural-historical theory as every theory has strengths
and limits. This paper is not about to develop arguments in support of one
theory and to diminish the other. Theoretical approaches not only provide
a researcher with the concepts and principles as analytical tools for better
understanding objects and processes under study; they orient empirical stud-
ies in designing concrete research projects and formulating research questions
and methods.
CHAT as a strong and powerful theory orients empirical and experimen-
tal research on studying various types of social and cultural practices as socially
driven activity systems. Contradictions of key components of activity systems
(subject-object-mediating artefacts-rules-division of labour) bring new social
practices which lead to transformation of the activity system. In relation to
studies of identity CHAT orients concrete research to looking at identity
within the context of social environments and interactions by exploring the
mediated action as a fundamental unit of analysis.
190 NIKOLAI VERESOV
Cultural-historical theory orients empirical research to focus on the ori-

gins and sociocultural process of genesis of identity as a dialectical process
of belonging, being, and becoming. Contradiction is seen as a real dramatic
event in the life of an individual, which challenges the sense of belonging; it
orients empirical research to investigate identity within the process of how
the social becomes the individual. Identification and analysis of such critical
dramatic collisions as situations of social changes in real life of an individual
might provide the researcher with very important data, which might show
the role and place of identity within the system of higher mental functions of
the individual and help to understand the process of reorganisation of higher
mental functions. The human being who acts and interacts within different
constantly changing sociocultural environments using various cultural tools
and mediators to establish or re-establish his/her identity is the fundamental
“unit of analysis” in cultural-historical theory. This orients empirical studies
to look at how human beings act, what are the cultural tools and mediators
they create and use to construct and reconstruct their sense of identity and
how identity influences cultural tools the human being creates or uses.
Cultural-historical theory orients empirical research in studies of pere-
zhivanie of individuals; analysis of various types of concrete perezhivanie
related to/connected with identity as social demand or individual sense of
belonging might help to improve better understanding of the role of identity
in human life as a form of socio-cultural being and becoming a human.
Note
1. In Russian original it is interpsychological (интерпсихическая) and intrapsycho-

logical (интрапсихическая) (Vygotsky 1983, p. 145).
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9. The Method in Vygotsky: Social
Compensation to Achieve Higher
Psychological Functions and Social
Changes
SUELI SALLES FIDALGO AND MARIA CECÍLIA C. MAGALHÃES
Introduction
Broadly speaking, this chapter focuses on Vygotsky’s (1924a, 1924b, 1928,

1929, 1931a, 1931b, 1934/1935) theoretical-methodological discussions
on human development of children with special educational needs (SEN)1 in
school contexts in order to create a flexible2 environment that might provide
alternative paths and channels of development that these children may not
have experienced before. For him, the development of higher forms of behav-
ior is the key for the social development of all children, and that is achieved
under the influence of necessity (Vygotsky, n.d./1993, p. 166) and the orga-
nization of collaborative relationships that might provide the possibility of
affect and cognition in dialectical relations (Vygotsky, 1934–35/1993, p.
234).
In other words, Vygotsky focuses on the importance of the school envi-
ronment whose duty is to create the possibility for the child to access cultural
tools, thus developing cognitively. The author emphasizes many times in his
texts that compose Fundaments of Defectology that the development of the
Higher Psychological Functions should not be understood as a direct exten-
sion of natural development, but as a result of collaborative learning and
play activities. When discussing Groo’s work, for example, he states that play,
“in a revolutionary era (…) like any game, prepares the child for the future,
implants the fundamental lines of his future behavior” (Vygotsky, 1928, p.
194 SUELI SALLES FIDALGO AND MARIA CECILIA C. MAGALHÃES
161) by creating contexts in which they can collaboratively interact with oth-
ers in social activities.
In fact, for Vygotsky, creating an environment for children—with or
without specific needs—is extremely important, since it leads to sociocul-
tural development (Vygotsky, 1931b, p. 192). The space will evidently vary
depending on the child—since the learning means must differ. In Brazil,
however, teaching-learning and development of children with special needs
are still dealt with by looking at what they lack—something that Vygotsky is
also very clearly against when he says:
A child whose development is impeded by a defect is not simply a child less
developed than his peers; rather he has developed differently… a child in
each state of his development, in each of his phases, represents a qualitative
uniqueness (…) (Vygotsky, 1929, p. 30)
Or
It is important that education aim to realize social potential fully and con-
sider this to be a real and definite target. Education should not nurture the
thought that a blind child [for example] is doomed to social inferiority.
(Vygotsky, 1924a, p. 63)
After all
…even normal children [sic], more often than not, fail to realize their full
potential in the course of their education. (Vygotsky, 1924a, p. 63)
Brazil fails to recognize this, both in schools and in the policies that are pub-
lished for these children. There is still very little work on how the children
learn; how they deal with their special needs or disabilities; which transfor-
mations are being socially and biologically operated on them so they can
continue to grow. It is taken for granted that they can do very little—if any-
thing—simply because they have a specific need, a ‘deficiency’. Vygotsky
(1924c, p. 77) also criticizes this view when he states that
More simply speaking, from both the psychological and the pedagogical
points of view, the question has commonly been posed in crude physical and
medical terms. A physical handicap has been analyzed and compensated for
as just that, a handicap. Blindness has been defined as simply the absence of
sight, deafness the absence of hearing, as if we were dealing with a blind dog
or a deaf jackal.
The Method in Vygotsky 195
Furthermore, as Fidalgo (2015, 2016) discusses, in some Brazilian

schools, if the child has a medical report which states that they have a disabil-
ity, the school will say: “they have a report. We don’t need to do anything
with them. We must just leave them alone.” So, no pedagogical material is
prepared for those children and no work is carried out with them. We create
a social class of uneducatable children, uneducated future adults.
As previously published (Magalhães, 2012; Magalhães e Oliveira, 2016;
Fidalgo, 2014; Fidalgo, 2015; Magalhães & Fidalgo, 2008, 2010), this can
also boil down to poor or no education provided for the teacher, since teach-
ers also become excluded due to poor public policies—that they do not know
how to put into practice because they are still not educated (at university and
after their graduation, in continuous education programs) with these policies
in mind. The university syllabus is still very content-based, fragmented, and
and aiming at the epistemological area the epistemological area that the stu-
dent-teacher will have to teach in the future. So, when they leave their under-
graduate courses, they feel lost, and this feeling is worsened when they join a
group of teachers who already feel out-of-place, and who say about teaching
children with specific needs:
Ma5: (...) So all this discussion about inclusion, on the part of the teacher,
is always the same thing: “No problem, you can bring them, but how am
I going to work?”
In this case, teaching becomes a daily struggle that scares the teacher:
Sa4: (...) I... At first, when I started teaching here, I faced some students
with disabilities, you know? I was a little uncertain, you know? I mean,
I was a little scared. (...) And I was terrified to have to face them, you
know? Because nobody had told me anything and I knew I was going to
get that group. I was really very worried with what I was going to face
here.
It is not, however, a matter of indifference from the part of the teacher.

Every year, hundreds of teachers seek courses to learn something about how
to teach children with specific needs. In Guarulhos [outskirts of São Paulo],
in February 2017, over 100 teachers enrolled for such a course, and there is a
long waiting list. Our postgraduate programs also receive hundreds of appli-
cations from teachers who want to carry out investigations on how to work
with children with disabilities. All of them have the same complaint:
A1: [speaking about the school she attended as a student prior to entering
the university program]: (...) He was in his second year of High School
and nobody knew how to help or guide him; nobody even knew what his
learning problem was. And up to the last minute of the teacher’s work
with him, the boy hadn’t made any progress.
And:
B1: You see, it was very complex, very difficult because nobody could
explain what need the boy had, nor explain any need of any student in
that school for that matter—because there were many students with spe-
cial needs there. So I’ll talk about a student with autism. He couldn’t
write or read. He was still learning in High School how to write and
read. And as a teacher, I had no idea of what to do in that situation.
On top of that, it is important to mention that, in public schools in Brazil—

more specifically in São Paulo where our investigations are carried out—many
students come from rather underprivileged backgrounds, i.e., some are raised
by grandparents because their parents are in jail due to involvement in drug
trafficking; some are very poor and go to school for the food that they can
receive there as much as for the education (or even more so for the food);
some have fallen victims of drug dealers themselves and are already traffick-
ing inside the schools. Some children have specific physical or intellectual
needs. Sometimes, in one class, we might find a child who is dyslexic, another
who is deaf, a couple who are blind, etc. In order to better contextualize this
educational setting, it is also important to say that most state public school
classes are overcrowded—with between 40 and 60 students—there is only
one teacher per class and no teacher’s aide.
If we focus on the education of the deaf—just as an example3—we see
that there may be a Sign Language instructor or interpreter where deaf stu-
dents are enrolled. We say “may be” because this is a legal right, but not
necessarily a practice in every school. It all depends if there are profession-
als available, and there are not many in São Paulo yet. Besides, not all hired
Sign Language interpreters are teachers. Most are not. On the other hand,
sometimes, instructors are hired, but, like most interpreters, they have little
or no teaching experience per se. So they may do a rather lousy job at instruct-
ing deaf children too. The teachers themselves have little, if any, education
on specific needs. Most have none. And there are some undergraduate stu-
dents who, having taken one term of Brazilian Sign Language at university,
are hired as interpreters in State schools. We bear this general picture in mind
when we write this chapter.
We also bear in mind that we are both Applied Linguists and among
other things, we believe that language can exert power. It can maintain the
status quo of exclusion. It can also challenge this reality, promoting changes
in schools and in society as a whole. We choose the latter. Besides, we focus
here on Vygotsky’s discussion of compensation processes and its relation to
the organization of the educational curriculum that allows greater flexibil-
ity aimed at the development of children with specific needs (disability). We
will address the need of pedagogical material production—or flexibilization—
related to the organization of collaborative and cultural relationships lead-
ing to the development of higher psychological functions, as proposed by
Vygotsky (1924a, 1924c, 1929, 1934/1935). In fact, as Vygotsky points
out, the path taken by the school when working with these children should
be based on theoretical-methodological discussions about the general laws
that govern children’s sociocultural development regardless of their having a
specific need.
To address this matter, the paper is divided in two: A section on Vygotsky’s
view of Defectology: a matter of method; and one on the idea of social com-
pensation, including the discussion of the need for material flexibility that
may lead to school practice transformation. Throughout the text, we will
bring some examples of difficulties or of flexibilized material design to exem-
plify our discussion.
Defectology: A Matter of Method
Vygotsky was primarily concerned with the method. As Van der Veer and
Valsiner (1988, p. 73) point out, he was a
Methodologist in the Russian sense of the word, that is one who analyzes
basic assumptions and concepts of various psychological currents and psy-
chology in general.
Besides, as discussed by Bein, Vlasova, Levina, Morozova and Shif (1993,

p. 303), Vygotsky´s work, on what he and his counterparts called Defectology, is
based on the area of psychology that concentrates on the general laws of chil-
dren´s development, that is, it is sustained by the theoretical-methodological
issues supported on Marxist dialectical methodology that underlie the dis-

cussion on human development “as a process through which people come
to know themselves and their worlds” (Stetsenko, 2011, p. 167, and in this
volume). The central issue in this discussion is the comprehension of human
development as a politically bound, sociocultural and collaborative processes
through which people constantly transform themselves, the other and the
world, and through which they affect and are affected. Because of this, human
development is radically different from that of animal species. This dialecti-
cal process is twofold: firstly, language as a cultural artifact mediates the cre-
ation of relationships in socially contextualized cultural experiences. Vygotsky
repeats in several of his texts that
Every higher psychological function occurs twice during the process of
behavioral development: first, as a function of collective behavior, as a form
of cooperation or cooperative activity, as a means of social accommodation
(i.e., on an interpsychological plane) and, again, a second time, as a means of
a child’s individual behavior, as a means of individual adaptation, as an inner
process; that is, on an intrapsychological plane. (Vygotsky, 1931b, p. 192)
and
Just as speech serves as the basis for development, so, too, does the external
form of collective collaboration precede the development of a whole series of
inner functions. (Vygotsky, 1931a, p. 130)
Secondly, as discussed by Sawaia and Magiolino, in this book, rejecting

the dichotomous mind/body view, and based Spinoza, Vygotsky argued for
an interdependency between affect and cognition, that expands the notion of
development of children’s higher psychological functions. More specifically
on children with disabilities, for Vygotsky (1934/35, p. 223),
The question of the relationship between affect and intellect in retarded chil-
dren [for example] must therefore stand at the center of our research. The
task of that research must be the development and construction of a working
hypothesis about the nature of mental retardation in children. To accomplish
this task with what we have at our disposal, the only path must be critical and
theoretical research on those clinical and experimental data which contempo-
rary science has to offer.
Both aspects are important for the work on special educational needs since,
as stated by Vygotsky, the awareness of a disability is socially acquired—as any
knowledge. Therefore, when the child becomes aware of their disability, they
also become aware of a deficiency—something that they are lacking. In actual

terms, for Vygotsky, this “awareness” is a social construction, and it jeopar-
dizes the child’s constitution in terms of cognition and affection since, as he
says “thought and affect are parts of the same, single whole, and that whole
is human consciousness” (Vygotsky, 1934/35/1993, p. 236). And we must
also bear in mind that, for him,
Blindness [for example] is not a disease but the normal condition for a blind
child; he senses his uniqueness only indirectly and secondarily as a result of
his social experiences. (author’s emphasis; Vygotsky, 1924c, p. 81)
In fact, for Vygotsky, any disability is “miniscule in comparison with the

colossal areas of wealth which handicapped children possess” (1924b, p. 68).
And this notion shows how focusing on the impairment—as is usually the
case in Brazilian schools—unnecessarily worsens the problem of social exclu-
sion by diminishing the child’s chances of development.
According to Bein et al. (1993, p. 304), Vygotsky´s research on ‘normal
and abnormal’ children’s development allowed him to formulate an innova-
tive approach to the “study of the external manifestations of individual func-
tions”, and argue that the development of higher psychological functions is
dependent on the sociocultural experiences provided by the environment. As
they pointed out, what interested Vygotsky was not the “defect” but chil-
dren’s potential, i.e., a prospective look on development rather than a retro-
spective view. So, instead of focusing on the training of elementary (concrete)
thinking, he focused on the development of higher psychological functions
and their interrelation with the elementary processes, stating that
(…) It is true that the underdevelopment of the higher processes is not
primarily, but secondarily conditioned by the defect. And, consequently,
they represent the weakest link in the abnormal child’s chain of symptoms.
Therefore, this is where all educational efforts should be directed, in order to
break the chain at its weakest point. (Vygotsky, 1931b, p 199)
On another occasion, he also highlights that “the heavy emphasis on the

training of elementary functions must be replaced with the mental devel-
opment of higher functions” (Vygotsky, 1931a, p. 136) so as to enable the
child’s maximum educability.
Considering that the author also stated that the rules that govern the
development of higher psychological functions are the same for children with
and without disabilities, we can affirm that it is the school’s job to find a social
path so as to enable both to learn-develop. Again, it is Vygotsky that says that
From a pedagogical point of view, a blind or a deaf child may, in principle, be

equated with a normal child, but the deaf or blind child achieves the goals of
a normal child by different means and by a different path. (Vygotsky, 1924a,
p. 60)
Bearing in mind the school’s role in the education of children with dis-
abilities or special needs, next, we discuss the concept of social compensation
and one possible path—which we call pedagogical material flexibility.
The Idea of Social Compensation: The Need for Flexibility

of Pedagogical Material
As we have discussed above, Vygotsky considered education to be a power-

ful aspect for children’s learning and development. In the case of children
with learning disabilities (or any disability for that matter), the author main-
tained what he called compensation. However, it is important to clarify this
concept since it had also been used differently by Freudian followers, such as
Adler, as a feature of the child, of the individual, something organic, some-
thing that the person with any difficulty could use to overcome (or compen-
sate for) their shortcomings, thus overcoming their “inferiority feelings”. In
Adler’s words (1925, n.p.): “If one feels inferior (weak) he / she (usually) tries
to compensate for it somewhere else.” Therefore, to Adler, the concept of com-
pensation is something undergone by the individual in their own bodies; it is
organic.
Though Vygotsky initially takes into account Adler’s concept of com-
pensation, he later specifically shows that it occurs socially. He acknowledges
that there are some situations in which organic compensation takes place—
in the case of, for example, twin organs like the kidneys, when one fails, the
other works overtime, thus, compensating for the lack of the one that is fail-
ing. Nonetheless, he is very clear in his discussion about compensation in the
case of disabilities or learning difficulties, and states that this compensation is
social. In other words, much like the awareness of one’s disability, the idea of
compensation occurs in the collectivity, i.e., we cannot forget that “(…) the
collective [is] a factor in the development of a normal and an abnormal child”
(Vygotsky, 1931a/1993, p. 129).
Vygotsky´s focus on collectivity brings to the fore some of his most
well-known concepts: the dialectical relationship between learning and
development and the focus on the teaching of concepts that children have not
mastered yet (the idea of ZPD), besides the notion of the child’s mediated
relation with the environment, or, as discussed by Tanzi Neto (in this vol-
ume), the notion of means and resources (mediation), which can only occur
“by means of tools and signs”. All of these concepts speak of the importance
the author placed on the school, and this is not different when it comes to the
child with disabilities:
(…) There are first common goals, which confront both means used in nor-
mal and special schools, and, second the special features and uniqueness of
means used in special schools. But apart from both of these, there exists
the creative character of the entire school, which makes it a school of social
compensation, of socialization, and not “a school for the weakminded” and
which forces it not to conform to a defect, but to conquer it. (Vygotsky,
1929, p. 50)
Nevertheless, many teachers believe that it is the repetition that will enable
the child to learn the information presented to them. We often come across
people who still believe in the “practice makes perfect” motto in the school
environment. In doing so, they focus on the abstract, on the concept, since
repetition is but a mechanic means of learning. It may not even allow for
the incorporation of cultural tools (Van Der Veer & Valsiner, 1988, 2014)
because no contradiction arises from this practice. Therefore, no negotiation
and no actual learning. One teacher, who was completing her Specialization
course,4 wrote the following:
I wrote on the board and he [dyslexic child] copied in this course book. When he
was writing, he said that his handwriting was not neat (...). In order to help him
memorize the explanation, I asked if he would greet the country’s president in
the same way as he greets his friends at school. He said that he wouldn’t because
with the president he would have to use formal language. I conducted the tasks
following the same pattern: we looked at the pictures and then he would answer
the questions I read, and I would write them for him. He would then copy from
the board the answers that he had given me. It would be very interesting, though,
if we could add two or three lines below each task for the student to copy a few
times because the more they copy, the more they memorize. (extract that describes
a test given to a 12-year old dyslexic child in 6th grade)
We can see in this excerpt that the teacher is flexible in her teaching
approach (even more so considering it is a test): She reads the tasks to the stu-
dent; they look at pictures together so as to help him understand; he answers
the questions; she writes them down and he copies before handing them in
to be corrected. Therefore, she does not expect him to read the instructions
while taking the test, but allows him to orally show what he knows, and with
the help of pictures—that is, actions that seem to be in tune with the second-
ary path (which Vygotsky calls ‘roundabout’ path) that the school must take
to enable social compensation. However, the teacher also expects that, if the
child copies twice or three times the same content, he might memorize it,
and this might lead to learning-development. She shows belief in the “prac-
tice makes perfect” motto, in which there is no relationship between prac-
tice and theory (as we understand the concept of praxis—which, to Vygotsky
“had taken over the leading role in science” (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1988,
p. 77)). There is only inexpressive repetition. In other words, despite her
knowledge of how a dyslexic child might learn and the reading-writing diffi-
culties that he might have, she thinks that this difficulty might be overcome
by the exercise of copying several times, i.e., a mechanical exercise that might
be meaningless to the student who might not even be able to read what he
is copying. Besides, there is no collective work. Language is therefore taken
as an abstract construction to be memorized and not as the core tool for
development, which in a language class, should be seen as the tool which is
learned, but also as a tool that negotiates, assesses/ analyzes and recreates the
entire learning process, i.e., the tool and the object of study.
Contrary to this belief, when discussing social compensation, Vygotsky
speaks of finding a new path, a “roundabout”—as mentioned above. This aims
at enabling the child with specific needs/disability to learn. Vygotsky is very
clear in stating that—in most cases—the curriculum should not be altered.
What should be altered is the path taken, the method used with the student.
About this, he states that “it is precisely in order that handicapped children
achieve the same things as normal children, that we must employ utterly dif-
ferent means” (author’s emphasis; Vygotsky, 1929, p. 48). It is important to
clarify, however, that, when Vygotsky says that all children achieve the same
things, he means that the focus of education should be the development of
Higher Psychological Functions (HPF). Needless to say: depending on the
disability, the child may not develop the HPF at the same level of children
without disabilities, but, as Vygotsky point out: “After all, even normal chil-
dren, more often than not, fail to realize their full potential in the course of
their education” (1924a, p. 63). He then emphasizes the social role of edu-
cation, saying
It is self-explanatory that blindness and deafness are biological factors, and in
no way social. The fact of the matter is that education must cope not so much
with these biological factors as with their social consequences. (author’s

emphasis; Vygotsky, 1924b, p. 66)
He also highlights that schools only perceive the disability in the child,
In an abnormal child, we perceive only the defect, and therefore, our teach-
ings about these children and our approaches to them are limited to ascer-
taining the percentages of their blindness, deafness or distortion of taste. We
dwell on the “nuggets” of illness and not on the “mountains” of health. We
notice only defects which are minuscule in comparison with the colossal areas
of wealth which handicapped children possess. (Vygotsky, 1924b, p. 68)
Bearing in mind the need to create means which might enhance the child’s
learning possibilities, the research group Linguistic Inclusion in Scenarios of
Educational Activity (in Portuguese, ILCAE5) has worked with the idea of
adding some flexibility to the pedagogical material (Fidalgo & Lessa, 2011;
Fidalgo, 2015, 2016) and educating the teacher to do the same. Initially, in
the early 2010s, this was carried out by forming a study group composed of
school teachers at PUC-SP that would (1) observe their students carefully to
establish what learning needs they might present—regardless of the medical
name it might have6—and (2) prepare material that could allow the child to
take part in the classroom as an agent of the knowledge construction process
that is taking place. The idea is that, in order for the child to have access to
the same content that is taught at school, they sometimes need this content to
be explained differently, or broken down into easier pieces to understand or
simply have some non-written information added to the books. For example,
if a child is having trouble reading, should the instructions also be written? If
they are, how will the teacher know if the child cannot do the task proposed or
simply cannot read the instruction? Our research has found that simple actions
such as adding a picture next to the instruction of what the written text means
(see Figure 9.1) might solve this kind of problem, diminishing the difficulty
the child is presenting when this difficulty does not refer to the content of the
lesson itself, but to reading.
Figure 9.1: Flexibility of instructions

Children who are dyslexic or even autistic children have been found to
benefit from this kind of instruction. Reily (2004) discusses the case of an
autistic child who says that he thinks by means of images, and that words are
often like a second language that he has to translate into images so that they
can play like a film in his mind. Evidently, we are not saying that all children
learn in the same way, but those who do need the image, may benefit from
this simple flexibilization of the pedagogical material.
Similarly, Sternberg and Grigorenko (2003, p. 134), when discussing
the formation of the brain in dyslexic children, state that studies of so-called
“normal” individuals suggest that many areas of the brain become involved
during the reading process; that several regions both from the left and from
the right hemispheres are activated by language. However, in dyslexic chil-
dren, the left planum seems to be less developed. Therefore, perhaps for this
reason, working with images might allow the dyslexic child to access knowl-
edge that is needed to fulfill certain tasks.
Further to this initial work with images, between 2011 and 2012, Fidalgo
and Lessa’s team flexilibized tasks from a course book collection published by
a large Publishing House in São Paulo. They had requested some advice on
how to flexibilize the material they had developed for first to fifth grades in
the subject areas of Portuguese, Sciences and Social Studies. The group of
teacher educators asked to work with the teachers since it is unlikely that one
child would have the same characteristics, or specific needs, as other children,
even if in theory, they would had the same disability. In the impossibility of
working with all the teachers that bought the Publishing House’s pedagog-
ical material across Brazil, the researchers agreed to choose a few tasks in the
books and provide an example of what could be done for a number of dis-
abilities chosen by the Publishing House. Dyslexia is the case we will discuss
in this part of the paper. The example shown here is from the Portuguese
course book for year one (6-year-old students). They were studying Brazilian
mythology7 and one of their first tasks was to identify two myths in the pic-
ture below.
The problem that we identified was that, for some dyslexic children, more
specifically children with dyseidetic dyslexia, it is not easy to perceive that the
whole is constituted of a number of parts (thus they have trouble separating
the parts from the whole, and trouble, for example, to instantly recognize
the whole word from their outline). They may struggle to choose between
letters that are similar in shape (p, q; b, d); or show difficulty distinguishing
words that look alike (and sometimes look as the reverse of each other—in
Portuguese: vaca, cava; in English: part, trap); or have trouble recalling the
shape of a letter, among other dilemmas. It was likely that dealing with the
image would not be so complex for the child. In fact, it might even be a bonus
for some. However, in some cases, a dyseidetic dyslexic child might find the
excessive number of images a little distressing. After explaining this to the
teacher in a text that composed the supplement requested by the Publishing
House, we proposed the following tasks be carried out with the child prior to
the lesson (or replacing it in some more intricate cases):
Figure 9.2: Myths puzzle—working with dyslexic children
The child would, first of all, have to assemble the puzzle that the teacher
would give them. The teacher would previously have made a copy of the
above picture and cut it in 6 or 8 parts along the dotted lines (task a).
Figure 9.3: Task flexilibity dyslexic and disorthographic children
Then, considering the difficulty to (1) identify the mythological beings

in the picture and (2) the trouble that the child might have with parts and
the whole, they would be asked to link the mythological creatures to their
parts (task b). Finally, thinking of the difficulty to identify letters that are sim-
ilar (e.g.: mixing the capital L with the capital I, and with the lower case I),
they would be asked to complete task c, in which they would have to circle
the words inside the box on the right that start with the same letter as the
word given on the left (Iara, which incidentally is one of the myths). There
were other tasks that have not been included in this paper (each preceding an
activity proposed in the and explaining it or making it more evident for the
dyslexic child). When work such as this is concluded, the student should be
better equipped to read the text presented in the course book because they
would be better familiarized with the content of the unit—in terms of topic
and lexical items at least—as long as the teacher helps the student to become
aware of what they had done and for what purpose lest it be taken as pun-
ishment for the child with learning difficulty: more mechanical work to over-
come disability.
In other words, if the task is carried out in a way that language is seen
solely as a component to be mechanically learnt, repeated in different exer-
cises, despite the colors and even the fun that the student may have, they
have only learnt what they have done (if they learn this), but they will not
have learnt how they have achieved their goal or why this needs to be learnt.
Language has to be used to establish the contradictions that lead to learning
and change (Magalhães, 2012). According to Vygotsky (1931a, p. 124),
It has been assumed that in the presence of biological defects, children develop
“along biological tracks,” and that in their case we may dismiss the laws deter-
mining the social development and formation of a normal child. This mecha-
nistic notion is unfounded methodologically speaking. From the very outset
we must settle on a position without the conception of which everything else
would remain theoretically groundless. (…) The difficulty in understanding
the development of a mentally retarded child [for example] arises from the
fact that retardation is taken as a thing and not as a process. (…) Nevertheless,
from the viewpoint of dialectics, there couldn’t be a more erroneous and
inaccurate conception than this. Precisely in the process of development, the
primary loss, which appears in the early stage of development, is repeatedly
“diminished in importance” by newly occurring formation.
Therefore, as we clarified at the beginning of this paper, the develop-

ment of the Higher Psychological Functions does not come about naturally,
through natural development, nor are the result of mechanics. They are a
result of collaborative learning and play activities. In order for the child to
develop HPFs, they need to internalize language that constructs language
or linguistic tools as well as other psychological tools which will shape their
intellect and their social participation. It is in the process of taking part in
social spheres (in the schools for instance), discussing, explaining, negotiat-
ing meanings, that the child will develop new means of thought and action,
as discussed by Liberali (in this volume). The child with learning difficulties
will do the same, and also by means of language as a mediational tool. The
difference is perhaps what kind of discourse situation and/or environmental
organization will trigger the process.
In Lieu of Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed some of Vygotsky’s concepts found in

Fundamentals of Defectology, more specifically those of higher psychological
functions—and their development—and compensation viewed from a social

perspective. Furthermore, we have presented ideas for work with children with
disabilities or specific educational needs, arguing that the teacher needs to
learn how to flexibilize the pedagogical material that is commercially available
so as to guarantee that all children have access to the content (or the sylla-
bus), and therefore may learn and develop in ways of intentional thought and
action. Despite the examples of tasks presented, we have also discussed that
having technical access to the content does not guarantee the development of
HPF. What does lead to this development is language seen as a psychological
tool promoting dialectical relationship and collective work, raising contradic-
tions (as discussed by Aguiar et al. in this book), and negotiating meanings.
As stated previously, around 100 teachers annually seek a teacher educa-
tion program whose contents include: (1) an overview of disabilities or SEN;
(2) how to evaluate the child to find out which specific needs they might
have; (3) Vygotsky’s texts on compensation and on HPF, leading to a poster
presentation on how to flexibilize material for the children identified as hav-
ing a specific need; which in turn is followed by a discussion in which these
posters are analyzed (what is proposed, how it is proposed, why it is proposed
and which student might benefit from the proposal) so that jointly, the group
can construct concepts of disabilities, SEN, flexible pedagogical material that
might later lead to the inclusion of the child.
It is important to remember that Vygotsky looked at the social element,
at collectivity as a source of tools for development:
we see that the reserve of compensatory forces is, to a large degree, to be
found in the social-collective life of the child. Collective behavior is where he
finds the material to build the inner functions which are realized during the
process of compensatory development. (Vygotsky, 1931a, p. 127)
As explained by Veresov (2015, p. 244),
by creating and using cultural signs an individual not only creates artificial
stimuli-devices for mastering his psychological processes, but actively reorga-
nizes the whole social situation.
Notes
1. In Brazil, a bill was passed to review the service provision to people with spe-
cific needs. After this, and probably following some international new trend, a
discussion was raised in education as to the word that should be used: special
educational needs, disability (necessidades educacionais especiais, deficiência).
In this text, we choose to use specific educational needs because, as discussed
in Fidalgo (2018), there are many children in schools that have specific needs,
but are not disabled, such as children with dyslexia and other learning difficul-
ties and gifted children. In Brazil, following the educational policy, published in
the late 1990’s and focused on allowing children more time to learn how to read
and write (called progressão continuada, or continuous progression), young peo-
ple reached the late primary school years—and even secondary school in some
cases—without mastering any form of literacy or numeracy. There are many such
children in schools, but they are not necessarily disabled. They need some atten-
tion. They have specific educational needs.
2. It is important to say that we chose to use flexibilization instead of adaptation to
avoid a focus on what is currently known in Brazilian law and public policies as:
(1) the need for the child to adapt to the school environment and (2) the need
for the school to adapt its space so as to become more accessible, which may pro-
vide a means for the child to become integrated to the school, but not necessarily
included in the school (Fidalgo, 2005), that is, the child is there, but is not nec-
essarily learning anything or developing their skills.
3. We would like to clarify that, in this text, we will draw on examples relating to
different disabilities or specific educational needs, since the work we carry out is
not about one given disability per se, but on the education of teachers to work
with the diversity they have in their classrooms.
4. Specialization is a graduate course taken between the undergraduate and the
Master’s degrees in Brazil.
5. In this paper, two research groups are represented: ILCAE and Language in
Activities within the School Context (LACE). The former, coordinated by Lessa
and Fidalgo, has been working with several aspects of inclusive or special edu-
cation and teacher education, whereas the latter, coordinated by Magalhães and
Liberali, has been focusing on educating the educator and the students within a
concept of school that is built as a community. Both focus on collaborative work
and the role that is taken by language in the teaching-learning process.
6. In Brazil, the teacher is instructed to avoid diagnosing disabilities. When they
have a child who they think might have a specific need, they should refer the
child to a specialist (a doctor, a speech therapist, etc.). However, in the pub-
lic sector (public schools, public health services), this referral might take from 3
months to 3 years to return with a report that clarifies to the teacher if the child
is disabled or not. As one can imagine, in most cases, the child is no longer in the
same teacher’s care; sometimes not even enrolled in the same school. Therefore,
we direct teachers to comply with the instruction received, avoid diagnosing stu-
dents, and refer them to a specialist. However, they cannot cross their arms and
wait. They must investigate by observing the child, seeing what they can do and
what their difficulties are, without labelling them with a disability, they should
think of ways in which they can flexibilize their pedagogic material to make sure
the child has a fair chance in the inclusive process.
7. Published with permission from the Publishing House. References at the end of
the paper.
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10. Totality, Historicity, Mediation and
Contradiction: Essential Categories
for the Analytic Movement
in Research in Education
WANDA MARIA JUNQUEIRA DE AGUIAR, MARIA EMILIANA LIMA

PENTEADO, AND RAQUEL ANTONIO ALFREDO
Introduction
Amidst the turbulent situation of Russian society in the early twentieth cen-
tury, Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896–1934) and his associates—Alexander
Romanovich Luria (1902–1977) and Alexis Nikolaevich Leontiev (1903–
1979)—made explicit the need for a new psychology to understand the
human being as historical and social while, at the same time, being individ-
ual. Over the years, this psychology was called Socio-Historical Psychology,
or Cultural-Historical Psychology, whose theoretical-philosophical frame-
work was the Historical and Dialectical Materialism, structured by Karl Marx
(1818–1883) and Friederich Engels (1820–1895).
In this study, we emphasize Vygotsky’s contributions1 with regards to the
research method (1925, 1926, 1927) for works aiming at analyzing reality
phenomena beyond their appearance. For this reason, we highlight some cen-
tral categories within the dialectical and historical materialism, namely, total-
ity, historicity, contradiction and mediation, emphasizing their importance
for the construction of the area’s theoretical-methodological propositions.
Our general objective is therefore to bring to the fore and discuss the theo-
retical-methodological relevance of such categories in the design of syntheses
that may explain the constitutive ties of reality, especially those referring to
the processes of human constitution.
214 WANDA MARIA JUNQUEIRA DE AGUIAR ET AL .
However, it should be emphasized that we did not find in Vygotsky’s

work any explicit definition of the word category as we do find in the work of
Marx and Engels. We argue that, by carefully analyzing Vygotsky’s work, in
addition to verifying abundant material that indicates his affiliation to the dia-
lectical and historical materialism, we have apprehended that his proposition
is that not only concepts should be considered, but also some of the power-
ful explanatory categories of the human psyche, such as thought, language,
among others. An example of this argument is the statement presented in the
text “The meaning of Psychology’s crisis: a methodological investigation”
(Vygotsky, 2004):
Dialectics encompasses nature, thought, history: it is science in general, uni-
versal to its maximum. This theory of psychological Marxism or dialectics
of psychology is what I consider to be general psychology. In order to cre-
ate these intermediate theories—or methodologies, or general sciences—one
ought to unravel the essence of the group of corresponding phenomena, the
laws about their variations, their quantitative and qualitative characteristics,
their causality; one ought to create the categories and concepts that pertain
to these phenomena, create Das Kapital. […] Psychology needs its Capital—
its concepts of class, basis, value, etc.—with which to express, describe and
study its object. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 393)
The author refers to the need for a new psychology that denies and over-
comes Empiricism and Idealism. A psychology which, as Leontiev (1991, p.
427) states, “aims at considering as a classic example the Marxist political eco-
nomics, explained in the Capital, where one can see how to develop the meth-
odology of a concrete science based on the general principles of Dialectical
and Historical Materialism.”2 Only then could psychology produce explana-
tions, considering the multiple fortitudes that drive social change.
Besides, in the Epilogue, M. F. Iarochevski and G. S. Gurguenidze
emphasize that, for Vygotsky, it would be impossible to build a new psychol-
ogy without a “historically-based scientific methodology” (Iarochevski & G.
S. Gurguenidze, 1991, p. 468)—And, they go on to say that, for the author,
“the methodology of a concrete science is formed under the influence of phi-
losophy, but has its own status, determined by the nature of its object, of the
development of its categorial structures.”
By bearing in mind the historical development of Vygotsky’s produc-
tion, we consider the 1927 text, “The Historical Meaning of the Crisis of
Psychology”, to be understood as a benchmark for the theoretical-method-
ological course of actions taken by Vygotsky. This is especially true in the
Totality, Historicity, Mediation and Contradiction 215
beginning, when he states that the “researcher does not always have to follow
the same path followed by nature; the opposite path is often more advanta-
geous” (Vygotsky, 1991, p. 261). Here, the author announces a fundamental
proposition with respect to the method that he intends to develop. We infer
that he would then be highlighting the concept of “inversed method”, which
Marx and Engels referred to when stating that “the anatomy of the human
being was the key to the anatomy of the monkey.”
Vygotsky (1991) did not translate the method of dialectical and histori-
cal materialism psychology. On the contrary, his intention was solely to quote
it as reference. What he did was borrow it from the core of Marxism and use
it as the principle for his theoretical and methodological foundations. Thus,
he could move forward in his research, deepening it and denying the dichot-
omy between theory and practice. The author claims not to want to restrict
his actions to mere quotations. Instead, he declares his intention to take full
advantage of Marx’s method, and then theoretically discuss how the produc-
tion of science takes place, especially considering consciousness—which is his
purpose of investigation (Vygotsky, 1991, p. 391).
We need to underline Vygotsky’s enterprise in the struggle for the consti-
tution of Psychology as a science, emphasizing his endorsement that science is
the only path to truth and that, throughout this pathway, psychology would
be confronted with millenary prejudices. Nevertheless, the author makes a
number of considerations, warning that, despite the effort to overcome errors
and prejudices, it is imperative that the contribution from previous genera-
tions be recognized. In the author’s words:
We do not want to be unreasonably simplistic; we do not have delusions of
grandeur, thinking that history starts with us; nor do we want to receive from
history clean and trivial designation; we want a name on which the dust of
centuries has settled [he is referring to the designation of Psychology]. It is
precisely on this matter that we find our historical entitlement, the sign of our
historical role, the aspiration to realize psychology as a science. We must be
united and related to what came before us, because even when we are deny-
ing it we are leaning on it. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 405, our additions)
Faced with this and many other statements by Vygotsky, we reiterate with-
out a doubt that his theoretical construction is based on historical and dia-
lectical materialism and, consequently, on its categories. This is clearly stated
in his text “The Historical Significance of the Crisis in Psychology,” when he
says: “I do not want to repeat a couple of quotations about what the psyche
is. What I want is to learn the full scope of Marx’s method; how science is
built; how to focus on the analysis of the psyche” (Vygotsky, 1991 vol. 1, p.
391). Our thesis is that Vygotsky appropriated the importance and unique-
ness of the Marxist method, and thus of the process of category construc-
tion. Therefore, we understand that the objectification of commodity as a
category constituted an inspiring path for Vygotsky’s theoretical process of
production.
Commodity, as a category proposed by Marx, overcomes its expression
as a concept that may describe an object. This is so because, commodity is
constituted as a theoretical and a methodological design, through which
the author carries out an analytical effort to apprehend, explain and render
explicit the historical process of formation of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion, essential to the understanding of the reality studied by him.
We need to stress Vygotsky’s aforementioned analytical effort, by which
he formulates his proposal of a new psychology that, based on dialectical
and historical materialist principles, could overcome the propositions of the
idealistic method. With his TROIKA3 companions, the author took the cat-
egories totality, historicity, mediation, appearance-essence, contradiction, and
connected them in the dialectical movement of category production that
was typical of this new psychology, that is, consciousness, thought, language,
sense, meaning.
According to Marx (2011, p. 59), categories are constituted as “forms of
being, determinations4 of existence”. They are theoretical constructs, abstrac-
tions that express the apprehension of the movement of the studied phenom-
enon. They shed light on and explain a certain zone of reality: how we can
penetrate the reality being woven and to what extent.
Aguiar (2001, p. 95) states that “categories are an ideal construction that
carries the movement of the studied phenomenon, its materiality, its contra-
dictions, and its historicity.” Therefore, they assist us in the analysis of the
constitutive relations of the object under study. It is safe to say that the cat-
egories guide our process of apprehension of the reality beyond appearance,
helping us to produce knowledge beyond ideology which, like a “smoke-
screen”, conceals it and makes it “opaque” in its superficiality.
As an example of the relevance when we are dealing with the under-
standing of the aforementioned categories, in the analytical process we use
an investigation which is being carried out at the moment: “The Subjective
Dimension of Educational Processes”. This investigation is part of the
PROCAD5 Project—call for application # 071/2013 and is carried out by the
Teaching Activity and Subjectivity Group (GADS) of the Pontifical Catholic
University of São Paulo (PUCSP). Our reflections on the themes addressed
in this paper have deepened in the practice of the critical and collaborative
research that the PROCAD project has been developing in the discussion
loci shared with the researchers from the participating universities (PUCSP,
UFPI,6 UERN,7 UFAL8).
The use of the highlighted categories aims at guaranteeing the appre-
hension of concrete reality, beyond its appearance, beyond what is immedi-
ately shown and what carries simplistic explanations of reality, that is, those
of the cause-and-effect type. We can exemplify with the following statement
by some primary school teachers of the São Paulo state school system, from
a school that we will call Collaborative School 1 (CS1), about students: “stu-
dents do not learn because they have no interest in learning.”9 This type
of statement, though an attempt by the teacher to explain a phenomenon,
dwells on the appearance of the processes under investigation, and unfor-
tunately, is restricted to the appearance of the phenomenon, disguising the
complex constitution of reality which is contained in the complex teaching
and learning process.
Discussing the importance of categories is paramount in guiding the
researcher’s reasoning while attempting to apprehend the multiple dimen-
sions of reality, and therefore, whilst questioning reality to understand it, s/
he can produce scientific knowledge beyond appearance by answering: How
does the phenomenon show itself? Why does it show itself? Why does it show
itself in this manner? How else could it show itself?
Within this process of collective analysis, GADS’s researchers found the
need to discuss and deepen their knowledge about the dialectic and histori-
cal materialism. This allowed them to expand their analysis production of the
process experienced by the group. They were also able to see that this analy-
sis was gradually more refined. As a fundamental aspect to be considered, we
argue that the development of the analysis movement to which we refer was
only perceived because it was guided by systematic critique and self-critique,
enabling us to think about the movement by which we produce research and
scientific knowledge, while at the same time producing critique and self-cri-
tique about these very processes. In Vygotsky’s words (1927/2004, p. 291),
“when science uses critical reasoning as method, both the process and the
result of this process are radically distinguished from critical discussion”—
thus indicating a promising path.
Our understanding is that critical reasoning, used as a methodological
principle, paves the path for an analysis that is based on historicity of facts and,
thus, for the apprehension of the movement of what is real, its contradictions,
transformations, producing new explanations for the studied reality.
Understanding that the notion of reality is contradictory and that nothing

is fixed or unchallengeable, we recognize that thought is also set in motion
and is constituted as reasoning that comprises this movement, as reasoning
that is conscious of the dialectical relation between historicity, totality, medi-
ation and contradiction, that is, as categorial thought.
The analysis movement undertaken by GADS by connecting theory with
the information and questions arising from intervention, had revealed the
urgency to deepen the understanding of some categories considered essen-
tial for the effective movement of analysis and interpretation of our object
of study. It should be noted that the movement stated by GADS shows the
group’s effort to undo the theoretical-methodological confusion of the the-
ory-practice dichotomy which is so often seen in our studies because it binds
theoretical concepts and categories to questions arising from the practice.
We return to the central axis of the article, namely: the discussion of the
importance of the categories previously indicated, understanding them as
central in Vygotsky’s work, as resources that constitute possibilities for appre-
hending reality, expanding the process of objectification of new explanations
for the object under study. That said, these categories will be discussed in
their specificities as well as within the practice that makes them evident, as one
would expect. This paper organization is due to the fact that we argue that
the category does not exist in isolation, it is dependent on the materiality that
is expressed in it, and it brings within this materiality elements of other cat-
egories, all of which determine its existence. Therefore, in their articulation,
the categories express the movement of what is real, and this is always contra-
dictory, historical and constituted by multiple determinations.
Next, we present the categories, restating their relevance for educational
research, and we also present our purpose as a research group, that is, to
produce knowledge about teacher education, based on the sociohistorical
psychology framework, since we understand that by using this theoretical
background, we can promote advances in the teacher educational processes
prevailing in Brazilian education, and therefore collaborate directly for the
promotion of social changes.
Historicity, Totality, Contradiction and Mediation: Essential

Categories for the Research (on) and Teacher Education Process
Through the complex movement of search for satisfaction of their needs,

human beings also produce and systematize scientific knowledge about real-
ity. Comprising this continuous process of knowledge production, we restate
the dialectical and historical materialism assumption that reality is movement
and that therefore, throughout the process of appropriation of this reality’s
multiple determinations, it is essential that we also set ourselves in motion
while carrying out our research, highlighting the importance of using the
aforementioned categories as analytical and interpretative resources.
Taking this into account, we stress that the research movement under-
taken by us constitutes us, and is carried out as praxis due to the circum-
stances of the investigation, the object under study, that is, by the specificities
or uniqueness of the situation, even those that are not perceived by the sub-
ject. All this process is marked by “a continuous replacement” (Prado, 1980),
though not an arbitrary one since it essentially takes into account the already
existing elements, overcoming them by incorporating them.
This process was experienced by GADS and we have tried to objectify it in
this study. Let us take as an example a movement that took place in the group,
which is in line with the statement made by Prado Jr., previously mentioned.
At a certain moment, when the researchers were using the methodological
procedures known as Simple Self-Confrontation (SSC) and Crossed Self-
Confrontation (CSC), developed by Yves Clot (2010), we noticed the need
to move beyond the script of this procedure, in order to respond to the need
built up in the group, that is, to more clearly produce transformations in the
researched reality, the Brazilian school. Thus, we began a strenuous process
of study, giving rise to a new modus operandi, the research with a critical and
collaborative perspective. Essentially a critique to the way things were being
developed, and still maintaining some elements of the methodology then
employed; in other words, by using SSC and CSC, this movement allowed
the group to overcome these procedures, producing the “new”, which can
also be understood as producing a new way that was fertile with the experi-
ences and practices that the group had, but now allowing for the use of the
perspective of critical and collaborative transformation.
We see this movement of denial and overcoming present throughout
Vygotsky’s work (2004), for example, when he criticizes reflexology in the
text on the Crisis in Psychology:
Every new grain is in fact already the broadening of the concept. Every new
found relation between two existing facts immediately requires the critique
of the two corresponding concepts and the establishment of new relations
between them. Conditioned reflex is the discovery of a new fact with the help
of an ancient concept. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 239)
Still on the subject of overcoming movement, based on methodologi-

cal critique, Vygotsky (2004, p. 295) sustains the intention of not limiting
himself to exposing the infertility or criticism of a certain principle, since, as
a principle, it has already composed science from undeniable facts and analo-
gies. Rather, he aims to scrutinize the facts, exhibiting the false and the truth.
And, furthermore, from the critique of these facts and of the principle itself,
his intention was to gather “other new facts”. The purpose is to, after the
confrontation and explanation of the facts, explain how the false and the true
built up a new principle to be overcome.
Our experience shows us—and it is precisely what we want to demon-
strate in this paper—that the richness of categories lays in their possibilities of
rendering explicit and explaining what is real, and that within the movement
of enlightening the multiple determinations, these categories can be poten-
tialized, enabling us to apprehend reality.
In the process of using the categories it is also possible to improve them,
considering the reality investigated and the need for new categories. This is so
because reality is historically constituted.
We also argue that, given the specificity of the object under study, and
depending on the historical movement of the society and similarly on the pro-
duction of scientific knowledge, categories may be denied and overcome. This
allows us to fully agree with Vygotsky, when he states that “…the method is
both a prerequisite and a product, the instrument and the result” (Vygotsky,
2007, p. 69). Agreeing with Vygotsky, Kahhale and Rosa (2009, p. 26) say
that “the method consciously and deliberately seeks to grasp the movement,
the relationships, and transformations that exist in the facts; it needs tools to
become feasible, it needs criteria, and categories of analysis “.
The researcher is committed to performing an analysis of the object nar-
rowed down for study, explaining its genesis, which is historical and mul-
tidetermined. Consequently, s/he takes on the challenge of carrying out,
through the analysis that is made possible by specific categories, a thorough
and intense study that s/he considers, throughout the entire research pro-
cess, the social reality as the totality that is susceptible of becoming known by
means of the mediation of the particularities that constitute it. Only then can
s/he contemplate the movement of a wide spectrum of social changes.
Although we sustain our intention to discuss the categories of mediation
and contradiction, we emphasize that such categories do not exist as isolated
forms, nor do they exist dissociated from other categories, proper to dialecti-
cal and historical materialism, such as those of totality and historicity.
Mészáros (2013), in his book “The concept of dialectics in Lukács”,
upholds that “social totality” without “mediation” is like “freedom without
equality” (p. 58). The author refers to the impossibility of thinking about
social totality without considering the mediations that constitute it. This
means that it is impossible to think of totality as immediacy.
And, we would add that it is not possible to think of historicity, with-
out considering the dialectical movement that defines it as such, and which
is understood as contradictory. This process would be emptied, idealized, if
seen without the mediations that constitute it. The studied reality—in our
case, the educational processes—can never be seized as composed by isolated,
linearly linked facts. One needs to analyze the totality of the studied phenom-
enon. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand that the object of analy-
sis is the synthesis of innumerable and complex determinations, that compose
the totality. The reality in which the object of study is inserted dialectically
determines its mode of expression in its specific history and within the his-
tory of society as a whole. According to Kosik (1976), Totality, in dialectical
reasoning:
[…] does not mean all the facts. Totality means: a reality as a structured, dia-
lectical whole, in which or from which any fact (classes of facts, sets of facts)
can come to rationally be understood. Accumulating all the facts does not
yet mean knowing reality; and all the facts (gathered together) do not yet
constitute totality. Facts are knowledge of reality if they are understood as
facts of a dialectical whole—in other words, if they are not unchangeable,
indivisible, and indemonstrable atoms from whose gathering together reality
may emerge—if they are understood as structural parts of the whole. (Kosik,
1976, pp. 35–36)
As we have seen here, having knowledge of all the facts is not equivalent
to understanding the dialectical totality, or rather, to totality understood by
thought that is guided by the general dialectics of things. Grasping the dialec-
tical totality of the object under study means understanding its very essence.
Therefore, we reiterate that totality is more than the knowledge of many par-
ticulars, or of its sum.
We infer that Vygotsky (1991), conducting his research with the purpose
of developing a new psychology, was concerned to demonstrate to the aca-
demic community of his time that psychological phenomena should be stud-
ied as a dialectical totality. For this reason, based on dialectical and historical
materialism, the author sought to develop a general psychological theory that
could encompass the human psyche as a totality. Kahhale and Rosa (2009)
emphasize the dimension of multiplicity and that of variability of reality, stat-
ing that for their analysis the categories of totality and mediation are essen-
tial. In their words:
The category of totality implies a dialectical link in which the part and the
whole, the singular and the plural are dialectically intertwined; they are not
taken one for the other, but they do not exist in isolation, so they are not sep-
arately grasped. This means that the singular expresses dimensions of the plu-
ral or of the whole that constitutes it, just as the whole dialectically articulates
all the possibilities of the singularities from which it is produced. In order for
this process to be apprehended, one works with the category of mediation.
(Kahhale & Rosa, 2009, pp. 30–31, emphasis added by the authors)
With the help of the previous excerpt, we reiterate that the process consti-
tuted by the mediation of the singular and the plural, dialectically objectified
in multiple determinations, composes the movement of human history. The
human being is born and lives in the movement of history production and, at
the same time, they are constituted as active subjects, because they make his-
tory. History is a constant “being” and “becoming”, it is a dialectical move-
ment. According to Lefebvre (1975, pp. 21–22):
One could not say it better than stating that dialectics only exists (dialecti-
cal analysis, exhibition or “synthesis”) if there is movement: and that there is
only movement if there is a historical process … History is the movement of
a content, engendering differences, polarizations, conflicts, theoretical and
practical problems, and resolving them [or not].
The previous quotation already shows the explanatory power of the cat-
egory of historicity; its importance to unveil the movement, transitions, con-
tradictions and possible syntheses. Historicity constitutes the human being
even before his/her birth. In order to understand and to render this historic-
ity explicit, one needs to consider the human being as a being, which is also
constituted by the history of humanity, in the same movement, or at the same
time that s/he is constituting this history.
The category of historicity allows us to look at reality and think of it in

motion and, more than that, it allows us to apprehend its movement. It is
raised to the position of fundamental principle, and is presented as ontologi-
cal insofar as it is constitutive of human, social and cultural realities, and due
to its potential to account for both the genesis and process of transformation
of that reality.
The category historicity thus allows us to stop focusing mainly on what
reality is and start focusing on “how it came about”, “how it has moved
and transformed” and what the contradictions, seized in a given historical
moment, indicate for the upcoming future. Thus, it is necessary to take into
account the cultural atmosphere of the time and space in which the investi-
gated object (ideas, values, knowledge, practices) was being constituted, in
other words, the spirit of the time.
In our analyses, the use of historicity as a category has enabled us to over-
come the naturalization of the phenomena, of mechanistic and linear eco-
nomic determinism, the naturalization of the idea that our subjects’ speeches
are mere answers, promptly provided to questions asked by the researcher. As
Vygotsky reminds us, based on Marx, speaking of historicity implies referring
to the “general dialectics of things.”
When discussing the importance of historical analysis, Vygotsky (1991, p.
62) states that:
(…) According to Engels, naturalism in historical analyses occurs on the
assumption that only nature affects human beings and that only natural con-
ditions affect the historical development. The dialectical approach, whilst
admitting the influence of Nature on human beings, states that they, on the
other hand, also affect Nature, and, with their changes on Nature, create new
natural conditions for their existence.
We take this opportunity to discuss the speeches of teachers from the

Second Collaborating School (CS2), who are participating in the investi-
gation which we have called “The Subjective Dimension of Educational
Processes”: “… there are professions for the rich and others that are for the
poor…”; “…rice and beans are good enough for students of public schools
…”, “the students are the ones that need help, not the teachers”, with a view
to emphasizing that, during the process of data analysis, we cannot run the
risk of taking these speeches in their immediacy, that is, isolated from the his-
torical process in which they have been constituted. If we did so, we would
be generating naturalizing explanations which are not the result of the move-
ment of denial of the empirically constructed, because these explanations
do not apprehend the dialectic and historical movement that constitutes the
teacher whose speeches are being analyzed. They fail to consider what leads
the teacher to produce such ideas.
With a view to better explaining our position, we refer to Lukács (1979)
to emphasize that history is not a mere movement, that is, it is not a matter of
looking at aimless, undetermined, ungoverned movement. The author clar-
ifies that the historical movement is determined by power relations that are
constituted within the period of existence of one object or another, which is
not the same as agreeing with historical determinism.10
Heller (1972, p. 2) states that history is the substance of Society and that,
for this reason, human society does not have any other substance besides the
human being in their objective conditions of existence,—and we may add
the subjective conditions as well. Furthermore, the author says that it is the
responsibility of human beings to create and sustain each social structure.
However, she calls our attention to the following:
(…) this substance cannot be the human individual since s/he can never
contain the extensive infiniteness of social relations—though individuality
may be the totality of his/her social relations. Nor can this substance be
identified with what Marx called “human essence”. We will see that “human
essence” is itself historical too; History, among other aspects, refers also to
the history of human essence explicitness, but is not identified with this pro-
cess. The substance does not contain only the essential, but also the continu-
ity of all heterogenous social structure, the continuity of values. Therefore,
the substance of Society can only be History itself. (Heller, 1972, p. 2)
The proposals set forth by Lukács (1979), Heller (1972) and Vygotsky
(2007) refer us to the consideration of how we seek to explain, through our
analytical movement, the constitutive processes of our object of study, and
how we seek to move forward, beyond the object of study understood solely
as product. Consequently, we seek to analyze mediations that historically con-
stitute the studied phenomena, always bearing in mind what is the focus pro-
posed in the research.
This said, we state that, in our investigations, significations11 gathered from
the teachers’ speeches on whichever processes they are referring to will only
be interpreted beyond appearance. Such movement will take place by means
of an analysis procedure known as constructive-interpretative (González Rey,
2005), which creates zones of intelligibility about the historical constitutive
process. We also need to always remember that the interpretation is carried
out by the researcher, thus one needs to consider that there are implications
here which relate to his/her historical uniqueness.
We argue, as does José Paulo Netto (2017, p. 5), that:
(…) by capturing its [the object’s] structure and dynamics, by means of ana-
lytical procedures, and carrying out its synthesis, the researcher reproduces it
in the dominion of thoughts; by means of investigation that is made possible
thanks to the method, the researcher reproduces the investigated object at
realm of the idealized.
However, we are left with a query: which elements are still necessary for
us to explain this movement of apprehension of the investigated object steer-
ing away from idealistic explanations that are detached from social reality and
based on the principle of identity, for which whatever is stated is sufficient?
Our understanding is that knowledge production on multiple constitu-
tive determinations of the historical subject is only possible by denying that
the human being is an isolated being. By the same token, it is only possible
by affirming that this historical subject is dialectically constituted, in his/her
relation to the social, carrying out what Vygotsky (2007) called the social
genesis of the individual. Our investigations aim at understanding this gene-
sis by apprehending the mediation relations that historically constitute them.
In the research process of GADS in the second Collaborative School,
during a moment of discussion between teachers about the meaning of being
a teacher, the following debate took place: “It is expected that you transmit
something”; “This idea of mediator is new. But the transmitter12 is old. You
don’t go to the classroom and just stay there, mediating. You teach.”
The teachers express concepts that have been presented to them in their
process of education, and that have caused conflict among them, whilst at the
same time, have revealed theoretical mistakes that are probably the result of
their academic education. As we can see, for these teachers, mediate means
solely to link knowledge to the student rather than teaching—understood as
transmitting knowledge.
Our analysis, aimed at apprehending the constitutive and transformative
processes of collaborating subjects, we seek to render explicit and to explain
determinations that have historically constituted their significations. To do
this, we thought essential to specify that our target is the apprehension of the
historical subject of the activity, “rather than his/her linguistic production or
the text/discourse produced by him/her. Our object of study, what we seek
to analyze and interpret, is the human, that is, we focus on the subject in his/
her relations. This aspect will detach us from linguistic analyses and place us
on the field of subjectivity analyses of the historically constituted subject”

(Bock & Aguiar, 2016, p. 50).
Our analytical movement, by means of Signification Nuclei,13 starts with
the collaborators’ significations (subjects’ speeches); we are never restricted
to the immediacy of these speeches, but seek the historically founded medi-
ations that have constituted them. Based on Gonçalves and Bock (2009, p.
121), we state that monocausal analyses based on naturalizing appearance of
what is real, “lead to abstract and universal formulations about individuals
and societies; they seem to speak of the whole, or of everything, but in fact
speak of very little.” Therefore, in the analytical movement, we demonstrate
the essential need not only of the category of mediation, but also of those of
totality and historicity, and reiterate that there are no such things as isolated
facts.
In the analytical process presented here, there were several aspects to be
apprehended, made explicit and analyzed. The collaborating teachers have
their own personal histories, which are rich in determinations. They are in a
school institution which is also comprised of constitutive elements, norms,
laws, values, pedagogical proposals, etc.—a school reality which is also marked
by specific physical space and a geographical context.
Even if we are unable to contemplate the infinity of determinations that
constitute an object, a process or a situation, we cannot fail to be coher-
ent with the notion of historicity. It is therefore imperative that we consider
that the educators that collaborate with us in the process of knowledge pro-
duction and ourselves also (everyone in fact) become who they are within
this process; we are all constituted within the “general dialectics of things”
(Vygotsky, 1929/2000). Thus, what the teachers feel and think, the way they
act does not result only from determinations such as current Legal Orders or
School Norms, or anything in the power relations between the different seg-
ments (students, teachers, etc.). This acknowledgement leads us to consider
the need to use the category of totality because significations are also histor-
ical constructions. Consequently, we have the task of also understanding and
apprehending the mediations pertaining to ideology, to social class condi-
tions, to cultural-historical elements, etc. The analyzed discussion revealed
disagreement-based conflicts between the teachers, whilst at the same time
exhibiting theoretical misconceptions that they have as one of their constitu-
tive elements in academic education.
As stated before, this group considers mediating as simply linking knowl-
edge to students, rather than teaching, fulfilling the teacher’s role, transmit-
ting knowledge. Facing this consideration, we could apprehend one of the
theses: that certain terms are publicized prior to being correctly understood,
becoming common sense in schools. This occurs both due to speedy teacher
education programs, and wide-spread, but not specialized media.
We intended, with this brief example, to present a type of analysis that
brought to the fore and explained the movement that constituted some signifi-
cations without, however, naturalizing or blaming the research participants.
Significations produced by teachers indicated to us the fragile understand-
ing about the definition of mediation. This frailty may generate misconceived
interpretations of Vygotsky’s propositions. Therefore, it is common in the
field of education to see that the category of mediation is understood as a
concept that refers to links, a type of connection established between two ele-
ments such as, for example, the student and their learning possibilities.
We seek the assistance of Oliveira, Almeida and Arnoni (2007, pp. 102–
103) to state that mediation acts as “a negative force that unites the imme-
diate to the mediated and, for this reason, also separates and distinguishes
them.” Therefore, even if it carries out “the passage from one term to the
other, mediation is not only a ‘bridge’ between two poles; it is one of the ele-
ments of the relationship that is entrusted with making it possible.”
We also agree with Severino (2002, p. 44), to whom mediation is “[…]
an instance that relates objects, processes or situations to each other; from this
understanding, the concept will designate an element that will enable the pro-
duction of another that, though different from the first, guarantees its imple-
mentation, enabling it to become concrete.”
Human relations, understood as social and historical in nature, are con-
stituted within the dialectic reality. For this reason, they are marked by con-
tradictions, always understood as social phenomena objectified by different
mediations that are interposed as an organizing core that generates new and
sharper contradictions. Therefore, in social relations, mediation is seen as
essential element for the promotion of learning, and consequently, for the
promotion of human beings’ developments
Cury (1985, p. 43) says that mediation “expresses the concrete relations,
and mutually and dialectically links different moments of a whole.” We can
then infer that, throughout a human lifetime, social relations are constituted
by cultural-historical mediations. In this process through which one human
being is introduced to the world by another human being, s/he learns, devel-
ops and truly becomes human. In order to apprehend the complexity encom-
passed in this process of human formation, it is essential to bear in mind the
mediations that compose it.
Returning to Vygotskyan theory, we can say that there are two types of
mediating elements: tools and signs. Human beings are capable of creating
their own tools for a certain objectives—which is a characteristic that distin-
guishes them from other animals. Besides, they can keep these tools for the
future and convey information about the function and production method-
ology of such instruments to other members of their society. Therefore, the
instruments correspond to social objects that are mediating in the relation
that the individual has with the world. Along the same lines, signs are tools
that belong to the psychological activity. They have similar roles as those
taken by tools in the work field, that is, they help our minds to become more
sophisticated, allowing for a regulated behavior.
According to Vygotsky (2004, p. 480), “it is thanks to signs that the
psychological structure of personality radically transforms itself, qualita-
tively acquiring a new character.” And we could add that it never becomes an
immediate reflex of the sign. Without neglecting the dialectic production in
which it is created, we understand that semiotic mediation must be consid-
ered essential for the constitution of human beings. We argue, therefore, that
it is not an exclusive phenomenon of objectivity or subjectivity, but has dou-
ble determination, makes the existence of the historical and unique individu-
al’s forms of being feasible, and simultaneously enables social reality to exist.
Basing his arguments on Marx, Vygotsky himself discusses the relation-
ship between tools and signs, making it clear that the signs cannot be consid-
ered as mere tools that transform the outside world—and we would add: as a
mere tools that intermediate the link between two sides. By bearing Wertsch
(1988) work in mind, Aguiar (2000, p. 131) highlights that “as a psycholog-
ical instrument, the sign does not change the object of a psychological oper-
ation, but psychologically influences the behavior of both parties involved.
Thus, the sign is seen as a means of internal activity”, aiming at the domain
of humans themselves.
In this reasoning, we can say that the category of mediation is imple-
mented as a constitutive and organizing category of higher psychological
functions, taking a central role in the process of thought and language pro-
duction. To make the mediation process more evident, nothing can be clearer
than Vygotsky’s own statement that “the meaning of a word represents such
a tight amalgam of thought and language that it is difficult to say when we are
dealing with a speech phenomenon or a thought phenomenon” (Vygotsky,
1993, p. 104)
In Vygotsky’s theory, language occupies a central position, representing
the most fundamental symbolic system. The first function of language is that
of social interchange. In other words, human beings use language to com-

municate with their peers. The second function is to serve as generalizing
thought, that is, as a resource to order what is real, grouping its multiple
determinations by similar general features.
Thought and language have different origins and develop independently.
In his studies, Vygotsky (2010) sought to understand the origin and paths
taken by these phenomena in his studies, and considered processes that are
prior to thought and language as “pre-verbal phase of thought development”
and “pre-intellectual phase of language development” and, by comparing this
with the development of superior primates, he found connections with human
development. In face of these considerations, we agree with the author when
he states that the “word with meaning” must be considered as a synthesis of
the mediation relations that are constitutive of the human being; the word
indicates the path for the apprehension of the dialectical relationship between
the human and the social.
Nonetheless, Vygotsky clarifies that the thought is not directly expressed
in the word; actually, it often fails to do so, which leads us to take the insuf-
ficiency of a given description and employ analytical-interpretative effort to
deny appearance, understanding it as essential element, though an element to
be overcome. As indicated by Vygotsky (2010, p. 482), we have to “analyze
the meaning of the word, which, for Psychology, has always been the other
side of the moon—the one that has not been studied and is still unknown.”
Vygotsky (2007, p. 83) states that: “only the objectification of internal-
ized processes can guarantee access to specific forms of superior behavior in
opposition to subordinate forms”. Along the same lines, M. F. Iarochevski
and G. S. Gurguenidze (1991) explain that to Vygotsky, the way to become
acquainted with human phenomena is by denying the positivist proposal that
knowledge should be produced from sensorial data rather than as synthesis
carried out by consciousness, from a number of sensorial experiences. Such
statements must be understood as part of the benchmarks placed by dialec-
tic reasoning, which allows us to carry out a non-dichotomic analysis of real-
ity. Only then can objective-subjective, external-internal, part-whole, just as
thought-language, sense-meaning, cognitive-affective be apprehended as dia-
lectic pairs, as elements that constitute each other in a relationship of medi-
ation. We believe that, by explained as we did, we avoid positions that take
these poles on their own, as conflicting or complementary parts.
What we ought to apprehend in order to understand the human being
is their objectifications, which do not maintain a relationship of identity
with the objective reality that contain them as essential element, one that
is constitutive of the objectivity and subjectivity unit. This said, we can also
affirm that human beings are unique and, at the same time, social, because
each one is constituted as a synthesis of the social when they transform the
social and the historical into subjective, they reveal these aspects in their entire
expressions.
Basing our work on Marxist production, we reiterate that the determina-
tions refer to the elements that compose reality; they are essentially constitu-
tive of the object of study. Therefore, we stress that the human being contains
the social as constitutive element, as determination, without being the social
themselves, since both are mutually interwoven, though maintaining their
identities. By the same token, the thought contains the affect as essential ele-
ment, as determination, and vice-versa, each keeping their uniqueness in this
relationship. This said, we can state that the relationship that exists between
these elements is nothing but mediation.
When we come across data of a given reality (EC1), in which teachers say:
“we would like to know what to do” and where researchers quickly answer
“the teachers want a recipe”, we again run the risk of falling into the trap
of immediatism, of staying with the apparent reality rather than analyzing
the complex mediations that exist in the studied situation. In the case of
our investigation, the teachers were immersed in a situation of public service
neglect, with little if any resource that might meet their professional needs.
In such conditions, when they came across professionals from the field of
Psychology, they sought the possibility of asking for some kind of “help”.
Let us see another example, concerning an investigation carried out in a
local school in São Paulo where the teachers were in a less precarious situa-
tion than the one previously cited. In this municipal school, which we have
called Collaborating School number 2—EC2—participants in a discussion
group related to the teacher’s profession, tried to answer a question “asked
by an ET” about what it meant to be a teacher. They reached the following
definitions: “We, human beings, are not perpetual. So the elderly must tell the
younger generations how things work, how we reached the situation in which
we live so that people can decide what paths to give their lives;” “A human
being that is capable of helping another, of understanding the world in which
s/he lives. Usually, this happens in a place called school.”
We stress that, by “simplifying” the answers provided to the ET about
what it means to be a teacher, the participants had to think about the human
condition, which is in tune with the sociohistorical view even if they do not
see this from a scientific perspective. When they think of the answer, they
seek the history of humanity—“We, human beings, are not perpetual”—and
continue by exemplifying with the history of human beings in society, when

they state that “elderly must tell the younger generations how things work.”
And then, they stress their activity in the world “A human being that is capa-
ble of helping another, of understanding the world in which s/he lives […]”.
The excerpts highlighted from the teachers’ speeches offer possibilities to
produce explanations about how they conceive the relationship between the
human being and society. Production of possible explanations are enabled
by means of the articulation of the categories of historicity, mediation and
activity. We reiterate that these categories constitute the materiality of the
phenomena that we study in the sociohistorical perspective and that, for this
reason, they allow us to understand reality that exists beyond appearance.
We would like to repeat also that the stated speeches serve can be analyzed
because they are constituted by “words with meanings”, that is, by words
that are constituted as parts of a whole. They are words that contain, as part
of their properties, the synthesis of a number of relations that constitute the
participant, so as to indicate the paths for the apprehension of the human—
society dialectic relationship.
Though considering the importance of the categories that we have high-
lighted, and from which we made explicit the meanings that refer to the dia-
lectic relation of the research participant with society, that is, those that refer
to the synthesis of a innumerable relations, we face the need to communicate
our understanding of the category of contradiction as essential to complete
the our analysis. Initially, we stress Cury’s (1985, p. 29) statement when he
says that “[…] contradiction is of double aspect. It is immanent to the devel-
opment of what is real and is the category that can subjectively reveal the pro-
cess itself.”
By quoting Afanassiev (1963), Alfredo (2013, p. 103) stresses the need
to consider that contradiction becomes effective in different conformities of
reality, and affirms that:
(…) the appropriation of the dialectics that exists in the history of the devel-
opment of human kind, regardless of whether one looks at the analysis of
a particular aspect or a specific matter of individual life, will always depend
on the theoretical-methodological assumption by which one argues that the
struggle between opposites undoubtedly supports (…) all the “experience of
the development of science and social practice. (Alfredo, 2013, p. 103)
From the previous excerpt, we can state that contradiction explains the
continuous and mutual transformation of the unit of contraries that exist
in a given object, process or situation under study. Thus, we infer that the
struggle between contrary elements moves the history of development both

of human beings and society. This can be confirmed by looking at the histor-
ical movement of class struggle.
Producing explanations about processes such as the one about teacher
education, with a view to rendering its dialectics explicit, implies exposing
the contraction that exists in its genesis. It is this contradiction that, when
strained by objective and subjective conditions, promotes the movement of
changes in the processes—changes that may signify a move forward or back-
wards. Thus, by the very denial and overcoming by assimilation, processes
develop historically.
By assuming the risk of presenting something too lightly or neglecting
the analytical depth, we explain another analysis carried out by our group.
This excerpt is composed of teachers’ speeches from EC2, all of which par-
ticipated of a group discussion about Feeding Education and Nutrition, part
of the abovementioned investigation of PROCAD: “Sometimes I am embar-
rassed when I have this kind of student in the class, and I keep thinking that
I may expose him/her. Or, you know that we live in a district that is under-
privileged, don’t you? And you know that some children here do not have an
adequate feeding habit at home”; “They bring this already from home, right?
These little packages. I see that, even at home, there is a replacement of this
food. Maybe it is because the other food that I am talking about does not
exist, because the district is underprivileged. I see this food replacement, of
rice, beans, greens with meat by chips snacks. It may even be because they are
easier. All you need to do is open the package and eat. There is no need for
that…you don’t spend anything to prepare them, do you? … “rice and beans
are good enough for students of public school…”.
It is important to stress that these speeches were said in a group of teach-
ers who are concerned with getting better prepared to take care of students’
nutritional matters. We emphasize that, at the moment of the first contact
with the teachers’ speeches, the risk is that we may keep to the immediacy
contained in such significations, that is, to take them in isolation from the his-
torical process that constituted them. If we did this, we would produce nat-
uralizing and guilt-ridden explanations, concealing the contradiction that the
process of meaning production contains.
In order to overcome the knowledge production restricted to the appear-
ance of the object, process or situation, it was essential that we base our work
on Vygotsky, so as to consider that the word with meaning is our unit of anal-
ysis, and taking into account that, as part of the meaning’s property, it con-
tains elements of the social historical process of the formation of the object
to which it (the meaning) refers. Therefore, the word is the starting point to
be overcome by the analytical movement. Even if they reveal the objective
and subjective conditions of the research participants, the analyzed significa-
tions must be considered as the first appearance of what Kosik (1976) called
“pseudoconcreticity, an expression of historical, complex and contradictory
subjects that do not show themselves in the immediacy.”
As previously discussed, we are committed to not being restricted to the
empirical, because if we did so, we could not apprehend the dialectic and his-
torical movement, the contradictions that constitute the means by which the
teachers feel, think and act. The historical and analytical analysis is the only
way to apprehend the constitutive mediations and, therefore, the social con-
tradictions that, ultimately allow us to apprehend the “individual’s social gen-
esis”. In this manner, and only by following this procedure, can we reach the
necessary theorization to understand the historical subject.
We stress that the contradictions are proper of society and that, as such,
they are constitutive both of human beings and of society that constitutes
them. The basic contradiction of our society, the capital—work, that engen-
ders, among other outcomes, the class opposition, must be considered and
exhibited as constitutive of multiple mediations that show and explain the
presented significations. As an example, we show here the mediating force
of the dominating ideology, expressed in the teachers’ speeches—which can
lead them to maintain and strengthen the ideology that naturalizes poverty,
when they stress that the rich and the poor have different needs, hiding social
inequities.
In the case of signification analyses, no matter what object, process or sit-
uation, we should always consider that, within themselves, they do not man-
ifest the sociohistorical genesis from which they are constituted. Therefore,
the significations do not immediately expose the contraries that compose
them. One needs to deny their apparent affirmation when analyzing them,
by carrying out a synthesis process, though maintaining these significations
as components of this synthesis, overcoming appearance, and explaining the
multiple determinations that render them complex and procedural.
In synthesis, taking into account the category of contradiction in an
investigation that is carried out within the field of sociohistorical psychology
requires the understanding the field as a means by which one can explain the
dynamic movement that is constitutive both of the process of human forma-
tion, and their reality, since it is the composition by contrary elements that
guarantees the generating tension between what already exists and what is to
become.
We recover here the first and utmost intention of this chapter: to discuss and
render evident the relevance of Vygotsky’s theoretical-methodological con-
tributions for the construction of a new Psychology, supported by a new
method that may contemplate the connection between categories that are
central to historical and dialectical materialism, namely: totality, historicity,
contradiction and mediation and that also may offer substrate to the propo-
sitions of categories that allow for the production of explanations about psy-
chological phenomena interwoven in the relationship between human beings
and society. These categories guide us through the production of our investi-
gation and through the process of teacher education.
Thus, we stress that the author, based on the tenets of historical and dia-
lectical materialism and its categories, made room for the production of new
knowledge that allows us to deny and overcome the apparent reality; free
ourselves of dogmatism, of camouflaging ideology that falsifies what is real;
break free of ideas that follow naturalizing development, that end up defend-
ing “progress” for some who are already privileged.
By producing, in our investigations, explanations under the mediation of
the categories of historicity, mediation, contradiction, totality, thought and
language, among others, we have greater chances of not succumbing to con-
cepts that conceive what is real as static; naturalize it; pathologize the means
by which people feel, think and act; that drag us to alienating analyses that are
not committed with concrete reality. For this reason, we consider it essential
to bear in mind the intention to produce a type of knowledge that favors the
kind of education that we call emancipating
As proposed by Vygotsky, in the production of research about educational
processes, we kept in mind the need to resort to a method that contains the
critique as an assumption, that allows for the denial and overcoming of the
explanation of phenomena that is restricted to layers of appearance of real-
ity, and favors the analysis of the multiple determinations contained in the
objective and subjective conditions under study. In short, it is a method that
detaches itself from the concept of science that has an empiricist nature, that
reduces the complex to the simple (Saviani, 2004).
By dedicating our work to the educational processes of educators/teach-
ers, we often infer the lack of theoretical and methodological resources that
may enable us to escape from the traps of noncritical maintenance and con-
firmation of the given knowledge. Considering the turbulent situation of
Russian society of the early twentieth century, the historical moment in which
Vygotsky lived, we emphasize his statement that only in a socialist society
will we be able to have a new psychology, constructed on different founda-
tions. Though we do not live in a socialist society, we do forget the struggle
for knowledge systematization that may result in the strengthening of the
Psychology that is proposed as science by Vygotsky.
By means of the appropriation of the contributions provided by Vygotsky,
our challenge is composed of the aim of transformation of objective and sub-
jective conditions so as to be able to intervene in order to know better and,
thus, transform. This possibility is indicated throughout his work as a path,
which is taken by the apprehension of data that are not noticed on the appear-
ance of educational processes, which undoubtedly compose the social totality,
provoking movements of critique that render explicit the constitutive media-
tions of the phenomenon, reconstructing the relations that reveal denial, and
therefore, bringing to the fore, the historical genesis.
When we accepted the above mentioned challenge, we initiated the con-
stitution of a path that comprises the struggle for an emancipating education,
which may promote, both from the part of the educators, and the students,
a relationship that is conscious of the multiple determinations that compose
history, therefore, favoring the establishment of educational praxis and effec-
tive social changes.
According to Saviani (2004, p. 40) it is essential that education may be
consolidated with a general objective of promoting an “education for subsis-
tence, for liberty, for communication and for emancipation.” When we state
the need to transform education, the need for emancipation, we indicate the
importance of broadening the process of dealienation. As stated by Mészáros
(2004), “the alienated man does not appropriate his entire essence, but lim-
its his attention to the daily sphere, to mere utility. This provokes extreme
impoverishment of Human Senses” (Mészáros, 2004, p. 182). Still to con-
clude, but without aiming at finalizing the discussion of this paper, we con-
sider it to be of essential relevance to once again mention the pillars of the
teacher education processes and investigations that are based on Vygotskian
studies.
The first aspect to understand Vygotsky’s work, considering his align-
ment with the principles found in the historical and dialectic materialism,
is that one cannot intend to state that their work is based on Vygotsky’s
ideas if they detach these from those of Marx and Engels. Therefore, the
researcher and/or teacher educator that wants to use Vygotskian principles,
and being a responsible professional, will need to seek to understand the
theoretical-methodological framework of the historical and dialectic mate-

rialism. Only by doing so will the researcher be able to return to Vygotsky’s
work in its entirety.
The second aspect is the necessary differentiation between concept and
category. While the former is confined to the description and generaliza-
tion of the object, therefore, staying at the level of its appearance, the latter
allows for the production of explicitness and the explanation of the essence
of the very object, penetrating zones of what is real and unveiling elements
beyond its appearance. This said, the researcher’s work is governed by theo-
retical-methodological rigor, which guides them to analyze and interpret real-
ity in its historical movement.
The third aspect is the consideration of critique and self-critique as essen-
tial elements within the research development. In the movement carried out
by the Teaching Activity and Subjectivity Group—GADS—presented in this
chapter, the elevation of critique, as stated before, to methodological prin-
ciple, was of vital importance. The critical movement in its inevitability, is
capable of avoiding mistakes typical of analyses that are produced by being
restricted to the immediacy and the daily routine that encompass production.
Notes
1. Since there is no standardized pattern as to how the author’s name is spelt

(Vygotsky, Vygotski), in Portuguese, we have chosen to use Vigotski, which is
the spelling that has been used in recent works published in Brazil. For similar
reasons, we have chosen to use Vygotsky in the English version, that is, because
this is the most common spelling in English texts.
2. All quotes from Vygotsky (1991) were freely translated by the authors.
3. Russian word that defines a group of three. This was the name the group of
researchers composed by Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896–1934), Alexander
Romanovich Luria (1902–1977) and Alexei Nikolaevich Leontiev (1903–1979)
used to call themselves.
4. Netto (2017) emphasizes that “determinations are traces pertaining to the cons-
titutive elements of reality; in the words of an analyst, to Marx, the determination
if ‘an essential momento, constitutive of the object’” (Dussel, 1985, p. 32).
5. National Program of Academic Cooperation.
6. Federal University of the State of Piauí (Northeastern region of Brazil).
7. State University of Rio Grande do Norte (Northeastern region of Brazil).
8. Federal University of the State of Alagoas (Northeastern region of Brazil).
9. We will use inverted commas to identify and separate the speeches of participants.
10. As we have previously explained, we understand determinations as properties that
are essential to the being (object, process or situation).
11. Significations are constituted by both meanings and senses about a given object,
process or situation. Significations are apprehended from the speeches of research
subjects, under the light of the proposed objectives.
12. Translator’s notes: here we have kept the translation closer to the Portuguese text
because, in Brazil, there is a dichotomy in schools referring to transmit versus
mediate. So the word “transmitter”, used in the Portuguese version of the text,
was kept where a translation which is closer to the target language and culture
might have been “source”.
13. See Aguiar and Ozella (2006), Aguiar and Ozella (2013), Aguiar, Soares and
Machado (2015).
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11. Imagination and Emotion as
the Basis of Social Transformation
BADER BURIHAN SAWAIA, LAVÍNIA L. S. MAGIOLINO

AND DANIELE NUNES HENRIQUE SILVA
For if the mind, when it imagines non-existent things to be present, could at the
same time know that those things did not really exist, it would think its power of
imagination to be a virtue of its nature and not a defect. (Spinoza, Ethics II,
Proposition 17, Scholium)
Introduction
Let us imagine a world where people had no imagination. Firstly, it would

be an unfounded and unreasonable request, as we would not even have the
ability to imagine. Secondly, we would be in the same level as our phyloge-
netic ancestors, repeating tracks, unable to plan the unusual. Development
would therefore be biological and natural, evolutionary at the most, in a pro-
cess where knowledge would be cumulative, the result of trials and errors, in
the same way as, for example, a monkey acts when using a stick to reach food.
Language would be a set of onomatopoeic signs, a reproduction of variations
of the nature sounds. The world would consequently be disenchanted, pre-
dictable, basically an eternal return to itself.
We believe that all social theory that eliminates imagination becomes ster-
ile, in the same way as a dry tree is unable to produce life. Hence, it is an inept
theory to think of change and, consequently, inefficient to promote social
transformation.
The great majority of approaches and tendencies of Human and Social
Sciences, notably in the areas of Psychology and Pedagogy, keep ignoring the
centrality of imagination as a founding theoretical construct in formulating
242 BADER BURIHAN SAWAIA ET AL .
their thesis statement on human specificity. We particularly cite the last two
areas, which will be discussed later in this text, as they are precisely the ones
that would have the responsibility to cultivate and to know the relevance of
imagination, as highlighted by Vygotsky (1896–1934)—one of the leading
educators and psychologists of our time.
According to Vygotsky (1930/2009a), imagination is the basis of free-
dom, without which no changes, no creation of the new occurs. Nevertheless,
this does not imply that imagination is either idyllic or bucolic, because it
is also through imagination that men create tools to exterminate them-
selves.1 Nevertheless, it is the imagination that removes the social and singu-
lar changes from chance, contingency and determinism, placing them in the
order of desire and immanence—as stated by Spinoza (1632–1677). Despite
not mentioning the term imagination, Marx had already pointed out that
conception when emphasizing that history results from the human transfor-
mation of nature:
[…] a process in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls
the material re-actions between himself and Nature. […] in order to appro-
priate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus act-
ing on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his
own nature. (Marx, 2001, p. 211)
Looking at a tree trunk and then turning it into a chair presupposes being
able to imagine what does not yet exist. After all, “[…] what distinguishes the
worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his struc-
ture in imagination before he erects it in reality” (Marx, 2001, p. 49). With
this statement, Marx asserts that it is under the creative action of man that
man and nature humanization processes take place. Hence, imagination is
responsible for the passage of nature to history (Pino, 2006, p. 49), reversing
the classical conception that the entry into culture occurs by violence and/or
repression (of, for instance, the murdering of the father).
Notwithstanding, creating an imaginary situation is not something acci-
dental in men and women’s lives. According to Vygotsky (1933/1988), in
ontogenesis, for instance, the creation of an imaginary situation is the first
manifestation of the child’s emancipation with respect to situational con-
straints. When playing, children can, in a symbolic transformation, turn a
pencil into an airplane or a piece of wood into a spoon to play house, being
able to symbolically be the father, the mother, the teacher or the scientist. By
playing make-believe, the child transgresses in and through imagination his/
her objective reality and (in)directly takes part of the surrounding cultural
Imagination and Emotion as the Basis of Social Transformation 243
universe s/he so desires and needs to belong to, even without being aware
of it.
In that way, imagining does not mean running away from reality or dis-
torting it. It is not a deficiency of the human nature, but a human virtue, a
power of the mind that characterizes our constitution. We might even attempt
to say that if our ontology is social, it is first of all (or also) creative.
It is precisely from this statement that is developed the thesis of the pres-
ent text: imagination and also emotion are constitutives of freedom and social
transformation (Sawaia & Silva, in press). In human life, imagination can
be translated into the expression of plurality that characterizes the human
beings and the power they carry with themselves of being social transforma-
tion agents.
We are going to defend this thesis on the basis of Spinoza and Vygotsky’s
reflections, recalling that Spinoza responds to the 17th-century philosophy;
and Vygotsky, to the 20th-century psychology.2 The elective affinities they
allow oxygenate themselves by exposing the libertarian dimension of imagi-
nation and that it is, consequently, a political issue, rather than exclusively a
psychic fact. We even point out that it is epistemologically and methodologi-
cally impossible to separate the political from the psychic as dissociated sphe-
res (an issue that will be discussed later in the text). Spinoza and Vygotsky
actually discard imagination from the place of alienation, of hindering the
transforming and free action, and place it as the ontological basis of freedom
(Sawaia & Silva, 2015).
Traditionally, imagination in Spinoza’s work has been interpreted in
an extremely negative form, being contemplated as a way of knowing the
world stressed by inadequacy and, simultaneously, the place of superstition
and delusion (Sawaia, 2015), associated with a lower faculty of the human
mind (sensation/ image) and, consequently, with a minor or faked form of
consciousness which must undoubtedly be corrected by the intervention of
other human faculties (especially the reason). Challenging this interpretive
perspective, Spinoza maintains that “[…] imagination is the basis of the pro-
gressive constitution of subjectivity” (Negri, 1993, p. 160). He shows this
thesis epistemologically: the image is the first form of experiencing the world.
Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance to understand that we just over-
come the images rather than discarding them (ethics), as well as that they are
not natural copies or reflections of the objects that affect us. As argued by
Vygotsky (2009a), quite the opposite occurs: the images, when present in
our mind, are in fact re(presented), undergoing processes of dissociation and
new and different combinations or mixes. This takes place because the central
nervous system is not a monolithic plaster block, but something plastic, flexi-
ble and dependent on sociocultural demands of symbolic origin.
Pino (2006) notes that human images differ from the ones produced by
animals because the former are produced by a human, historically and cultu-
rally constituted brain that transforms natural images into symbolic, meanin-
gful ones, “[…] and this semiotic character of human images is what enables
what we call creative activity” (Pino, 2006, p. 55).
Spinoza (2008) points out that our consciousness is inseparable from our
illusions (Sawaia, 2009). Knowing things does not imply that we cease to
have their images, as they will not be repressed or eliminated by reason. This
issue is very well illustrated by Spinoza through the famous example of the
sun reflected in the lagoon: by knowing the true distance from the sun, we
do not fail to perceive it or imagine it near us (Ethics III, Proposition 35,
Scholium); however, from then on we associate its image with a clear and dis-
tinct knowledge of the sun, a suitable idea of the sun.
For both Vygotsky (2009a) and Spinoza (Ethics), imagining means think-
ing through images, which allows us to make associations. As reported by
Spinoza, such associations are not contingencies, but guided by the desire to
increase the potency of life, which leads us to a constant search of what we
imagine to be a good meeting. “So long as it can, the mind strives to imagine
the things that increase or aid the body’s power of acting” (Spinoza, Ethics
II, Proposition XII, G II).
Hence, the imagination also enables us broadening our experience, as
we can be exposed to what we have not experienced directly when we come
in contact with the experience of the other (Vygotsky, 2009a). The narrated
experience mobilizes our affects, raising images that consecutively provoke
countless emotions. Imagination and emotion are two different but inexora-
bly intertwined processes.
It is in this proposition we find in Spinoza (2008) and Vygotsky (2009a)
that lies the ace in the hole to reflect upon the problem that involves psychol-
ogy regarding social transformation. Lastly, there is no social transformation
without the subjective character that contains the imagination, emotion and
desire. On the other hand, this does not mean reducing the social phenome-
non to psychologicism, but recognizing that subjectivity is collective and social,
rather than a matter of apparently individual psychology. It is the dimension
that keeps us apart from physicality and directs us to the most ordinary dra-
matic experiences of the common man (we will return to this theme later in
this text).
Imagination and Emotion or the Emotional Bonding
As previously observed, imagination and emotion have generally been treated

with derision and disdain in the scientific field, being bound to the irratio-
nality, error or pathology spheres (Silva, 2009; Magiolino, 2010; Sawaia &
Magiolino, 2016). Nevertheless, both themes have been recently tackled
again in different fields, indicating the presence of interest and concern not
only towards the development of the human beings, but with the ways of
controlling their behavior and exploring their capacities regarding the main-
tenance of the capitalist social order (Silva & Oliveira, 2007; Mendonca,
2018). Such ideological politics of affects makes Spinoza’s theory of affects
and the interpretative entirety of Vygotsky’s work even more indispensable
for Psychology and Pedagogy.
In Ethics, his most outstanding work, Spinoza (2008) analyzes the con-
stitution of affects in the liberation perspective and shows that imagination is
crucial in the socialization of affects. He emphasizes: “[…] We also endeavor
to do whatever we imagine men to regard with pleasure, and on the other
hand we shun doing whatever we imagine men to regard with aversion”
(Spinoza, Ethics II, Proposition XII, GII), what explains that we try to do
everything we imagine to be seen with joy by someone—like by my parents,
for example.
In Ethics, Book III, Spinoza (2008) carries on these reflections stat-
ing that: “Love is the imagination that our joy has because of some external
cause. Hate, on the contrary, is the imagination that our sorrow has because
of some external cause” (Spinoza, Ethics III, Definition of affects). When we
feel joy, this affect comes with the idea of the existence of the being who has
caused us such affect. Love is the imagination/desire that we should join it.
Sadness/hate, on the other hand, is encompassed by the idea/image of an
external being we imagine to be its cause. Both affects, joy and sadness, in
despite of also being imaginative processes, can lead us to act in such way that
we strive for goodness to those we love and for badness to those we hate.
Fear is also connected with imagination. It is the thought of the possibil-
ity that something bad may happen and it lies at the bottom of superstition
and prejudice: two illusory ways of understanding and dealing with the world
that lead us to submit ourselves to something that we have eventually gener-
ated, giving them power over ourselves.
It must be noted that Spinoza defends that the affects are neither lin-
ear nor monolithic, as they can predominantly be conflicting and undecided,
referring to this condition as fluctuatio animi (‘waverings of the mind’, ‘fluc-

tuations of the soul’). In Spinoza’s own words: “[…] a condition of the
mind arising from two conflicting affects should be called fluctuatio animi”3
(Spinoza, Ethics III, Proposition XVII, Scholium, GII). It is a state of suspen-
sion deriving from divergent affects, but equally powerful as love and hate.
Vygotsky’s reflections (1925/1999, 1926/2004) point towards that
direction. They refer to a stubborn defense in his work according to which
imagination and emotion are intertwined in both life and art experiences
(Silva & Magiolino, 2018). He highlights that imagination is attached to
emotion through an emotional bonding (Vygotsky, 1999), explaining that the
images of fantasy are consistent with feelings, as experiencing certain emo-
tions gives rise to several images. Simultaneously, evoking images can also
assemble diverse, often contradictory feelings and emotions. Furthermore,
Vygotsky underlines that there is also another law governing this process, the
Law of the common emotional sign or the double expression of feelings, whose
essence is the following:
Impressions or images that have a common emotional sign, that is, produce
similar emotional effects in us, have a tendency to cluster together, despite
the fact that there is no association among them either based on external
similarity or contiguity. A combined product of the imagination is generated,
which is based on the common feeling or common emotional sign uniting
these diverse elements that have become associated. (Vygotsky, 2009a, pp.
26–27)
Aiming at giving visibility to the previously exposed ideas, we will now

present some narrative excerpts from an empirical investigation4 carried out in
the rehearsal room of a collective theater in São Paulo city.5 They analytically
demonstrate the interdependence between emotion and imagination in sub-
jective experience and reveal their outcome for reflecting upon social transfor-
mation in the field of Human and Social Sciences.
On-scene Research
The Cia. de Teatro Fábrica de São Paulo (The Factory Theater Company
of São Paulo)6 developed a theater technique called immersion. It consists
of a physical entry into memory proposal in which the actors revisited places
where they had stored significant moments of their lives, reexperiencing the
emotions emerged by the dramatic plot to be staged (Magiolino, 2015). In

addition to the immersion exercises, there were also those concerned with
the creation of scenes aimed firstly at the actor or actress testing the differ-
ent roles composing the theatre play. The chosen theme was social isolation
in the metropolis.
The report presented here addresses the work of a single actress of The
Cia. de Teatro Fábrica de São Paulo, called Lorena,7 and her scene building
exercises of the character Laís—a dentist who had some kind of compulsion
for pulling her teeth out and who starts to lock herself in her apartment, liv-
ing in a kind of self-exile.
We have chosen a scenic unit in which bitterness penetrates and consti-
tutes the actress Lorena and her character Laís in the ethical and aesthetic
creation process. The data gathered was recorded in video and registered in a
field diary, and then transcribed and organized like a narrative for data anal-
ysis. We have chosen the narrative methodology for understanding it as the
expression of experience, as explained by Benjamin (1994).
The immersion exercise starts with the actresses walking around the
rehearsal room after intense warming up exercises. Following the director’s
request to face and get rid of what they want but cannot, the actresses delve
into their remembrances and more intense memories. At the corner of the
room, Lorena turns her arms slowly around herself, then she places her hands
on her head, pulls her hair, and says, over and over again: “Get out of here!”
Next, she starts moving one of her hands towards her chest while the other
one remains against her belly. As if holding a dagger, she strikes her chest
with hard beats. Then, she says: “Stay … stay there, because I think I need it!”
Afterwards, she places both hands together on her chest, looks up, and says:
“Stay, you can stay.”
Silence.
‘What would it be like if I wouldn’t have this? What would I have instead? I’d
have nothing! […] Oh, but how I wanted it came out.’ With her eyes closed,
she places both hands together on her chest and then pulls them slowly out.
Next, she rubs them. Then, she says: “Oh, but I’m waiting for the day I’m
going to lose my self-control and then I’m really going to let it all out, and
you’re going to be standing there and listening to everything.’
Her expression suddenly changes and she becomes serious: ‘You think
everything wrongly! You don’t know anything!’ Then, changing her voice,
she shouts: ‘You’ve no idea how much you’re nothing! You don’t know! But
I don’t listen to your lies anymore! […] I pretend I listen to you.’ By saying
that, she covers her ears with both hands and goes on: ‘I bluff…I smile at you
because I’m a well-educated girl! I smile at you because my mother told me
to! For me, I shouldn’t do that… because you don’t deserve it!’ […]
Lorena implies that there is something that needs to stay (she hits her-
self, then she places both hands together on her chest as if wishing to find
what needs to be kept). She also says that without that she “wouldn’t have
anything”, at the same time that she wonders what it (her life) would be like
if that (which seems to stay inside her breast) did not exist.
Lorena strongly expresses a suffering engendered by someone she says
she respects by her mother’s command: her father (as we have found out
afterwards). An emotion that endures, stays; a timeless feeling, enlivened in
her memory by her fantasy (Sawaia & Magiolino, 2016). Something that is
some sort of prison that weakens her power of action: “Oh, but how I wanted
it to come out!” Although she wants to change, she is unable to.
Lais was the next character to be focused on in the evening subsequent to
the immersion. The actresses talked freely about their ‘internal contents’ that
could feed the character Lais: old, recent and present memories and affects,
emotions and passions… The director explains them that they need to talk
about immersion in the personal universe, without, at first, being worried
about the connection with the character.
Lorena starts to speak. She says: ‘In my case, I was working with deep
bitterness, with a specific person. But I am a very bitter person and I hold
a grudge against many people. So, not only against that person, but more
against that person. I don’t like it to happen… Therefore, I control myself.’
[…]
Lorena mentions no specific person, but the negative feeling against

someone: bitterness. In her speech, it emerges three levels of bitterness: bit-
terness in itself, imbued in her personality:—‘I am a very bitter person’; bit-
terness in her relationship with the others—‘I hold a grudge against many
people’; and bitterness coming from social and value control:—‘I don’t like it
to happen… Therefore, I control myself’. The three dimensions are articulated
and indicate that Lorena’s deepest, most intimate and uncomfortable feel-
ings, provoked by work experience, are also of social nature. That allows us to
assert that the subjective processes are not only articulated with social dimen-
sions, but they also co-constitute themselves, undoubtedly involving emotion
and imagination.
Lorena says: ‘But at the same time there’s pleasure in this act, when you blow
up with someone and let something out that you have kept for a long time.
And you never let everything out anyway […], but something goes out and
that’s good, like this.’ […] Laughing, she goes on, motivated by her col-
leagues… ‘Even before really delving into bitterness, I started with some-
thing in my body, saying: It doesn’t leave here… I don’t let it out; nothing
leaves here.’ (She starts placing her hands on her chest and moves them
upwards, one at a time, while uttering the sentence: ‘It doesn’t leave here,’
until her hands reach her mouth, covering it). ‘I got to my mouth: nothing
gets out of here!’ And then, I started to touch my teeth and it came up to me
pulling them out (which brings us back to the character of Laís, the dentist).
[…]
With that scene, Lorena shows us how the memory of affect and creative
experience may also emerge in someone’s body (not in the psychosomatic
perspective). According to the philosophy of monism, mind and corporeal
body are of one substance; all that is in the mind is the body’s affectation.
Lorena keeps her explanation on this intricate path of emotions and imagina-
tion in a process where body and mind are parallel. She describes the images
(of self-destruction, followed by preserving life images) of the affected body
as well as the idea of the mind building from these images of thought—con-
cerning the fact that the character hurts herself and the others; the moral val-
ues and judgments—guilt, words and control; the moment to really say many
things, followed by the moment of not saying anything anymore, of self-con-
trol. Then, the sensations again: asthma breathing, rhinitis, diseases. There is
a complex process undergoing—language, pain, body movements, imagina-
tion and emotion are ruled by bitterness, which becomes a sad passion that
confines and weakens the power of acting of Lorena.
In consonance with Espinosa, this process restrains her acting and so
she starts to just re-acting. The idea of pulling out her teeth is an outstand-
ing metaphor for the psychic drama Lorena is facing: being subjected to the
tyranny of a socially degrading emotion that also hinders her emancipation
process.
Lorena then says: ‘But to pull out (my teeth) because I couldn’t let it go
any other way, I couldn’t let it out in the form of… word.’ […]
Lorena is aware of the bitterness domain; nevertheless, she indicates that

mentioning the word is prohibited, it cannot be expressed: the suffering of
the indescribable, but which constitutes the subtext of language, action and
other emotions. It is the sad passion that cannot be uttered due to feelings of
shame and prejudice, as well as because of a meta-feeling regarding her social
subjectivity and which leads her to another feeling: the guilt.
Lorena says: ‘And I don’t know if this is usual, but it’s a self-destructive
impulse, a desire to self-harm when you keep something to yourself that you
cannot get rid of! You cannot mention it or you don’t have any control over
yourself in relation to certain things you want to do… And then, it emerges
this self-harm impulse as punishment. […] it seems that it happens through
the body, […] it is a matter of really hurting yourself, bleeding, pulling out
your teeth, hair, skin, tearing yourself completely. […]. And then it gave me
the feeling of a need for isolation because I got so fragile, so fragile that I can-
not live in the world with everyone else, like that…’
Lorena talks with the group about how the fragility of compressing the
bitterness she regularly feels is embodied as a trace of the self, surfaced from
the father-daughter-mother social relation and conjoined with revenge.
As stated by Vygotsky: “My contempt for another person forms my appre-
ciation of this person, of my understanding of him. […] our affects act in a
complex system with our concepts” (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 127). There is a
cross-functional relationship; affect and intellect are related to one another,
(trans)form themselves, and they are reinforced by imagination in the creative
activity of the actress.
Notwithstanding, this alliance, which is the emotion-imagination unit,
is not monolithic. As already stated by Vygotsky, there is a migration and
nomadism process of emotions, so their place and function are not static.
Here, we also have some elements to understand what Spinoza calls fluctu-
atio animi—a confrontation of contradictory and equally powerful feelings.
There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every affects
compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these,
such as love, hatred, hope, fear, as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
affected. (Spinoza, Ethics, III, proposition V)
Changing is difficult, as in this case it would also mean betraying her love
to her mother. The bitterness present in Lorena’s life story, which is crystal-
lized in her chest (in the form of a stone, as Lorena mentioned in another
video recorded situation), is constantly renewed by the feeling of being aban-
doned by her father. Nevertheless, it is also nurtured by the feelings of love
and respect for the mother—it is as if feeling no anger towards her father any-
more would also mean betraying her mother. As we have seen in Spinoza,
a stronger affect is needed to transform and pull her back from this state of
‘fluctuation of the soul’.
Lorena says: ‘Oh, what I’m saying here is that, if I didn’t have it [that bit-
terness], I wouldn’t have anything… concerning that person … It’s the only
connection that exists… If I didn’t have that, I’d forgive, I’d let it go, you know?
And… I don’t want this!’
(Researcher’s comment) I insist on that being a way of withstanding
changes, insofar as when a stone is removed (from the chest) the possibility of
building something else is open. She nods and says nothing. (Researcher’s com-
ment) It is only then that I confront her directly with an image: the concrete
stone is like one of those heavy iron balls with chains that are shown in cartoons,
in movies, when someone is in prison.
After a while, Lorena says: ‘But it’s sort of that… because I think this type of
thing holds us very much in life… one can hold a lot in that way.’
A powerful image is produced: the one of a concrete stone inside her

chest, which explains the crystallization process of bitterness in her body and
mind, supporting the sad passion that crushes her. The relationship between
emotion and imagination experienced in the immersion exercise prompts the
way in which constructions of reality and fantasy orders impact her feelings,
and, despite the fact that her construction has no correspondence by itself to
reality, all the feelings it foments are true and actually experienced by Lorena,
invading her.
Moreover, this is an image that allows us to realize how the affective
process is ethical. It supports, in this case, what Spinosa calls servitude and
isolation, explaining the reason why Lorena cultivates a sad passion such as
bitterness and why she has no strength to leave this state of ‘fluctuation of the
soul’. She cannot change her emotions. This happens because her emotions
are not only hers, but also social. They result from specific social conditions
of a life experience that is incorporated in Lorena, but which belongs to many
other people living, for example, parental abandonment, and not only to her.
Hence, this situation will not be changed only by her own will. Thus, it is of
utmost importance new meetings and suitable ideas to change the sense of
affects, as we will see below:
The playwriter then asks: ‘But… pain, too?’
Lorena confirms:
‘It’s terrible, but you feel… because you also have resentful feelings
against a person, you think he deserves it. Then, at the same time it’s awful to
say certain things to someone, you know the person deserves it. So, you feel
guilty, but at the same time you say: ‘No!’ But he deserved it, he needed to
hear that. Well done, got fucked! (She smiles and puts her hand on his chest).
However, at the same time you feel guilty because… I don’t know… We’re
also Christians and there are a lot of things involved, right?’ (She laughs).
She interprets her feelings here through the mediation of the other, the
values, exposing a conflict between the emotionally lived experience and the
social norms, which is a process that transforms the psyche into a drama in
the Vygotskian sense of the term. An alliance is built with the meta-feelings
shame and guilt—by social mediation—and their manifestations as two dis-
tinct sad passions. The bitterness, which at first seems to be circumscribed to
the individual sphere, has a sociocultural origin. And, above all, it is in this
social sphere of social relations that some possibilities of transforming bit-
terness into something of the order of joy seem to emerge.8
Vygotsky had already noted when he described the centrality of the actor’s
work towards an understanding of human life:
The experience of the actor, his emotions, appear not as functions of his per-
sonal mental life, but as a phenomenon that has significance an objective,
social sense and significance that serves as a transitional stage from psychol-
ogy to ideology. (Vygotsky, 2009b, p. 21)
Imagination and Emotion in the Subjective and Social

Transformation Process: An Issue for Pedagogy and Psychology?
Going back to the thesis defended in this text, which argues that imagina-
tion and emotional bonding is the central dimension of social transforma-
tion, we find in Vygotsky the essential theoretical foundation. According to
him, creative and imaginary activities are the key categories of Psychology and
Pedagogy (1926/2010). Neglecting this centrality means acknowledging the
inability of these sciences, in their different theories, to objectively explain
what is specific to the human. On the one hand, the pendulum, without
imagination, is pulled toward a simply adaptive and responsive understanding
of subjectivity (without effective possibilities of creation). On the other hand,
it floats on the wings of the subjectivist idealism (in which creation cannot be
objectively explained, but only creatively recognized as a gift or talent).
The opportunities of acting freely arise in man’s consciousness, being
closely connected to the possibilities of the imagination/emotion relation-
ship (as we could see through Lorena’s experience).. Therefore, for Vygotsky,
it is crucial and necessary to study the imagination for not understanding it as
a simple whim or fun of the brain. For this reason, he strongly criticizes those
who regard the imaginary situation as just a form of pleasure.
The imaginary function is a condition of freedom, an ontological partic-

ularity that assures the revolutionary power of subjectivity (Sawaia & Silva,
2015). For this reason, ignoring the relationship between imagination and
emotion, speculating that it is only a matter of the psyche, means to ignore
a constitutive dimension of the social transformation and human emancipa-
tion processes. Lastly, the psychological understanding has something very
important to say to the reflection and analysis of the social phenomenon this
text highlights: the imaginative process is essential for political emancipation.
Allied to joy, the psychological understanding turns into “[…] a great force,
life power and transforming action” (Ferreira, 2018, mimeo). Furthermore,
we reiterate, it is not a process that takes place in solitude, but that depends
on the encounter.
This means to assert that creation depends on the existing materiality,
not occurring in a vacuum. Quite the opposite, it stems exactly from what is
available in reality and in history. It is from reality that we obtain the imag-
ination contents. “It would be a miracle indeed if imagination could create
something out of nothing or if it had other sources than past experience for
its creation”9 (Vygotsky, 2009a, p. 20). For this reason, the responsibility of
Psychology and Pedagogy is a key factor, since the sciences are those that
symbolically meditate the possibilities of composing and transforming human
experiences, amplifying subjective experiences.
In this perspective, the worst mistake of education is to overlook creation.
Educating always means changing (Vygotsky, 2004). If there were nothing to
be changed, there would be nothing to educate. Thus, Vygotsky underlines
that the authentic Pedagogy is the one which is articulated with the creation
of life—the live in a concrete and historical materialist perspective.
In Pedagogical Psychology (2004), the term life gets a very specific mean-
ing: “a system of creation, of constant straining and transcendence, of con-
stant invention and the creation of new forms of behavior” (p. 462). It is
the teacher’s duty to freely circulate the creative processes in the classroom.
S/he must always be aware of what matters and make sense for the student.
Opening the imagination means to prepare oneself for what lies ahead, to
guide oneself towards future interest or to what lies in the prospective field.
Accordingly, Vygotsky defends an aesthetic education in which art is
conceived as fomenting a fundamental experience in human formation: the
aesthetic experience, which enables a qualitative change in the dynamics of
emotions. And that is also the responsibility of Pedagogy and Psychology. As
argued by Vygotsky (1999, p. 342), “As any intense experience, the aesthetic
experience creates a very sensitive attitude to the later acts, and, evidently,
never disappears without leaving a trace to our behavior.”
The art drives the imagination, given that the aesthetic experience means
to live the different, the new emotions and ideas that both foster our develop-
ment and disturbs us because they give rise to contradictions, to short circuits
(as Vygotsky would say). The purpose of art is not only to contaminate us
with the character’s emotion, “[…] but to rise ourselves above it, to force us
to win it, to beat it” (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 339).
Vygotsky has a resolute faith in the human development incorporated in
imagination and in the power of devir that emerges from the concrete and
objective conditions of history: a history that can always be changed, trans-
formed and guided by a horizon of freedom. In the end, “man is richer than
his life” (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 339). Vygotsky bets on the New Man—a term
applied to define the man who emerges from Socialism after the Revolution
of 1917.10 He argues that, without imagination, whether reduced or con-
trolled, no emancipation takes place and history is just a simple reproduction.
This is a conception that places imagination and emotion at the heart of
the development process and reverts Psychology and Pedagogy. This is not a
matter of teaching and/or developing creativity, but of advancing (and releas-
ing, when necessary) the power of the body to feel and of the soul to think,
as well as the desire of changing, of developing life beyond customs, routine
and norms. Nevertheless, we must not forget: imagination without the criti-
cal awareness of the affectation process is servitude—albeit one being illuso-
rily located in the level of reason.
We must also bear in mind that imagination is (it can be) hindered by
social conditions. All things considered, “Life will only be creation when it is
definitely free from the social forms that mutilate and deform it. The prob-
lems of education will only be solved when the questions of life are solved”
(Vygotsky, 1999, p. 462).
All of that which is defended by Vygotsky—among other things, the
weight he assigns to Psychology and Pedagogy—is originated from the idea
that development must be guided towards complexity, being constantly in
expansion, broadening the human capacity for reflecting upon what it knows,
feels and imagines, thence avoiding subordination.
And what does Espinosa have to tell us about education?
As noted by Ravà (2013), the greatest Spinozian philosophers will argue
that there is no place for Pedagogy in their system, but that there are many
elements that allow us to maintain that there is an important pedagogical/
political meaning in the system of the Portuguese philosopher, namely: the
concept that we are beings of passion, imagination and relationships, guided

by the desire to boost our power of thinking and acting with freedom and
happiness, given these feelings are interwoven. This increase is not produced
by distancing oneself from others. Spinoza urges on the social dimension of
this happiness that must be shared with the others:
[…] to my happiness belongs giving attention to many other people working
for the same thing to understand the same I do […]; it is necessary to form
such a society to be acquired, so that the greatest number reaches that with
greater easy and safety.11
For Espinosa, one of the bases of the collective life organization is educat-
ing young people to love and to know what is true (Ravà, 2013, p. 263), and
that education takes place through experience. Experientia docet (the experi-
ence teaches us), an expression often used by Spinoza, shows us that we feel
and learn from our experience, for the good and evil: “On the one hand,
the experience, for being imagination, is a space of illusion never ceasing to
deceive and deceive itself; on the other, it is the teaching, the wisdom” (Ravà,
2013, p. 289). For that reason, education should aim at both offering us
good experiences and the possibility of reflecting upon the appropriate ideas
of our quotidian experiences. It should not be oriented to obedience and res-
ignation, but to questioning, reflecting and daring to think the different, con-
fronting ideas and creating. That does not mean, however, a free education,
lacking constraints and contradictions, but just the opposite, as in its core is
found the rigid nucleus of the connection imagination/emotion and reason.
That is a proposition Vygotsky translates into his psychological theory, argu-
ing that Psychology and Pedagogy must not ignore that such understanding
of emotions and imagination is essential to social transformation, which is
always of a subjective order.
Chauí observes that the mark of the image is abstraction, in the strict sense of
the term. It is what is separated from its real and true cause, and that is why it
leads the soul to produce imaginary causes (Chauí, 2003, p. 200).
[…] anything can become a sign for imagination: a burning bush, a shooting
star, a river that dries up, an eagle carrying a serpent in its beak, the entrails
of a sheep, a glass of water, a burning candle, the darkness of a room, and so

on. The imagination translates into signs such things when it removes them
from its natural existence, being able to look for the appropriate idea or to
find mysterious, hidden meanings in such signs, which demands a compre-
hensive submission to instructions and rituals. And when the sign turns itself
into the hypostatization of what the imagination ignores as being its creation,
the cult is created. And everything can turn out to be the object of such wor-
ship: a stone, a piece of plaster, a river, monkeys and rats (as in India), even
sores and wounds, in addition to ordinary books, worshiped as if they were
authentic philosophy. Interpreting the signs will call for unique endowments,
or it will depend on the grace received by the few chosen to master such
interpretive practices.
As we have already seen with Lorena, the signs are converted into
symptoms, myths, instruments of servitude under the passionate existence.
Nevertheless, as we have stated throughout this chapter, the imagination is
linked to affects by associations that both reduce our powers and enable us to
expand our possibilities of thinking, feeling and acting. That is what allows us
to be active, rather than reactive—being the mass of maneuver, for instance.
In other words, the questions raised in this chapter show us that imagination
and emotion enhance human action in the direction of freedom and emanci-
pation. Moreover, this also needs to be understood in terms of class suruggle
consciousness: a political emancipation related to powerful encounters.
We observed the extensive exploitation of this reactivity in the last
Brazilian elections, which was characterized by the exploitation of the sad
passions of the individuals who were locked in their reactivity—hatred against
a political party, and fear of the other one. After all, “the tyrant needs sadness
to be able to govern while the sad souls need a tyrant to support and to prop-
agate” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 34) in reactivity, and not in activity.
When the understanding is not powerful enough to redirect imagination,
the latter pursues its pretension of knowledge, of rationality deluged with
affection, searching in the outside world signs that corroborate with what it
imagines to be true, in a similar way that a jealous man finds out in everything
signs of betrayal, even in the special smile that his beloved gives him. In other
words, the imagination—or the act of forming images—only leads to errors
when the mind blends the real and the imaginary, deeming as being actually
present the things it just imagines. Apart from that, the imagination is in itself
a virtue or a power of the mind.
Spinoza, in Ethics IV, from Proposition XVIII, begins to discuss both the
strength of desires that are born of happiness and that result from our rational
dimension and the importance of cultivating them, given that they are stron-
ger than those coming from sadness: “The desire that is taken from the joy
is stronger, under equal conditions, than the desire which arises out of sor-
row.”12 Both ethics and politics demand freedom, because we can only be
happy with freedom, and happiness can only be obtained through a work on
passions that inhibits actions and imagination—always keeping in mind that
this is a historically cultivated process as a strategy of power. Nevertheless,
even as the place of a wrong choice, imagination and emotion shelter the idea
of social transformation (Sawaia & Silva, in press).
Concluding, we refer to a sentence of Santos (2001, p. 17) we find appro-
priate to be recalled at the end of this text, unifying, in line with the reflec-
tions we have presented here, identifying with imagining: “The power of
alienation is originated from this fragility of individuals when they can just
identify/imagine what separates them, and not what unites them.”
Notes
1. Professor Daniele Nunes Henrique Silva, “A negatividade da imaginação” (“The

negativity of imagination”—Lecture), The Pontifical Catholic University of São
Paulo, São Paulo, June 23, 2017.
2. Spinoza’s thinking of monism strongly influenced Vygotsky’s work.
3. “Haec mentis constitutio, quae scilicet ex duobus contrariis afectibus oritur,
animi vocatur fluctuatio [...].” (Spinoza, Ethics III, Proposition XVII, Scholium,
G II, p. 153).
4. Lavínia L. S. Magiolino’s postdoctoral research was conducted in The Program of
Postgraduate Studies in Social Psychology of The Pontifical Catholic University
of São Paulo under the supervision of Professor Bader Burihan Sawaia. The pro-
ject, entitled “Emoções no processo de organização dramática do psiquismo—
transformação e significação nas relações éticas e estéticas” (Emotions in the
dramatic organization process of the psyche—transformation and significance
in ethical and aesthetic relationships), was supported by FAPESP (São Paulo
Research Foundation).
5. In Brazil, more precisely in São Paulo, a significant number of theatrical and
artistic collective groups have been showing a growing interest in creating shows
addressing social issues and the subjective contradictions experienced in the city
in a provocative manner. These groups fought for the composition of a public
policy regulated by law, which allocates annual municipal budgetary resources to
finance artistic research projects in the municipality. The group researched in this
paper, the Cia. de Teatro Fábrica de São Paulo (The Factory Theater Company of
São Paulo), with almost thirty years of existence, was composed of four actresses
and a director at the time this research was conducted.
6. The Cia de Teatro Fábrica de São Paulo authorizes the disclosure of its name for
this research. It should be pointed out that the project was evaluated and appro-
ved by the Ethics Committee and the terms of free and informed consent were
duly signed.
7. Lorena is a fictitious name, because although the Cia. de Teatro Fábrica de São
Paulo authorizes the disclosure of its name, we have decided to maintain the con-
fidentiality in relation to our research participants.
8. “Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem
affectu coercendo” (Spinoza, Ethics IV, Proposition VII, G II, p. 214).
9. It is relevant to point out here that, for Vygotsky (2009), the experiences are not
only those directly undergone by the subject, but they also influence the creation
of the experience of others, the historical experience, intensified or mediated by
the word, the sign, the culture.
10. As Prestes (2012, p. 23) explains: “With the introduction of the Soviet power,
the first socialist country faced many political, economic, cultural and social
challenges. The priority was education, which should cease to be a privilege of
the few to be transformed into one of the rights of any citizen, being created, for
that purpose, a new educational system. [...] with the task of building the foun-
dations of the Soviet Psychology and Pedagogy, which aimed at the formation of
the new man, what created the demand for new ways of thinking Science.”
11. “[...] de mea felicitate etiam est operam dare, ut alii multi idem adque ego intelli-
gant (…); necesse est tantum Natura intelligere, quantum sufficit, ad talem natu-
ram acquirendam; deinde formare talem societatem, qualis est desiderandam ut
quamplurimi quam facillime, et secure eo perveniant” (Spinoza, Ethics, § 14, G
II, p. 8).
12. “Cupiditas, que ex laetitia oritur, caeteris paribus, fortior est cupiditate, que ex
tristitia oritur” (Et IV, prop. XVIII, G II, p. 221).
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12. The Challenges of the Reception of
Vygotsky’s Theory in View of Missing
Revolutionary Changes
GORDANA JOVANOVIć
Introduction
The title of this book explicates its main goal—to revisit Vygotsky’s theory
for social change. This is an instance of a broader problem of relationship
between theory and practice—a topic with a long tradition, starting already
in the philosophy of the ancient Greece. Over the centuries, status of both
theory and practice and their relationship have changed. Generally speaking
modern times are characterized by shifting preferences toward practical appli-
cation of knowledge, in contrast to the previous medieval neglect of practical
attitudes and values. Thus, one of the founding figures of modern philoso-
phy René Descartes, alongside with his strong subjectivism and rationalism
insisted on the importance of the use of reason. Both the title and the subtitle
of his famous Discourse on the Method (1637/1971) explicate that—at stake is
the “method of rightly directing one’s reason”. Right at the beginning of the
Discourse Descartes argues: “For it is not enough to have a sound mind; the
main thing is to apply it well” (Descartes, 1637/1971, p. 7), before Discourse
Descartes devoted a separate writing to the Rules for the Direction of the Mind,
composed in 1628, nine years before Discourse, but first published only post-
humously, in 1701.
However, it is worth reminding that in this context practice has a rather
narrow meaning. It is closer to technique than to practice in the sense of
practical social activity. Asking the question What is praxis? in 1970s Hans-
Georg Gadamer, one of the most important philosophers of the 20th cen-
tury, admitted: “We don’t know anymore because due to the outcome of the
262 GORDANA JOVANOVIć
modern concept of science we are pushed in direction of application of sci-

ence when we speak of praxis” (Gadamer, 1976, p. 54; my translation from
German). Instead Gadamer argued that the proper origin and subject mat-
ter of praxis lies in the common social life. Thus, praxis should be defined by
social intentionality. In this way the questions of organization of society are
necessarily included into definition of praxis.
However, as Gadamer pointed out, due to changes in the very under-
standing of knowledge in modernity—the foundation of knowledge in expe-
rience, and mostly sensual experience that led to a very fast development of
science, accompanied by an impressive technological development based on
application of scientific knowledge—and due to the modern privileging of
scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge and experience—even
the very understanding of praxis has been transformed, or rather reduced to
application of scientific knowledge.
These phenomena are aspects of scientism, a form of reductionist think-
ing or rather ideology which assumes that scientific knowledge is the only
valid source of knowledge and values in general. A more specific meaning of
scientism is expressed in beliefs that only natural science methods are proper
scientific methods that should be applied to all other sciences. In words of
Tom Sorell: “Scientism is a matter of putting too high a value on natural sci-
ence in comparison with other branches of learning or culture” (Sorell, 1994,
p. 1). Sorell speaks even of “infatuation with science”, some other strongly
evaluative expressions are “scientific expansionism” or “fundamentalism”.
After the very notions of knowledge and theory have been transformed
they in turn necessarily contributed to a transformation of the notion of
praxis. What is common in these processes of transformation of knowledge
and theory, on the one hand, and praxis, on the other hand, is their isola-
tion from a broader context on both sides—on the side of subjects who pro-
duce knowledge and are involved in practical activities, and on the side of
objects to be known and acted upon. As scientism already imposed exclusion
of “human factor” from scientific methodology and such a methodology has
become understood as a universal methodology mandatory also for social and
human sciences, whose subject-matter are exactly human factors in different
forms, it is clear that such a reductionist concept of knowledge and science,
when applied to social issues, necessarily leads to further devastating reduc-
tionism. Not only that praxis has become reduced to application of science or
scientific knowledge, but knowledge itself has become beforehand freed from
“human factor”. Thus, access to praxis as a social human activity has been
epistemologically and conceptually made impossible.
The Challenges of the Reception of Vygotsky’s Theory 263
I would claim in this concluding chapter that “application of Vygotsky’s

theory” presupposes a broader, non-technical concept of praxis. In other
words, a proper “application” of Vygotsky’s theory requires at the same time
a transformed concept of praxis, that is, such a concept of praxis which is ori-
ented toward society as a totality and keeping on Vygotsky’s very strong con-
cept of theoretical thinking, which is necessarily dialectical and historical. In
arguing for such an understanding of relationship between theory and praxis
in Vygotsky I will especially refer to his writing The socialist alteration of man
(1930/1994) where Vygotsky explicated societal preconditions for develop-
ment of a new psychology of human beings. These societal preconditions
mean no less than a new, and for Vygotsky meant that a non-capitalist society.
Vygotsky’s Cultural-historical Thinking
The history of reception of Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory contains

in explicit or less explicit forms broader social and political histories, both
national and international ones. These historical intertwinings of Vygotsky’s
theory transcend the usual understanding of historical contextualization of
theories. The surplus of historical saturation stems from both Vygotsky’s the-
ory itself and changes in historical contexts, on the one side, in Soviet Union
and Russia, and on other side, internationally. (See, for example, Dafermos in
this book or in 2018.)
As far as Vygotsky’s theory itself is concerned, historical saturation is expli-
cated in the very characterization of his theory as a cultural-historical theory.
And it should be born in mind that already according to the pure nominal
criterion Vygotsky’s theory is an exception in the history of psychology, espe-
cially in its early history. There are many reasons for uneasiness of psychol-
ogy with history—historical, political, cultural, epistemological ones. Instead
psychology dominantly adopted naturalism as its standpoint and accordingly
an epistemological model which generates conceptualization of psychic phe-
nomena as natural kinds (Danziger, 1999; Jovanović, 2010). Naturalization
of psychic phenomena deprives them of features which are constitutive of
human subjectivity and human, historically constituted world (meanings, val-
ues, reflexivity). In that way psychology as science has actually missed what is
supposed to be its subject-matter—experiences and actions of human actors
in a world created by humans themselves.
Given such a generative status of naturalism in psychology, it is worth

reminding that naturalism has a quite long history in which it experienced
quite different vicissitudes, ranging from being accepted as a self-evident truth
to being subjected to critique and repudiation. But so far its acceptance pre-
vails and naturalism has indeed become a very strong paradigm, ingrained in
many structures of modern epoch, not just natural sciences. Another import-
ant domain where naturalism flourished in modern epoch is law. Even though
the very idea of natural rights dates back to Stoic philosophy (for example,
Seneca in the first century AD, in De Beneficiis claimed—the mind is indepen-
dent, and free, it cannot be restrained), it is in the modern epoch that nat-
ural rights became the common topic of philosophical discourses (Hobbes,
Locke, Hutcheson) and beyond that an indispensable reference in building
social and political institutions of modern societies. Even religion was recon-
ceptualized in Protestant Reformation when Martin Luther (1483–1546)
returned faith to responsibility of individuals—every man is responsible for
his own faith (Luther, 1520 in On the Freedom of a Christian). In contrast,
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) associated natural rights with a presupposed
state of nature in which every man has right “to use his own power, as he will
himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life.”
(Leviathan, 1, XIV). John Locke (1689) emphasized the right to life, liberty
and even property. Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Francis Hutcheson
(1694–1746) in his moral philosophy considered freedom of judgment an
inalienable right.
There is no doubt that naturalism has substantially determined modern
understanding of humans as beings born free and endowed with reason, com-
mon sense. In that respect naturalism has had an emancipatory role. It dis-
coursively granted freedom to every human being stating that liberty is an
unalienable natural right. However, at the same time, by naturalizing freedom
and reason, important questions on development, and especially historical
conditions of development are excluded. Postulating freedom and equality
as human rights does not by itself warrant freedom and equality—certainly
not for all, but the claim was exactly that all human beings are free and equal.
Thus, it could be argued that at this point naturalism has subverting function
as far as working toward securing real historical and social conditions under
which humans could enact their rights to freedom and equality is concerned.
Naturalism exceeds conceptualization of rights. Human capabilities were
also a privileged domain for naturalistic accounts. Historically, reason as a
common sense was understood as naturally given to human beings. At the
beginning of his Discourse on the Method Descartes stated to show that:
(…) the power of judging well and distinguishing truth from falsehood,
which is what we properly mean by good sense or reason, is naturally equal
in all men; and furthermore, that the diversity of our opinions does not arise
because some men are more rational than others, but only because we direct
our thoughts along different ways, and do not consider the same things.
(Descartes, 1637/1971, p. 7)
The very fact that Vygotsky developed cultural-historical psychological

theory expresses his departure from the prevailing understanding of human
psyche outside of psychology and within psychology as it was understood and
practiced in his life time, in the first decades of the 20th century. According to
Vygotsky, psychology was at that time in crisis, which he analyzed extensively
in his work The Historical Meaning of the Crisis of Psychology, written in 1926–
7, but published only posthumously. In sum, psychology was not able to
study specific human psychic phenomena, which means the most developed,
the highest psychic functions in a scientific way. Vygotsky was at that time
not alone in stating the crisis of psychology—another known example is Karl
Bühler’s Die Krise der Psychologie (1927). However, Vygotsky was alone in
working toward a historical psychology, in the strong sense, as he introduced
achievements of historical development of mankind, first of all language, into
the very structure of psychic functions, as shown in his study The History
of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1931). Thus, Vygotsky con-
vincingly argued that even the development of psychic functions has its his-
tory. In that sense Vygotsky’s psychological theory is a strong alternative to
naturalism.
Beyond the usual label “cultural-historical theory” associated with
Vygotsky’s theory, the most important point is Vygotsky’s cultural-historical
argumentation. Exactly that meaning was stressed by Soviet historian of psy-
chology Yaroshevsky who wrote in his book devoted to Vygotsky: “Vygotsky
referred to his theory as cultural-historical. This term stressed that the factors
determining the individual’s life activity and the wealth of his psychical world
were produced by the historical development of culture” (Yaroshevsky, 1989,
p. 19). And we can read Vygotsky’s words:
in the process of historical development the social man [obshchestvenny
chelovek] changes the methods and devices of his behavior, transforms natu-
ral instincts and functions, and develops and creates new forms of of behavior
—specifically cultural. (Vygotsky, 1931/1997b, p. 18, italics added by G. J.)
Vygotsky’s main argument is that the process of historical develop-

ment is founded on a different principle, and thanks to that different princi-
ple humans have developed higher, that is, cultural pychic functions which
are then tools in building human world —a historical, social, cultural world.
Vygotsky stated: “The laws of historical evolution of man differ fundamen-
tally from the laws of biological evolution and the basic difference between
these two processes consists of the fact that a human being evolves and devel-
ops as a historical, social being” (Vygotsky, 1930/1994, p. 182; italics added
by G. J.).
Given such a status of the historical in Vygotsky’s theory, it is striking
to me that the historical itself has been hardly a subject-matter of analysis in
Vygotskian scholarship. I have drawn attention to that in a special issue of The
History of the Human Sciences devoted to Vygotsky:
the components of the compound signifier ‘cultural-historical’ of Yygotsky’
theory have quite different histories so far. ‘The cultural’ has been privileged
in theoretizations and research, while ‘the historical’ is left either self-under-
standable or marginalized, if not completely ‘unattended’—except, of course,
at the level of ‘history of the higher psychic functions’. Neither the histori-
cal itself nor its relative marginalization comparing to the status of the cul-
tural have been subjected to a systematic reflection in Vygotskian scholarship.
(Jovanović, 2015, p. 11)
Such a weak reception of the historical in Vygotskian scholarship cannot

be explained just by epistemological reasons, even though they certainly have
played their role. Reception horizons are shaped by totality of life worlds, as
they are understood in Husserl’s late philosophy. To life world “all human
beings and all accomplishing activities and capacities always belong…every-
thing that happens and develops here exists in the life-world and in the man-
ner of the life-world” (Husserl, 1936/1954/1970, p. 138). To Husserl, it
was “life-world, which originally grounds ontic meaning” (Husserl, 1936/
1954/1970, p. 218). Thus, if a life-world does not contain and foster capac-
ities for and sensitivity to the historical, it will remain invisible, unrecognized
or ignored. Henry Daniels draws attention to some reasons which explain a
rather weak historical approach to Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory:
Interestingly, whilst attempts to develop Vygotsky’s work in Russia have not
foregrounded semiotic mediation but have foregrounded the analysis of social
transmission in activity settings, much of the work in the West has tended to
ignore the social beyond the interactional and to celebrate individual and
mediational processes at the expense of a consideration of socio-institutional,
cultural and historical factors. Ideological differences between the West and
the East have given rise to differences in theoretical development and of
course pedagogical application. (Daniels, 1996, p. 9)
Scientism associated with naturalism understandably diminish interest

and sensitivity to the social, cultural, historical. A powerful factor in shaping
life worlds are certainly political ideologies—in this context the dominant
Western political ideology of individualism and liberalism. Both individualism
and liberalism share strong naturalistic assumptions, privilege individuals and
have a very poor concept of society, which is mostly seen as a source of restric-
tions imposed on individuals.
In contrast, Vygotsky has a strong concept of the social. Explicitly the
social is represented in his theory in interactions and symbolic tools which
were produced as a consequence of humans living in groups with increasing
complex organisation.
The word ‘social’, as applied to our subject, has a broad meaning. First of all,
in the broadest sense, it means that everything cultural is social. Culture is
both a product of social life and of the social activity of man and for this rea-
son, the very formulation of the problem of cultural development of behavior
already leads us directly to the social plane of development. Further we could
indicate the fact that the sign found outside the organism, like a tool, is sep-
arated from the individual and serves essentially as a social organ or social
means. (Vygotsky, 1931/1997b, p. 106)
With such an understanding of the social Vygotsky formulated the

socio-genetic principle of psychic development. It is important to stress that
Vygotsky made clear that the social cannot be restricted to interpersonal
interactions.
We might say that all higher functions were formed not in biology, not in the
history of pure philogenesis, but that the mechanism itself that is the basis
of higher mental functions is a copy from the social. All higher mental func-
tions are the essence of internalized relations of a social order… Changing
the well-known thesis of Marx, we could say that the mental nature of man
represents the totality of social relations internalized and made into functions
of the individual and forms of his structure (Vygotsky, 1931/1997b, p. 106).
Vygotsky—The Socialist Alteration of Man
If “the mental nature of man represents the totality of social relations”, then it
follows that for a different mental nature of humans different social relations
are necessary. Vygotsky addresses that issue explicitly in the text “The social-
ist alteration of man” published in Varnitso, the journal of the All-Union
Association of Workers in Science and Technics for the Furthering of the
Socialist Edification in the USSR (Van der Veer, 1994). In the context of
reception of Vygotsky’s ideas it is worth mentioning that in the second pub-
lication of Vygotsky’s work in English titled Mind in Society (1978), which
consisted of edited excerpts from Vygotsky’s works and contains a bibliogra-
phy of Vygotsky’s works given in English translation, the text by Vygotsky is
rendered as “The Communist Reconstruction of Man” (Vygotsky, 1978, p.
147) The Russian title was Sotsialisticheskaja peredelka cheloveka [Socialist
transformation of man]. This biased translation is just a small example of influ-
ences of cold war interpretive repertoires on allegedly objective domain of sci-
ence. If it would be too unrealistic to assume that the Western non-spezialised
audience was in possession of theoretical differences between socialism and
communism, it is indeed strange that it was chosen to offer a translation of a
word which does not exist in the original title. If we accept the assessment by
Joseph Glick—“In contrast to the earlier introduction of Vygotsky in Thought
and Language the Vygotsky of Mind in Society proved generative” (Glick,
1997, p. IX)—then this biased edited translation becomes even more import-
ant. It would be very unlikely to assume that a reference to communism could
instigate interests in Vygotsky’s broader socio-psychological project.
Coming back to the original title of Vygotsky’s paper, I think it is indeed
very telling. It describes the goal of the social project inaugurated by the
October revolution. Obviously Vygotsky shared that project and its goals.
His theoretical contribution to this project was developing a concept of a new
psychology. In accordance with his general cultural-historical understanding
of development of psyche social conditions need to be changed first in order
to secure presuppositions for changes in psychic functioning of humans.
Vygotsky explicates three roots of transformation of man which will fol-
low from societal change accomplished through the socialist revolution. The
first root “consists of the very fact of the destruction of the capitalist forms
of organization and production and the forms of human social and spiritual
life which will rise on their foundation”. The second springs from the fact
that “an enormous positive potential present in large scale industry, the ever
growing power of humans over nature, will be liberated and become oper-
ative.” The “third source which initiates the alteration of man is change in
the very social relations between persons. If the relationships between people
undergo a change, then along with them the ideas, standards of behaviour,
requirements and tastes are also bound to change” (Vygotsky, 1930/1994,
p. 181).
Vygotsky is very clear in his position, accusing capitalist organization of
society of “crippling effects” on human development. Quite in a Marxist man-
ner he mentioned as the “crippling effects” “corruption and distortion of the
human personality and its subjection to unsuitable, one-sided development
within all these different variants of the human type.” (Vygotsky, 1930/1994,
p.176) Overcoming capitalist organization of society would bring a radical
turn in activities of individuals—“Whereas earlier their actions were directed
against people, now they begin to work for their sake” (Vygotsky, 1930/1994,
p. 181).
From these statements it is clear that Vygotsky is consistent in his views on
social genesis of psychic processes. From such a position it follows that social
and societal conditions have a determining role in psychic development,
that is, they have developmental priority. Vygotsky explicated that before he
turned to the program of a “socialist alteration of man”, already in his writing
on the crisis in psychology, written in 1926–7.
We cannot master the truth about personality and personality itself so long
as mankind has not mastered the truth about society and society itself…In
the future society, psychology will indeed be the science of the new man.
Without this the perspective of Marxism and the history of science would
not be complete. But this science of the new man will still remain psychol-
ogy. Now we hold its thread in our hands. (Vygotsky, 1927/1962/1997a,
pp. 342, 343)
Thus, a new society would need a new psychology, or from another per-
spective, a new society is a precondition for a new psychology. These are
Vygotsky’s programmatic statements, but unfortunately they were not fol-
lowed by further elaborations. To my knowledge, Vygotsky did not elabo-
rate more on relations of his already developed cultural-historical theory of
human psychic development and the future psychology of a new man. Given
the fact that Vygotsky’s History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions
was published after The Socialist Alteration of Man, in 1931, this would allow
to assume that Vygotsky’s theory of development of higher mental functions
was a contribution to a development of a new psychology. However, in The
History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions he did not make any
reference to the socialist transformation of man.
However, given the fact that Vygotsky wrote on the socialist transforma-
tion of man and socio-economic conditions for that transformation to occur,
in 1930, which means thirteen years after the accomplished October rev-
olution, it could be concluded that in Vygotsky’s view the revolution itself
and the post-revolutionary decade or so did not provide sufficient conditions
for that change, that is, the formation of a new man. In 1930 Vygotsky still
speaks of future psychology.
Nevertheless, there are theoretical reasons to assume that Vygotsky’s
theory of the development of higher mental functions conceptualizes indis-
pensable capacities of subjects of future society. They certainly need to be
conscious of the world and of themselves and instead of these capacities to
be taken for granted, as in many psychological theories, Vygotsky’s theory
offered an explanation of their genesis, and that not as a consequence of
their natural maturation but as having a social origin (in interactions) and
being mediated by symbolic tools (most importantly by language as a histor-
ical social product). This is the mechanism of development of higher, or as
Vygotsky called them, cultural mental functions. It is a mechanism structur-
ing the development of specifically human mental functions.
What is missing in Yygotsky’s theory—and this omission could have dif-
ferent reasons, including the sad fact that Vygotsky died just few years after
he turned to the project of developing a theory of consciousness of which
Thinking and Speech, published in the year of his death in 1934, was a part—
are more differentiated, more socially and semiotically saturated conceptions
of basic notions and the very mechanism of development. Both the origin of
development, that is, social interactions and means, that is, symbolic tools are
permeated by class, race, gender positions and their semantics. In this way,
psychic functions transmit and reproduce social order with its structures of
domination and discrimination. Consequently, individuals while being agen-
cies of social reproduction are also confronted with constrains ingrained in
social order which are beyond their influence, or even beyond their awareness.
While social change requires changed subjects, changed subjects do not nec-
essarily change society in its totality. As rightly warned by Niklas Luhmann,
(1992) there is no interaction which can reach society in its totality. This
systemic asymmetry sets the limits of individually or even inter-individu-
ally achievable social change. Nevertheless, it is clear that a radical change
requires changes at individual, inter-individual and socio-structural level.
Building New Society and New Human Being
The defining feature of individuals with agentic status in social transforma-

tions is certainly—mastering own behavior, or in traditional vocabulary free
will. Vygotsky offered a different approach to this basic feature of human
individuals. Instead of assuming it as an internal essence, as understood in
modern discourses, Vygotsky, in accordance with his socio-genetic theory of
higher mental functions, externalizes free will as well, linking it to external
stimuli. As with other mental functions Vygotsky provided explanation of
the genesis of mastering own behavior, not just its final form. And the gen-
esis goes through the external to the internal: “the basic law of our behav-
ior states that behavior is determined by situations and reaction is elicited by
stimuli; for this reason the key to controlling behavior lies in controlling stim-
uli. We cannot master our own behavior except through appropriate stimuli”
(Vygotsky, 1931/1997b, p. 210).
External stimuli in human development include also other individuals.
Thus, the development of free will of an individual depends on control of
stimuli coming from other individuals. Vygotsky’s general labeling “stimuli”,
although with an acknowledged origin from natural sciences, allows for dif-
ferent contents. But even though Vygotsky did not explicate the content of
stimuli coming from other humans, it is possible, I would claim, to ascribe
to them patterns of domination or discrimination as well, or as Vygotsky
described them in The Socialist Alteration of Man—patterns “against people”.
Coming back to the question raised above—whether Vygotsky’s the-
ory of the history of the development of higher mental functions could be
understood as a contribution to the future psychology, that is, psychology
of a new man, I would argue that in Vygotsky’s texts we can find justifica-
tion to claim that this would be possible. Clearly, two Vygotsky’s texts—The
Socialist Alteration of Man and The History of the Development of Higher
Mental Functions are quite different in many aspects, but nevertheless they
have in common a clearly socio-genetic understanding of human psychic
development. While in the first text Vygotsky explicated societal conditions
for development of a new man, in the second text Vygotsky mostly dealt with
the structure and genesis of higher mental functions. However, both soci-
etal and individual psychological perspective are directed toward the same
goal—freedom, understood as mastery of human own life or behavior. At a
historical level “The leap from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom
of freedom’ …inevitably puts the question of the mastery of our own being,
of its subjection to the self, on the agenda” (Vygotsky, 1927/1982/1997a,

p. 342).
At an individual level Vygotsky understands mastery of our own being,
as already explained, as mastery of external stimuli. External means to
Vygotsky—social
… For us to call a process ‘external’ means to call it ‘social’. Every higher
mental function was external because it was social before it became internal,
strictly mental function; it was formerly a social relation of two people. The
means of action on oneself is initially a means of action on others or a means
of action of others on the individual. (Vygotsky, 1931/1997b, p. 105)
This is the psychological meaning of transformation of the external, social

into internal, mental. But the developmental priority has the external, social,
which means that it determines the following internal, mental. Therefore
the external, social has to be addressed in any project of developing a new
man and building a new society. To my knowledge, except three roots of
this development mentioned above Vygotsky did not elaborate further on
that. But I would claim that there are hermeneutic hints in The History of
the Development of Higher Mental Functions along which it would be pos-
sible to reconstruct the path toward raising the question on the features of
the external, social and consequently put on the agenda a request to change
them. As Vygotsky did not refer to socialism or social justice in The History
of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, it would be too easy to claim
that Vygotsky’s former text The Socialist Alteration of Man was a text iso-
lated from his other writings and therefore of no theoretical significance.
Instead I am arguing here that The Socialist Altwration of Man shares the
same socio-genetic account of psychic development, therefore it is relevant
when assessing Vygotsky’s theory. My second claim might sound even more
provocative—namely, that The History of the Development of Higher Mental
Functions contains latent hints that could be developed toward a social cri-
tique or necessity for social change. Vygotsky stated:
It remains for us to assume that our control over our own processes of behav-
ior are constructed in essentially the same way as control over natural pro-
cesses. Of course, man living in society is always affected by other people.
Speech, for example, is one of the powerful means of affecting the behavior
of others, and naturally, in the process of development, man himself masters
the means by which others controlled his behavior. (Vygotsky, 1931/1997b, p.
211; italics added by G. J.)
What Vygotsky asserted here—“man himself masters the means by which

others controlled his behavior” could apply to the ontogenetic development
in which a child masters to do alone what was previously done by adults, but
as a general statement this is hardly a plausible claim. It is certainly a norma-
tive claim which regulates struggles for freedom and therefore requires rais-
ing questions on conditions necessary for this mastery to be achieved. And
these conditions are themselves subject-matter of struggles. In other words,
behind Vygotsky’s manifest positive statement about the man’s achieved
mastery of own behavior, there are many implicit questions—whether is it
indeed achieved, who and how has achieved it, under which conditions etc.—
and these questions open up the whole field of race, class, gender, ethnic-
ity, ability/disability etc. as determining factors in our struggle for freedom.
Vygotsky did not refer to these categories—except for the class in Marxist
theories, other categories have much later, more or less since the second half
of the 20th century, achieved a discoursive status that made them indispens-
able reference points.
Vygotsky thought in universalist notions, he refers to humanity
(chelovechestvo, человечество) and human being (chelovek, человек).
However, in English translations chelovek (человек) which is a universal,
not gendered term, is rendered as man, which has gendered connotations.
While man might be understood as excluding the other (woman), человек
is inclusive. Thus it would not be correct, relying on English translations, to
raise objections against Vygotsky for ignoring development of woman. But it
would be correct to object that he did not raise the question whether there
are specificities of development of woman. However, within the political con-
text of building new socialist society in which Vygotsky lived and worked, and
whose important ideological and practical goals were also emancipation of
woman and striving for their equal legal and social status, it seems that a uni-
versalist account was preferable, or at least quite appropriate.
Historically, instead of building more socialist societies, the existent for-
mer socialist egalitarian societies were destroyed —I would say, in a joint ven-
ture by external and internal forces. Capitalism has been restaurated and thus
has become or rather has been imposed as a social model with no alternative
—in spite of flourishing discourses of plurality. Issues of deprivation, discrim-
ination, inequalities, injustice, poverty, even wars are becoming an omnipres-
ent experience of more and more people.
Has Vygotsky’s theory any relevance in view of such a situation, socially,
economically, politically, ideologically, subjectivelly very different from his
own?
Contributors to this book believe and tried to show that revisiting

Vygotsky for social change and bringing together theory and practice is not
just possible, but has been already achieved. The first question to be raised
concerns the very title —revisiting Vygotsky’s theory. Should this imply that
Vygotsky’s theory originally was not meant for social change? Or that a dif-
ferent kind of social change is needed now? Or rather that Vygotskian schol-
arship so far did not assume such goals, in the sense of a global social change,
but was oriented toward changes in educational or work settings? In my view,
these are interpretive possibilities readers should keep in mind concerning the
very title—Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change.
Beyond the title the main issue is of course social change itself. How to
understand the scope and content of the social change? Does the meant social
change presuppose changes within the preserved capitalist society? Is it now-
adays possible to raise the question about the necessity of overthrowing the
capitalist model of organisation of society? Has the existing legacy of socialist
countries historically discredited the socialist project? Or is it discreditation of
the socialist model according to capitalist criteria irrelevant or anyway inap-
propriate? What is individual, social, ecological price for the alleged historical
success and victory of capitalism? How much suffering of how many people is
it worthy of success of capitalism?
I guess these questions reveal someone having some non-capitalist expe-
riences. They were possible, thus theoretically they could be possible again.
Are they wanted?
The next question to be raised within this project refers to the ways of
understanding and doing practice. The contributors offered examples of dif-
ferent practices in different countries and settings and documented changes
achieved in those settings. It is true that any change in a part of a totality
already on hermeneutical grounds changes the totality, in this case totality
means society. Hermeneutical changes refer to different understanding of the
totality whose part has changed. But it is also true that totality is more than a
sum of parts, even sum of all parts. In the analyzed examples there were par-
ticular innovative practices which brought about changes in those settings
and some aspects of the lives of their members. There is no reason to dimin-
ish the value of those achievements. My concerns here are rather theoreti-
cal and strategic ones. It is an important theoretical issue how to conceive of
complex, dynamic processes in human kinds or social ontology. Additionally
to their complexity and process character comes the specificity of social facts
that they are observer-dependent. In words of John Searle:
…there is a distinction between those features that we might call intrinsic to

nature and those features that exist relative to the intentionality of observers, users
etc… The existence of observer-relative features of the world does not add any
new material objects to reality, but it can add epistemically objective features to
reality where the features in question exist relative to observers and users. It is,
for example, an epistemically objective feature of this thing that it is a screwdriver,
but that feature exist only relative to observers and users, and so feature is onto-
logically subjective. (Searle, 1995, pp. 10–11)
Clearly, if we consider symbolic and very polysemantic objects—like free-

dom, justice, equality, domination, violence, discrimination—epistemic and
practical situations become even more complicated. There is no doubt that
they all are ontologically subjective, but do they have epistemically objective
features? This is an issue of contest, of social struggle to achieve for freedom,
for example, a status of epistemically objective features, or to transform epis-
temically subjective features into objective ones. From history we could learn
that epistemically subjective features of freedom could be a strong motive for
practical, even self-sacrificing engagements. If a phenomenon is not recog-
nized as existent, that is, if it has no epistemically subjective features—if it is
unconscious, for example, it still can motivate thinking and practice, but it is
beyond the control of the subject, with all restrictive consequences coming
from its unconscious status. It is not suitable for intentional collective actions,
and it is exactly such kind of practice that is needed in struggles for freedom,
justice, equality.
The other aspect of the hermeneutic circle defines the influence of the
whole on its parts. Thus parts are changed when the whole changes, even
though these changes are not result of intentional doings of the parts. While
hermeneutics deals with processes of understanding, pointing out that a dif-
ferent understanding of the parts changes the understanding of the whole
and vice versa, it is clear that wholes are not just hermeneutic objects. The
whole that is at stake here is society as an organized system. And it is clear
that economic order on which a society is based shapes lives of members of
society even though they might not have decided about that and have a very
limited space to be exempted or to limit the influence of that order on them-
selves. The same asymmetric pattern is at work in other institutions—legal,
educational, religious etc. Therefore I would argue that both individualistic
and interactionist solutions have limited capacities to change the whole. In
other words—changes in particular domains are necessary but not sufficient
to achieve a change in the powerful, determining whole. This warning is not
meant to discourage particular practices oriented at generating change in spe-

cific domains, but to raise consciousness that a kind of binocular strategy is
needed—considering part and the structure, the whole at the same time.
In many sense Vygotsky is still an excellent teacher in that regard. I agree
very much with Lucien Sève’s interpretation of Vygotsky’s, in Marx founded,
thinking of the structure as irreducible to its parts, but at the same time
dynamic and historically changeable:
The Gestalt psychology inaugurated in 1890 by the work of von Ehrenfels
on the qualities of form draws its inspiration from the neo-Aristotelianism
that was in full swing at the end of the 19th century. The logical culture of
Vygotsky is another matter entirely, fed by Hegel’s dialectics as revisited by
Marx. Thus he is at once fundamentally in agreement with the Gestaltists on
the irreductibility of a structure to the sum of its parts, and in frequently-ex-
pressed disagreement on two essential points: the structure does not obey the
simple Aristotelian logic of the principle of identity but reveals internal con-
tradictions, and for that itself is not invariable but evolutive—beyond the sole
immutable nature considered by Gestaltism, human psyche returns to history.
(Sève, 2018, p. 8)
Just few years before Vygotsky, Wilhelm Wundt, the acknowledged

founder of the first laboratory for experimental psychology, and thereby
father of scientific psychology, argued for the necessity of Völkerpsychologie
—on the same holistic grounds:
In his Logik Wundt insisted that community (Gemeinschaft) is a unity which
cannot be reduced to its individual elements. In a section added to the fourth
edition of his Logik—and these were probably the last words Wundt wrote in
his life—Wundt described the community principle (Gemeinschaftsprinzip)
as a totality, a “creative product” (Wundt, 1921, p. 45) (Jovanović, 2019b,
p. 103)
Almost a century after these insights by Wundt, mostly forgotten or

repressed in the history of psychology (Jovanović, 2019a), Lucien Sève refers
to Marx in order to argue for irreducibility of society to sum of interpersonal
interactions—a fallacy quite often committed by psychology when trying to
overcome shortcomings of individualism. It is worthy quoting Sève at full
length:
We have often read, to this day, that Marx wrote that in his reality the human
essence consisted of “the whole of social relations”; however, he did not write
Beziehungen but Verhältnisse, having in mind—as specified in The German
Ideology—not simply the relationships between individuals but social rela-

tions in their immense objectivity, such as the technical and social division
of labour. Two undoubtedly connected but fundamentally distinct ideas.
According to its incorrect reading, this critical wording may be a simple the-
ory of social psychology: individuals are what their interpersonal relationships
make of them—an accurate idea, certainly, and even fertile, but which does
not yet determine a complete historical materialism. In the reading imposed
by the text, and all of Marx’s thinking, what makes us the humans we are
is also to be found beyond our intersubjective relationships, right up to the
heavily objective social structures they imply and which govern them—which
is where a truly materialist anthropology is born. (Sève, 2018, p. 11)
In what sense are these epistemological considerations relevant to the

goals set in this book? I would argue that they are highly relevant as they draw
our attention to the specificity of psychic and social structures, of observer-de-
pendent phenomena and their practical implications. Social change and prac-
tice are exemplary observer-dependent phenomena—and actor-dependent.
Therefore it is important to know what kind of features we ascribe to those
phenomena. If we lose sight of society as totality, it is true, it can nevertheless
change, but without us. To quote an insightful warning by Günther Anders:
It does not suffice to change the world. We do that anyway. And to a large
extent that happens even without our involvement. In addition we have
to interpret this change. Precisely because to change it. That therefore the
world does not change without us. And ultimately into a world without us.
(Anders, 2002, p. 5)
We are witnessing that more and more people are affected by decisions of
bodies which have no democratic legitimacy, or even are not visible. And even
worse than that—decisions are taken in their names, but against their inter-
ests. We are experiencing that democratic institutions are overshadowed or
permeated by other more powerful, although not legitimized ones. We are
also experiencing that more and more democratic institutions are becoming
exhausted in formal procedures, while the domains of contents, meanings,
values remain unattended or transferred to just personal choices, without a
reliable orientation.
In my view, the most needed social change is actually re-appropriation of
society which is taken away from its members in different ways. We need also
an epistemological appropriation of society by overcoming naturalism, indi-
vidualism and atomism as forms of reductionism which prevent conceiving of
that society has features that cannot be derived from features of individuals
and their interpersonal interactions, and which are not given but historically
constituted, and therefore changeable.
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20–22 juin 2018
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Instead of an Epilogue. “We Are
on Fire”: Crisis as Turning Point,
Vygotsky and Social Change
MICHALIS KONTOPODIS, MANOLIS DAFERMOS,

AND ADOLFO TANZI NETO
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 came as a shock to the peace-

ful daydreaming of middle- and upper-class people around the globe. In a
world of hyperconnected capital and money markets, the financial crises that
started in the United States spread quickly, even disrupting economies that
until that point seemed to represent stable and continuous economic growth.
Like the financial crisis spread across the globe in 2008, so did the flames of
the most destructive wildfires on record in 2018, spreading across California,
one of the richest areas of the world. A total of 8,527 fires scorched an area
of 1,893,913 acres, the largest amount of burned acreage recorded in a sin-
gle fire season.1
The rapacious appetites of the global finance industry have supported a
harrowing depletion of our natural resources. Burning through these resources
have led to a human-induced climate change, which in turn increases the risk
of extreme weather events such as forest fires. We are on fire, both literally
and metaphorically. The US national debt currently exceeds $22 trillion and
is constantly increasing. With 90% of global transactions in foreign currency
and 60% of global currency reserves in US dollars, the debt of the United
States is also exported to other national economies, all of which are also in
debt, as well, as calculated with precision by so-called national debt clocks.2
The world’s total debt is around $244 trillion, which is more than three times
the size of the global economy, according to a recent analysis by the Institute
of International Finance.3 As these pages are being written and more than ten
years since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the fact that a multi-faceted
crisis is occurring becomes more and more apparent. This crisis affects global
282 MICHALIS KONTOPODIS ET AL .
and local economies, ecologies and communities as much as it affects people’s

personal trajectories and everyday lives. This crisis is not a temporary, geo-
graphically limited and exceptional condition, but a long-lasting one: $244
trillion of debt will never be paid off, no matter how intensively natural and
human resources are exploited.
A crisis (from ancient Greek κρίσις, meaning discerning, evaluating and
making a decision)4 indicates a period of intense difficulty. It can also be
understood as the turning point when a difficult or important decision must
be made. This may entail danger and taking risks, but it also involves the
possibility that novel ways of being and acting in the world may emerge. In
other words: a crisis indicates the moment in which a new world must be
built on the ruins of the old. The book in your hands desires to support that
moment by proposing a conceptual shift across disciplines towards under-
standing the future as an essential dimension of human activity (cf. Nadin,
2015). Vygotsky’s project entails a concrete vision of a future society and
goal-oriented activity (Stetsenko, 2017; Dafermos, 2018):
It is precisely human creative activity that makes the human being a creature
oriented toward the future, creating the future and thus altering his own
present. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 9)
While neoliberalism has been introduced by many governments in various

countries and geographical regions as the only solution to the contemporary
crisis (Dafermos, 2013), Vygotsky’s work offers us the possibility to imagine
how the impossible becomes possible in the course of future-oriented creative
and collaborative human activity. Imagination plays a central role in recontex-
tualising the current state of affairs, and in revealing the spectrum of possibil-
ities for radical social change (Kontopodis, 2014) even if creating alternative
societal futures may seem impossible from the perspective of the neoliberal
“there is no alternative” thinking (Mould, 2018).
Within the contributions of this collective volume, the careful reader
may find the seeds of this imagination in a wide variety of contexts. In the
beginning of this volume, Manolis Dafermos argues that cultural-historical
theory is a future-oriented rather than a past-oriented theory. That human
creative activity is oriented towards the future is intrinsically connected with
“the active transformations of existing environments and the creation of new
ones through collaborative processes of producing and deploying tools”
(Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004, p. 65). From this perspective, creative i.e.
transformative activity interrupts the linear, continuous, accumulative tem-
porality of transition from the past to the present and from the present to the
Instead of an Epilogue 283
future. Imagining the future offers the opportunity to remember and re-write
the past, as well as to change and transform the present.
The next contributions to the collective volume examine the topic of
agency, i.e. active and transformative subjectivity. An important idea in cul-
tural-historical psychology indeed, active subjectivity is the idea that humans
actively participate in and contribute to defining how signs and tools are
used and how social relations are shaped. Active subjectivity enters in a dia-
logue with the future and transforms a given social situation so that new prac-
tices emerge. Indeed, it is quite difficult to imagine social change without an
advanced reflection on agency as the force that resists, reorients and trans-
forms social relations. As Anna Stetsenko argues in Chapter 2, the issue of
agency entails a question about who we are and what our position is in our
environments, contexts and realities. From the perspective of a transforma-
tive activist stance, Anna Stetsenko first reflects on the limitations of certain
relational approaches to agency, such as habitus and structuration theories,
actor-network theory, social constructionism, etc. She then explores the
development of radically transformative agency within collaborative projects
of social transformation.
Fernanda Liberali’s contribution in Chapter 3 reflects the experience of
the struggle for social justice in Brazil, a country permeated by social inequal-
ities, the exploitation of natural resources and the growth of racism. Liberali
maintains that it is possible to promote agency for social change through
perezhivanie: repertoires and habits established within previous contexts can
be reconstructed in new trajectories and paths. Echoing Fernanda Liberali’s
argumentation, in Chapter 4, Yrjö Engeström and Annalisa Sannino high-
light the importance of Vygotsky’s understanding of double stimulation, and
employ the metaphor of knotworking as a way to grasp social change. The
existence of conflictual forces that break away from each other through the
reorganisation and reconfiguration of the situation are crucial moments in the
process of social change.
The volume proceeds with in-depth analyses of how Vygostkian theory
may be adapted and expanded for use in the contemporary critical context.
Lois Holzman proposes social therapeutics as a group-oriented psychotherapy
from a post-modern perspective in Chapter 5. She presents this as a new psy-
chology of becoming through play, performance and creativity. Creative imita-
tion and performance are examined as ways of promoting both learning and
human development. Moving from clinical practice to education, in Chapter 6
Adolfo Tanzi Neto highlights the need to examine the social spaces of schools
from the perspective of various forms of mediated practices, social positionings
of power and control, and discursive relations. Understanding the complex

social architectures of school practices is a precondition for promoting creative
activity in a school’s community and its relation to wider society.
The dialogue on Vygotsky’s theory continues with Peter E. Jones’s
actional-integrative view of sign-making. Peter E. Jones demonstrates the
problems in the transition from Pavlovian signalisation to Vygotsky’s signifi-
cation in Chapter 7. As he argues, for an alternative perspective on the active
capacity for creation of signs by human subjects which is crucial for their
development and conscious action. In turn, in Chapter 8, Nikolai Veresov
explores identity as a sociocultural phenomenon while exploring the individ-
ual sense of belonging in view of complex and dramatic dialectics of being
and becoming.
Sueli Salles Fidalgo and Cecilia Magalhaes explore the notion of social
compensation in Chapter 9 as a way of promoting the development of children
with special educational needs. A social learning process organised around the
creation of signs is examined as a kind of creative activity that provides alter-
native paths of development. In a similar mode, Wanda Maria Junqueira de
Aguiar, Maria Emiliana Lima Penteado and Raquel Antonio Alfredo reveal
the Marxist underpinnings of Vygotsky’s theory in Chapter 10, and explore
the importance of a set of concepts, that is, historicity, totality, contradiction
and mediation for educational research. Bader Burihan Sawaia, Lavinia L. S.
Magiolino and Daniele Nunes Henrique Silva explore in Chapter 11 how cre-
ating imaginary situations is a way to promote emancipation from situational
constraints: social theories that neglect the imagination become sterile and
infertile. Imagination and emotions are a crucial part of social transformation
processes, and the human ability to imagine is examined as a condition of
freedom that assures the revolutionary power of subjectivity.
In the final chapter, Gordana Jovanović provides an overall reflection on
the topic of social change and its relation to Vygotsky’s theory. She demon-
strates that naturalistic, individualistic and interactionist interpretations of
human relations are not able to change society as a whole. Society cannot
be reduced to a sum of individuals and their interpersonal interactions. The
dominance of naturalism, individualism and atomism as forms of reduction-
ism is not irrelevant to the bureaucratization of society and its lack of revolu-
tionary change.
The contributions in this collective volume reflect the diversity of inter-
pretations of Vygotsky’s legacy as well as the complexity of social change.
Social change is intrinsically connected with future-oriented, creative activ-
ity that challenges the dominance of the commercialization of social life and
Instead of an Epilogue 285
consumer individualism. While dominant social forms are often perceived as

universal, eternal, and immutable qualities of “human nature,” Vygotsky’s
project questions this view of “human nature” as related to competitive indi-
vidualism. Challenging the systemic inequalities and injustices of “creative
capitalism” and “market-based social change” (Kinsley, 2008) is crucial for
achieving social change and social justice.
Even if, as Jameson (2003, p. 76) noted, “it has become easier to imag-
ine the end of the world than the end of capitalism,” the radicalization of
the imagination can be seen as a way of overcoming today’s crises. Grappling
with dramatic conflicts and contradictions and imagining alternative forms
of societal organization beyond privatization and commodification is at
the source of social change and human development in the present critical
moment. Vygotsky’s project is highly relevant and inspiring in this context,
as it fundamentally challenges mainstream understandings of human develop-
ment as adaptation, instead envisaging human engagement with the world as
future-oriented i.e. creative and transformative.
Notes
1. Cf. 2018 National Year-to-Date Report on Fires and Acres Burned. National
Interagency Fire Center, https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/intelli-
gence/2018_statssumm/2018Stats&Summ.html (date of access: May 21,
2019).
2. Detailed overview is provided on https://usdebtclock.org/world-debt-clock.
html (date of access: May 21, 2019).
3. Cf. Global Debt Monitor, Institute of International Finance, January 15,
2019: https://www.iif.com/Research/Capital-Flows-and-Debt/Global-Debt-
Monitor (date of access: May 21, 2019).
4. Cf. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/crisis (date of access: May 21,
2019).
References
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Jameson, F. (2003). Future city. New Left Review, 21, 65–79.
Kinsley, M. (2008). Creative Capitalism. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Kontopodis, M. (2014). Neoliberalism, Pedagogy and Human Development. London:
Routledge.
Mould, O. (2018). Against Creativity. London: Verso.
Nadin, M. (Ed.) (2015). Anticipation: Learning from the Past. The Russian/Soviet
Contribution to the Science of Anticipation. Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
Stetsenko, A., & Arievitch, I. (2004). Vygotskian collaborative project of social
transformation: History, politics, and practice in knowledge construction.
International Journal of Critical Psychology, 12(4), 58–80.
Vygotsky, L. (2004). Imagination and creativity in childhood. Journal of Russian and
East European Psychology, 42(1), 7–97.
Contributors
Raquel Antonio Alfredo acquired her PhD in psychology of education

at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo-PUC-SP in 2013. She
is accredited as a collaborating professor of the Postgraduate Program in
Education (PPGED) of the Federal University of Piauí-UFPI and a fellow
of the National Postdoctoral Program/CAPES, member of the Center for
Studies and Research in Education in Socio-Historical Psychology (NEPSH)
at UFPI and a researcher in the research group of the Graduate Program in
Educational Psychology (PUC-SP) and registered at the CNPQ under the
name Teaching Activity and Subjectivity. Furthermore, she has recently devel-
oped a partnership established between the Pontifical Catholic University
of São Paulo-PUC-SP (Postgraduate Studies Program in Psychology of
Education), the Federal University of Piauí (PPGEd: Graduate Program in
Education), the State University of Rio Grande Norte (PPG: Postgraduate
Program in Education) and the Federal University of Alagoas (PPG: Post-
Graduation Program in Brazilian Education).
Manolis Dafermos is an associate professor in the epistemology of psychol-

ogy in the Department of Psychology at the University of Crete. He holds a
PhD in philosophy from the Lomonosov Moscow State University. His inter-
ests include cultural historical psychology, critical psychology, the history of
psychology, and methodological and epistemological issues in the social sci-
ences. He has authored or co-authored papers in these areas for Theory &
Psychology, European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counseling, Information,
Communication & Society, Social and Personality Psychology Compass,
Learning, culture and Social Interaction, Journal of Community & Applied
Social Psychology, Cultural-historical Psychology, Forum Kritische Psychologie,
Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology, etc. Manolis Dafermos is the author of
the book Rethinking Cultural-historical Psychology: A Dialectical Perspective
288 CONTRIBUTORS
to Vygotsky (Springer). He is a member of the Editorial Board of the journals

Cultural-historical psychology, Dialogical Pedagogy, Outlines: Critical Practice
Studies, Teoría y Crítica de la Psicología, and Human Arenas. He has been a
guest editor of two special issues of the journal Annual Review of Critical
Psychology. He has served as a member of the Executive Committee of ISCAR.
Yrjö Engeström is Professor Emeritus of Adult Education at University of

Helsinki, Finland and Professor Emeritus of Communication at University of
California, San Diego. He is Director of the Center for Research on Activity,
Development and Learning (CRADLE) which applies and develops cul-
tural-historical activity theory in studies of transformations and learning in
work and organizations. He has received an honorary professorship from
University of Birmingham in UK and honorary doctorates from University of
Oslo, Norway, and University of Ioannina, Greece.
Sueli Salles Fidalgo is an associate professor at the Teaching Program in

Portuguese and English and at the Postgraduate Program in Education and
Health at the Federal University of São Paulo. Sueli supervises investigations
focusing on teacher education, ex-/inclusive education and specific educa-
tional needs. She follows the critical collaborative perspective and the socio-
historical frameworks. Besides her Doctorate degree in Applied Linguistics
and Language Studies, she has completed two periods of Post-doctoral
Fellowship, researching the abovementioned topics, and has published (inter)
nationally.
Lois Holzman is the director and co-founder of the East Side Institute for
Group and Short Term Psychotherapy. As a leading proponent of a cultural
approach to human learning and development, she has made the writings of
Lev Vygotsky relevant to the fields of psychotherapy, education and organi-
zational and community development. She is well known for her pioneer-
ing work in exploring the human capacity to perform and its fundamentality
in learning how to learn. She is particularly respected as an activist scholar
who builds bridges between university-based and community-based practices,
bringing the traditions and innovations of each to the other. Holzman has
written and edited twelve books and over sixty articles on human devel-
opment and learning, psychology, education and social therapy; among
them: Performing Psychology: A Postmodern Culture of the Mind; Schools for
Growth: Radical Alternatives to Current Educational Models; Lev Vygotsky:
Revolutionary Scientist (with Fred Newman); Psychological Investigations: A
Clinician’s Guide to Social Therapy (with Rafael Mendez), Vygotsky at Work
Contributors 289
and Play, and the Overweight Brain: How Our Obsession with Knowing Keeps
Us from Getting Smart Enough to Make a Better World.
Peter E. Jones is Reader in Language and Communication at Sheffield

Hallam University. His work attempts to marry a critical approach to lin-
guistics and communication theory from an integrationist perspective with
a re-vitalising of the Marxist tradition generally and to a re-visiting of the
cultural-historical and activity theory traditions specifically. He is the Guest
Editor of the 2018 special issue of Language Sciences devoted to the theme:
‘Karl Marx and the Language Sciences—Critical Encounters’.
Gordana Jovanović is Full Professor of Psychology at the Department of

Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia. In addi-
tional to classical courses on general psychology and personality theories,
historical introduction to psychology and psychological schools, she has intro-
duced new courses into psychology curriculum: qualitative research and cul-
tural-historical psychology. She was awarded research grants by the Alexander
von Humboldt Foundation (Germany) in 1984–1985, 1989, 2003, 2011,
2013, 2014, and 2016. She was a guest researcher at the University in
Frankfurt on Main, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University in Berlin.
She was also awarded a grant by The British Psychological Society in 1999.
Gordana Jovanović is committed to psychology understood as a human sci-
ence closely related to other human sciences and philosophy. She is author
of Symbolization and Rationality (1984 [in Serbian]). Freud and Modern
Subjectivity (1997 [in Serbian]) and Interpretive Worlds of Psychology (2012
[in Serbian]) and various contributions, articles and book chapters in German
and English. In 2015 she edited a special issue of the History of the Human
Sciences devoted to Vygotsky. She is the first editor (co-editors Lars Allolio-
Näcke and Carl Ratner) of The Challenges of Cultural Psychology. Historical
Legacies and Future Responsibilities. New York: Routledge (2019).
Wanda Maria Junqueira de Aguiar is a full Professor at the Pontifical

Catholic University of São Paulo. A psychologist, she graduated from
Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (1975). She has a master’s
degree (1988) and PhD (1996) in psychology (social psychology) from the
Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo. She is professor and researcher of
the Program of Postgraduate Studies in Education: Educational Psychology,
of the Professional Master Program in Education: Teacher Training and of
the Psychology course of the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo. She
received a Research Productivity Grant in 2018. She has published 18 articles
290 CONTRIBUTORS
in specialized periodicals and 60 papers in national/international events. She

has 40 chapters of books published and participated in the organization of 4
books in the last ten years. She works in the area of educational psychology,
with emphasis on socio-historical psychology. She coordinated the Project
for Academic Cooperation—PROCAD (2008–2012), carried out in partner-
ship between the institutions PUCSP, UFAL, UNISA RJ, with the support of
Capes. She is currently coordinating another PROCAD (2015–2018), which
is being carried out between the institutions PUCSP, UFAL, UFPI, UERN,
with support from CNPq/Capes. She is the leader of the Research Group
registered in CNPQ—Teaching Activity and Subjectivity (GADS).
Michalis Kontopodis is a Chair in Global Childhood and Youth Studies

and Director of the Research Centre in Childhood, Education and Social
Justice at the University of Leeds. His background comprises psychology,
anthropology and education. In collaboration with a wide network of aca-
demics, practitioners, NGOs, community organisations and policy makers,
Prof. Kontopodis conducts research on inclusive and equitable quality edu-
cation and children’s well-being in a global perspective. His books, edited
volumes and journal articles have been published in 6 languages; for further
details please visit https://mkontopodis.wordpress.com/
Fernanda Liberali is a teacher educator, researcher and professor at the

Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, in the Department of English,
in the Program of Postgraduate Studies in Applied Linguistics and Language
Studies and in the Post Graduate Program in Education: Education of
Educators. She holds a degree in Languages from the Federal University
of Rio de Janeiro, a master’s and a doctorate degree in Applied Linguistics
and Language Studies from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo,
and three postdoctoral degrees from the University of Helsinki, from the
Berlin Freie Universität from the Berlin Freie Universität and from Rutgers
University. She is one of the leaders of the Research Group/CNPq/PUC-SP
Language in Activity in the School Context; an advisor to CNPq and FAPESP;
a Brazilian representative of the international committee of the International
Symposium on Bilingualism and Bilingual Education in Latin America
(BILINGLATAM), and the general coordinator of the national extension
and research project DIGIT-M-ED Hyperconnecting Brazil. Among her rel-
evant academic and administrative activities are: the national coordination of
the DIGIT-M-Ed International project, funded by Marie Curie Actions, the
Brazilian representation of the international Vygotskian association ISCAR,
Contributors 291
the coordination of projects for the continuing education of principals, coor-

dinators, teachers and councils of municipal public schools of São Paulo,
the participation in boards and editorial commissions of scientific journals.
Within the framework of Socio-Historical-Cultural Activity Theory, her main
research interests are related to teacher education, teaching-learning, multi-
modal argumentation, multilingualism / bilingual education.
Maria Cecilia C. Magalhães is a full professor at Linguistic Department

and the Applied Linguistics and Language Studies Postgraduate Program,
both at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Brazil, besides being
a researcher with the National Council for Scientific and Technological
Development (CNPq), investigating language, critical thinking, collabora-
tion, intervention-oriented works and continuing teacher education, within
the theoretical frame of Social-Cultural-Historical Activity Theory. Leader of
the Language in Activities in School Contexts Research Group, she has pub-
lished in Brazil, the UK, Spain, and Denmark.
Lavínia L. S. Magiolino received her Ph.D. in education from the State

University of Campinas (UNICAMP), São Paulo, Brazil. A professor from
the Psychology Department of Faculty of Education and of the Postgraduate
Course in Education at UNICAMP, she conducts researches focused on
emotions, imagination, arts, education and human development. Among her
main works are the paper: How do emotions signify? Social relations and psy-
chological functions in the dramatic constitution of subjects. Mind, Culture,
and Activity, 20 (1) (Magiolino & Smolka, 2014).
Maria Emiliana Lima Penteado has a PhD in education: psychology of edu-

cation from Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo—PUCSP (2017).
Maria Emiliana Lima Penteado teaches at Faculdades Integradas Campos
Salles (FICS) in the course of pedagogy teaching psychology of education,
methodology of scientific research and didactics and teaching practice applied
to early years of primary education and in the postgraduate course in psy-
chopedagogy in the disciplines clinical and psychopedagogical attendance
and psychopedagogical aspects the family socialization and monitoring pro-
cess. Maria Emiliana Lima Penteado is Tutor of the Postgraduate Program
in Education: Formation of Trainers–PUCSP and currently a member of the
Research Group “Teaching Activity and Subjectivity”–PUCSP, under the
coordination of Profa. Dr. Wanda Maria Junqueira de Aguiar. Maria Emiliana
Lima Penteado is Effective Officer of the Municipality of São Paulo since
1999, in the position of Pedagogical Coordinator.
292 CONTRIBUTORS
Bader Burihan Sawaia is Professor of the Postgraduate Course in Social

Psychology at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, PUCSP-Brazil
and a founding member of the research group titled: “The Socio-Historical
Psychology and the Brazilian Context of Social Inequality.” She conducts
research focused on affectivity, social inequality, and community. She has pub-
lished papers in Brazil, Spain, Latin America and England and is the orga-
nizer of the book The Wiles of Exclusion—Psychosocial and Ethical Analysis of
Social Inequality (14th Edition), which has been adopted in various Brazilian
Universities.
Anna Stetsenko is Full Professor in the PhD Program in psychology (Head

of Developmental Psychology in 2001–2009), with joint appointment in
the PhD Program in Urban Education at The Graduate Center CUNY. She
joined CUNY in 1999 with years of experience acquired in leading research
centers around the world, including Moscow State University and the Russian
Academy of Education, Max Planck Institute of Human Development and
Education (Berlin, Germany), University of Bern (Switzerland) and Center
for Cultural Studies (Vienna, Austria).
Professor Stetsenko has published widely on cultural-historical activity the-
ory, Vygotskian approach and human development in English, Russian, Italian
and German. Her works have appeared in leading international journals such
as Human Development; Theory & Psychology; New Ideas in Psychology; Mind,
Culture & Activity; Pedagogies: An International Journal; Cultural Studies
of Science Education; European Journal of Social Psychology; International
Journal of Psychology; Developmental Psychology; Child Development; Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology; International Journal of Behavioral
Development; and Contemporary Psychology, among other journals as well as
in edited book volumes.
Annalisa Sannino is Professor of Education at Tampere University, Finland.

Her research focuses on collective learning and agency formation processes in
educational settings, workplaces and communities. She has worked for long
periods in American, French, and Italian universities. She is currently serving
as visiting professor at University West, Sweden and at Rhodes University,
South Africa. Results of her research have been published in numerous publi-
cations across disciplines among which edited books published by Cambridge
University Press (2009) and Routledge (2013).
Daniele Nunes Henrique Silva received her Ph.D. in education from the
State University of Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil. She is a professor from the
Contributors 293
Psychology Institute, University of Brasília and a collaborative professor of the

Postgraduate Course in Education (UNICAMP). Recently, she was approved
as Invited Professor in the Faculty of Psychology and Sciences of Education,
University of Geneva. She conducts researches focused on imagination, arts,
and human development and organized the book Vygotsky and Marx: towards
a Marxist Psychology by Routledge (Ratner & Silva, 2017).
Adolfo Tanzi Neto is an adjunct professor and head of the Department

of Anglo-Germanic Languages, Faculty of Languages and Arts, at Federal
University Rio de Janeiro. He holds a PhD in Applied Linguistics and
Language studies from Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo with
doctoral training at University of Oxford, Department of Education in the
Sociocultural and Activity Theory Research Centre. He is the leader of the
Research Group/CNPq—Nucleus for Studies and Research of the School of
Vygotsky in Applied Linguistics (NUVYLA/UFRJ). His research interests
include the socio-historical-cultural activity theory, teacher development,
school designs, social activism, social practices and cultural and linguistic diver-
sity in the contemporary world. He has authored and co-authored books and
papers in these areas for Pontes Editores, Parábola Editorial, The ESPecialist,
DELTA: Documentation of studies in theoretical and applied linguistics, etc.
He is the editor-in-chief of The Especialist Journal, member of the editorial
board of the journals: Dialogic Pedagogy, Revista Intercâmbio and DELTA.
He has been part of the international scientific committee of International
Academy of Technology, Education and Development. He is a member of the
Executive Committee of ISCAR (International Society for Cultural-historical
Activity Research) and coordinator of the ISCAR, Brazilian regional section
(ISCAR-BRASIL).
Dr. Nikolai Veresov is Associate Professor at Monash University, Australia.

He has an experience as a day care centre and kindergarten teacher (1987–
1991) and secondary school teacher (1982–1987). He has got his first PhD
degree in Moscow in 1990 and started his academic career in Murmansk
(Russia) as a senior lecturer (1991–1993) and the Head of Department of
Early Childhood (1993–1997). The second PhD was obtained in University
of Oulu (Finland) in 1998. From 1999 to 2011 he had been affiliated to
Kajaani Teacher Training Department (Finland) as a Senior Researcher and
the Scientific Director of the international projects. He published 5 books
and over 85 articles available in 10 languages. His area of interests is devel-
opment in early years, cultural-historical theory and research methodology.
Index
A C
activity 5, 17, 18, 20, 31, 39, 43, capitalism 3, 31, 32, 34, 44–46, 56, 57,
48–52, 87, 92, 96, 97, 112–116, 273, 274, 285
118–120, 123, 126, 128, 134, change laboratory 93–96, 98–99, 102,
136, 138, 148, 149, 154–156, 104, 106
159–161, 164–169, 175–179, CHAT 6, 18, 31, 32, 149, 154, 175,
181–189, 203, 225, 228, 231, 177–182, 184–189
244, 261, 262, 265–267, 282, 284 communication 6, 130, 134, 136, 138,
adaptation 7, 25, 32, 49, 198, 209, 285 139, 147–149, 152, 162, 165–169
affect 193, 199, 230, 245, 249, 250 community 6, 26, 56, 111–114, 121–
affection 8, 199, 211, 256 123, 136, 181, 209, 276
agency 4, 5, 25, 31–33, 35, 38–46, compensation 7, 197, 200–202, 208,
48, 49, 52–57, 63–67, 69, 80, 81, 284
87, 88, 90–96, 98, 101, 104, 105, conflict 56, 89–91
126, 129, 140, 177–179, 283, 292 contradiction 7, 24, 65, 182, 187, 190,
anthropocentrism 43, 52, 55–57 213, 216, 218, 219, 221, 231, 232
architectonic 6, 125, 128, 134–141 contradictions 7, 63, 65, 66, 73, 92,
artifacts 6, 89, 90, 94, 95, 106, 125, 136, 179–184, 187, 189, 227,
126, 129, 132, 135, 136, 139– 233, 254, 255, 276, 285
142, 168, 198 crisis 3, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24–26,
31, 35, 48, 57, 96, 112, 113, 116,
B 214, 215, 219, 265, 269, 281, 282
critical pedagogy 17, 45, 53
becoming 6, 7, 23, 24, 53, 54, 114, cultural-historical theory 1–2, 6,
115, 120, 123, 175, 180, 182, 13–19, 21, 23, 26, 135, 180, 181,
184, 185, 187–190, 222, 283, 284 184, 185–187, 189–190, 263,
being 6, 7, 9, 54, 65, 68, 74, 81, 82, 265, 266, 269, 282
115, 180, 185, 187–190, 216, culture 16, 17, 68, 114, 127, 138, 139,
222, 272, 282, 284 141, 142, 149, 242, 265, 267, 276
296 INDEX
D human development 2–5, 7, 17, 21,

26, 32, 49–51, 53, 54–55, 69,
dialectics 6, 7, 180, 183, 185, 187–
112–113, 115, 118, 121, 122,
189, 207, 214, 221–223, 226,
126, 136, 140, 193, 198, 229,
231, 232, 276, 284
254, 269, 271, 283, 285
disability 195, 197–200, 202–204,
206, 209
discourse 42, 45, 99, 128–132, 138,
I
139, 141, 154, 155, 158, 160, identity 4, 6, 7, 38, 67, 74, 131, 136,
178, 179, 207, 225, 261 138, 139, 141, 164, 169, 175–
double stimulation 20, 88–90. 93–95, 187, 189, 190, 225, 229, 276, 284
105, 283 ideology 35, 45, 48, 128, 130–132,
226, 233, 234, 252, 262, 277
E imagination 5, 8, 24, 25, 116, 133,
153, 241–246, 248–257, 282,
emancipation 17, 235, 242, 249, 253,
284, 285
254, 256, 273, 284
imitation 118–120, 283
emotion 8, 243–246, 248, 249, 251–
individualism 32, 267, 276, 277, 284,
257
285
empiricism 3, 22, 23, 40, 214
inequality 4, 8, 48
expansive learning 91–92, 99
L
F
language 2, 6, 20, 49, 50, 64, 66, 69,
formative intervention 93–95
70, 72, 73, 81, 115, 117–120,
freedom 25, 48, 242, 243, 253–257,
126, 129–132, 134, 135, 138,
264, 271, 273, 275, 284
139, 141, 147–150, 152, 155,
future 4, 9, 14, 23–26, 88, 133, 193,
156, 160, 162–169, 178, 179,
282, 283
197, 198, 201, 202, 204, 207,
208, 214, 216, 228, 229, 234,
G 241, 249, 265, 270
generalization 105, 126, 160, 165, 236 learning 2, 66, 69, 91, 92, 99, 111,
113–118, 120, 122, 123, 131,
H 135, 136, 139–141, 169, 193,
194, 200–203, 207, 209, 217,
handicapped children 21, 199, 202, 283, 284
203 linguistics 19, 164
higher mental functions 23, 65, 126,
129, 181–184, 188, 190, 267, M
269–271
historicity 4, 7, 14, 41, 43, 52, 135, Marxism 4, 15, 18, 40, 45, 46, 48, 52,
139, 213, 216–219, 221–223, 54, 131, 147, 214, 215, 269
226, 231, 234, 284 materialism 7, 32, 41, 44, 45, 48–50,
52, 166, 213–215, 217, 219, 221,
222, 234–236, 277
Index 297
meaning 15, 16, 20, 23, 33, 41, 47, practice 2, 4, 21–23, 49, 51–53, 70,
49, 89, 91, 116, 117, 120, 129, 92, 104, 114, 160, 166, 167, 202,
130, 148–150, 159, 160, 166, 215, 218, 261, 274, 275, 277, 283
216, 225, 228, 229, 232, 233, psychology 2, 3, 7, 8, 16, 18–23, 26,
265, 266 34, 43, 48, 111, 113–115, 118,
mediation 4, 6, 7, 16, 20, 90, 125– 123, 126, 129, 130, 147–152,
127, 129, 130, 136, 137, 139, 159, 160, 163, 164, 169, 176,
151, 152, 180, 185–187, 201, 182, 213–216, 218, 219, 222,
213, 216, 218, 219, 221, 222, 229, 230, 233–235, 241, 243–
225–231, 234, 252, 266, 284 245, 252–255, 263–265, 268–
memory 39, 65, 163, 246, 248, 249 271, 276, 277, 283
method 7, 20, 94, 113, 114, 118, 197,
202, 213, 215–217, 220, 225, R
234, 261
mind 6, 8, 32, 35, 54, 87, 128, 129, reductionism 32, 176, 262, 277, 284
136, 142, 147, 149, 150, 184, revolution 1, 16, 17, 148, 270
198, 241, 243, 244, 246, 249,
251, 256, 261, 264 S
scientific knowledge 160, 217, 219,
N 220, 262
naturalism 223, 263–265, 267, 277, sign 16, 64, 66, 69, 89, 128, 130, 131,
284 148–154, 156, 159, 160, 162,
new society 16, 269, 271–272 164–166, 185, 228, 246, 255,
256, 267
socialism 254, 268, 272
O
social change 2–7, 35, 49, 63, 68, 81,
oppression 8, 81 112, 138, 147, 169, 183, 190,
214, 218, 221, 235, 261, 270,
P 272, 274, 277, 282–285
social justice 2, 21, 35, 48, 126, 140,
pedagogy 17, 21, 45, 53, 141, 241, 142, 272, 283, 285
245, 252–255, 258 sociocultural theory 18
perezhivanie 5, 7, 63–65, 67, 69, 80, social structure 39, 46, 131, 138, 224,
81, 187–190, 283 277
performance 66, 97, 117–122, 158, social transformation 5, 40, 46, 57,
283 138, 169, 241, 243–246, 252–
play 113, 115–121, 193, 207, 283 253, 255, 257, 271, 283, 284
power 4, 8, 42, 51, 66–70, 79, 81, speech 50, 73, 119, 120, 126–128,
125, 127, 129, 131, 136, 138, 130, 131, 137, 139, 141, 148,
139, 141, 151–154, 159, 161, 149, 155–159, 166, 198, 272
164–167, 178, 179, 197, 224, subjectivity 4, 5, 32, 49, 52, 120, 226,
226, 243–245, 253–257, 264, 228, 230, 243, 244, 252, 253,
265, 284 263, 283, 284
suffering 8, 249, 274
298 INDEX
T
theory 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 13–26, 32, 35,
37, 39, 41–44, 47–49, 51, 52, 54,
70, 87, 114, 135, 147–152, 156,
159, 160, 167, 175, 177–181,
184–187, 189, 190, 202, 204,
214, 215, 218, 222, 228, 241,
245, 255, 261–263, 265–267,
269–274, 277, 282–284
thinking 22, 24, 33, 76, 79, 92, 105,
113, 118–120, 125, 149, 151,
152, 155–158, 160–168, 199,
244, 255, 256, 262, 263, 270,
275, 277, 282
thought 8, 16, 19, 31, 119, 126, 127,
137, 150, 156, 164, 165, 199,
207, 208, 214, 216, 218, 221,
228–230, 234, 249
totality 7, 39, 42, 115, 134, 135, 216,
218–222, 224, 226, 234, 235,
263, 266–268, 270, 274, 276,
277, 284
V
volition 65, 88
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Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change

Tanzi Neto, Liberali & Dafermos, Eds.

Manolis Dafermos is an associate professor in the epistemology of psychology in the

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Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change

Tanzi Neto, Liberali & Dafermos, Eds.

Manolis Dafermos is an associate professor in the epistemology of psychology in the

WWW . PETERLANG . COM

Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change

“Cultural-historical psychology offers strong conceptual and methodological tools to

“The book is organized by three well recognized authors within cultural-historical

Márcia Aparecida Amador Mascia, Silvia Grinberg

The (Post)Critical Global Studies series

Adolfo Tanzi Neto, Fernanda Liberali

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List of Figures and Tables ixi

8. Identity as a Sociocultural Phenomenon: The Dialectics of

12. The Challenges of the Reception of Vygotsky’s Theory in View of

4.1. Two key steps in the emergence of agency by double stimulation

3.1 Participants whose speeches were discussed in the chapter 72

We are very pleased to introduce Revisiting Vygotsky for Social Change:

ecology; migration; and globalization. It includes critical discussions of the

Márcia A. Amador Mascia,

ADOLFO TANZI NETO, FERNANDA LIBERALI,

Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory emerged in the first decades of 20th

development of Vygotsky’s theory. Moreover, inspired by the Vygotskian idea

understanding of radical social (societal) change (Stetsenko, 2017; Dafermos,

collective human activities. This chapter discusses the significance of agency,

contradictions in an individual’s dramatic life events as an important compo-

these categories as resources constituting how people view reality, expand-

Blommaert, J. (2010). The Sociolinguistics of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge

Engeström, Y. (2001). Expansive learning at work: Toward an activity theoretical

different countries and continents? How is it possible to deeply understand

Recontextualizating Vygotsky’s Theory

One of the difficulties in understanding cultural-historical theory is connected

cultural-historical theory in a dialectical way? What happens when a theory

already accepted decision. It’s a good example of an instrumental approach to

‘sociocultural paradigm’ that was developed in North America. The concept

traditions in China is a crucial theoretical, methodological and political issue

The Challenge of the Implementation of Vygotsky’s Theory

Vygotsky had a solid professional background in humanities, before his turn

them. Cole (1985) proposes that “…the sociocultural approach in combi-

The expansion and implementation of a theory out of the domain of

Bringing the Gap Between Theory and Practice

The cultural-historical theory was not a purely scientific or cognitive project.

commitment to the broader transformative—liberational social project that

between practicing theory and theorizing practice is a crucial characteristic of

Imaging the Future, Remembering the Past

The cultural-historical theory is future-oriented rather than past-oriented. It