Summary about Dialogue: Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor

by Jorge Berli, SJ

This chapter of the book introduces the reader to a discussion between Jürgen
Habermas and Charles Taylor about the way of participation of religion in the public sphere.
The discussion begins with a consideration of Charles Taylor’s proposition that
‘religion should not be considered a special case in comprehensive views of the good.
Religion is one instance of the more general challenge of diversity’.
First of all, Habermas makes a concession and mentions that there are no
differences between religious reasons and other kinds because religious reasons are not
coming out of an irrational perspective.
However, in his next step, Habermas argues that the difference between other
reasons and religious ones is that these ones are directed to his own community. He says:
“By using any kind of religious reasons, you are implicitly appealing to membership in a
corresponding religious community”.1 In other words, Habermas discredits religion from the
public debate because his reasons, even though are rational, are for his own believers.
Jürgen Habermas adds another difference between religious opinions and other
ones. The religious reasons generate a unique addesion for the ones who stand for it. It
means that the believers think that the salvation of his own soul depends on it. This does not
happen with other postures.

Charles Taylor replies to Jürgen that he does not agree with the argument that
religious reasons are less valuable because the believers are supposed to be the only
receivers of the message. He argues with the example of Martin Luther King’s discourse
about the U.S. Constitution. Nobody had trouble to understand it and was not relevant to the
deeper experiences that he might have had. All reasons (including philosophical ones) have
some personal experiences behind them.
He expresses that postures should not be differentiated from where the motivation to
speak comes: “How can you discriminate discourses on the basis of the deep psychological
background?”2

Habermas goes on telling that the difference is that religious comes as an experience
that is tied up with your membership in a community.3

1 Dialogue: Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, in J. Butler, J. Habermas, C. Taylor, and C. West,
The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.: 61
2 Ídem. 63
3 Cfr. 63
 About the discourse, the German author adds that the religious speech in the political
public sphere needs translation if its content should enter and affect the public sphere.
Philoshophical speeches do not need such an adaptation. He says that if in any public
statement there is a reference to the Genesis, it should be explained in secular terms.
The Canadian author replies that the difference is that there cannot be translations
for those inner references because the references themselves are the ones that make
changes in the speakers.
Taylor adds that the same thing goes for the reference to any philosopher (Marx,
Kant). Their reasons cannot be quoted without the explanation in ‘secular terms’. Charles
Taylor says that religious reasons should not be treated especially, because they do not
belong to a different domain. He proposes that for fairness and universality, religious
thoughts should be in the same level as other viewpoints.
Finally, both orators seem to agree in the last point that is mentioned by Habermas:
“Religious members of a liberal community would know in advance that certain arguments
do not count for those other believing or non believing fellow citizens with whom they are
trying to reach an agreement.”4 Asked by the moderator, Taylor agrees and concludes that
the discussion they had was on another level.
We could conclude that both perspectives have been developed in the present
summary. We believe that the central issue is whether religious reasons and other ones
have to be on the same level or they should be treated differently.
On the one hand, Habermas holds that religion is a particular case due to its
characteristics. On the other hand, Taylor argues that religious reasons have their
particularities but they are more similar to the other reasons than they seem to be, and
because of that, they must not be treated differently. The central argument remains open.

4 Ídem 68