Tim Noble

Whose Liberation, Whose Freedom?

Nikolai Berdyaev and Juan Luis Segundo on Freedom
as the Key to Human Identity*

Abstract: The Uruguayan liberation Der uruguayische Befreiungstheo-

theologian Juan Luis Segundo wrote
his doctoral thesis on the Russian re-
ligious philosopher Nikolai Ber-
dyaev. The chapter examines the the-
sis to show what Segundo took from
it in terms of his understanding of
freedom and the lasting influence that
Berdyaev’s commitment to the pri-
macy of freedom over being had on
Segundo and his understanding of
what it is to be human. Examples are
given of how Berdyaev continued to
be present in the background of Se-
gundo’s work and in his attempt to
avoid the ideologization of liberation.
loge Juan Luis Segundo schrieb seine
Doktorarbeit über den russischen Re-
ligionsphilosophen Nikolai Berdja-
jew. Dieser Beitrag untersucht diese
Dissertation, um zu zeigen, was Se-
gundo darin in Bezug auf sein Ver-
ständnis von Freiheit gewonnen hat,
sowie den bleibenden Einfluss von
Berdjajews Überzeugung vom Vor-
rang der Freiheit über das Sein auf
Segundo und dessen Verständnis da-
von, was es bedeutet, menschlich zu
sein. Es werden Beispiele dafür ge-
geben, wie Berdjajew im Hintergrund
von Segundos Arbeit und in seinem
Versuch, die Ideologisierung der Be-
freiung zu vermeiden, weiterhin prä-
sent war.

Keywords: Juan Luis Segundo, Ni- Juan Luis Segundo, Nikolai Berdja-
kolai Berdyaev, freedom, ideology jew, Freiheit, Ideologie

Two years before his death in 1996, the Uruguayan Jesuit theologian Juan
Luis Segundo gave a lengthy autobiographical interview to a Mexican doctoral
student at the KU Leuven. 1 In it he recalls how he first came to write his doctoral
thesis on the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev
(1874–1948), 2 published in 1963 as Berdiaeff: Une réflexion chrétienne sur la

* This study is part of a research project entitled “Latin American Liberation Theology:
Prospects and Challenges” (GAČR 18-01543S), funded by the Czech Science Foun-
dation.
1
Coronado, Jesús Castillo: Juan Luis Segundo in Conversation. An Interview with
Jesus Castillo Coronado, in: Louvain Studies 22:3 (1997), 263-307.
2
On Berdyaev, apart from Segundo’s work, see Lowrie, Donald: Rebellious Prophet:
A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev, New York 1960. Lowrie, an American, knew and
worked with Berdyaev for many years in Paris. See also Berďajev, Nikolaj: Vlastní

357
personne. 3 He summed up Berdyaev’s influence thus: “It had an impact on me
and interested me and he was an important author in my life, who had much
more importance than people would think.” 4 In what follows, I want to examine
this importance and the role Berdyaev plays in helping Segundo find a language
about freedom. Or, to put it as a question, why is it that Segundo, as one author
notes, speaks much more of “freedom” or “liberty” than of liberation? 5

Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948)

Born in Kiev in 1874 into an aristocratic family, 6 Berdyaev first went to uni-
versity in the early 1890s, beginning with the study of science before moving on
to law. There, as Segundo put it, “[h]e participated … in revolutionary move-
ments and even went as far as adhering to Marxism, to an original Marxism as in
all that he did, in which the notion of alienation is placed over against a spiritual
freedom which is the leitmotif of all his work.” 7 The association with Marxism
led to him being sentenced to internal exile, after which he went to Heidelberg,
before returning to St Petersburg around the time of the 1905 revolution. Spurred

životopis, Olomouc–Roma 2005, 19-20. The Czech translation is more faithful to the
original than the English version, published as Berdyaev, Nicholas: Dream and Reali-
ty: An Essay in Autobiography, London 1950. See also Noble, Tim: Theosis and Ple-
roma in East and West: Integral Freedom, in: Arblaster, John/Faesen, Rob (eds.):
Theosis/Deification: Christian Doctrines of Divinization East and West (BETL 249),
Leuven 2018, 129-147; and Noble, Tim: Mission Born in the Place of Encounter Be-
tween East and West, in: Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 56:1-2
(2015), 289-299.
3
Segundo, Jean-Louis: Berdiaeff: Une réflexion chrétienne sur la personne, Paris
1963.
4
Castillo, Conversation (note 2), 286. Coronado, Jesus Castillo: Some Elements and
Methodological Considerations for Interpreting Segundo’s Theo-Anthropological
Project, in: Louvain Studies 22:3 (1997), 216-228, suggests (220), that “Berdyaev
exerted the most decisive influence on his philosophico-theological understanding.”
5
Rocha Botelho, André da Conceição da: Teologia na complexidade (do racionalismo
teológico ao desafio transdisciplinar), Doctoral Thesis, Pontifícia Universidade
Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2007, 272. All translations in this article
are mine.
6
See Berďajev, Vlastní životopis (note 3), 19-20.
7
Segundo, Juan Luis: Berdiaeff: Exposición del Dr. Segundo, in: Boletín de la Socie-
dad Uruguaya de Filosofía Año 1965, Sesión del 6 de diciembre de 1963, available
through https://www.mediafire.com/folder/ 032rk88ruibhi/Juan_Luis_Segundo_02,
under the heading “Berdiaeff: Ponencia Soc Uruguaya Filosofia – 1963.Segundo,
“Berdiaeff: Exposición del Dr. Segundo”, page 1 of pdf.

358
in part by his readings of Dostoevsky, 8 Berdyaev discovered Christianity as a
living reality and possibility, and worked together with his old friend Sergei Bul-
gakov (1871–1944) on several journals.
A few years later Berdyaev moved to Moscow, where he began his prodi-
gious writing career. He taught briefly in Moscow University following the 1917
revolution, but was eventually expelled from the country on what has been called
the Philosophers’ Ship. 9 He first settled in Berlin, one of the initial intellectual
and publishing centers of the Russian exiles, where among other things he set up
an Academy. As financial woes hit Weimar Germany, however, the majority of
the exiles moved on to Paris. Many of them, including Berdyaev, whose mother
had French ancestry, spoke French, and despite the hardships, Berdyaev was
heavily involved in intellectual life. He lived in France till his death, for most of
this time in Clamart, just outside Paris, where his home became a place of en-
counter. 10 He also founded and edited a journal Put’ (The Way), which ran until
the beginning of the war, as well as writing books and articles.

Berdyaev and Segundo on Freedom

Berdyaev’s major preoccupation was with freedom. 11 In one of his early

works on the meaning of creation 12 Berdyaev already insists on the fact that crea-
tion cannot be a necessity, but that “every creative act is, by its very essence, a
creation from nothing, that is to say, the creation of a new force and not the modi-

8
For Berdyaev, Dostoevsky, particularly the story of the Grand Inquisitor from The
Brothers Karamazov, played a central role. The story is also an element that Segundo
picks up on. His treatment of it in regard to Berdyaev is in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note
4), 14-16 and 95-103. He returns to it, for example, in Segundo, Juan Luis: A Theol-
ogy for a New Humanity 1: The Community Called Church, Dublin 1980, 87-88.
The five volumes were reprinted as A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity 1-5,
Eugene, OR 2011.
9
See Chamberlain, Lesley: The Philosophy Steamer: Lenin and the Exile of the Intel-
ligentsia, London 2006. Berdyaev is a major character in this story.
10
See Noble, Tim: Springtime in Paris: Orthodoxy Encountering Diverse Others Be-
tween the Wars, in: Pierce, Andrew/Schuegraf, Oliver (eds.): Den Blick weiten:
Wenn Ökumene den Religionen begegnet: Tagungsbericht der 17. Wissenschaftli-
chen Konsultation der Societas Oecumenica (Beiheft zur Ökumenischen Rundschau
99), Leipzig 2014, 295-310.
11
He puts this very clearly in Berďajev, Vlastní životopis, (note 3), 66-67 (= Dream
and Reality, 46).
12
English: The Meaning of the Creative Act, London 1955, original 1916.

359
fication and transformation of previous forces.” 13 Segundo finds in this early
work “the most important conclusion for Berdyaev’s metaphysics, the primacy of
freedom over being.” 14 Berdyaev sought a non-foundationalist philosophy which,
because he nearly always works in antinomies, is founded on freedom. As he puts
it, “Freedom is the baseless foundation of being.” 15
Segundo explains the relationship between freedom and being thus: “Ber-
dyaev never confuses freedom and ‘non-being’, pure nothingness. He would
even go as far as using the term […] meontic […] to designate this reality which
is not yet being but which contains being as a free possibility.” And moreover
“divine liberty precedes the being of God. God, for Berdyaev, like every being,
has a free origin, a meontic state where primordial liberty has not yet played it-
self out, where all is in suspense.” 16 Berdyaev takes the idea of meontic reality
from his reading of the German Lutheran mystic Jakob Böhme. 17 His starting
point is what Böhme calls the Ungrund. 18 As the word implies, Ungrund cannot
be an existent, but it is ultimately the “baseless basis” of will and freedom which
issues forth in Being. For Böhme, says Berdyaev, we see that
the inner eternal life of God reveals itself as a dynamic process,
as a tragedy within eternity, as a struggle with the darkness of
non-being. The teaching about the Ungrund and freedom is also
a bold attempt to perceive the world-creation from the inner life
of the Divinity. The world-creation bears a relationship to the in-

13
Berdiaeff, Nicolas: Le sens de la création. Un essai de justification de l’homme, Paris
1955, 169, cited in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 43.
14
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 44.
15
Berdyaev, Meaning of the Creative Act (note 13), 145, Le sens de la création (note
14), 191. The French speaks of freedom as “le fondement sans fond de l’être”. The
Russian original speaks of “bezosnovnaja osnova bytija”, so to keep the wordplay, “a
baseless basis” would probably be the best English translation.
16
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 45. – Taken from the Greek, Berdyaev uses the term
meontic to get beyond the reduction to being, and to open up the primacy of freedom.
17
Berdyaev worked with Jakob Böhme’s Sämtliche Werke herausgegeben von K. W.
Schiebler, Leipzig 1831-46. Berdyaev turns to Böhme on many occasions. See, e.g.,
Berdyaev, Nikolai: Studies Concerning Jakob Boehme: Study I. The Teaching about
the Ungrund and Freedom (http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1930_349.
html, accessed 15.10.18). Original: Iz jetjudov o Ja. Beme. Jetjud I. Uchenie ob Un-
grund'e i svobode, in: Put’ 20 (Feb. 1930), 47-79. I refer to the English translation as
Berdyaev, Study 1. On Böhme and his reception, see Hessayon, Ariel/Apatrei, Sarah:
Introduction to Jacob Boehme. Four Centuries of Thought and Reception, New York
2013.
18
See on this James McLachlan, Mythology and Freedom: Nicholas Berdyaev’s Uses
of Jacob Boehme’s Ungrund Myth, in: Philosophy Today 40:4 (1996), 474-485.

360
 ner life of the Divine Trinity, and cannot be for It something
completely external. The principle of evil thus acquires a seri-
ousness and tragic aspect. 19
But Segundo sees an unresolved ambiguity in Berdyaev concerning freedom.
On the one hand, being is the object of desire of “the Pre-Being,” so that freedom
is most fully realized in and through being. But on the other hand, there are pas-
sages that see being as a cooling in the “fire of freedom,” so that being is a fall-
ing away, a failure of the primacy of freedom. 20 It is this ambiguity that Segundo
tried to work through in his doctoral thesis.
He cites a passage in which Berdyaev describes the roots of his Christian
faith:
I have come to Christ through liberty and through an intimate
experience of the paths of freedom. My Christian faith is not a
faith based on habit or tradition. It was won through an experi-
ence of the inner life of the most painful character … Freedom
has brought me to Christ and I know of no other path leading to
Him. I admit that it is grace which has brought me to faith, but it
is grace experienced by me as freedom. Those who have come to
Christianity through freedom bring to it that same spirit of liber-
ty. 21
But is God, then, the author of freedom, and if so how can we be free? For
this reason, says Segundo, Berdyaev’s fundamental question is “Can God be jus-
tified for a free person?” 22 If human beings are free, the further question is
whether this is worth it. If freedom can (does, Berdyaev and Segundo would add)
give rise not simply to moral evil but to ontological evil, then why be free? If we
could be not free but avoid evil, would that not be a better path to take? Either,
says Segundo, we seem to have a “God producing despite human beings ‘a future
harmony’ over against the present pain, or the God-Man infinitely respectful of a
liberty which only adds to the pain of the world.” 23
Segundo returned to this question some years later. In a chapter entitled “God
and Liberty,” 24 he starts with a discussion of Trinitarian heresies, and most par-
ticularly with the appearance of modalism in the second and third centuries. The
19
See Berdyaev, Study 1 (note 18).
20
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 47-55.
21
Cited in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 97. I use Berdyaev, Nicolas: Freedom and the
Spirit, New York 1935, x. Segundo cites from Esprit et la liberté, Paris 1933, 15-16.
22
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 99.
23
Ibid., 103.
24
Segundo, Juan Luis: A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity. 3: Our Idea of
God, Eugene, OR 2011, 98-145.

361
first point that he makes is that modalism, under the form it took with Paul of
Samosata and his teaching about the infusion of the man Jesus with divine na-
ture, leads to a removal of God from history: “God simply manifested himself
and operated through Jesus, but he remained independent of his instrument and
infinitely distanced from his sufferings, his commitments and his and our histo-
ry.” 25
Segundo sees this resulting in “a reduction of the Christian God to the divine
nature.” 26 But the consequence of this, he argues, is essentially that human be-
ings, indeed the whole of creation, is tied to a Creator who has no ties to them,
because God gains nothing from creation. All of creation is dependent (hence not
free) on a God who has no attachment to it. Segundo illustrates his point with a
series of contrasts between more philosophical statements and biblical cita-
tions—for example “One [of these two languages] says, ‘No one and no thing
can add anything to the Infinite Being.’ The other says, ‘here I stand knocking at
the door; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in and sit
down to supper with him and he with me’ (Rev 3:20).” 27 And he continues, in
explanation: “the image of a God who is infinitely happy both in the face of
man’s right use of his liberty as well as in the face of his wrong use of that liberty
is, qua image, contradictory to rather than compatible with the image of God who
stands at the door of man’s heart.” 28
Picking up on the relation, fundamental for Berdyaev, between freedom and
creativity, Segundo says that “Either human liberty can produce something unex-
pected, something original which is lacking, in which case it is creative. Or else it
is merely something which sadly and inexplicably separates man from his natural
finality, in which case it is a test with no value for the world and a worthless
piece of cruelty toward man.” 29 For Segundo modalism ends up denying any
worth to human existence, because the God it proposed was a God who did not
really engage with his creation or allow it true freedom. And here he turns direct-
ly to Berdyaev, quoting him as saying “One can say that the recognition of God
as person preceded the recognition of man as person … The doctrine of hyposta-
sis in the Trinity … in terms of the problem of the person, occupies a privileged

25
Ibid., 101-102. According to Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 137-138, in some places
Berdyaev is positive about Sabellianism.
26
Ibid., 102.
27
Ibid., 104. See on this Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 128, where he quotes Berdyaev,
Freedom and the Spirit, “God awaits from the human being a free response to his
call, the reciprocity of love and his creative cooperation in the victory over the
darkness of non-being.”
28
Ibid., 105.
29
Ibid., 107.

362
place in the history of world thought.” 30 Thus the question is about the purifica-
tion of our thought about God—de-idolatrizing it—in order that we might also
have a proper image and understanding of what it is to be human.

Berdyaev and Segundo on Grace and Freedom

In several places in his treatment of Berdyaev, Segundo has occasion to dis-

cuss the role of dogmas. He quotes Berdyaev: “dogmas only serve to signal the
route of spiritual liberation.” 31 To understand what it is to be free and human, it is
necessary to consider the relationship between human freedom and grace, which
are often placed in opposition. For Berdyaev, the problem goes back to the very
beginnings of the debate between Augustine and the Pelagians over the nature of
free will.
Pelagius, the fanatical upholder of a natural and invariable free
will, was a rationalist quite incapable of understanding the mys-
tery of freedom. The very antithesis between freedom and grace
is false and vicious, because it involves a rationalisation of free-
dom which subjects it to the natural world order. This false an-
tithesis of freedom and grace was the precursor of the division
between Protestantism and Catholicism …. 32
Rather, for Segundo, reading Berdyaev, grace is nothing else than “the put-
ting into action of the designs of God, and these designs aim above all at the
freedom of humanity.” 33 Thus, the respective roles of law and freedom are re-
versed: “Through Christ, the free human being needs nothing to enter into rela-
tion with God. The law moves from being an end to a means; freedom, from
means to end.” 34 Or as Berdyaev puts it in Freedom and the Spirit, “The mystery
of the Cross is the mystery of freedom. God the Son, veiled beneath the form of a
crucified slave, does not force recognition of Himself upon anyone. His divine

30
Ibid., 111. Segundo does not give the precise reference to Berdyaev here, but he cites
this passage in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 166: Berdiaeff, Nicolas: De l’esclavage
et de la liberté de l’homme, Paris 1946, 34. The English translation, Berdyaev,
Nicholas: Slavery and Freedom, London 1948, 33, changes the order.
31
Ibid., 104.
32
Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit (note 22), 117-118. Cited in Segundo, Berdiaeff
(note 4), 104-105, with reference to Esprit et la liberté (note 22), 126. Segundo dis-
cusses Pelagius also in Segundo, Juan Luis: A Theology for Artisans of a New Hu-
manity. 2: Grace and the Human Condition, Eugene, OR 2011, 17-19.
33
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 113.
34
Ibid., 110.

363
force and majesty are manifested in the activity of faith and free love. The Cruci-
fied addresses Himself to the freedom of the human spirit.” 35
This question remained with Segundo. The second volume of Teología
abierta is entitled “Grace and the Human Condition.” He phrases it thus: “Does
grace actually come to help liberty or to help the law? In other words, does it
make man more free or less a sinner?” 36 The answer is complex, but ultimately he
refuses to differentiate between grace and liberty, grace and creation—they are,
he says, synonyms. The ability to live out the freedom in which we are created
over against the concupiscence which is also part of human existence is basically
what grace is or at least what grace permits. It is the refusal to give up on free-
dom, to recognize that freedom “is not ready-made. It is not some liberated, spir-
itual, numinal zone wherein man is able to construct his own existence. Liberty is
a possibility given and a value to be won by handling an ever increasing number
of determinisms.” 37 And it is, as for Berdyaev, always about the person. The call
to freedom is a call to become person. As he sums it up in the conclusion:
Each chapter in this volume … has led us to discover the same
reality: the irresistible force that seeks to make us free, that trans-
forms us into free men, and that turns toward all free men so that
we may collaborate in a common task. This task, which is both
human and divine, is to create a history of love in all its fullness
precisely by virtue of being free. 38

Berdyaev and Segundo on Unfreedom

But human beings, born out of freedom, filled with grace, are not free. What
leads freedom to become a choice for unfreedom? For Berdyaev, freedom is al-
ways under threat and the temptation is always to turn to slavery. He shows how
the choice for slavery is made by religion and by the church in so many different
ways and cases. For example, he writes of his astonishment at how “the Church
imposes, as far as sexual life goes, a very severe asceticism bordering on terror-
ism, while it is very indulgent with sins to do with property, cupidity, the desire
to enrich oneself and economic exploitation of the other.” 39 And yet even this
distinction in common morality points to one of the key understandings of the
35
Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit (note 22), 140. Cited in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note
4), 113.
36
Segundo, Grace and the Human Condition (note 33), 19.
37
Ibid., 33.
38
Ibid., 169.
39
Nicolas Berdyaev, Spirit and Reality, London 1939, 87 (French: Esprit et réalité,
117), in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 181.

364
Fall in Berdyaev. It is connected with the rupture between subject and object, a
result of the “tragic hesitation between a necessary objective social good leading
by natural decline to slavery and on the other hand a subjective good that would
consist in isolating oneself from all conditions of efficacy far from people and
their history.” 40 So, ultimately for Berdyaev, “the Fall could not have taken place
in the natural world, because this world is itself a result of the Fall. The Fall is an
event in the spiritual world and in this sense it is anterior to the world, for it took
place before time began and in fact produced time as we know it.” 41
It is in this respect that the question of freedom and sin is addressed. Segun-
do says that for Berdyaev, “original sin depends on our own will.” The funda-
mental question is “how is my freedom responsible for the fall of my being, and,
consequently, to what extent can my freedom, through a ‘metanoia’, escape this
fall?” 42 Eventually Berdyaev would come to see this in structural terms. The
world is structured in a way that makes sin possible: “we live in a fallen world,
doomed to move within the categories of good and evil.” 43 As Segundo puts it, in
this view, “‘sin’ does not appear formally constituted, as is customary, by a free
act of evil, but by an evil structure of nature over against freedom … freedom is
defined in the time of humanity as an action against the Fall, against the ‘interior
lie’ of a slavery disguised as refusal.” 44
These passages make clear how Segundo’s notion of structural sin is at least
in part indebted to Berdyaev. Freedom is primary, but it is also true that we live
in a world where choices have been made. Thus we are not free, and yet the re-
sponse of the creative power of freedom that we have received is in refusing to
accept that sin and the Fall are inevitable and necessary. Liberation is the free
decision to enter on this path to freedom.

40
Segundo, Berdiaeff, 195.
41
Ibid., 196-197, quoting Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit (note 33), 22 (= Esprit et la
liberté, 45). The original refers at the end to not just time, but “bad” time, nashe
durnoe vremja.
42
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 197. For some of Segundo’s own responses to this, see
Segundo, Juan Luis: A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity. 5: Evolution and
Guilt, Eugene, OR 2011.
43
Berdyaev, Nikolai: The Destiny of Man, London 1955, 40 (= De la destination de
l’homme, 61) in Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 199.
44
Segundo, Berdiaeff (note 4), 200.

365
Conclusion

A book on Segundo speaks of the restless Christianity incarnated in his the-

ology, 45 while a biography of Berdyaev is called Rebellious Prophet. 46 This rest-
lessness, this refusal to accept the status quo, intellectually, politically, socially,
marks both men. Both have been accused of a certain gnosticism, 47 not altogether
unjustly if one understands gnosticism as an attachment to the liberative possibil-
ity of knowledge. Most importantly, Segundo made his own Berdyaev’s com-
mitment to the human person as free. And thus he made a commitment to the
poor, to those who are free yet whose freedom is bound by oppression in all its
manifold forms. Because, with Berdyaev, he understood freedom as prior to be-
ing, liberation is the restoration of the human person to the creative fullness for
which they are created and this is a pressing and unending task.
To be human is about freedom, about the possibility to incarnate the creative
power of freedom to build a new world. Berdyaev also constantly serves as a re-
minder that liberation theology has to avoid the temptation to make liberation
itself an ideology. Freedom escapes all attempts to reduce it to a particular pro-
gram, and a theology is only liberating if it serves to build a world in which the
creative power of freedom, a free gift of a free God to a free humanity, is spoken
in faith, hope and love.

45
See Murad, Afonso: Este cristianismo inquieto: a fé cristã encarnada em J. L. Segun-
do, São Paulo 1994. See also Id., A “Teologia Inquieta” de Juan Luis Segundo, in:
Perspectiva Teológica 26 (1994), 155-186.
46
Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet (note 3).
47
See on Berdyaev, Linde, Fabian: The Spirit of Revolt: Nikolai Berdyaev’s Existential
Gnosticism, Stockholm 2010). On Segundo, see Bojorge, Horacio: Teologias deici-
das. El pensamiento de Juan Luis Segundo en su contexto, Madrid 2000, critically
evaluated in Pastor, Félix-Alejandro: Arcani disciplina: Sobre el pensamiento teo-
lógico de Juan Luis Segundo, in: Gregorianum 83:3 (2002), 545-558.

366