Religious Insurgencies: Angus Muir

Wars from Within
Chapter 3
Religious Insurgencies
Angus Muir
by NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY on 06/06/17. For personal use only.
Wars From Within Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
The Iranian revolution of 1979 surprised and shocked a world

dominated by the secular imperatives of the Cold War. An oil-rich
state, a compliant ally of the US and one previously only convulsed
by nationalist coups, had succumbed to a puritanical, religious revo-
lutionary form in some respects more familiar to the Middle Ages
than the 20th century. Despite comment at the time that this event
was a historical anomaly, over the next two decades religious insur-
gencies of one sort or another appeared throughout much of the
world under the banners of all the world’s major religions — par-
ticularly Islam — and this pattern shows little sign of abating. The
events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), for example, were a manifesta-
tion of Islamic, anti-Western violence. The size and form of these
insurgencies have varied considerably from the activities of small-
scale terrorist organizations to full-scale revolutionary wars, but all
share an underlying basic premise — a spiritual rationalization for
altering temporal political reality through violence.
Religion, as a motivation for insurgencies, is as old as the motiva-
tion for organized warfare itself. Because religion simultaneously
functions as a system of social organization and regulation and also
offers a divinely promised destiny, religious communities react vio-
lently when their world order is threatened. It is the reaction to a
threat — real or imagined — which has defined religious insurgen-
cies since the earliest times, and religious insurgents to this day
invariably see their struggles as primarily defensive in nature.
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60 Wars from Within
Religious insurgencies, as with other manifestations of the phenom-

enon, can take a variety of different forms, last for varied periods of
time and ultimately result in success or failure. The defining fea-
tures, however, are constant. Religious insurgents see in their belief
systems the mechanisms for establishing a more just, equitable and
pure society, and within their scriptural traditions they see divine
justifications for bringing these changes about through violence. It
is this sacred justification for violence and the apparently archaic
alternate social realities offered that make the contemporary resur-

gence of religiously motivated insurgencies both surprising (especially
to the secularized Western world) and of particular concern for the
maintenance of domestic and international security.1

Following a brief history of the phenomenon, this chapter will
examine four defining components of religious insurgencies. The
components cover a spectrum from the justification for violence
itself to the conduct of operations. Their examination against the
backdrop of the last 20 years or so is important to suggest how states
might most effectively counter and contain religious insurgencies,
and at the same time reinforce the reasons why they have been so
enduring and why they will continue to endure.
The History of Religious Insurgency

The history of religious insurgencies can be traced back to the
ancient world and has continued in fits and starts to the present.2
Moreover, within the context of religious history and tradition,
many of these previous struggles were effectively precursors of reli-
gious insurgencies being conducted today, establishing a dynamic
interaction between past and present that is central to religious-
historical narratives. Some of the earliest recorded religious insur-
gencies were mounted against foreign occupations, a casus belli that
has remained constant over time. The Maccabeaen revolt of the
second century BCE, for example, was fought against the Seleucid
Greeks and the First and Second Jewish revolts, in the first and sec-
ond centuries CE respectively, were against the Roman occupation
of Judea.3 The medieval Ismaili sect, the Assassins in the Middle East
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Religious Insurgencies 61
during the 12th and 13th centuries, struggled against both orthodox
Muslims and Christian crusaders. In Europe the Taborites of early
15th century Bohemia and the Anabaptists in 16th century northern
Germany were both examples of a violent Christian reaction against
religious orthodoxy and its control of political power. Following the
enlightenment era in Europe and the apparent triumph of secular-
ism, many later examples manifested themselves as reactions to
European colonialism. Throughout the 19th century, the French
repeatedly experienced religious revolts in their North and West

African possessions. Amongst the various violent ethnic and reli-
gious reactions to the consolidation of the Russian empire, Muslim
resistance in Dagestan and Chechnya between 1830 and 1859 stands

out. The British Empire also experienced religious insurgencies,
perhaps the most significant being that led by the self-proclaimed
Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, which began in 1881 and was
not extinguished until 1898.
Nor were religious insurgencies in the post-enlightenment
period confined to European colonial possessions. The Ottoman
Empire also experienced religious revolt, most notably that inspired
by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in league with the house of Saud,
a later manifestation of which would result in the establishment of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Another example with resonance
today was the Muslim revolt of Said Ahmad against the Sikh rulers
of the Punjab in the 1820s, one of the objectives of which was to free
Muslim Kashmir. These early religious insurgencies sprang from the
same basic causes of all subsequent ones, namely the perception of
a threat to culture posed by an oppressor — either a foreign one of
a different religion, that of “apostate” co-religionists or some combi-
nation of the two.
The interwar period, however, saw a pronounced decline in reli-
gious insurgency, especially in Muslim lands where it had been most
common. By the 1940s secular ideologies had surpassed religious
reasoning as a focus for revolutionary discontent in the colonial and
former colonial areas. As one experienced British diplomat noted of
the Middle East in 1942: “For practical purposes Theocracy had
been displaced as in Europe by Ethnocracy, pan-Islam by National
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62 Wars from Within
Independence.”4 The primacy of secular ideology as a basis for

insurgencies (reinforced by superpower patronage) lasted until the
1970s when a global resurgence of religious belief as a political vehi-
cle took place, a process Gilles Kepel has aptly termed “the Revenge
of God.”5 Since that time religious insurgencies have grown in num-
ber — primarily in the developing world — until today when some
of the most pernicious and enduring insurgencies are religious in
nature.
The Components of a Religious Insurgency

The components that most clearly differentiate a religious insur-

gency from other types are the formation of a violent ideology, the
function and type of leadership, the attitude of the groups towards
the time and space within which violence occurs, and the tactics
employed. These particular components stand out because they
cover the spectrum of a religious insurgency ranging from the inter-
pretation and reformulation of traditional ideas into a contemporary,
functional, militant ideology through to the instrumental and oper-
ational considerations that give religious insurgencies substance.
The formation of ideology

The logical starting place when discussing the dynamics of a religious
insurgency is to examine the process of ideological formation. An
understanding of this process not only provides insights into the
group, but also provides an understanding of how the group might
be delegitimized by the state. A religious ideology that acts as a justi-
fication for violence has many sources, the most important being
scripture and religious traditions. Scripture is interpreted in light of
contemporary events and the environment within which a group
exists. Religious ideas are critically evaluated and reformulated to
explain and offer solutions to a perceived condition or crisis. The use
of religious dogma is often selective, chosen to illustrate the world-
view of the group and to justify its attempts to alter the existing
sociopolitical status quo. Accordingly, the most emphasized elements
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of religious traditions are those that concern themselves with strug-

gles against oppression, differentiation of a religious community,
and eschatological visions of religious destiny. Ideology also has a
variety of objectives: It is at once an attempt to differentiate the
group from society generally (and from other, secular vehicles of
protest); It may also be aimed at expanding a group’s following; and
it offers both an alternative vision of reality and a justification for any
methods used to bring about this alternative reality. The ideologies
so formed have a number of common features: A Golden Age Myth;

the perception of a “theft” of culture; scripturalism; a Manichean
worldview; and a messianic vision (of varying intensity) based on the
imminence of an expected messianic era.6

The myth of a “Golden Age” of harmony and abundance is a
common feature of most religious belief systems and a desire to emu-
late this time is an important feature of contemporary religious
insurgencies. This universal myth concerns itself with the wholeness
and peace that communities throughout the ages have felt to be the
“ideal” human condition.7 For Jews it might be the Davidic period
when the old Kingdom of Israel was at its zenith. In Christianity the
early primitive Church is frequently an inspiration, as is (for
American groups) early Puritan America. For many Muslim intellec-
tuals it is most frequently the formative period of Islam when the
community was ruled by Mohammed or the Rightly Guided Caliphs.8
For Sikhs it has been the establishment of an independent Khalistan
analogous to the former Sikh Kingdom. For religious insurgents,
however, the perception of a crisis implies that this Golden Age can-
not be achieved peacefully; instead it must be brought about through
armed struggle. Exactly when the Golden Age will be delivered varies
according to group. In the case of some messianic and apocalyptic
groups, the advent of the Golden Age and redemption are imminent,
while in most cases it lies at a distant, frequently ill-defined point in
the future, one that can only be reached through years of steadfast
“cosmic” struggle.9 Paradoxically, many violent religious groups see
their struggle as ultimately leading to peace, and that violence perpe-
trated in the contemporary world serves merely to purify that world
and ensure that what follows will be a better one devoid of violence.10
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The specific content of the myth itself can vary widely depending on
the precise theological leanings of the group and what the group
regards as worthy of reconstruction or emulation — a process deter-
mined by the group’s environment. Within Judaism and Islam there
is less variation, and in both cases the myth has informed actual
political programmes. In the case of violent Christian groups — such
as those adhering to Christian Identity beliefs — far greater theo-
logical variation has led to a situation where “[t]he range of possible
utopias of the past to choose from is almost unlimited, and Identity

quarters have delved deep into a largely imagined history to recon-
struct scenarios of former bliss.”11 Indeed, for Christian groups
variation extends across environments. The aspirations of the

Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, for example, have little in com-
mon with those of Christian Identity groups.12
All Golden Age myths, however, share certain common features.
Apart from representing an idealized world obtainable only through
devotion and struggle, they are concerned with a time that ended
due to a combination of a “fall from grace” and the actions of some
malevolent other.13 Both of these forces endure still in one form or
another and their physical manifestation provides an identifiable
source of grievance and thus a focus for violence. The Golden Age
myth is also a way of making the history of the various faiths contem-
porary — a process whereby historical, religious events are recast
into contemporary forms. This is done in a variety of ways including
the phraseology the group uses, the group’s nomenclature and the
symbols it employs, all of which create a direct and more immediate
link between the past and the present.
Most groups involved in religious insurgencies have a percep-
tion that their traditional culture is under assault, and in certain
cases has been actively eroded and threatened for a considerable
period of time. The threat to culture itself is shaped by political
events both in the distant past and the immediate present — the
gap in time is of no consequence because the threat is seen as a
historical constant.14 The broader phenomenon of religious radical-
ism may be defined as the rejection of surrounding cultural norms
and values that are not considered authentic to a religious tradition,
and the vacuum created by this rejection is filled by intensifying key
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elements of this religious tradition15 — an alien, hostile culture is

thus “displaced.” For Jewish groups, this belief draws on a long his-
tory of persecution both during biblical times and during the
Diaspora following the destruction of the Second Temple — a per-
secution that only abated (but did not cease) with the creation of
the state of Israel. In the contemporary period, these events are
recalled and viewed within the context of the threats posed by Arab
states and sub-state groups to the newly reacquired Promised Land.
For many Christian groups, it is a (comparatively) more recent pro-

cess involving a Zionist and governmental conspiracy against a white
Anglo-Saxon Christendom. For Islamic groups, the threat is largely
that of secular, Western imperialism (and formerly Communism),

both cultural and political, and its indigenous proponents through-
out the Muslim world.16 The perceived threat for Islamic groups
may come from any competing religious group, as the former
Taliban government in Afghanistan showed by destroying Shi’ite
and Buddhist places of worship. Israel and Judaism are also per-
ceived as both a threat and an “insult” which is in league with the
Christian West. For militant Sikhs in India it has been the percep-
tion of Hindu cultural dominance at the expense of Sikh culture.
For all denominations there is a belief that traditional values must
be defended and propagated lest they be destroyed forever by mod-
ern, “ungodly” actors and processes which were unleashed at the
time of the enlightenment and continue unabated in the present.17
Secular culture is perceived as eroding traditional values and also as
a sanctioning force for practices that are regarded by religious com-
munities as taboo. In this regard religious insurgents see their
struggles as defensive in nature, unlike their opponents who con-
versely identify them as an aggressive threat to the existing order.
Concepts of a Golden Age and theft of culture cannot be formu-
lated in a vacuum; they must be based upon and legitimized by
textual sources. The ideologies of all groups involved in religious
insurgencies are rigorously defined by scripture and religious tradi-
tion, and there exists a symbiotic relationship between scripture and
reality. Contemporary events are often recast into a scriptural reality,
bridging the gap between past and present. This recasting serves
both to mobilize the group itself and to place the “enemy” within a
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mortal, cosmic struggle that is much greater than mere temporal

history. Flexibility in ideology is allowed by the vast scope of these
sources, and the degree to which various components are selected,
interpreted and emphasized. There are many religious messages
that condone violence, and although these are in the minority, once
they have been brought to prominence and related to the present
social context they provide a divinely sanctioned justification for
action.18 This process is driven by the belief of religious insurgents
that scriptures not only record the past, but that they are equally
relevant to the present and the future.
Certain themes within the various religious traditions are con-
tinually employed, such as the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein in

Shi’ite theology or the role of the high priest Phineas in Judaism.19
The common theme here is the need to base ideological perspec-
tives in scripture and the accepted inerrancy of these texts. Each
religion possesses clearly defined canons of scripture and decisive
commentaries where a believer may find immutable doctrines, sto-
ries and bodies of law. Examples of the enforcement of law include
the sharia in Iran following the 1979 revolution and more recently
by the Taliban in Afghanistan. The importance of scriptural stories
can be seen where an ancient enemy is equated with a modern one,
for example Meir Kahane, founder of the Jewish Kach movement
and one of the great ideologues of modern Jewish extremism, iden-
tifying the biblical Amalekites (exterminated by the Israelites at the
behest of God) as lineal predecessors of the Palestinians. These
scriptural interpretations are then reinforced by related symbolic
acts, such as martyrdom operations, in order to mobilize the group
and any prospective constituency. This complex process of scriptural
justification means that ancient ideas are relevant to the present,
making tradition reality.
Part of the process of ideological formation is the adoption of
what might be called a Manichaean worldview which divides human-
ity into a righteous “us” and a non-believing “them.”20 These two
groups are all encompassing and mutually exclusive. Moreover, the
“us” represent the followers of God, while the “them” represent the
enemies of God or the friends of Satan, who by scriptural definition
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must be fought and ultimately converted or destroyed. Because of

their association with God, the righteous themselves are assured of
ultimate victory. Conflict has thus been elevated to a “cosmic” level
where there exists only “an ultimate good and evil, a divine truth
and falsehood,”21 and it is a conflict that transcends all earthly strug-
gles. The primary use of such a distinction is to mobilize support
and to create “the other” — a process not unique to religious vio-
lence but common to all conflicts throughout time.22 What is unique
is the transformation of the other into something evil. In the words

of Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, for example, “Muslims are
to embark on an ‘Islamic Revolution’ under the guidance of reli-
gious officials, the ‘ulama’ whose knowledge and integrity guarantee

the ultimate triumph of Islam over the Satanic force of disbelief.”23
Similarly, a Hamas communiqué, issued in response to the American
military build-up in Saudi Arabia following Iraq’s annexation of
Kuwait, described the event as “another episode in the fight between
good and evil.” The communiqué continues to identify a sectarian
threat to culture and describes a “hateful Christian plot against our
religion, our civilization and our land.”24 An Aryan Nations bro-
chure claims that, “there is a battle being fought this day between
the children of darkness (today known as the Jews) and the children
of light (God), the Aryan race, the true Israel of the Bible.”25 Such
distinctions are amplified by de-humanizing the “enemy” with titles
such as “mud-people,” “monkeys,” “dogs” or “beasts.” When the
enemy is no longer seen as being human, an important restraining
factor on violence is removed.
Despite this clear division, certain groups of non-believers are
more frequently attacked for reasons of accessibility, symbolism and
the degree to which they pose a threat to the group’s continued
existence and traditional values. Whatever the mechanisms that
compel a group to turn towards violence, one of the first steps is to
decide which people will be targeted. Ideology is important in deter-
mining the targets selected, but so too are the contexts within which
a group operates, the opportunities that present themselves, the
constraints that exist and the group’s overall objectives.26 Target
groups may be defined simply along the lines of religious belief, or
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68 Wars from Within
along those of political significance, but in both cases they are per-
ceived as threatening the true faith. While it is true for some
religious groups that the “absence of a constituency in the secular
terrorist sense leads to a sanctioning of almost limitless violence
against a virtually open ended category of targets,”27 different insur-
gencies will favour certain types of targets depending upon their
capabilities and declared objectives. Target groups may include
members of other religions and “apostates” of the same religion,
simple but all-embracing distinctions created by a Manichaean out-

look. The latter group frequently includes religious moderates and
what may be described as “co-opted” religious establishments as well
as members of the political hierarchy and the repressive apparatus.

The “apostate” label is a powerful rhetorical device for religious
insurgents, as deviation from a religion is frequently perceived to be
a worse crime than the ignorance of it.28
All religions contain a messianic promise and this promise can
play an important part in the conduct of a religious insurgency.
Messianic ideas of renewal play an important part in cosmic time
and provide a promise of ultimate victory — regardless of how dif-
ficult a struggle may appear at any point in time. Ideas of cosmic war
between “good” and “evil” and the idea that the adherent is the
member of a persecuted, righteous few, are most explicitly conveyed
in messianic texts and traditions. Messianic ideas, as with other scrip-
tural themes can be brought to prominence by linking them to
mortal activity. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, for instance, altered
mainstream Jewish messianic perceptions by arguing that the com-
ing of the Messiah and the redemption for the Jewish people could
be accelerated through human agency. The messianic idea is a pow-
erful (if frequently latent) one and may even be found in the only
case where a successful violent religious revolution took place — the
5th article of the Iranian constitution states that it will remain in
force until the return of the 12th Imam.29 Perhaps most important
of all, messianic ideas and expectations are flexible, allowing for
change according to alterations in political circumstances. If a mes-
sianic expectation is disappointed, the belief system itself may even
be strengthened and renewed (if a group remains intact) through a
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process of rationalization.30 A religious insurgency which empha-

sizes messianic expectations, however, is generally doomed because
of a lack of popular support — for example, the short-lived occupa-
tion of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by the Saudi Ikhwan in 1979
when the Saudi people were called upon to rise against the House
of Saud and one of Ikhwan’s leaders was declared to be the awaited
Mahdi. Where a messianic belief is close to accepted orthodox
expectations, however, there may be a corresponding degree in
popularity, for example, Jewish militant attempts to destroy the

Dome of the Rock as part of hastening the construction of the Third
Temple and Jewish redemption.
The process of ideological formation is akin to the creation of a

new belief system. But the veracity of this belief system can be chal-
lenged on many levels by the state. Educational systems, both state
and private, must not be allowed to teach incomplete versions of
history or narrow, selective and dogmatic interpretations of ortho-
dox Islam. On the level of religious discourse the primacy of
moderate clerical opinion is essential. Moderates can offer a rea-
soned critique of the selective radical dogma and have this critique
presented to the vast majority of religious communities who are
themselves moderate. Unfortunately many moderates are automati-
cally seen as apostates, as are members of many state-run clerical
establishments. This label of illegitimacy must in turn be addressed.
Leadership
Group leadership is extremely important to religious insurgencies
not only because of its relationship to the formation of group ideol-
ogy but also because of its subsequent influence on the practical
reality of developing a tactical programme. It is in the realm of lead-
ership where scriptural imperatives are confronted by, and adapted
to, the practical constraints and problems of the temporal world. It
is this dual process of confrontation and adaptation which will deter-
mine what form a group will ultimately take and also its propensity
to endure and survive. Leadership pronouncements and texts are
also a useful barometer of a group’s intentions and attitudes towards
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its environment. The various statements of Osama bin Laden and

his lieutenants, Muhammad Faraj’s (an ideologue of the Egyptian
al-Jihad) Neglected Duty, Juhayman Utaybi’s (leader of the Saudi
Ikhwan) Seven Letters and Meir Kahane’s They Must Go are all
designed to justify violence within the context of a corrupt and fail-
ing society and to offer potential solutions. By contrast the novel The
Turner Diaries by William Pierce is intended not only as a critique,
but also as a tactical and operational blueprint for conducting a rac-
ist religious insurgency. The Turner Diaries, for example, served as a

guide for the violent activities of The Order, a right-wing Christian
group active in the US during the early 1980s, and influenced the
thinking of Timothy McVeigh, executed for his part in the 1995

Oklahoma City bombing.31 Statements made by leaders (and groups
in general) also take advantage of the full panoply of both the media
and information technology, thus reaching a larger and more varied
audience. Most importantly the manipulation of group dynamics by
leaders has a profound influence on the manner and degree of vio-
lence in which an insurgent group engages.
Leadership may take a variety of different forms. All religions
provide examples where a dominant intellectual cleric provides
active leadership and/or a blueprint for action. There are also
examples where a single charismatic “divine” leads, or where leader-
ship is collective. These leadership forms are not mutually exclusive,
although there is a direct link between the type of leadership and
the course an insurgent group follows.
Ideologues, or religious authorities, are generally not directly
involved with operational matters and may even deny a direct asso-
ciation with a violent group, but they exert significant influences
through their sermons, publications and rulings. Ideologues may
exert a posthumous influence, living on in their published works
and influencing succeeding generations of dissent. It may be said
they perform the role of “spiritual” but not “active” leadership.
Many religious movements have a central religious ideologue who
may be linked to a religious establishment, or they may ignore exist-
ing bodies of juridical opinion and draw their inspiration directly
from scripture. A good example of the former is the role played by
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Fadlallah in Lebanon. Despite Fadlallah’s apparent connections

with Hezbollah, he is not part of the leadership, and yet for many
Lebanese Shi’ites by the early 1980s he had become “an infallible
moral and political compass,”32 a position true to this day, and one
that extends far beyond Lebanon itself. By contrast the “self-taught”
religious leaders Utaybi and Shoko Asahara, leader of the Japanese
Aum Shinrikyo cult responsible for the 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas
attacks, are more generally associated with charismatic activism due
to their implicit rejection of existing religious judicial opinions on

violence and their role in directing violence.33 In fact, ideologues
perform the important role of legitimating acts of violence; it is they
who explain contemporary events and invest them with religious

meaning. Clerical sanction is crucial for the conduct of religious
violence itself, particularly so when none of those directly involved
are religious authorities. The proposed Dome of the Rock attack by
the Jewish Underground, for example, was shelved in 1982 because
none of the rabbis consulted would approve the plan, and without
such approval the participants were unwilling to act.34
In his Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Max Weber
stated that the term “charisma” should be applied to “a certain qual-
ity of an individual personality by virtue of which he [sic] is set apart
from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or quali-
ties.”35 Charismatic leadership can also be seen as the result of a
combination of different factors, including a situation of social cri-
sis, the character of the leader, the leader’s ability to alter values, and
perceptions of legitimacy.36 Charismatic leaders set themselves apart
through an intimate knowledge of religious scripture and tradition
and also by exhibiting personal qualities that command considera-
ble respect and loyalty from followers, reinforced through highly
effective communication skills. One observation made of contempo-
rary Islamic leaders, but equally true of all the faiths, is that “they are
people who exude a moral authority that is politically persuasive to
a great many people in their respective societies, particularly to the
‘downtrodden’ ... who harbour deep resentment over the broken
promises of their ... regimes.”37 Once a charismatic “bond” has been
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established between a leader and his followers the leader exercises

an increasing degree of influence on the normative orientations of
his group, and perhaps on those outside the group. Unlike other
systems of authority, charismatic leadership can exert a significant
(or complete) influence over a person’s value systems.38
Charismatic leadership in the context of religious groups can be
an end in itself or eventually lead to a collegial leadership system.39
In those cases where leadership has remained charismatic, such as
those of Utaybi, Kahane or Asahara, the group tends to be set on a

direct collision course with the state, endangering the existence of
both group and leader. By the same token, once the charismatic
leader is removed, the group in many cases can no longer sustain

itself. In situations where charismatic leadership gives way to or
coexists with a collegial form, the prospects for group security and
longevity are increased. Charismatic leadership in the context of
violence is arguably a more volatile form of leadership than collegial
structures because authority rests with a particular individual who is
the sole interpreter of divine instruction. For this same reason char-
ismatic leadership is also more prone to emphasis on messianic and
apocalyptic expectations.
As noted above, a collegial leadership form frequently grows out
of charismatic leadership. The founders of groups are frequently
charismatic in nature and if the group is sufficiently large, pragmatic
in its beliefs, and does not actively court destruction, then the char-
ismatic form will be succeeded by a collective leadership. Collective
or collegial leadership tends to be the most common form, resulting
in greater flexibility in decision-making and recourse to action, and
a more sophisticated organizational structure that is difficult for the
state to penetrate or disrupt. Hezbollah in Lebanon provides an
enduring example of this. Indeed, the nature of a collegial leader-
ship is a key indicator of the breadth of an organizational network.
The collective form is also hierarchical in nature, involving at
the top a level where decisions on targets are taken and justified
according to religious doctrine. This role is frequently adopted by a
cleric or groups of clerics such as that which presided over the
activities of the Egyptian al-Jihad at the time of the Egyptian
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President Anwar Sadat’s assassination, headed by the blind Sheikh

Omar Abdel Rahman. A similar phenomenon can be seen in
Judaism and Christianity. Beneath this exists a variety of different
sub-departments, each charged with responsibility for a certain spe-
cific area such as propaganda, intelligence or operations. Such
structures are necessary to coordinate and focus the resources and
activities of groups with a large membership and relatively broad
agenda. The collegial form helps ensure group survival and is also
useful for resolving internal dissent. When a prominent leader is

killed, for example, the succession must be as quick and uncompli-
cated as possible in order to ensure group cohesion and the
operational direction of the insurgency.

The challenge for states is to discredit insurgent leaders or to
neutralize them. The former is difficult because the leaders of reli-
gious insurgencies transport messages to which people are receptive
and that can be disseminated in a variety of ways. The effects of kill-
ing or capturing leaders vary greatly according to the group — small
groups find the removal of leaders more traumatic than larger ones.
But in the case of all large-scale religious insurgencies, leadership
vacuums are quickly filled, and the death of a leader may simply
make him a more powerful iconic martyr figure. Furthermore, the
decentralized leadership network of al-Qaeda blurs the lines of
organizational control further, denying the state a clear hierarchy to
dismantle.
Time and space

The issues of time and physical space are important elements in
defining the parameters of a religious insurgency. The timing of a
religious insurgency is important for both temporal and spiritual
reasons, and so is the group’s perception of time itself. There are
many dates which hold enormous religious significance and which
are potentially very propitious times for violence including specific
eschatological dates such as the beginning of the Islamic century
and the ends of Christian millennia, anniversaries of martyrdoms, or
the expected arrival of messianic figures. Other anniversaries may
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Wars from Within
74 Wars from Within
relate to post-scriptural times and include acts of inter-communal

violence such as the 1994 Hebron massacre, the assassination of a
more contemporary “martyr,” or large-scale political events such as
the creation of the state of Israel, 9/11 or subsequent events related
to the on-going “war on terror.” A related issue is the perception of
time held by a group. As has been noted long ago with regards to
group violence, “[t]he innermost structure and the mentality of a
group can never be clearly grasped as when we attempt to under-
stand its conception of time in the light of its hopes, yearnings and
purposes.”40 Religious perceptions of time identify continuity
between past, present and future, and while there may exist a time-
table for action, tactical goals can be suspended in order to ensure

group survival. This perception poses profound difficulties for tem-
poral rulers in terms of consistent policy and terms of office. Due to
the multiplicity of reasons behind the timing of religious violence,
the area may be divided into four different categories. First are anni-
versaries of specific events usually celebrated as part of a religious
festival. Second is the largest category of political or tactical timing,
where violence is timed for maximum effect. Third is the category
of reactive or “tit for tat” violence, which follows no predictable pat-
tern and is motivated largely by revenge. Fourth and finally are dates
relating specifically to messianic redemption, which are derived
from revealed eschatology.
The location of acts of religiously inspired violence is also an
important consideration, as is the broader concept of “sacred
space.” Two categories of location suggest themselves, those regarded
as “holy places,” and those of a tactical, temporal variety. Places of
religious significance are frequently the scene or even the cause of
religious violence.41 Indeed, as David Rapoport has noted, ethnic
and religious groups have in part gained their very identity through
the control of particular places over time.42 This applies not only to
specific sites of enormous scriptural significance such as the Grand
Mosque in Mecca or the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, but also
to more geographically complex areas such as Khalistan or the
Holy Land. The situational or geographical overlap in holy sites
between the revealed religions in particular makes this situation
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Wars from Within
more complex and more volatile. The symbolic and ideological

motivation of holy places may even be seen in group nomenclature —
as exemplified by “the International Islamic Front for the Liberation
of the Islamic Holy Places” (al-Qaeda), the name of a communiqué
claiming responsibility for the 1998 US embassy bombings in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.43 Location may also be governed simply
by the nature of the target, defined around tactical value or tempo-
ral significance. Religious violence directed against a specific
communal group, country or group of countries might thus target

numerous locations, such as embassies, aircraft, military installations
and personnel, civilians and the economy.
In terms of physical geography, space and sparsely populated, dif-

ficult terrain have always aided insurgencies whatever their motivation.
A retreat to the wilderness to escape repression and the conventional
military superiority of a regime also have a peculiar scriptural reso-
nance for religious insurgencies, recalling specific incidents from
religious history and functioning as an opportunity for spiritual
renewal by removing themselves from the influences of a corrupt and
evil society. Physical geography may also include the availability of
what have been called “lawless zones” where there is no functioning
state control and the insurgency can conduct its activities with rela-
tive impunity — al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, Yemen and
Pakistan, as well as in northern and west Africa under the auspices of
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are recent examples.
Perceptions of time and space are difficult for a state to influ-
ence, engrained as they are in religious tradition. Predicting the
timing of attacks is not easy, but anniversaries and calendars should
provide a guide, as well as calculations of when an insurgent attack
will be most damaging. By the same token predicting the location of
attacks is difficult, and the sheer number of potential targets means
they cannot all be effectively guarded. The clues lie in what type of
locations a group has struck before and an awareness that, as targets
are hardened, the more attractive softer ones become. At the very
least lawless zones should be closely monitored and assistance given
to whoever or whatever passes for local authority there — a situation
complicated in contexts where there is no semblance of authority
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Wars from Within
76 Wars from Within
(for example in Somalia), those in charge are sympathetic to the

insurgents (as with the Taliban in Afghanistan), or if the authorities
themselves are regarded as unpalatable.
Tactics
A variety of tactics are employed by religious insurgents depending
on the group’s objectives, the environment in which it operates, its
size and capabilities, and the group’s theological understanding of

the role it should play in the transformation of society. These may
include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, social welfare activities, political
participation, fundraising, mobilization and recruitment. In this

respect the actual tactics employed during religious insurgencies
are, by and large, the same as those employed by violent secular
groups. The employment of conventional methods such as bomb-
ings and shootings by religious groups however, has certainly been
more prolific and destructive than that of violent secular groups,
reflecting both the nature of their struggle and their world out-
look.44 Seen within the mythological context of “holy war” it has also
been noted that “[t]he exact manner in which God’s hosts go about
subduing the world is relatively unimportant, as long as it is done
with sufficient ferocity to effectively communicate the immensity of
His rage.”45 Once again, context and group type are major determi-
nants of the mode and scale of the violence employed. The larger
and more mature a group, the broader the scope for employing
different means. Al-Qaeda, for example, has employed a vast array
of different techniques to attack diplomatic, civilian and military
targets around the world. By the same token, group size and organ-
ization are not the sole determinants of effectiveness. Some of the
larger-scale acts of violence perpetrated in the 1980s and 1990s were
ostensibly the work of small groups with loose and ill-defined links
to larger organizations — the Oklahoma City and first World Trade
Center bombings are prime examples.46
Perhaps the area of greatest concern is the possibility that reli-
gious groups will acquire and use some form of unconventional
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Wars from Within
weapon. A number of factors contribute to this fear. Religious

groups are widely understood to have fewer normative constraints
with regard to violence. Moreover, for a variety of reasons uncon-
ventional technology is more accessible than ever, and
unconventional weapons possess a unique symbolic, religious value.
Such weapons may be seen as approximating the scriptural felling
hand of God, and their effects are similar to those brought about
by the various cataclysms associated with eschatological myths.
Although examples of actual unconventional usage by a religious

group are limited to the 20 March 1995 Sarin gas attack on the
Tokyo subway by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect,47 there are many
other recorded incidents that suggest this is an area of greater con-

cern than it ever was with secular terrorism and violence. When
examining the tactics employed, one must also consider the actual
trajectory of the violence. Groups may escalate or de-escalate
according to alterations within their operational context. A group
might, for example, believe that the degree of persecution that they
face, or a change in the sociopolitical balance, warrants a rapid
escalation in violent activity. These considerations must be made
with a view to what a group is attempting to achieve and the time-
table by which it is operating.
The major problem states have with the tactics of religious insur-
gents is that they require relatively few resources and exploit readily
available technologies such as nitrate-based fertilizers and commer-
cial aircraft. This capacity for innovation coupled with preparedness
to accept martyrdom has caused a major rethink of security prac-
tices that is far from over. A state might hope that the tactics of
religious insurgents are so brutal that they deprive the group of a
support base, as was the case with Egyptian al-Jihad and the Algerian
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) during the mid-1990s. But in most
cases this will not occur because the insurgents’ level of violence is
regarded as acceptable. The likelihood of religious insurgents
employing a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN)
weapon of some sort is high, even though these are constrained by
financial, technological and logistical reasons.
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Wars from Within
78 Wars from Within
Conclusion
As with other forms of insurgency, religious ones arise in response
to a perceived threat to a traditional culture — in this case one
defined by religion — and religious insurgencies will receive their
greatest support and be most active when this threat (real or imag-
ined) manifests itself in the political, social, economic and military
spheres. Support for a group engaged in a religious insurgency will
depend not only on the severity of living conditions generally, but

also on the degree to which the group’s scriptural justifications and
defined objectives accord with commonly held religious beliefs.
Thus, most messianic and apocalyptic groups will lack popular sup-
port because their scriptural emphasis and objectives are not seen as
desirable within the communities from which they have arisen.
The most important part of managing religious insurgencies in
the long term, or even preventing them in the first place, lies
in addressing the causes of discontent. A second important element in
managing a religious insurgency relates to scriptural justification —
this is the importance of delegitimizing the insurgent group in the
same way that the group itself seeks to delegitimize the state. The third
element is the coercive response taken by the state. These three pro-
cesses are complex and dependent on the particular context within
which a religious insurgency manifests itself, but broadly speaking
together they offer the most relevant ways to challenge the type of
group whose appeal revolves around an ancient and basic sense of
communal loyalty the origins of which are divine.
The causes of discontent that religious insurgents thrive upon lie
at the heart of the societies affected and are endemic in many parts
of the world. Poor economic conditions and the absence of job pros-
pects are a ready source of grievance and provide an important
constituency and recruiting pool, especially amongst young males.
The repression of religious movements may also be a powerful moti-
vating factor. But religious insurgencies are not only the province of
the poor and oppressed. Higher class strata and professionals are
also motivated to action by the perceived corruption and nepotism
of a state and its consistent failure to deliver on promises — promises
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Wars from Within
of prosperity, of justice and of national status. Discontent and hostile

attitudes are also fostered by education systems. There is an obvious
need to alter the curricula of dogmatic religious schools such as
many madrassas, although public education can also play a negative
role. In public schooling in the Arab world, for example, often a one-
sided view of history is taught, lionizing Arab achievement and
despotic regimes while demonizing (or failing to mention) Israel.
A similar criticism can be made of the media in much of the develop-
ing world where press freedoms are limited and anti-Western,

anti-Zionist conspiracy theories are often portrayed and accepted
uncritically as truths. The unfortunate reality for many states in the
developing world is that to address these causes would be to endan-

ger their grip on power.
If a religious insurgency does take hold, a state must actively seek
to delegitimize it. In extreme examples, such as messianic insurgen-
cies, the insurgents themselves often have no real legitimacy in the
eyes of the population at large. However, in cases where the theo-
logical basis of an insurgent group is close to religious orthodoxy,
attempts must be made to separate the leaders and their reasoning
from their constituency. One way in which this can be done is
through efforts by the state to “co-opt” the mainstream religious
establishment, although not in such a way that they might be
labelled “lackeys” of the state. This may involve closely examining
and offering a public, religious critique of the group’s strategies and
objectives. For example, despite their proclaimed desire to institute
a better society, many religious insurgent groups are unable to
articulate effectively a viable alternative to the existing political,
social and economic status quo.48 As one commentator has put it,
religious insurgents “are articulate about what they are against —
more so, in fact, than what they are for.”49 Another element within
the process of challenging legitimacy lies in altering the worldview
of insurgents and their constituency. This may be attempted in a
variety of ways including religious debate and, in cases where the
nexus of antagonism is between different religions, in processes
such as inter-faith dialogues. The costs of an insurgent victory
should also be made clear to certain segments of society, such as
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Wars from Within
80 Wars from Within
women and secularized middle classes. The greatest stumbling

block to this process is the perceived legitimacy of the state itself.
Coercive measures are an essential element in combating reli-
gious insurgencies, although the management of these measures
has the potential to intensify the conflict. In many cases, such as
militant Islamist groups in Palestine, a religious insurgency will be
fuelled by heavy-handed responses to insurrection. They harden the
resolve of those already involved in struggle and also tend to per-
suade other elements in society to support it. By the same token

repression can prove to be effective if it is applied consistently and
if there is no widespread popular support for the insurgent cause.
The case of Egypt is significant in this regard. It should be noted,

however, that in situations such as these, although the insurgency
has failed to achieve its final goals, it is seldom eliminated entirely
and the insurgents may resort to lower-level activity and terrorist
tactics more commensurate with their reduced capabilities. Coercive
measures must rely heavily on intelligence agencies and law enforce-
ment with the blunt instrument of military force applied only where
it is justifiable, for example where an insurgency has adopted guer-
rilla tactics or the use of specialist military units to deal with specific
situations beyond police forces. In the many cases where an insur-
gency spills over one set of borders, multilateral state cooperation is
also essential.
Another feature of religious insurgencies that provides an
opportunity to manage them is the gap between rhetoric and reality
created by the conflict between a Manichaean world outlook and
the constraints of the temporal world. Few religious insurgent
groups possess the capabilities to realize their more extreme,
declared objectives and the capacity for pragmatism is often essen-
tial for the continued success of religious insurgencies. A group may
see greater short-to-medium term utility in toning down some of its
rhetoric and participating in mainstream politics — for example,
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Even if a religious insurgency is successful,
as in Iran, the ruling authorities will have to make some concessions
in order to make sure their state is a viable one within the interna-
tional system. This element of pragmatism can be used by states as a
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Wars from Within
complementary carrot to the coercive stick. The problem is to offer

concessions and opportunities that will effectively defuse violence
rather than merely appease the insurgents.
Twenty to thirty years ago religious insurgencies seemed out of
place in a largely secular, technologically advanced world. This view
ignored the unevenness in distribution of secularism and technol-
ogy, as well as their failure to address pressing and enduring social
and economic problems.
The use of scriptural justification for rebellion against an estab-

lished government provides an unarguable sanction for committing
violent acts whose divine nature transcends existing temporal legal
mores. It is this rejection of temporal, legal, political and social

structures and the supposition that they might be legitimately
destroyed, that make religious insurgencies appealing in their out-
look to many constituencies, extremely violent in their conduct and
difficult to bring to a successful conclusion. The reality is that reli-
gious insurgents are very much a feature of today’s world and a
multifaceted response is required. This response can only hope to
succeed if the insurgents are deprived of safe operating environ-
ments, resources and supporters, and if those fighting them can
understand and effectively counter the insurgents’ motivations and
beliefs.
NOTES
1. When discussing this topic, an important distinction must be made
between insurgencies that are religious in nature, and those for which
religion is merely a feature. It is legitimate to identify the sectarian
nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland but it would be wrong to say
that it is a religious insurgency. Religion is a feature — often a powerful
rhetorical feature — but the various militant leaders are not clerics and
the objectives of the protagonists are not defined by religion.
2. This is certainly true if an insurgency is regarded as “an armed insur-
rection or rebellion against an established system of government.”
3. In the Judeo–Christian context even older religious insurgencies can
be seen in the Israelite conquest of Canaan described in the Old
Testament.
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Wars from Within
82 Wars from Within
4. Ronald Storrs, Orientations, London: Nicholson & Watson, 1945, p. 84.

5. Gilles Kepel (trans. Alan Braley), The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of
Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, Cambridge: Polity,
1994.
6. These variables are a modified version of those set out by Jeffrey
Kaplan, see his “The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary
Theology: The Case of the ‘Identity Christian’ Church of Israel,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. V, No. 1, 1993, pp. 42–43.
7. See Mircea Eliade (trans. Rosemary Sheed), Patterns in Comparative
Religion, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958, pp. 382–385.

8. See Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988, Part 1 and pp. 880–883.
9. As David C. Rapoport notes, however, “[c]learly, one can believe that a

messianic era is predestined and that the day of deliverance is neither
near nor predictable.” See “Messianic Sanctions for Terror,” Comparative
Politics, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1988, p. 198.
10. Mark Juergensmeyer, “The Terrorists Who Long For Peace,” The
Fletcher Forum, Winter/Spring, 1996, pp. 1–11.
11. Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary
Theology: The Case of the ‘Identity Christian’ Church of Israel,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. V, No. 1, 1993, p. 44.
12. For an examination of the Lord’s Resistance Army see the Human
Rights Watch Report, The Scars of Death? Children Abducted by the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997.
13. For a brief discussion of the “Other” as it applies to the monotheistic
faiths see Fathi Osman, “Monotheists and the ‘Other’: An Islamic
Perspective in an era of religious pluralism,” The Muslim World,
Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 3–4, 1998, pp. 353–363. For the concept of moral
disengagement as it relates to modern terrorism, see Albert Bandura,
“Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
14. This is in line with Clifford Geertz’s thesis that culture is a socially con-
structed and historically transmitted network of symbol “systems.” See
his The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books,
1973.
15. Charles S. Liebman, “Extremism as a Religious Norm,” Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. XXII, No. 7, 1983.
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Wars from Within
16. In this light the year 1979 must be seen not only as the year of the
Iranian revolution but also of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
17. For an interesting example of similar attitudes to “blasphemy” in dif-
ferent religions, see Emmanuel Sivan, “The Mythologies of Religious
Radicalism: Judaism and Islam,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. III,
No. 3, 1991, pp. 71–81.
18. A good example is Sayyid Qutb’s revival of the 7th century doctrine of
jahiliyya, the pre-Islamic state of ignorance and conflict. See Sayyid
Qutb, Milestones, Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student
Organisations, 1978.
19. The character of Phineas has also been co-opted by right-wing
Christian groups.
20. The word Maichaean (or Manichaen) is derived from Manichaeism, a

religion established in 3rd century Iran by Mani, which was fundamen-
tally dualist in nature. It is interesting to note that throughout its
history, Manichaeism numbered Augustine as one of its adherents
before he converted to Christianity. See George Widengren (trans.
Charles Kessler), Mani and Manichaeism, New York: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1965.
21. Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts
the Secular State, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 155.
22. “The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of the enemy
is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of
murder by making the former an act deserving all honour and praise.”
Quoted in Richard Holmes, Firing Line, London: Cape, 1985, p. 360.
23. As quoted in John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th edition, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 156.
24. Hamas communiqué #64, 26 September 1990.
25. This is Aryan Nations, pamphlet distributed by Aryan Nations (also avail-
able on the Internet), n.d.
26. For the role of ideology in target selection see C.J.M. Drake, “The Role
of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 53–85.
27. Bruce Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a
Religious Imperative, RAND P-7834, Santa Monica: RAND, 1986, p. 3.
28. In Islam for example there is a hadith transmitted through the
Prophet’s uncle al-Abbas that says: “Whoever changes his religion, kill
him.” The death penalty for apostasy is not mentioned in the Quran
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84 Wars from Within
and opinions vary as to the appropriate punishment. See John Bowker,

Voices of Islam, Oxford: Oneworld, 1995, pp. 100–105.
29. Hamid Algar (trans.), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Berkley:
University of California Press, 1980.
30. This is a process known as “cognitive dissonance,” a theory first
advanced in Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken and Stanley Schachter,
When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that
Predicted the End of the World, New York: Harper & Row, 1956.
31. Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the
United States, R-3618, Santa Monica: RAND, 1988, p. 42, available

online at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/
2005/R3618.pdf. Accessed on 7 March 2014.
32. Martin Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn

Fadlallah,” in R. Scott Appleby, ed., Spokesmen for the Despised:
Fundamentalist Leaders of The Middle East, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1997, p. 120.
33. Utaybi studied at the Islamic University at Medina under the tutelage
of Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah al Baz, the two clashed on several
issues and Utaybi was expelled in 1974.
34. Ehud Sprinzak, “Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott
Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economics
and Militance, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 476.
35. Max Weber (trans. Alexander M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons),
Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Collier MacMillan: London,
1964, p. 358.
36. See for example Richard H. Dekmejian and Margaret J. Wyszomirski,
“Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahdi of the Sudan,” Comparative
Studies in Society and History, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1972, pp. 194–199.
37. Judith Miller, “The Charismatic Islamists,” in Martin Kramer, ed.,
Middle East Lectures: Number Two, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Centre,
University of Tel Aviv, 1997, p. 39.
38. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations,
New York: The Free Press, 1961, pp. 203–204.
39. In this regard Dekmejian sees the progression for Islamic groups thus:
“Generally, the founders of Islamist societies tend to be charismatic
while their successors are bureaucrats types operating within a collective
leadership,” Richard H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalisms
in the Arab World, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995, pp. 62–63.
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40. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of

Knowledge, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 209.
41. Most historians of religion regard devotion to “sacred space” as one of
the oldest and most universal of religious practices. For an examina-
tion of the sacredness of “place” in religion see Mercia Eliade, Patterns
in Comparative Religion, Nebraska: Nebraska University Press, 1996,
pp. 367–387.
42. David C. Rapoport, “Observations on the Importance of Space in
Violent Ethno-Religious Strife,” Paper presented at the seminar
“Religious and Ethnic Conflict,” University of California, Riverside,

28 April 1995.
43. Alternatively the “Army for the Liberation of the Islamic Sanctities,”
Al-Hayat, 8 August 98—BBC/SWB, ME/3301, MED/1, August 10,

1998.
44. While in 1995, for example, religious terrorists committed only 25% of
international terrorist incidents, they were responsible for 58% of the
fatalities. See Bruce and Donna Hoffman, “Chronology of International
Terrorism, 1995,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1996,
pp. 87–127.
45. James A. Aho, Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious
Symbolisms of Military Violence, London: Aldwych Press, 1981, p. 156.
46. This is the phenomenon of the so-called “amateur terrorist.” See Bruce
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz, 1998, pp. 185,
302–204.
47. Another example is the 1984 dissemination of salmonella bacteria by
followers of the Indian mystic Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh in a town in
Oregon. Although the poisoning (which resulted in no fatalities) was
an attempt to manipulate municipal elections in the cult’s favour, the
limited objectives of the group make them unlikely candidates as
“insurgents.”
48. It is interesting to note that the Iranian economy is in no way identifi-
ably “Islamist,” and the Taliban’s strict adherence to religious law has
made Afghanistan unviable as a functioning state.
49. Juergensmeyer, 1993, op. cit., p. 146.
b1832_Ch-03.indd 85 01-10-2014 09:20:24

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Wars from Within

The Iranian revolution of 1979 surprised and shocked a world

b1832_Ch-03.indd 59 01-10-2014 09:20:23

60 Wars from Within

Religious insurgencies, as with other manifestations of the phenom-

alternate social realities offered that make the contemporary resur-

maintenance of domestic and international security.1

The History of Religious Insurgency

b1832_Ch-03.indd 60 01-10-2014 09:20:23

repeatedly experienced religious revolts in their North and West

resistance in Dagestan and Chechnya between 1830 and 1859 stands

b1832_Ch-03.indd 61 01-10-2014 09:20:23

62 Wars from Within

Independence.”4 The primacy of secular ideology as a basis for

The Components of a Religious Insurgency

The components that most clearly differentiate a religious insur-

The formation of ideology

b1832_Ch-03.indd 62 01-10-2014 09:20:23

of religious traditions are those that concern themselves with strug-

so formed have a number of common features: A Golden Age Myth;

imminence of an expected messianic era.6

b1832_Ch-03.indd 63 01-10-2014 09:20:23

64 Wars from Within

utopias of the past to choose from is almost unlimited, and Identity

variation extends across environments. The aspirations of the

b1832_Ch-03.indd 64 01-10-2014 09:20:23

elements of this religious tradition15 — an alien, hostile culture is

For many Christian groups, it is a (comparatively) more recent pro-

that of secular, Western imperialism (and formerly Communism),

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66 Wars from Within

mortal, cosmic struggle that is much greater than mere temporal

tinually employed, such as the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein in

b1832_Ch-03.indd 66 01-10-2014 09:20:23

must be fought and ultimately converted or destroyed. Because of

is the transformation of the other into something evil. In the words

gious officials, the ‘ulama’ whose knowledge and integrity guarantee

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68 Wars from Within

simple but all-embracing distinctions created by a Manichaean out-

as members of the political hierarchy and the repressive apparatus.

b1832_Ch-03.indd 68 01-10-2014 09:20:23

process of rationalization.30 A religious insurgency which empha-

popularity, for example, Jewish militant attempts to destroy the

The process of ideological formation is akin to the creation of a

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70 Wars from Within

its environment. The various statements of Osama bin Laden and

ist religious insurgency. The Turner Diaries, for example, served as a

thinking of Timothy McVeigh, executed for his part in the 1995

b1832_Ch-03.indd 70 01-10-2014 09:20:23

Fadlallah in Lebanon. Despite Fadlallah’s apparent connections

to their implicit rejection of existing religious judicial opinions on

who explain contemporary events and invest them with religious

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72 Wars from Within

established between a leader and his followers the leader exercises