Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec.

4, Case Digest Compilation|Page 1 of 5

Art. III, Sec. 4
Who can invoke?
1. Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission, 558 US ___Jan. 21, 2010
Facts: In January 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a 90 minute
documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie (hereinafter Hillary). The movie expressed
opinions about whether then-senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for the Democratic
presidential nomination, was fit for the presidency. Citizens United distributed the
movie in theaters and on DVD, but also wanted to make it available through video-on-
demand. It produced advertisements promoting the film and wanted to show them on
broadcast and cable television. To pay for the video-on-demand distribution and the
advertisements, Citizens United planned to use its general treasury funds.
As amended by § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal
law prohibits corporations and unions from spending their general treasury funds on
“electioneering communications” or for speech that expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a candidate. An “electioneering communication” is any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication that (1) refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office,
(2) is made within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election, (2
U.S.C. § 441b), and (3) is publicly distributed (11 CFR § 100.29(a)(2)).
Citizens United, fearing that Hillary would be covered under § 441b, sought an
injunction in December 2007 against the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) in federal
district court, arguing that § 441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary. The district
court denied this motion and granted summary judgment to the FEC.
Additionally, Citizens United argued that BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure
requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the advertisements
promoting Hillary. Under BCRA § 311, televised electioneering communications funded
by anyone other than a candidate for office must include a clear, readable disclaimer
displayed on the screen for at least four seconds. The disclaimer must identify the
person or organization responsible for the advertisement, that person or organization's
address or website, and a statement that the advertisement “is not authorized by any
candidate or candidate's committee”. Further, under BCRA § 201, any person who
spends more than $10,000 on electioneering communications during a calendar year
must file a disclosure statement with the FEC.The statement must identify the person
making the expenditure, the amount, the election to which the communication was
directed, and the names of certain contributors .Again, the district court ruled against
Citizens United and granted summary judgment to the FEC. Citizens United appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue: Do corporations have freedom of speech? Does the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 intrude into freedom of speech?
Ruling: Yes the majority opinion found that the BCRA §203 prohibition of all
independent expenditures by corporations and unions violated the First Amendment's
protection of free speech. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable
to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation.
The majority argued that the First Amendment protects associations of individuals in
addition to individual speakers, and further that the First Amendment does not allow
prohibitions of speech based on the identity of the speaker. Corporations, as associations
of individuals, therefore have speech rights under the First Amendment. Because
spending money is essential to disseminating speech, as established in Buckley v. Valeo,
limiting a corporation's ability to spend money is unconstitutional because it limits the
ability of its members to associate effectively and to speak on political issues.
Hierarchy of Protection
2. Pharma Health Care vs Duque, GR 173034, 9 Oct. 2007
FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino
on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under
the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes .
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July
7, 2006.
ISSUE: What are commercial speeches? Are they entitled to constitutional protection?
RULING: In his concurring and separate opinion, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno said
that “the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the
ambit of the term commercial speech…a separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.”
The Supreme Court today unanimously declared null and void certain provisions of the
Department of Health’s Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Milk Code,
which call for an absolute ban on the promotion and advertisement of breast milk
substitutes.
The Court pointed out that the national policy of protection, promotion, and support of
breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for

breastmilk substitutes. It noted that the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising
promotion; or other marketing materials may be allowed if said materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee.
Content Based/Neutral
3. Chavez vs Gonzales, GR 168338, 15 Feb. 2008
FACTS: The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and
local elections.  On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a
mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).  The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On
June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
ISSUE: 1) What is content-neutral and content-based regulation? 2) Is the warning to the
media in not airing the “Hello Garci” tapes a case of prior restraint? 
RULING: 1) Content-neutral regulation, ie, merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech like time, place, manner, and well-defined standards while content based
restraint or censorship is based on the subject matter of the utterance of the speech.
2) Yes. The court holds holds that its decision that the press statements made by
respondents were not reduced or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
suffiencient that press statements were made by respondents while in exercise of their
officla functions. any act done, such as speech uttred for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.
4. NBN vs Dy, GR 170270, etc., 2 April 2009
Facts: Petitioners applied for renewal of Mayor’s permit and the CAO in Cauayan city
noted in COC’s Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002 that the property was
classified as “commercial”. However, Maximo, the acting Zoning administrator
designate required petitioners to submit “either an approved land conversion papers
from the BAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to
commercial land and an approved resolution from then SB or SP authorizing the
classification of the property from agricultural to commercial.
Issue: Is the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it
operates a radio station has been zoned for commercial a case of content-neutral
regulation?
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 4, Case Digest Compilation|Page 2 of 5
Ruling: The circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents
as a content-based restraint. The court is of the position that the actions of the
respondents warrant heightened on strict scrutiny from the court, the test which we
have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as a
rule as far as laws dealing with freedom of the mind on restricting the political process,
or laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as fundamental
rights as expansions from its earlier applications to equal protection. The immediate
implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon
respondents as agents of government to prove that this actions do not infringe upon
petitioner’s constitutional right.
5. Gov. Brown vs Entertainment Merchants, 564 US___, 27 June 2011
Facts: Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, looking to overturn the Ninth Circuit's
ruling against the constitutionality of California Law through filing a writ of certiorari to
the Court in May 2009. The California Assembly Bill 1179 (2005), Cal. Civ. Code Ann.
§§1746–1746.5 (West 2009) (Act) prohibits the sale or rental of “violent video games” to
minors, and requires their packaging to be labelled “18.” The Act covers games “in
which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming,
dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are
depicted” in a manner that “[a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole,
would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors,”
and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.” Respondents, representing the video-game and software
industries, brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. That court concluded that the Act violated
the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
Issue: Does California law that restricts the sale or rental of violent video games to
minors violate the First Amendment? Was the regulation content neutral or content
based?
Ruling:Yes. The Act does not comport with the First Amendment. Video games qualify
for First Amendment protection. Like protected books, plays, and movies, they
communicate ideas through familiar literary devices and features distinctive to the
medium. And “the basic principles of freedom of speech . . . do not vary” with a new
and different communication medium. (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495,
503.) The most basic principle—that government lacks is the power to restrict expression
because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content, (Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573)—is subject to a few limited exceptions for historically
unprotected speech, such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words. But a legislature
cannot create new categories of unprotected speech simply by weighing the value of a
particular category against its social costs and then punishing it if it fails the test.

Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid
unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is
justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest. R. A. V., 505 U. S., at395.
The court ruled that the regulation is content-based. California’s Act does not adjust the
boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition
designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children. Instead, the State wishes to
create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only for
speech directed at children.
Media and Judicial Process
6. In Re: Live Coverage of Maguindanao Trial, AM Nos. 10-11-5-SC, etc., 23 Oct.
2012
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media
practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted
as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent
history, the tragic incident, which came to be known as the “Maguindanao Massacre”,
spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against
197 accused.
On November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP),
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims,
individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a
petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in
these criminal cases be allowed.
ISSUE: In case of conflict between the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
and the right to public information and the fundamental rights of the accused, which
one should prevail?
RULING: While the Court recognizes the freedom of the press and the right to public
information, which, by the way, are rights that belong to non-direct parties to the case,
the rights of the direct parties should not be forgotten. In a clash among these competing
interests and in terms of the values the Constitution recognizes, jurisprudence makes it
clear that the balance should always be weighed in favor of the accused.
The constitutional rights specific to the accused under Section 14, Article III of the
Constitution such as the right to due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and to an impartial and public trial and the requirement of the
highest quantum of proof to justify deprivation of his liberty (or even of his life) provide
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 4, Case Digest Compilation|Page 3 of 5
more than ample justification to take a second look at the view that a camera that
broadcasts the proceedings live on television has no place in a criminal trial because of
its prejudicial effects on the rights of accused individuals.
Lawyers and Courts
7. Foodsphere vs Mauricio, AC 7199, 22 July 2009
Facts: Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat
processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products
under the brand name "CDO," filed a Verified Complaint for disbarment before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio"
(respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong
TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired
over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3)
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors. In his radio program Double B-
Batas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB, respondent said:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas
Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa
telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero
ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan
malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver
spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-
7549 st 433-7553. Open po ang contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin
ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas
an[g] may uod? Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in
bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he
wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he
wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!" which appeared in the same
publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its
September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN
ANG CDO."
Issue: Were the accusations of Atty. Mauricio within the constitutional bounds of the
freedom of the press?
Ruling: No. Freedom of the press is not absolute. Atty. Mauricio’s accusations were
motivated by ill-will, particularly the intent to injure the reputation of another.
Moreover, the power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be

underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,the therein complainant engaged therein-
herein respondent’s services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality," only to later find out that after he
demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor
any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the
radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a
certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness
when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.
8. Lentorio-Do judges have freedom of expression, belief, association, and
assembly? Reyes vs Duque, AM RTJ-08-2136, 21 Sept. 2010
9. Lentorio-Did the Show Cause Resolution deny the respondents their freedom
of expression? Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty, AM 10-10-4-SC, 8 March 2011
10. Gov. Garcia vs Manrique, GR 186592, 10 Oct. 2012
Facts: The instant case stemmed from an article in Luzon Tribune, wherein respondent
Manrique is the publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements
against the Supreme Court. The petitioners alleged that the subject article undermines
the people’s faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they employed
bribery in order to obtain relief from the Court, particularly in obtaining a TRO in a
certain case. Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his
article since he only stated the facts or circumstances which attended the issuance of the
TRO.
Issues: Are court decisions beyond criticism and public opinion? Is Manrique’s
invocation of the freedom of speech in his criticisms tenable?
Ruling: No. The court ruled that every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at judicial authority. It is, however, crucial that such criticisms be
decent and proper. On the second issue, Manrique’s invocation of the freedom of speech
no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an indecent attempt to
malign the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of this
Court. Malicious publications cannot seek the protection of the constitutional guaranties
of free speech and press.
Unprotected Speech (Libel)
11. Fermin vs People, GR 157643, 28 March 2008
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 4, Case Digest Compilation|Page 4 of 5
Facts: Spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo Gutierrez filed two criminal
informations for libel against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas. The RTC of
Quezon City found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Petitioner and Tugas appealed
to the CA. The CA affirmed the conviction of petioner, but acquitted Tugas on account
of non-participation in the publication of the libellous article.
Issue: What are the standards to be adopted on those in the entertainment business,
media and intrigue columns?
Ruling: We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners
of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession. The
danger of an unbridled and irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that
is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in wilful disregard of the cumbrous
responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the
regression of human society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is
short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute
“unrestraint” in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the
marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that which is limned
by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be
freedom from the press? It is this sense that self-regulation is distinguished from self-
censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned,
“Without...a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful
instrument of justice.”
12. Acas-What is privileged communication? Was PDI’s publication privileged and
protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech? Villanueva vs
Phil. Daily Inquirer, GR 164437, 15 May 2000
Expression and Assembly
13. GSIS vs Villaviza, GR 180291, 27 July 2010
Facts: Petitioner Garcia as President and General Manager of the GSIS filed separate
charges against respondents Villaviza et.al, for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. That respondent, together with other
employees in utter contempt of the Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass
Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and
disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
Issue #1: What are “public concern speeches”?
Ruling: “Public concern speech" is defined as speech that "'relates to a matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community.
Issue #2: Are these constitutionally protected?
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 4, Case Digest Compilation|Page 5 of 5

Ruling: Yes. Citing Scott v. Meters, the court said that though the government’s right to
impose reasonable restrictions is recognized, the court held that the NYTA’s rule was
“unconstitutionally overboard.” Respondents’ wearing of red shirts did not amount to a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action rather it constituted speech on a matter of
public concern and is protected by the constitution.
14. Filipinas-Does the denial of accreditation of Ang Ladlad as party-list group
violate their freedom of speech, expression, and assembly? Ang Ladlad vs
Comelec, GR 190582, 8 April 2010
15. Phimco vs Phimco Labor Assoc., GR 170830, 11 Aug. 2010
nature of the picket was aggravated by the placement of benches, with strikers standing on
top, directly in front of the open wing of the company gates, clearly obstructing the entry
and exit points of the company compound. What the union demonstrated was a very
persuasive and quietly intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the
operations of the company, not solely by the work stoppage of the participating
workers, but by excluding the company officials and non-striking employees from
access to and exit from the company premises. The strike caused the company
operations considerable damage in violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which
prohibits picketing carried on with violence, coercion or intimidation.

Facts: PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with principal

address at Phimco Compound, Felix Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco
Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly authorized bargaining representative of
PHIMCO’s daily-paid workers.

When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31,
1994, PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a
deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to disagreements on salary increases and
benefits. PILA staged a strike. PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing
– through force, intimidation and coercion – the ingress and egress of non-striking
employees into and from the company premises.

On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike
case) with the NLRC, with a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and members who
knowingly participated in the illegal strike. PHIMCO claimed that the strikers
prevented ingress to and egress from the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing
PHIMCO’s operations.

Issue: Does the right of employees to publicize their dispute fall within the protection of
freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble to air their grievances?

Ruling: Yes; however, the Court said: “While the right of employees to publicize their
dispute falls within the protection of freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble to air grievances, these rights are by no means absolute.  Protected picketing
does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises. That the
picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free
it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the
company premises.” It was maintained so close to the company gates that it virtually
constituted an obstruction, especially when the strikers joined hands, or were moving in
circles, hand-to-shoulder, that, for all intents and purposes, blocked the free ingress to
and egress from the company premises. In fact, on closer examination, it could be seen
that the respondents were conducting the picket right at the company gates. The obstructive