SUCCESSION DIGESTS
75. SEANGIO V. REYES decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, thus the same
[FACTS]
Private respondents filed for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Segundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed this on the ground that
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private
respondents. In lieu of this, petitioners instituted probate
proceedings for the will.
Private respondents opposed, alleging that the document does not
meet the requirements for a will as it does not dispose of property,
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC- dismissed the probate proceedings as there was preterition.
[ISSUE]
WON disinheritance can be considered a holographic will.
[RULING]
YES.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the
disinheritance, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of the disinherited heir.
AS TO PRETERITION - The compulsory heirs in the direct line were
not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with
the sole exception of the one he disinherited.
FALLO: petition to probate the will is GRANTED.
76. FERNANDEZ V. DIMAGIBA
Doctrine
Only the total and absolute revocation of the will can preclude
probate of the revoked testament. If the revocation invoked is merely
implied from later acts of the testatrix it will not affect the will itself
but merely the particular devise or legacy.
Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba filed for the probate of purported will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes before the CFI Bulacan.
The will instituted Isabela as the sole heir of the estate of the
deceased. Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes,
and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent,
filed oppositions to the probate, alleging forgery, vices of consent of
the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and revocation of
the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the
estate made by the testatrix.
CFI: Admitted probate.
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation
be considered and resolved.
 Trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and
unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the
oppositors elevated the case to the CA.
CA: The probate of will became final for lack of opportune appeal.
There was no legal revocation.
On Matters of Procedure:
ISSUE: W/N the order allowing probate should be considered
interlocutory.
HELD: NO. SC agrees with the CA. The probate order is not
anymore interlocutory, making it final and appealable. The probate
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
had become final and conclusive.
ISSUE: W/N THERE WAS REVOCATION
Held: NO.
If the will denied probate, all questions of revocation becomes
superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be
nothing to revoke. However, the revocation invoked by the
oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied
from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect
the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament.
The revocation at bar is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of
the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
"ART. 957. The legacy or device shall be without effect: xxx xxx xxx"
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or device shall be without effect only with
respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing
should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity
of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid,
unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the
exercise of the right or repurchase;
The subsequent alienations made by the testatrix in 1943 and: 1944
after the execution of her will in 1930 do not necessarily mean a
change or departure from her original intent as expressed in her will,
when, as in this case, the alienations were made in favor of the
legatee herself and the testatrix merely intended to comply in
advance with what she had ordained in her testament.
As observed by the CA, the existence of any such change or
departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of
the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, "no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the
transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in
conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended
to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament,
rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below,
that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the
legacies, if we bear in mind that it was the moral influence,
originating from their confidential relationship, which was the cause
for execution of the 1943 and 1944 conveyances. If the annulment
was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the
transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making
the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such
conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.
Disposition: CA decision is affirmed.
77. BELEN V. BPI
DOCTRINE: The word "descendants" (descendientes) when used in
a will or deed to designate a class to take property in substitution of
named legatees, includes not only children but also
grandchildren. In other words, in the absence of other indications
of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply is that the testator, by
designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members
thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with Article 846, New
Civil Code.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died leaving a codicil which
together with the will, was admitted to probate in the Court of First
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Instance of Manila. After the proceedings for the administration of his
estate, it was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee
BPI, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
One of these legatees, Filomena Diaz died on 1954, leaving two
legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera, married, with seven
legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single.
Consequently, Onesima filed a petition contending that the amount
that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil
should now be divided (equally) only between herself and Milagros
Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased,
to the exclusion of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros
Belen de Olaguera.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – denied the petition ruling that the share of Filomena should
be distributed not only between her children, but also among her
other legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes include not
only children but also grandchildren.
Thus this instant petition. Appellant contends that the phrase “sus
descendientes legitimos” should be taken to mean the relatives
nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her
thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (reproducing ne varietur Article 751 of the Code of 1889):
"A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's
relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in
degree."
ISSUE: WON "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all
living descendants (children and grandchildren) of the legatee as a
class
RULING: YES. The appellant’s argument fails to note that Article
959 is specifically limited in its application to the case where
the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the
legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator
intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the
relatives closest to him.
But the ratio legis (that among a testator's relatives the closest are
dearest) obviously does not apply where the beneficiaries are
relatives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator.
There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator
intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a
testament and provided substitutes for each legatee. Nor can it be
said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the
legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a
group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
The word "descendants" (descendientes) when used in a will or
deed to designate a class to take property in substitution of named
legatees, includes not only children but also grandchildren. In
other words, in the absence of other indications of contrary intent,
the proper rule to apply is that the testator, by designating a class or
group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per
capita, in consonance with Article 846, New Civil Code. So that the
original legacy to Filomena Diaz in question should be equally
divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.
FALLO: The order appealed from is affirmed.
78. ROSALES V. ROSALES
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
INTESTATE SUCCESSION, GENERAL PROVISIONS,
RELATIONSHIPS, AND RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; WHO
ARE THE INTESTATE HEIRS: There is no provision in the Civil
Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own
right or by the right of representation.
[FACTS]
Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband, Fortunato, and their 2 children Magna and Antonio.
Another child, Carterio predeceased her, leaving behind a child
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
Macikequerox I swear their child is a Decepticon and his widow
Irenea, the herein petitioner.
On 1971, Magna instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the CFI. CFI appointed Magna as
administratrix and declared Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox, and
Antonio as the legal heirs of the deceased.
Petitioner insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as
the surviving spouse of the late Carterio claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, she sought the reconsideration of the orders.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
CFI: denied reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
[ISSUE/S]
WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can
inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
[HELD]
HELL NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit
by the right of representation.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit
from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of
representation.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 887.
The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by
Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code:
"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited.
"Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would
have succeeded."
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not
succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom
his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same
right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.
[FALLO]
Petition is DENIED.
79. BAGUNU V. PIEDAD
[FACTS]
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Pastora is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
degree relative of the decedent, while Ofelia is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
Intestate proceedings of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad were filed
before the RTC. Ofelia moved to intervene as a collateral relative
and she seeks to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC – denied Ofelia’s petition to intervene.
CA- dismissed the appeal.
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
[ISSUE]
WON the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application
among collateral relatives?
[RULING]
YES.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in
degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except
when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply as
provided in Article 962.
Also provided is the rule in Article 971 “… In the direct line, right of
representation is proper only in the descending, never in the
ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may
only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.”
Thus, Pastora, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the
late Augusto H. Piedad excludes Ofelia, a relative of the fifth degree,
from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
FALLO: CA AFFIRMED.
80. ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO
Facts
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided
there continuously until 1944. However, after 10 years of her
unknown whereabouts, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs.
Melodia left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one third (1/3)
share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00
adjudicated to her. Melodia.left no surviving direct descendant,
ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, her aunt, and
half- sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris,
her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the
decedent). These two classes of heirs (aunt, and nieces and
nephews) claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person
when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit:
an aunt or her nieces and nephews? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the
inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
CFI: Ruled in favor of nieces and nephews, (oppositors-appellees)
as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent,
exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent,
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees)
than the latter since nieces and nephew succeed by right of
representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant
from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by
brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent
in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
In the present appeal, petitioner-appellant AUNT contends that she
is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-
appellees nieces and nephews, three degrees removed from the
decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right
or representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of
the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at
bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.
ISSUE: W/N a decedent’s uncles and aunts may succeed the
former when nephews and nieces are still alive.
HELD: NO.
First, We agree with the with appellant that as an aunt of the
deceased, she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent
(three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the
common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art.
966). We also agree that her nephews and nieces alone do not
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by
Article 975.
However, under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed.
In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005,
and 1009 of the Civil Code.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate."
Appellants contend that Art. 1009 does not establish a rule of
preference. However, it can be gleaned that under the last article
(1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession.
In fact, Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil
Code does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other
collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, Tolentino expressly
states:
“The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say, there is
hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the
law, therefore, persons beyond the fifth degree are no longer
considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this
article should be understood in connection with the general rule that
the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation.
They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
on account of the whole blood relationship."
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession,
a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long
as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.
Disposition: CA decision is affirmed.
81. CORPUZ V. CORPUZ
DOCTRINE: Under Article 943 of the Old Civil Code, there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives as it “prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.”
This rule is now found in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child”.
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died with a will and with no forced heirs. He was
an acknowledged natural son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Cruz. Before Ramona’s union with
Luis Rafael Yangco, she had begotten five children with Tomas
Cruz, one of whom was Jose Corpus. Jose Corpus had a daughter,
Juana Corpus. Herein petitioner, Tomas Corpus is the son of Juana.
As the sole heir of Juana, Tomas Corpus filed an action to recover
his mother’s supposed share in the intestate estate claiming that the
project of partition made pursuant to the order of the probate court
as invalid and hence, the estate should be disposed of under the
rules of intestacy.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
RTC – dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata stating that
the intrinsic validity of Teodoro’s will had already passed upon in a
special proceeding approving the project of partition.
ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco; and
WON Tomas Corpus has a cause of action to recover his
mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate
RULING:
ISSUE 1 – NO. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco
because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives as provided under Article 943 of the old
Civil Code which “prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.”
This rule is now found in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child".
The rule found in Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibiting
successional reciprocity between legitimates and illegitimates is
based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
upon by the legitimate family, while the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood
tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.
ISSUE 2 – NO. Since the decedent, Teodoro R. Yangco was an
acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, who himself was a
legitimate child, the Court held that appellant Tomas Corpus has no
cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of
his mother in Yangco's estate.
Furthermore, under Articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code,
"if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without
issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if
both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share
and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and
sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his
estate under the rules of intestacy.
FALLO: WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed.
82. SAYSON V. CA
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
INTESTATE SUCCESSION, GENERAL PROVISIONS,
RELATIONSHIPS, AND RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION;
REPRESENTATION: ARTICLE 981. Should children of the
deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
[FACTS]
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson has 5 children, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilio
and Teodoro. Eleno died on 1952 and Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro
died on 1972 and his wife died on 1981. Teodoro’s properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who claim to
be their children.
On 1983, petitioners Mauricio, Rosario, Basilia, and Remedios filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants. – case for
the estate ni Teodoro and Isabela
Later, respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
against the couple’s 4 surviving children. They asserted that Delia
and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were
entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation. – case for the estate ni Eleno and Rafaela
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC: both cases were decided in favor of respondents.
CA: affirmed the Teodoro estate case but modified the Eleno
estate case in that Delia and Edmundo are DQed from inheriting
from the estate.
Hence this petition.
[ISSUE/S]
WON private respondents are capable to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. YES parents, NO sa
grandparents.
Petitioners contend that Delia and Edmundo were not legally
adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967.
The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Pero weird kaayo kay they also contend that Doribel herself is not
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to
one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the
child that she was her natural mother. ENSEMENJED MO
PETITIONERS.
Since, ila arguments kay on the legitimacy of Doribel and the validity
of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo. Ila giraise ang issue about
validity of adoption and legitimacy. Pero ana si Atty. Valencia-like
voice inside my head na these issues cannot be made collaterally.
[HELD]
YES. Article 979 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child.
Moreover, in Article 981:
ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is
true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
[FALLO]
Petition is DENIED.
83. MANUEL V. FERRER
[FACTS]
Juan Manuel is an illegitimate child. He had no children of his own,
so he and his wife adopted respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half portion of his land.
Upon the death of Juan and his wife, Modesta executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land of
her parents and transferring such under her name.
Juan Manuel’s siblings (the legitimate ones), herein petitioners,
sought the declaration of nullity over these instruments.
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC- dismissed, as petitioners were not heirs ab intestate.
[ISSUE]
WON legitimate siblings may inherit from their illegitimate sibling.
[RULING]
NO.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly
referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family."
The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line
between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand.
Petitioners, therefore, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the
case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the
complaint.
FALLO: RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
84. LEONARDO V. CA
Facts:
Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by
two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson,
Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who
predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra
Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
Here comes Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the
son of the late Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters
(Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. To prove this, he submitted in
evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero
Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Claiming his alleged share of the estate, he filed a complaint for
ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the CFI
Rizal, praying to be declared as one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of
said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein,
Maria Cailles, and to have the properties left by Francisca partitioned
between him and Maria.
However, Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the
subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child
who cannot succeed by right of representation. On the other hand,
private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties
are now his, by virtue of a deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. Bracewell already mortgaged
the properties to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc.
CFI: Granted in favor of Petitioner;
CA: Reversed CFI’s decision.
 Found the subject properties to be the exclusive
properties of the private respondents Maria Cailles and
Bracewell.
o What really happened was that, Maria Cailles
paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to
1948.
o Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso
Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva
Ecija, decedent Francisca Reyes administered
the property and like in the first case, declared
in 1949 the property in her own name.
o Apparently, petitioner thought that Francisca
owned the property so he filed the instant
complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the
same allegedly represents the share of his
father.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner can claim a share by representation.
HELD: NO.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
SC didn’t anymore disturb the CA’s findings to the effect that:
Leonardo’s piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to
his tale (that he was the son of Sotero Leonardo). This is because
the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of
the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol.
Plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certiAcate is no other than
he himself. Thus, plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a
fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an
heir in the inheritance in question.
Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by
the CA, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when
he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and
mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's
first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes, under (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
Disposition: CA decision is affirmed.
85. DIAZ V. IAC
DOCTRINE: Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or
iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. In the case at bar, while Pablo Santero is a legitimate child of
the decedent, the petitioners, however, are his illegitimate children.
FACTS:
Private respondent, Felisa Pamuti Jardin, filed a Petition "In The
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters
of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as
special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Private respondent Felisa – niece of the decedent Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and the legitimate child of the decedent’s sister
Juliana – sister of the decedent, who together with the latter, are
legitimate children
Pablo Santero – legitimate son of decedent
Petitioners – illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
Pablo predeceased his mother, thus petitioners herein sought to
inherit from the decedent, by right of representation of their father.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – excluded Felisa from further taking part or intervening in the
settlement of the intestate estate and declared her to be NOT an heir
of the decedent.
IAC – reversed the order, declaring Felisa as the sole heir of the
decedent and ordered herein petitioners not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship
ISSUE: WON petitioners, as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
RULING: NO, because Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. In the case at bar, while Pablo Santero is a legitimate child of
the decedent, the petitioners, however, are his illegitimate
children.They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family, there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The latter
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS

considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of

which it is thereby deprived and the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life. The law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

It is clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes
all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that
from the commencement of this case, the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the

assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY