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FOCUS 25 February - 2 March 2016 7
The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe
T
he Muslim Brotherhood organisation spread
in Europe after Brotherhood members be-
gan leaving Arab countries for the continent
in the mid-1950s against the backdrop of conflicts
with political regimes, specifically in Egypt, Syria
and Iraq.
Prominent Brotherhood members who ended
up in Europe include Said Ramadan (the son-in-
law of Hassan Al-Banna and the father of Broth-
erhood ideologue in Europe Tarek Ramadan, one
of the group’s main ideological tools in Europe in
the present day). Said Ramadan settled in Geneva
and branched out to Germany (West Germany at
the time) in the late 1950s, establishing the Munich
mosque and its associated Islamic centre in 1961. The Muslim
This became the nucleus of the Brotherhood or- Brotherhood always
ganisation and the institutional networks that still
exist today. (Mohamed Mahdi Akef, the former saw Europe as
general guide, was the imam of the mosque in the
second half of the 1980s.) The Munich phase was a launching pad
the product of close cooperation between Egyptian for overthrowing
and Syrian Brotherhood currents led by Issam Al-
Attar and Ghaleb Himmat. The Syrian Brotherhood Arab regimes, but
used its presence in Aachen in West Germany and
its proximity to France and Belgium to expand the attempts
institutional Brotherhood base in Europe.
Thanks to the efforts of the Egyptian Brother-
hood, the Islamic Committee of Germany was to Islamicise
established in 1982. Functioning as the umbrella
organisation of Arab mosques in Germany, it took Europe-based
the Munich mosque as its seat. The association Muslims have failed,
controlled mosques spread across several German A sign carried by
cities, including Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Cologne and writes anti-Muslim Legida
protesters in
Nuremberg. This is in addition to the Muslim Stu-
dents Associations, established by Egyptian Broth- Germany
erhood members in Germany in 1964 as a feeder of
the Munich mosque.
The 1970s saw the Brotherhood make qualitative
advances in Europe as the political regime in Egypt
opened up to the Islamist current and in the shadow
of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Brotherhood cadres were able to use
the rise of political Islam in the Middle East to ex-
pand its target groups among immigrant communi-
ties in Europe, especially among students studying
in European universities, most of whom came from
the middle classes. Traditional Brotherhood activity
had been centred on the first waves of immigrants
in the 1960s, most of whom were workers of low
social and educational levels.
The 1980s saw a breakthrough for the Brother-
hood in Europe in light of two important factors.
First, compared to the 1970s, more middle-class
Arabs began studying in Europe. Second, second-
generation immigrants began to make their pres-
ence felt on the European scene after graduating
from European educational institutions. The inter-
national Brotherhood organisation exploited this by
creating new organisational structures to respond to Ibrahim Tarek
new developments, especially the rise of European
Muslims who did not speak Arabic and had little
facility with Islamic rites of worship.
ropean authorities. This was clearly demonstrated and the emergence of new generations sations in France issued a fatwa criminalising the generations that were born and raised in Europe.
The Brotherhood redoubled its vertical efforts by
by the influential presence of Brotherhood mem- prompted the rise of a class of religious intermedi- rioting youths, though the events were largely so- The old guard insists on maintaining the status quo,
expanding its institutional network in European cit-
bers, both from North Africa and the Levant, in the aries who attempted to speak an educated, tolerant cioeconomic in nature. As a result, the federation which has had negative consequences for the Broth-
ies with a strong Muslim presence, particularly in
Islamic Council in Britain, the Executive Council discourse in contrast to the traditional religious dis- failed to play a role in calming the situation and erhood’s ability to produce a discourse suitable to
France, Britain, Belgium and of course Germany,
of Belgian Muslims, and the French Council of the course of preachers and imams. The Brotherhood in resolving the crisis by acting as a mediator between the reality of the new European generations.
the earliest nucleus of the Brotherhood in Europe.
Islamic Religion in France. Europe supported Tarek Ramadan and his brother the French government and the suburban youth. A second struggle is being waged between re-
In tandem with this, the group began establishing
In 2006, the Brotherhood organisation in Germa- Hani Ramadan (grandsons of Hassan Al-Banna) as The Brotherhood in Europe thus lost much of the formists and conservatives, with the former seeking
associations working with youth, women and stu-
ny was a major player in the conference on German the main prop of Brotherhood ideology in Europe. ideological momentum that characterised the first to induce some sort of break with traditional Broth-
dents, and offering social assistance.
Islam, organised by the German Interior Ministry Ramadan played an important role in the attempt generations of the Brotherhood. The European real- erhood culture and to fundamentally alter the inher-
It also began acting on a more regional level. The
with the goal of setting guidelines for interactions to Islamise new generations of European Muslims ity dictated that Brotherhood cadres, many of whom ited operating methods of Brotherhood associations
Muslim Youth Association in France, for exam-
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the country. by encouraging social assimilation and promoting were second-generation immigrants, ignore tradi- and organisations, which has reduced support for
ple, after its establishment in the 1980s in France
Through the Central Council for Muslims in Ger- an understanding of European Islam among youth tional outreach activity and enter European politics, the Brotherhood among European Muslims.
and Belgium, began organising a series of periodic
many, the Brotherhood became one of five groups circles, which initially was viewed with great cred- especially with the emergence of representative Mus- The last decade demonstrates the limits of the Broth-
lectures and panels to spread religious awareness
in the conference acting as an intermediary between ibility at the expense of traditional imams. lim councils as an institutional actor on the European erhood model in Europe, both in its ability to mobilise
among second-generation Muslim immigrants who
German Muslims and their government — tanta- Ramadan presented himself as a reformist in 1994 scene following the events of 11 September 2001. youth and in advancing the project to Islamise youth
did not speak Arabic.
mount to official recognition of Brotherhood’s pull after the publication of Les musulmans dans la In turn, Brotherhood cadres used these councils in Europe, which has always been the cornerstone of
At the same time, the international Brotherhood
in Germany. laïcité, in which he argues that Muslims in Europe- to make deals with European authorities and exploit the Brotherhood enterprise in European territory.
organisation set up local and regional organisations
Brotherhood associations also acquired a firm lob- an societies must engage as European citizens who their function as a conduit with Muslims in order A disparity is now observable between the Broth-
using North African Brotherhood members, who
bying presence in European institutions, especially respect the Quran and Sunna in a way appropriate to to instigate against regimes that were hostile to the erhood’s media presence in Europe and its actual in-
acquired increasing importance, and these spawned
the European Parliament, which allows affiliation the demands of European societies, requiring a full Brotherhood in the Arab world. This led the Broth- fluence on the ground, particularly in light of fierce
smaller Brotherhood associations and institutions.
by European associations and organisations work- reconciliation between the Muslim and his status as erhood to attempt to replace, on the surface, its competition from other Islamist entities, such as the
In 1983, the Federation of Islamic Organisations
ing in economic and social affairs and human rights. a European citizen and the need to break with the radical political discourse with a more conciliatory European branches of the Moroccan Al-Adl wa Al-

T
was created in France employing North African
culture of his ancestral country. discourse that suggested that the Brotherhood had Ihssane, the Justice and Development Party and the
Brotherhood personnel.
HE BROTHERHOOD’S IDEOLOGICAL This superficially open yet isolationist discourse assimilated into European culture. Lebanese Ahbash, all of which have succeeded in
The Federation of Islamic Organisations in Eu-
STRATEGY IN EUROPE: The ideological managed to attract the marginalised classes who The last decade has seen a struggle within the attracting many segments of European youth thanks
rope was established in 1989 in Britain (its head-
strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in the were striving to reconcile their European identity Brotherhood’s institutional structures in Europe on to their practical political discourse.
quarters was later moved to Brussels). Considered
1980s and 1990s was to use Europe politically as with their Islamic one. It also resonated in Euro- two major levels. The first is between the rigid bloc
the umbrella organisation for all Brotherhood as-
a platform for activities opposed to Arab regimes pean communities who found in it a way out of the that fled due to its conflict with Arab regimes — this The writer holds a PhD in international affairs from
sociations and institutions in European territory, it
hostile to the Brotherhood, as well as to exploit re- repeated crises with Islam. bloc controls the leadership positions — and the new the Sorbonne in Paris.
was estimated to comprise 500 associations in 29
lations with European organisations and political Nevertheless, Ramadan later came under at-
European countries, controlling hundreds of Euro-
circles to bring down Arab regimes. tack by some Muslims and Europeans who argued
pean mosques, about half of them in France.
The central idea among the Brotherhood was that that European laws allow full freedom of worship,
It should be noted that France represents the ideo-
Europe, as the seat of the multinational Islamist op- which requires no break or isolation from the native
logical centre of Brotherhood activity given the
position, with Brotherhood members from Egypt culture. Moreover, Muslims’ problems in European
group’s control of an estimated 250 associations
and the Levantine and North African branches, societies were largely socioeconomic at root.
and 100 mosques and religious centres in several
could act as the cornerstone for future Islamic re- The Brotherhood’s strategy failed at numerous
cities; most importantly, Marseille, Lille, Bordeaux
gimes in the Arab world. In pursuit of this, the junctures. The crisis of the group in Europe lies
and Dijon. But the group is concentrated largely in
Brotherhood chose to prioritise re-Islamising the with its ambition to posit religion as the solution
the east and south of the country (in addition to at-
social practices of immigrants and second-gener- to the problems of European Muslims — “Islam is
tempts to increase its presence in the capital). The
ation Muslims, given that conditions in European the solution,” as its slogan goes. This failed in Eu-
Brotherhood largely monopolises Islamic outreach
Muslim communities had distanced them from Ara- ropean societies that uphold separation of religion
in these areas at the expense of other groups such as
bic and the sound practice of Islamic teachings. and state and limit religion to the purely private,
Al-Tabligh wa Al-Dawa.
The goal was to politicise religion by establishing individual sphere.
During the 1990s, the international Brotherhood
a network of Brotherhood associations and organi- In the wider context, the strategy had only modest
organisation began to diversify its engagement with
sations capable of offering services and resolving success. This was a result of several factors, includ-
Europe by establishing new, issue-based institutions
immigrants’ socioeconomic problems, which would ing the weak number of adherents to Islam in Europe
outside the traditional outreach framework, such as
link them ideologically with the Brotherhood in the and the persistence of European Muslims’ same so-
the Committee for Charity and Solidarity with Pal-
short and medium term. cioeconomic conditions, particularly with regards to
estine in France, the Aqsa Association in Belgium,
The Brotherhood’s ideological strategy in Europe the marginalisation of the suburbs and discrimina-
and Interpal in Britain.
sought to promote a comprehensive understanding tion against European Muslims, despite the Brother-
This era also saw an expansion of Brotherhood
of Islam and social behaviour based on reconciling hood’s promise that Islam was the solution.
youth organisations, as new associations were
the demands of Islamic teachings with the demands In addition, the Brotherhood in Europe failed to
formed, such as the Federation of Muslim Youth
of European life and culture. To this end, the Broth- put forth an Islamic jurisprudence that considered
in Lyon, France, the Muslim Students Associa-
erhood adopted a discourse promoting the need to European Muslims’ circumstances, which natu-
tion in France, and the Islamic Society Association
integrate in European political and social life by rally differed from those of Muslims in the Arab
and Muslim Youth in Britain. These groups were
encouraging its adherents and sympathetic youth world, whether in connection to the jurisprudence
formed in coordination with a number of interna-
to participate politically, whether through local and of minorities or the theory of Islamic citizenship.
tional Islamic associations, including the Gulf-fi-
parliamentary elections or through involvement in These issues did not receive a broad response due
nanced Global Association for Muslim Youth.
European political parties. to the insistence of Brotherhood leaders in Europe
More important in this context, however, is that
At the same time, the international Brotherhood in imposing the thought of the group’s leaders, such
Brotherhood leaders began expanding specialised
organisation played the “Islamic citizenship” card, as Hassan Al-Banna, Sayed Qotb and Youssef Al-
religious institutions as religious arms of the organi-
positing itself as the conduit between European Qaradawi, even as no educated current emerged
sation in Europe through the establishment of the
Muslims and their governments in issues of concern within its structures in Europe, despite the numer-
European Institute of Human Sciences in France (the
to Muslims, such as racism, the marginalisation of ous university graduates joining the organisation’s
writings of leading Brotherhood figures are the pri-
the suburbs, the construction of houses of worship, European branches.
mary material for study), which trains preachers in
and other religious matters. Another factor is the political pragmatism of the
Europe and has graduated several hundred students.
Through the idea of Islamic citizenship, the Brotherhood in Europe, which elevates cutting po-
In addition, the Dublin-based European Council for
Brotherhood was able to use events in Europe to litical deals with European powers over rigorous
Fatwa and Research, headed by Youssef Al-Qarada-
make additional gains. An example is the crisis of ideological purity. This was demonstrated in two
wi, provides fatwas for European Muslim youth as a
the headscarf in France in 1989. The Federation cases in France: first, the Brotherhood’s utter si-
tool for Brotherhood control and infiltration.
of Islamic Organisations in France (a Brotherhood lence on the law prohibiting religious symbols in
The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked the
arm) inflamed the crisis to acquire more legitimacy French official institutions, part of a deal made with
beginning of a new phase for the Brotherhood in
among European Muslims. In Britain, through the then-French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, and
Europe. The group exploited European countries’
Council of British Muslims, the group mobilised second, the 2005 uprising in the French suburbs,
need to contain Islamism by establishing represent-
demonstrations in British cities against the US-led which turned European Muslim youth away from
ative councils for Muslims, using its institutional
invasion of Iraq in 2003. the Brotherhood.
weight and historical presence to present itself as
The evolution of the status of Muslims in Europe At the time, the Federation of Islamic Organi-
an intermediary between Muslims and various Eu-

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