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FEYERABEND, Paul - Creativity - A Dangerous Mith
FEYERABEND, Paul - Creativity - A Dangerous Mith
Paul Feyerabend
1. Introduction
Grazia Borrini and W. J. T. Mitchell read an earlier version of this paper and made
many valuable suggestions. I adopted almost all of them.
1. Plato Apologyof Socrates22c. Translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.
2. Plato Phaedrus 245a.
Critical Inquiry 13 (Summer 1987)
700
the first step in the setting of a "real external world" is the formation
of the concept of bodily objects and of bodily objects of various
kinds. Out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take,
mentally and arbitrarily, certain repeatedly occurring complexes
of sense impressions (partly in conjunction with sense impressions
which are interpreted as signs for sense experiences of others),
and we correlate to them a concept-the concept of the bodily
object. Considered logically this concept is not identical with the
totality of sense impressions referred to; but it is a free creation of
the human (or animal) mind. On the other hand, this concept
owes its meaning and its justification exclusively to the totality of
the sense impressions which we associate with it.
The second step is to be found in the fact that, in our thinking
(which determines our expectation), we attribute to this concept
of the bodily object a significance, which is to a high degree inde-
pendent of the sense impressions which originally give rise to it.
This is what we mean when we attribute to the bodily object "a
real existence." The justification of such a setting rests exclusively
on the fact that, by means of such concepts and mental relations
between them, we are able to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of
sense impressions. These notions and relations, although free mental
creations, appear to us stronger and more unalterable than the
individual sense experience itself, the character of which as anything
other than the result of an illusion or hallucination is never com-
pletely guaranteed. On the other hand, these concepts and relations,
and indeed the postulation of real objects and, generally speaking,
of the existence of "the real world," have justification only in so
far as they are connected with sense impressions between which
they form a mental connection.4
8. Jean Piaget, The Constructionof Reality in the Child (New York, 1954), p. 352.
One often calls the numbers "free creations of the human mind."
The admiration for the human spirit that is expressed in these
words is quite natural when we view the finished and imposing
edifice of arithmetic. However, our understanding of these creations
is better served by tracing their instinctivebeginningsand considering
the circumstances which led to the need for these creations. Perhaps
one will then realize that the first structures [Bildungen] which
arose here were unconsciously and biologically forced upon humans
by material circumstances and that their value could be recognized
only after they had proved useful."1
15. For examples, see Jacques Salomon Hadamard, An Essayon the Psychologyof Invention
in the MathematicalField (Princeton, N.J., 1945).
in accordance with these ideas, and they achieved results we still admire
and try to imitate.
As an example take again the Homeric epics. A Homeric hero may
find himself faced by various alternatives. Thus Achilles says,
Bruno Snell has pointed out that passages such as these cannot be in-
terpreted as saying that Achilles will choose the one path or the other;
we must rather say that he eventuallyfinds himself on one of the two paths,
and, having been given its description in advance, he now knows what
he can expect: "In Homer we never find a personal decision, a conscious
choice made by an acting human being-a human being who is faced
with various possibilities never thinks: it now depends on me, it depends
on what I decide to do."'7 And it could not be otherwise. Human beings,
in Homer, simply do not have the unity needed for conscious choices
and creative acts. Humans, as they appear in late geometric art, in Homer,
and in popular thought, are systems of loosely connected parts; they
function as transit stations for equally loosely connected events such as
dreams, thoughts, emotions, divine interventions. There is no spiritual
center, no "soul" that might initiate or "create" special causal chains, and
even the body does not possess the coherence and the marvelous articulation
given it in late Greek sculpture. But this lack of integration of theindividual
is more than compensated by the way in which the individual is embedded
into its surroundings. While the modern conception separates the human
being from the world in a manner that turns interactions into unsolvable
problems (such as the mind-body problem), a Homeric warrior or poet
is not a stranger in the world but shares many elements with it. He may
not "act" or "create" in the sense of the defenders of individual respon-
sibility, free will, and creativity-but he does not need such miracles to
partake in the changes that surround him.'8
With this I come to the main point of my argument. Today personal
creativity is regarded as a special gift whose growth must be encouraged
and whose absence reveals serious shortcomings. Such an attitude makes
sense only if human beings are self-contained entities, separated from
the rest of nature, with ideas and a will of their own. But this view has
led to tremendous problems. There are theoretical problems (the mind-
body problem and, on a more technical level, the problem of induction,
the problem of the reality of the external world, the problem of mea-
surement in quantum mechanics, and so on), practical problems (how
can the actions of humans who viewed themselves as the masters of
nature and society and whose achievements now threaten to destroy both
be reintegrated with the rest of the world?), ethical problems (have human
beings the right to shape nature and cultures different from their own
according to their latest intellectual fashions?).19 All these problems are
closely connected with the transition, already described, from complex
and concrete to simple and abstract concepts. For while the earlier concepts
took dependencies for granted and expressed them in various ways, the
concepts of the "philosophers" (as the first theoretical scientists called
themselves) and their seventeenth-century refinements were "objective"-
that is, detached from those who produced them and from the situations
in which they were produced and therefore in principle incapable of
doing justice to the rich pattern of interactions that is the world. It needs
a miracle to bridge the abyss between subject and object, man and nature,
experience and reality that is the result of these conceptual "revolu-
tions"-and creativity leading to wonderful castles of (philosophical and/
or scientific) thought is supposed to be that miracle. Thus the allegedly
most rational view of the world yet in existence can function only when
combined with the most irrational events there are, namely miracles.
4. Return to Wholeness
of a human being (of a group) that make it possible Einstein starts from
an abstract entity, the thinking subject, in fictitious surroundings, the
"labyrinth of [his] sensations." Naturally he needs an equally abstract
and fictitious process, creativity, to reestablish contact with real human
beings and the results of their work. The gap that needs the miracle
occurs in his model, it does not occur in the real world as described by
researchers of a less abstract bent of mind (old-fashioned biologists, non-
behavioral psychologists) and by common sense. Replace the model with
this world and the specter of individual creativity will disappear like a
bad dream. Unfortunately, this is not yet the end of the matter.
The reason is that fictitious theories while out of touch with nature
need not be out of touch with behavior and thus with culture. On the
contrary, they often provide motives for strange and destructive actions.
Unrealistic policies do not just collapse; they affect the world, they lead
to wars and other social and natural disasters. Once enthroned they
cannot be easily dislocated by argument. Argument starts from certain
assumptions, proceeds in a certain way, and has strength only if it moves
in an acceptable direction. Put into a hostile environment the most beautiful
argument sounds like sophistry-this is true of science, this is even more
true of politics and of the common sense that supports it in democratic
countries. We do need arguments-but we also need an attitude, a religion,
a philosophy, or whatever you want to call such an agency with corre-
sponding sciences and political institutions that views humans as inseparable
parts of nature and society, not as their independent architects. We do
not need new creative acts to find such a philosophy and the social
structures it demands. The philosophy (religion) and the social structures
already exist, at least in our history books, for they arose, long ago, when
ideas and actions were still the results of a natural growth rather than
of constructive efforts directed against the tendencies of such a growth.
There are the Homeric epics, there is Taoism, there are the many "prim-
itive" cultures which put us to shame by their cheerful respect for the
wonders of creation. We can learn a lot from the myths and rituals by
means of which "primitive" communities tried to achieve a peaceful
coexistence with nature. We cannot reject their views by claiming that
they clash with "science" or with "the modern situation." There is no
monolithic entity, "science," that can be said to clash with things, and
"the modern situation" is a catastrophe that offends our most basic desires
for peace and happiness. Scientists themselves have started criticizing
the separatist view of human beings, the view, that is, that there exists
an "objective" world and a "subjective realm" and that it is imperative
to keep them apart. Thus Mach pointed out, more than a century ago,
that the separation cannot be justified by research, that the simplest
sensation is a far-reaching abstraction and that any act of perceiving is
inextricably tied to physiological processes. Lorenz has argued for a science
that makes "subjective" factors parts of research while one of the most
20. For a summary of the technical and philosophical aspects, see David Bohm's
magnificent Wholenessand Implicate Order (London, 1980).