Trillanes IV v. Pimentel
To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the
G.R. No. 179817 | 556 SCRA 471 | June 27, 2008 | Carpio-Morales, J.
Petition: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus.
Petitioner: Antonio F. Trillanes IV
Respondents: Hon. Oscar Pimentel, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 148, Makati City; Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, Vice Adm. Rogelio I. Calunsag, M.Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino, and Lt.
Col. Luciardo Obeña
Rule 114 — Bail
DOCTRINE
• It is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong,
whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial
court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like
petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
• Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
• Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position—such an aberrant situation not only
elevates his status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. (People v. Jalosjos)
FACTS
1. July 27, 2003, at the wee hours of the morning: “Oakwood Incident”
a. Around more than 300 soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key
national officials.
b. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to
suppress the rebellion. Negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with militant soldiers’ surrender that evening.
c. Thereafter, Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV along with his comrades was
charged with coup d’etat (punishable under RPC, Art. 134-A) before RTC of
Makati (case docketed as People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al.).
d. 4 years later, petitioner still remains in detention while he won a Senate seat
with a 6-year term starting on June 30, 2007 at noon.
2. June 22, 2007: Before the commencement of his term, petitioner filed with the
RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” (Omnibus Motion).
Among his requests were the ff.:
a. To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere), meetings, etc. usually held
at the Senate in the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually Mondays
to Fridays, 8AM to 7PM).
b.
Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a
desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment when
there are no Senate sessions. Costs to be funded by the Office of the
accused from the senate.
c. To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at
his place of detention (at Taguig City)
d. To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions
and/or opinions to the press or the media as Senator.
e. With prior notice to the court, to the accused & his custodians, to be
allowed to receive on Tuesdays and Fridays the media who may wish to
interview him.
f. To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of
officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning
(9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate.
3. July 25, 2007: RTC denied all requests in the Omnibus Motion
a. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, waiving his requests in (b), (c) and (f),
to trim them down to 3.
b. September 18, 2007: RTC denied petitioner’s motion
4. Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial
court, and for prohibition and mandamus to:
a. (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests
from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and
b. (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate.
5. (Note as to the military co-respondents) Since November 30, 2007, been in the
custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the
foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel.
a. Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action
as against the above-named military officers--respondents because the
issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable
controversy.
ISSUE
1. W/N petitioners' election as a senator provides a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement and legal justification to allow
him to serve his mandate? – NO.
RULING & RATIO
1. No, petitioner cannot be allowed to hold office as senator.
SC: All of petitioner’s contentions are baseless. [SEE CONTENTIONS BELOW]
People v. Jaloslos succinctly expounds: “x x x Allowing accused-appellant to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.”
Petitioner’s contention #1:
a. Petitioner posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that
of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the
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 motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of
Jalosjos.
i. Petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already
convicted pending appeal whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner.
ii. Petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude,
i.e., 2 counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is
indicted for coup d’état which is regarded as a “political offense.”
iii. Petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption
in the AFP.
b. SC: A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
i. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions of
the office are not substantial distinctions in the class of prisoners.
c. Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution1 and the Rules of Court (Rule 114 on Bail)
state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
i. The cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua.
ii. There is no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.
d. In this case, petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.
i. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused. This accentuates the proviso that
the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.”
ii. This rule applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
e. Court cited People v. Hon. Maceda: “Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or
hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.”
i. These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent
that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It
bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda,
the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.
ii. The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not
carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
f. Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos in that until a promulgation of final
conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails.
g. Petitioner’s Contention #2: Petitioner contends that unlike Jalosjos who
attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered.
1 “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.”
i. The records show otherwise. On November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security
detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue
certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the “Manila Pen Incident,”
proves that there is risk.
ii. Circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining
the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.
iii. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall
be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
h. Petitioner’s Contention #3: Petiitoner cites Montano v. Ocampo.
i. SC: Petitioner cannot find support in Montano v. Ocampo because unlike
petitioner Trillanes, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged
with multiple murder & multiple frustrated murder, was able to rebut the
strong evidence for the prosecution.
i. Petitioner’s Contention #4: Petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that
Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s
duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was
the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFP’s
apolitical nature.
i. SC: While the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on
security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same
manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
j. Petitioner’s Contention #5: Petitioner posits that his election provides the legal
justification to serve as Senator. He bases his contention on the doctrine in
administrative law that “a public official can not be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.”
i. SC: The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is
no “prior term” to speak of. The Court has repeatedly held that the doctrine
of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
ii. In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, it is opportune to wipe
out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the
overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which
the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
iii.
People v. Jalosjos: “The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
in prison. … Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.”
k. Petitioner’s Contention #6: petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment
accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with
non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social functions.”
i. SC: Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in Dec. 2006 to file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast
his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his
oath of office on June 29, 2007.
DISPOSITION
• WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
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