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The Illicit Drug Policy Formulation in the Philippines: Policy, Polity and Plurality
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 THE ILLICIT DRUG POLICY FORMULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES:
POLICY, POLITY AND PLURALITY
Maria Minerva P. Calimag, M.D., M.Sc., Ph.D.

T
he government of the Philippines has set the illicit drug problem as a priority topic.
Unfortunately, no one policy option seems effective enough to solve the problem. Political
considerations often play a greater role in determining approaches to the drug problem than do
considerations of effectiveness. Political considerations also lead to an emphasis on short-term as opposed
to long-term solutions. In the Philippines, as in other drug consuming countries, drug control laws are
preferred to the longer process of value change or socio-economic structural change. It is therefore
important to explore the complex political dynamics and to know the logical and formal procedure to
manage the political aspects of public policy related to the illicit drug problem in the Philippines.

The Philippines has definitely borne the weight of the violence and crime that seem to inescapably
accompany illicit drug distribution. As a practical problem, recurring drug epidemics have overwhelmed
the nation’s treatment and rehabilitation resources. Illicit drugs have wide societal impact responsible for
numerous public health and social ills including suicidal or unintended premature deaths of some drug
users. Equally plagued are the nation’s police forces and judicial system struggling to maintain order and
credibility, including but not limited to maintaining border controls, i.e., for foreign nationals who bring in
precursors and maintain laboratories for the manufacture of illicit drugs as well as Filipino nationals
recruited as drug couriers.

Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act), repealing Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the “Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972” was passed and approved by the Joint Assembly of the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Twelfth Congress of the Philippines on June 7, 2002 (Official Gazette dated August
12, 2002, V. 98, N. 32, pp. 4325-4370). The Act is an attempt by the Philippine Government to write a
policy paper formulating a long term, comprehensive drug policy that approaches the drug problem from a
multidisciplinary model and advocates a balanced approach toward reduction of both supply and demand
of illicit drugs.

The illicit drugs problem is experienced primarily at local and national level, but it is also a global issue
that needs to be addressed in a transnational context. As a regulation therefore, the Act was enacted mainly
because of internal demands to curve the unrelenting drug problem in the country as well as to address
external demands. The institutional policy actors who determine the shape and content of the anti-illicit
drugs strategies of countries are required to conform to the global standards set by relevant UN conventions
(the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 protocol, the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (1988)), The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three
protocols, and the UN Convention against Corruption which are major legal instruments for addressing the
illicit drugs problem. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs of 1998 confirmed
the importance of the integrated and balanced approach, in which supply reduction and demand reduction
are mutually reinforcing elements in drugs policy.

As the context-shaping power underscored the exercise of the agenda-setting and decision-making
powers, the law-making experience that created the Act, highlights the employment of the different
dimensions of power as well as the contemporary dynamics in the global drug control framework structure
vis-à-vis the policymaking process.

This research is aimed at shedding more light on the mechanisms of the political system, in particular
on the policy-formation and policy decision-making processes related to the illicit drug problem the
Philippines. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the making of Philippine drug policy through
the lenses of the Multiple Streams Model (Kingdon, 1984; Porter, 1995). The paper aims to widen the
perspective of how drug policy specifically the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002” was
created. This paper is about the power dynamics at work in policymaking. The main anticipated results of
the study are: 1) better understanding of the policy-making process in the Philippines relevant to the illicit
drug problem; 2) increased knowledge of political decision-making evolution; and 3) familiarity with the
policy research methodology and quality increase of policy analysis. Specifically, the paper examined the
use of agenda-setting, decision-making, and context-shaping powers in enacting the “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”.

Framework for Analysis

Studying public policymaking and understanding policy decisions is problematical. More often
than not, the conclusions of policy analysis are shaped and biased by the model selected. Models, metaphors
or other theoretical constructs are necessary to simplify complicated phenomena. In 1984, Kingdon came
up with the Multiple Stream Model (Kingdon, 2003). He purported that needed changes in policymaking
can come about when multiple sets of activities (so called “streams”) – defining the problem, suggesting
solutions, and obtaining political consensus – occur simultaneously, thus opening a window of opportunity
for the changes to happen. Problems stream denotes social conditions perceived by people as problems
which need to be remedied by government action. Citizens, media, and interest groups often define
problems and their potential causes. Often, it is difficult to clearly define the problem and its history because
many actors lobby for their own views about them. Policies stream consists of the solutions or policy
alternatives that are generated by mid-level government officials and administrators, policy advocates, and
academics. Well-crafted policy solutions entail sensitive development of content, timing, and sequence of
reform, translation of policy directives into programs, generation of strategies for adoption of policy and
the taking advantage of supporters of the reform as well as, management of the opposition. Politics stream
consists of political events that may or may not be favorable to the policy. Ideally, a compelling problem is
linked to a plausible solution that is politically feasible. The Multiple Streams model is not linear, since
three streams flow relatively independently through the policy system. It is suitable and expedient insofar
as it argues that numerous real life contextual factors – political events (elections, changes in government
ministers, and public protests), bureaucratic procedures, interest groups, etc. – largely shape the future of a
public policy and can strongly impact whether or not a particular problem will actually be solved. It forces
all interested and involved stakeholders (actors) to recognize the realities of policymaking and logically act
to see policies come to reality. Strong stakeholder efforts such as lobbying, research, communication,
coalitions, interactions, bargaining and media blitz make the three streams meet and prolong their
concurrent flow.

Significance of the Study

Independent researchers and institutions have yet to acquire broad acceptance for their services in the
policy formation process. The lack of qualified experts and researchers, underdeveloped policy-analysis
methodology, lack of information, and unwillingness of policy-makers to collaborate with independent
research centers top the list of reasons for this.

Understanding models of policy making can help researchers maximize the uptake of their work and
advance evidence-informed policy. Academics who possess the requisite knowledge to constructively
understand or try to influence policy as decision-makers, tend not to possess enough power to contribute to
the goals, objectives and content of the policy-making process in government. It is expected that the
different types of models will provide illicit drugs researchers with insights on how to better position
themselves to influence policy making. While power, ideology and interests often stand in the way of good
research evidence being influential, they are central to democratic processes. Both individual researchers
and research institutions need to find more effective ways of grappling with these realities.

Ideally, study results, including their usage and promotion, is expected to trigger follow-up activities,
thus leading to mutually-reinforcing cascades that increase the effectiveness and the cooperation between
research institutes and government bodies alike. Thus, the results of this study could therefore be used: first,
to broaden understanding of the mechanisms, goals and content of the policy process; secondly, to facilitate
development of policy analysis; thirdly, to design concrete recommendations and strategies to advance the
policy decision-making process and policy issues based on the acquired results; and lastly, the results of
the study can be disseminated and used among the academic network and a full range of policy-makers
working on the illicit drug problem in the Philippines.

Methodology

The study employed a qualitative approach. Key documents with relevance for the evaluation process
were identified and gathered. Data extraction and analysis included the following: 1) document review and
content analysis of legal enactments (Senate and House Bills; DDB Board Resolutions), legislative
Committee Daily Bulletins, in order to systematically draw out the policy stipulations contained therein; 2)
discourse analysis of legislative proceedings for the purpose of clarifying the role of stakeholders in the
process of formulating and enacting the law; 3) a review of relevant historical and grey literature, in
particular those pronouncements made by relevant stakeholders that could be found in public domain was
also undertaken in order to determine stakeholder triggers for review and revisions of drug policies; and 4)
insights from an emic ‘insider’ perspective as the author is a content expert in the field of pharmacology
and anesthesiology who sits in the panel of resource persons during review and revisions of existing
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations, and in committee hearings of the House and Senate Committees on
Health.

Findings and Discussion

Policy Setting (Problem Stream)

The Southeast Asian Region is a “hot spot” in relation to the drug trade and the Philippines sits at the
center of the illicit drug ring. Daily newspapers carry news of drug pushers, users, traffickers, drug lords to
include foreigners being apprehended by law enforcement authorities. Everyone reads or witness authorities
proudly declaring the recovery of several grams or several kilos of shabu (methamphetamine) or marijuana
including drug related paraphernalia or the burning of huge volume of drugs in police camps. Many are
likewise witness to many incidents of rape, killings and robberies and other heinous crimes perpetrated by
drug-crazed individuals. Apart from these are more shocking news that the Philippines is being utilized as
a transhipment point of drugs by transnational criminal organizations, that government officials are
involved in the drug trade, that shabu laboratories are operating in the Philippines, and that ordinary stores
sell shabu like any other commodity.

The ASEAN have a self-imposed target of a drug-free ASEAN by 2015. The drug problem in the
Philippines however, remains significant. Philippine law enforcement authorities undertake sustained
efforts to disrupt major trafficking organizations and dismantle clandestine drug laboratories and
warehouses. Challenges remain in the areas of drug use and production, law enforcement, corruption and
drug trafficking. The Director of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) during the meetings of the House
Committee on Dangerous Drugs (25 Sept 2001/RCN/VI-2) identified the threats inherent to the drug
problem in the Philippines, i.e., narcopolitics, narcoeconomics, narcojustice, narcomilitary and
narcoterrorism. The value of narcotics seized in 1999 was Php3.04billion increasing to Php3.99billion in
2000.

During the Consideration of H.B. No. 4433 on Second Reading Period of Sponsorship and Debate (6
Mar 2002) the Distinguished Chairperson of the Committee on Drugs referred to the drug problem in the
Philippines as the “deadliest menace, most wicked, most vicious, and most soul-destroying horror that ever
corroded the Filipino race (p.26)…a clear and present danger to the social, moral, political and economic
fiber of our society (p.32).” He alluded to two new evil developments, namely: “narcopolitics…which
means the entry of drug lords into party politics, with their surrogate candidates during elections (p.29)…
and the entry of drug lords, with their billions, into legitimate business investments (p.30).” He identified
sources of smuggled illicit drugs “from countries like mainland China, Taiwan, (and) the golden
triangle…Myanmar, Thailand and Laos (p.122)” and cited the Philippine coastlines of “Quezon, Batangas,
Zambales, Pangasinan, Ilocos Province and Batanes (p.122)” as entry points for illicit drug smuggling for
sale in the country and for transhipment to other countries. He quoted PNP survey reports that “there are
more than 275 drug syndicates operating in the whole Philippines (p.122).” In 2010, a total of 38 kg of
crystalline methamphetamine was seized at Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila, smuggled by
Malaysian nationals on flights originating in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur (PDEA 2011).

The 2011 United Nations World Drug Report identified the Philippines as having the highest
methamphetamine abuse in East Asia at 2.1% of the adult population ages 16-64. Some reports indicated
that ephedrine, used for illicitly producing methamphetamine in Southeast Asia, is diverted and smuggled
out of China and India, whereas caffeine, the adulterant used for producing methamphetamine tablets, is
mainly smuggled into Myanmar through its border with Thailand. Seizure data showed a dramatic increase
in trafficking in MDMA through Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the
Philippines, and Thailand and in several other countries in the region, methamphetamine remains the most
common drug of abuse and a significant increase in ATS abuse (amphetamine, methamphetamine, and
MDMA) among the youth who smoked, sniffed, and inhaled them have been reported. About 70 per cent
of drug abusers in the Philippines were treated for methamphetamine abuse. Domestically manufactured
methamphetamine is also trafficked to countries in Asia, such as Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand as well
as to countries outside the East and South-East Asia region (PDEA 2010b). The Philippines has also been
indicated as a source for crystalline methamphetamine found in Brunei Darussalam in recent years (ARQ
2010).

In 2002, the drug problem particularly in the production of opium and heroin in Afghanistan, Myanmar,
and Laos, the three largest producers of illicit opium in the world and in Southeast and Southwest Asia was
as equally serious. Opioid drugs are the least commonly used drugs worldwide. Opioids however, are the
most widely used pain medication for management of postoperative acute pain and chronic non-malignant
and malignant pain syndromes. As several countries in the region adopted control measures for substances
not under international control, the Philippines included nalbuphine hydrochloride, a synthetic opioid
agonist-antagonist drug used mainly for the control of postoperative pain, in its list of controlled drugs in
2010 (DDB Board Regulation No. 1 Series of 2010), mainly because of reported abuse in the Central
Visayas region. The Philippine National AIDS Council reports nalbuphine hydrochloride as the most
commonly injected drug in the Philippines (PNAC 2010). The number of injecting drug users (IDUs) in the
Philippines is estimated to be between 7,000 and 14,500 persons. The estimated HIV prevalence among
IDUs is between 0 and 7% (PNAC 2008). An estimated 11.5% of all IDUs in the country have been reached
with HIV prevention programmes (PNAC 2010). There is no reported injecting use of methamphetamine
in the Philippines.

In view of the country’s limited illicit market for cocaine, the Philippines is at risk as a transit country
for cocaine consignments destined for other countries. In 2010, a record 342 kg of cocaine were seized, an
increase of 32 per cent over 2009. Female drug couriers were identified in several seizures in Japan,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Also in 2010, the Philippine government seized approximately
2,400 kg of cannabis from 207 illicit cannabis cultivation sites identified and eradicated in several
mountainous areas of the country, the greatest number since 2005. The abuse of benzodiazepines (such as
alprazolam, estazolam, midazolam, nimetazepam) also continues to be a concern in Brunei Darussalam,
Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Considering the horrible drug trade situation in Southeast Asia, the member states of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recognize the fact that because of the transnational character of this
menace, no single state in the region can effectively address the problem on its own initiative. On December
18-20, 1997, the ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs meeting was first hosted by the Philippines.
The three day summit resulted in the signing of the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime which
includes the establishment of an ASEAN Center on Transnational Crime (ACOT) to coordinate regional
efforts against transnational crimes through intelligence sharing, harmonization of policies and coordination
of operations.

The magnitude of the drug abuse problem can also be gleaned in the results of the National Household
Surveys conducted by the Dangerous Drugs Board in 1999, 2004 and 2008. The results of the said surveys
were as follows: Based on the results of the 1999 DDB survey, it was estimated that there could be 3.4. M
drug users in the country at that time. Of these users, 1.8 M were regular users, while 1.6, occasional users.
In 2004, based on the results of the DDB survey conducted in selected regions and studied areas in the
Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao and the National Capital Region (12,000 respondents with ages 10 to 44 years
old), it was estimated that there might be 6.7 million drug users at the time of the survey. Methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), cannabis (marijuana) and contact cement (Ex. rugby) were the most abused drugs
of those who admitted to have continued their drug-taking behavior. Based on the results of the 2008 survey,
it was estimated that there could be 1,715,854* current drug users or 2.5% of the 2008 projected *Filipino
population aged 10-64 years old (Based on the 2008 NSCB population projections of age 10-64 years old).
Senator Vicente Sotto III (Senate Majority Floor Leader and Ex-Officio Member of the Senate Committee
on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs; former member of the Board of Directors and acting Chairman of
the DDB), in a message he delivered during the Anti-Illegal Drugs Forum with the Justice Sector
Coordinating Council last November 14, 2011, mentioned that “The role that statistics plays in our
campaign needs further looking into. Conviction rates would be a good indicator of our performance on
this matter, without sacrificing the adherence to the truth and the rule of law. Former statistics placed our
drug dependents at 6.7 million several years ago. The more accurate version is just above one million. At
6.7 million drug users/dependents, we had a higher number than China with a population of over one
billion. Other countries base the figure on detained people on drugs, while we project our drug dependents
from extrapolated surveys.”

In 2010, PDEA bagged a total of 8,259 drug-related arrests (84% males and 16% females) were reported
in the Philippines, which is 9% lower than the 9,052 drug-related arrests in 2009. According to DDB
estimates, of the total drug-related arrests in 2010, crystalline methamphetamine accounted for roughly
77%, and cannabis accounted for 22% (DDB and PDEA 2011). The majority were street-level traffickers
(53%), followed by users (29%) and persons arrested for possession (16%). Only three persons were
arrested for manufacturing during the year (PDEA 2010a). Of the street-level traffickers, the majority are
married and employed with an average age of 29 years, and the male-to-female preponderance of 6 to 1
(PDEA 2011). In addition, the number of minors arrested for drug trafficking offenses has increased from
42 in 2008 to 62 in 2009 (47.6% increase) to 86 in 2010 (38.7% increase) (PDEA 2010a).
Policy Strategies (Policy Stream)

The principal statute for drug control in Philippines is the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002”. In the Accomplishment Report of the 12th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines (2003), the
amendment of the Dangerous Drugs Act is highlighted as one of the reform measures under the section on
“Promoting peace and order”. Both the Senate and the House agreed to exempt drug-related offenses from
probation and imposed maximum penalty on a lowered volume of drugs caught (from 200 grams to 5
grams), thus making it “the toughest anti-drug law in Asia”. Towards the enactment of the amended Act,
the Standing Committees on Dangerous Drugs held 13 In-House Committee Meetings, 5 Out-of-Town
Public Hearings, 4 Ocular Inspections, 5 Bicameral Meetings, 12 Technical Working Group Meetings and
filed 2 Committee Reports.

Article XIII SEC. 95 of the Act further stipulated the creation of a Congressional Oversight Committee
composed of seven (7) Members from the Senate and seven (7) Members from the House of
Representatives. The Committee shall be headed by the respective Chairpersons of the Senate Committee
on Public Order and Illegal Drugs and the House of Representatives Committee on Dangerous Drugs.

In its Declaration of Policy, the Act enunciates a clear, overarching goal for drug control -- namely, to
reduce the harms to society arising from the production, consumption, distribution, and control of drugs:
“Toward this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs, and projects” (supply
reduction). In conformity with that goal and with the legislative requirement of the Act it further articulates
the role of the State, thus: “It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of its territory and the
wellbeing of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their
physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the State needs to enhance further the efficacy of
the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of today's more serious social ills” (demand reduction) —
but in so doing the Act promises to maintain the balance between prohibition for illegitimate use and
permission and non-deprivation for legitimate use – “The government shall however aim to achieve a
balance in the national drug control program so that people with legitimate medical needs are not
prevented from being treated with adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which include the use of
dangerous drugs.” It further stipulates the role and commitment of the State in the societal re-integration
of drug users through programs for treatment and rehabilitation, stated thus: “…the State (shall) provide
effective mechanisms or measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug
abuse or dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation.”
(treatment, rehabilitation and re-integration). The Philippines therefore still adhere to the twin strategies
of Supply Reduction and Demand Reduction as conventional weapons against illegal drugs. There will be
no supply of illegal drugs if there is no demand for them. The day the buying stops is the same day the
selling stops.

Most governments in South East Asia have endorsed harm reduction in HIV policy and programs. Some
countries such as Cambodia, Philippines and Vietnam have introduced legislation on HIV; others are in the
process of doing so. However, none of these laws including the Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control
Act of 1998 specifically address the conflict between policies and practice of harm reduction. The Act
supports HIV prevention through provision of information but does not include specific tools or services.
Western and Eastern perspectives deal differently with the illegal drugs problem. The Western mind adheres
to Harm Reduction Strategy for injectable drug dependents and views the use of some of nature's mind-
altering plants with compassion and with tolerance. The Philippines stands as one of the countries that reject
the Harm Reduction Strategy (Sotto, 2011). The Eastern view, to which the Philippines is more culturally
attuned, favors discipline and harsh penalties for illicit drug users. Asians usually do not spare the rod, mete
out long prison terms, and the death penalty even, for some drug-related crimes and offenses. Prior to the
moratorium on the death penalty in the Philippines in 2000, drug dealing has been considered as a heinous
crime punishable with death. The existing policies in Singapore and China likewise adhere to the death
penalty for drug offenders.

Congress constantly searches for effective ways to address the drug problem not only in Asia but in all
other areas where Overseas Contract Workers reside; conducted dialogues with Netherlands and Germany
(October 2008) and with Australia (April 2009) regarding drug syndicates involved in the mail/courier and
money remittance business; reported at the 6th AIFOCOM Meeting on Combating the Drug Menace which
brought about the Resolution on the Control of Synthetic Drug and Illicit Drug Crop Production drafted
during the 29th ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (August 2008, Singapore) aimed to enhance
partnerships among parliamentarians, public sector, private sector and community groups to, inter-alia,
enhance regulatory control of precursor chemicals, develop preventive education and build national
capacities and resources to control synthetic drug and illicit drug crop production among member ASEAN
countries.

Republic Act No. 6425 (November 14, 1972), “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”, organized the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and Article IX Sec 77 of the RA 9165 (June 7, 2002), “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”, designates the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) under the Office of the
President. Its Vision is for “A Drug-Resistant Philippines by 2010 and a Drug-Free Philippines in 2015”,
goals that it hoped can be achieved “…through a dynamic and responsive partnership between the
government and society”. In its Mission statement, the DDB aims to aggressively address drug prevention
and control issues by eradicating both “…the supply of and demand for dangerous drugs and their
precursors and to stop trafficking to and from the country.” During the deliberations of the House Bill in
the House Committee on Dangerous Drugs whether to impose higher penalties for drug abusers and
consider drug abuse as a heinous crime regardless of amount as proposed by one congressman, the
Executive Director of the Dangerous Drugs Board can be quoted as saying that: “…drug abuse is a sickness,
not a criminal offense. To label mere possession a criminal offense would have negative effects because we
are mandated by the Constitution to take care of the health problem of the citizen, of the youth. So I think
to punish mere possession regardless of the quantity as a capital offense would be too much.” (Transcripts
of the Committee Hearing of the Committee on Dangerous Drugs, 25 September 2001/ACV/VII-1) This
rational inclination of the DDB towards drug abuse as a sickness is borne out by its articulated logical
framework.
 Article IX Sec 82 of the Act stipulates the creation of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
as the implementing arm of the Board responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all
provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the
Act. R.A. 9165 defines more concrete courses of action for the national anti-drug campaign and imposes
heavier penalties to offenders.

The enactment of RA 9165 reorganized the Philippine drug law enforcement system. While the
Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) remains as the policy-making body, it created the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) under the Office of the President. The new law also abolished the National
Drug Law Enforcement and Prevention Coordinating Center, Philippine National Police Narcotics Group
(PNP NARGRP), National Bureau of lnvestigation Narcotics Unit (NBl NU), and the Customs Narcotics
Interdiction Office (CNIO). Personnel of these abolished agencies were to continue to perform their tasks
on detail service with the PDEA subject to a rigid screening process. Attached Task Force Agencies of
PDEA include the PNP Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force (PNP-AIDSOTF), the NBI Anti-
Illegal Drugs Task Force and the Customs Task Group/Force in Dangerous Drugs and Controlled
Chemicals (CTGFDDCC) (PDEA Website www.pdea.gov.ph). On June 18, 2003, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Executive Order 218 (repealing Executive Order 206 issued May 15, 2003) to strengthen the
support mechanisms for the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency during its transition period.

The salient features of the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002” include the following
provisions: to retain and further strengthen the existing Dangerous Drugs Board; to increase the
membership of the Dangerous Drugs Board by invoking a wider spectrum of the government strata and
non-government participation in the policy-making arena; to give a single definition of "dangerous drugs"
to cover both prohibited and regulated drugs; to include a definition of dangerous drugs preparations as
"controlled precursors and essential chemicals," which includes the control mechanisms for the illicit trade
of such, and penalties for violation thereof; to reduce the quantity of dangerous drugs in the application of
penalties; to increase the penalties and fines for the illegal possession of certain dangerous drugs in
quantities above specified limits and the illegal possession of controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
to increase the penalties and fines for the unlawful importation of dangerous drugs and controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; to penalize the illegal possession of "other drugs in quantities beyond its
therapeutic requirements" under Section 8, in recognition of the so-called designer drugs such as ecstasy;
to impose the maximum penalty for those who plant evidence; to elucidate a new procedure for the custody
of seized dangerous drugs and mandating the immediate destruction or disposition thereof; and to require
the mandatory drug testing for the following instances such as, application for a driver's license; application
for permit to carry firearms; employment, whether public, private, domestic or overseas; entry into the
military service; and all persons seeking public office.

Contentious issues that came up during the interpellation include the following provisions: the
reduction in the possession of the dangerous drugs as listed in Section 8 might increase the incidence of
planting evidence (raised by then Representative from Tarlac and now President Benigno Aquino III,
(Transcripts of the Congressional Hearing on Consideration of H.B. No. 4433 Period of Sponsorship and
Debate Mar 11, 2002 2125H); and that the requirement of mandatory drug testing can be easily abused.
Policy Stakeholders (Politics Stream)

Policy-making is inherently political as politics affect and shape all aspects of public policy —what
gets on the agenda, who endorses and champions an issue, who opposes an issue, whether an issue receives
official approval, and whether the official policy is implemented. Stakeholders are all those actors
(individuals and organizations) who have, or think they have, a personal interest in the policy
implementation and in the outcome of a policy. Policy is seen as resulting from the interaction of political
institutions (parties, legislatures, cabinet ministers, governors, bureaucracies, etc.) subject to constraints
imposed by the social, economic, and political environments (Dye 1966; Hofferbert 1969; Gray and Lowery
1990). Hence there is a need to identify the stakeholders who comprise the most important players, analyse
their networks and coalitions, analyse their positions, power and interests, and assess the policy’s
consequences for the players. Stakeholder interest motivates them to attempt to influence the development
of that policy. In the case of the country’s drug policy agenda, all citizens are recognized as stakeholders
insofar as all are affected by the decisions made by elected and appointed officials and, therefore, have the
right to vote or speak on the matter.

Conducting a stakeholder analysis is of great importance for policy evaluation, as the effectiveness of
a policy is often seen differently by the different groups involved in or affected by the policy. Stakeholder
analysis generates knowledge about actors, so as to understand their intentions, interrelations, interactions
and interests; and for assessing the influence and investments they bring to bear on decision–making or
implementation process (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000). Retrospectively, it recognizes that each
stakeholder inevitably contributes to the plurality of persona, purpose, position, power, perspective and
performance that bring about the political dynamics that can change the tenor of policy goals and affect
how popular support is mobilized, how social learning is created and how government organizations
develop accountability. Stakeholder analysis is thus hereby applied to produce new knowledge about the
Philippine illicit drug policy-making processes – a prospective outcome.

Table V-1 shows the various stakeholders involved in the illicit drug categorized according to the
following themes:

Persona

Stakeholders portray several roles or personas in the policy-making process as: a) Leaders, the
stakeholders who attach a high priority to the reform policy a priority and whose actions definitely have an
impact on the implementation of the policy, moving swiftly to enact laws, policy, programs or activities; b)
Lobbyist, the stakeholders who attach a high priority to the reform policy but whose actions can have
significant impact on the implementation of the policy only if they persist in their advocacy; c) Latent
stakeholders whose actions can affect the implementation of the reform policy but may attach a low priority
to the policy for the meantime; and d) the Lukewarm stakeholders whose actions cannot affect and/or can
negatively impact the implementation of the reform policy because of the low priority that they attach to
the policy.
 Purpose

The stakeholders’ purpose refers to their needs and their relative importance to others in the network:
a) that of the axis, the initial policymakers from whom the policy emanates; b) the boundary, the field-
implementing agencies and officials; and c) the core group, the private sector at whom the policy is aimed
at.
Perspective

Perspective refers to the degree to which stakeholders are likely to be affected by policy change.
Stakeholders operate from different perspectives when the outcomes of the evaluation were considered: a)
the champions of the policy (policy makers, professionals and financier); b) the beneficiaries (those who
stand to gain from the positive consequence of a policy); and c) the abandoned (those who will feel
marginalized or suffer the negative consequences of a policy).

Position

Position refers to the stakeholder’s view on the policy issue and position in relation to policy change
being proposed, i.e. support or oppose? It also involves assessment of intensity of each group’s position on
an issue. Support/ (+3 Very strongly support; +2 Moderately support; +1 Weakly support; Neutral
0/Oppose (-3 Very strongly opposed;-2 Moderately opposed; -1 Weakly opposed).

Power

Power refers to the stakeholder’s potential capacity to influence policy decisions through any of the
following activities: agenda-setting, context-shaping, decision-making and resource mobilizing capacity.
Power judgement of level of force with which the stakeholder might support or oppose the policy is based
on the quantity of resources (human, financial, technological, political, informational, legal and other)
available to the stakeholder and his or her ability to mobilize them. High resource mobilization capacity
paves the way for funding allocation of the much needed support of the law enforcement agencies from
intelligence gathering, seminar workshop/trainings, inter-agency conferences, anti-drug programs, rewards
for tipsters and other logistical requirements to launch a full attack on drug traffickers.

Performance

High / Medium /Low

Performance refers to the stakeholder’s level of engagement with the policy issue as: High, medium or
low
Table V-1. Stakeholders and their roles in the illicit drug problem in the Philippines

Associations and Societies

The Philippine House of

Enforcement Agency

Professional Medical
Treatment Facilities
The Philippine Drug

Social Associations
Religious Groups)/
Rehabilitation and

Illegitimate Users
The Government

and Paramedical
Representatives

NGOs (Civic and

The Dangerous
The Philippine

Departments
Drugs Board
Senate

PERSONA
Leader (High Priority, High Influence)/Lobbyist (High Priority, Low to Medium Influence)/Latent (High Influence, Low Priority)/ Lukewarm (Low Influence, Low
Priority)
Leader Leader Leader Leader as Policy- Leader as Policy- Lobbyist Lobbyist Latent Lobbyist as
as Law-maker as Law-maker as Policy-maker Implementer Implementer as Patient as Patient Advocate Social
Advocate Advocate
PURPOSE
Axis (the law and policy-generating bodies)/ Boundary (the implementing agencies and officials)/Core (the target group)

Axis Axis Axis Boundary Boundary Core Core Core Boundary

PERSPECTIVE
Champion (High Interest, High Knowledge)/ Beneficiary (High Interest, Low Knowledge)/ or Abandoned (Low Interest, Low Knowledge)

Champion Champion Champion Champion Champion Beneficiary Champion Abandoned Champion

POSITION
Support/ (+3 Very strongly support; +2 Moderately support; +1 Weakly support; Neutral 0/ Oppose; -3 Very strongly opposed; -2 Moderately opposed; -1 Weakly
opposed )

+3 Very strongly +3 Very strongly +3 Very strongly +3 Very strongly +3 Very strongly +3 Very strongly +3 Very strongly 0 Neutral to -2 +3 Very
support support support support support support support Moderately strongly
opposed support

POWER
Agenda-setting/ Context-shaping/ Decision-making/ Resource-Mobilizing Capacity

Agenda-setting/ Agenda-setting/ Agenda-setting/ Agenda-setting/ Agenda-setting/ Agenda-setting/ Agenda-setting/ Context-shaping/ Resource

Context-shaping/ Context-shaping/ Context-shaping/ Context-shaping/ Context-shaping/ Context-shaping/ Context-shaping/ Capacity Mobilizing
Decision-making/ Decision-making/ Decision-making/ Decision-making/ Resource Resource Resource Capacity
Resource Resource Resource Resource Mobilizing Mobilizing Mobilizing
Mobilizing Mobilizing Mobilizing Mobilizing Capacity Capacity Capacity
Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity

PERFORMANCE
High / Medium/ Low

High High High High High Medium Medium Low Medium

 Existing drug policies in the Philippines include: schools as drug free zones, drug monitoring
programs, random drug testing in schools, mandatory to random drug testing prior to licensing,
international treaties and conventions, prohibition, customs and border control, crackdowns and raids,
undercover operations, zero tolerance policing, police management reform, multi agencies
taskforces/partnerships, drug courts, rehabilitation programs, pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic
interventions, post-release programs for community integration.

Stakeholders portray several personas according to the level of priority that they attach to the
abovementioned reform policies, the potential impact of their actions on the implementation of the
policy, the urgency they attach to their purpose and the resolve that they invest in the policy-making
process. Considered leaders in the illicit drug campaign are Senate and Congress as the law-making
bodies; the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) as the policy-making body; and the Government
Departments /Cabinet Members and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) that
concurrently comprise the DDB Board as the policy-implementers and program/project initiators and
implementers. House Bill 4433 is actually a consolidation of twenty-three (23) House Bills (House Bill
Nos. 547, 555, 806, 820, 1004, 1097, 1493, 1846, 2092, 2773, 2913, 3379, 3457, 3605, 3614, 3787,
3796, 3830, 3866, 3893, 3907, 3991 & 4025) sponsored by 34 legislators that dealt with the illicit drug
issue (Transcript of the Second Reading Period of Sponsorship and Debate Mar 6, 2002,)
(http://erbl.pids.gov.ph). The Professional Medical and Paramedical Associations and Societies (The
Philippine Medical Association; The Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists and all its subspecialties;
The Pain Society of the Philippines and all allied specialties; the Philippine Pharmacists Association
and all its subspecialties; the Philippine Dental Association and all its affiliates; and the Philippine
Veterinary Medical Association and all its affiliates), the sector comprising the Rehabilitation and
Treatment Facilities and the NGOs (religious and civic groups) are the lobbyists who act as patient
advocates. They serve as counterbalance to the oft enforcement-skewed approach of the legislators. The
economic influential comprise the latent stakeholders as they can use resource mobilizing capacity to
impact on legislation when the need arises and when their interests appear to be compromised by
legislation. The illegitimate users comprise the lukewarm personas because they lack direct ‘voice’ on
the issues unless otherwise tackled by the lobbyist groups who speak on their behalf.

R.A. 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002” (Senate Bill No. 1858 and House
Bill No. 4433) was passed during the Joint Assembly of Senate and the House of Representatives on
June 7, 2002, or exactly 14 weeks after Joint Committee Report 246 of the House Committee on
Dangerous Drugs, the House Committee on Public Order and Safety and the House Committee on
Appropriations was submitted for deliberations on February 20, 2002). The initial policymakers and the
axes in our case are the legislators in the Senate who sponsored Senate Bill 1858 and those in the House
of Representatives who sponsored House Bill 4433, and from whom the force to generate the law rests;
and the Dangerous Drugs Board, to whom the burden of drafting the implementing rules and regulations
rests; the boundary, the field implementing agencies and officials are the various Departments of
government, including the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency; and the core group include the private
sector at whom the policy is aimed at, i.e., the drug users (legitimate or illicit); drug prevention and
treatment professionals in rehabilitation centers; interest groups (e.g., unions and medical associations
of public health professionals, pain specialists, oncologists; non-profit organizations (NGOs,
Foundations), civil society members and volunteer groups.

The Dangerous Drugs Board under the Office of the President is the policy-making and strategy-
formulating body in charge of the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention
and control. It is mandated to develop and adopt comprehensive, integrated, unified, and balanced
national drug abuse prevention and control strategy. It has three Major Final Outputs, the tripod of
prevention, treatment, and law enforcement as the basis of its comprehensive drug control strategy.
Through the years, the DDB thus has shifted more resources toward treatment as part of a public health
approach to reducing drug abuse and its consequences (DDB Website) thus reiterating its rational
inclination towards drug abuse as a sickness rather than as a crime (Transcripts of the Committee
Hearing of the Committee on Dangerous Drugs, 25 September 2001/ACV/VII-1).

In the area of enforcement, PDEA implements the policy decisions made by legislature and the
DDB. In the implementation process they must interpret policy objectives, adapt the policy to changing
circumstances in the real world, and integrate the policy with other policies delegated to the agency.
During implementation PDEA can use its political support, expertise, vitality, and leadership skills to
remake public policy. From 2002 to 2010, a total of 72 illicit crystalline methamphetamine laboratories
were dismantled by drug law enforcement authorities in the Philippines (PDEA 2011a). By comparison,
in the first half of 2012 alone, antinarcotics agents of the PDEA have dismantled twenty-four illegal
drug facilities all over the country (six in Region VI; four each in Regions IVA, V and VII; two in
Region XIII; and one each in Regions III, IX, X and XII) (Yap, 2011).

The medical, paramedical and pharmaceutical communities play an important role. The integration
of rational postoperative pain control and palliative care are key aims of the medical specialists in the
Philippines who adhere to the principle of balance in drug control policy; who believe that government
should not only have an obligation to prevent drug abuse but also to ensure the availability of opioid
analgesics for medical purposes; and who promote efforts to prevent drug abuse and diversion that do
not interfere with the adequate availability of medication for patients' pain relief and drug substitution
therapy. Toward these ends, medical specialists advocate that opioids for medical use must be:
available, accessible and affordable. At the First Congress of the Association of Southeast Asian Pain
Societies (ASEAPS) held in Manila on December 2006, Javier and Calimag reported on the results of
a survey of 211 physicians about the use of opioids in the Philippines (Javier & Calimag, 2006). While
it found an ‘adequate’ awareness of the WHO analgesic ladder among prescribers, it identified a
resistance to the prescribing of strong opioids such as morphine. Doctors in the Philippines however,
are reluctant to give opioids to patients for various reasons, even in cases of terminal cancer. In effect,
‘Step 2’ of the ladder was being treated as a comfort zone: an area where physicians tended to ‘overstay’.
This is partly due to the government’s regulatory policies, a factor that has also affected physicians’
attitudes towards narcotics license application. The study concluded that the use of opioids in cancer
pain management remains very low, 20 years after the introduction of the WHO 3-step ladder for pain
management (Javier & Calimag, 2007). The World Health Organization has expressed its concern that
physicians themselves, are unable to provide sufficient pain relief.

To date, medical, dental, veterinary and pharmaceutical practitioners through their respective
professional associations and societies form a significant lobby group in the affairs of the Dangerous
Drugs Board particularly in the recent policy reforms involving Board Regulation No. 3 Series of 2003.

One of the articulated benefits of RA 9165 is that it provides a program for rehabilitation and
treatment of drug dependents. Treatment and rehabilitation of drug abuse in the Philippines entail
detention at a center for six months to one year or in some cases, placement under the care of a certified
physician as prescribed by law. Enrolment in medical care may be at the instance of the user, his/her
family or mandated compulsorily by the Dangerous Drugs Board. Voluntary submission and discharge
may result in waiver of penalty but failure to complete treatment a second time leads to prosecution for
illicit drug use. In 2011, there were 38 accredited drug rehabilitation centers with a total bed capacity
of 3,876. The Philippine Congress approved funds for an additional seven rehabilitation centers.
Congress likewise considered a proposal to allow the Philippine Health Insurance System to cover
rehabilitation enrolment costs.

The number of persons who underwent drug treatment in the Philippines continued to decline in
2010. During the year, a total of 2,745 persons underwent drug treatment, representing a slight decline
compared with 2009. The majority of those entering treatment are first-time admissions. Only a small
number of drug users in the Philippines receive drug treatment and rehabilitation. This is often either
because most individuals refuse to admit they have drug problems or because families choose to keep
the drug problem of a family member secret for fear of public humiliation. Most persons who enter
treatment facilities are poly-drug users and have been taking drugs for six years or more. Crystalline
methamphetamine and cannabis are the predominant drugs of use. Of those who enter treatment,
approximately 57% are single and 34% are unemployed. The ratio of male-to-female users in treatment
is 9 to 1 and most users are between the ages of 20 and 29 years (PDEA 2011).

Figure 5-1, illustrates the web of relationships among stakeholders in the anti-illicit drug
management in the Philippines. The core of the figure illustrates the conventional hierarchical
relationships among national and local government, with solid arrows indicating the (downward)
direction in which most power is exerted in the relationship. In addition, however, this figure shows the
relationships of local government with neighborhoods/households/schools and industries/businesses—
whose people are at greater risk for illicit drug-related incidents. It shows how information and influence
flow from the bottom up as well as from the top down, and between groups of stakeholders.

In addition to the influence government has over neighborhoods/ households/ schools and
industries/businesses, these stakeholders are also affected by social influentials (e.g., knowledgeable
peers), who are inFigure
turn5-1. The web of relationships
influenced by socialamong stakeholders(e.g.,
associations in the anti-illicit drug management
pharmaceutical in the
and medical
Philippines
organizations). They are also affected by economic influentials, in turn, influenced by industry
associations (e.g., bankers, and insurers, i.e. the Philippine Health Insurance Commission and the
Association of Health Maintenance Organizations of the Philippines, Inc.). Finally, local government
and businesses are influenced by medical and paramedical practitioners who, in turn, are influenced by
their professional associations. Relationships may be based on any of the four bases of power (agenda-
setting, context-shaping, decision-making and resource mobilizing capacities) previously mentioned.
 All of these stakeholders interact with the governmental system to promote their preferred
definitions of, and solutions to problems. Thus, Figure 1 illustrates that anti-illicit drug management
policy is a much more complex process than a set of government mandates “trickling down” from the
national government. Rather, anti-illicit drug management involves a complex web of interlinked bi-
directional power relationships among stakeholders with widely differing characteristics. In addition to
these vertical linkages, there are horizontal linkages among stakeholders within a jurisdiction and from
one jurisdiction to another (e.g., from one municipality to another). These vertical and horizontal
linkages provide communities with the resilience to respond to and recover from illicit drug-related
incidents.

While a limited number of issues can remain salient and at the forefront of the political agenda at
any given time, illicit drug issues definitely compete with other issues for space on that agenda.
Administrative powers such as agenda-setting, context-shaping, decision-making and resource-
mobilizing capacity have a significant impact in the determination of who receives benefits and who is
restricted as a result of the implementation of any policy. These powers also have far-reaching impact
on society as a result of the promulgation of agency regulations, contracting, licensing, inspections,
enforcement, adjudication, and the actual discretion for agencies to interpret their own agency rules.
Government agencies must translate laws into operational rules and regulations. Hence, as government
agencies and officials continually perform tasks and activities that involve decisions that determine
policy and decisions that affect all other stakeholders, they play an important role in interpreting
legislation and making regulations to put it into effect. Thus they make important decisions while
applying laws and regulations to individual cases. In certain instances, stakeholders can change position
from support to opposition depending on one’s perspective at a point in time.

A case in point is the mandatory drug testing that is imposed by the Act on distinct classes of persons
including students, military recruits and those seeking positions in public and private office. During the
2004 national election, Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165 was put to the test, when Pimentel, a senator and
a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65. In it, he sought (1) to nullify Sec. 36(f) and 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the
Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected
to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
R.A. 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be
certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Pimentel’s contention
was upheld as valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36(f) and 36(g) of R.A. 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 were declared unconstitutional insofar as the Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. The provision “no person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is
therefore not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator
to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power and the
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution (Supreme Court of the
Philippines Case Digests, 2008)
Summary and Conclusion
Illicit drugs have a great symbolic significance in politics. As in many countries where ideology
and populism have often determined the views of individual elected representatives, party discipline is
not a crucial factor in allowing the Philippines to pursue its illicit drug policy approach. That said, it is
easy to ascertain the stance of politicians regarding the illicit drug issues, and therefore how this political
‘voice’ is impacting upon drug policy. Our application of the policy and stakeholder analysis tools
suggested that a window of opportunity to pass the Joint Bills did exist. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
her cabinet ministers had just assumed office in January of 2001 and her vision of a Strong Republic
served as impetus to initiate Bills that addressed public order and the illicit drug problem was at the top
of her agenda. Moreover, the convening of the 12th Congress follows the 2001 elections, which replaced
half of the Senate membership and the entire membership of the House of Representatives.

Overall, it seemed that for the Philippines, the coupling of three of Porter’s streams existed – the
problem was recognized, political will existed on the highest level, and the plausible policy was
generated. The problems stream was coherent in that although many undercurrents pulled in their own
direction and various stakeholders had their own definitions of the problem, the stakeholders were one
in their goal to rid the country of the drug menace. The politics stream flowed naturally, since the policy
was truly politically feasible due to the combined efforts of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Moreover, the Act eventually defined the roles of the various stakeholders. And, finally, the policy
stream was in touch with barriers on the ground, and thus able to make the connection with the other
two.

Thus the successful reform envisioned came to fruition. The problems were first thoroughly
examined; each of the major stakeholder groups identified its most pressing problems in the illicit drug
policy system; an finally, the smaller list of the specific problems that the reform tried to target were
made in such a way that each group had at least its most crucial grievance included in the governmental
agenda. The Senate and the House, in allocating the power to amend the policies within the Dangerous
Drugs Board, actually decentralized the policymaking and brought the reform agenda closer to the other
stakeholders. Continuous reforms are on-going with the various stakeholders through discussions and
public hearings with the DDB Technical Working Group. The lawmakers still view the illicit drug
menace as a crime issue and the medical practitioners and those in charge of treatment and rehabilitation
still view it as a disease issue, yet it seems clear to all that only compromise can lead to fulfilment of
every group’s requests, as no side completely controls the situation and single-handedly determines the
outcome of the reform. In case of the Philippines, the government is to be given credit for understanding
this.

Once the problems were clearly defined and prioritized, the solutions were embraced accordingly:
the biggest complaint of each major stakeholder group was addressed even if it meant that achievement
of every group’s overall goals might be somewhat delayed. Only by having a vested interest in the
reform can every entity try its best to see it succeed. Again, in the Philippines, the government wanted
to see all of its problems gone while hoping that their comprehensive solution serve as incentive for
other groups to want to implement the reform.

It should be noted that agreements on problems and solutions were pursued with full force and in
relatively short period of time as less than a year was invested to make the Act come to fruition. This is
not to say that the identification of the problems and solutions was superficial; an appropriate task force
in charge of the reform and comprised of several experts representing each stakeholder group intensely
worked together, researched possible options, and investigated potential obstacles. If the obstacles were
too great to be overcome, they need to become part of the problem and be accordingly addressed. In the
Philippines’ case, administrative sharing of responsibilities between the national government and
provinces were large boosts to implementation of the main aim of the reform – eradication of the drug
menace as can be gleaned from the increasing number of city and provincial drug busts in the recent
past. By addressing the obstacles that needed to be resolved, reform was able to proceed; by clarifying
the obligations of each governmental office and making their actions binding and accountable, the
government was able to clear the way for the meaningful reform to occur. All these notwithstanding,
all stakeholders must continually be alert because the illicit drug problem is truly not just a local but a
global problem as well.

The success of the problems, solutions and politics streams to meet provided the needed impetus
for the Dangerous Drugs Act reform. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law of 2002 seems to have
been destined to succeed from the outset: its policies were deliberate and well-defined, it considered
and carefully deliberated many issues important for its implementation particularly in the context of a
developing country, and it galvanized the necessary support needed for its realization. It closed many
of the gaps left open by its predecessor, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Other policymakers should
learn that for policy to succeed, thoughtful consideration of the problems, policy and politics streams
needs to be undertaken; obstacles on all levels recognized and addressed, and implementation carried
out with full force.

Moreover, the Act continuously undergoes revisions in order to address prevailing needs. The DDB
is currently reviewing and is in the process of revising Board Resolution No. 3 Series of 2003, together
with all the stakeholders with interests thereat.

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