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G.R. No.

L-33171 May 31, 1979


Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of
the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
 At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered
 City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
 CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for


 nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
 Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant
 primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence
are principles calculated to protect society
 The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. 
 Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property
 word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done
 Cinco vs Canonoy


 PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of
Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and
CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account
of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the
civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court
of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property
during the pendency of the criminal action.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be
prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments
in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the
jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection
exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-
driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others,
that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees,
a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally
predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in
nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may
proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever
stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain
that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is
finally terminated.

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