A.C.

1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member
of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest,
the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt
are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978

,   the vote being unanimous with the late.

1

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be
reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there
made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion."  2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may
not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On
November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors,
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On
January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue
until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted
his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from
him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case
was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 
3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found
in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.  4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.   It was pointed out in the resolution
5

that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case
No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973.   The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine
6

Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 
7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered,
there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it
would be denied. So it turned out.   It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to
8

certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his
pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously
sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that
his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment
visited on him was more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on
his part was discernible.   The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating
9

character invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the
welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently
undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession
and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than
two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise
taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for
contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,   the power
10

to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and

not on the vindictive principle. 
11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

DIGEST

IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in
the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership
fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a

member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is
merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC               March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them
to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a
disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect
contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds
that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who
manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law
professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and
democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds,
they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession,
and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court
for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for
such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is
not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations
whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable
professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention
or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was
respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s
proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom
invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past
by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young
aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the
factual antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the
counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision, raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic)
assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely,
under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those
provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if
fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens –
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to
jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and
Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in
G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the
grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and
Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S

JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia
to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision
were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized
parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on
the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the
Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of
the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his
work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism
in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday
with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that
are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-
Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations
until after the motion was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it
implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not
jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision
is available here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to
the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr.
Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question
of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian
law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive
Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine
chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the
London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp.
27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed
Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate
legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your
esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this
letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter
was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the
letter of Justice Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s
website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various
on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The
statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board
allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38)28 members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual
signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the
notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law
faculty Statement is reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal
stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act
of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the
charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s

work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes
a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went
into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such
ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A
judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial
decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the
production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification
of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no
longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the
absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they
came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those
primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of
organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources
all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is
a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the
Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the
State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of
the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty
of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying
works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of
the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage.
National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the
petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second
World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But
instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to
take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the
Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members
of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in
a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it
cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of
war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its
own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily
includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of
a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very
crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them
as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is

unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does

violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and
to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position,
without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which
it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing
in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
 (SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR

DAWAY (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
Associate Dean and Associate Assistant Professor
Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his
sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of

Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-
mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the
section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter
shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of
my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as
this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the
substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an
appropriate form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s
cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my
book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been
widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory
chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of
international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been
cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned
at the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without
properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26,
2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that
Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the
names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three
days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the
signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full
roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy
of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies
of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel
R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among the
signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible
signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement,
having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under
consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established
fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence
of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to
the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza,
Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S.
Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10)
days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting
through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the
investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative
matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the
following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents,
excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of
violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to
the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common
compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the
"Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring
Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public
concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the
purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause
Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are in
contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have
violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the
courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in
the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign
the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the
portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to
ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement
of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1,
id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to
vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome
occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity
Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted
and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21,
2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez
was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the
matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did
nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference to
the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled
them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed

plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic
writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits

of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of
the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and
jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism
charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified
in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance
included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M,
Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya
decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana
Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and
from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law
Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human
Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that
Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but
this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have
likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various
published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of
respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine
Star on July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian

Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the

Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard
Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former
dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for
sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that
they may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their

position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing
their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as
citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67 In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement
was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher
learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which
provided that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic
freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to
encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of study
without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism
issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as
teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students, professionals,
even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or,
worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or
relevance to one’s conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following
portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the
bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too
vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and
unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of
a case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common
Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and

officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause
Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their
"obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that
before final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the
findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including
especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted
and defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
 Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts,
reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof.
Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein
she adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the
findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity
Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the
best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part,
Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the
Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view
highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning
such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no
authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the
University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall
be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’
constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and
imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by
registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the
circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was
a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year
2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he
was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class;
and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the
same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that
a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public
officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente
Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American
Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the
Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on
respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement."84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress
upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof.
Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused
the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the
same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the
intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty
made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court
has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off
as one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have
been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could
have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his
explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will
rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation
to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law
Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:

 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of
Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty
members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable
Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which
reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the
notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in
the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was
also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law
on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

 "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which
presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law
that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual
signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their
printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight
(8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant
since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature
pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean
Leonen alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the
faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and
circulate it among the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this
purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing
 pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring
Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was
unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that
the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the
faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still
other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring
Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they
would sign as soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a
style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own
established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to
reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed
draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name.
Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of
non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for
aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that
"[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake
to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted
signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza
among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had
physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen
called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)"
signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice
Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza
had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at
that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the
United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely
accurate.91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so
placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also
authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time
unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out
that this was what actually transpired:
 2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on
the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did
not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement.
Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to
leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate,
still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he
went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S.
This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received
from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time
the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival
from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he
predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under
those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former
Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the
Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity
II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in
Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court
was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to
him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of
the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in
the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that
38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the
Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the
main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages
were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as
a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory
portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be
made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more
signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an
instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an
act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of
the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper
and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or
Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the
Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their
desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of
Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the
same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with
the hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing
Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required
quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for
the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of
honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the
Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records,
evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of
the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he
first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the
same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he
believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting
opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that
"[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when
the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to
their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger,
clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of
Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he
"has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he
signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the
material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law
professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should
not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in
relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the
Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and
 evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause
Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and
expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and
actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on
what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged
one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said
pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance,
publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity
Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an
established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the
Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to
explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression
when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence
of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to
the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco
both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second
motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the
rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not
want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to
the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of
this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the
same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases
supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and
further held that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in
his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion
were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction
them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and
impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will
resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of
prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding
the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases
supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from
the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a
pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following
principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669),
but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of
justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases,
is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases
supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes
way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was
an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and
releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he
claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the
petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved
by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed
by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession."121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle
that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of
public officers, including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such
criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal
authorities sustaining this view.  To quote from that decision:
1awphi1

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and
it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same,
has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice,
and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have
their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental
right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the

decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so
many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights
when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned
even from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of

a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative
complaint and held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a
judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to
avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly
declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem
in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court
and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of
offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and
offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the
judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil.
Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs.
Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks
(Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under
his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for
using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion
to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits
of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition
for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom
of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair
attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice
of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a
pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the Statement
presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how
they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that
dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure,
even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any
previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors
can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the
courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar
discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case.
The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom
of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to
give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the
case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in
Cayetano v. Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of
law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that
their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot
agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and
13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to
influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by
given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence,
since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.

Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic

freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of
their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure
motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that
Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so
unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the
righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in
public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine,
which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong,
should be applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to
the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public
statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the
Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas
was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the
same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women,
but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on
the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who
have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid
basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two
separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it
highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the
compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents
even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against
Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the
filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit,
they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure
for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on
their own administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as,
among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and
respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send
a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to
their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in
full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of
these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are
the ones who would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took
pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the
Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the
universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and
soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive
action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement
was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in
the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was
prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part
of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the
UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism
in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s
issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first
drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they
had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics
charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting
and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in
early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the
respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then,
when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent
respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the
interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’
reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof
that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common
Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from
persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals
whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost
sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of
civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on
legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this
appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of
this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part
well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that
where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent
can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need
no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions
and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability
(13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid
defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the
facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed
and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes
at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed
to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others,
by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to
treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim
of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect
to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance
compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who
showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward
account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his
agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010
Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on
whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to
acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his position on
the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and
without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this
Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they
recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We
commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true
import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof.
Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of
Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused
from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a
professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even
if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar,
civility and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under
universal standards of decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.

To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not
be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for
submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true
and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the
text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring
Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public
manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur
thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not
misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in
the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement
was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its
signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies
precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive
authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the
same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the
"importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the
matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did
not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11,
2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature
pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the
retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to
allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II.
Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the
signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD).
This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting
to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed
document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In
most cases, it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least
a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why
he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August
11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this
Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism
with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of documents
and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to
this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason
therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his
explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza
agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors
had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to
this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to
Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a
person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed
the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of
Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the
Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the professors
who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some
signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen
should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures
before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither
parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The
Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather,
it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court
is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in
pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the
Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty
in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the

plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the
Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for
hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of
witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may
be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s
separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and
hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be
accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs
largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance
therein on the majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding
and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in
the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme

Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the
same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to
the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is
only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of
Rule 139-A will be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases
supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the
Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of
their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct;
the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also
inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in
their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination
of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.

xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146 (Emphases
supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their
reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they
shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They
have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to
present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on
the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on
the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause
Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in
the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records
and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual
signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened
there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the
respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the
pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need
to go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common
Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the
Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc.,
of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of
Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within
the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be
in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September
2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October
12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply
reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally
agreed" with the Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same
on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply
let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or
evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective
compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on
being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their
stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-
necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they
have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence
presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views
on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors
or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds
his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota,
Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon
F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P.
Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La
Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva
and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law
professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or
to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be
more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and
professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

DIGEST:

Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the

Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”

Facts:
SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the petition for
certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive
department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the
Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese
soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion
for reconsideration. 

UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative
to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of
the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not
only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction
over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the
quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of
the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
“polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as
well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even
the most basic values of decency and respect. 

ADVERTISEMENT
REPORT THIS AD

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and
undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion
for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath
they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. 

Issue:

Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Held:

Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar per issues stated above.

[case is ongoing]

Dissenting Opinion:

(1) Serreno, J.

This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion
for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law
Faculty’s statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future
orders would be eroded by the release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu
in which the Vinuya decision was received by the public is well-known. It is not as if
any outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement
alone. It is also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and
competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself.
Either one is honest, has integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can
undermine those qualities other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP
Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase
“Restoring Integrity.” In the second paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s
recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of
such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this would only
further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.” In the next paragraph, it
says: “The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond
reproach.” In the same paragraph, it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all controversies: a
position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional
ethics.”

Carpio Morales, J.

The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle
that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the
Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is “totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.” 

A.C. No. 7676               June 10, 2014

AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
 DECISION

REYES, J.:

This concerns an administrative complaint  for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De
1

Taza) for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client
purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their case which was pending before the Court.

The Facts

Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings
engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of
Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.  The
2

complainant claimed that sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the
Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a
contract.3

According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or in January
2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza
proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court.
Handwritten receipts  signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant,
4

which state:

15 Jan. 2007

Receipt

That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn shall result
in the following:

1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;

2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be included in
the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza 18 Jan. 2007

5

Receipt

The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the process
before the courts. The said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same
should be reimbursed to her by her siblings upon winning the case with finality.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza 6

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that
the Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s
representations that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but
she could no longer be found. 7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment  against
8

Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and documents  from other individuals who
9

attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A
certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit  which was attached to the complaint, alleging
10

that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks  in her favor amounting to ₱481,400.00, which were all
11

dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.

Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit  was attached to the
12

complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check  for ₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan.
13

Said check was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.

Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,  stating that Atty. De Taza
14

owes her ₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.

On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter  informed the Court that Atty. De Taza
15

is planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the United States of America
(U.S.A.).

In a Resolution  dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a
16

Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s
notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then resolved by virtue of the
Resolution  dated July 2, 2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address at Romero De
17

Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned unserved with the notation "RTS-not
connected."

It was then required in the Resolution  dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant inform the
18

Court of Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by giving
Atty. De Taza’s new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution  dated January 26, 2009,
19

directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a
copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A. address.

Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with the
complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court
in its Resolution  dated September 9, 2009, held that the said copy of the Resolution was
20

deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing of her
comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference  was sent to the parties, in which they failed to appear. Thus,
21

the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. The complainant, in a
letter  addressed to the IBP, averred that he was already residing abroad and maintained that he
22

had already submitted his documentary evidence at the time of the filing of his complaint. Atty.
De Taza, for her part, did not file any position paper.

In its Report and Recommendation  dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar
23

Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the
practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommendation in a
Resolution  dated January 3, 2013, viz:
24

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of [P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending
in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.  (Emphasis supplied)
25

The Issue

WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING

BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS
UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED.
Ruling

The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the accusations
against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from
the complainant’s allegations, but all these efforts were only met with silence. Whether her
transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she
would certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give
Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a
comment will not be a hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.

The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the Court
to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
As this Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,  citing In the
26

Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v.
Yaptinchay:  "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
27

purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they
are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.  (Italics supplied)
28

"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required."  Based
29

on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza
manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts
which she left unpaid without any reason. The complainant even submitted a document
evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No.
22 case filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for
drawing checks against a closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her
other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is
much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De
Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and
fairness.

"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order.  It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has
1âwphi1

taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession
she should hold in high esteem." 30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had
the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be
expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme
was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty.
De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used the
name of the Court to defraud her client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.
And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client.  In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is
31

baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of
a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 32

The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo  suspended the respondent from the
33

practice of law for two years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,  the same penalty was meted out
34

by this Court to the erring lawyer who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.

Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,  the Court held that suspension from the practice of law
35

for four years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client into paying
₱42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent
therein presented to his client a copy of the petition with stamped receipt from the trial court
when in reality, no such petition was filed.

In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,  the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the complainant
36

to be put up as injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on other occasions,
supposedly to pay the judge who was handling the case. When the complainant verified this with
the judge, the judge denied the respondent’s allegations. The complainant later learned that the
bond was also unnecessary, as the application for a writ was already denied by the trial court.
Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach."  "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
37

corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of
mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and
cannot be tolerated." 38

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law
for two years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let
it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIGEST:

DOCTRINES

- hindi to namention sa full text but it’s related also. Canon 16 rule 16.01

FACTS:

- Amado Dizon, the complainant alleged that he, along with his siblings engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in a case. The complainant claimed that
Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Php75,000 from him to expedite the proceedings before the
court. This amount was over and above the parties stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a
contract.
- According to the complainant, unknown to him at the time was that, a month earlier, Atty. De
Taza had already demanded and received a total of Php 800,000.00 from his sibling Aurora
Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the
proceedings of their case before the Court.
- Handwritten receipts signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant.

- In 2007 the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had
already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty, De Taza’s representations
that the case was still pending.
- He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found. Thereafter, the
complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment against Atty. De Taza. He also attached checks
and/or failed to pay off her debts to them.
- In its report and recommendation dated Jan 2, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar discipline
recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of Two years from the practice of
law.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing checks, demanding
and/or receiving money from her clients under the guise of having the proceeding before the court
expedited.

HELD:
- The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was NOT able to refute the accusations
against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from
the complainant’s allegations, but all these efforts were only met with silence. Whether her
transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she
would certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give
Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a
comment will not be a hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
- The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the court
to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
As this Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, citing in the
matter of the Proceeding for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yapthinchay:
“disciplinary proceeding against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proven themselves no longer worthy to be en trusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney….

- In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required." Based on
the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza
manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts which
she left unpaid without any reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty.
De Taza's involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07- J-2815-36) for drawing checks
against a closed account, among other complaint- affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such
conduct, while already off- putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent
when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember
that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness.

- "We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order. It also manifests a lawyer's low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken
when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she
should hold in high esteem."
- Atty. De Taza's actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had
the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be
expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme
was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty.
De Taza's actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used the
name of the Court to defraud her client.
- When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.
And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is
baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place.
- Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of
a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
- "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals w ho
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach." "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
 corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of
mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and
cannot be tolerated."

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.

A.C. No. 5359               March 10, 2014

ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, VICENTE A.

PICHON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the late Felipe
Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995,
involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to
file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and
received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees,
to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 -₱3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 -
₱5,250.00 or a total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was
filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga. 1

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the
amount of ₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant would
pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and
ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On
June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount
of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do
so. Atty. Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of
₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee
and attorney’s fee.2

In reply,  complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and asserted
3

that the filing fee at that time amounted only to ₱7,836.60.

In the Report and Recommendation,  dated January 12, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner
4

found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of four (4) months.

In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,  the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
5

adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1)
month.

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the
penalty imposed.

Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:

Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.  He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
6

mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. 7

In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed.
He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the
full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is
not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted
to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming
that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way
to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and
showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. 1âwphi1

In a number of cases,  the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted
8

to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension
ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty.
Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIGEST
[ A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014 ]

ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-

FACT, VICENTE A. PICHON, COMPLAINANT,

VS.

ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the
late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On
three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriff’s fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 – P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 – P1,800.00; and September 2, 1996 – P5,250.00 or
a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed
by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibility

Ruling:

Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that:

Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and
signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney’s
fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from
liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention
whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not
remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his
client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant
and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.

A.C. No. 10164               March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a
complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the
titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a
fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it
was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty.
Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that
Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of
the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey
plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional
payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001,
they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling
was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded
the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional
fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00,
but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed,
however, that he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was
that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he
did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax
declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a
case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in
behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,  dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner
1

found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted
the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his
obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty.
Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written
consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,  the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
2

modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty.
Guaren, except as to the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. 3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for
the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to
serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons
17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a
warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIGEST

A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014 ]

STEPHAN BRUNET AND VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, COMPLAINANTS, 

VS.

ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Complainants alleged that  they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a
residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a
fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding;
that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title;
that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) which
they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their
lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange,
sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on
March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded
Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress;
that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the
return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided
that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his
professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship

between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending
before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Issue:

Whether or not resondent violated the code of professional responsibility

Ruling:

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as
partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to
file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren
breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected
a legal matter entrusted to him.
DIGEST
SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. AGUILOS
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016 |Bersamin, J.,

This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the
former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to
perform during his professional engagement?

FACTS

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services.

 She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in
the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband.
 She subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already
paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case; that she had
sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less
whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed
 That the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any
appreciable legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted
her to bring an administrative complaint against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on March 20, 2007.

IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence
that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of
the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant
with the grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the
complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as
acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle
of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of
P30,000.00.

IBP also recommended that Atty. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

ISSUE(S)

 (a) Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b)
Whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.

RULING

Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount
received from the client
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant.
As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal
separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of
him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation
that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case
unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an
action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her
British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition
for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for
annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his
claim for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos
is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the
stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from
notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision
until full payment.

A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016

ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao

(complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty. Limos) for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
 The Facts

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF
Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. At the
preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.2 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible
settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the
latter represented that she was duly authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty.
Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by
installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant would pay an
initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the
complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to
approve compromise agreement for filing with the court.3 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos,
who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her undertakings as counsel of
BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of their agreement. Notwithstanding such
failure, Atty. Limos still sought to get from the complainant the next installment amount of their
purported agreement, but the latter refused.5 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who
informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to negotiate
any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF. The complainant also learned that BHF
did not receive the P200,000.00 initial payment that he gave to Atty. Limos.6 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7 to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00
initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos
to file an answer but she did not file any responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was then
set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19, 2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the
IBP-CBD ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but once again, Atty. Limos did not
bother to submit her position paper.

On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty.

Limos.10 The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty.
Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice by
concealing or omitting to disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to
negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the
P200,000.00 from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return to the complainant
the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date
of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of the full amount.11 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation.

On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the
Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As per verification of the
Court, neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review thereafter.

The Issue

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty.
Limos from the practice of law?14 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 Ruling of the Court

To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this
Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty.
Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous
expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was
found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held
administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of
P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said
loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court,
gave Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will merit a more
severe penalty.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for
receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable
settlement with her client BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not
authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor was she
authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is compounded by the fact that
she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant, despite
due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she
was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement
as counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. The foregoing
factual antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not
too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to
employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming
and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.

Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges brought against her.
Similar with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against
her. She also failed to file her mandatory conference brief and her verified position paper. Worse,
Atty. Limos did not even enter appearance either personally or by counsel, and she failed to
appear at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which she was duly notified.17 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter, to justify her
actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality
demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought against
her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her
disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the authority of the Court.

Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this Court that
not only is she unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in
following the dictates of the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos' unwarranted
obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of
disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender. Considering the serious nature
of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior misconduct which grossly degrades the
legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer
of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the
Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the
Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated desecration of her
ethical commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she
remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."20 "Of all classes
and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot
and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."21 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this
case definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the
strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and
her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let other
copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST
A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016
ARNOLD PACAO v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS,
Arnold Pacao’s wife, Mariadel Pacao, was a former vault costudan of BHF Pawnshop and
was charged with qualified theft. Atty. Limos appeared as counsel for BHF. Complainant
initiated negotiation with the BHF through Atty. Limos for a possible settlement. After series
of negotiation, Atty. Limos relayed that that BHF is demanding P530,000.00. An initial
amount of P200, 000.00 was entrusted to Atty. Limos to be submitted to BHF for the
compromised agreement. Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of agreement and still sought
to get from the complainant the next installment amount of their purported agreement, but
the latter refused. Thereafter, complainant learned that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF’s
counsel and also learned that BHF did not received the P200,000.00 initial payment.
Complainant demand the return of the initial payment but Atty. Limos failed and refused to
do so. Complainant then filed a disbarment case gainst Atty. Limos.

Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos for the commission
of fraud and practice deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or
omitting to disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and
conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the
P200,000.00 from the complainant.

Whether the disbarment of Atty. Limos is applicable?

The foregoing factual antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and
misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very
beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum
of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.

By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter, to justify her
actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality
demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought
against her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence from the proceedings before
the IBP. Her disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the
authority of the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED
and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

A.C. No. 11350 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211], August 09, 2016

ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera for absconding with
money entrusted to him and soliciting money to bribe a judge.

On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a complaint for disbarment1 against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent and asked for help in his
application for a work permit from the Bureau of Immigration.2 They met a few days later, and
complainant paid respondent P10,000.00 as professional fee.3 chanrobleslaw

They met again, and complainant gave respondent another P10,000.00, together with his
passport. This was allegedly for the processing of his work permit.4 chanroble slaw

They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos.5 Respondent
asked complainant for another P10,000.00, but complainant refused as they only agreed on the
amount of P20,000.00.6 chanroble slaw

Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for complainant's other case, which
respondent was also working on.7 He explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Piñas
judge to reverse the motion for reconsideration against complainant, while P3,000.00 would be
used to process the motion for reconsideration. Complainant gave him the P8,000.00.8 chanrobleslaw
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he never received any updates on
the status of his work permit and pending court case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to
follow up on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his
wife.10
chanrobleslaw

Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints against respondent if he did not
give back the money and passport. That was the last time complainant heard from
respondent.11 chanrobleslaw

After inquiring and researching on respondent's whereabouts,12 complainant was able to track

down respondent and get back his passport, which respondent coursed through complainant's
aunt.13 However, despite the return of complainant's passport, respondent still refused to return
the P28,000.00 earlier endorsed to him.14 chanrobleslaw

Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.15 chanrobleslaw

On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the Order16 directing respondent to
file an answer to the complaint.

Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014 mandatory conference,17 as well as at
the second mandatory conference set on October 22, 2014.18 The parties were directed to submit
their verified position papers, after which the case was submitted for resolution.19 chanrobleslaw

On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension for
two (2) years from the practice of law and return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20 chanroble slaw

On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and
approved21 the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but modified it to disbar
respondent from the practice of law, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's violation of
Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to appear in the Mandatory
Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys and Ordered to Return the Twenty
Eight Thousand (P28,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines transmitted the case to this Court for final
action under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.23 chanrobleslaw

This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.

Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to complainant's
allegations. It manifests his tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of the
complaint and other documents submitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In Macarilay v. Seriña,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified withholding of funds belonging to
the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer."25  By absconding with
cralawred

the money entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a manner not befitting a member of the
bar, respondent violated the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.
....

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.

....

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

....

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

....

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

....

Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client's interests and the degree of
service expected of him in this capacity is his "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability."26 The lawyer also has a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with
utmost trust and confidence.27 chanroble slaw

Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and diligence. He not only
neglected the attorney-client relationship established between them; he also acted in a
reprehensible manner towards complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening complainant and his
family with bodily harm, hiding from complainant, and refusing without reason to return the
money entrusted to him for the processing of the work permit. Respondent's behavior
demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral soundness.

Del Mundo v. Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards expected of law practitioners: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring
lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.29 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent
to his entrance to the bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership.30 chanrobleslaw

II
When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to process his work permit,
respondent persuaded complainant to give him an additional P8,000.00 purportedly to ensure
that a motion for reconsideration pending before a Las Piñas judge would be decided in
complainant's favor.31 However, after receiving P28,000.00 from complainant for the work permit
and ensuring the success of complainant's court case, respondent made himself scarce and
could no longer be contacted.

Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided in
complainant's favor, respondent's act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the
judge and the judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won by the party with the
deepest pockets and not on the merits.32 chanrobleslaw

"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system."33 Further, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body."34 chanroble slaw

By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of P8,000.00, respondent
trampled upon the integrity of the judicial system and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This
gross disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the
lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly
shown that he is unfit to exercise it.

III

As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment proceedings against him, this
Court notes that on May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed respondent to
answer the complaint against him, but he failed to file his answer.35 The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines set two (2) separate dates for mandatory conferences36 after respondent failed to
attend the first setting, but he failed to appear in both instances.37 All issuances from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines had the requisite registry receipts attached to them.

Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of disbarment proceedings. This Court

held that lawyers must update their records with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by
informing it of any change in office or residential address and contact details.39 Service of notice
on the office or residential address appearing in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines records
shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative proceedings against him or her.40 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Socrates R. Rivera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years. He is ORDERED to return to complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the amount of
P28,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until
fully paid. He is likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the amount within
10 days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal record as a member of the bar,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

DIGEST

PLUMPTRE vs. ATTY. RIVERA

A.C. No. 11350, August 9, 2016
FACTS: Complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Socrates Rivera alleging that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent and
asked for help in his application for a work permit from the Bureau of Immigration and he
paid respondent P10,000 as professional fee. The second time they met, complainant gave
respondent another P10,000 together with his passport for the processing of his work permit.
The third time, respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos and asked for another
P10,000 but complainant refused to pay since they only agreed on the amount of P20,000.
Respondent also asked for an additional P8,000 for the other case involving the complainant
he was working on.

Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he never received any
updates on the status of his work permit and pending court case. Further, whenever he
called respondent to follow up on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and
threatened him and his wife.

On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent’s

suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law and the return of P28,000 to
complainant.

On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation, but modified to disbar
respondent from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty. Rivera warrants disbarment.

RULING: Atty. Rivera failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and diligence. He
not only neglected the attorney-client relationship established between them; he also acted
in reprehensible manner towards complainant. Respondent’s behavior demonstrates his lack
of integrity and moral soundness.

Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided
in complainant’s favor, respondent’s act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign
the judge and the judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won by the party
with the deepest pockets and not on the merits.

By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of P8,000,
respondent trampled upon the integrity of the judicial system and eroded confidence on the
judiciary. This gross disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral fiber
and betrays the lack of integrity in his character.

“A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.” Further, “a lawyer shall not state or imply that he
is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.”

In conclusion, the Court issued an order suspending Atty. Socrates Rivera from the
practice of law for three (3) years. He is likewise ordered to return to complainant Adegoke
R. Plumptre the amount of P28,000 with interest at 6% per annum from date of promulgation
of the Resolution until fully paid. He is also directed to submit to the Court proof of payment
for the amount within 10 days from payment.
B. Qualifications (In the Matter of the Admission to the
Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and
one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted
by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued
a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now
be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint
efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment
on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder
since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of
the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992,
literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him
that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner
of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering
becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other
than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances
in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of
justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving
to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Digest
Al C. Argosino, BM No. 712, July 13, 1995

FACTS:
A Criminal information was filed against Argosino and 13 others for the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of Camaligan in the course of hazing. Argosino and co-accused
entered into plea bargaining to a lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence
which the court accepted.
Argosino and colleagues filed and granted with probation. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examination disclosing the fact of his criminal conviction
and his probation status.
He was allowed to take the bar and passed. However, he was no allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.

ISSUE:
WON Argosino should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

Ruling:
No.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
The requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be proper broader than
inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission
to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from the
members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception
that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualification.
The growth of such perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people’s
confidence in the courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City,
They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
 . . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company,
as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and
quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith.
deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not
have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner
above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had
been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking
for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby

annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract"
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself
is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . .
(his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
"Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"  in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
3

Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a
mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District
Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred
that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the
Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion
of a Royal Family . . ." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,  Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
5

comment thereon.  He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
6

confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.  He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
7

communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage
- PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by
the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);  and as far as he knew, his subordinate
8
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does
not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."   He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
10

classmate and friend.   He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
11

would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated;   He says Alawi
12

somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day,
she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract
with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of
which he ever saw.  13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations."
and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996,
he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.  14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . .
(his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who
had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.  15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.   Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . .
16

at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."   More than
17

once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary." 
18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy,
or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely
— to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good
faith."   Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
19

language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.   As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect
20

for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he
had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts.   While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
21

Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title
of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,   the record
22

contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.

Digest
Facts:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one
housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company.
Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract
void ab initio.

Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M.
ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law.
Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as
a local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.

Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped
the title of an attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

Issue:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

Held:
No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those
who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had successfully passed
the bar examinations, have been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may
only practice law before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of
counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.

B. M. No. 1036               June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A
bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees
as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,"
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he

submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath
as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the
instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
"counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that
he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L.
Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged
in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that:

1 
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
2 

court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of
the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports
the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully
well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he
had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
4 

not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate
6 

passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was
held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3
(e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is
liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.  However, 1âwphi1

it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites
8 

for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." Vice-Mayor Relox
10 

accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the evidence does not support
11 
the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Digest

Facts:

 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.

 The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

 Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as

counsel for a candidate in an election.

 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a

municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant

accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims
that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:
 Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

 the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill.

 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.

 True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.

B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a
question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate
it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes
him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age,
of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a
certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of
the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law
is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the
Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,

Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Digest

Facts:

 Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for
his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

 Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the

Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:

 The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship
ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization
as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never
to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.

 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the

Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
“(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.

A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015

ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B. Llunar
(complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and inexcusable
negligence and serious misconduct.

Antecedents

In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent
to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel
of land allegedly owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently registered under the name of
Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.

The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject
of foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from
the complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption
price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees.

Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever
filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the
complainant demanded that the respondent return to her the amount of P95,000.00.

The respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00 to the complainant. He
argued that a complaint2 for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in
court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to
return only what was left of the P95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the P50,000.00 that he
paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria
and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the
complaint was filed three (3) years late and the property could no longer be redeemed from the
bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative
Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and not the
respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.

In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the
respondent to have been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have
gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating
Canons 156 and 17,7 and Rules 1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in not informing his
client that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Due to these infractions,
Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the respondent remain suspended indefinitely from
the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors agreed with
the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but modified the
recommended penalty from indefinite suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent
to return to the complainant the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. The
respondent moved for reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his referral of the complainant's
case to Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he paid
Atty. Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an
affidavit14 dated November 17, 2004, but were alleged to have been overlooked by
Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-
710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration.15 chanrobleslaw

Our Ruling

We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in
engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon
him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave
misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case.
He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant's property within the period of
redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property
was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to recover the
complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the
complainant for handling the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received
from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of
redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against
Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up
on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions
on her case had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in
court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was
left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any
amount has been made. These facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR,
which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession"16 and to "account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client."17 In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he
holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property
for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.18
chanrobleslaw

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he
was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed
this fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the
CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of
the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and should
not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension
imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the
above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would
have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules;
he is a repeat violator of these rules. In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the
respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a
property owned by his client and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution
issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed against him by his
client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of
disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no different in character from his previous
offense - we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become
completely unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the IBP that the
respondent should return the whole amount of P95,000.00, without deductions, regardless of
whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the complainant's knowledge and
consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent
been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's case from the start. The complainant
should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that
the respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable non-
delivery of such services.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law

and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately upon his receipt of
this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to complainant
Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. This Decision should likewise be posted
on the Supreme Court website for the information of the general public.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Digest
Adelita R Llunar vs Atty Romulo Ricafort
AC No. 6484 - June 16 2015
The Facts:
In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo Ricafort for the recovery of a parcel of land
owned by the Banez family but which was fraudulently registered to a different name.  The lot was the subject of
foreclosure proceedings, hence, Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of P95,000.00 (partial redemption fee,
as filing fees, and attorneys fees).  Three years later, complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case
with the RTC of Legazpi City, hence, she demanded the return of P95,000.00. The latter averred that there was a
complaint for annulment of title filed against Ard Cervantes, though not him, but by another lawyer.  Thus, he was
willing to refund the amount less the P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria.  Adelita refused to recognize the
case filed by Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire him as counsel; also, the complaint was filed three years late
and the property cannot be redeemed from the bank anymore.  She also learned that Atty. Ricafort was
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law since 2002 in A.C. No. 5054, thus she suspected it was the
reason why another lawyer filed the case. 
The Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable.
The Ruling:
The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in the
practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of
DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First, the
respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant’s case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming
the complainant’s property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the
complainant’s case and wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to recover the
complainant’s property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant for handling
the latter’s case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received from the complainant the amounts of
P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and
filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several
times thereafter to follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her
that actions on her case had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in court, she
demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The
respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts
confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to “hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession”  and to “account for all money or property
1 

collected or received for or from the client.”  In addition, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds or
2 

property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. 3 

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was
approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.” The respondent lacked the candor
expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that he could
not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him.
This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of
suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an
ordinary violator of the profession’s ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK

A. CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan

(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly
Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar
Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A.
Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while
complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at
the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon
his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in
Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for
Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he
married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant
rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in
Muntinlupa.9 chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng

Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on
helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with
his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school
to earn a college degree.12 chanrobleslaw

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former
had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed
complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name
and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of
Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed
these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15 chanroble slaw
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he
saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the
latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it
since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support.17 chanroble slaw

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was
ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was
informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office
in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was
using the najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant
appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was
interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his
Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of
St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was
because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph
G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20 chanroble slaw

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful
activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating
to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013,
PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member
had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost
victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call from a
certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing
that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further,
he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of
explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25 cralawredchanroble slaw

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan,"
complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of
conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at
PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use
of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28 chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a
defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already
been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the
administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared
closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to
humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and
criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33 chanroble slaw

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both
parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On
such date, however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue
an Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties
submitted any.37chanrobleslaw
 The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally
and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that
respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to
prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41
chanrobleslaw

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the
Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43 chanrobleslaw

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These,
according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed
complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent
and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and
finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute
appropriate actions against respondent.47 chanrobleslaw

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting
the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is
Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll
at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar
Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati
bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55 chanroble slaw

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's
name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan,"
be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless
he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year
high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science,
logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the
PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his
brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the
Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations
and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the
latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from
PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who
would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation
which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.62 chanroble slaw

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged
unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him.
Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the
primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is

found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court
hereby resolves that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any

representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under
the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates
issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and  cralawlawlibrary

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the
bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, "
Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a
statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Digest

Caronan V.S. Caronan

FACTS:
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma
A. Caronan. Complainant obtained a degree in Business Administration in the University of
Makati in 1997. He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. Then, in 2009, complainant
became a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa. Meanwhile, upon graduating from
high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where
he stayed for a year before transferring to the Philippines Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.
In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family’s
car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and three children.
In 1999, respondent told complainant that he would be enrolling in law school in
Nueva Vizcaya. Subsequently, in 2004 their mother informed complainant that respondent
passed the bar and he used complainant’s name and records from the University of Makati
to enroll in St. Mary’s University’s College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take
the Bar Examinations.
Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to
him.
In 2009, Complainant was invited by the NBI to be interviewed and asked to identify
documents which belonged to him and respondent. Complainant also found out respondent
was using the name “Atty. Patrick A. Coronan”, which was complainant’s name. Realizing
that respondent was involved in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G.
Agtarap (Agtarap).
In 2013 complainant learned of the many schemes and crimes respondent was
involved in by the use of complainant’s name and because of this complainant developed a
fear for his own safety and security. He was also forced to resign from his job at PSC.
Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent’s alleged use of
former’s name and identity, and illegal practice of law.
Respondent answered and denied all allegations against him and invoked res
judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as
it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors
dismissed the administrative case filed by Agtarap against him, and which had already been
declared closed and terminated by this court A.C. no. 10074.
In 2015 the IBP scheduled mandatory conferences where both parties failed to
appear twice. The IBP-CBD prompted to issue an order directing both parties to file their
respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.
ISSUES:
WON the name “Patrick A. Caronan” stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
WON the name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
HELD:
Yes, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own
brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his
own safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative in the nature of the
office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as
between him and the court. Respondent also made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualification to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of
lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several
criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and
dignity.
Yes, Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court , no applicant for admission to
the Bar examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a
pre-law course. In the case at hand, the respondent never completed his college degree.
Even though the respondent can go back to school and complete his college degree, then
earn a law degree with his real name, his false assumption of his brother’s name, identity,
and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law is not
a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather,
it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.
Wherefore, respondent Richard A. Coronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A. Coronan” is found
GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity and academic records of complainant Patrick
A. Coronan to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
#####################

C. Appearance of Non-lawyers

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a
fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they
appear to find validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some
law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive
legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of
learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been
instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on
errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque
language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of
ignorance,"   been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words
1

of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his
trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he has
ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the
results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many
scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for
which he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic
transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly
because of his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on
imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal
Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC).
Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted
mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He
failed to pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his
own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his
obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let him have his way,
he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its
officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against
him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment,
resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees
signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the
astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal,
administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering
the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a
real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.
59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred
Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of
P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of
Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of
P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on
July 22, 1980.2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale
conducted by the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to
TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the
properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo
would also have to settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80
(P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits
commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.

CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for
specific performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the
foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without
need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was
rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on
defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the
judgment was reversed, by decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the
"plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant to allow
redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for
failure . . . to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law."
Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for
reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion,
by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the
remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment
was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another
motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the
Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be
entertained . . . ."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;

CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil
action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues.
The action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense,
dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990,  on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in
3

the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been
ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal
Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a
criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against
the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short
shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the
TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers,
Mario Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and
bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero,
as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank
despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it
was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res
judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with
finality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by
that Court's 16th Division  on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;

CA-G.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another
civil action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers,
Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles
with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion,
dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 14 ) on the ground of litis pendentia.
5

The RTC ruled that —

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely
the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal
Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the
 same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the
present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more
defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The
inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-
9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with
the questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case
No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged
fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by
Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by
another Judge on November 11, 1991   — the Judge who previously heard the case having
6

inhibited himself; but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of
Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
(Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo),   which 7

decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith
made that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's
attorneys — Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm.
This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for "Annulment of
Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved the foreclosure of
the three (3) immovables above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious,
deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case
No. 22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court   dismissed the case on the ground of
8

prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant
Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil
Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause
against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and
thus also venting his ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him.
He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the
same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW,
Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court
who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as
the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made
dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover
damages from the defendants Justices for —

. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding

evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions
and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving
plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against deprivation of property
without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently illegal,
fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which) constitute a)
GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the
people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL
 PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV.
PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held liable under
said laws.

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by
TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary
damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious
demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated
November 7, 1989,  dismissed the case.
9

7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior
actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's
lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October
4, 1993,   on the ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same as that in Civil
10

Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306   — and litis pendentia — the subject matter
11

being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356. 12

8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu
(Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law.  The case
13

was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of
Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date
for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as
may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his
motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the
Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action
being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that
there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for
being without merit.  14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution
dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the
requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-
Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed
only by a mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not
resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk."  15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some
patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA
1)   and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating
16
that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply
advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular
matter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices)
signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this
Court dated. _________,

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the
resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The
record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon
(of this Court's Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243.   The same
17

matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno,
dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma,
dated May 19, 1989.  And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court,
18

notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No.
87897. 19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to
fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers.   Several other
20

attempts on his part to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will
now be dealt with here.

1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of
Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the
respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that
the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them:
that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of
the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal
knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing
market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990,   the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the
21

complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's
mother, but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the
foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim
injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed
properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial
litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner
of its falsification.

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal
also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the
same foreclosed properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors
(including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack
of merit. These were:
 a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and
RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and
False Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19,
1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter
dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion
of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank
as new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no
showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed
of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had
benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for
"Estafa Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — This
case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.

2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme
Court,   an affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the
22

former's fire insurance claim over property registered in its name — one of two immovables
formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said
bank.   In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983,
23

TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which
property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB."
The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over
the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the
consolidation was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso)
for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the
Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint.   It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any
24

malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer
Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in
order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 —
sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of
the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against "Supreme
Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" — was dismissed for lack of
merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990   which, among other things, ruled as follows:
25

It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available

under the Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not
the prerogative of this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of
judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records do not warrant this
Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of
the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant
had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;" and Sec. 21 the
 same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary
authority over members of the Judiciary.

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated,   Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the
26

United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure
repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot
covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7,
1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase
(pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge
and consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had
obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the
UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of
the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property
he had purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but
imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the
property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As
a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings
foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also
against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously
with his court war with Traders Royal Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.

No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao
in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for
consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in
accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo
Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding)
denying consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a
sale with pacto de retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to
pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the
amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the transaction
(P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure
of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted
in a Decision by the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in
toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page
Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken
by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was
that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3),
Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no
way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at
least three of the members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the
same was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent
to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely:
Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank,
Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just
stated, had given him notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed
Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys.
Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of
Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them
with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding).
These processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved
to treat the matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April
25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the
Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-
8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in
the future be filed in his court." Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990
quashing the summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990   explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose
27

of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the
Divisions, in this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against
officials of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the
Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices,"
because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this
Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of
Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable
complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the
signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions
and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the
resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the
facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks
of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the
bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory,
as were a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
 nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due course always gives the legal basis. As
emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he
Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way
whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. . . .

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent

pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to
the petition and states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error
in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis stated
in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement
. . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition for review or
motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated
by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies
thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a
particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action
taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of
Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and
resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the
Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine
Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6,
1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious
petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took
part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief
Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would
not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their
time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court
and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the
formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with
the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases
coming to it. . . .

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)

6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the
UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by
Joaquin Borromeo against administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who
decided one of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages
against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501.
On January 12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a
cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18,
1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the
RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial
court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by
submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund
fees; it also referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition
was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for
failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27,
1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any
Justice, set forth no findings of fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty.
Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court
denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for failure of
the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
17, had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November
21, 1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does
not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R.
No. 82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so
clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members'
deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists
merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's action to the parties
concerned.

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an
already long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of
Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who
had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on
June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding).
Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in
relation to G.R. No. 91030 — in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical
reasons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice
sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying his
motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not by
the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding an
explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored;
defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by
any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton,
malicious and patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral
shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral
damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation
expenses of P5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the
Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled
"Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all
complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the
injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the
Court ordered expunged from the record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.

CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu
City RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case
No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants
in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson
K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty.
Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was
represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11,
Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to
foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's
fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and
Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed
it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion
for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of
judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said:

The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by
petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion
having been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of
Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for
Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25,
1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected
as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court
of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the
merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and important reason
therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed
summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require
consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the
petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites
prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is
further advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to a resolution as to
which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for
 reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of
June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25,
1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is
that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review and consequently bringing about a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the
errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore,
there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in that judgment; and in
such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and restating the
conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the
Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES,
EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk
with power which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and characterizing the
conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-
LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the
letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10,
1989 protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE
RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a
communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August
10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because containing "false,
impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of
the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution
promulgated on December 13, 1989.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.

SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999

In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate
the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in
Case No. CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented
by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding)
dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's
fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses (P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R.
SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account
of his failure to comply with that Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified
true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26,
1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a
Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's
petition for review by the respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the
services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for
Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated
March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration
dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law,
was denied.

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC
of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to
him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres
Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella G. Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then,
respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge
German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the case was raffled — caused issuance
of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said
defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in
G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of
Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them
for issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a time represented
Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that
there was "no compatibility" between him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had
been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and declaring that
he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October
23, 1989, apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order
dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely,
Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of
appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated
November 29, 1989.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.

CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which
gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in this Court.   The transaction involved a
29

parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo
sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory
that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action
was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court
(Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the
subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that
Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated
on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No.
77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was
denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal research fund fees
were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the
Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated
June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions
through various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter
alia complaining that the notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any
Justice — elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third
Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:

Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual
resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case
G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition was denied for lack of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July
6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al.,
wherein the Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court
denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar,
are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition
is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision
or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of
Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y.
CARREON

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly
without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the
UCPB criminally liable.

1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the
judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880,   Borromeo filed with the Office of the
30

Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of
the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals,
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu
City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990,   the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's
31

complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits
determined by different courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No.
87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for complainant to
dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest
tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."

2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated
January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme
Court, and others, charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court
resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear
the justices' signatures.   In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman
32

dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned
actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and
fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering them," and "it is not the
prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial resolutions." 
33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY

BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-

G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was
the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the
aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To
secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which
set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to
Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence,
SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge
Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later
withdrew and was substituted by the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit
through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.

Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were
sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees
(but in no case less than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A
writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo was levied
on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder,
SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same
was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied,
Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed
his petition. Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari —
his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his
petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment
was made on December 26, 1990.

However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history
of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning
Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another
congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted
by Borromeo.

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of
his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-
21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried
and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract,
Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused
defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process
and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and
moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he
sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto,
presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint,
holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action
asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as
there is nothing for them to controvert."

2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;

CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another
suit against the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including
Judge Godardo Jacinto,   who had rendered the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed
34

as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust
Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the Constitution, Fraud
and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they
decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants
committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him
equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had been "caused untold
mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for which the former
are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res
judicata, immunity of judges from liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of
jurisdiction.

Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.

In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for
contempt of court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th
Division) dated April 13, 1993.   Said the Court:
35

Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in

fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be
considered res judicata under the circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent
penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who
precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal
advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets
he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and needlessly
derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a
licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise
contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and leniency it
probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, by far,
exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in
the future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.
IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,

CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent.
This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in
1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT
No. 34785.  Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from
36

Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations;
Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in
consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2)
parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then
mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu
Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property.
Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said
Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a
Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated
a Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently
show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to
him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken
part in approving the resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of
date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial
Court at Cebu City (Branch 18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly
founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third
Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August 31,
1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing
Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the
following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has
indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the
Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff
against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court of the
land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond
the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their
propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order
of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but also
contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of
the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof
are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly
issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made
directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being
the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment
 of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself had
issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's
decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such
violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution
by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have been obtained
before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts of a
superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon
common sense. Lower courts are without supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to
reverse the judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of
sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers

of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had
appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned,
and others. As already mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo
Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that
the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of
sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2)
fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3)
defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez and Regis falsely
attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and
nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and
Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President),
Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez
(Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina
(Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista
P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the following observations:

It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary
with deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the
might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and
unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the
authority and name of the courts.

And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer
who uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his
path more especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims and
caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice

Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went
on to say the following:
 The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other
members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and
contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public
confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the
dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in the country's
judicial system and administration of justice.

. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo
against this Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free would
certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court
with all the respect and esteem due them.

Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged
"refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his
disbarment cases "filed against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted
to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as
well as the corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the
Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President,
IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, recommending
dismissal of the complaint as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning to
Borromeo to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers."  37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or
otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many
court judgments or directives against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers
and employees, as well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse
dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in
Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were
apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court
of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen" and of
the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which were found to be) highly
reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors,
violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the
reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of
Texas for his contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan
"and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due
Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of
FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered

INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the
opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and
harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter,
he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this
Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges
have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression,
instead of being saviours and defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again
to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, sanctions
injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the
Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of
his, dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo
Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute
Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing and arson of my properties
by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN
— all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite your
firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in
your house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply
want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he
mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to
support the landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the
center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by
such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL
STEAL!" etc Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute
resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition:
"Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER."  38

One other "circular" reads:

SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!!

— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the
judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance
Of the supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and
another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for themselves (Res
Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued

UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR
FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution.
It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham
rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB,
UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or
shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY
IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions,
NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and
naked land grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).

Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving
the motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of
power for the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and
declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit" — despite their failure to file
 any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and
rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for
themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS
CHARGES OR RESIGN!!

IMPEACH NARVASA

• ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR,

UNCONSTITUTIONAL "MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE
OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution

• VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN

ORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679)
DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE
PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT

• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT
OF REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS
WORTH P3 MILLION

• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO

LAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF
PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION

• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND

PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW
CORRUPT JUSTICES

• DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS

TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
PEOPLE and REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE
CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T.
BORROMEO

Mabolo, Cebu C

Te. 7-56-49.

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter

IBP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some
members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President
thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one
of them — that last quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other
officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks against
the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers
and members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his
condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by
Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The
resolution pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the
Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr.
Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal
Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator herein,
the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by
Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano
Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and
Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In
that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles
applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other
cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of other
communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already
passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of
those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking
account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE:

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for
contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City
Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff,
Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June
21, 1993 together with its annexes; and

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice
of resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with
its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such
notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a
comment on the letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in
this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.
 1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the
resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the
principles and established practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of
in several other communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the
letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's
Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243  ) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
39

Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,

1989,   and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to
40

wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897;   that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274
41

(186 SCRA 1),   and that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 
42 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27,
1993 in which he alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution
which requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High
Court;" hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"

2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this
case should be heard by an impartial and independent body;"

3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP
Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to
point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and
condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or
file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the "libelous circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of

speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances
as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the
accountability of public officials;" the circular merely states the truth and asks for
justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and
encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements
are false and lies;

5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with
pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice
and members of the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the
justice that they are duty bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain
his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on
September 30, 1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk
of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the
Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President
 Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After
deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT
Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof
within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer
and submit such further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those set
out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.

SO ORDERED.

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment

of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments
and allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and
amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:

1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the
alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered
to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in
contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the precious time of this
Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;

2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based
on the TRUTH and the LAW", namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and

laws are patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to

the Appelate Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of
redemption price, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in
many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in right of
redemption;

c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds
and defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the
failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the
concerned Justices to refute the charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these
as "and admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the said
Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to
courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.  He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit,
44

obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and
proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably
insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more
than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted
the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly
overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees
who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions.
He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who
have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More
particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his
theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same,   he45

has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much
loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should
inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this
case should be heard by an impartial and independent body, is still another illustration of an
entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the
law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument long since
declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to
institute a charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting
officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants,
lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges
obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to
bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform
their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the
prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable
to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing
duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.
The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ."  46

His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP
Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what
particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not
appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in
the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing,
deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations
claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression,
and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec.
4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights
invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for
insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and
rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing

the Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the
principles governing finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at
some point, and to lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing
predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to administrative
prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the
specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.

1. Reason for courts; Judicial

Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is
a more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive
system of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation
of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the
judgments of lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of
the factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by
law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.

2. Paramount Need to end

Litigation at Some Point

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence,
after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review
set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter
is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be
expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy
demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions
thereon accorded absolute finality.   As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines
47

v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision,   a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
48

privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune.
Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may
attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are
the temples of right."

3. Judgments of Supreme Court

Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that
judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter
must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity,
much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or
conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other
respect.   This, on the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional
49

and traditional principle.

In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

— involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First
Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust
extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised
penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-heirs
because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act . . . — the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established
doctrine: 50
 . . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986,
which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court
is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early
case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible
reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the
risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted
to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of
practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the
court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law,
into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for
which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the
questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the
parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305,
316-317)

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en

banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence
and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729;
Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled
that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to
Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil.
Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes,
61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3
SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of

powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA
677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to
expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the
mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to
alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch
into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes
mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government.
(Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

4. Final and Executory Judgments of

Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a
party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or
reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of
courts.   Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered
51

without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the
special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher
tribunals — become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal,
they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed,
or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court,
much less by any other official, branch or department of Government.  52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action

against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase
in the resort to administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a
substitute for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies
operates as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of their
prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints
are being presented to the Office of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of
damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court
of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.

1. Common Basis of Complaints

Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or
Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders   — i.e., judgments or
53

orders which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and
compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of
this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial
Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its
correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.

2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for

Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the
prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an
administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or,
having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or
criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the
administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary
postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by
a judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous function
pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition
is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative
or criminal litigation, a possibility here after more fully explored.

Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the
power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review
judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by
appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must
be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-
standing processes and procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra.  54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge
who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not
the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision
rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the
same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents
should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of
a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions
in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is
"unjust" cannot prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge,

more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good
faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert
and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the
judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance
to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to
everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful."
(Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members
acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard
or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions
and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty.
To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and
undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
 Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation
of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final
judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries
for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within
the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and
executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not
reviewable by any other body or authority.

3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed

Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust — or
was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had
exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an
essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of
courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch; nor any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and
executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to
the courts alone.

4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness

and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments
or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the
accusation that the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of
fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of
corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not
only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd
consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a
judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper
Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court
of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the original
decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the
question; it would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have
to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust,
but by necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as
well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who affirmed the original
judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very
evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question —
despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing
with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the
Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a
Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have
an inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the
correctness of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the same
appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from
filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge
who should convict him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the
Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and
regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the
vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.

5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative

Criminal Prosecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering
an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations,
the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or
order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence,
on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily
contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial
court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a

criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny
the State or the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the
test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice
or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the
essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly
unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from
either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the;
judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not
proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or
criminal action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want
of an indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from

Influence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They
should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts
they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions.
Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not
generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.   To hold otherwise would be
55

nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment.   The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
56

evident bad faith;   it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an
57

imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and
general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in
the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction."  Based on Section 9, Act No. 190,   the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent
58 59

with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or
assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial
action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and
jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public
officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another
person — which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the
Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust
judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that
prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned: that such
prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial
pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it
took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by
respondent Borromeo in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the
present administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary
work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further
elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the
repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would
somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided
path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the
preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect
on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness
and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and
emboldened others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting
proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of
even involving the legislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their
assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must
come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between
reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with
the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a
firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to
maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt

repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end
that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts
and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in
the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is
warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or
other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious
sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Footnotes

Digest

IN RE JOAQUIN BORROMEO
"It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing;
and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client."

FACTS: Respondent Joaquin T. Borromeo -- non-lawyer that he is -- has, in the span of 16-
year period (from 1978 to sometime in 1994~5) for some reason ventured to represent
himself -- whether warranted or otherwise -- in numerous original and review proceedings
(civil, criminal, and administrative) with disastrous results. This led him to compose and
circulate many scurrilous and outlandish statements against courts, judges and their
employees, as well as his adversaries -- one to his mind among a substantial number being
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, for whom he dedicated a circular calling for his (Narvasa's)
impeachment for being a "tyrant" -- for which he is now being called to account.

The Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) addressed a letter to
the Supreme Court quoting Borromeo's defamatory remarks against the SC and the
judiciary, and strongly urging the SC to impose the attendant sanctions.

The matter was then docketed as a proceeding for contempt. Borromeo contends, inter alia,
that it was necessary that the Chief Justice and other members of the SC should inhibit
"since they cannot be the accused and judge at the same time."

ISSUE: Should Borromeo be held in contempt of court?

RULING: YES.

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to
courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.

Superficial was his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be
contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Section
4, Article III) and in accordance with the [Constitution’s provisions on the] accountability of
public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious
litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and
other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and
bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
The Supreme Court found it fitting to reiterate certain matters as to the judiciary hence:

1. The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e.,
the presentation of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the first
instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and
legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed
by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
2. After the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and
the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no
further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there
may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the
verdict [...] but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to
repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be
laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.
3. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision
should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much
less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings
of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise
erroneous in some other respect.
4. [S]hould judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to
review by higher tribunals — become final and executory before, or without,
exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious
to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in [any way]
modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme
Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government.
5. [N]o other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and
executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
6. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they
may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is [a]
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges
are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and
in good faith.

G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RELOVA, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the
then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners
Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and
58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat.
Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion
for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of
party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to
be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute
cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying
professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical
injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the
Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as
they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November
8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting
for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of
the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of
the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any
such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court
and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or
agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he
can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the
private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the

offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to
institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of
section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution
of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction
and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later
on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in
the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed
by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was
allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City
Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is
accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano
V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense."
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he
wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether
he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and
control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of
the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan,
as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it
separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases.
Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil
action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a
friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4,
1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as
friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent
judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and
Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on
November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining
witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case
are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a
criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil.
621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.

Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect
of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling
(Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically
provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of
the offense.

I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases. Orders set aside.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining
witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case
are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a
criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil.
621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.

Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect
of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling
(Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically
provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of
the offense.

I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases. Orders set aside.

De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining
witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case
are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a
criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil.
621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.

Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect
of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling
(Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically
provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of
the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases.

De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice Herrera.

Digest

FACTS:

Petitioner Romulo Catimbuhan filed criminal complaints against

Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious
physical injuries. Petitioners Nelson Malana and Robert Lucila,
were senior law students of the U.P. College of Law, were required
to render legal assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the
Legal Aid. Thus, they files their separate appearances, as friends of
complainant-petitioner Catimbuhan. Herein respondent Fisccal
Quilatan opposed and disallowed the appearances of said
petitioners.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners be allowed to appear in court.

RULING:

Yes. Complainant Catimbuhan has personal interest in the case of

the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be
deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

G.R. No. 154207             April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on
pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May
3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case
No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the
RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should
take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,
does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the
rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a
Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground
that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be
prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention
of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner
argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect.
And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for
the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant,
even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner
filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the
reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No.
730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had
already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of
granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING
FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section
34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student
practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the
Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court
as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf
of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney
duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

 RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or
officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers
to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed
to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC
on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must
have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission
to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability
may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do
not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Digest

CRUZ v. MINA – G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

Fact:
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry
of Appearance, as private prosecutor for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner,
describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc
in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of0020a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was
with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence
over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan. Petitioner
filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the
Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding
Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone. The
MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public
respondent MeTC. RTC denied the petition of the petitioner and its
Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

Held:
Yes, Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or
not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730,
by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a
lawyer before inferior courts. There is really no problem as to the
application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former,
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, may appear before the courts.

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, &
QUINTIN MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue
presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution,
dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo,
granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the
said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et
al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano
Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien
equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed
a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December
1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of
their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of
Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

 Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late
filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.  He asked for reconsideration, but,
1

considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer
to the petitioner for review.  The case was considered submitted for decision without
2

respondent's brief. 3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'

Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,  that an 4

agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall
not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section
adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall

be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's

fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer.
Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
 But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting
persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under
statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were
rendered.  5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law

unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good
standing at the time.6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;  that acting as an
7

attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both,  and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done
8

in violation of law;  and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in
9

hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.  10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by

non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney.  11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's
fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of
special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was
the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for
review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as
petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them
(Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization
is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court,   on behalf of its members; and the union
12

was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-
being";   hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
13

appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any

order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the
Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If
true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively
pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in
issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however,
may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
 WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all
other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ. concur.

Footnotes

Digest

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU),

Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations
and Quintin Muning
FACTS:
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT WITH
BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
1. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
                            i.     Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees
for 25% of their backwages
                           ii.     Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages.
1.   Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
a.    Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
                           i.     Cipriano               10%
                          ii.     Quintin Muning      10%
                        iii.     Atanacio Pacis       5%

                         iii.     CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-
lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers
1.   Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-
litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
a.    Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
b.   Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
2. The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to compensation for
such representation.
1. Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
                                 i.      An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services.

a.    Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
b.   His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral
character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was
 eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan
M. Publico.
                           ii.     PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
                         iii.     Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school records or
credentials.
3. PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
4. Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his
witnesses had turned hostile.
                            i.     Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
2. Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
                            i.     Respondent falsified his school records
                           ii.     Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which
require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary,
high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
5. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never
received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the
Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
1. He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
2. He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to
Manila.
3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary
conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards,
resolutions and/'or commendations he received,
                            i.     Court denied the Petition.
                           ii.     Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of merit.
4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through
the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and enrolled him in
a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
                            i.     Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16 year old, he
could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle,
who later on caused his disbarment
                           ii.     No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.

ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.

WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
some of its members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as
petitioners in the present petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF
BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is
not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and for
the protection of courts, clients and the public.
3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated:
1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
 2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law
3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from
the backpay of some of its members:
1. YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action
in the industrial court on behalf of its members
2. If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
                            i.     Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.

D. Sanctions for Practice or Appearance Without

Authority
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISIDRO L.

CARACOL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty.
Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.

Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation patents and

transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale
and recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on
record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando
and Efren.  As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren
received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued
in their respective names.

When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and
titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn
sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa.  A deed of absolute
sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a
decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No.
433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law.  This decision was appealed to
and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion
for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the
March 2, 1994 decision.5 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition6 which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela”7.

Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions
since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited
that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had
already been dead9 for more than a year.  He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a
certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa
presented affidavits of Efren’s widow10 and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a
waiver of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. 
Both also stated that they were familiar with Efren’s signature.  They state that the signature in
the waiver was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol
committed deceit and gross misconduct.

In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured
evidence into the proceedings.  Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated as Waiver
of Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the
execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also
filed a case13 for falsification of public document and use of falsified document against Ernesto
Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as “additional counsel”.  He
said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing.  Moreover,
he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s
favor.

In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct.  It found
that respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not
authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record.  Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of
the second motion, Efren was dead.  It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained
the authority nor did he present any proof of the authority.  However, there was insufficient
evidence to hold him liable for falsification.

The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region
X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating
his oath as a lawyer.  It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of five years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to
one year suspension from the practice of law.16  Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but
was denied.18 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are
required in administrative cases.20 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We adopt the findings of the IBP.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s
appearance on behalf of his client, hence: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized
to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires.  An attorney willfully
appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
(Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court said that while a lawyer is
not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show such
authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act.  Thus: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the
counsel in his client’s name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other
party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.22

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court.23 If
an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the
litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24  If
a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he
may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transaction.25 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-
client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.26 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings
before the DARAB.  The records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was
questioned.  Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority
during the course of the proceedings.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion
for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition.  As an honest, prudent and
conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may
have been substituted.27 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28 where he
stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably
upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO).  It would
seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a
crime the man did no[t] commit.  As the ponencia observes, “outside of his improvident plea of
guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him – presented or forthcoming.  From the evidence
of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have been implicated.”

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral
compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense
counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to
plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.29

While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability under the present
circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial system. 
Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with
fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients.30  Under Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

This flows out from the lawyer’s oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and
court processes in the pursuit of justice.  Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his
demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.

Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. 
Atty. Caracol’s blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced.  In view of his
actions of contravening his lawyer’s oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of
law for a period of one year. chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY.  Accordingly,

we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE
YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Digest

Deceit, Gross Misconduct and Violation of Oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons,
Fernando and Efren. When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and
titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in
turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. The
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it
was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by
the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the
Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
praying for the full implementation of the decision. Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance
of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the
Plaintiff Efren Babela.” Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no
authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel
of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the
second motion because Efren had already been dead for more than a year. He claimed that
Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the
same parcel of land. Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as
“additional counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go
ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of
rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor. In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol
committed deceitful acts and misconduct.

ISSUE:
Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
YES. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a
lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney
is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the
authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the
name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires.  An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions. (Emphases supplied)
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a
person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by
leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite
authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be
bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to
deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.
Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the
Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest,
prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing
and presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus
the parties may have been substituted.
 Atty. Caracol was found guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, he was suspended from the
practice of law for one year.