UNIVERITY OF SAN JOSE- RECOLETOS

School of Law

Compilation of Civil Law

Questions and Suggested Answers
Book 1: Marriage

Submitted by:

CIVIL LAW CLASSES

Regular and executive
A.Y. 2016-2017

Submitted to:

ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLO

Civil Law Review Professor

June 2016
 Marriage 2017

M A R R I A G E

NAME: JOAN RISEL B. ABANGAN (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: EDWARD N. LIM VS. MARIA CHERYL STA CRUZ-LIM GR NO. 176464,
FEBRUARY 4, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: ARTICLE 36- PYSCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:

In 1979, Serena married Tenten. Serena bore Tenten three children. Serena, Tenten and
their children resided at the house of Tenten's grandmother in Forbes Park, Makati City.
Tenten's family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered
the family expenses. Serena had no steady source of income. On 14 October 1990, Serena
abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her, after a violent
confrontation with Tenten whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Tenten's
grandmother in "a very compromising situation". Tenten filed a petition and sought the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Serena on the ground that both of them are
suffering from psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During the
trial, offered in evidence the Psychiatric Report of Dr. Luciana Marchesa who based her
report on the interview she conducted to the parties. The RTC declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void as the two were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Is the RTC correct?

Suggested Answer:

No. Dr. Marchesa's global conclusion of both parties personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists
specifically trained in the tests use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders
of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific
aspects of peoples intelligence, thinking, or personality A judge should not substitute his
own psychological assessment of the parties for that of the psychologist or the psychiatrist.
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.

II
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NAME: AIRENE C. EDAÑO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO V. ARHBENCEL LOPEZ G.R. NO. 181258, MARCH
18, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Question:

Maria gave birth to a baby boy named Juan. Since the birth of Juan, Pedro has been
supporting the needs of baby Juan. He even wrote Maria a letter promising her to always
provide the needs of Juan. During the baptism and birthdays of Juan, Pedro always had
portraits of him cuddling baby Juan. Based on these facts, Maria filed a petition before the
RTC for recognition of baby Juan as the child of Pedro. Does Maria have enough bases for
filing the petition of recognition?

Suggested Answer:

NO.

The law provides that a notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by
the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be
a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. Standing alone, neither
a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.

In this case, the bases of Maria to prove filiation are only the private handwritten letter of
Pedro promising to always provide the needs of Juan and the pictures of Pedro cuddling
Juan during the latter’s baptism and birthdays. Since the letter did not expressly state that
Pedro recognized Juan as his child and it being not notarized, then it cannot suffice as
evidence to prove filiation. The pictures alone will also not prove filiation to the child.
Hence, the petition of Maria has no leg to stand on.

III
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NAME: ANNE VERNADICE AREÑA (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: ANTONE VS. BERONILLA G.R. NO. 183824, DECEMBER 8, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: ARTICLE 40- JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A PRIOR
MARRIAGE FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE

Question:

W executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against H before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet
been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one M in 1991. H
informed the court that his marriage with W was declared null and void by the Regional
Trial Court in April 2007; that the decision became final and executory on 15 May 200[7];
and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12
June 2007. He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of  Absent a first valid marriage, the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.

Is H’s argument tenable?

Suggested Answer:

NO. H’s argument is not tenable.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void. Hence, a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is
guilty of bigamy.

IV
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NAME: MA. ELENA CHICANO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: SILVINO A. LIGERALDE VS. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 168796 APRIL 15, 2010
TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:

You are a Family Court judge and before you is a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage (under Article 36 of the Family Code) filed by Rhoda against Marvin. Rhoda claims
that Marvin is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage because Marvin is a drunkard, a womanizer, a gambler. Although summoned,
Marvin did not answer Rhoda’s petition and never appeared in court. To support her
petition, Rhoda presented three witnesses- herself, Dr. Elda Tiu, and Ambrosia. Dr. Tiu
testified on the psychological report on Marvin that she prepared. Since Marvin never
acknowledged nor responded to her invitation for interviews, her report is solely based on
her interviews with Rhoda and the spouses' minor children. Dr. Tiu concluded that Marvin
is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, an ailment that she found to be already
present since Marvin’s early adulthood and one that is grave and incurable. Rhoda testified
on the specific instances when she found Marvin drunk, with another woman, or
squandering the family's resources in a casino. Ambrosia, the spouses' current household
help, corroborated Rhoda's testimony. On the basis of the evidence presented, will you
grant the petition?

Suggested Answer:

No. The petition should be denied.

The psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some physiological (not
physical) illness. In this case, the pieces of evidence presented are not sufficient to conclude
that indeed Marvin is suffering from psychological incapacity [Narcissistic Personality
Disorder] existing already before the marriage, incurable and serious enough to prevent
Marvin from performing his essential marital obligations. Dr. Tiu’s report contains mere
conclusions. Being a drunkard, a womanizer, a gambler merely shows Marvin’s failure to
perform his marital obligations. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court did not find the
existence of psychological incapacity in cases where the respondent showed habitual
drunkenness, blatant display of infidelity and irresponsibility or being hooked to gambling
and drugs.

V
 Marriage 2017

NAME: MICHELLE MABANO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: JARILLO VS PEOPLE, GR NO. 164435, JUNE 29, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW: ART. 40, FAMILY CODE

Question:

A naturalized Canadian citizen married a Filipino but subsequently filed for divorce in
Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years
later, the naturalized Canadian fell in love with another Filipina; he then went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage
certificate with his former Filipino spouse. However, despite the registration, an official of
National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by
a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982. Consequently, he
filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution
of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz
cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. Is the contention of the RTC correct?

Suggested Answer:

No. The General Rule is that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision. However, in the case of Corpuz vs. Tirol Sto. Tomas, the Honorable Supreme
Court qualify the above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss alien's petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip an alien of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of an alien, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. Further,
direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, SC have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is
valid according to his or her national law.

VI
 Marriage 2017

NAME: MICHELLE MABANO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: JARILLO VS PEOPLE, GR NO. 164435, JUNE 29, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW: ART. 40, FAMILY CODE

Question:

Vicky was charged for Bigamy for contracting a subsequent marriage without seeking a
final judgment for the absolute nullity of her previous marriage. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. On her motion for reconsideration, she alleged that Article
40 of the Family Code cannot be applied on her case as both her marriages were entered
into before the effectivity of the Family Code. Rule on the petitioner’s motion.

Suggested Answer:

Petitioner’s motion is without merit. Article 40 is a rule of procedure which should be

applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said “Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it dies not prejudice vested or acquired rights.”
Petitioner cannot just disregard Art. 40 by alleging retroactive application of the law which
will render the provision on bigamy nugatory.

VII
 Marriage 2017

NAME: SHEENA LLEVA (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC GR NO. 158298 AUGUST 11, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Cresenciano and Leonila got married on Dec. 26, 1949. On Oct. 17, 2000, Ablaza, the
brother of Cresenciano filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage. Is Ablaza a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of
the marriage of his brother?

Suggested answer:

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited by the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Ablaza has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano
that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like petitioner
although not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in articles 1001 & 1003 of the civil
code.

VIII
 Marriage 2017

NAME: CULTURA, FAITH (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR
G.R. NO. 199194, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE

Question:

Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later
became sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila
City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he
left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three
months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about
her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the
latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home after his contract
expired. He then inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but
they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife
Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another
marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was
indeed already dead. Is the RTC correct?

Suggested Answer:

NO. Mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news
that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or
invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice.
This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of
"well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is
already dead.

IX
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NAME: ISHA B. CORBETA (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: JORDAN CHAN PAZ VS. JEANICE PAVON PAZ G.R. NO. 166579 FEBRUARY
18, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS GROUND FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
(ART. 36 OF THE FC)

Question:
Manilyn and Monroe met sometime in April 2012. Manilyn was only 20 years old while
Monroe was 33 years old. In May 2012 or shortly one month after courting, Monroe
successfully won the heart of Manilyn, and, on August 20, 2013, they were formally
engaged. They had their civil wedding on 23 December 2013. Their marriage was blessed
with one daughter, Ayeishaguill, who was born on 29 September 2014. After a big fight,
Manilyn left their conjugal home on 14 December 2015.
Following the incident, Manilyn immediately filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Monroe cited Art. 36 of the Family Code. Manilyn alleged that Monroe was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to
Manilyn, Monroe’s psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency
to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent
and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied. Manilyn further alleged
that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother and oftentimes, forget his
responsibility in the family especially to Ayeisha.
Should the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage be granted based on Art. 36 of the
Family Code?

Suggested Answer:

No. the petition should be dismissed. The incidents cited by Manilyn do not show that
Monroe suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Monroe from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.

What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity
is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the psychological incapacity as required by Art. 36
of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It must be confined “to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.”

X
 Marriage 2017

NAME: KAREN ABEGAIL S. MONTERON (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: ALCAZAR VS. ALCAZAR; G.R. NO. 174451; OCTOBER 13, 2009

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

Question:

Mhai and Rey got married in Cebu City. After their wedding, they lived in the house of Rey’s
parents in Cebu City. After a few days, they returned to Tondo, Manila, where Mhai has a
house. However, Rey did not live with Mhai. Subsequently, Rey then left for Riyadh where he
works. Since he left, Rey never contacted his wife and refused to answer Mhai’s calls
whenever she tries to call him. About a year and a half, Mhai was informed that her
husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go directly to her in Tondo
but to his parent’s house in Cebu City instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent
was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause
for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code.
During the trial, Mhai presented a psychologist who testified that Rey was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Hence, it recommended the nullity of marriage between
Mhai and Rey. However, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Is the Regional Trial Court correct in dismissing the complaint on the basis that Rey
is not psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations under Article 45(5)
of the Family Code.

Suggested Answer:

YES.
“ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
x x x x 
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; x x x.”

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of
the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the
anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the
spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.

XI
 Marriage 2017

In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted
that she and respondent had been living as husband and wife after their wedding and
before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to
respondent. Therefore the court was correct in dismissing the case and maintaining that
the marriage of petitioner and respondent is valid.

XII
 Marriage 2017

NAME: KEISHA ROJAS (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: RAMOS VS. PANGILINAN GR NO. 185920 JULY 20 ,2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FAMILY HOME

Question:

Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against petitioner Ramos. The Labor Arbiter
then ruled in favor of the respondents and issued a writ of execution against the property of
Ramos located at Pandacan, Manila (Padacan Property). Petitioner moved to quash the said
writ alleging that the Pandacan Property is a family home, hence, exempt from execution.
Petitioners also claim that at the time Pandacan property was constituted as family home in
1944, its value was below P300,000.00; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code is applicable.
However, respondents countered that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home
and in fact served as the company’s business address as borne by the company’s letterhead.
Is the contention of the petitioners correct?

Suggested Answer:

NO.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under
Art. 154 actually resides therein. In both rules, it is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. Such claim of exemption
must be set up and proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, they must comply with the procedure mandated under the Civil Code.
Having no absolute proof that the Pandacan property was judicially and/or extrajudicially
constituted as Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by
petitioners.

XIII
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NAME: YODICO, MARIA THYRA LYN A. (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: CYNTHIA S. BOLOS VS. DANILO T. BOLOS, G.R. NO. 186400, OCT. 20, 2010
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

Question:

Kathryn Padilla and Daniel Padilla got married on February 14, 1980. Conversely, on July
2003, Kathryn Padilla filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage to Daniel
Padilla invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted her petition on August 2,
2006. Daniel then filed a Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006. The trial court denied
due course to Daniel’s appeal due to his failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial under Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages or A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Daniel
filed a petition for review before the CA which was thereafter granted. The appellate court
ruled that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply to the case at bar as their marriage was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. Kathryn filed a
petition to the Supreme Court contending that the appellate court erred in ruling that their
case is not covered by the Family Code. Does the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages apply to the case at bar? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

No.

Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope which reads: “Section 1. Scope. This
rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.

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NAME: COLLEEN ROSE GUANTERO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO GR. NO. 184063 JANUARY 24, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE (DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE)

Question:

X, married to Y, after more than 30 years of being married, X filed a petition in court praying
for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to lacked of effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility. Y’s refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his
business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional
turmoil or mental difficult.

Suggested Answer:

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

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NAME: KIMBERLY DY (EXECUTIVE)

CASE: SPOUSES LIM V LIM ( OCT 30, 2009)
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: SUPPORT

Question:

X is the wife of Y, who is the son of A and B. The former have 4 children, L, M, N, O. Several
years after they were married, X left the marital home with the children in tow after a
violent confrontation with Y. X subsequently sued for herself and her children an action for
support against Y and A & B. Can A&B be made concurrently liable with Y to provide
support for X and the children (L,M, N, O)?

Suggested Answer:

Yes, but only to their grandchildren. In the case of Spouses Lim v. Lim GR 163209, the SC
ruled that although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends
upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general
familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under
Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only
upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide
sufficient support.

Bar Question:

Petitioner Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of their granddaughter, Maryl Joy,
from Spouses Bagtas whom their daughter relinquished her rights over. The latter refused.
Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a petition for habeas
corpus. RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the deputy sheriff to produce Maryl
Joy before it and to summon Spouses Bagtas to explain why they were withholding the
custody of Maryl Joy.

The Spouses Gallardo &, Bagtas entered into a compromise agreement. The latter learned
that the former brought Maryl Joy to Samar. In their motion, Spouses Bagtas prayed that the
Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC, that they be directed to
explain why they violated the RTC’s Order, and that they be cited in contempt. The RTC
dismissed the action for having become moot since the person subject of the petition has
already produced [sic] to this court and has been turned over to the petitioners, the issue
on the petition for habeas corpus is now moot and academic without prejudice to the filing
of the proper action to determine as to the rightful custody over the minor child. Rule on
the matter.

Suggested answer:

XVI
 Marriage 2017

Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited
to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the
question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining
the right of custody over a child.

The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy
was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had
the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the
petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without sufficient basis.

XVI
I
 Marriage 2017

NAME: LALAINE GABUYA

CASE: NOEL B. BAGTAS VS. HON. RUTH C. SANTOS G.R. NO. 166682
NOVEMBER 27, 2009
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

Question:

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.

Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void based on psychological
incapacity.

Suggested Answer:

YES.

Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.

In the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,

produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent.

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NAME: LORELIE BELLEZA

CASE: ALAIN M. DIO VS. CARIDAD L. DIO GR. NO. 178044  JANUARY 19, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE ( DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE)

Question:

James' and Nadine's marriage has been declared by the trial court NULL AND VOID from
the beginning on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.  However, in the
dispositive portion, trial court ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. Is the trial court correct?

Suggested Answer:

No. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496
of the Civil Code, partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. Thus, the decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.

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NAME: ALBERT BITANGHOL

CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NESTOR
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE ( DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE)

Question:

A and B got married. A then filed a petition for annulment of marriage because he alleged
that B is psychologically incapable of carrying out the essential obligations of marriage
based on the following grounds: refused to wake up in the morning to prepare breakfast,
squandered a lot of money, indulge into gambling, falsified the respondents signature in
order to encash a check. As a presiding judge, will you grant the petition?

Suggested answer:

No. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations.

It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a

married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing
so because of some psychological, not physical, illness.

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NAME: KIRBY BRAGAT

CASE: ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA
PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW REVIEW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

A married B twice, first, according to Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993, and
subsequently under a civil ceremony on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, A’s civil
status was indicated as “divorced”.
C and her son D, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of A and B, holding
that the marriage between the two was bigamous, because the marriage between her
officiated in civil rights in 1958, was still valid and subsisting; that the prior marriage was
governed by the New Civil Code; the deceased never divorced her during his lifetime, and
he could not have done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code. He
could also not divorce her because their marriage was not governed by PD 1083, the Code
Of Muslim Personal Laws.
B affirmed her belief that her marriage with A was valid. B is also steadfast in her belief that
her marriage with A is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at
the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of
C and the deceased.
Is the marriage between A and B bigamous?

Suggested Answer:

“The marriage between A and B was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized.

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
of A and C.

In view of A’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time B married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.”

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NAME: JIGO DACUA

CASE: OCHOSA vs. BOLANO G.R. No. 167459
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Jose met Bona. They had sex. They had no offspring. However, they found an abandoned 1
year child whom they registered as their daughter naming her Ramona. Bona was
unfaithful to Jose. She had illicit relationship with other men while Jose was out to various
place in the Philippines to work. One day, Bona was caught by Demetrio having sex with
Jose’s driver. This illicit relationship circulated in the workplace of Jose. Bona admitted her
relationship with the driver. Ramona lived with Jose for that matter. It is Jose who is
supporting Ramona. Jose then filed a Petitioner for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of Bona’s Psychological Incapacity. Will the petitioner prosper?

Suggested Answer:

No.

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondain’s testimony and her psychiatric evaluation

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report as well as the individual testimonies of Jose and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes
Himpayan Padernal and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case,
that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her
spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However,
we cannot apply the same conviction to Jose’s thesis that the totality of Bona’s acts
constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There
is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects" were already present at the inception of,
or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not
satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."

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NAME: STEPHEN ESPARAGOSA

CASE: NOLLORA VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 191425 SEPT 7, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

X and Y got married here in the Philippines. Y, the wife went to saudi arabia to work as a
nurse. While Y was in saudi Arabia, X married Z. Y, upon knowing that her husband got
married , she went home and discover it herself that X indeed contracted a second marriage
to Z. Y sued X for bigamy. X made a defense that his marriage with Z is valid since he is
already muslim before he contracted marriage with Y and Z. The documents show that X
married Y as a roman catholic and X subsequently married Z without disclosing to Z that X
is a muslim because he is afraid that Z might runaway from her. Is the second marriage
between X and Z valid?.

Answer:

No, the second marriage is Bigamous.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines, No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer.

In the case at bar X clearly has no legal capacity to contract a marriage to Z due to the fact
that a previous marriage exist. In case of a marriage between a muslim and a Non-muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with muslim law, the family code should govern. The
respondent did not declare his true religion in the marriage certificates, such omissions are
sufficient proof that X is liable for bigamy.

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NAME: COLLEEN ROSE GUANTERO

CASE: YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO GR. NO. 184063 JANUARY 24, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE (DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE)

Question:

X, married to Y, after more than 30 years of being married, X filed a petition in court
praying for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to lacked of effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility. Y’s refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for
his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional
turmoil or mental difficulty.

Whether or not such behaviors constitute a ground for psychological incapacity?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.’

What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

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NAME : DARYL ANDREW C. MONTECLAR

CASE: ARTURO SARTE FLORES, vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C.
LINDO, G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
SUBJECT : CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
TOPIC: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (MARRIAGE)

Question:

Lor obtained a loan from Jigo amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 2015 with
3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the
loan, Lor executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property in the name of Lor
and her husband Christian. Lor also signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and
for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.

Lor issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, prompting Jigo to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents.

The trial court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
The court found that the Deed was executed by Lor without the consent and authority of
Christian. The court noted that the Deed was executed on 31 October 2015 while the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated 4 November 2015.

Whether or not the court is correct in denying the judicial foreclosure of the mortgage?

Suggested Answer:

YES, the court is correct denying the judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides that the administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing
such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.

The real estate mortgage executed by Lor over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an
act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her husband Christian to be effective. In
the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the husband, is
necessarily void.

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NAME: CEFERINO ONG

CASE: VALERIO KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ G.R. NO. 166357
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FAMILY LAW

Question:

Tyrone and Malyn were married and had Four (4) children. A few years after the marriage,
Malyn fled the conjugal home leaving Tyrone and their Four (4) children. Tyrone then filed
a case under Article 36 of the Family Code stating that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital obligations for abandoning him and their children. He
alleged that Malyn had an affair with Benjie stating that in one instance he saw his wife and
Benjie in a hotel room half naked. After the incident she left the household. Malyn however
denies the allegations and that she left the home for her own safety because Tyrone was a
physically abusive husband. She does visit the children on weekends. Can Malyn be
considered psychologically incapacitated?

Suggested Answer:

NO. Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of

and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.

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NAME: ROCHE O. TORREJOS

CASE: ROSALINO L. MARABLE VS. MYRNA F. MARABLE GR 178741 , JANUARY
17, 2011
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE ( DECLARATION OF NULLITY ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE)

Question:

Spouses Rosalino and Myrna Marable got married in December 1970. They were blessed
with 5 children. Frequent verbal and physical quarreling challenged their marital life which
lead petitioner to feel unhappy. The frequency of their quarrel increased when one of their
children committed juvenile misconduct and the other became pregnant at a tender age.
Longing for peace and love, petitioner had a short-lived relationship with another woman.
He severed their marital ties and filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of his psychological incapacity. An expert concluded that his incapacity to
perform his marital obligation is caused by his Anti-Social Personality Disorder which is
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse which rooted in deep feelings of rejection
starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed
for needed attention. If you were the judge, should the marriage be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the basis of the findings of the expert?

Suggested Answer:

NO. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a
thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

In the instant case, there was no established link between petitioner’s acts to his alleged
psychological incapacity. 

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Name: TANO, April Jay E.

Case: SPS. ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA, et al. v. SPS. CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. et al.,
G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012
Subject: CIVIL LAW
Topic: FAMILY LAW – FAMILY HOME

Question:

Spouses Sweet obtained a loan from Spouses Bitter . When Spouses Bitter failed to pay the
loan, the property was sold at a public auction. Spouses Sweet was the highest bidder.
Thereafter, respondent-Spouses Sweet leased the subject property to its former owners
who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses
Sweet filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Bitter.

On the other hand, Spouses Bitter filed a complaint with the RTC, seeking to nullify the title
of Spouses Sweet on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt
from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon
for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. Is the contention of Spouses Bitter correct?

Suggested Answer:

NO.

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, this right can be
waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property
as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. It is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived
or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within
the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the
subject property as a family home.

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NAME: DESCALLAR, ROWELLA L.

CASE: ANTONIO PERLA, PETITIONER, VS. MIRASOL BARING AND RANDY
PERLA, (G.R. NO. 172471, NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE, FILIATION

Question:
Myra and John filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Jojo. Myra claimed that
she and Jojo had a common law relationship and that John was the result of their affair.
However, Jojo abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. As proof of
filiation, Myra presented John’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating
her and Jojo as parents of the child and testified that she and Jojo supplied the information
in the said certificates. John testified that he called Joho "Papa" and kissed his hand while
the latter hugged him. John asked Jojo for support and was promised that he would be given
support.

The RTC ruled that Myra and John are entitled to the relief sought since Jojo himself
admitted that he had sex with Myra. The CA upheld John’s illegitimate filiation based on the
certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying
Antonio as his father. Did the respondents succeed in establishing Johns’s illegitimate
filiation to Jojo?

Suggested Answer:

No.

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations
of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must
be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.

The single instance that Jojo allegedly hugged John and promised to support him cannot be
considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The respondents
failed to establish Johns’s illegitimate filiation to Jojo. Hence, the order for Jojo to support
John has no basis.

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NAME: SUAL, JECAR

CASE: EFREN PANA, PETITIONER, VS HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. AND JOSE
HUANITE, JR., GR NO. 164201 DECEMBER 10, 2012]
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FAMILY CODE

Question:

Spouses A and B were married in 1970 without making a prenuptial agreement. A was
convicted of murder and was ordered to pay P50, 000 as way of damages. After finality of
the decision, the court then issued a writ of execution to levy on the conjugal properties of
the spouses.

a) What is the property relation of the Spouses?

b) Can the conjugal properties of the Spouses be levied upon?

Suggested Answer:

a) The property relations of the Spouses A and B is Conjugal Partnership of Gains. The
Family Code took effect on August 3 1988. The governing law during the time the Spouses
were married was the Civil Code which provides the Conjugal Partnership as the default
regime.

b) Yes. Though the property regime of the Spouses is determined by the Civil Code, the
property relation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains is now governed by the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256 of the Family Code.

Article 122 of the said law provides that fines and indemnities of contracted by either
spouse may be charged to the conjugal assets, even if there is no liquidation, if the said
spouse has no exclusive property and the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
said law are covered.

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NAME: MARCELO, CORNELIO C.

CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., G.R. NO. 159594, NOVEMBER 12, 2012

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC: FAMILY LAW – PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:

A filed a petition for nullity of marriage alleging psychological incapacity of his wife B.
Petitioner A presented a report made by psychologist who rendered an opinion that B has a
Borderline Personality Disorder i.e. that she is immature and childish which render her
incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. The OSG alleged that the report
alone of the psychiatrist is not sufficient to declare B psychologically incapacitated.

What are the requisites of Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Suggested Answer:

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or

inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely
the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It
consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the
inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.

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NAME: CLAROS, STEPHANIE A.

CASE: ARABELLE J. MENDOZA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, G.R. NO. 157649, NOVEMBER 12, 2012
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FAMILY LAW, MARRIAGE, PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:

Arrah married Dominic. Sick of Dominic’s immaturity after he was charged with estafa,
Arrah filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage. Arrah called on Dr. Samson
as expert witness to testify on Dominic’s psychological incapacity. Dr. Samson made her
psychiatric report based from interviews with Arrah and her other witnesses. But Dominic
did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.

The RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed. Was the reversal proper?

Suggested Answer:

YES

Opinions of expert witnesses are accorded great weight. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

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NAME: AUGUSTO, MEL JASON T.

CASE: CHARLES GOTARDO VS DIVINA BULING
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FILIATION; SUPPORT

Question:

Z filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, for the reason
that the X denied the imputed paternity of M, child of Z. It was shown that Z and X are sweet
hearts. From then on, X started intimate sexual relations with Z. The sexual encounters
occurred twice a month and became more frequent until X found out that Z was pregnant.
During the hearing, Z testified for herself and brought G (her uncle) as her witness.
However, Z blatantly denied the imputed paternity, contending that M could not be his
child. Is X’s contention correct?

Suggested Answer:

X’s contention is incorrect.

It is well-settled rule that that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof —
that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence
shifts to the putative father.

In the instant case, Z established a prima facie case that the X is the putative father of M
through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man (X) at the time of
her conception. G corroborated her testimony that X and Z had intimate relationship.

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NAME: CABUENAS, MARIA CLEA B.

CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, G.R.
NO. 187512, JUNE 13, 2012
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FAMILY CODE

Question:

X met Y at a company were both were working. The two eventually got married and had a
son. When the company closed down, X decided to go to Taiwan to seek employment. From
that time, Y had not received any communication from X and had no idea of the latter’s
whereabouts, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. After 9 years of waiting, Y filed a
Petition to have X declared presumptively dead. The RTC granted the Petition. On Appeal, Y
moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment is immediately final and
executory, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, hence, not subject to appeal. Is Y correct?

Suggested Answer:

Yes.

The law provides, “For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. “

In this case, since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding,
the judgment of the trial court is immediately final and executory. Therefore, the decision is
not subject to ordinary appeal.

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NAME: DENILA, JUN MARLON L.

CASE: BRIGIDO B. QUIAO V. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO,
PETCHIE C. QUIAO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER RITA QUIAO, G.R.
NO. 176556, JULY 4, 2012
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: FAMILY CODE

Question:

Problem: X and Y contracted marriage in 1977. In 2000, Y filed a complaint against X for
legal separation. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation
of the parties. The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between
them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, X’s share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code. After more than 9 months later, X
filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the
court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.” X claims that his
vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership was violated
when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and
129 of the Family Code. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation. He insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive
him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits
retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right. Is
X correct?

Suggested Answer:

NO.

The law provides that “In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her
share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both,
and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages
and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture
shall not apply.’

In this case, the X's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article
176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is
the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was
given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be
set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.

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NAME: MICHELLE JOSEPHINE EDEN M. SILVA

CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CESAR ENCALAN, G.R. NO. 170022,
JANUARY 9, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE – PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:

Problem: Cesar and Lolita got married and bore two children. To support the family, Cesar
flew and worked in Saudi Arabia. It was later found out that Lolita had been having an illicit
relationship with Alvin. Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration
of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. He alleges that
Lolita is psychologically incapacitated since psychological evaluation report found that
Lolita’s "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with
co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go
with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family
relationship." Is there sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity?

Suggested Answer:

No.

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

In the case, Cesar failed to prove that Lolita was psychologically incapacitated. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record
exists. Further, the psychological evaluation showed that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.

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NAME: MELISSA S. GUILLEMER-COTONER

CASE: GEOFFREY BECKETT VS. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. A.M. NO.
RTJ-12-2326 JANUARY 30, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE – CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD

Question:

Based on a compromise agreement, Eltesa and Beckett agreed agreed that Beckett shall
have full and permanent custody over their son Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject
to the visitorial rights of Eltesa.

In one visit, Geoffrey, Jr. stayed with Eltesa, subject to a condition that she returns the child.
But Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltesa.

Geoffrey, Jr., at nine (9) years of age, in a conference displayed hysterical conduct, shouting
and crying, not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though Beckett, the father, was a
total stranger.

Who has the rightful custody over the child?

Suggested Answer:

Eltesa has the rightful custody over Geoffrey, Jr.

Article 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. If
already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be
under custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.

In the case of Perez vs. Court of Appeals, the court held that: “In custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. (G.R. No. 118870, March
29, 1996, 255 SCRA 661, 669) “The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If
the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the
matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted. The welfare, the best interests,
the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent
is chosen to be the custodian. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." (Article
3, number 1, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on November 20, 1989)

Further, in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor
can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their

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children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child
over 7 years of age can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect,
enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold his/her right to live in
an atmosphere conducive to his/her physical, moral and intellectual development. x x x
(Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7, 16)

In the present case, Geoffrey, Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be turned over
to his father, was already 9 years of age. As such, he was very much capable of deciding,
based on his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay. Custody is not permanent,
even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, based on the
compromise agreement in the instant case. Thus, the preference of the child Geoffrey, Jr.
over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected, that is, with
Eltesa.

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NAME: ROUNALD A. SITOY

CASE: SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS G.R. NO. 183896 JANUARY
30, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Mr. Aa Pakistani national married Ms. B a Filipina. The marriage was solemnized without
marriage license and such is not under the exceptions provided by law to be exempt from
such license. Was there a valid marriage?

Suggested Answer:

No, the marriage is void ab initio.

A marriage license in needed to have a valid marriage. Article 3 of the Family Code states
that a valid marriage license is one of the formal requisite of celebration of marriage.
Article 4 of the Family Code states that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio except as stated in Article 35 (2)

In the case at bar, the absence of marriage license during the celebration of marriage makes
the marriage void ab initio. Furthermore, the case is not one of the exceptions provided by
law to have a valid marriage notwithstanding the absence of valid marriage license

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NAME: REYNOLD JOHN F. GIME

CASE: FUJIKI VS MARINAY G.R. NO. 196049, JUNE 26, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Mr. X is a Japanese citizen married Ms. Y a Filipino citizen in the Philippines. However the
marriage was not approve by the parents of X. As a result X cannot bring Y to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.Y met another Japanese Mr. Z.
Without dissolving the first marriage Y and Z got married in the Philippines. Y was brought
to japan by Z to live with him. Allegedly Y suffered physical abuse from Z. Eventually, Y
separated from Z and begun contacting X.

Y and X begun to rekindle their love. Y obtained a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Y and Z void on the ground of bigamy. X filed a
petition in the RTC praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
QUESTION: Is X correct on filing the petition?

Suggested Answer:

No

In Juliano-Llave v. Republic,this Court held that the rule that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court

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NAME: JESON PAGAPONG

CASE: BANGAYAN VS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. G.R. NO. 201061 JULY 3, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

X was a married man. However, while his wife is abroad, he developed a romantic
relationship with Z over the objection of Z’s father. To appease Z’s father, Z convinced X to
execute a simulated marriage contract. The marriage between X and Z did not end up well
resulting to X filling a declaration of nullity of their marriage. He alleges that the marriage is
void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Is the marriage void?

Suggested Answer:

Yes. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between X and Z was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section
3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between X and Z
was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."

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NAME: ANNA BEATRICE QUIJANO

CASE: YASUO IWASAWA VS FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, GR 204169, SEPT 11, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Saitama, a Japanese national, met Josefina in one of his visits to the Philippines. Josefina
introduced herself as “single” and “never married before”. As their relationship
progressed, they both decided to tie the knot and resided in Japan after their marriage.
Josefina later on confessed to Saitama that she received news that her previous husband
passed away. This prompted Saitama to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to
Josefina as null and void on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. During trial, aside
from his testimony, Saitama also offered in evidence the Certificate of Marriage between
Josefina and Pedro issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO). The court ruled that there
was insufficient evidence to prove Josefina’s prior existing valid marriage to another man
because he did not present the records custodian of the NSO. Is the ruling of the court
tenable?

Suggested Answer:

No, the ruling of the court is untenable. There is no question that the documentary evidence
submitted by Saitama is a public document.

As provided in the Civil Code, Article 410: The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. Thus, the court erred when it disregarded said documents
on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who
issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity
and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.

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NAME : ANNA DANESSA VALDEZ

CASE : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS G.R. NO. 198780
, OCTOBER 16, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC : MARRIAGE

Question:

Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios, a Filipina were married before MeTC Judge Calo.
Subsequently, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. a) Is a marriage
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent? b) Can the marriage be
considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45(3) of the Family Code?

Suggested Answer:

a) No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.

Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render
a marriage void ab initio.

For consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.
In the case at bar, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.

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b) No. Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conviction
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud
as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose
of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured
or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

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NAME: LORENZ MARTIN M. LERIN

CASE: REPUBLIC VS. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, G.R. 171557, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Ace and Bea were married. Ace filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that Bea sold their conjugal home, cohabited and sired a child with Xavier, and married a
second time with York. Ace and Bea submitted to a psychiatric evaluation conducted by
Zero. Zero reports that both Ace and Bea were psychologically incapacitated because both
were emotionally immature and that their mental condition was present at the time of
contracting of marriage, even if it was shown after its celebration. The RTC declared their
marriage void due to psychological incapacity.

Will the emotional immaturity of one of the parties serve as a sufficient ground to declare
the marriage void due to psychological incapacity? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

No.

As a rule, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity that
cause a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. The law confines psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage.

Under jurisprudence, it was held that emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not
be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which makes a party completely unable to
discharge the essential marital obligations.

In this case, there is lack of factual or legal basis to conclude that Bea’s emotional
immaturity can be equated with psychological incapacity. Hence, emotional immaturity is
not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage void due to psychological incapacity.

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NAME: ROSLYN D. CORTES

CASE: RENE RONULO, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 182438, JULY 02, 2014
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE, SOLEMNIZATION

Question:

JU and CB were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church. The church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of
a marriage license. With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they
headed to an Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, RR, conducted a ceremony on the
same day where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. Did
RR violate Article 352 of the RPC?

Suggested Answer:

YES.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: 

1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and 

2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

The first element is present since RR he has authority to solemnize a marriage. The second
element is present since the alleged "blessing" by RR is tantamount to the performance of
an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6
of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: 
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and 
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife.

The first requirement is present. The second requirement is likewise present since the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. RR is
guilty of violating Article 352.

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NAME: RALPH KEVIN H. SANTILLAN

CASE: CELERINA J. SANTOS, PETITIONER, V. RICARDO T. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE; PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

Question:

X filed a petition with the RTC for declaration of presumptive death of her spouse who has
allegedly been absent for 12 years for the purpose of remarrying. RTC declared Y as
presumptively dead. Y, the wife, upon knowing the said petition, filed an action for
annulment of judgment with CA stating that she has never been absent and it was X who
left the conjugal dwelling to live with another woman. CA dismissed Y’s petition for being a
wrong remedy, stating further that Y should’ve filed a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. Y
argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would
not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
declaring her presumptive death. However CA stated that the Family Code provides the
presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by
mere reappearance. Is CA correct?

Suggested Answer:

No. CA is not correct.

Under the law, termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to the
following conditions:

(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it

void ab initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.

In the case at bar, Y is correct in her remedy of annulment of judgment since what is sought
by Y is to nullify not only the subsequent marriage which CA argued that a mere affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code can terminate said marriage, but also the
effects of the declaration of presumptive.

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NAME: RAMON MIKHAIL DUYONGCO

CASE: LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, G.R. NO. 171914, JULY 23, 2014
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: NATIONALITY RULE

Question:

LUNA was first married to EUGENIA (BOTH FILIPINOS). After two decades, they agreed to
live apart from each other and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property. Years later, LUNA obtained divorce in Dominican Republic and subsequently
married SOLEDAD. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and thus the former
established a law firm named LUPSICON. LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased
condominium unit and was registered bearing the name"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to
Soledad L. Luna

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage.

1. Did the divorce between Luna and EUGENIA validly dissolved their marriage?

NO.

The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.

Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case considering that both
parties to the first marriage are both Filipinos and that the non-recognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground
expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or
judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. Granting that the second marriage between LUNA and SOLEDAD was bigamous, what
rule governs their properties acquired during their marriage?

The marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil
Code, viz:Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and

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salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

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NAME: ELERLENNE LIM

CASE: TUPAL VS. ROJO, 717 SCRA 236
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Judge X solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized
affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized these
affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.

Is the act of Judge X proper?

Suggested Answer:
No. Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of
the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation
cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.

As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to
examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’
affidavit of cohabitation.

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NAME: GLEN MARVIN Y. TIU

CASE: FRANCISCO LIM, VS. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, 713 SCRA 555
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE (PROPERTY REGIME TRANSACTIONS)

Question:

X executed a SPA in favour of Y, his brother, to have his share of the property co owned by
the siblings, to be mortgaged. Y was granted loan from A Bank and B bank. The loan amount
in A bank has been paid while in B bank defaulted. B Bank foreclosed the property
prompting X to file a case with a prayer for TRO. The trial court ruled in favour of X but the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. X asserted that the bank should have
been prompted by the fact that the subject mortgage contract was executed without the
consent of his wife. Is X’s assertion tenable?

Suggested Answer:

NO.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife; that is, presumption is not overcome by the fact that
the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the
consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. This
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name
of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

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NAME: FERNANDEZ, MAE CLAIRE C.

CASE: SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION VS EDNA A. AZOTE
G.R. NO. 209741 APRIL 15, 2015
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:
In 1992 Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System (SSS), were
married in civil rites. Their union produced six children born from 1985 to 1999. Edgardo
submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their children as designated beneficiaries. In
2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with
the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that
Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 in 1982 with a different set of
beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote
(Elmer), as dependent. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. It opined that
Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage
had been annulled or dissolved. Does SSC have the authority to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage?
Suggested Answer:
No. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, it is required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine available statistical
and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
The second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the
Family Code was already in force. Using the parameters outlined in Article 41, Edna, failed
to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at
the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. She could not adduce evidence to
prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether
there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-
member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of
Edgardo.

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NAME: CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ

CASE: GLENN VIŇAS VS MARY GRACE PAREL- VIŇAS GR. NO. 208790

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

Petitioner Glenn and respondent Mary Grace got married in civil rites. Respondent was
already pregnant then. However the infant died and the alleged cause of death was by
respondent’s heavy drinking and smoking during pregnancy. Afterwards, respondent left
home and went to work in Dubai. Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent was not able to fulfill her
marital obligations in the family life. Petitioner sought professional guidance and submitted
himself to a psychological evaluation by a clinical psychologist Dr. Tayag, in which
petitioner was found normal. On the other hand, respondent was diagnosed to be suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits based on the data and
testimonies given by petitioner and Rodelito Mayo, a cousin of petitioner. Respondent,
however, was not physically examined by Dr. Tayag. Is lack of personal examination by
psychologist on one spouse fatal to the declaration of nullity of marriage?

Suggested Answer:

NO. The lack of personal or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist

is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

The cumulative testimonies of petitioner, Dr. Tayag and Mayo and the documentary
evidence do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent’s
condition that would warrant the nullity of their marriage.

The respondent was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to
present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the former’s condition. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
petitioner. Both testimonies are wanting in material details.

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NAME: YVONNE NICOLE C. GARBANZOS

CASE: VALERIO E. KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ (GR NO. 166357;
JANUARY 14, 2015)
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Question:

Valerio Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez were married in Hong Kong. They had 4 children. After
the birth of their 4th child, Valerio had and extra marital affair with Jocelyn Quejano with
whom he had three children. Valerio migrated to the US with Jocelyn. When they returned
to the Philippines, Valerio filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He
further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation by playing mahjong
all day and partying with male friends. To support his claim, he presented Dr. Gates who explained
on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual
mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality
disorder (NPD).
Did Valerio sufficiently prove Malyn’s psychological incapacity?

Suggested Answer:

NO.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of a supposed expert witness who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. The grounds
stated by petitioner per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.

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NAME: IMEE HIYAS

CASE: JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA V. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA (GR NO. 193038; MARCH 11,
2015)
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

X AND Y during their marriage on September 1, 1990 obtained house and lot. While X
returned to Israel to work as a domestic helper, Y cohabited with another woman Z. This
prompts X to file a case for legal separation. While the case is pending, Y sold the house and
lot to A without obtaining the consent of X. A claiming to be a purchaser in good faith states
as a defense that she only rely on the TCT which stated that the subject properties were
registered only in Y’s name. The lower court however only nullifies the ½ portion of the
subject properties in so far as this represents X’s share.

RULE ON THIS MATTER.

Suggested Answer:

Lower court’s decision should be nullified.

Since X and Y were married when the Family Code took effect, in the absence of stipulation
on their property regime, the absolute community of property shall govern. Hence, under
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the
community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in
Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and
Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their
marriage, and despite the fact that only the husband’s name appears in the TCT as
owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the

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administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void.

If the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property, such sale
is void. The consent of both the husband and the wife is required and the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void including the portion of the subject
property pertaining to defendant who contracted the sale with another.

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NAME: BARRY RAZA

CASE: ROBERT F. MALLILIN, PETITIONER, VS.LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192718 FEBRUARY 18, 2015
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC: MARRIAGE

Question:

X is married to Y and had 3 children. X filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of

marriage alleging that Y is suffering from psychological and mental incapacity. X claimed
that Y had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Y did not
know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister
was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male
students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Z slept
in their house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
Decide.

Suggested Answer:

No psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. The alleged failure of Y to assume her duties as a wife and as a
mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage.

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