Art 5. Abellana Vs People of The Philippines

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FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 174654

Facts:

Felixberto A. Abellana extended a loan to private respondents spouses Alonto, secured by a real estate
mortgage over 2 lots in Cebu City. In 1987, Abellana prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to
him, which was allegedly signed by spouses Alonto in Manila.

However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.
Thereafter, Abellana caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons.

In 1999, an Information was filed charging Abellana with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document.

During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. RTC concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty
of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual under the RPC and not estafa through falsification of
public document as charged in the Information.

On appeal, CA held that Abellana who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public
document under the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual, as
the falsification committed in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric
while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person
participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person did not participate.

Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not
necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed petitioner's civil liability. To this, Abellana
filed this case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not petitioner Abellana could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal?

(2) W.O.N. the alternative sentence imposed by the trial court to petitioner should be sustained?

Held:

(1) No. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.

When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other
words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.

Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently causes
damage to another.  Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable, it must be proven that the acts he committed had
caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by
the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto. Hence, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the
trial court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject
properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them the value of the properties and to pay them damages.

(2) No. the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an
action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages.
Sentences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences
in the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both
in the alternative. He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.

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