Funa vs Exec. Secretary Ermita (GR No.
184740) the Administrator of MARINA who will be reviewing the acts of said agency
DOCTRINE:
- The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely:
o (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
o (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
o (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and
o (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
- As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review
FACTS:
- On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin
R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department under on October 23, 2006.
- On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA
Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity
as DOTC Undersecretary.
- On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment.
- On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was
appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
- Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC
Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
- Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC
Undersecretary and MARINA Administrator. The reason is that with
respect to the affairs in the maritime industry, the recommendations of the
MARINA may be the subject of counter or opposing recommendations
from the Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. In this case, the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport and the OIC of MARINA have
become one (1) and the same person. There is no longer a person above
because the person who should be overseeing MARINA, the
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, has effectively been compromised.
- Finally, petitioner contends that there is a strong possibility in this case
that the challenge herein can be rendered moot through the expediency of
simply revoking the temporary appointment/designation. But since a
similar violation can be committed in the future, there exists a possibility
of "evading review," and hence supervening events should not prevent the
Court from deciding cases involving grave violation of the 1987
Constitution, as this Court ruled in Public Interest Center. Notwithstanding
its mootness therefore, should it occur, there is a compelling reason for
this case to be decided: the issue raised being "capable of repetition, yet
evading review."1
- On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial
inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual
controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of
respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009
and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic.
Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this
supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.
- Respondents also raise the lack of legal standing of petitioner to bring this
suit. Clear from the standard set in Public Interest Center is the
requirement that the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of public funds, and
more particularly, his personal and substantial interest in the case.
Petitioner, however, has not alleged any personal or substantial interest in
this case. Neither has he claimed that public funds were actually disbursed
in connection with respondent Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC. It is
to be noted that respondent Bautista did not receive any salary while she
was MARINA OIC. As to the alleged transcendental importance of an issue,
this should not automatically confer legal standing on a party.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are present, allowing the
court to take cognizance of the case
RULING:
- YES. Requisites for Judicial Review.
- The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely:
o (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
o (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
 case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events, whether intended
result of its enforcement; or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there
o (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest is a grave violation of the Constitution.
possible opportunity; and - Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot,
o (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
case. raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and
- Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case. public.
- Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when: - As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already
o (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
government; evading review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not
o (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the President’s
o (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. appointment or designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-in-
- The question on standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a charge of an attached agency will arise in every such appointment.
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
- In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from
jurisprudence, we held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
o (1) cases involve constitutional issues;
o (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
o (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
o (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
o (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
- Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional
prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact
that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him
with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.
- The other objection raised by the respondent is that the resolution of this
case had been overtaken by events considering the effectivity of
respondent Bautista’s appointment as MARINA Administrator effective
February 2, 2009 and her relinquishment of her former position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
- A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, as we held in

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc. vs Anti-Terrorism Council
(GR. No. 178552)
DOCTRINE:
- - Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites:
o (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
o (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and
o (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court.
- Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either:
o (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or
o (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
- Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
FACTS:
- Petitioners, made up of several non-government organizations, challenge
the constitutionality of RA 9372, “Ac Act To Secure the State and Protect
Our People from Terrorism”, otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007.
- Petitioners assail the law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad with the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the
Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the courts can exercise its power of judicial review
RULING:
- NO. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
- In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which
are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
- PETITIONERS LACK LOCUS STANDI
- Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
- Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary summarized
the rule on locus standi, thus:
o Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.
- The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
- A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
- For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it
must show that
o (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government,
o (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
o (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
- Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
- The court that transcendental public importance dispenses with the
requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different
genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal
interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
- Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
- KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners
in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
 "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their
offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that
they have been branded as "enemies of the State."
- Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
- BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-
organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial
notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law.The petition of BAYAN-ST,
et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
- The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.
- Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites:
o (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
o (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and
o (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court.
- The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either:
o (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or
o (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
- Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.  -
- No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of
judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been
filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim
of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging.
- The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No.
178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and
NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization
and members.
- While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist
organization, the United States of America (US) and the European
Union (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement
of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to
declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three
years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations
have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
- Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-
list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiñ o, Rafael Mariano
and Luzviminda Ilagan, urged the government to resume peace
negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of
which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU
as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the
Aquino Administration  of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the
government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription
of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
- More important, there are other parties not before the Court
with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised. Of
recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under
Section 17 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan
Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group. Petitioner-
organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
- Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as
taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen
standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
- PETITIONERS FAIL TO PRESENT AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.
- Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
- As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission. the Court ruled that the power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
- An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest
the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
- Herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA
9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to
do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and
existing one.
- Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly
being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to
render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
- Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated
reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.
- The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to
take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.

Imbong vs Ochoa (GR No. 204819)
DOCTRINE:
- An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest
the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is
that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy
must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and
a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
FACTS:
- Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress on December 21, 2012.
- Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law
- Respondents claim there is no actual case or controversy and therefor the
issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the court can exercise the power of judicial review over the
controversy
RULING:
- YES. OSG asserts that the court should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress.The OSG posits that the authority of the Court
to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since
the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional
policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress. It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in
Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the
validity of the acts of the legislature.
- Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot
prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.
- It is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and
accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere
- The Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed
by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority,
but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it
may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in
the Constitution.
- In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of
review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind
of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of
social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the
earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the
legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their
collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of
them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.
- Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
o Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
- The Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete
with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz :
o (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
o (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
 o (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
o (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota(cause
or motivation of a legal action) of the case.
- ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY – Respondents claim that there is no
actual case or controversy because the RH Law is yet to be implemented
and no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and there
is no showing that any of the petitioners’ rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.
- An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.
- In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it
is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As
stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
- Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly
public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter NOW.

Belgica vs Exec. Secretary (GR No. 208566)
DOCTRINE:
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
- "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."
- Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
- "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a
result of the challenged action."
POLITICAL QUESTION
- A political question refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
- The courts have no jurisdiction over political questions.
FACTS:
- In 2013, petitioners assail the PDAF or “Pork Barrel Fund”, the Executive’s
lump-sum, discretionary finds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE/s:
- 1) Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an
actual and justiciable controversy
- 2) Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review
- 3) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to sue
RULING:
- The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case
1) YES. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is
an actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
- Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.
- In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."
- Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
- "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."
- "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or
moot questions."
- Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual
and justiciable controversy in these cases.
- The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for
their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence,
there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
- As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken
by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits. 
- Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said
reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article
 which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing.
- Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the
PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its
legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a
law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing
law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
- Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates
that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide
cases, otherwise moot, if:
o first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
o second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
o third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and
o fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
- The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental
posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of
powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.
- The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature
of the interests involved– the constitutionality of the very system
within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time
when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous
whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are
needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a
prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the
matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as
not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v.
CoA, a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of
irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
- The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
- It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation
of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
x x x.
- Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under
the CoA Report to be sufficient.
- The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the
practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As
disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation,
Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed
out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.
Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution
of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that
the government may be guided on how public funds should be
utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
- Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the
recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The relevance of
the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF
-free budget for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its
multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance
of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing
a different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had
already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the
"capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent
similar questions from re- emerging." The situation similarly holds true to
these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which
certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time,
are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

2) MATTERS OF POLICY: THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE.
Respondents claim it is a political question and cannot be subject to
judicial review. NO, they are.
- The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude
into areas committed to the other branches of
government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of
the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of
Baker v. Carr, applies when there is found, among others, "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that
the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific
demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose
a solution at this stage."
- The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
- Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present
political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve.
- A political question refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure."
- The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional
lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
- More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty
to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."
- In Estrada v. Desierto, the expanded concept of judicial power under the
1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was
explained as follows:
o To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach
of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of
the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x
x (Emphases supplied)
- It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." 
- To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty.
Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these
cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two
other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are
erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of
the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to
the problems of society.
- For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial
restraint.
3) LOCUS STANDI. YES, they have standing.
- "The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has
no standing."
- Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to
the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess
the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork
Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers,
are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if
the Court so rules.
- Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
- Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified
as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest." The CoA
Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls” amplifies, in addition to the matters above-
discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is
the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute.
- All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition vs Lim (GR No. 119775)
DOCTRINE:
- An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.
The controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal
relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse
legal interests.
FACTS:
- R.A. No. 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," which was enacted setting out the policy of the
government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into
alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947
Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely,
the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions
including the Camp John Hay Station in the City of Baguio.
- It created public respondent Bases Conversion and Development
Authority2 (BCDA), and the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone
(Subic SEZ). Also the said law granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging
from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from
local and national taxes.
- On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and
Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd
(TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD),
preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of
Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations
and recreation centers. Four months later, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD
executed a Joint Venture Agreement whereby they bound themselves to
put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International
Development and Management Corporation.
- Meanwhile, the Baguio City government passed a number of resolutions in
response to the actions taken by BCDA in their MOA and as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay. One of which is Resolution No. 255,
seeking and supporting the issuance by then President Ramos of a
presidential proclamation declaring an area of 288.1 hectares of the camp
as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
- On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which
established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay, and in effect, granted tax
exemptions pursuant to R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ extends to other SEZs.
- The petitioners now allege that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant
of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the
grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and investment incentives
to the therein established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the
John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28
(4) of the Constitution which provides that "No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress."
- On the other hand, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay
SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which
was established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely
implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military
bases into hubs of business activity or investment. They underscore the
point that the government's policy of bases conversion can not be achieved
without extending the same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to
Subic SEZ to other SEZs.
- Respondent also claim that petitioners have no locus standi and that there
is no actual case or controversy for the court to exercise its power of
judicial review
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the court can exercise its judicial review
RULING:
- YES. It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.
- An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory. The controversy needs to be definite and
concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted
against each other due to their adverse legal interests.
- There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between
petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential
proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered by Camp John
Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation contains
unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.
- R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in
the country. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of
concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal
standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that
communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its
utilization.
- Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing
the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
 government act being challenged. Theirs is a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the
question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social
existence of the people of Baguio City.
- Petitioners' locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other residents
of Bataan, specially of the town of Limay, in Garcia v. Board of Investments
where this Court characterized their interest in the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal, for it
would affect not only their economic life but even the air they breathe.
- Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly
elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of
Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their
constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a
portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,
petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against
the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the
issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing
to bring the present petition.
- That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond
doubt. The mootness of the issues concerning the questioned agreements
between public and private respondents is of no moment.
- "By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty."
- As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is
likewise no question that they have been complied with in the case at
bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional
issues, ruling on which this Court must take up. Besides, respondents
never raised issues with respect to these requisites, hence, they are
deemed waived.

Pormento vs Estrada (GR No. 191988)
DOCTRINE:
- As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to
the thing in issue in the case before it.  In other words, when a case is moot,
it becomes non-justiciable.
- An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is
not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
FACTS:
- The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection."
- Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
- Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent’s
candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his petition
was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). His motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the COMELEC en banc.
- Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not Estrada(Respondent) can run for President
RULING:
- MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Private respondent was not elected President the
second time he ran.
- Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection"
will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election
as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No
live conflict of legal rights exists.
- There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy
that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
- No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this
case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of
an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
- As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions
or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case
before it.  In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable.
- An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless
the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is
nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been
overtaken by subsequent events.
- Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation
of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus,
any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
- The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case
present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law
students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates that
this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already
been mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional
requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the
proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the
allure of making a grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to
nothing but a non-binding opinion.

Philipine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education
(GR No. L-5279)
DOCTRINE:
- As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned.
- Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy.
- When and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial
intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are
exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit
constitutional boundaries and protect individual liberties.
FACTS:
- The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition
that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and
Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of
Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth
Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that
o 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well
as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of Law;
o 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty
to rear their children for civic efficiency and
o 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative
powers.
- Section 1 of Act No. 2706
o “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to
maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and
colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate
instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of
instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or
his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to
determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,”
- The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of
Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original
Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they
contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own
and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the
other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a
memorandum contending that
o 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy
exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
question;
o 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said
act and
o 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for
prohibition was dismissed by the court.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not there is a justiciable controversy
RULING:
- NO. This Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand
for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert,
petitioners suffered no wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of
the criticized statute.
- It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative
enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the
human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility.
- When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights
have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an
attack on its validity.
- As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on
only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in
a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned.
- Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy.
- And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual
and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually
solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues
"reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play
regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues
unless avoidance becomes evasion."
- No justiciable controversy has been presented to the court. The court was
not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text,
or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some
 textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so
refusing.
- The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act
139 will fail to perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the State
prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or
adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper? What's the
power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the
investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to
civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as
petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm.
- Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the
statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's
effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to
the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course between the
Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for
complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop.
Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru
an administrative appeal to the National Board of Education created by
Republic Act 1124.
- Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and
if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention
is suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted,
the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional
boundaries and protect individual liberties.
 basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President
Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of
rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have
been rendered moot and academic.
- It is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police
Lacson vs Perez (GR No. 147780) authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
DOCTRINE: committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary
- The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual investigations will henceforth be conducted.
basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at - The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the
this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer
feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
FACTS:
- The police were deployed to arrest the former President Joseph Estrada
for the criminal cases filed against him, while a number of his supporters
sought to prevent his arrest.
- A skirmish ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ
batons and water hoses to control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists
and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. 
- Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA
Shrine to show its support for the deposed President. Senators Enrile,
Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial candidates including petitioner
Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the crowd
during these rallies.
- President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation
No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP
and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
- Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
“rebellion” were thereafter effected, including the mentioned personalities.
- Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus
with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
- Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray
that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is
resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending
warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure
orders were issued against them.

ISSUE:
- Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless
arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. 

RULING:
- MOOT AND ACADEMIC. All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of
a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no

Republic vs Manalo (GR 192302)
DOCTRINE:
- A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use.
FACTS:
- On July 18, 2003, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
filed a complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. R.A.B. Realty, Inc.,
et al.,".
- Subsequently, or on July 21, 2003, it filed a second complaint for civil
forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et al.,"
- In the said civil forfeiture cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in
its favor of certain deposits and government securities maintained in
several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were related
to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from
the public, in violation of the Securities Regulation Code as well as the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
- On September 25 and 27, 2006, herein respondents filed separate motions
for intervention, in the civil forfeiture cases, respectively, alleging, inter
alia, that they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof. In
this relation, they asserted that in a separate petition for involuntary
insolvency proceedings, they were appointed as assignees of the
properties of Spouses Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay) (as
well as their conduit companies) who were impleaded as defendants in the
aforementioned civil forfeiture cases.
- Manila RTC denied the respondents separate motions for intervention,
citing Sec 35 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture.
- Dissatisfied, respondents moved for reconsideration, which was likewise
denied by the Manila RTC in an Order dated January 10, 2008, prompting
them to elevate the case to the CA on certiorari.
- The CA granted respondents’ petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying respondents’ separate motions for
intervention. It found that respondents were able to establish their rights
as assignees in the insolvency case filed by Sps. Baladjay. As such, they
have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject of the civil forfeiture
cases. Moreover, a reading of Section 35 of the Civil Forfeiture Rules as
above-cited revealed that there is nothing therein that prohibits an
interested party from intervening in the case before an order of forfeiture
is issued.
- Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the CA in a Resolution, hence, this petition.
- At this point the Court duly notes that during the pendency of the
instant petition, the Manila RTC rendered a Decisions on September
23, 2010 which ordered the assets subject of the said cases forfeited
in favor of the government.
-
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Manila RTC’s decision
RULING
- The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
- A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use.
- In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which presents a moot
question can no longer be enforced.
- In this case, the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decisions dated September
23, 2010 by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases were all
forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening events which have
effectively rendered the essential issue in this case moot and academic,
that is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by the
Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they have a legal interest in the
forfeited assets. As the proceedings in the civil forfeiture cases from which
the issue of intervention is merely an incident have already been duly
concluded, no substantial relief can be granted to the Republic by resolving
the instant petition.

Province of Batangas vs Romulo (GR No. 152774)
DOCTRINE:
- The constitutionality of General Appropriations Act (GAA) is without a
doubt a legal issue
- The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the
proper legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions.
Moreover, the transcendental importance of the case, as it necessarily
involves the application of the constitutional principle on local autonomy,
cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy, therefore,
warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to
resolve the case forthwith.
-
FACTS:
- On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR
DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION.
- The program was established to facilitate the process of enhancing the
capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of the
functions and services devolved to them by the National Government
Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.
- The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O.
No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
Local Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate and issue
the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation.
- Further, to address the funding shortfalls of functions and services
devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created.
- For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined
by the Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal
surveys undertaken by the DILG.  maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks
- The initial fund was to be sourced from the available savings of the
national government for CY 1998. For 1999 and the succeeding years, the
corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be
incorporated in the annual GAA. The Oversight Committee has been
authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the
equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.
- The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which
were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before
the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
- Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion
for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release
thereof.
ISSUE/s
1) Whether or not petitioner has locus standi
2) Whether or not the petition involves factual questions that are properly
cognizable by the lower courts (actual case or controversy)
3) Whether or not the issue had been rendered moot and academic
RULING:
1) YES. The petitioner has locus standi to maintain the present suit
- The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
- Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way.
- It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of.
- The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to
relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the
other LGUs.
- This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA.
The petitioners constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the
automatic release to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes.
- Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of
its share in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the
assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner
standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
a plain, direct and adequate interest in the manner and distribution of the raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
IRA among the LGUs. public.
- Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive
2) YES. The petition involves a significant legal issue. issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise
- The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. For the
contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions GAAs in the coming years may contain provisos similar to those now being
infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. This is sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before
undoubtedly a legal question. another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical
- On the other hand, the following facts are not disputed: ruling on the substantive issue now.
o 1.The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF in
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted
budget for 2001;
o 2.The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing for
the allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the
implementing rules and regulations therefor; and
o 3.The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their
compliance with the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by the
Oversight Committee.
- Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal
question now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not
be determined by a trial court.
- In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.
- The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails
the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions. Moreover, the transcendental importance of the case, as it
necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle on local
autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy,
therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in
order to resolve the case forthwith.

3) NO. The substantive issue needs to be resolved notwithstanding the

supervening events
- Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of
the case had already been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA,
including the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released
and the government is now operating under a new appropriations law,
still, there is compelling reason for this Court to resolve the substantive
issue raised by the instant petition.
- Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases

Sanlakas vs Reyes (GR No. 159085)
DOCTRINE:
- As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited
to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will
decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading
review." 
President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez
and accompanying cases precluded this Court from addressing the
constitutionality of the declaration.
- To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity
to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in
the exercise of the President's calling out power, the mootness of the
petitions notwithstanding.

FACTS:
- They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered
ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into
the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July
27, 2003.
- Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other
things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
- In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the
day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state
of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 
- On August 1, 2003, President Arroyo lifted the state of rebellion through
Proclamation 435.
- Sol Gen claims the issue is moot and academic since the state of rebellion
has already been lifted

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the case is moot and academic

RULING:
- YES, BUT the court will still rule.
- The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of
Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to
exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot
cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of
"actual controversies."
- Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
"capable of repetition yet evading review." The case at bar is one such
case.
- Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and
called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through
Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, "'an angry
and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,
stones and other deadly weapons' assaulted and attempted to break into
Malacañ ang." Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of
the President's declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the

Alunan III vs Mirasol (GR No. 108399)
DOCTRINE:
- Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable
of repetition, yet evading review.  that the Department of Interior and Local Government shall have direct
FACTS:
- The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992.
Accordingly, on August 27, 1992, the Commission on Elections issued
Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the general
elections for the SK on September 30, 1992.
- The guidelines placed the SK elections under the direct control and
supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC.
- After two postponements, the elections were finally scheduled on
December 4, 1992.
- Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A
total of 152,363 youngsters, aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of
them filing certificates of candidacies. The City Council passed the
necessary appropriations for the elections.
- On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael
M. Alunan III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from
holding elections for the SK on the ground that the elections previously
held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first under the newly-
enacted Local Government Code.
- On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the
24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set aside the
resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior
and Local Government had no power to amend the resolutions of the
COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution
in question denied them the equal protection of the laws.
- Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of
Manila, having already conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990,
was exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992.
- They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine
whether the City of Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d) so
as to be exempt from holding the elections on December 4, 1992.
- The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on
May 13, 1996 rendered this case moot and academic.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the holding of the second elections on May 13,
1996 rendered this case moot and academic
RULING:
- NO. The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second
elections on May 13, 1996 rendered this case moot and academic. There
are two questions raised in this case.
- The first is whether the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can
exempt a local government unit from holding elections for SK officers on
December 4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide
control and supervision over the election of sangguniang kabataan with
the technical assistance by the Commission on Elections.
- We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to
decide the issues raised by the parties.
- For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected
in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the
enforcement of the decision of the trial court and these officers continued
in office until May 13, 1996.
- For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review. For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in
the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in
connection with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided
before the date of such elections.
- In the Southern Pacific Terminal Case, the Court held:
o The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in the
case at bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they
might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition,
yet evading review, and at one time the government, and at
another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the
Commission without a chance of redress.
- In Roe v. Wade, petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970
challenging anti-abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia on the ground that
she had a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at least within
the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when she was no
longer pregnant. But the U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as
moot. It was explained: [W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in
the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that
the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is
complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation
seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy
provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non-mootness. It
truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Araullo vs Aquino III (GR No. 209287)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
-

Tañada vs Angara (GR No. 118295)
DOCTRINE:
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
- The Court DOES NOT review the wisdom of the decisions of the President
and the Senate, , it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction"
FACTS:
- On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The
Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act).
- By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, agreed: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for
the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
- On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it
hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." The text of the
WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes
various agreements and associated legal instruments.
- Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement) and for the prohibition of its
implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of
public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as
the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of
various executive offices concerned therewith.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
- YES. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that
it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy.
- Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as
to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 
- The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the
petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution,  as follows:
o Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights ,which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
- The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to
strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in
our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
- As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will
not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold
the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought
before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government.
- We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition,
this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President
and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon
the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes,
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers.
Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying
the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs COMELEC (GR No. 119694)
DOCTRINE:
- If there is no claim that there is a sustained actual or imminent injury
caused by a an allegedly unconstitutional statute, is not ripe for judicial
review for lack of an actual case or controversy
FACTS:
- On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
- Philippine Press Institute (PPI) asks the court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government,
and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. (mandatory free comelec space to disseminate
vital election information)
- Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of
Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same
time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of
involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
- COMELEC subsequently issued Resolution 2772-A that stated in section 1
that section 2, Resolution 2772 is not construed to mean requiring
publishers to provide print space under the pain of prosecution (COMELEC
merely soliciting space from publishers) and stated in section 2 that
section 8  shall not be construed to mean as constituting prior restraint on
the part of publishers with respect to the printing or publication of
materials in the news, opinion, features or other sections of their
respective publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear from
the last sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall, "unless the
facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise . . . respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views published are significant,
newsworthy and of public interest."
- The court may render the issue moot and academic, but still issued a ruling
to prevent its resurrection.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy for Section 8 of
Resolution 2772
RULING:
- Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the
Comelec to establish a guideline for implementation of the distinction and
doctrine in National Press Club case, an effort not blessed with evident
success.
- Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful, does not add
substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The
distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and
news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be
given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-
to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.
- At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege
any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to
enforce or implement Section 8.
- PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual
or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8.
- Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional
issue here sought to be raised — whether or not Section 8 of Resolution
No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under
Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to :
o supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise
or permits for the operation of — media of communication or
information — [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections —
- is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy
involving, as the very lis mota  thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.
 DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

Estrada vs Desierto (GR No. 146738)

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

IBP vs Zamora (GR No. 141284)

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

Vinuya vs Executive Secretary (GR No. 162230)

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

Francisco vs House of Representatives (GR No. 160261)