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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma

Author(s): Philippa Foot
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, No. 7 (Jul., 1983), pp. 379-398
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME LXXX, NO. 7, JULY 1983
-~~~~~~~. -4__.
T
MORAL REALISM AND MORAL DILEMMA
WO articleswrittenby BernardWilliamsin the middle
sixties have recentlybeen receivingattentionin the jour-
nals, and as thesearticlesargue against moral realism the
idea is abroad that moral realism is under attack. Moreover,the
basis of the attack seems to be new. Formerly,emotivistsand pre-
scriptivistsstartedout frompervasivefeaturesof moral language to
draw a contrastbetweenmoral judgments and descriptionsof the
world; but the latterday anti-realismbases itselfratheron a set of
special cases: those in which moral judgmentsseem to collide. The
suggestionis thatmoral realismor cognitivism(which are not here
distinguished)cannot do justice to the factsof moral dilemma or
conflict.So in "Ethical Consistency"' Williams insisted that the
feelings we have in situations of moral conflict show that the
"structure"of moral judgmentsis unlike thatof assertionsexpress-
ing beliefs.In "Consistencyand Realism"2 he argued that we can
tolerateinconsistencyin moral principlesthough not in assertions,
and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the
latter but not of the formerto reflectan "independent order of
things."
I shall suggestthatin each of his papers Williams' main line of
argumentis mistaken. Much of what he says in "Ethical Consis-
tency" about moral conflicts not being resolvable "without re-
mainder" seems to me to be true,but in no way inimical to moral
This paper was writtenat the CenterforAdvancedStudyin the Behavioral Sciences

at Stanford.I am mostgratefulto the Centerand am also gratefulforfinancialsup-
port fromthe AndrewMellon Foundation, and fora Fellowship fromthe National
Endowment for the Humanities. Dagfinn Follesdal, Hans Kamp, JerroldKatz,
WarrenQuinn, David Sachs and Richard Watsonhave all helped me by readingand
commentingon various drafts.
I Proceedingsof the Aristotelian
Society,XXIX (1965).
2Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, xi (1966). Both articlesare reprintedin
Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: UniversityPress, 1973) and
subsequent references are to thisvolume.
0022-302X/83/8007/0379$01.90? 1983 The Journalof Philosophy, Inc.

379

380 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
realism. Much of what he says in "Consistencyand Realism" about

the tolerabilityof conflictingmoral principles also seems to be
true,but again the anti-realistor anti-cognitivistinferenceseems
mistaken.This is what I shall tryto show.
I
To open the discussion we must,of course,ask what it is thatWil-
liams, and otherswho have recentlywrittenabout moral conflictor
moral dilemma, are talkingabout. We notice at once thatcases of
"moral dilemma" are not necessarilyones in which anyone is in a
dilemma about what to do; and thattheconflictis not thewar that
goes on in someone's mind when he is torn betweenalternatives.
For while in many favoriteexamples the protagonistis torn; like
Agamemnonwho mustsacrificehis daughterto save his campaign,
or Sartre'syouthcaught betweenhis duty to his motherand to the
cause of freedom,it is unlikely that anyone who has to break a
promise to see a friend,in orderthat he may save a life,should be
in conflictabout what to do. Yet the latteris also treatedin this
discussion as an example of moral conflict.The conflictin ques-
tion is therefore betweenprinciples such as keep promisesand save
lives, not the conflictthatmay be produced in someone's mind by
theseclashes of principle.
In situationsof moral conflictas thus understoodone principle
enjoins one action and another another,and it is impossible that
the agent should do both. Usually the impossibilityis fairlyand
squarely an empirical impossibility,and it is oftenup to theagent
to rack his brains fora way out beforedeclaringthattheconflictis
real. But sometimes the mere descriptionsof the obligations are
such as to rule out joint compliance, as when one has promised to
say nothing and also to tell all. In one way or anotherjoint com-
pliance is ruled out, and thisis what mattersin thepresentcontext.
Williams prefersto describeconflictsituationsin termsof a and b
and the impossibilityof doing both a and b. For the sake of con-
venience I shall, however,normallytalk about the factthatsome-
one ought to do a and ought to do not a. I shall treat'X ought not
to do a' as a merestylisticvariationon 'X ought to do not a'. With
'It is not the case that X ought to do a', which is of course quite
different, I shall not be directlyconcerned.
As already mentionedWilliams argues in "Ethical Consistency"
that cognitivistaccounts of moral judgment cannot do justice to
thefactsof moral conflict,especially as thesefactsconcernthefeel-
ings attendingchoice in conflictsituations.He writes:
It seemsto mea fundamentalcriticismofmanyethicaltheories that
theiraccountsofmoralconflict do notdo justiceto
and itsresolution
thefactsof regretand relatedconsiderations:basicallybecausethey

MORAL REALISM AND MORAL DILEMMA 381
eliminatefromthescenetheoughtthatis notactedupon.A structure

appropriate toconflicts
ofbeliefis projectedon to themoralcase;one
bywhichtheconflictis basicallyadventitious, and a resolutionofit
disembarrasses one ofa mistaken viewwhichfora whileconfusedthe
situation.Such an approachmustbe inherent in purelycognitive ac-
countsof thematter;sinceit is just a questionof whichof twocon-
flicting oughtstatements is true,and theycannotbothbe true,to de-
cidecorrectly forone ofthemmustbe tobe ridoferrorwithrespectto
theother-an occasion,ifforanyfeelings, thenforsuchfeelings as re-
lief(at escapingmistake),self-congratulation
(forhavinggottheright
answer),or possiblyself-criticism (forhavingso nearlybeenmisled).3
Williams says that moral conflictsare not all soluble without
remainderand that this is implied by theregretthatwe sometimes
feelin conflictsituationseven when we are convincedthatwe acted
forthe best. Two principlescompete with each otherforthe guid-
ance of our conduct and the one whose claim is rejected is not
simplyeliminatedlike a beliefthatwe decide is false.The realityof
the claim that we judge less pressinggoes on making itselffeltin
the formof regret,and in theformof otherphenomena such as our
willingness to make it up to anyone who is injured by our choice.
In this,he thinks,moral conflictsare more like conflictsof desire
than of belief.If I decide thatone of two conflictingbeliefsis true
the other cannot substantiallysurvivethe decision, because to de-
cide thata beliefis untrueis to abandon thatbelief.A rejectedde-
sire, on the other hand, may survivethe decision not to satisfyit,
and even when opportunityforsatisfactionis past it may reappear
in the formof a regretforwhat was missed.
Thus Williams believesthatone cannot accept a pictureof moral
judgment which as he puts it "makes it a necessaryconsequence of
conflict that one ought must be totallyrejectedin the sense that
one becomes convinced that it did not actually apply."4 And this
account he had said, in the passage quoted earlier,to be a necessary
consequence of cognitivisttheoriesof ethics. I shall firstconsider
the argumentfromfeelings to "remainder," then the factsabout
what is leftover afterthe solution of a moral conflict,and finally
theimplications,if thereare any implications,forthedebateabout
moral realism.
The feelingsthatWilliams thinksso significantare the feelings
of regretor "distress"thatsomeone may feel even when he is con-
vinced thathis choice of actions was morallyjustified-that he was
"acting for the best." The regretor distressis supposed to show
thattheagent thinkshe was doing somethinghe ought not to have
3Op. cit., pp. 175/6.
40p. Cit., p. 184.

done e.g., in breakinga promise,even wherehe also thinksthatin

the circumstancesit was right to break the promise. Opting in
favorof thesecond ought leaves theotherintact.Againstthosewho
would call the feelingsirrational Williams says that theydo the
agent creditby showing that he takes promises seriously.He also
insists that the regretsspring fromthe agent's thoughtthathe has
done somethingthathe ought not to have done and not fromsome
otherdistressingfeatureof the situation.
The formof this argumentis surelystrange.It is not, of course,
to be denied thatfeelingssuch as regretare "propositional," so that
to feelregretis at least to feelas ifsomethingin some way bad has
happened. But it does not follow thatit has happened,and perhaps
not even that the subject thinksit has, since one may say e.g., "I
can't get away froma feelingof regret,thoughI know I haven'tac-
tuallylost anythingat all." It is impossible to move fromtheexist-
ence of the feeling to the truthof the proposition conceptually
connectedwith it, or even to the subject's acceptance of thepropo-
sition. Nor will it help to argue, as Williams does, that if we call
such feelings irrational we must be using the description non-
pejoratively.He thinksit creditableforsomeone to feel"moral dis-
tress" when making a choice in a conflictsituation; to which one
would replythat this is neitherhere nor there.There are plentyof
feelingswhich are irrationalwithoutbeing discreditable,as forin-
stance feelingsof guilt about giving away thepossessions of some-
one latelydead. It would obviously be wrong to conclude fromthe
fact-the normalityalmost-of such feelingsthat therewas indeed
some elementof wrong-doinginvolved.
It is a mistake then to think that the existenceof feelingsof re-
gretcould show anythingabout a remainderin cases of moral con-
flict.The feelingsare rational feelingsonly if it is reasonable to
thinkthatgiven a conflictsituation thereis somethingregrettable
or distressingeven in a choice thatis clearlyright.What we findis,
I think,thattheremay indeed be a "remainder"in theshape of ob-
ligations unfulfilled,and thingsleftundone which it is correctto
say thatwe ought to have done. But whetherit is always regrettable
or distressingwhen obligations are unfulfilledor things leftun-
done which ought to be done is more doubtful.I shall come back
to thispoint afterdiscussing the obligations and oughts which are
leftover when a moral conflictis resolved.
Suppose a case in which I have promised to do an action a and
promised to do an action b; say to be best man at A's wedding and
also at B's. By bad luck A and B fix theirweddingsforthesame day
and I can't attend both. So one of my promises must be broken,
and as we are consideringresolvableconflictswe may suppose that
for some reason my promise to A has clear precedence over my

promise to B. NeverthelessI promised B, and nothing has hap-

pened to release me fromthispromise. I have an obligation to him
which, when I opt for A's wedding, I decide not to fulfill.I still
have the obligation and it doesn't much matterat what point it
will be right to say that I had it ratherthan that I have it. In one
formor another theobligation stands,unless B releases me fromit
beforethe time forfulfillmentis past.
There is, therefore,the possibilityof saying trulythatI have an
obligation to do two thingsthatcannot both be done. I have an ob-
ligation to do each of them,although I do not of course have an
obligation to do themboth.' It can similarlybe truethatI ought to
do them,though it is less common to speak of two thingseach of
which I ought to do but both of which I cannot do, than of two
mutually exclusive obligations. However, the possibility of em-
ploying 'ought' like this reminds us that the area of conflict-
without-inconsistency extendsbeyond that part of moralitywhich
has to do with what are strictlyobligations. Moreoverwe find the
phenomenon outside morality,since it makes perfectlygood sense
to say, when pressing business has given one overridingreason to
go to town, that one neverthelessought to be at home nursing
one's awful cold. Indeed it may seem surprisingthatanyone should
ever have denied thatI can have an obligation to do a and an obli-
gation not to do a, or that I ought to do a and ought not to do it.
Why is this harder to accept than the factthat I can have two en-
gagementsthatconflict?'Engagement' like 'obligation' and 'ought'
is an "action-guiding" term:if people did not look in theirbooks
or consult theirmemoriesand say things like "I have an engage-
ment so I must go . . . "the concept of an engagementwould not
be known. But I can have conflictingengagementsas I can make
conflictingpromises. Given the possibilityof lying promises and
of memorylapses I may even have promised that I will do a and
that I will not. If I cannot have an engagementto do a and not to
do a thisis merelybecause (i) we do not have negativeengagements
and (ii) in 'engagementto do a' thecontextof referenceof 'a' is ar-
guably opaque. I can only too easily have an engagementto do a
and an engagement to do b, where I can't do both. Propositions
about engagementsare what I shall call 'type 1' propositions. We
shall see later on that 'obligation' and 'ought' can appear also in
anothertypeof statement,but forthemomentthecomparisonwith
promisesand engagementsis to be kept in mind.
Why is thereresistanceto the idea that an obligation or ought
may be overriddenwithout being destroyed?I thinkthat thereare
two reasons.
5See op. cit., pp. 181-3 forWilliams' denial of what he calls "the agglomeration
principle."

The firstreason is thata certainkind of example sticksin one's

gullet. Suppose, forinstance,thatsome person has an obligation to
support a dependentrelative:an aged parentperhaps. Then it may
be that he ought to take a job to get some money.The obligation
produces an ought relatedto means. So farso good. But what if the
only means of gettingmoney is by killing someone? The obliga-
tion to refrainfromtakingsomeone's life-to refrainfrominterfer-
ing with him in this way-is strongerthan the obligation to give
aid to the parent, and it is thereforeclear what should be done.
Should we neverthelesssay that although the agent ought not to
kill he also ought to kill, since oughts which are put out of action
by strongeroughts are not therebydestroyed?Surely this ought is
destroyedby the superiorinjunction against takinglife?
We need an explanation of why it is not thecase thatthe son or
daughterought to kill to get the money,but an explanation which
will not interferewith the general principle that oughts that are
inactivatedmay neverthelessstand. We findsuch an explanation in
the fact that in the problem case the ought would have been at-
tachedto thekilling only because killing was a means to thefulfill-
ing of an obligation. For the only things thatcount as means are
possible actions. If some obligation of mine could be fulfilledonly
by my flyingup the ceiling we do not thereforesay thatI ought to
flyup to theceiling. This may seem irrelevant,forwe think"After
all it is possible fortheagent to kill and get the money." But then
we have failed to notice that it is not only natural law possibility
that mattersbut also moral possibility. When we say "I can't do
such and such" we do not necessarilymean thatthereis nothingin
our power that would bring it about. Often we have no idea
whetherthereare some steps we could take if only no holds were
barred.In our example killing is not a possibilityand so thereis
no question of treatingit as a means which ought to be taken to
fulfill the obligation to support the aged parent. The obligation
stands though we cannot dischargeit; but it does not make thekill-
ing into somethingthat ought to be done. Puzzling as moral mo-
dalities are, we have to take them into account if we are going to
understandtheway concepts such as obligation and ought workin
cases of moral conflict.6
The second reason why it is hard to see that conflictingought
statements('ought a' and 'ought -a') are consistentis thatthereis
another kind of ought statementforwhich this is not true.When
6The relation betweenobligation and moral possibilityis complex. Wherean ob-

ligation is overridenwe may say thatit-the obligation-could not be fulfilled.("I
was unable to fulfilmy obligation.') But while original obligations may stand it
seems thatderivativeobligations are aborted.

'ought a' and 'ought -a' are both of the second kind, are both as I
shall say used in type2 ought statements,theyare not consistent.
This distinction between types of statementsis essential to my
argument.
What is a type2 ought statement?What is it that makes 'ought
a'(2) inconsistentwith 'ought -a'(2), although 'ought a'(l) is con-
sistentwith 'ought -a'(l)?
The explanation is that type2 ought statementstell us the right
thing to do, and that this means the thing that is best morally
speaking,or speaking fromwhateverotherpoint of view may be in
question. It is implied thatforone forwhom moral considerations
are reasons to act thereare bettermoral reasons fordoing this ac-
tion than fordoing any other.As thiscannot be trueboth of a and
of -a, 'ought a'(2) is inconsistentwith 'ought -a'(2). 'Ought a'(2)
is not, however,inconsistentwith 'ought -a'(l). I can have reason
not to do somethingand yethave betterreason to do it than I have
to do anythingelse.
From the fact that 'ought a'(l) is consistentwith 'ought -a'(l)
but that 'ought a'(2) is not consistentwith 'ought -a'(2) it follows
that if we are to keep the intuitivelysound idea that what one
ought to do one is permittedto do it is in termsof type2 ought
statementsand not those of type 1 that permissibilitymust be de-
fined.So 'a is permissible'= def. 'It is not thecase thata ought not
to be done' (type 2 ought). And 'ought a'(2) does imply - (ought
-a)(2).
The division into type1 and type2 propositions,as I am describ-
ing it, belongs also to some other action-guidingstatements.The
testof whetheran action-guidingpredicateappears, or is here ap-
pearing, in statementsof one type or the other is that it does or
does not make sense to add 0(-a) to 0a. By this testwe would de-
terminethat 'dangerous' on its own appears only in type 1 state-
ments,since theassertionthatit is dangerous to do a is always con-
sistentwith theassertionthatit is dangerousnot to do a. (It may or
may not be moredangerous to do a.) If it is dangerous to pick up a
poisonous snake it may neverthelessbe dangerous not to pick it up
if thatis theonly way of gettingrid of it. By contrast'imprudent'is
a predicateappearing only in type2 propositions: if it is impru-
dent to do a it cannot be imprudentnot to do it.
From this last example we might conclude that a type2 state-
ment is one assertedon an 'all things considered' basis, while a
type1 statementis not. But thiswould be wrong.'All thingsconsid-
ered it is dangerous' contrastswith 'Prima facie it is dangerous'
and both are about a dangerousnessof doing somethingwhich is
compatible with the dangerousnessof not doing it. And type1 ob-

ligation statementscan also be said eitherto be prima facie trueor

to be trueall thingsconsidered.For instancethereis a prima facie
case forthinkingthat I have an obligation to support someone in
old age given that he is my father.But perhaps he desertedmy
motherbeforeI was born,and thenI maysay thatall thingsconsid-
ered I have no obligation to him. But even if, in ratherdifferent
circumstances,I thinkthatall thingsconsideredI do have an obli-
gation to this man it does not follow that the right thing to do
would be to support him; because my obligation to my children
may overridemyobligation to him. So it was only a type1 obliga-
tion statementthatwas said to be, all thingsconsidered,true.7Yet
we do naturallyindicate thatwe are employing 'ought' in a type2
statementby talkingabout what ought all thingsconsideredto be
done. Why is this? I think it is simply because the same word
'ought' is used in both kindsof statements,and type2 propositions
take as evidence all the available type 1 statementsabout the same
subject togetherwith any principles fordeciding priorities.There-
fore,in moving fromtheconsiderationof any type1 ought propo-
sition to a type2 ought proposition about the same subject we can
mark the transitionby asking "And what all things considered
ought we to do?"
We now have a clue to therelationshipbetweentype1 and type2
statementsabout what ought to be done. A type1 proposition says
what is the case not what prima facie is the case. But a referenceto
what it statesto be the case can appear in a prima facie statement
about a type2 predication.So the factthatsomethingis dangerous
shows thatprima facie it is imprudentto do it. And the factthatI
have an obligation (1) to do something shows that prima facie I
ought (2) to do it.
We have now seen one definiteway in which even theclearestso-
lution of a moral conflict,expressed in a type2 ought statement
which nobody doubts, neverthelesscan leave "remainder."It may
be thecase thata "conflicting"type1 propositionabout an obliga-
tion, or about what the agent ought to do, or to have done, is true.
Let us now return,briefly,to thequestion of feelingssuch as regret
or "distress." Does the truthof a type 1 obligation or ought state-
ment make such feelingsrational? This, as I said before,does not
seem to me as clear as Williams and otherssuppose.
'In his article "Prima facie Obligations," in Z. van Straaten(ed.) Philosophical

Subjects: Essays Presentedto P. F. Strawson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) John
Searle seems to miss the difficultyof identifyingwhat I call type2 propositionsas
"all thingsconsidered"statements.

Take, forinstance,the breakingof a promise. One has promised

to meetsomeone but mustinstead takean accidentvictimto hospi-
tal. Obviously one regretsit if thereisn't time to let the promisee
know and he is incommoded. But this is regretfora consequence,
not regretfor the breakingof a promise as such. So, to isolate the
latterwe shall suppose that thingsturnout splendidlyall around;
the promisee does not have a moment'sannoyance, and meetshis
futurebeloved,or someone who offershim a job, while standingat
my door. Are we to say that neverthelessin the general rejoicing
thereshould be an elementof distress(moral distress)because after
all a promise was brokenand thatis somethingbad, and therefore
regrettable?To this suggestionone hardlyknows what to reply.A
charitable man would wish fora world in which promisesdid not
have to be broken (as he would wish for a world in which there
were no earthquakes) but this is because the breakingof promises,
even when necessary,usually has bad effects.And we may perhaps
suppose thata moral man mustregretthe wickednessof the world
that contains wantonly broken promises and must regretit even
when nothing bad follows. But our case is one in which neither
bad consequences nor wickednessis thereto be regretted.Someone
who neverthelessfeltdistresswould seem to manyof us ratherfool-
ish, though one can of course imagine a societyin which someone
was held to incur shame or be "tainted" by having to break a
promise even forthe bestof moral reasons.And we ourselvesmight
feela distressthatwe thoughtrational if forinstancewe had had to
reveal a secretthatwe had promisedwe would nevertell,even if no
harm had come of it or could come of it. If the secretwere some-
thingthatits possessorhad wantedverymuch to guard theneven if
his reputationhad been enhanced ratherthan damaged by the tell-
ing of it, and even if he were now dead, one mightstill feel thatit
was somethingregrettablethatone had to do, and one mighthate
to do it. The area seems to be one of uncertainty,but perhaps this
veryfactmakes the argumentfromfeelingsto "remainder" in the
solution of moral conflictsa bad one. And it is in any case unnec-
essarysince the language clearlyallows us to use 'obligation' and
'ought' as we use 'engagement'in type 1 statements.
Against one argumentfromfeelingsone must definitelyprotest.
This is an argument,not given by Williams himself,about feelings
of guilt. It may seem obvious that no one can be guilty if he acts
"for the best," but this has recently been denied by Bas van
Fraasen and by Ruth Marcus, thoughon slightlydifferent grounds.
Van Fraasen questions the connection between guilt and what

is in the agent's power, suggestingthatit is denied in the doctrine

of original sin.8Ruth Marcus takesa line which seems to me more
interesting.9 She says thatwhile no one is guiltyexceptby virtueof
a choice he has made, thisdoes not rule out the possibilitythathe
is in such a situation thathe will be guiltyif he does some action
and guiltyif he does not, since he is freeto choose to do it and free
to choose not to do it.
These argumentsseem to me wrong, but theythrowupon their
critics the burden of showing why guilt is not like this. Afterall
shame is not, since no one has to be in any way responsible for
what bringsshame on him, which mightin Dostoevskian fashion
be his craven or dissolute father.And then there is the idea of
"dirty hands," which is perhaps nearer to what Marcus wants,
since one's hands get dirtyonly by one's voluntaryactions-or so
one may suppose-but neverthelessthe situation may be such that
no one can emergewith clean hands whateverhe does. Perhaps he
musteitherbetrayhis friend'sconfidenceor let an innocentman be
condemned through his silence. Either action seems shabby and
what Williams has called the moral "disagreeableness"will not go
away, even if thereis a clear solution and theagent is guided by it.'0
What is it then about guilt that makes this different? Since the
argument is not about a word I don't want to dispute about the
exact boundaries of the concept of guilt. It will be enough to es-
tablish thatthereis some notion offault which is such thatno one
can be at fault both if he does a and if he doesn't do a, unless of
course thefaultis imputed to him on account of some priorchoice,
or otherpast or presentmoral failing."
That thereis such a notion of fault is shown by the fact that
thereis an imputation against which not only physical or mental
but also moral necessityis a shield. How can thisbe denied?There
is a clear place fortheplea 'I couldn't help it' (couldn't help break-
ing the promise because I had to attendto theaccident victim,and
so on). Nor does thisplea simplyplead mitigation,as if theoffense
of breakingthepromisewas merelylessened.If you sufferbecause I
cannot get to the appointment I have with you, I say that I am
8
Bas C. van Fraassen, "Values and the Heart's Command," this JOURNAL LXX, 1
(January1973).
9Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Moral Dilemma and Consistency,"this JOURNAL LXXVII, 3
(March 1980).
'?Bernard Williams "Politics and Moral Character" in Stuart Hampshire (ed.)
Public and PrivateMorality(Cambridge: UniversityPress, 1978) pp. 62-64.
" A common case would be thatin which he had carelessly,or with indifference,
assumed two obligations likely to conflict.I have throughoutignored this special
case.

sorry,meaning that I regretit; but if it was not my fault I do not

apologize, and I certainlydo not have to "make restitution"as
some have suggested. If I can't keep the appointment it isn't my
faultthatyou suffer, and it doesn't make any difference
whetherthe
necessityof breakingthe promise was physical,mental,or moral.
I do not know quite what Marcus, forinstance,would say here.
Would she deny the whole procedure of refusingto admit moral
faulton groundsof moral necessity?Or would she say thatit some-
times won't be allowed, as if the plea will only do for cases in
which no grave moral issues are involved?It is hard to see why this
would be more plausible than so restrictingthe plea of physical or
psychological necessity.The plea of moral necessityis thatone had
to do a because it would have been worse not to. Since we are still
dealing with cases in which moral conflictsare resolvable, i.e.,
whereit can be said thata is worse than -a or vice versa,and since
thiscan be said no less in gravesituationsthan in others,eithera is
worse than -a or the other way around. And thereseems no basis
fordrivinga wedge between this and moral necessity,or between
moral necessityand the absence of fault. This is not of course to
deny the suggestionthat thereare some actions of which it cannot
ever be said that I had to do them,pleading moral necessity.But
this is only to say that some things never can be such that it is
morallyworse not to do themthan to do themand myargumentis
neutral about this possibility.What I am arguing is that if -a is
worse than a, then thereis a kind of fault thatcannot be imputed
to an agent who does a. Nor does it seem reasonable to deny this
kind of faultinessthe name of guilt.
Let me now sum up theresultsof thisfirstpart of thediscussion.
We asked ourselves a question about the solution of moral con-
flicts,namelywhethertheycould be solved only "with remainder."
What emergedmost clearlywere some factsabout obligations and
oughts: thatan obligation is not annulled by being overridden,and
thatit is possible to say thata subject ought to do something,even
when a morepressingclaim makes it impossible forhim to do that
thing. I tried to sort out various consistenciesand inconsistencies
which depended on the typeof ought proposition intendedin the
words 'X ought to do a'. It emerged that 'I ought to do a' is in
many cases, though not always, consistentwith 'I ought not to do
a'.
How is all this relevantto theoriesof ethics,to cognitivismand
non-cognitivismor realismand anti-realism?How do thingsstand
with Williams' argumentsfromthe factsabout moral conflictto
non-cognitivism?The firstpoint to notice is a crucial difference of

terminologybetween Williams' articles and the foregoingdiscus-

sion. On the whole he talksabout moral conflict,which is how he
describes a clash between moral principles where the clash is
broughtabout simplyby thefacts.But he also talksabout inconsis-
tencyin cases wheretheclash is betweenlogically incompatibleal-
ternatives,eithera and not a, or a and b wherethedescriptionsof a
and b are such that in no possible world are a and b both per-
formed.(He has a parallel vocabularyfordescribingdesireswhich
cannot both be satisfied:one has eitherconflictingdesiresor incon-
sistent desires.) I find this piece of terminologyunhelpful for
reasons that will become obvious as I go on. In my vocabulary
propositions, moral or otherwise,are inconsistentonly if being
eithercontradictoriesor contrariesthey"contradict"each other.
In the firstof his two articles,"Ethical Consistency,"Williams'
procedure is as follows. He firstcontrastsconflictsof desire with
conflictsof beliefand then argues that moral conflictsshare char-
acteristicswith the formerratherthan the latter,which is what he
thinkshis cognitivistopponent cannot admit. Moral conflictsare
like conflictsof desire in that they are not settled "without re-
mainder." The decision to satisfythefirstof two desireswhen both
cannot be satisfieddoes not in itselfextinguish the second, which
may lingerin the formof a desire,or of a regretforwhat was sacri-
ficed. And similarly,the decision to let one "ought" or "obliga-
tion" proposition guide one's conduct may leave a remainder
whose presenceis, he says,indicatedby moral regretor distress.In
thecase of beliefs,however,thedecision thatone of two conflicting
beliefs is true means that the other has been abandoned. So, he
thinks,the "structure"of moral judgmentsis unlike thatof theas-
sertionsby which beliefsare expressed.And so moral cognitivism
is false.
What shall we say about this argument? First of all, that the
structureof moral judgments about what ought to be done is like
that of statementsabout what is desirable,and like expressionsof
desire,insofaras all allow of the 'because of this Ox but because of
that0(-x)' formof proposition,and therefore of 'Ox and 0(-x). But
this has nothing to do with cognitivismand non-cognitivism.If
statementsabout what is desirable or expressionsof desire cannot
be understood as being "about the world" this is not why they
cannot be so interpreted.It was observedearlier thatwe may have
an engagementto do a and an engagementto do b whereit is not
possible to do both a and b, and that the decision, however well
justified,to keep one ratherthan the otherdoes not "destroy"the

other,which stands as "remainder." We should not, however,be

impressed by an argumentagainst a cognitive theoryof engage-
ments based on the dissimilarityin the matterof remaindersbe-
tween "conflictsof belief" and "conflictsof engagements." It is
usually a plain matterof provable factthatI do or do not have an
engagement; if I say that I do have one my assertion is fully li-
censed by the evidence and however it may be with moral judg-
ments,statementsabout engagementsundoubtedlyexpressbeliefs.
They differfromcertainothercognitiveaffirmations as judgments
about what is dangerous differfromjudgmentsabout what is im-
prudent.They are action-guidingpropositionsof a type1 variety.
But this, as the case of engagementsshows, is a differencefound
within the class of assertions(assertionsabout the world) and has
nothing to do with the demarcationof thatclass.
Williams thought that the cognitivistmust believe that when
two ought statementsconflictone is necessarilyfalse, and would
thereforefindhimselfunable to explain thefactof regretforan un-
fulfilledobligation such as a promise not kept.It does not seem to
have occurred to Williams that his opponent could simply allow
the truthof 'I ought to do a' and 'I ought to do -a' and othercon-
sistent propositions whose consistencyis easily explicable on a
"because of this . . . , but because of that . . . " basis. And the
reason it did not occur to him was, it seems, that he thoughtthe
cognitivistwas committedto a comparisonbetweenmoral conflicts
and conflictsof belief.But why should the cognitivistever accept
such a comparison?'2Beliefsthatconflictare beliefsthatcontradict
each other,eitherdirectlyor in thecontextof otherbeliefs.But the
whole point about statementsabout what is desirable and what
ought to be done is (for both) that thereis a class of statements
which conflict,in that theygive conflictingguidance for action,
but which neverthelesscan both be true.The strangething about
what Williams wrotein "Ethical Consistency"is thata great deal
of it seems designed to show exactly this: thatmoral conflictdoes
not imply"contradiction."It is as ifhe himselfshowed thecognitiv-
ist how to avoid theveryerrorhe thinksthecognitivistmustmake.
I conclude thatit is not "inherentin purelycognitivistaccounts"
of moral judgment to thinkthatonly one of the conflictingought
statementscan be truein a case of moral conflict.The cognitivist
12Samuel Guttenplan's otherwisestrongarticle "Moral Realism and Moral Di-

lemma" in Proceedingsof theAristotelianSociety,1979-80,is weakened,I think,by
his failureto challenge Williams here.

can do justice to factsabout "remainders" and about "moral re-

gret" or "moral distress"exactlyas well as anyone else.
II
So farwe have been consideringexamples of moral conflictswhich
are resolvable,though not "withoutremainder."In such situations
thereis an answer to the type2 question 'What, all thingsconsid-
ered, ought NM to do?' although this answer may leave standing
any number of type 1 ought statements,some of which may con-
flict with the firstanswer in that both cannot be the basis forac-
tion. I have argued that Williams and othersare rightto insiston
this typeof "remainder" but wrong to thinkthatan argumenthas
been providedagainst moral cognitivismor realism.
This has, I believe, disposed of Williams' case against moral
cognitivismas it was presentedin "Ethical Consistency."But we
have yet to look at the points made in the second article,"Consis-
tencyand Realism" which seem to be different.
In "Consistencyand Realism" Williams firstcontrastsdemands
for "consistency"of beliefsand demands for "consistency"of im-
peratives, suggesting that beliefs claim to representreality and
therefore cannot withouterrorbe inconsistent.It cannot be thecase
that two inconsistentbeliefs are both equally good. This could
however be so with inconsistentimperatives.There are, at most,
pragmatic,practical,reasons foravoiding issuing inconsistentim-
peratives or other directives;since imperativesare not about the
world. In the final paragraphs of thearticlehe argues thatto com-
pare moral judgments with imperativesin this respectis to give
sense to an anti-realisttheoryof ethics.
For a realistviewwouldseemto determine viewofconsis-
a different
tencyin ethicsfromthatdetermined bya non-realistview.... on a
realistview,thesignificanceofconsistency, and theexplanationof it
as an aim, are going to come down to thesimplepointthatmoral
judgmentsbeingstraightforwardly assertions, moral
twoinconsistent
judgmentscannotbothbe true,and hence(truthbeingtheaim ofas-
sertions)cannotbothbe acceptable:one of themmustbe rejected; its
reasonsmustbe defective; something mustbe wrong.... But... the
non-realistapproachmaywell allow forthepossibility thatone can
be forcedto twoinconsistent moraljudgmentsabout thesame situ-
ation,each of thembackedby thebestpossiblereasons,and each of
themfirmly demanding acceptance. . . '3
He gives no argumentfor thinkingthat this is how it is with
moral judgments, simply referringback to "Ethical Consistency"
'3 Williams, Problems of the Self,pp. 204/5.

forhis reasons forfavoringa non-realisttheory.As we have found

these to be bad reasons the comparison betweenmoral judgments
and imperativesmust be consideredon its merits.The essence of
Williams' case is, clearly,that theremay be two equally acceptable
but inconsistentmoral judgmentsjust as theremay be two equally
acceptable but inconsistent imperatives; there may be nothing
wrong with either of the moral judgments just as there may be
nothingwrongwitheitherimperative,and he goes on to say thatif
we do favor moral systemsin which such inconsistentjudgments
do not appear this is not because moral judgmentsare straightfor-
ward assertionswhich claim to mirrorreality,but ratherbecause
we have pragmaticreasons fordoing so. We are to compare moral
judgments to imperativesin orderto be able if we so wish to accept
"inconsistentmoral judgmentsabout the same situation."
To understandthis argumentwe must once more ask what Wil-
liams means by 'inconsistent'in theexpression"inconsistentmoral
judgments"; and when we do so we find that the interpretation of
inconsistencyis just what the argumentis about. There are two
possibilities.The firstis that 'It is wrong to do a' and 'It is wrong
not to do a' are inconsistentin the way thatstraightforward asser-
tions are inconsistent.The second is that the propositionsare in-
consistentonly as 'Do a' and 'Do not do a' are "inconsistent,"that
is in theirpractical aspect, as enjoining inconsistentstatesof af-
fairs.On thefirstinterpretation inconsistentmoral judgmentscon-
tain a contradiction,and cannot both be assertedbecause reality
cannot be such as to accommodate them both. On the second in-
terpretationthe "inconsistent"moral judgmentsmerelyconflictas
"inconsistent"ordersconflict;and just as such ordersmay be issued
so may conflictingmoral judgmentsbe voiced. AlthoughWilliams
himselfdoes not put it this way we may see him as arguing that
there are moral situations which by forcing inconsistentmoral
judgmentsupon us make it necessaryforus to interpretthisincon-
sistencyas conflictratherthan contradiction.
What should we think about this argument?The firstthing to
notice is thatit is an argumentthatcannot be dealt with in theold
way, i.e., by showing that where Williams sees inconsistentmoral
judgments we have in truthconsistentassertionof type 1 obliga-
tions or oughts. For Williams is not here arguing from the re-
mainder thatexists even wherea moral conflictis most clearlyre-
solvable-where it is most obvious that morallyit would be better
to do a than not to do a, or the otherway round. He is now argu-
ing fromspecial cases in which no such resolutionis in sight.The
presenceof this different argumentis markedby insistenceon the

difficultyof resolving hard cases such as that of Agammemnon's

cruel dilemma, an insistence that would be irrelevantif "re-
mainder" were all that was in question. It seems clear that this is
how we should interpretthe passage in "Politics and Moral Char-
acter" in which Williams refersto "cases of tragicchoice whereone
mightsay thatwhateverthe agent did was wrong."14Moreover,his
solution to the problemdoes allow us some understandingof what
it could mean to say that in some situations an agent might be
wrong whateverhe did, as being unjustifiedin whichevercourse of
action he took, in spite of thefactthata rightchoice did not exist,
and even wherefaultcould not be imputed to him forbeing in this
situation. It is as if the agent made the wrong choice although the
rightchoice does not exist. The thoughtremainspuzzling, but the
picturecan be somewhatfilledin, I suppose, by thinkingof a sub-
ject to whom conflictingordersare issued, and who is penalized by
theauthoritiesfordisobeyingone orderor fordisobeyingtheother,
whicheverit is that he does. Perhaps we sometimesthinkof our-
selves as if we were in this position vis a vis "the moral law" and
are confirmedin this idea by the discomfortswe sufferin certain
cases of hard choice.
We see thenthatWilliams' new argumentagainst the moral real-
ist-the one that startsfromhard-to-resolvecases-cannot be met
in the old way and cannot be dismissed out of hand as
unintelligible.
Nor is thereany reason to deny the assumption that theresome-
timesare cases of irresolvableconflictbetweenmoral principlesor
values. Bas van Fraassen writesof irresolvablemoral conflictsay-
ing "By this I mean a conflictbetweenwhat ought to be for one
reason and what ought to be foranother reason, which cannot be
resolved in termsof one reason overridinganother,or one law or
authorityor value being higherthan another."15 And he also refers
to Sartre'scontention"that no ethical systemcan resolveall moral
dilemmas" 16 and to the possibility that thereare cases in which
"our morality'sguidance is ambiguous, inconsistent,or absent al-
together."17 Marcus writes,in the same vein, ". . . it would appear
that however strong our wills and complete our knowledge we
might be faced with a moral choice in which thereare no moral
grounds forfavoringdoing x over y. 18
4 Hampshire (ed.) Privateand Public Morality,p. 61.

5van Fraassen,op. cit., p. 8.
'6Ibid., p. 10.
'7Ibid., pp. 11/12.
18
Marcus, op. cit., p. 125.

I do not thinkthatthereis any reason to denyincommensurabil-

ity of the kind spoken of by van Fraassen and Marcus, as also by
David Wiggins when he writes"It seems that in the sphere of the
practical we may know forcertainthatthereexist absolutelyunde-
cidable questions-e.g., cases wherethe situationis so appalling or
thechoices are so gruesomethatnothingcould count as thereason-
able practicalanswer."19Whetherundecidabilityexistsparticularly
in situationswhere the alternativesare ghastlyI am not so sure. It
certainlyisn't thecase thatthereare neverbetterand worsealterna-
tives here, and it is perhaps particularlyimportantto hang on to
this fact, given the temptationto think "The choices are all so
awful moralityreally doesn't tell me what to do" just because the
going is especiallyrough. For all I know theremay be just as much
undecidabilityin small moral matters,or where the choice is be-
tween goods rather than evils, only it doesn't worryus and we
don't notice it so much.
It is noticeable thatalthough van Fraassen,Marcus,and Wiggins
all make referencesto irresolvablemoral conflictstheydifferfrom
Williams in thattheydo not seem to draw any anti-cognitivist con-
clusion fromtheirobservations.The question therefore arises as to
whetherWilliams has some special assumption which makes him
think such a conclusion irresistible?And whether,if so, his argu-
ment can be undermined by challenging this assumption? The
answer to both these questions is affirmative.Williams must be
making thecrucial and questionable assumption thatin cases of ir-
resolvable moral dilemma, where the application of one principle
would give thejudgment'thereis strongerreason morallyspeaking
to do a than to do b' and the other'. . . to do b than to do a', and
thereis no way of resolvingthe issue in favorof one ratherthan the
other,both judgments have to be affirmed.This must be what he
means when he speaks of both as "firmlydemanding acceptance."
For as I have suggested the new argument in "Consistency and
Realism"-the one that is based on the existence of irresolvable
moral conflict-depends on the idea thatcontradictory affirmation
has to be avoided by a shiftfromthe cognitive to the imperatival
mode. And the need arises only if joint affirmationis indeed in
question.
What we must ask, therefore, is whetherin cases of irresolvable
moral conflictwe have to back both thejudgment in favorof a and
thejudgment in favorof b, although doing b involvesnot doing a?
'9David Wiggins, "Truth, Invention,and the Meaning of Life," Proceedingsof

the BritishAcademy,1976,p. 371.

Is it not possible thatwe should ratherdeclare that the two are in-
commensurable,so that we have nothing to say about the overall
meritsof a and b, whetherbecause thereis nothingthatwe can say
or because thereis no truthof the matterand thereforenothing to
be said. The acceptance of incommensurabilityin moralitywill of
course raise many interestingquestions, such as how we recognize
it. But incommensurabilityis not an unfamiliaridea. I think,for
instance,of the impossibilityof saying in many cases whetherone
man is happier than anotherwhen one lives a quiet and contented
life and the other a life that is full of joy and pain. On occasions
we make comparisons of happiness with perfectconfidence,and
yet sometimesthereseems nothing to be said. Perhaps we should
similarly accept incommensurabilityin certain cases where con-
flictingmoral judgments suggest themselvesto us. And if we do
this we do not have to avoid a "contradiction" betweentwo of our
affirmationsby interpretingtheseaffirmationsin a special way.
This concludes my argumentagainst Williams. Let me add two
observationsby way of postscript.The firstis about the interestof
the "remainder" thesis. I should say that it is not veryinteresting
in so faras it concernsthe factthatobligations thatare overridden
are not annulled and thatthereare type1 propositionsabout what
ought to be done as well as those of type2. On the otherhand the
thesisof "remainders"in so faras it is about what is inevitablyre-
grettablein the outcome of moral conflictsis veryinterestingin-
deed. The most interestingpartof the topic has, I think,to do with
the inevitable loss involved in a choice betweenvalues: when one
really good thing which the man of virtuemust cherishhas to be
sacrificedforanother,a loss that is oftenreflectedin a conflictof
oughts or obligations but is not describedsimplyby talkingabout
such conflicts.It is Sir Isaiah Berlin who has done most to make us
aware of the realityof inevitableloss of one value or anotherin the
political sphere,as when he says,in "Two Concepts of Liberty":
The extentof a man'sor a people's,libertyto chooseto liveas they
desiremustbe weighedagainsttheclaimsof manyothervalues,of
whichequality,or justice,or happiness,or security,
or publicorder
areperhapsthemostobviousexamples.20
David Wiggins too has also recentlystressedsuch thingsand he has
been particularlyconcernedwith the rival goods that a man may
see as giving meaning to his life. In neitherauthor does the full
20Isiah Berlin,Four Essays on Liberty(Oxford: UniversityPress, 1980) p. 170.

difficulty of the most difficultpart of the thoughtabout inevitable

loss emerge.I mean the thoughtthatso farfromforminga unityin
the sense that Aristotleand Aquinas believed theydid, the virtues
actually conflictwith each other: which is to say that if someone
has one of them he inevitably fails to have some other. Many
people do not see thedifficulty of thisidea because theyinterpretit
rathersuperficially,as the thought that e.g., the claims of justice
and charitymay conflict.But this is easy to accommodate. For in-
sofaras a man's charityis limitedonly by his justice-say thereadi-
ness to help someone by his recognitionof this person's rightor
the rightof some other person to non-interference-heis not less
than perfectin charity.The far more difficultthoughtis that he
can only become good in one way by being bad in another,as if
e.g., he could only rein in his ruthlessdesiresat the cost of a deep
malice against himselfand theworld;or as ifa kind of dull rigidity
were the price of refusingto do what he himselfwanted at what-
evercost to others.So Nietzschefound thoughtsabout thepossibil-
ity that hatred,envy,covetousness,and the lust to rule must be
present in the "general economy of life," and must be "further
enhanced if life is furtherto be enhanced," terriblethoughts;but
with his extraordinaryand characteristiccourage did not decide
thatthereforetheymust be false. Perhaps we have shied away from
such ideas because we so thoroughlyrejectNietzsche.In any case
the subject seems a hard one which standsreadyto be explored.
I would also add the following commentwhich has to do with
the distinctionbetweencognitivismand realism in ethics.I do not
know whetherone will be able to distinguishthe two unless one
understandsrealism as Michael Dummett does, but if realism is
what Dummettmeantbyrealismthenit is obvious thattheyare dis-
tinct.21A cognitivisttheoryof ethicssays thatmoral judgmentsare
about the world as are other kinds of assertions-with, no doubt,
many significantvariations.A realisttheoryof ethicswould be one
that refusedto let the possession of truthof falsityby a particular
ethical proposition stand or fall by our capacityor lack of capacity
forassigning truthor falsityto it. Thus theissue of realism,under-
stood like this, has to do with the implications of incommensur-
ability.Those who say thatwherethesolution of some ethical con-
flictsis beyondour capacities therewill neverthelessbe a solution
which is perhaps known to God are realists:thosewho denyit are
2 Michael Dummett,Truthand Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth,and Cam-

bridge,Mass.: Harvard, 1978) especially the Prefaceand pp. 1-24 and 145-165.

anti-realistsas regards the class of propositions in which moral

judgmentsare asserted.
I add this merelyas a final comment,because Williams seems to
have meant by 'realism' not this but rathercognitivism.Whichever
way we understandrealism I thinkhis argumentsfail.
PHILIPPA FOOT
Universityof California/LosAngeles
and
SomervilleCollege, Oxford
THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION
P EOPLE oftenhave reasonsforwhat theybelieve,and fre-

quently a belief is justifiedby a reason the believerhas for
holding it. Ann's reason forbelievingthattherehas been little
rain might be that the grass is dry,and this reason might justify
her beliefthat therehas been littlerain. Clearly this sortof justifi-
cation requires that she also believe the proposition constituting
her reason. It is in part her believing it that makes it her reason.
Moreover,since it is in some sense throughher evidentialbelief,as
we mightcall it, that her beliefjustifiedby a reason is justified,it
is natural to speak of the latterbeliefas indirectlyjustified.More
explicitly,let us call S's beliefthatp indirectlyjustifiedifand only
if it is justifiedby one or more reasons S has forbelievingp. Using
this terminology,we can now formulatea major problem. How
must an indirectlyjustified belief be related to the evidential be-
lief(s) by which it is justified?The problem is very large. This
paper is addressedto only part of it, namely the question whether,
if S's beliefthatp is indirectlyjustifiedby one or more of S's other
beliefs,theremust be some kind of (causal) sustainingrelationbe-
tween the latterbelief(s) and the former.This question is impor-
tant in understandinghow psychological and causal concepts are
related to epistemicconcepts,in distinguishingjustificationfrom
rationalization, in assessing the analogy between justified belief
and justifiedaction, and in otherways thatwill soon be apparent.
I. THE SUSTAINING REQUIREMENT ON INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION
Our centralquestion is whether,if S's beliefthatp is indirectlyjus-
tifiedby one or more of his other beliefs,then it is at least in part
0022-302X/83/8007/0398$01.70 ?) 1983 The Journalof Philosophy,Inc.


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Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma

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This paper was writtenat the CenterforAdvancedStudyin the Behavioral Sciences

0022-302X/83/8007/0379$01.90? 1983 The Journalof Philosophy, Inc.

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realism. Much of what he says in "Consistencyand Realism" about

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eliminatefromthescenetheoughtthatis notactedupon.A structure

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done e.g., in breakinga promise,even wherehe also thinksthatin

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promise to B. NeverthelessI promised B, and nothing has hap-

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The firstreason is thata certainkind of example sticksin one's

6The relation betweenobligation and moral possibilityis complex. Wherean ob-

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ligation statementscan also be said eitherto be prima facie trueor

'In his article "Prima facie Obligations," in Z. van Straaten(ed.) Philosophical

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Take, forinstance,the breakingof a promise. One has promised

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is in the agent's power, suggestingthatit is denied in the doctrine

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sorry,meaning that I regretit; but if it was not my fault I do not

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terminologybetween Williams' articles and the foregoingdiscus-

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other,which stands as "remainder." We should not, however,be

12Samuel Guttenplan's otherwisestrongarticle "Moral Realism and Moral Di-

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can do justice to factsabout "remainders" and about "moral re-

'3 Williams, Problems of the Self,pp. 204/5.

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forhis reasons forfavoringa non-realisttheory.As we have found

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difficultyof resolving hard cases such as that of Agammemnon's

4 Hampshire (ed.) Privateand Public Morality,p. 61.

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I do not thinkthatthereis any reason to denyincommensurabil-

'9David Wiggins, "Truth, Invention,and the Meaning of Life," Proceedingsof

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20Isiah Berlin,Four Essays on Liberty(Oxford: UniversityPress, 1980) p. 170.

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difficulty of the most difficultpart of the thoughtabout inevitable

2 Michael Dummett,Truthand Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth,and Cam-

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anti-realistsas regards the class of propositions in which moral

THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION

P EOPLE oftenhave reasonsforwhat theybelieve,and fre-

0022-302X/83/8007/0398$01.70 ?) 1983 The Journalof Philosophy,Inc.

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