DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE GC UNIVERSITY

Title: Foreign Policy Analysis

Mid-Term Examination (1st Semester)
MPhil Political Science 2020 (Evening)

Submitted To: Dr. Sadia Rafique

Submitted By: Sadaqat Malik
Roll No. #461
Course Code: PS-7217

QUESTION NO. 1: Compare and contrast the world-views of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and
Angela Merkel.

ANSWER:

INTRODUCTION:

It has been claimed that Trump's foreign policy views are impulsive, inconsistent and that they
were improvised on the campaign trail. He has also eroded America’s position on the global stage
through isolationist policies and rhetoric. By closing the nation’s doors to many visitors and non-
European immigrants, he has made the United States less inviting to foreign students and
researchers. In comparison to Trump, Angela Merkel is still one of Germany's most popular
politicians; often, she's the only one to top the polls. She has led Germany through many crises
— the financial crisis, the euro crisis, the Ukraine crisis, the refugee crisis — relatively safely, and
has to a certain extent preserved the stability of the system, while also making the country and
the party more liberal, more open. In contrast, Xi’s worldview places greater emphasis on Chinese
nationalism, economic achievement, and political self-confidence. It represents a clear departure
from Deng Xiaoping’s orthodoxy of “hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.” Xi is
certainly a more forceful, assertive, and ambitious leader than his predecessor. He has behind him
a China with greater capacity—economic and military—than any of his predecessors. How
distinctively the three leaders hold world-views is quite interesting.

CONTRASTING WORLD-VIEWS OF DONALD TRUMP, XI JINPING, AND ANGELA MERKEL:

A. ON CLIMATE CHANGE
 Trump has called climate change "mythical", "nonexistent", or "an expensive hoax". He
withdrew from the Paris climate agreement and replaced President Barack Obama's Clean
Power Plan. On the flip side, German leader Angela Merkel has been nicknamed "Climate
Chancellor" for her long-standing international engagement for emissions cuts. With her at
the helm, the German EU Council presidency forged a consensus among EU member
states on a more ambitious 2030 climate target that promises a green recovery. Similarly,
Xi Jingping now believes that the Earth is our shared home. In recent months China, the
world’s largest emitter, has signaled intent to strengthen its climate commitments. This is
the first time President Xi has spoken of cutting emissions to net zero. 

B. ON IRANIAN REGIME

During his four years in office, Trump has tried to force Tehran back into talks about its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs and its activities in the Middle East by imposing
more sanctions. Trump quit the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, which Tehran had struck with
world powers in 2015 to rein in its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. Playing
cautiously, Angela Merkel wanted a “political solution” to US-Iran tussle and made a plea
for the international community to band together to peacefully resolve the conflict
between Iran and the US. Likewise, Xi suggested that US should exercise restraint and
made a request that Iran nuclear deal should be fully implemented and respected, as it is
of crucial importance for peace and stability in the Middle East and non-proliferation.

C. ON MIDDLE EAST

In its essence, Trump’s Mideast gambit was to align the United States with Israel, Saudi
Arabia and other Arab Sunni states, then join with them in a relentless campaign against
Shiite Iran. Opposingly, defining Merkel’s legacy in the Middle East is tricky, because of
how low-profile she has been on foreign policy. China has focused on building economic
exchanges with countries in the region and avoided taking sides in the conflicts.

D. ON NORTH KOREA

Indeed, as president, Donald Trump devoted a lot of time to it in his first two years in
office, initially trading insults with the dictator Kim Jong Un, whom he nicknamed "Little
Rocket Man," and eventually praising his North Korean counterpart by saying Kim had
written him a "very beautiful letter." The two met in person three times, including two
formal summits, feeding optimism that there could be a lasting rapprochement between
the countries and that North Korea might even abandon its nuclear program — to no avail
in the end. Later in Japan, Angela Merkel warned against handling North Korea naively.
Unlike its predecessor, which regarded the prevention of the collapse of the North Korean
regime as the top priority of China's Korea policy, the Xi Jingping leadership regards the
preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as the top priority of its Korea
 policy, for the outbreak of a war on the Korean Peninsula could seriously undermine
China's security interest by embroiling it in an unwanted war.

E. ON AFGHANISTAN

There had been hope that Afghanistan could come a little closer to peace under Trump. In
February 2020, the Taliban signed an agreement with the United States that could bring its
nearly two-decade fight against the internationally recognized government to an end. The
idea was that the United States would withdraw troops if the Taliban were to cut ties with
terror groups. Yet the security situation in Afghanistan is as fragile as ever. However,
Merkel has warned against the hasty withdrawal of forces from the Afghanistan. Xi
Jingping congratulated Afghanistan on the 100th anniversary of its independence and
wished Afghanistan an early restoration of peace, stability and development. Xi Jingping
pointed out that China and Afghanistan are neighboring countries that enjoy traditional
friendship and strategic cooperative partners. The Chinese side is willing to, together with
the Afghan side, constantly deepen the mutually beneficial cooperation in various sectors
within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, steadily advance practical
cooperation projects in economy and trade, and support the two countries' enterprises in
strengthening cooperation based on the principles of mutual benefit and win-win results.

F. ON SOUTH-ASIA (PARTICULARLY PAKISTAN AND INDIA)

Trump’s policy towards the two sub-continental powers reflects his transactional world
view and is based on an understanding of the strategic utility and constraints
encompassing United States-Pakistan and United States-India relations. The importance of
Pakistan, due to its geostrategic location and influence over the Taliban, has heightened
because of Trump’s political goal to end the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The United States’
recent reset of relations with Pakistan has negatively affected India’s interests in the
region, as well as raised questions about U.S.-India bilateral ties. Trump’s indifference for
India’s concerns, from the peace process in Afghanistan to demands for a de-hyphenated
U.S. foreign policy approach vis-a-vis India and Pakistan in South Asia and beyond, are
suggestive of a major ambivalence towards India. German Chancellor Angela Merkel paid a
three-day visit to India to seek ways to strengthen bilateral economic and strategic ties.
China's policy towards South Asia has been a combination of unique bilateral relationships,
characterized by economic opportunities, territorial disputes, security challenges,
containing Indian power and resisting American influence. China is containing India's
influence and power by strengthening Pakistan's strategic and military capabilities. Its’
flagship project, CPEC, is the striking example. While solidifying the traditional bond with
Pakistan, China remains focused on enhancing its influence with Bangladesh, Nepal,
Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

G. ON TRADE WAR
 Trump's economic strategy of trying to reduce the trade deficit by slapping tariffs on
Chinese goods led to an escalation of punitive duties. German Chancellor Angela Merkel
said during a visit to Beijing that the China-U.S. trade war was affecting the whole world
and she hoped it would be resolved soon. She welcomed all Chinese investments with the
exception of few involving critical infrastructure during trade war. Beijing called for a more
constructive approach to an open global economy, and hit out at "Washington’s
protectionism" under Trump.

H. ON OBOR (ONE BELT ONE ROAD) INITIATIVE

United States shares the concern of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for
China-led regional development and military expansion. Under President Donald J. Trump,
Washington has raised alarm over Beijing’s actions, but it has struggled to offer
governments in the region a more appealing economic vision. Merkel cautiously
supported US’ position on OBOR. However, Xi has time and again reassured the Europe
that cooperation is greater than competition.

I. ON COVID-19 PANDEMIC

President Donald Trump has repeatedly lied about the coronavirus pandemic and the
country’s preparation for this once-in-a-generation crisis. However, Merkel's handling of
the coronavirus crisis has revitalized her reputation as a science savvy and reasoned leader
at a time when she was set to become a sort of lame duck chancellor. Beijing acted in an
open and transparent manner, and that it had taken concrete efforts that helped save tens
of millions of lives around the world during the pandemic.

CONCLUSION:

To sum up, the president Trump has planted his flag in global politics. His actions will have a long-
lasting impact on Afghanistan, Syria and the Gulf region in particular — but he hasn't
accomplished all that he had pledged. He looked to China in a zero-sum game. Merkel’s style of
government has been characterized by pragmatism, although critics have decried her approach as
the absence of a clear stance and ideology. She demonstrated her willingness to adopt the
positions of her political opponents if they proved to be sensible and popular. Under the
leadership of Xi Jinping, a paradigmatic shift has been witnessed in China’s foreign policy goals
from geopolitical interests to economic ones towards the international community.
QUESTION NO.3: What is the difference between complex and simple learning? Answer with
reference to the examples of Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu concerning a two-state
solution for Israel and Palestine.

ANSWER:

INTRODUCTION:

In foreign policy learning, internal learning consists of simple and complex learning. Complex
learning is the adoption of new goals while simple learning is a change in means but not goals.
Sharon’s leadership qualities regarding the state of Palestine is the classic example of complex
learning, whereas Netanyahu’s policies depict simple learning in process. Sharon and Netanyahu
both spent the bulk of their political career within the right-wing Likud party, which has always
firmly opposed the Palestinian state. Sharon underwent a gradual evolution of his position on the
problem of a Palestinian state, thus showing complex learning. Against this, Netanyahu's reversal
on the problem of a Palestinian state occurred relatively suddenly, and it had been because of
heavy pressure by US President Barack Obama to vary course.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPLEX AND SIMPLE LEARNING:

According to Nye, “simple learning” refers to new information the actor uses to alter means, but
not ends, whereas, “complex learning” entails focusing on ends. Similarly, Haas distinguishes
simple learning, which he calls “adaptation,” from genuine learning. Opposed to simple and
closed learning, complex and open learning tends to be brought about by dramatic events, such
as crises, which may trigger a change in a decision-maker’s belief system. For example, the impact
of 9/11 on George W. Bush was more negative and included a bellicose worldview. Opposite to
conventional wisdom, complex learning can also occurs incrementally in the absence of a
particular formative event. Consequently, both simple and complex learning is important because it
is a strong indicator of leader’s level of commitment to a newly announced policy. Complex
learning shows high level of commitment to goals. On the other hand, decisions made under
simple learning are mere tactical moves and lack commitment.

Explaining Simple And Complex Learning With Reference To Sharon And

Netanyahu Concerning A Two-State Solution For Israel And Palestine
A. ARIEL SHARON ON TWO-STATE SOLUTION:

Recent studies show that Israel's premier Sharon underwent complex learning. His
position on the issue that has changed incrementally provides a greater degree of
certainty that this alteration wasn't merely tactical. He genuinely reassessed his prior
beliefs as he came to easily accept the necessity of a Palestinian state.

Israeli policy toward a Palestinian state has changed dramatically since the late-1990s.
Barak was the first sitting prime minister to publicly endorse a "Palestinian state" in 2000.
From 1967 to the late-1990s, there was a broad Israeli consensus on a Palestinian state. In
the wake of Oslo leaders came to terms with the eventuality of a Palestinian state
although they were cautious, at first, in expressing their support publicly.
 As late as January 1992, Ariel Sharon, who spent most of his political career promoting the
event of settlements within the West Bank, held the view that Jordan was Palestine. He
outright rejected the Oslo peace accord of 1993, arguing that Arafat still intended to
destroy Israel, and he urged Prime Minister Rabin to annex significant portions of the West
Bank. Within the late-1990s, Sharon began to show greater flexibility toward the
Palestinians. While maintaining his support for Jewish settlements, he dropped his Jordan-
is-Palestine rhetoric. This is a transparent indication that Sharon was undergoing a
complicated learning process on the Palestinian issue. When asked a year later, as
secretary of state in Benjamin Netanyahu's first government, if he still believed that the
tactic would end in a Palestinian state, Sharon expressed his concern that such a state
"could sign a treaty with Iraq or Iran" and warned that "every effort must be made to
make sure that there is no unilateral decision"; significantly, however, he didn't rule out a
negotiated two-state solution. In September, 2001 Ariel Sharon declared that "the state of
Israel wants to give the Palestinians what nobody had given them before: the likelihood to
work out a state". Nevertheless Sharon's declared support for a Palestinian state was his
own initiative, forced on him neither by international nor domestic political forces, he
undoubtedly was aware of polls indicating that. By 2001, a majority of Israelis favored the
creation of a Palestinian state. Whilst the general public's attitudes toward such a state
had begun to evolve within the 1990s, so did Sharon come to favor the eventual
establishment of a Palestinian state.

Sharon's evolution on this issue isn't unprecedented: Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also
had undergone a change in his beliefs regarding the Palestinians that mirrored that of
Israeli society. Sharon's acceptance of a Palestinian state was formalized when, on May 25,
2003, he and his government approved the Road Map for Peace, as proposed by the so-
called "Quartet" the US, the EU, Russia, and thus the United Nations. The second phase of
the Road Map involved the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with
provisional borders. Sharon not only defended his decision to approve the Road Map, but
he also began to use the politically loaded term "occupation." "Holding 3.5 million
Palestinians under occupation could also be a terrible thing for Israel, for the Palestinians,
and thus the Israeli economy," he argued. In an unprecedented move, the Sharon
government adopted, in June 2004, a thought to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip
and 4 settlements within the West Bank”. A plan administered the next summer and which
cost him much support among his traditional constituency. He also emphasized his
support for a Palestinian state in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, 2005.
In November 2005, Sharon started a political earthquake in Israel by bolting the Likud and
forming a replacement centrist party, "Kadima," whose platform involved achieving "two
states for two nations." Until he suffered an enormous stroke that has left him
incapacitated since January 2006.

B. NETANYAHU AND TWO-STATE SOLUTION:

In contrast to his predecessors, Netanyahu doesn't appear to possess complex learning on

this issue. A lifelong hawk, Netanyahu was raised in an ideologically right-wing family.
Being the leader of the Likud opposition within the 1990s, he was a fierce critic of the
 human process with the PLO, arguing that "the Oslo concept is failed" .Until recently, he
was an outspoken opponent of a Palestinian state. "Such a state," he has written, "would
nullify the whole value of the buffer area on Israel's Eastern front". As prime minister from
1996 until 1999, he agreed to carry out Israel's territorial commitments under the Oslo
accords by overseeing withdrawals from the West Bank city of Hebron and additional
West Bank territory under the Wye River Memorandum. He did so, however, with much
reluctance and under significant pressure from the Clinton administration. Netanyahu
didn't soften his approach toward this issue following his first stint as prime minister. At an
August 2002 forum of the Likud Central Committee, he proposed a resolution to restate
the party's opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state. He cautioned that a
Palestinian state "could become a fortress of terror" against Israel. Fifty-nine percent of
the 2,600 voting members voted in favor of Netanyahu's proposal, dealing a political
defeat for Prime Minister Sharon, who had opposed this proposal (CNN 2002). After being
elected prime minister for a second time, in February 2009, Netanyahu continued to
oppose Palestinian statehood. He tried to woo Kadima Chairwoman Tzippi Livni to hitch
his Likud-led coalition. The negotiations failed largely because Netanyahu refused to
incorporate the two-state solution, a central plank in Kadima's platform into the new
government's guidelines. It had been four months later, on June 14th, when Netanyahu
stated his support for a Palestinian state for the first time. During a historic speech at Bar-
Ilan University, Netanyahu joined the ranks of his predecessors in endorsing a Palestinian
state. A month later, Netanyahu went a step further when he uttered the phrase "two-
state solution," stating that "for the first time, we've received a national consensus on the
term 'two-state solution'". In contrast to Sharon, Netanyahu's shift occurred nearly a
decade later and his shift was sudden. Netanyahu appears to have been compelled to
endorse the two-state solution by US President Barack Obama's relentless pressure on him
to undertake to do so. Failing to publicly endorse a Palestinian state would have risked
severely harming US-Israel relations.

Netanyahu refused to resume negotiations from the aim at which they were left off by his
predecessor, laying out strict demands regarding the long run establishment of a
Palestinian state: it'd need to be demilitarized; it'd need to receive international
recognition of the demilitarization arrangements; and, in an unprecedented demand by an
Israeli government, Palestinians would want to easily accept Israel as a Jewish state.
Moreover, before heading to Washington in May 2011, Netanyahu publicly rebuffed
President Obama’s stance on future Palestinian state that supported the 1967 borders and
land swaps. Thus, Netanyahu’s earlier policy reversal on a Palestinian state appears to
possess been a strictly tactical move, spurred by heavy pressure from President Obama.
Later, under Trump’s presidency Netanyahu pursued his policies more vigorously. America
also supported Israel (US embassy shifted to Jerusalem).

CONCLUSION:

In short, Sharon had showed complex learning over time that led him to reverse his beliefs
regarding a Palestinian state. His acceptance of such a state was the culmination of a gradual shift
in his attitude toward the conflict with the Palestinians that began within the late-1990s. Over
time, Sharon had become convinced of the necessity and inevitability of a Palestinian state.
Although the two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict was formally approved by the
Sharon government in May 2003, Prime Minister Netanyahu, who publicly endorsed it only in
June 2009, doesn't appear to have fully accepted the thought of an independent Palestinian state
existing alongside Israel, thus showing simple learning. Sharon took concrete steps to plug his new
policy, however, Netanyahu has conveyed mixed messages, and brought measures that are
widely considered obstacles to the establishment of a future Palestinian state. Without
Netanyahu’s full backing for a Palestinian state, the emergence of such a state during his tenure in
office is extremely unlikely.